Khrushchev was also concerned with other abuses, as the following paragraph suggests:

We must mercilessly root out such evils as parasitism, a negligent attitude toward work, and private property psychology. A relentless struggle against the survivals of capitalism is needed * * *, and now I wish to speak about intensifying the struggle against wastefulness, about how we must be more thrifty in spending public funds."

The abuses in Soviet agriculture arising from "survivals of capitalism" were carefully enumerated in Khrushchev's speech. One of the most distressing was the widespread practice of "hoodwinking and report padding" of agricultural production and procurement. Accordingly, at the plenary session of the party central committee in July 1961, a new control commission was established to stamp out the practice of padding agricultural production and procurement

reports.3

This new measure of the Communist Party raises again the old and persisting question of the reliability of Soviet statistics. Soviet agricultural output was reported for many years on a "biological basis," that is, on estimates made before the harvest. This was corrected in the 1950's to an "in the barn" basis—the yield actually realized after the harvest. In the barn data, theoretically, were about 10 percent below the biological data; practically, the difference was much larger. However, in any event, it still appears that reports are padded seriously enough to warrant the setting up of an entire enforcement apparatus with representatives in every state and at each collective farm. These farms are huge. The average state farm is said to be 22,485 sown acres; the average collective farm about 6,785 sown acres.

The Soviet record over the past 20 years can hardly be described as effective. In 1959, the cereal output per capita of the Soviet population was below the average prevailing in the years 1935–39. There may, accordingly, be some doubt whether the grandiose plans outlined in Khrushchev's 20-year plan can be carried out. On the record, Soviet agriculture has been less successful than that of the less developed area, in which total output of cereals increased almost 29 percent in the 25-year period as compared to about 11 percent for

the U.S.S.R. (See appendix table A-8.)

In the East European satellites as a group, agricultural developments have not been as unfavorable as in the other sectors of the Communist bloc. Over the entire area of Eastern Europe, food availabilities have increased substantially since 1950. According to official reports, they have now about reached the level prevailing in the prewar period. Total output of the main cereals has increased above the prewar level. (See appendix table A-9.)

Food, however, is still a major problem. In Poland and East Germany, it has been a constantly disturbing factor. In East Germany, the population has declined about 1 million during the 1950's and agricultural output has not been sustained. In Poland, a population increase of nearly 5 million has more than canceled out production

increases.

Substantial amounts of food are imported by the satellites from outside the bloc. Such imports, in 1959, included cereal grains, fruits, vegetables, lard, sausage casings, and fish. In the same year, the satellites exported to non-Communist countries food and beverages,

³ New York Times, July 24, 1961, p. 1.