

Question 5. Why were these reports not published between August 31 and October 10, 1962?

Answer. In effect, two reports were skipped in this period. The change in policy by the Department of Defense under which foreign launch data was classified occasioned a restudy of the scope and coverage of the Satellite Situation Report.

Question 6. Who determines the number designation used in Satellite Situation Reports for objects in orbit?

Answer. The North American Air Defense Command.

Question 7. The October 10, 1962, issue of the report, volume 2, No. 16, contains a gap in the Greek-designated numbering sequence for 1962: namely, "A-Tau."

(a) Why was reference to "A-Tau" omitted from the report?

(b) Who determined that the report should be published without listing "A-Tau"?

(c) Were the security aspects of the gap in the numbering sequence of objects in orbit considered before publishing this report? If so, please explain what government agencies or organizations were consulted.

Answer. The reference to "A-Tau" was omitted because it referred to a classified launch. Under the principles discussed above, it could not be included by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in an unclassified report. The gap aspect was called to the attention of the Department of Defense, and the gaps have been carried with the full knowledge of that agency.

Question 8. On two occasions—September 5, 1962, in a letter from the NASA Administrator to the Honorable Robert S. Kerr and the Honorable George P. Miller, and on June 6, 1963, in a letter from Ambassador Stevenson to the Secretary General of the United Nations—information on Soviet-launched objects in orbit, which had not been released publicly or contained in NASA Satellite Situation Reports, was made public. Please explain why the letters dealing with Soviet space failures were released at the time they were. If it was not considered to be against the national interest to release the information contained in each letter at the time of release, why is similar information not released as soon as it is gathered?

Answer. In both cases the announcements were carefully measured against the yardstick of the national interest. They reflected detailed appraisals and determinations made at the highest level of government. No single agency was solely responsible for the actions.

Question 9. Do the terms of the DOD Directive No. 5200.13, entitled "Security Policy for Military Space Programs" prevent or impair the Administrator's fulfillment of the requirements of section 303 of the act creating NASA?

Answer. No. See discussion under question 2, above.

Question 10. Has NASA questioned DOD classification of information relating to Soviet space efforts? If so, when and who held discussions on the problem?

Answer. No. NASA has never questioned the right of the Department of Defense to classify its own material. A meeting was held on November 29, 1962, attended by representatives of the DOD, NASA, and the State Department at which compilation and content of the Satellite Situation Report were discussed.

Question 11. Does NASA have knowledge of the basis for DOD classification of satellite tracking information?

Answer. No.

Question 12. Has NASA agreed in every instance to DOD restriction upon satellite tracking information?

Answer. It has not been a question of agreeing or disagreeing. As indicated above, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration has been under no obligation to agree and under no responsibility to disagree. The classifications were the legal responsibility of the Department of Defense, and it was the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's duty to respect the Department of Defense action.