terest, where such action was deemed necessary for the protection of orderly and effective operations of the executive branch.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have inserted into the Record at the close of my remarks the exchange of correspondence between the Secretary of State and myself on the subject of the

Coolidge report.

I insert this correspondence not to make political capital and not even to try at this late date to flush out the recommendations of the Coolidge report. But I am inserting this material as a report to the Senate on one of the experiences of the subcommittee in trying to obtain information regarding disarmament policy.

There is also another reason for making a point of this experience.

The appointment of the Coolidge committee was given again and again as an excuse for not having a disarmament policy. As I mentioned earlier in my remarks, the U.S. delegation to the United Nations had nothing to offer in the way of a policy during the 1959 session of the General Assembly.

If the Department of State did not want to make public the recom-

mendations of the Coolidge committee then the Department should not have made so much fuss over its appointment. The Department should not have claimed that the Coolidge committee was its reason for the lack of policy during the period August 1959 through February 1960.

I sympathize and am in agreement with the notion that the Department must be able to receive confidential advice. But the Department cannot have it both ways. It should not publicize the fact of the Coolidge committee and then turn around and pretend that it cannot share the contents of the committee's recommendations to a duly authorized subcommittee of the Senate on an evecutive basis.

But, Mr. President, the Department of State evidently was not successful in keeping the Coolidge report bottled up. Someone somewhere in the executive branch of the Government thought that the recommendations of the Coolidge committee should be made public. A leak to the press was conveniently arranged. An article appeared, and from all the information I can gather, it is fairly accurate. I ask, Mr. President, unanimous consent to insert into the record following the insert of correspondence the article by Mr. Richard Fryklund of the Washington Evening Star of April 22, 1960, entitled "Secret Report Opposes Signing Arms Pact Now."

The experience of the Department of State with the Coolidge committee points up an important need. That is the need to have a permanent group in the Government with competent and qualified staff to work full time on problems of arms control. The appointment of ad hoc committees, such as that headed by Mr. Coolidge, places an undue burden on private citizens, with little or no experience in arms control matters, to propose solutions to difficult problems within a period of a few months. Not only is this posing an unfair burden on the individuals involved, it is dangerous for the country. Arms control policies involve serious questions of national security. They should be given the most careful and thorough scrutiny. The need for a thoughtful and well-staffed effort to map arms control programs and policies remains unfulfilled and urgent.