

and other defense agencies—I might say we received comments from each of the offices to which this was submitted—in the light of that the Secretary and I analyzed with great care all of the comments. In light of that analysis, the Secretary and I concluded that the most economical and expeditious method of handling space research and development would be to assign future responsibility for the development of approved Defense space projects and programs to the Air Force. The Secretary then directed the redrafting of the directive in the form in which it has been issued and it is before you.

In our analysis of the comments of the several Services, we found that basically there were two criticisms of the Secretary's proposed directive. First was the criticism that such a move would result in overall loss of effectiveness through failure to utilize to its full potential the initiative, background experience and brain power available in the other Services and, further, that the move would impair the capabilities of the other Services.

Without in any way underestimating the seriousness or sincerity with which such contentions were advanced in the present situation, I must in all frankness point out that criticism of this sort directed to a Defense Department proposal is not new. It is also a criticism which is often impossible to prove and which has been made against many proposals for change within the Department of Defense since 1947, and will probably be made against many other proposals for change.

In any event, Secretary McNamara and I gave earnest and thorough consideration to the claim that this directive would bring about an overall loss of effectiveness in the other Services and would result in an impairment of their capabilities. Against these contingencies, we weighed the recommendation of the President's Ad Hoc Committee on Space, which was chaired by Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, the President's Scientific Advisor, and the recommendation of Dr. Herbert York, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense on scientific and technical matters. Both of these men are eminent scientists in the field of space. We also took into account the limitation on the concept of a joint space agency and the problem that had been faced by ARPA when it was charged with responsibility for all space research and development projects in the Defense Department.

Furthermore, the Secretary wrote into the directive three safeguards designed to preserve the effectiveness and capabilities of all of the Services.

First, it was provided that each component of the Department of Defense would be permitted to conduct preliminary research to develop ways of using space technology to perform its assigned function.

Second, it was provided that no space project would be developed beyond the preliminary stage until it had been specifically approved as a Department of Defense space project or program by the Secretary and myself. Such approval would be given only after an affirmative scientific and technical recommendation had been made by the principal scientific advisor to the Secretary, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. It should be noted that the Department of the Air Force does not select what projects are to be developed. In this respect, the Department of the Air Force is only another pro-