

**GOVERNMENT INFORMATION PLANS AND POLICIES**  
**(PART 5—NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION)**

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**HEARINGS**  
**BEFORE A**  
**SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE**  
**COMMITTEE ON**  
**GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS**  
**HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**  
**EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS**  
**FIRST SESSION**

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**MAY 23, AND JUNE 6, 1963**

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**Printed for the use of the**  
**Committee on Government Operations**



7022867

**U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE**  
**WASHINGTON : 1963**

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## GOVERNMENT INFORMATION PLANS AND POLICIES (Part 5—National Aeronautics and Space Administration)

THURSDAY, MAY 23, 1963

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND  
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SUBCOMMITTEE  
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,  
Washington, D.C.

*(Portions of the testimony indicated by asterisks have been deleted by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for the purpose of protecting the national defense.)*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room 1537, Longworth Office Building, Hon. John E. Moss (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives John E. Moss, Porter Hardy, Jr., George Meader, and Ogden R. Reid.

Also present: Samuel J. Archibald, staff administrator; Jack Matteson, chief investigator; and David Glick, counsel.

Mr. Moss. The subcommittee will be in order. Let the record show that a quorum for the purpose of taking testimony is present.

This is the third in a series of hearings on the subcommittee's current study of Government information plans and policies.

At the first two meetings on March 19 and March 25 witnesses representing various segments of the news media and the Public Information Offices of the Departments of State and Defense discussed Government information practices and policies in a broad sense.

### SCOPE OF INFORMATION INQUIRIES

Starting with today's hearing the subcommittee will look into specific applications of these practices and policies to matters of significant importance to the public. As I indicated in my opening statement at the March 19 hearing, it is hoped that these hearings will lead to specific recommendations for procedures to insure that the public will be fully informed at all times on Government activities. This is particularly important in periods of crisis or emergency when there must be no doubt or confusion about the activities and motivations of our Government.

During the forthcoming hearings the subcommittee will continue its investigation of the Department of Defense space secrecy directive which clearly has resulted in the withholding of information vital to public understanding of United States and Russian space activities.

We shall determine the facts on allegations that information was withheld or distorted on certain aspects of the Cuban crisis. We shall find out what steps, if any, have been taken to establish guidelines on necessary control of information during emergency situations. In addition to the problems of guidelines during a period of crisis, it appears that censorship plans for an all-out conflict are themselves a problem, and this will be discussed in detail with appropriate witnesses.

#### DATA HELD LACKING ON SOVIET SPACE ACTIVITIES

The subcommittee also will inquire into the plans for the Directorate for Classification Management which was established in January of this year as a result of committee recommendations. We want to determine what is being done by the agency to carry out its assigned duties of identifying specific programs and papers which require various categories of classification so that the generation of classified material can be reduced.

Because some of the documents the subcommittee will consider have been classified as "Top Secret," "Secret," or "Confidential" to protect national security, we must—although regrettably—hear some of the witnesses in executive sessions. This will apply to our inquiries into the origin and alleged need for the space secrecy directive, to certain Cuban crisis information matters, to censorship plans for an all-out conflict, and to information problems relating to Vietnam. The public, of course, will be informed to the fullest extent possible on the highlights of each executive session.

The subcommittee has received numerous complaints about the information policy which stems from the Department of Defense space secrecy directive. There have been charges that the directive has the effect of keeping the public almost totally in the dark on Russian space activities, and to some extent our own. The taxpayers certainly should not be called upon to spend billions of dollars on our space programs without being given all the facts necessary to make an intelligent judgment as to whether we are behind, ahead, or at least keeping pace with Russian space efforts.

At one time the public was informed, through official sources, of all Russian space endeavors. The subcommittee has been told that, following the Department of Defense directive, official space information has dwindled to the point where a true perspective of where we stand, in relation to the Russians, scarcely exists as far as the general public is concerned.

In order to help determine what might be done to make more information available, within the limits of national security, we shall establish what information now is being provided through our two official sources: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of Defense.

As NASA has the assignment of formally reporting United States and foreign satellite tracking information the subcommittee will call as its first witness Dr. George Simpson, Assistant Administrator for Technology Utilization and Policy Planning, who has supervision of NASA's satellite reporting publications.

Doctor, before hearing your statement, I would like to take this opportunity to compliment you and your associates in NASA on the recent and very spectacular success of Major Cooper's flight. I think

one of the most important aspects of this flight was the openness with which it was conducted.

Dr. SIMPSON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Moss. I think it quite clear that we have enhanced our prestige tremendously, because the whole world had the opportunity of viewing our activities, in very sharp contrast to the policy of the Russian Government. No one doubts that we did what we claimed to have done.

Now we would like to hear from you, and have your statement.

**STATEMENT OF DR. GEORGE L. SIMPSON, JR., ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR TECHNOLOGY UTILIZATION AND POLICY PLANNING, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION; ACCOMPANIED BY H. R. BROCKETT, DIRECTOR, NETWORK OPERATIONS AND FACILITIES; AND MELVIN S. DAY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION**

Dr. SIMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your remarks.

I would like particularly to say that my colleagues should have heard this too.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, my name is George L. Simpson, Jr. I am Assistant Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for Technology Utilization and Policy Planning. I am here at the invitation of the committee to discuss NASA's responsibilities with respect to the satellite situation report and related procedures and reports.

**SATELLITE SITUATION REPORT**

The satellite situation report is an unclassified document issued by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration through its Space Operations Control Center, Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Md. It includes all of the data available to NASA on objects in earth orbit as of the date set in each such report. Every issue lists the objects in orbit giving the international designation, code names when available, the launch date, the orbital characteristics, and certain of the transmitting frequencies (some of the objects in orbit are burned out rocket bodies, etc. which do not transmit).

Every fifth issue has carried a listing of the things that have decayed since the last listing of decayed objects. Here is a copy of the latest issuance dated May 15, 1963: I submit it for the record. These reports reflect data computed and compiled by NASA, NORAD (North American Air Defense Command), a military agency of the United States and Canada, and the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory.

The report is designed as an informational service to the public and especially to the scientific community. It is mailed to about 1,700 addressees and is made available to anyone who requests it.

NASA did not originate the report. As I understand it, prior to 1961 the Department of Defense under the project name "Space Track," had experimented with techniques for keeping track of objects

in space. By 1960 Defense was ready to move the project into an operational phase under the control of NORAD. At that time Defense approached NASA with the proposal that NASA assume responsibility for reporting on all unclassified space launching and orbital information to the scientific and civilian community.

#### NASA-DOD REPORTING AGREEMENT

DOD felt that it should concentrate on only those phases necessary to meet its operational requirements. NASA agreed to accept this responsibility and in January 1961 an agreement was made which spelled out each agency's responsibilities. DOD agreed to make available to NASA all unclassified information available to NORAD for publication by NASA.

The first issuance under the new system was dated February 17, 1961. The new system was the subject of an exchange of correspondence between the chairman of this subcommittee and NASA's Administrator James E. Webb under dates of February 23, 1961, and March 8, 1961, in which, responding to the chairman's inquiry, NASA outlined its program.

NASA has been publishing the satellite situation report since that time. It has included all unclassified information made available to it by NORAD except for a period from January to April 1963 when it was thought, through a misunderstanding, that each agency, NASA and DOD, would handle its own reporting. NASA has resumed publishing all unclassified information received from NORAD.

It should be noted that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, from its own resources, can only develop information on satellites which operate on frequencies used by NASA satellites.

The Department of Defense and Russian satellites operate on frequencies different from those used by NASA. As a result, the latter's direct tracking information is only on NASA or NASA-sponsored satellites. The Smithsonian, under a grant from NASA, operates 12 Baker-Nunn satellite tracking cameras to obtain precision tracking information for scientific studies of earth shape, air density, and so forth. Because of workload limitations, such optical tracking of satellites is restricted to those of scientific interest.

In summary, NASA was never really assigned the responsibility for reporting satellite tracking information but did agree at DOD's request, when the DOD's space tracking effort became operational, to disseminate all unclassified information on satellites to the scientific community using the information made available to it by NORAD.

