the very minimum require the most detailed investigation and sober consideration before giving it approval.

What I have advocated, and what I believe is clearly required by Section 204 (a), (b) and (c) of the Federal Power Act, is careful investigation and genuine opportunity for a hearing to determine whether the line is "compatible with the public interest" as alleged by the order. Failing this, we confront the public not merely with negligent failure of the Commission to secure the necessary information, but with the Commission's pointed and obdurate refusal to ask the necessary questions.

Let us consider the fragmentary facts available to us. All State and Federal authorities are agreed that a 230 kv line is justified and would be useful in the proposed location. The line as proposed would initially and for an undetermined period carry 230 kv but would be built (except for terminal facilities and connecting lines) to 500 kv capacity. The amount of over-building and over-investment has not been identified, but that it is a substantial amount cannot be denied. Clearly this over-building represents a complex gamble by PP&L and PG&E that (a) the building of a Federal or other publicly-owned intertie can and will be prevented; that (b) eventually the projected line will become a segment in a privately-owned Pacific Northwest-Pacific Southwest intertie; carrying (c) the Bonneville surplus load, in addition to company-generated surplus and other purchases. In any gamble involving three essential and interdependent elements such as those, the hazard factor increases geometrically.

If this three-ply gamble is successful, presumably the excess capacity of the segment under discussion here would at some future date become fully utilized and therefore economically justified. It follows that, whatever the eventual outcome, for an indeterminate period (during operation at 230 kv) the opposite would be true -- the facilities could not be used to full capacity and would not be economically justified.

It also follows that if the gamble is unsuccessful, i.e., if a tie-line or system of tie-lines is built under Federal or other public ownership, it is probable if not certain that the excess capacity of the projected line will remain permanently, or for a very long period, unused and therefore permanently or semi-permanently unjustified from an economic viewpoint. 5/

Here we enter an area in which the responsibilities of the Federal Power Commission are to me very clear and of major importance. Let me say at the outset that building excess capacity, in reasonable amounts for a future market that has been carefully assessed, is not only proper but commonplace in the utility industry, and on many occasions has had the support of this Commission, after proper investigation. But here we are not dealing with a solid and assured source of supply, and hence we

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5/ Lest the foregoing reasoning be dismissed as theoretical, Appendices D and E are attached and should be studied carefully. Both are articles from Electrical World, a leading trade journal of the electric utility industry. Appendix D, published before the order was issued, illustrates how little was known of the purposes behind the application in this case, even within the industry itself. Appendix E, published after the order was issued and received by me after this dissent was written confirms the purposes and the strategy and the gamble by applicant already outlined in this dissent.