Anyway, why should we be freeing such high interest rates into long-term borrowings?

Coming to the needed changes in the national policy, which is my last point, during the 9½-year period from the beginning of 1953 to the middle of 1962, we forfeited about $387 billion in total national production—measured in 1961 dollars—compared with what we would have achieved at the maximum rates of economic growth called for by the Employment Act of 1946. I don't say we could have done that well. But for goodness sakes, we should have done at least half that well. Over the same span of years, the true level of unemployment aggregated about 24 million man-years higher; in other words, well over 2½ million higher annually on the average, than it would have been under conditions of sustained maximum employment.

The record during the past year and a half indicates no fundamental change in the chronic ailment, although fortuitously we have been in upward movement during most of this short period. In fact, I think it is getting worse because of the uniquely weak character of this recovery and the fact that we are already in stagnation.

We are now in another stagnation, and confronted with the ominous threat of another recession later this year or next year. If our average annual growth rate 1963–66 averages no better than during the past 9½ years, and I do not think that it will average appreciably better without drastic changes in national economic policies, and I think it could even average worse because these imbalances feed on themselves, we could forfeit another $290 billion of total national production, and suffer another 17 million man-years of excessive unemployment, while we talk about the great worldwide contest in which we are engaged and about the needs of our own people and about the need for economic growth.

Neither domestic nor worldwide conditions permit us to countenance even the possibility of such development. We must act, and act at once.

In one sense, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, there is never an "immediate" need for anything, except carrying somebody to the hospital who has been hit by an automobile. You may quibble about whether we should act now or wait until next winter, but once you analyze this problem correctly, we are 5 or 6 years late now, and it is getting later every minute.

We won't know any more a few months from now, unless we have a catastrophe. I don't expect a catastrophe within the next few months. I don't see any obstacle in the way of action now that will disappear a few months from now, and this whole business of looking at a few weeks at a time, or a few months at a time, or at the little upturns and downturns, is the greatest manifestation, in my view, of the immature nature of our economic policy and our national purposes in times when we should be thinking over the long-range.

This completes my summary answers to the policy questions that the chairman has raised. I would appreciate a little chance to document this with some of my pictures, which I think I can do rather quickly now that I have laid the contours of the argument before you.

Chairman PATMAN. You may go ahead and present the charts that you have. I suggest that you confine it to probably 10 or 15 minutes if you can.