There apparently has been some variation in the type and scope of the information which Defense has made available to us. We have released all unclassified material received from NORAD without modification.

For example: In 1961 certain DOD launches were no longer given project or "code" names; in 1962, except for an occasional satellite, NORAD stopped naming DOD satellites, but orbital information was given, and also in 1962 information on Soviet space vehicles was apparently screened out by NORAD.

## NEW CRITERIA FOR REPORTING FOREIGN SPACE ACTIVITIES

However, under a recently installed procedure, NORAD is now furnishing information on Soviet satellites according to the following three criteria:

(a) Data on foreign space activities which has been authorized for public release through the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).

(b) Data on foreign space activities officially reported to the United Nations registry if NORAD orbital elements generally confirm the registry.

(c) Data on foreign space activities (including failures) which have been publicly announced by the foreign government concerned and which are generally confirmed by NORAD data.

In addition to the satellite situation report, NASA publishes the NORAD Prediction Bulletin. This bulletin provides information of primary interest to scientists.

The frequency of publication is generally once a week, although it is irregular. Information contained is on all unclassified major payloads in orbit.

The distribution includes about 200 addressees which are normally scientific organizations. This report as received from NORAD is distributed to these organizations without charge. It can be had on request by anyone.

Mr. Chairman, thank you sir.

I have with me Mr. Brockett of the Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition of NASA, who, if you desire—if the committee desires—could put on this screen a page from a satellite situation report, and answer questions of any nature that you and the committee might wish.

Mr. MOSS. Is there any objection to having the page report screened and explained to us?

Mr. MEADER. Mr. Chairman, before that, may I just ask one question for clarification? I notice you said the satellite situation report reported only on objects in earth orbit.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MEADER. Now, there are other space objects that are not in earth orbit, are there not? For instance, the shot to Venus and the Russian shot around the moon.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir; we would include, we did include the Mariner shot, too.

Mr. MEADER. In other words, your situation report is on all space objects?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MEADER. Not just earth orbits?

Dr. SIMPSON. All objects in space, yes, sir.

## REPORTING CRITERIA QUESTIONED

Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, before we proceed along this other avenue, just a question in connection with the listing of items which you publish.

Under the procedure that NORAD is following, apparently you list on page 5 a., b., and c. I presume, maybe it is not a proper presumption, but is there an interrelationship between a. and c.? In c. you said "data on foreign space activities (including failures) which have been publicly announced by the foreign government concerned."

Do we wait for them to announce it? Do we have any sources of knowledge other than their public announcements? That is my question.

Dr. SIMPSON. NASA does not. I don't know what sources other agencies of the Government may have. But c. as I understand it is especially designed to make clear that we were not going to withhold and not publish launches that have been publicly announced by other governments.

Mr. HARDY. It seems to me that that is a rather gratuitous sort of an expression, to say that you are not going to withhold from the public of the U.S. announcements which have been made by other nations. This is rather superfluous, isn't it?

Dr. SIMPSON. Well, sir, I didn't write this.

Mr. HARDY. I figured that you didn't, but you must have a pretty good hand that writes these things for you.

Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir; I didn't originate this. What I mean to say, this was written in the Department of Defense.

Mr. HARDY. I know, but you are supposed to be able to tell us what it means.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARDY. At least you are the present witness we have got.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir. My intention is simply to say that this does indicate clearly we are going to report, as received from NORAD for publication here, objects announced by foreign governments.

Mr. HARDY. Don't you see how that hits me right between the eyes?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARDY. You come in here to tell us, tell the subcommittee that you are going to tell us about things that foreign governments have publicly announced. Now that is a real fine help you are giving us. Do you see how silly the darned thing is?

Dr. SIMPSON. I understand your reaction entirely, sir. I think it is elaborating the obvious.

Mr. HARDY. It sure is elaborating the obvious, and you tie it in with a. up there "Data on foreign space activities which has been authorized for public release through the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense and Public Affairs."

So if you have any sources of information other than that particular one, you still would not release them unless they were released for publication by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. So he has got a lock on you pretty doggone tight, hasn't he?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir. We do not release any information on foreign launches—

Mr. HARDY. I don't know why you are in the information business if DOD is going to exercise this kind of control. Maybe you ought to give it back to them and let them release it. They are just as tight as you are, I expect.

Dr. SIMPSON. Let me make one point clear, sir. They don't exercise control over NASA launches. We publish those.



Our own information we put out. We can publish this information on their launches and on foreign launches only as it is furnished to us. That is right.

Mr. HARDY. Actually this is the kind of a statement that doesn't impress me as worth a thing. It doesn't have any real significance as far as I am concerned. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Moss. That is perfectly all right, Mr. Hardy.

#### AGREEMENT RESTRICTS REPORTING BY NASA

Mr. MEADER. If I could follow that up, Mr. Chairman, does NASA recognize the right of the Defense Department to prohibit NASA from publishing information about foreign space activities which have been made public by those foreign governments themselves?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir. I mean that is the record. We have not done this because we publish only information on foreign space activities furnished to us through NORAD, and the record I am sure will show that on occasion announcements made by foreign governments have not been included in the NORAD reports, so I have to say "Yes."

Mr. HARDY. George, we might follow this up together. Public information provided by foreign governments is being suppressed by NORAD, and you are not permitted to release it to the American people. We really are—

Dr. SIMPSON. Let me be accurate, sir. I mean this has happened. It is not now the case, but in answer to your question, yes, it has happened.

Mr. HARDY. According to the way you have got it expressed here, it could still be happening. How do we know it isn't?

Dr. SIMPSON. What I have before me is a statement by the Department of Defense that they will furnish us under c., information that has been announced.

Mr. MEADER. Let me see if this isn't a little ambiguous, number c. Let's assume that the Russians have released to the world generally information about one of their space activities. Let's assume that that has not been confirmed by NORAD.

This c. would not prohibit NASA from publishing it in its satellite situation report, would it? It is only those foreign space activities announced publicly by the foreign government which have been confirmed by NORAD, which are submitted to NASA.

Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir. Under the terms of the agreement with the Department of Defense, we will publish information on foreign launches submitted to us by the DOD.

Mr. MEADER. Whether they were confirmed by NORAD or not, is that correct?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir. I really can't go beyond saying we publish on foreign launches the information given us by NORAD.

Mr. MEADER. What disturbs me, Mr. Simpson, is that NASA will recognize the power of the Defense Department to determine what it can and cannot publish, whether it is Defense Department information or not.

Now with respect to classified Defense Department information, I recognize the right of the Defense Department to limit NASA in its publication activities, but something which is not a Defense Depart-

ment activity, but is publicly known anyhow, I can't see any reason why NASA should recognize the authority of the Defense Department to tell it it cannot publish information which did not originate within the Defense Department at all.

NASA CITED AS SUBSERVIENT TO DOD

How can you justify that subservience of an independent agency to a department of the Government?

Dr. SIMPSON. Well, sir, there is much here that I am sure I don't know, and I think I am certainly getting over into areas of classification and broad Government policy and jurisdiction which, even if I were fully informed on it, it would probably not be appropriate for discussion in open session.

Mr. HARDY. If we ask you anything that we can't discuss in open session, I would like to have it identified right now. If there is anything that Mr. Meader raised that is not appropriate for open session discussion, I think we ought to know what it is.

Dr. SIMPSON. All right, sir. I feel this way, that what you are saying is that NASA is being subservient to DOD here. I am sure that the Department of Defense has reasons, unknown to me, reasons which undoubtedly are related to other agencies of the Government, for this policy.

You gentlemen, of course, will make your own decisions as to whether or not these are good reasons. What I am trying to say is we don't feel we are subservient to another agency of the Government as an agency, that we are conforming here to Government policy broadly stated, and I am sure, broadly discussed.

But I am not in a position to either inform you on it in any detail. That is what I mean.

Mr. MEADER. Let's ask this question then. Can you see any reason, Mr. Simpson, why information released by a foreign government about their space activities should not be included in your satellite situation report?

Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir; I don't, but that is not up to me to determine.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Reid?

Dr. SIMPSON. That is not my determination.

