

it, then at that time—I think I have received assurances if at that time that kind of situation arose, that certainly exceptions would be made, or if necessary the directives would be changed. But I anticipate no such thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me interrupt right here to say it is 11:20 now. We have three other witnesses to be heard. All of them are well worth hearing. They are distinguished witnesses. We can not meet this afternoon, because of the schedule on the floor of the House, and we have witnesses summoned for the hearings tomorrow morning. So we are in this situation: If we can finish with the witnesses present this morning, we had better do so.

Now, that is all I have to say, not with any desire on my part to cut anybody off.

Mr. DADBARIO. I yield, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. I yield.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Randall.

Mr. RANDALL. As I see it, coming in late, and I think I understand it, after this preliminary research stage there is something the Navy comes up with, perhaps something else connected with the Polaris or atomic sub, that if you feel the safety of this whole thing, even beyond the preliminary research, lies in the safety valve of the unusual exceptions, you can go to the Secretary of Defense and say, "Here is something we should retain," and you feel you will be able to sell that, and the directive implies that, and the spirit of the Department will permit it?

Secretary CONNALLY. Yes, I have every confidence.

The CHAIRMAN. I recognize Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. The question is, what does this directive do, Mr. Secretary? And that hinges on a management question. At the present time and prior to that, the time this directive was issued, the method of distribution of programs in the Department of Defense was without any favoritism or emphasis on any service or de-emphasis on any service.

Now, at the level of management, it would seem to me that the decisions were made at Dr. York's level, and then with the approval of the Secretary of Defense and in consultation with the various departmental Secretaries.

This directive, after some study, to me, raises the level of decision above Dr. York's level and puts it in the Secretary of Defense's person.

First, he says if it is the ordinary routine, or the ordinary project, it will be Air Force. Then he puts a "but if" there are unusual circumstances, it will then go to the Navy or to the Army.

So it seems to me he is just setting a premise, that is, 91 percent of the money already goes to the Air Force, and that that means in the majority of cases the projects go there, but if there are sufficient reasons shown, and that is where I disagree with him on his "unusual circumstances," if there are sufficient reasons shown that a particular Service should itself continue or start into a new project relating to the strategic necessities of that Service, that particular Service will get the project.

Do you agree with that? Do you agree, first, it increases the level of decision of the Secretary of Defense, which is, to me, bad, and,