

not the directive is good or bad, with respect to the defense effort of this country—and I am not talking about the Navy or the Army—but whether it is good or bad in its basic concept will depend largely upon the administration of it.

Let me make one other point:

In consideration, if you combine many of the activities that have been carried on by the three Services, where then and how then do you combine it? Well, at the time this directive was issued approximately 90 percent of all of the money being spent in this direction was being spent by the Air Force. So the weight of the evidence of that one factor alone largely contributed, I am sure, to the determination that the consolidation of responsibility within this area should be placed in the Air Force.

Mr. ANFUSO. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Chairman, may I direct this to you, as Chairman?

In view of this very clear statement made by the Secretary, I think we ought to have a further clarification of the Secretary of Defense as to the reasons for this directive.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let's get through with the witnesses we have this morning.

Mr. Chenoweth.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Am I correct in assuming from the statement here today and the general replies you have given to the questions propounded, that in your opinion this directive is not really going to have any great impact upon the space programs of the Navy?

Your group is enthusiastic about what you are doing; you feel you are doing a good job; you have got a real mission, and you don't anticipate any difficulty whatever in selling it to the Secretary if it comes to that point. In other words, you don't feel it is going to have any impact on your present space programs?

Secretary CONNALLY. On the basic preliminary research I do not anticipate it will have any effect.

Let me say this:

We always have difficulty in selling ideas to the Secretary, as I think we necessarily must, because every idea we generate costs money, and it has to be considered in the light of other requirements; so we have trouble all along the line. Very frankly, the research people have trouble with me, and I have trouble with the Secretary of Defense, and he has trouble, and we all have trouble up here.

So I can not—

Mr. CHENOWETH. We don't want you to have any trouble here, Mr. Secretary.

Am I correct in assuming the Navy resisted this directive?

Secretary CONNALLY. We resisted it only to this extent—I would not use the word "resist," but we resisted it, to use your word, by attempting to make constructive suggestions that were not completely in accord with the directive as it was finally issued.

Mr. CHENOWETH. You were reluctant to acquiesce in the directive; you were not just quite sure it was in the best interest of our space program, from the Navy's standpoint, particularly?

Secretary CONNALLY. You certainly could be correct in that.

Let me say at that point, though, I certainly don't think I know as much about the space programs of the various Services as a lot of other people do, and so I talked to our people, to our research and