

We employed in the order of 142,000 civilian personnel. We had about 30 million square feet of shop area. The dollar investment in tools, test equipment, and facilities approximated \$3 billion—rather, three-quarters of a billion dollars.

Each one of these depots was completely self-sufficient. It was for all practical purposes a general depot.

Within certain geographical boundaries we had certain Air Force equipment. Each one of these depots was capable of maintaining any and all equipment within that geographical area.

At the close of World War II we introduced a concept of specialization. In order to take advantage of mass production techniques, and in order to use lower-skilled personnel we started specializing certain kinds of jobs at particular depots. We concentrated our specialization at that point in time principally on aircraft engines and aircraft engine spare parts (C-9).

We thought it was a real good management move.

Since the introduction of specialization at the end of World War II, we have followed a concept of specialization, up until the present time.

Following World War II, I am sure all of you are aware of the tremendous rollback that took place as far as our forces were concerned. By 1947 we had reduced the number of groups to be supported within our inventory from 273 down to 48.

Correspondingly the workload decreased and we decreased our internal labor force from this 142,000 figure down to some 66,500.

Again, I would like to reiterate at this point in time that all of our depot maintenance was still being accomplished within our own organic resources. At the same time we accomplished this rollback and this decrease in personnel, we deactivated some of our major depots: The depots at Miami, at Spokane, at Rome, at San Bernardino, and the Fairfield Air Depot, which was located at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. We closed all the subdepots and the majority of our oversea depots (C-10).

We had accomplished this job, and then we were faced with our first real emergency situation with the advent of the Berlin airlift. This imposed upon the depot system a rather significant increase in our total workload.

There was in-being at about the same time a number of contractors who were maintaining similar kinds of aircraft that we were using in the Berlin airlift. What we did, then, at this point in time, rather than to reactivate some of the depots which we had closed out and rather than to bring back on board a rather significant number of people, the Air Force made the decision that they would contract out some of this work to the same types of contractors who were already engaged in maintaining civilian counterparts to the aircraft that we were using on the Berlin airlift (C-11).

Mr. HÉBERT. Was that your first time that you contracted out?

Colonel RIEMONDY. That is correct, sir.

So starting with the Berlin airlift, then, we introduced the concept of doing some of our depot-level maintenance on contract.

Mr. NORBLAD. What is "LAS," at the end there?

Colonel RIEMONDY. Lockheed Air Services.