

In both the short and the longer run, external aid may help a government and its people to deal with their internal conflicts and to maintain reasonable stability through democratic processes. But there is no guarantee that this will be the result. Moreover, the far-reaching revolutions which are going on in nearly all of the developing countries are likely to generate continuous social conflicts for many years to come, and will constitute a continual threat to internal political instability which could lead to dictatorships of the right or of the left.

At the present time in most of the countries of Latin America, Asia, and Africa, where we are directing our economic assistance, there exist middle-of-the-road governments maintaining a somewhat precarious balance of power between those forces which favor the traditional way of life and tend to oppose economic and social change on the one hand, and those forces that seek very rapid economic and social change through the establishment of authoritarian and dictatorial governments on the other. Politically the forces of the extreme left frequently have turned to the Communist world for inspiration and assistance to establish the social and economic system of their choice. By and large, however, the leftist leaders are not devoted to international communism as such, but are rather extreme nationalists in the sense that they look to an authoritarian state for the achievement of their social and economic goals and would deny any significant role to private enterprise. The coming to power of extreme nationalist groups is viewed as unfavorable to United States and free world security objectives because (a) such governments are likely to come under the influence of communism and become active allies of Russia in its struggle for world power; and (b) they may seek to undermine the independence of neighboring countries and thereby constitute a continual threat to world peace. The latter, of course, may also be true of governments of the extreme right. Basically then, the objective of the United States and its Western allies is to strengthen the position of those governments that are seeking to steer a middle course between the forces of reaction on the one hand, and the extreme left wing on the other. Fundamentally the realization of our foreign policy objectives depends upon the success of these middle-of-the-road governments in increasing their popular support by convincing the public that the best hope of realizing their social and economic desires lies in the maintenance of democratically constituted governments and of orderly processes of change and social reform.

The Kennedy administration's program for development assistance is apparently based in large measure on the approach outlined above. Most of the elements in the Kennedy administration's aid program were already present in one degree or another in that of the previous administration, but they have been made somewhat more explicit in the new AID program. These elements are (a) the emphasis on self-help and economic, social, and administrative reform measures by recipient governments as a condition for economic aid; (b) greater emphasis on social programs which are closely related to the desires of the people, while at the same time recognizing that continued social gains must be predicated on rising per capita output, and (c) the adoption of long-range programs for development assistance. The long-range approach to development assistance stems from the conviction: (1) That the realization of economic and political objectives for most less-