Mr. REID. Dr. Simpson, I would like to thank you most warmly for appearing this morning. I have one or two questions that flow from the queries of my colleagues here. First, as I understand it NASA is an independent agency, is that correct?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. REID. And you are charged as an assistant administrator with the Space Administration for Technology Utilization and Policy Planning.

Am I correct in the view that the President has indicated the desire on several occasions for the United States to be first in space?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. REID. And that NASA is concerned essentially, if not entirely, with the peaceful applications of development of space.

EVALUATION OF SOVIET SPACE EFFORTS TERMED ESSENTIAL

My question therefore is how will it be possible for NASA, as an independent agency and you representing NASA here today, to give



an evaluation to the American public, on how our space effort is making out, consistent with the President's desire to see us first in space, if you are not able to comment on or release appropriate information on Soviet successes and Soviet failures in space, as I assume some of them at least are not entirely military in application?

Or to put it another way, are you in a position now to evaluate the Soviet space programs compared with ours, and give an evaluation to the American public as to how we are making out, and to report fully on Soviet experiments and launches in space, because as I understand the discussion today, there has been certainly a lack of clarity, if not the claim that certain information has been withheld on Soviet space launches.

I would think the American people would have to look to NASA for an evaluation of that and not to the Department of Defense.

Dr. SIMPSON. Respectfully I must disagree. The Space Act is very clear in its directive to the Administrator that he furnish the American people with the widest possible information on our space program, and this we are attempting to do.

NASA has, so far as I know, no statutory or other formal responsibilities so far as tracking, assessing, and reporting on the Russian space effort.

Mr. REID. But we cannot operate in a vacuum, can we? Do you not have to measure the success of our program in relation to Soviet efforts?

Are you saying the American people have to look to the Department of Defense for any evaluation of Soviet space efforts, peaceful or otherwise? Where is NASA's responsibility to evaluate our own space effort in relation to the Soviets, in peaceful areas?

#### NASA DENIES EVALUATION RESPONSIBILITY

Dr. SIMPSON. Well, it is not NASA's responsibility to evaluate the Russian space program. We don't have that responsibility. I really don't see how I can go beyond that.

Anything that we receive that is unclassified on any area of space activity we give the widest possible distribution and publication to, especially in the area of scientific and technical information. We have a large program in this particular area.

Mr. REID. Let me go at it from a different tack. Is there any reason the American people, in the judgment of NASA, should not be fully informed as to Soviet space efforts in the peaceful areas of exploration of space?

Dr. SIMPSON. Again, sir, you ask me this question—NASA has a mission. It is an agency operating out in the open. It is publishing its own program. I am not in a position, I don't have access to all the issues and ramifications in order to answer that.

Mr. REID. What are the ramifications? My colleague, Mr. Hardy, mentioned a minute ago that he would be interested in knowing what the ramifications are that you cannot discuss in open session here with regard to Soviet space efforts.

If the American public is not to look to NASA in matters of this kind, where is it to look? Are you suggesting that it must look to the Department of Defense for peaceful Soviet information or peaceful Soviet space efforts?

Dr. SIMPSON. I am in no position to suggest what part of the Government should have this responsibility. My guess would be that it would be a total responsibility.

But so far as the unclassified information that is available from Russian sources or any other sources, NASA collects it for its own uses, and we put it out, and I think this is very excellent, and there is no reason why we shouldn't do it.

Mr. REID. Let me ask you this, and be a little more specific. What in your judgment is unclassified in the Soviet space effort? What do you consider is classified? Should a peaceful space effort, a peaceful launch, be classified?

Dr. SIMPSON. Sir, I have no participation in these things at all. So far as I know nobody in NASA does.

It would just be ridiculous for me to try to sit here and say a certain kind of activity in the Russian space effort should or should not be classified. I really don't—

Mr. REID. You are responsible for policy planning. What does that consist of? Does policy not comprehend how our space effort is making out in a peaceful sense?

Dr. SIMPSON. It comprehends the policies of the NASA space effort itself. It has no relation to the policies of the Russian space effort.

Mr. REID. But as I understand it, the President has made clear, both to the American people and to the Congress, the importance of a peaceful effort in space.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. REID. And he has encouraged the American people and the Congress to support this effort. As I understand it, NASA is principally charged with the peaceful development of this program.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. REID. And yet, you are in effect saying, you can only comment on the U.S. effort, without relationship to the Soviet effort.

Now if we are way ahead of the Soviet effort, that is interesting. If we are way behind, that is equally interesting. My concern is that we need to have some kind of evaluation.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. REID. Between what we have got to do to catch up.

Dr. SIMPSON. I think your point is well taken. I can only say that it is not NASA's responsibility to make this comparison.

#### SOVIET CAPABILITIES NOT ASSESSED BY NASA

Mr. HARDY. May I follow that up. You stress this lack of statutory responsibility. Can you put your finger on any other agency that does have a statutory responsibility for assessing and evaluating peaceful space effort in other countries?

Dr. SIMPSON. Please, sir, I said—

Mr. HARDY. I think you are ducking a responsibility which must be inherent in the Space Act.

Now let's boil the thing down. You say that you don't have assigned statutory responsibility. So far as I know, the Department of Defense doesn't necessarily have the assigned responsibility of

determining every single missile capability that foreign countries have either. But if it didn't do it to the best of its ability, the agency would be remiss.

If NASA has the responsibility for our peaceful space effort, and it is not paying any attention to foreign activity in this area, then it is derelict in its responsibility to the American people, whether it has statutory responsibility or not.

Dr. SIMPSON. Mr. Hardy, I did not say that NASA is not paying attention. We were talking about the responsibility for assessing and publishing an estimate of how we stand with the Russians. This was a question—

Mr. HARDY. That is one phase of the question.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir; but this is the phase I was addressing myself to.

Now then, I have already stated that we publish all unclassified information. We have numerous scientific meetings.

We have people who attend meetings abroad. We go to the greatest possible effort to publish and disseminate all information that is unclassified related to the Russian effort. Yes, sir. We have that responsibility. I agree.

Mr. HARDY. Well, then I think you are going to find some inconsistencies in your testimony, either that or I misunderstood you.

Dr. SIMPSON. All I can say is we do not have the responsibility for assessing the Russian space effort, of making comparisons between it and our progress. We do have the responsibility for disseminating all information in the space field.

Mr. HARDY. You are talking about two different things. You are talking about assessing and evaluating Russian or foreign accomplishments in space, and you are talking about disseminating the information with respect to the two.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARDY. I think that you have testified both ways on this business of assessing and evaluating foreign accomplishments.

Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir.

Mr. HARDY. I think you have, but anyway the record will show.

Now the matter of disseminating that information is a different matter. But obviously if you don't have it, you can't pass it out. You have just testified or most recently that you do gather such information, at least I understood you to say that.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARDY. Is that right?

Dr. SIMPSON. We get all information that is relevant that we can lay our hands on to the space effort.

That is quite a different matter from NASA assuming the responsibility of coming before the American people and saying "We are here and the Russians are here." This is the way I understood your question.

Mr. REID. That was one of the implications, but there are several others.

Mr. HARDY. I don't think you need to carry it quite that far necessarily.

## INFORMATION MANDATE SET BY STATUTE

Mr. Moss. I think we should take a look at the language of the statute, because I played a role in the drafting of this language working rather closely with Congressman McCormack of Massachusetts, chairman of the Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration.

The language says:

Information obtained or developed by the Administrator, in the performance of his functions under this chapter, shall be made available for public inspection except where they find (a) information authorized or required by Federal statute to be withheld and (b) information classified to protect the national security, provided that nothing in this chapter shall authorize the withholding of information by the Administrator from the duly authorized committees of the Congress.

Now then, the question doesn't go to whether you have a responsibility to make available to the public information on Russian space activity, but if such information is possessed by your agency, then you do have the responsibility.

This language does not say that this is limited only to the activities of the agency, but it says, "Information obtained or developed by the Administrator in the performance of his functions."

