

acre of cotton from 150 to 30 hours; the next stage, already in effect in some areas, will reduce the labor to 6.5 hours.⁴

Increasing productivity and worker displacement

In a hungry world, the developing food surpluses generated by Western agriculture have become a continuing embarrassment. Western Europe, increasingly dependent for almost a century on imports of bread grains and the historic market for North American and Australian exports, is now a declining importer of bread grains. Japan is self-sufficient in rice after a long and heavy dependence on imports.⁵ At the same time that European imports of bread grains have been declining, the share of North America in world grain exports has been increasing. U.S. exports are increasingly being diverted from historic markets to the hungry areas—markets which are unable to import food at world prices. In fact, so much of U.S. food exports move under special Government export programs that the United States is no longer a net dollar exporter of food—outlays on food imports in 1960 were larger than the amount realized on exports.

In the late 1930's, North America provided only 45 percent of the total world exports of bread grains; Latin America, over 20 percent; Australia about 25 percent; and the U.S.S.R. about 10 percent. Africa and Asia were almost self-sufficient. Europe accounted for about 90 percent of all imports. Today, with more than twice as many exports, only North America and Australia are significant exporters—with the United States and Canada now accounting for nearly 90 percent of the total. Africa has a significant deficit; the Asian deficit has risen rapidly; Latin America is a deficit area.

If the population of the less developed area continues to increase at current rates, just to maintain present nutrition, the year 1970 may see the development of an additional annual import requirement of 25 to 30 million tons or more of cereal grains. India alone may require an additional 8 to 10 million tons of grain.⁶

In the industrialized West problems associated with the agricultural surplus are sources of acute difficulty within countries and no small source of economic disunity among countries. The governments of almost all of these nations protect or support their farmers' incomes in one way or another. In Western Europe deep-rooted adherence to policies of maintaining protected markets for domestic agriculture appears to be a main obstacle to continuing progress of the Common Market concept. In the United States, where agriculture is, relatively speaking, a high-efficiency "industry," surpluses are greatest, and in large part because most U.S. agricultural products are met by high tariff walls in most countries of Europe. And, of course, in the United States, too, most agricultural products enjoy price supports and quotas or other barriers which have been imposed to provide a protected market for domestic producers.

The various price-support and other Government programs for agriculture in the industrialized nations have led to some anomalies. In Japan, for example, paddy rice prices are supported at about \$200 per ton, as compared with \$100 in the United States, and \$30 in Burma. United States textile producers are paying 8.5 cents a pound more for their cotton than Japanese and Hong Kong importers

⁴ Ibid., for general increases in efficiency of farm labor, see p. 317 ff.

⁵ New York Times, July 25, 1961, p. 33.

⁶ U.S. Department of Agriculture estimate.