Secretary Stahr. I can summarize my own views. Obviously, I can't give anybody else's.
Mr. Daddario. This is what I would like to have.

grulia ski li Secretary STAHR. On the plus side, there is the elimination of duplication, the efficient use of funds which despite the fact that the Defense Department seems to have a big budget, are still always strained, and I think we have an obligation to use them as efficiently as possible.

Up to this point, the Army has not had withdrawn from it any of its principal interests in space. What kind of interests might develop in the future which the Army would like to see all the way through, but which under this directive it would have to share development of with the Air Force, I am just unable to visualize.

But I am quite confident, just as a matter of experience with the way in which scientific breakthroughs are occurring, that there will be new things develop. I have no reason up to this point to believe that if there is a new development which logically should be carried all the way through by the Army, it won't be.

On the other hand, there is such a thing as trying to bring a little

order out of what to some people seems to be a little chaos.

I think that is the basic purpose of the directive. If the Army and the Navy were cut off from the possibility of having anything whatever to do with even thinking about space, much less using it; then I think it would be a very bad directive, but the directive just does not do that.

Mr. Daddario. With these positive gains which you have spelled out, I can completely agree. The point that still bothers me is what

is the negative side of it, what has the Army given up?

Secretary Stahr. Well, it has given up the possibility that something may develop—that it may come up with an idea which it would like to take all the way through to development, but which it may

It has not given up any of the programs which it already has

assigned to it.

Mr. Daddario. Then your statement, Mr. Secretary, is that there is nothing which has been given up, insofar as programs presently on the book are concerned, but that the weaknesses which might arise are those from this point on, that if the Army has a program which it wishes to sell from this point on down through the years ahead, that it may not be able to and a decision to have this developed by the Air Force may at some time then weaken the Army.

Secretary Stahr. I suppose that is a theoretical possibility. It just

doesn't strike me as a very real one.

Mr. Daddario. I asked the question because of that. I can't conceive that the argument which the Army posed could have been based on future prospects and the thing that I still would like to know is, what are we giving up which presently exists? What programs are there now on the board which you feel will be curtailed as a result of this directive?

Secretary STAHR. Even if there were some, I think our desire to point out the Army's interests at the time this directive was under consideration were based upon a philosophy that the fellow who is the

most interested probably ought to do the work.