

program should not be halted' (p. 250). At one point, Secretary Herter told the committee, 'The decision not to suspend this program of flights, as the summit meeting approached, was a sound decision,' (p. 7). Later, however, he said that the question of a moratorium had never been discussed with anyone in the State Department, to his knowledge (p. 25). And he agreed, 'that is right,' that no positive decision was taken not to suspend the flights (p. 58). Secretary Gates likewise testified that in his conversation approving the program, nothing was said about a moratorium (p. 125). Secretary Herter also testified that so far as he knew, no actual decision to proceed with the flight or not to proceed with it was made (p. 93).

"The record is considerably less clear on the question of whether the flights were ever suspended for reasons other than the weather or technical considerations. Secretary Gates testified he had 'no knowledge' of any such suspensions (p. 125). Secretary Herter said that so far as he knew, the question of a moratorium during the Camp David talks in September 1959 never arose and there was no moratorium (pp. 58-59). On the other hand, the unpublished portions of the record, which cannot be cited here in detail, indicate that the flights were in fact suspended on occasion. On this point, however, the record is at best highly ambiguous.

"In any event, it appears that there was something very special about the May 1 flight, though the committee has been unable to determine exactly what. Both the President and the Secretary of State have said that the flight was mounted to secure very important information which might not be available later. Both the Secretary of State and the Director of the CIA declined, for reasons of security, to tell the committee what this information was.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

"Let it be said at the outset that the gathering of intelligence with respect to foreign activities potentially inimical to our security and that of the free world is fully justified by precedent as well as by vital necessity. Since time immemorial, nations have found it necessary to engage in such activities of both the overt and covert variety. The Soviet Union itself has probably engaged in covert intelligence activities on a wider scale than any other nation in the history of the world. What the committee is concerned with respecting the U-2 program is not the propriety, desirability, or necessity of such operations, but the lessons, if any, which can be drawn from the failure of the May 1 flight and related events.

"On the basis of classified testimony which cannot be discussed, the committee has no reason to believe that technical preparations for the flight were faulty or that the pilot was unreliable in any respect. From the technical point of view—that is, the preparation and equipment of plane and pilot—what befell the U-2 on May 1 was just plain bad luck.

"There remains the question of the wisdom of sending the flight at all. The committee was told that the flight was after information of well above average importance, but it was not told what this information was. The committee cannot, therefore, come to any conclusion as to whether the importance of the information sought justified the risks