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. Moss. Now we could perhaps say that it isn't a function for the Administrator to know what the Russians are doing, but I think, Doctor, you would agree with me that would be a rather farfetched interpretation.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. Moss. Of the act itself, because inherently, whether or not it is classified, the Administrator, in order to program for our Government's activities, has to have the fullest of knowledge, however he may obtain it, of the activities of the Russians.

And so having developed that information, from whatever source, it is clearly encompassed within the language, and the intent of the statute as written by the Congress. And so I say that you do have a mandate to make it available.

Now whether you make it available through some regular publication, or whether it is available upon request, that comes down to a matter of policy. But the language does not bar you nor limit you in any way to make available only the activities of your own agency.

Mr. HARDY. As a matter of fact, it requires it.

Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir. Please, sir, I thought I made clear that we disseminate—I have brought Mr. Day with me. We have a very large program of gathering and disseminating information relevant to the space effort from all sources, all unclassified sources. I do not disagree with that.

I was attempting, or what I really intend to say is that whatever classified information which comes through the Administrator's office cannot then be put out as part of an assessment of how we stand in relation to the Russians. That is to say, everything that the Administrator has, classified information received by the Administrator—

Mr. HARDY. That is an entirely different matter. Nobody has ever suggested that NASA had a right to declassify something that the Department of Defense had classified. Of course, it doesn't.

Dr. SIMPSON. I am sorry; I took the question too literally.

I don't see how we can make an assessment, if I understood your question correctly, how can we say how we stand with reference to the Russians, that would not be related to classified information.

PUBLICATION CONFINED TO UNCLASSIFIED DATA

Mr. REID. Well, as I understand it, on September 1, 1962, NASA suspended release of all data on Soviet space activity, presumably as a result of a DOD decision that this information was to be restricted in its entirety.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. REID. And subsequently on April 19, 1963, there was further discussion, apparently with DOD, authorizing NASA to publish certain Russian launch data, and specifically Russian launches which, (a) have been announced by the Soviet Government, (b) have been made known by the Soviet Government to the U.N. registry, and (c) those launches cleared for releases as I understand it by Mr. Sylvester of the Department of Defense.

This seems to me to be a different policy than existed prior to that time. It would seem to me that there has to be a release by NASA of information on the Soviet space effort broader than this.

This is, as you said earlier, essentially elaborating the obvious. It is pretty clear from an exchange of letters that has occurred, and I refer to a letter of September 4, 1962, to Director Webb, from Congressman George Miller, then chairman of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, and Senator Robert S. Kerr, chairman, Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee, and a subsequent reply to those gentlemen of September 5, 1962, by the Administrator, Mr. Webb.

It seems clear from this exchange that for a period—and it seems to me to be a continuing period—certain material was not released with regard to either successes or failures, and perhaps notably failures in certain aspects of the Soviet space effort.

I think what we are trying to determine here is—does not NASA have a clear responsibility, as the chairman has pointed out, under the statute, to release information relevant to Soviet space launches, both failures and successes, and most particularly those that do not have any precise military application.

Obviously some of the Soviet effort is supposedly peaceful in character.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. REID. And therefore how do you define what your present responsibility is to inform the American public with regard to Soviet space launches?

Dr. SIMPSON. We define that by publishing those data that are furnished to us on an unclassified basis.

We publish everything, not only on launches, but we go to great effort—and I would like to emphasize this, since there seems to be some misunderstanding—we go to great effort to study and bring together and to publish and disseminate all unclassified information from Russian sources or elsewhere. There is no disagreement on that.

But we define the policy simply on the basis of what we receive on an unclassified basis. We can publish only that information that is unclassified.

Mr. HARDY. Let me, if the gentleman will permit, try to clear up my confusion on this.

Suppose the Russians announce a launching, and perhaps even say, which is hardly likely, but suppose they announce a failure, and NASA had independent knowledge of that.

Do I understand that your policy would prohibit you from publishing that, unless the Department of Defense authorized it, although Russia has publicly announced it?

You are not permitted to let the American people know about it, unless the Department of Defense says you can go ahead and do it?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, that is something I think we should have the Department of Defense explain, if they are issuing instructions to NASA on the basis of—well, to suppress information which has been publicly released by a foreign government.

Mr. REID. If I may, Mr. Chairman, just to pursue the clear point that my colleague has just raised, as I understand it, you now have no authority and do not constitute it as your responsibility, speaking for NASA under the statute, to release any information whatsoever on Soviet launches, except as may be released by Mr. Sylvester of the Department of Defense.

You have no initial initiating responsibility on any Soviet launches, unless it is cleared by the Department of Defense, whether it is classified or unclassified.

Dr. SIMPSON. That is true, sir.

#### CHANGE IN STATUTE SUGGESTED

Mr. HARDY. I would think then, Mr. Chairman, that actually the statute which has been discussed and which created NASA as an independent agency should be modified and put under the Secretary of Defense, because it seems to be subservient to the Secretary of Defense under this procedure that has just been outlined.

I would suggest that we ought to change the statute and put it where it belongs. If Mr. McNamara is going to call all the shots for the Department of Defense and NASA also, we might just as well know it.

Mr. Moss. Let me say that I can understand the reasoning that brought forth that observation from my colleague.

But I think he also shares my conviction that perhaps we should proceed to have the statute, which is rather clear, administered on a more independent basis than it is presently being administered.



| OBJECT        | OBJECTS IN ORBIT |        |                          |                 |                 | TRANSMITTING<br>FREQ. (MC/S) |               |                |
|---------------|------------------|--------|--------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------------------|---------------|----------------|
|               | CODE NAME        | SOURCE | LAUNCH                   | NODAL<br>PERIOD | INCL-<br>NATION |                              | APOGEE<br>Km. | PERIGEE<br>Km. |
| 1962 LAUNCHES |                  |        |                          |                 |                 |                              |               |                |
| B TAU 5       |                  | US     | 13 DEC                   | 114.3           | 70.37           | 2609                         | 240           |                |
| B TAU 6       |                  | US     | 13 DEC                   | 115.0           | 70.37           | 2671                         | 241           |                |
| B UPSILON 1   | RELAY 1          | US     | 13 DEC                   | 185.0           | 47.51           | 7443                         | 1319          |                |
| B UPSILON 2   | ROCKET BODY      | US     | 13 DEC                   | 184.8           | 47.46           | 7451                         | 1294          |                |
| B CHI 1       | EXPLORER 16      | US     | 16 DEC                   | 104.3           | 52.00           | 1186                         | 743           |                |
| B PSI 1       | TRANSIT 5A       | US     | 19 DEC                   | 99.2            | 90.63           | 728                          | 703           |                |
| B PSI 2       |                  | US     | 19 DEC                   | 97.9            | 90.73           | 729                          | 582           |                |
| B PSI 3       |                  | US     | 19 DEC                   | 99.1            | 90.63           | 742                          | 688           |                |
| B PSI 4       |                  | US     | 19 DEC                   | 100.3           | 90.49           | 824                          | 715           |                |
| 1963 LAUNCHES |                  |        |                          |                 |                 |                              |               |                |
| 1963 3A       |                  | US     | 16 JAN                   | 94.6            | 81.89           | 537                          | 460           |                |
| 1963 3B       |                  | US     | 16 JAN                   | 93.9            | 81.87           | 497                          | 432           |                |
| 1963 3C       |                  | US     | 16 JAN                   | 94.3            | 81.88           | 521                          | 438           |                |
| 1963 4A       | SYNCOM           | US     | 14 FEB                   | 1426.6          | 33.51           | 37022                        | 34185         |                |
| 1963 4B       | ROCKET BODY      | US     | 14 FEB                   | 605.3           | 29.30           | 34604                        | 271           |                |
| 1963 5A       |                  | US     | 19 FEB                   | 97.8            | 100.48          | 803                          | 498           |                |
| 1963 5B       |                  | US     | 19 FEB                   | 97.8            | 100.49          | 789                          | 510           |                |
| 1963 5C       |                  | US     | 19 FEB                   | 97.1            | 100.48          | 755                          | 478           |                |
| 1963 5D       |                  | US     | 19 FEB                   | 98.5            | 100.45          | 832                          | 532           |                |
| 1963 8B       |                  | USSR   | COMPUTATIONS IN PROGRESS |                 |                 |                              |               |                |
| 1963 9A       | EXPLORER 17      | US     | 3 APR                    | 96.2            | 57.61           | 912                          | 247           |                |
| 1963 9B       | ROCKET BODY      | US     | 3 APR                    | 95.6            | 57.62           | 851                          | 243           |                |
| 1963 10A      |                  | USSR   | 13 APR                   | 91.5            | 48.92           | 442                          | 265           |                |
| 1963 10B      |                  | USSR   | 13 APR                   | 91.3            | 48.94           | 431                          | 253           |                |
| 1963 12B      |                  | USSR   | 28 APR                   | 89.3            | 65.01           | 283                          | 191           |                |
| 1963 13A      | TELSTAR 2        | US     | 7 MAY                    | 225.0           | 43.73           | 10797                        | 867           |                |
| 1963 13B      | ROCKET BODY      | US     | 7 MAY                    | 225.0           | 42.76           | 10766                        | 982           |                |
| 1963 14A      |                  | US     | 9 MAY                    | 167.0           | 87.43           | 3683                         | 3606          |                |
| 1963 15A#     | FAITH 7          | US     | 15 MAY                   | 88.74           | 32.55           | 268                          | 161           |                |
| 1963 15B      | ROCKET BODY      | US     | 15 MAY                   | 88.74           | 32.55           | 268                          | 161           |                |

