In truth there is no reason why we cannot be more honest with ourselves. And as we become more honest with ourselves, those parts of the world that are looking to us for leadership will have more faith in us and, indeed, recognize our singular beneficence to the whole world. As we become more honest with ourselves, it becomes easier for us to define our goals, both national and international. It becomes less difficult for us to compete with other economic and social systems. We will be striving for objectives and not merely working against something we don't like.

In considering any revision of American foreign economic policies and goals, it is fair to begin by accepting the fact that nationalism at home and abroad is the world's strongest motivating force. Against this we have to recognize that our goals as a leader nation are international in character. We cannot, therefore, avoid conflicts within ourselves since our concerns and loyalties go beyond our borders. Today, West European nations are seeking to solve similar conflicts through close economic integration which may ultimately bring about political integration among the European Economic Community countries. For their own good, West European countries are thinking more and more in terms of European community interests rather than in narrow national terms.

Whether we like it or not, today the United States is a part of the whole Inter-American Community. Whether we like it or not, the United States is also a part of the Atlantic Community. We are going to have to think and act more in terms of community as opposed to purely national interests.

In 1947 the American public and Government became thoroughly alarmed at the possibility that all or much of Western Europe might be taken over by the Soviet Union, and a truly gigantic effort was made to create a strong Western Europe as a bastion against further Soviet encroachment. Here was a national goal which became identified with a kind of loyalty to Western civilization as well as with our own national security. Definitive plans for the achievement of this goal were prepared together with quantitative estimates of both the economic costs and the economic results to be expected within a definite time period. Because of the nature of the governments in power in Western Europe, the relationship between the economic objectives and the political or basic national security objectives were reasonably certain. Our goals were achieved.

In the earlier postwar period, just prior to the cold war, the revulsion to war led to a widespread popular demand for the creation of international instruments, both political and economic, to avoid future wars; but soon disillusionment with U.N. machinery, both political and economic, set in.

The Korean war and the establishment of NATO laid the groundwork for the creation of a strong Atlantic Community. Unfortunately, we missed the boat with NATO. Its orientation was far too narrow—largely militaristic and we failed to see that Western security is intimately tied to political and economic developments not in Europe alone, but in the world as a whole. More and more our foreign economic objectives became obscure and complex. Unlike the Marshall plan of 1947 they have lacked definite targets to be achieved over a given period of time.