

principles and things that you think ought to be done in connection with regulatory agencies.

Mr. MORGAN. I have enjoyed my work and studies in this field very much. It is fascinating. There is no more interesting work that I know of and I shall leave it with regret.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you referred to the dedication of certain people whose names you mentioned who have rendered great service in the past. As was expressed by someone else, I wonder, if you are so dedicated, and have the opportunity, why didn't you pursue it with the view of trying to bring about as much of that as you possibly could. It is puzzling to me.

Mr. MORGAN. Well, I think I covered that yesterday, sir. The rate of progress was just too slow.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you think that it ought to be done overnight?

Mr. MORGAN. No—

The CHAIRMAN. You have had a year and a half now, and you have become discouraged, and you say, "If I can't have it the way I want it I will quit."

And then you refer—you talk about your letter yesterday and today, and then you read in the record today some very possible reasons for what is wrong. You didn't have those reasons yesterday. I asked you very carefully to explain the letter, which you did undertake from your viewpoint, I presume. And I asked you to give an example of what you meant. And you pointed out the *Idaho* case. And Mr. Brotzman asked you, a moment ago, if that is not what you had reference to, reading the language of your letter, and you answered: "No." Mr. MORGAN. I think he was trying to get me to connect up those hypothetical statements in the letter describing what can happen in the absence of superior personnel. I cannot prove, and I don't care to try, that the *Idaho* case is a clear example of that. But I do feel that it is a case of failure to take the actions that were available to protect the public interest.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I don't want to argue the point with you. I just asked you to cite an example, and you yourself selected it as one. And it was developed later that there were four or five or six other opinions. And now you come up today with these reasons that you have given, which I must say are quite interesting, your suggestions and recommendations, particularly to this committee, because we recommended and introduced legislation and considered it, providing for these commissions to elect their own chairmen.

I personally supported that kind of a recommendation in our committee reports, and introduced legislation to carry it out. So you can see that that idea has been thought of around here. The Interstate Commerce Commission has had it all these years, and it has worked out pretty well. I think Mr. Landis' idea—I am not too sure—Mr. Landis' idea would give the Executive far greater authority than he has today.

And you perhaps know that this committee proposed that at no time should the White House interfere with the administration of these laws by the Commission. I think that is fundamental. You have just read a statement about how this works in a roundabout way. And you referred to that as hypothetical the question Mr. Brotzman asked you,