

Mr. FULTON. Well, let it go. If you get an answer, put it in the record later.

(See the first question and answer carried at the end of this day's testimony.)

Mr. FULTON. I want to compliment you—when you appeared at the Carnegie Music Hall in Pittsburgh lately, you were in good voice.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, I think we should wish the General a well earned vacation.

The CHAIRMAN. He deserves a well earned vacation. Now, when he comes back he has another hat he has to put on, too, and he has to adapt himself to the new environment.

Mr. MILLER. Are you going to take a postman's holiday and do some flying?

General SCHRIEVER. Well, I plan to go out to the West Coast. My wife swears that I will—this probably shouldn't go on the record, but—

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, gentlemen. If there is no objection, the committee will go into executive session.

As was indicated on the first day of these hearings, there are certain additional questions to which I would like to have answers supplied for the record.

(The questions and answers referred to are as follows:)

QUESTIONS ADDRESSED TO THE AIR FORCE

Question 1. If the DOD directive on development of space systems, dated 6 March 1961, is the right thing for space, why isn't it the right thing for aeronautics?

Answer. In the infancy of military aircraft development, a decision to centralize responsibility for such development in either the War or Navy Department might well have been a valid and economic one. Such speculation should recognize that in an era of no executive control of these departments below the Presidency, such a decision might have been stifling to the fruitful employment of aviation in military undertakings. The facts are that no such decision was made and today the Army, Navy and Air Force are engaged in the development of military aircraft. Certainly no objection exists to the use by all Services of military aircraft, but the question of how many Services, or departments, should be engaged in developing military aircraft is a valid one.

It may be stated that the history of multi-department development of military aviation permitted full and free study of its uses for military tasks. The high production rates of aircraft during World War II would have legislated against consolidation under a single department at that time of all military aircraft development. A different situation now exists. The science of aeronautics is relatively mature. The role of pure aeronautics in military affairs is firmly established as are its concepts. The airframe and airbreathing engine industries are in the descendancy and the unit and dollar volumes of military aircraft development are waning. Yet a heavy investment still remains in the departmental development organizations. Development costs constitute an increasing portion of total aircraft programs, due in some measure to the limited numbers of modern aircraft procured in our current programs. The extremely high costs of aerospace systems development makes questionable the benefits from competitive Service duplication. Careful study might determine that many advantages would accrue from consolidation of DOD aircraft development when the unit or dollar volume of such reaches a level which would no longer justify the continuation of separate departmental organizations for such tasks. The question and its broad implications merit thorough study.

Question 2. The committee finds it hard to arrive at a clear statement of what constitutes "unusual circumstances" which would permit the Army or Navy to carry out development of a space project. How does the Air Force