

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Make the Space Council an effective agency for managing the national space program.
2. Establish a single responsibility within the military establishments for managing the military portion of the space program.
3. Provide a vigorous, imaginative, and technically competent top management for NASA, including:
 - (a) Administrator and deputy administrator
 - (b)
 - i. A technical director for propulsion and vehicles
 - ii. A technical director for the scientific program
 - iii. A technical director for the non-military space applications
 - iv. A technical director for aerodynamic and aircraft programs.
4. Review the national space program and redefine the objectives in view of the experience gained during the past two years. Particular attention should be given the booster program, manned space flight, the military uses of space, and the application of space technology to the civilian activities of the country.
5. Establish the organizational machinery within the Government to administer an industry-government civilian space program.

The CHAIRMAN. One Wiesner Report was a published document, but the other one wasn't.

Secretary GILPATRIC. You are correct. There was a portion of Dr. Wiesner's committee findings which related to classified areas and that was left out of the published report. As far as we are concerned—we didn't put the report out, it was put out by his committee—I think it is just a matter of how you handle classified materials and I would think that would be a subject for your staff to talk to Dr. Wiesner about.

The CHAIRMAN. We would like to have a copy of the available report for this record. That would show to what extent you relied upon the Wiesner Report in working out your present organizational set-up.

(The classified version of the Wiesner Report contains other material pertinent to these hearings but cannot be printed in this record.)

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it from what you say, you have a working agreement with NASA through Mr. Webb, the Administrator, so that there will be coordination, and I want to commend you for that working agreement.

Do you have agreement that you will not enter into a new space program that NASA might be interested in, without getting NASA's approval?

Secretary GILPATRIC. We deal by specific project. We have an agreement that Jim Webb and I signed in February that covers just launch vehicles, the boosters.

(The document referred to above is as follows:)

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., February 23, 1961.

MR. JAMES E. WEBB, *Administrator*,
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. WEBB: It is the purpose of this letter to confirm and record our understanding concerning the maintenance of a National Launch Vehicle Program. This program comprises in its totality the development and procurement of launch vehicles for space purposes, some of which are the responsibility of the DOD and some of the NASA and all of which taken together comprise an integrated space booster program consistent with national space objectives and requirements. It is understood that boosters developed for weapons purposes are not automatically considered to be part of the National Launch Vehicle Program, although certain missile boosters, particularly the Thor and Atlas,