\$Transmitting on command only.

#Manned space capsule controlled by Astronaut  
Leroy Gordon Cooper which will be de-orbited  
by command on May 16, 1963 at 2303Z



Mr. HARDY. Apparently, and I am looking at it again right now, it looks to me as though there is some dereliction of duty in NASA.

Dr. SIMPSON. Well, sir, I wish if I could do anything to clear that up—

Mr. HARDY. Maybe we have got the wrong witness. Perhaps we should have Mr. Webb.

Dr. SIMPSON. That may very well be, sir. I wish to assure you that we are publishing, we are gathering and publishing everything that is available to us.

We are not withholding anything of our own program. We are gathering, both through scientific media and meetings and through the general press and public, all scientific technical information.

Mr. HARDY. But the statute says:

Information obtained or developed by the Administrator in the performance of his functions under this chapter shall be made available for public inspection except—

And it would be under (b)—

information classified to protect the national security.

Dr. SIMPSON. I believe we are conforming, sir.

Mr. HARDY. You think you are conforming to that, so it is classified to protect what national security? The Russian people and everybody else have already been advised and been informed over the Russian radio, and all of the world knows about it except the American people. So you are going to protect the American security by keeping the American people in ignorance of things that everybody else in the world knows about.

Dr. SIMPSON. Well, sir, I think you know the situation as well as I do.

Mr. HARDY. I know the situation all right.

#### SATELLITE REPORTS EXPLAINED

Mr. MOSS. Are there any more questions at this point? If not, Doctor, I would suggest we have the page from the satellite situation explained to the subcommittee.

Dr. SIMPSON. Mr. Brockett, if you don't mind, sir,

Mr. BROCKETT. This is the page from the May 15 report. See the heading "Object," the international designation on the left, the code name available, the country of launch, the launch date, the period of the satellite, the time it takes to go around the earth once, the information, apogee, perigee, and frequency. At the bottom you will notice this report contains "Faith 7," which was in orbit at the time of publication.

Mr. MOSS. Does any member of the committee have any questions on this?

Mr. MEADER. Not on that page, but there is an abbreviation that I am not quite sure about with respect apparently to objects in space which are not in orbit.

I notice from this space situation report of April 30, 1963, after Lunik I there is on the perigee and the apogee the letters "AU."

Mr. BROCKETT. Astronomical unit. This is the mean distance from the earth to the sun. In other words, Lunik I was in orbit around the Sun rather than around the Earth. What page is that, sir?

FROM NASA GODDARD SPACE FLIGHT CENTER. DATA SOURCE NORAD.

ISSUE DATE 12 MAY 1963.

BULLETIN 36 62 OMEGA1 308 IN FOUR PARTS. PART I.  
 5113 131.25217 .063392 -.117367-6 0 1.05245 .00090  
 272.808 -1.141 0 243.089 -3.772 0 272.72 82.12

PART II S-N EQUATOR CROSSINGS.

| REV       | TIME Z LONG W  | REV  | TIME Z LONG W  | REV  | TIME Z LONG W  |
|-----------|----------------|------|----------------|------|----------------|
| 11 MAY 63 |                |      |                |      |                |
| 5120      | 1642.57 207.09 | 5121 | 1813.92 230.06 | 5122 | 1945.26 253.03 |
| 5123      | 2116.61 276.00 | 5124 | 2247.95 298.97 |      |                |
| 12 MAY 63 |                |      |                |      |                |
| 5125      | 19.30 321.94   | 5126 | 150.64 344.91  | 5127 | 321.99 7.89    |
| 5128      | 453.33 30.86   | 5129 | 624.67 53.83   | 5130 | 756.02 76.80   |
| 5131      | 927.36 99.77   | 5132 | 1058.70 122.74 | 5133 | 1230.05 145.71 |
| 5134      | 1401.39 168.68 | 5135 | 1532.73 191.65 | 5136 | 1704.07 214.62 |
| 5137      | 1835.41 237.59 | 5138 | 2006.75 260.56 | 5139 | 2138.09 283.53 |
| 5140      | 2309.43 306.50 |      |                |      |                |
| 13 MAY 63 |                |      |                |      |                |
| 5141      | 40.77 329.47   | 5142 | 212.11 352.44  | 5143 | 343.45 15.41   |
| 5144      | 514.79 38.38   | 5145 | 646.13 61.35   | 5146 | 817.46 84.32   |
| 5147      | 948.80 107.29  | 5148 | 1120.14 130.26 | 5149 | 1251.47 153.23 |
| 5150      | 1422.81 176.20 | 5151 | 1554.15 199.16 | 5152 | 1725.48 222.13 |
| 5153      | 1856.82 245.10 | 5154 | 2028.15 268.07 | 5155 | 2159.49 291.04 |
| 5156      | 2330.82 314.01 |      |                |      |                |
| 14 MAY 63 |                |      |                |      |                |
| 5157      | 102.16 336.98  | 5158 | 233.49 359.94  | 5159 | 404.82 22.91   |
| 5160      | 536.16 45.88   | 5161 | 707.49 68.85   | 5162 | 838.82 91.82   |
| 5163      | 1010.15 114.79 | 5164 | 1141.49 137.75 | 5165 | 1312.82 160.72 |
| 5166      | 1444.16 183.69 | 5167 | 1615.48 206.66 | 5168 | 1746.81 229.62 |
| 5169      | 1918.14 252.59 | 5170 | 2049.47 275.56 | 5171 | 2220.80 298.53 |
| 5172      | 2352.13 321.49 |      |                |      |                |
| 15 MAY 63 |                |      |                |      |                |
| 5173      | 123.46 344.46  | 5174 | 254.78 7.43    | 5175 | 426.11 30.39   |
| 5176      | 557.44 53.36   | 5177 | 728.77 76.33   | 5178 | 900.09 99.30   |
| 5179      | 1031.42 122.26 | 5180 | 1202.75 145.23 | 5181 | 1334.07 168.19 |
| 5182      | 1503.40 191.16 | 5183 | 1636.72 214.13 | 5184 | 1808.05 237.09 |
| 5185      | 1939.37 260.06 | 5186 | 2110.70 283.03 | 5187 | 2242.02 305.99 |
| 16 MAY 63 |                |      |                |      |                |
| 5188      | 13.34 328.96   | 5189 | 144.67 351.92  | 5190 | 315.99 14.89   |
| 5191      | 447.31 37.85   | 5192 | 618.63 60.82   | 5193 | 749.96 83.79   |
| 5194      | 921.28 106.75  | 5195 | 1052.60 129.72 | 5196 | 1223.92 152.68 |
| 5197      | 1355.24 175.65 | 5198 | 1526.56 198.61 | 5199 | 1657.88 221.58 |
| 5200      | 1829.20 244.54 | 5201 | 2000.52 267.51 | 5202 | 2131.84 290.47 |
| 5203      | 2303.16 313.44 |      |                |      |                |
| 17 MAY 63 |                |      |                |      |                |
| 5204      | 34.47 336.40   | 5205 | 205.79 359.36  | 5206 | 337.11 22.33   |
| 5207      | 508.43 45.29   | 5208 | 639.74 68.26   | 5209 | 811.06 91.22   |
| 5210      | 942.38 114.19  |      |                |      |                |

