been deeply committed to the development and research programs in the space field. In changing the management structure and in selecting the administrators for the effort, the need to make space activities attractive to a larger group of

competent scientists and engineers should be a guiding principle.

The new administration has announced that it plans to use the National Aeronautics and Space Council for coordinating Government space activities, or advising the President on policy on plans and on the implementation of programs. We believe that the Space Council can fulfill this role only if it is technically well-informed and, moreover, seriously accepts the responsibility for directing the conduct of a coherent national space effort. Particular care should be taken to insure the selection of a very competent and experienced staff to assist the Council.

Not only must we provide more vigor, competence and integration in the programs which support our national policy. We refer particularly to the missile needs, already mentioned, and to the continuing need for the development

and research in the field of aeronautics.

Each of the military services has begun to create its own independent space program. This presents the problem of overlapping programs and duplication of the work of NASA. If the responsibility of all military space developments were to be assigned to one agency or military service within the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense would then be able to maintain control of the scope and direction of the program and the Space Council would have the responsibility for settling conflicts of interest between NASA and the Department of Defense.

We are also concerned by the NASA preoccupation with the development of an in-house research establishment. We feel that too large a fraction of the NASA program, particularly in the scientific fields, is being channeled into NASA-

operated facilities.

One important responsibility of NASA given little attention now in the organization, is that of providing for basic research and advanced development in the field of aeronautics. There is a general belief in the aviation industry that the national preoccupation with space developments has all but halted any advance in the theory and technology of aerodynamic flight. There is ample evidence to support the contention that the Russians and possibly the British are surpassing us in this field and consequently in the development of supersonic commercial aircraft. We should make a substantial effort to correct this situation, possibly by getting some of NASA's aeronautical and aerodynamic experts back into the field of advanced aircraft research and development. Possibly, after careful investigation, the Space Council would prefer to stimulate this work by non-governmental arrangements, or by placing it entirely in another agency.

We believe that the work of NASA would be facilitated and the task of recruiting staff made possible if an outstanding expert was placed in charge of the direction and management of each of the following important areas of work:

a. Propulsion and vehicle design and development

b. The space sciences

c. Non-military exploitation of space technology

d. Aeronautical sciences and aircraft development

IV. The Booster Program

The inability of our rockets to lift large payloads into space is the key to the serious limitations of our space program. It is the reason for the current Russian advantage in undertaking manned space flight and a variety of ambitious unmanned missions. As a consequence, the rapid development of boosters with a greater weight-lifting capacity is a matter of national urgency.

Payload weight is currently limited by our dependence on modified military rockets as the primary boosters (Thor, Jupiter, Atlas). Current plans call for the first substantial increase in payload with the addition of the Centaur upper stage to the Atlas in 1962, followed by a second big step with the Saturn

booster in 1965.

It is likely that a variety of new booster programs will be proposed in the near future, particularly for military projects. There are no fundamental differences in civilian and military requirements which are foreseeable now. If the national effort is to be focused and the very large expenditures are not to be distributed among an excessive number of booster programs, it is important that we maintain and strengthen the concept of a National Booster Program.