

obvious. We have NORAD and its associate facilities, which keep track of every object that comes over the United States.

In these particular cases, they were things in orbit, and, in these particular cases something happened, certainly nothing went on the way to Venus or Mars. This could be determined from direct tracking.

MONITORING TECHNIQUES INVOLVED

Mr. MEADER. I think you really anticipated the question I was going to ask, Dr. Dryden, by your explanation; but I will ask the question anyhow.

Dr. DRYDEN. There is considerable detail.

Mr. MEADER. And then you can answer. You apparently feel that in these six instances which were released on September 5, 1962, there was no danger of revealing your monitoring techniques.

Dr. DRYDEN. Because there was something in space which everybody knows our NORAD tracking system can see.

Mr. MEADER. Then let me ask this question: Why could not all such failures, which failed to reveal monitoring techniques, be released to the public?

Dr. DRYDEN. Well, I think this is the reason for the second exception that has happened today.

They are of the same type. They are launchings not reported to the U.N., although not only our tracking people but, in England and everywhere else, they track these satellites.

Unfortunately one element in this picture is that they are interpreted as U.S. secret military satellites, and I suppose this is one factor in deciding to open this up. They are not U.S. military secret satellites. They are Russian satellites.

I am just anticipating what may have gone on in the decision to make this kind of release. I think you are right that this is the same sort of thing. * * *

Mr. MEADER. In other words, you would subscribe to the general proposition that any episode, the revelation of which would not impair the security of our monitoring techniques, should be released to the public.

Dr. DRYDEN. Certainly a fair candidate for release. I think this has been done in a number of cases.

I think the important thing, there is a mechanism by which this information can be declassified for release. It does operate in some instances. It operated in the Cuban affair, as you all know.

Mr. MEADER. I have been looking through the testimony of Dr. Simpson, and I don't find the passage for which I was looking, and I think the question I am going to ask bears somewhat on the line of questioning that Mr. Hardy conducted.

REPORTING OF RUSSIAN SPACE ACTIVITIES

As I understood Dr. Simpson's statement, information concerning the space activities released by foreign governments, made public to the press, might, nevertheless, be classified by the Defense Department.

Dr. DRYDEN. He was incorrect in that statement.

Mr. MEADER. In such a way as to prohibit NASA—