PART III. REDUCTION TO OTHER LATITUDES AND HEIGHTS FOR REV 5165  
 LAT MINUTES LONG HEIGHT LAT MINUTES LONG HEIGHT  
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|       |       |        |        |       |       |        |        |
|-------|-------|--------|--------|-------|-------|--------|--------|
| SN 00 | .00   | .00    | 337.0  | NS 00 | 45.63 | 191.50 | 330.4  |
| SN 10 | 2.53  | 359.25 | 338.2  | NS 10 | 48.17 | 190.76 | 330.3  |
| SN 20 | 5.08  | 358.41 | 340.6  | NS 20 | 50.71 | 189.92 | 331.6  |
| SN 30 | 7.64  | 357.37 | 343.8  | NS 30 | 53.25 | 188.89 | 334.0  |
| SN 40 | 10.20 | 355.95 | 347.5V | NS 40 | 55.63 | 187.48 | 337.2  |
| SN 50 | 12.79 | 353.81 | 351.3V | NS 50 | 58.39 | 185.36 | 340.9V |
| SN 60 | 15.41 | 350.14 | 354.7V | NS 60 | 61.01 | 181.74 | 344.3V |
| SN 70 | 18.11 | 342.48 | 357.4V | NS 70 | 63.70 | 174.22 | 347.6V |
| SN 80 | 21.23 | 314.63 | 358.7V | NS 80 | 66.81 | 147.15 | 350.0V |
| N PT  | 22.82 | 276.62 | 358.7  | S PT  | 68.40 | 109.86 | 350.6  |
| NS 00 | 24.42 | 237.94 | 358.0  | SN 00 | 69.99 | 70.53  | 350.8  |
| NS 10 | 27.53 | 209.28 | 355.3  | SN 10 | 73.10 | 41.63  | 349.8  |
| NS 20 | 30.23 | 201.46 | 351.6  | SN 20 | 75.79 | 33.05  | 347.9  |
| NS 30 | 32.85 | 197.74 | 347.2  | SN 30 | 78.41 | 29.28  | 345.3  |
| NS 40 | 35.43 | 195.57 | 342.6  | SN 40 | 80.95 | 27.09  | 342.5  |
| NS 50 | 37.99 | 194.14 | 338.2  | SN 50 | 83.55 | 25.64  | 339.9  |
| NS 60 | 40.54 | 193.09 | 334.5  | SN 60 | 86.11 | 24.59  | 337.9  |
| NS 70 | 43.09 | 192.25 | 331.8  | SN 70 | 88.65 | 23.75  | 336.9  |
| NS 80 | 45.63 | 191.50 | 330.4  | SN 80 | 91.33 | 22.96  | 336.9  |

PART IV.

|       |       |       |       |       |        |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|
| SATOR | 62241 | 51105 | 3479Z | 8212X | NOWES  |
| 03917 | 20846 | ARPER | 24310 | 2239X | PERIOD |
| 91288 | 00034 | ECCEN | 00090 | PERRA | 41673  |
| RAFRE | RADEG | 27281 |       |       |        |

Mr. MEADER. That was the first page. In other words, the "AU" means that it is in orbit around the Sun and not around the Earth.

Mr. BROCKETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. REID. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Reid.

Mr. REID. Might I ask what the notation there under the USSR "computations in progress" refers to. When did this launch occur and what is meant by "computations in progress"?

Mr. BROCKETT. This means that NORAD does not have, apparently means that NORAD does not have enough tracking information available to describe the orbit.

Mr. REID. What was the date of the orbit?

Mr. BROCKETT. I don't know, sir.

Mr. REID. You did not have the date of the orbit or the launch. Did it occur between February and April?

Mr. BROCKETT. Yes, between the 19th of February and the 3rd of April. Normally that would have been shown. I think this may be a mistake. You will notice going through the other pages of the report there will occasionally be a satellite where it says "insufficient observations."

Mr. HARDY. Does this mean that the Soviet Union only has four orbital bodies now in orbit?

Mr. BROCKETT. No, sir; it does not necessarily mean this. This is just one page of the report.

Mr. HARDY. Well, of the launches in 1962 and 1963. Your 1962 is—

Mr. BROCKETT. It is part of it, yes, sir.

Mr. HARDY. But launches made during that period, they only have four.

Mr. BROCKETT. That is correct, sir.

Dr. SIMPSON. Wait a minute; I think we had better say these are the launches reported to us by NORAD.

Mr. HARDY. That is just the point I was leading up to. So that there may be a whole flock of others launched during that same period that you haven't told us about.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MOSS. Are there further questions? Apparently we have no further questions on this.

Dr. SIMPSON. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that we do have also a slide on this NORAD Prediction Bulletin. It is, as you know, a somewhat similar kind of thing but more complicated.

If the committee should want that, we will be happy to put it on.

Mr. MOSS. Does the subcommittee desire to see the page on the screen?

Mr. HARDY. I don't know what it is. Let's look at it a minute.

Mr. BROCKETT. This is what we call an equator crossing bulletin. It comes in four parts.

The first part is the upper three lines. You can see Bulletin 36, 62, Omega I" provides the fairly precise orbital elements of the satellite.

Part II you will notice May 11, May 12, May 13 provides the revolution numbers of the satellite. The time and the longitude measured

west from Greenwich of where the south and north crossing of the equator will occur for each orbit.

Part III takes one typical orbit, normally in the middle. This time you will notice reduction to other latitudes and heights for revolution 5165, which if you will notice, 5165 occurs on the 14th of May.

On the right is the center of the column there. This for every 10 degrees of latitude provides the position and the altitude of the satellite.

Now part IV is so-called Sator code, which again is a representation of the satellite orbital elements in another form. The top and the bottom, the first part and the fourth part essentially give the same information, but some people like to use this, the bottom code, rather than the upper. They both give the same information.

Mr. Moss. Thank you. Mr. Meader.

#### STATUTORY AUTHORITY REVIEWED

Mr. MEADER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to go back to the statutory basis for providing access to information.

The chairman read from section 2454 of title 42 of the code. I want to read the first sentence again because I want to relate it to section 2451:

Information obtained or developed by the Administrator in the performance of his functions under this chapter shall be made available for public inspection.

Section 2451 under (c) (5) reads as follows—and this, I would take it, would be the statement of the objectives of the act. It starts:

General provisions, congressional declaration of policy and purpose—and under 2451(c) (5) we find this:

The preservation of the role of the United States as a leader in aeronautical and space science and technology and in the application thereof to the conduct of peaceful activities within and outside the atmosphere.

Now if that does not involve a comparison with space activities of other governments, I can't understand what that means, and it seems to me it is definitely one of the functions of the Administrator, and, when related to the section 2454—access to information—it seems to me it does impose a statutory obligation upon the Administrator to be advised of space activities of foreign governments and to make that information available to the public.

Dr. SIMPSON. I certainly agree with the first part, sir, and I hope never indicated that NASA tried to do its business without reference to what is going on in Russia.

The second part I cannot agree with, because it obviously would violate security regulations now in effect. It involves classified information.

Mr. MEADER. No one is questioning subsections (a) and (b) to section 2454 with respect to information which is classified.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MEADER. But we are not talking about classified information, and you cannot escape the obligation to make information public.

Dr. SIMPSON. Oh, no, sir.

Mr. MEADER. By referring to classified information, because we are not talking about that.

Dr. SIMPSON. All right, sir. Yes, sir, I agree that we should make all information on the Russian space effort which we have that is unclassified available, and I think you will find, sir, that we are doing this. Now then, we come to the question of assessment, which is where this began, and that is a different matter.

