Rueff's proposals are supported also by Heilperin, a Swiss professor, who has been handling this problem for many years.

3. *The Triffin plan.*—This plan which has raised many sharp polemics, takes up again Keynes' idea to create a World Central Bank, having a nominal currency of its own (the "bancor"). Triffin, however, does not entirely abolish the function of gold, but he *links* it to a new form of international reserve consisting of deposits with IMF *with a guaranteed rate of exchange and interest bearing.* These deposits would be made up by compulsory payment of a fraction (20 percent is suggested) of the reserves of each country, as well as by other voluntary payment. The part of the deposits which exceed 20 percent of the total national reserves could, however, be withdrawn in gold at any moment. The countries with a surplus in their balance of payment would go on with the compulsory payment of 20 percent of the increase in their reserves, whereas the countries with a deficit could utilize for their needs that part of their initial payment which has become excessive in respect of their compulsory deposit. The availability of the Fund, and therefore its credit capacity, would in this way be automatically increased in proportion wtih the increase of the world reserves

The Triffin plan has undergone many criticisms, some of which are justified (especially, for example, the one by Angell). It has also met opposition, almost preconceived, which reflects, in our opinion, above all the difficulties of the "psychological adjustments" necessary to face problems of such wide dimensions.

4. *The Zolotas plan.*—According to Professor Zolotas, governor of the Bank of Greece, it is not necessary to change the present "gold exchange standard" system, but it is sufficient to strengthen it with some supplementary agreements.

In the first place the IMF should conclude "standby" agreements with the treasury departments and the central banks of the various participating countries, for the purpose of automatically obtaining supplementary credits from countries with a surplus balance of payment. These credits would be used by the Fund for the purpose of granting loans to those countries having a deficit.

Furthermore, Zolotas proposes that the United States and Great Britain, whose currencies are used as international reserves, should accumulate large amounts of other currencies convertible between them, to be used for operations on the open market to counteract short-term speculative operations.

Finally, all countries having a convertible currency should guarantee the gold exchange on the amounts of their currencies held by central banks of other countries. This, together with the payment of preferential interest rates to official foreign deposits, would encourage the various countries to maintain their reserves in foreign currency and not request their conversion into gold.

5. *The Stamp plan.*—This plan, which is very simple, contemplates the possibility that IMF issues a limited amount of certificates (a figure of $3 billion for 12 months is suggested) with a value expressed in gold, but not automatically convertible into gold. The members of the Fund should commit themselves to accept these certificates, in exchange for national currency, from the Fund itself or from other central banks. The proceeds of these certificates would be used to grant aid to underdeveloped countries.

The Stamp plan also considers, alternatively, the possibility that the Fund obtain substantial "standby" credits from the various countries in a mechanism which has a similarity to that of the Triffin plan and which also includes the gold guarantee for credits toward the Fund.

6. *The Bernstein plan.*—Bernstein, like Zolotas, belongs to the group of those who support the validity in substance of the present system with only a few necessary marginal modifications. Bernstein proposes, like Zolotas, the concession by members of the Fund of substantial "standby credits" from which the Fund could draw whenever it becomes necessary.

Besides, Bernstein also proposes to create, side by side with the Fund, a new collateral "stabilizing" organization in which all the members of the IMF should take part. Against these new contributions by the members, the stabilizing Fund would issue interest-bearing certificates with a given maturity, in the currency of the lending country and with *exchange guarantee.* The quotas subscribed by the various countries would be paid in only when such countries showed surpluses in their balance of payment.

It is to be noted that also in the Bernstein proposal, one finds again some of the essential points of the Triffin plan even though in a more simple mechanism.

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