which executive departments ask to have classified. The review should seek to determine the reasons for continued classification and whether they are valid. Such a procedure would redound to the benefit of the electorate by providing our citizens with an opportunity to become better informed. Members of Congress would also be in a much better position to perform their constitutional responsibilities.

The cases which follow illustrate the various points I wish to

bring out.

(1) The Central Intelligence Agency, in reviewing testimony given by a noted scientist, had classified a passage of testimony. When questioned as to why, the CIA official indicated he did not agree with the conclusion of the scientist and incorrect information should not be given out. When challenged further on the point, the CIA repre-

sentative agreed to let the scientist's conclusion stand.1

(2) The Atomic Energy Commission at first classified portions of testimony given by one of its chiefs of divisions that there was no evidence the Soviet Union was developing, testing, or producing socalled clean nuclear weapons; that is, weapons with reduced radio-active fallout. The Commission was asked whether it was not in the interest of the United States to have this information brought out. The Commission reviewed the matter and decided that the information was of interest and agreed to leave in that portion of the testimony.2

(3) The Department of State had struck out of testimony questions by the chairman and answers by a witness regarding a study being made by the Government on U.S. oversea bases. When it was pointed out by the subcommittee that this information was contained in a news conference of the Secretary of State, the Department officials then said the testimony had been deleted because it seemed irrelevant. It was suggested that it was not the function of the Department in reviewing testimony for publication to rule on the relevancy of the discussion, particularly questions the chairman considered sufficiently relevant to raise in the first place. The Department then agreed to leave in the discussion on the oversea base problem.3

(4) The Department of the Army and the Department of Defense classified testimony relating to the results of Operation Sagebrush, simulated war maneuvers of the Armed Forces using tactical nuclear weapons. The Army refused to remove the classification even after it was pointed out that at the time of the maneuvers in October 1955 a reporter wrote extensive stories about them and that these news accounts could only have been written as a result of considerable background briefing on the part of military officers. Part of the reason why the Army wished to continue to classify the information, according to one officer, was that the results indicated the Army didn't know quite what it was doing in the maneuvers. Even if this were true, said the officer, the information should not be released.4

¹Hearings of the Subcommittee on Disarmament, "Control and Reduction of Armaments," pt. 17, testimony of Dr. Hans Bethe, p. 1539, discussion of the number of earthquakes occurring each year in the U.S.S.R. and China equal to a given yield of nuclear

quakes occurring each year in the U.S.S.K. and China equal to given yield of indicar explosive.

² Hearings of the Subcommittee on Disarmament, "Control and Reduction of Armaments," pt. 16, testimony of Brig. Gen. Alfred D. Starbird, p. 1394.

³ Hearings of the Subcommittee on Disarmament, "Disarmament and Foreign Policy," pt. I, testimony of William C. Foster, pp. 73-74.

⁴ Hearings of the Subcommittee on Disarmament, "Disarmament and Foreign Policy," pt. I, testimony of Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, p. 140.