Mr. MEADER. I am not trying to make that point.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

#### INFORMATION CLASSIFICATION UNCHALLENGED

Mr. MEADER. But I may have misunderstood you, and I hope I did. But my understanding is that if there is information about a Russian space activity which the Russians themselves have made public, but our Defense Department or NORAD undertakes to classify that information, you will respect that classification, and even though it is already made public, you would not observe 2454 in making this information available to the American public, notwithstanding the fact it was already available to them, if they could speak Russian or maybe some other foreign newspaper might have carried the story.

Dr. SIMPSON. Sir, I must agree, as members of the committee staff have known all along, that this is not on the surface a reasonable posture. I agree with that.

But I do not know what other considerations there are that must be taken into account by the people who make these determinations. I am not willing to think that they don't see this as you see it on the surface, and I must simply ask you to find out from them, if it can be found out, what these considerations are.

I am not going to sit here and say that I don't see what you are talking about, that this does not look on the surface like an unreasonable situation. I have seen this all along, ever since I took this job.

However, we are responsive to the fact that there may very well be other considerations which the Government as a whole takes into account in these matters, and I simply must direct you to those who do this.

Mr. Moss. Dr. Simpson, I think we must go back to 1958 at the time of the creation of the special committee of the House and of the Senate, to determine the type of agency which the Congress desired to create for the purpose of permitting the United States to fully engage in space exploration and the development of new technology.

We recognized at that time that there was a considerable interest in having this function performed within the military departments of our Government.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. Moss. But the Congress determined that this would be a civilian agency, not a military agency.

I said I played a role in having this provision guaranteeing information placed in the statute. The report of the Select Committee of the 85th Congress details all of the efforts of the subcommittee—working with Congressman McCormack and then Senator Lyndon Johnson, who was chairman of the committee on the Senate side—to bring about the inclusion of clear language in the statute.

## PROBLEM OF DECLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Perhaps one of the most difficult things we have to do in this committee is to deal with the problem of classified information. This is sacrosanct; don't touch it.

I speak the sentiments of every member of this committee and, I think, of the House, when I say that when there is properly classified information bearing upon the security of this Nation we have no desire to have it exposed to public view or to make it easy for any foreign power to have knowledge of it.

But, there is an easy method here to delegate responsibilities imposed on the civilian agency, and I am concerned as to whether or not that hasn't already happened. Apparently NASA takes the direction of the Department of Defense, without question.

Now is it a fact that the agency is satisfied that it is getting full information and is making that information available to the American public within the bounds of security?

Dr. SIMPSON. I don't have any reason to think—and as I have told you, I am not on all the councils on these things, but I do not have any reason to think—that anything is being improperly withheld from us.

Mr. Moss. You are satisfied that you get every bit of information. I am particularly interested in the fact that these satellite situation reports do not include failures of the Russians.

Do you get information on Russian failures?

Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir.

Mr. Moss. You do not?

Dr. SIMPSON. No.

Mr. Moss. You mean that the space agency charged with developing the policies of our Government—

Dr. SIMPSON. I beg your pardon; let me be clear. I have in mind this particular report.

The space agency and the properly constituted officials of the space agency do receive information that is available to the Government as a whole on these matters, I am sure, but I do not know the nature or the times or what not.

I think you would have to pursue this, if I may respectfully suggest, in executive session with the people who really both give and receive this information in its entirety.

I am not myself involved in knowing everything that is received in NASA at the highest levels of classification. With all respect, sir, I am not trying to be evasive.

Mr. Moss. I realize you are not trying to be evasive. Do you feel that you as a top, I assume, policymaker in NASA—

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. Moss (continuing). Have full information on Russian affairs?

Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir, I do not. I don't have any reason to know that I do; no, sir. I have not been told that I know all about Russian failures. It is possible that I do, but I don't have any knowledge of my own or any participation in any committee or group that would—

Mr. Moss. Do you feel that you have all the information you require in the discharge of your duties?



Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir; I really do. I feel that our duties are, as I have said earlier, focused first on the development of our own program and its publication, on the gathering of the unclassified information. This whole matter of classification.

Mr. Moss. That is our stumbling block. The minute you say unclassified—

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir; but that is what we deal in. That is the kind of information NASA has.

#### NASA'S ROLE IN OBTAINING INFORMATION

Mr. Moss. Without any disrespect to the Department of Defense, I would point out that under the former Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson, a special committee was appointed, chaired by a very distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts, the former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Charles Coolidge. In addition to the civilian members, there were four general officers of the four military services serving on that committee.

You know they made the same finding the Government Information Subcommittee had made about a year earlier; that about 90 percent of the material they dealt with of a classified nature was either needlessly classified or overclassified.

I am just concerned as to how much attention the Administrator of NASA, having this responsibility by statute, is paying to the nature of the classification itself, to make certain that it does bear upon the security of this Nation.

Dr. SIMPSON. Well, sir; I—

Mr. Moss. I hope he is not delegating it and having it unilaterally determined by the Department of Defense.

Dr. SIMPSON. I think you will find, sir, that both Mr. Webb, and especially Dr. Dryden, whom you know, who is out of the country today, have watched this very carefully, and that certainly in this area, as in other areas, they not not lack for energy and application.

Now whether what they do would be exactly agreeable to your thoughts is another matter, but I am sure especially Dr. Dryden is active in this, and he has a long background of declassification experience.

Mr. Moss. I want now, Mr. Archibald, to have you arrange for Mr. Webb or Dr. Dryden to appear following the appearance of Assistant Secretary of Defense Arthur Sylvester, because I think it is most important to this inquiry that we have a full understanding of the role NASA plays in determining the information it is to receive from the Department of Defense.

Mr. Hardy?

Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, I was interested in the discussion that you had just a minute ago. Dr. Simpson, I understood your testimony to be that you get all the information that you need for the conduct of your duties, is that right?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir. My duties are to carry out the intent and the letter of the space act, which is to put forth—I mean this is one of my duties, the particular one under discussion—all the information, scientific and otherwise, developed in the space effort that is not classified. That is the definition of my duties.



Mr. HARDY. Wait a minute, maybe we ought to have your job description up here to look at, but I always get myself confused in trying to understand some of the titles. I believe your title is Assistant Director for Policy Planning?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARDY. What kind of policy do you plan? In other words, I am not being facetious now. I am trying to understand how in the world, if you are planning policy, how you can do it and be as ignorant as you profess to be with respect to Russian failures. Don't they have anything to do with your policy planning? Are you operating in a vacuum?

Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir; I am not operating in a total vacuum.

Mr. HARDY. A total vacuum?

Dr. SIMPSON. And NASA gets certain information. I assume Mr. Webb and the highest officers get the full information. I get certain parts of it.

#### JOB DESCRIPTION REQUESTED

Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, let's get his job description up here, and see just what he does do, because you are Assistant Director for Policy Planning?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

[NASA Management Manual, pt. I, No. 2-1-6, ch. 2, General Management Instructions, effective Apr. 26, 1963]

#### FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITY—ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR TECHNOLOGY UTILIZATION AND POLICY PLANNING

1. *Purpose.*—This instruction establishes the responsibility, functions, and authority of the Assistant Administrator for Technology Utilization and Policy Planning.

2. *Organizational location.*—The Assistant Administrator for Technology Utilization and Policy Planning reports to the Administrator.

3. *Responsibility.*—The Assistant Administrator for Technology Utilization and Policy Planning is responsible for assisting in the planning and integration of agency policy; evaluating the socioeconomic impact of aeronautics and space programs; dissemination of public information, technical information, and educational materials and services; and insuring the most effective utilization of technological and scientific innovations arising from the national space program.

4. *Functions.*—The Assistant Administrator for Technology Utilization and Policy Planning will—

(a) As directed by the Administrator, anticipate, identify, and develop for general management consideration the basic questions and issues essential to policy formulation and planning.

(b) Devise techniques for determining the socioeconomic impact of the space program.

(c) Evaluate NASA accomplishments in terms of the social, political, and economic implications and the accomplishment of national goals.

(d) Develop and direct a comprehensive program of public services and information to satisfy the Agency's statutory responsibility to "provide for the widest practicable and appropriate dissemination of information concerning its activities and the results thereof."

(e) Develop and direct a program of scientific and technical information relative to the space program to meet the needs of NASA scientific and technical offices and the scientific and engineering communities generally.

(f) Develop and direct a program of educational materials and services in the area of space related disciplines.

(g) Develop and direct a program to identify and disseminate substantive or conceptual innovations arising in the course of NASA programs which are potentially applicable to the national productive effort.

(h) Represent NASA in areas that are predominantly of a social science nature.

5. *Scope of authority.*—The Assistant Administrator for Technology Utilization and Policy Planning is authorized to take such action as is necessary to carry out the functions assigned to him within such limitations as may be established by the Administrator or by applicable law or regulation. He is authorized to redelegate to personnel under his jurisdiction such of his functions and authority as he may consider necessary and which are not specifically restricted to him.

6. *Relationships with other NASA officials.*—(a) *The Administrator, Deputy Administrator, and Associate Administrator.*—The Assistant Administrator for Technology Utilization and Policy Planning is the principal adviser to Agency management on the socioeconomic implications of policy and operational management decisions. In this capacity he participates in the decisionmaking process, both on his own initiative and at the request of the Administrator and other top management officials.

(b) *Directors of Headquarters Program and Staff Offices.*—The Assistant Administrator for Technology Utilization and Policy Planning advises and supports the headquarters program and staff office directors and their staffs on all matters concerning the technology utilization, public information, and policy planning needs and implications of their activities. His relationships include, but are not restricted to—

(1) Serving the needs of the offices for scientific and technical information.

(2) Planning, coordinating, and executing the preparation and dissemination of both general and specific public, scientific, technical, industrial, and educational materials.

(3) Coordinating the management or support of scientific and industrial conferences as required by program needs.

(c) *Directors of Field Installations and Staffs:* The Assistant Administrator for Technology Utilization and Policy Planning serves as adviser to the Directors of NASA field installations on matters relating to his counterpart activities.


7. *Approval of organization.*—The basic organization for the Assistant Administrator for Technology Utilization and Policy Planning is outlined in the attached chart (attachment A). Changes in the basic organization of this office are subject to the approval of the Administrator.

8. *Revision.*—General Management Instruction 2-1-6 (TS-367), January 24, 1962.

JAMES E. WEBB, *Administrator.*

General Management Instruction 2-1-6

ATTACHMENT A



Mr. HARDY. And if you are as ignorant about what goes on in foreign launches as you have given me to believe you are, I am a little worried about how you can carry out your job properly. I don't believe you are being told enough to let you do what you are being paid to do.

Dr. SIMPSON. Sir, I am not entirely ignorant. You asked me if I had reason to—I don't have reason to know that I am learning everything that goes on in Russia or in the space effort.

Mr. HARDY. I just don't like for your superiors or other agencies of the Government to put you in a position that you cannot do your job properly. It bothers me. I think we may have some other people in Government in that same fix.

Dr. SIMPSON. Well, sir, I feel that I have access to sufficient—

Mr. HARDY. If you did not feel so, you would be foolish to stay in your job.

Dr. SIMPSON. I do feel so.

Mr. HARDY. That is a rather self-serving statement, you must admit that, and you wouldn't be prejudiced by any means, would you, about that?

Dr. SIMPSON. Sure I am prejudiced.

#### NASA'S AUTHORITY TO CLASSIFY INFORMATION

Mr. HARDY. Well, let's not pursue that, but let me just ask you one other question. Does NASA in itself have any authority to classify information?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir; I think we do.

Mr. HARDY. Who has the authority in NASA? Do you?

Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir. The final authority would rest with the Administrator.

Mr. HARDY. I am not talking about the final authority. I am trying to talk about where the actual authority is.

Dr. SIMPSON. That is the actual authority.

Mr. HARDY. All right, the Administrator then does have authority to classify information?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARDY. Is that right?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir; I think that is right.

Mr. HARDY. Has he ever done it?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARDY. He has done it?

Dr. SIMPSON. I think so.

Mr. HARDY. Then can we understand that the classification of information which NASA gathers itself and refuses to disseminate because of classification is due to a classification imposed by the Administrator or a classification imposed by the Department of Defense?

Dr. SIMPSON. All classifications, from whatever source of course must be approved by the Administrator. But the bulk of—

Mr. HARDY. No, no, no; classification doesn't have to be approved by the Administrator, because if you have data that is classified by the Department of Defense, you must, by law, respect it.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir; but I mean it must go through his office. I don't just accept a classification that has not been approved by my superiors. That is my point.

Mr. HARDY. If you get hold of a document, I don't care what agency of defense has classified it, you have to respect that classification.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARDY. Regardless of whether Mr. Webb has ever seen it.

Dr. SIMPSON. That is true, sir.

Mr. HARDY. And if you don't, you are in violation of the law.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir; I understand that, but I mean I understand this to be his directive to me in terms of my job.

But with reference to the organization of classification, the point I am trying to make is that people down the line do not unilaterally go over and agree with somebody to classify or declassify things on their own. This is the point I am trying to make. This is no capricious—

Mr. HARDY. That was not what I was asking you.

Dr. SIMPSON. All right, sir.

Mr. HARDY. What I was trying to determine is that you must get some information about foreign launches.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARDY. On your own.

Dr. SIMPSON. I am cleared up to a certain level, sir. There is no question about it.

Mr. HARDY. I am not talking about classified information. I am talking about information put out by foreign governments.

I would think that—maybe you don't, and maybe your agency hasn't grown up enough to get them yet, but I would think—that NASA would be collecting on its own certain information with respect to foreign progress in space activities.

Now the question is simply this. Having developed that information on your own, do you classify it or do you refuse to classify it because you asked the Department of Defense won't you classify this so we can't release it?

Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir; we don't ask the Department of Defense to classify anything so we can't release it. If in the rare occasions that we think something should be classified, we do it for substantive reasons.

Mr. HARDY. The thing that I am trying to understand is this. If you get information from the Department of Defense which carries a defense classification, you have got to respect it.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes.

Mr. HARDY. And that is as it should be.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARDY. There isn't any question of that.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARDY. But if you get information independently, then the question in my mind is why you wait to get the Department of Defense to act on it and make its own determination, before you take action with respect to determining whether it should or should not be released.

Dr. SIMPSON. Because we are part of the Government, sir, and we are responding in these cases to the fact that we are part of the Government—

Mr. HARDY. Well, I am in the Government too.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARDY. If I picked up information of that kind, then you are trying to tell me that I should wait and find out—now this is publicly announced in the foreign country, and it comes to my attention.

Maybe I could listen to a radio broadcast and get an official announcement of a foreign government, and if I spoke to you about it,

you would stick a classification on it so I couldn't say anything about it until Defense had cleared it; is that right?

Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir, we would not prohibit you from saying it; but, we would not put it out.

Let me say this, sir. One reason that this has some meaning to us is that NASA does not track Russian launches; we don't have any information of our own. Anything we hear from Russia is not necessarily to be believed, sir.

Mr. Moss. Mr. Reid?

#### NO COMMENT ON SOVIET SPACE FAILURES

Mr. REID. Dr. Simpson, could you comment to this subcommittee on Soviet space failures?

Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir.

Mr. REID. You are not in a position to comment this morning?

Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir.

Mr. REID. On Soviet space failures?

Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir.

Mr. REID. Let me ask you this. Are we to understand that, before a regularly constituted committee of the Congress, in light of the statute that the chairman has read, that Mr. Hardy and Mr. Meader have referred to, you are unable here this morning, on behalf of NASA, in public session, to make any comment, obviously of an unclassified character, of any sort, to this committee and to the American people on Soviet space failures?

Am I to understand, and are the American people to understand, that you are unable in any respect to comment on Soviet space failures?

Dr. SIMPSON. Well, no, sir. There have been failures. That is clearly known. I am not in a position, as you know, by the regulations that have been discussed here, to—

Mr. REID. If I may interject very clearly on that: What do you think the American people should know about Soviet space failures? Do you think they should be informed as to Soviet space failures?

Dr. SIMPSON. