

With this concept then in mind, we laid down some basic ground rules for the use of our depot facilities and also for the use of contractor facilities. We recognized that we had to create the wherewithal to take care of the most important weapons—the ones we had put our blue chips on in the event we got into war.

As a consequence, then, we scheduled our so-called first line weapons into our depots in order to create and develop a high degree of personnel proficiency, in order to work on those kinds of weapons in the event we got into war. Recognizing we couldn't saturate our facilities or we would have no basis for expansion, we deliberately limited the utilization of our facilities to a one-shift, 8-hour a day, 40-hours a week operation. This gave us sufficient room for expansion in the event of war (C-14).

We also recognized that with the changing force structure we were causing considerable concern as far as our manufacturers of our prime equipment. We turned on the production program and then we turned it off. We recognized we had to create there also a mobilization base, that is a base from which we could expand.

So we laid down a ground rule that those workloads associated with our first line weapons, which we could not accomplish within our depot on this one-shift basis, would be contracted back to the prime manufacturers. These workloads were principally aircraft and engines.

We also recognized that we had what we call second-line equipment—cargo and liaison types—which had a commercial counterpart. These kinds of equipment we said we would contract with the so-called commercial maintenance industry.

However, we threw an element of caution in this thing. We said we would continue this organic contractual relationship only to the extent that it did not endanger the Air Force's maintenance engineering capability to cope with national emergencies. We felt this must be our job (C-15).

Based on an evaluation of this policy, the Air Force decided to limit its organic labor force to 66,000 people. It was felt that this number of people would provide the air force with a sound mobilization base, a reasonable utilization of our depot facilities, and a reasonable distribution of workload to industry (C-16).

That policy then pretty well dictated the way we did our job up through about 1955 and 1956.

When the Russians detonated their atomic bombs, we knew they had weapons which were capable of doing the same destruction as ours. We also knew that they had means of delivering them.

The whole complex of peace and war changed. And we in the Air Force felt that the mobilization concept was no longer valid, that if we got into another hostility we would undoubtedly have to fight with the weapons we had at hand.

So then there was born the necessity of creating a logistic system which would assure that the forces in being were maintained in a state of maximum operational readiness (C-17).

With this kind of a posture, then, in mind, it again became necessary to lay down some ground rules as to how we would accomplish the total job. We felt it was necessary to create a depot establishment which would be responsive to this new military need, and that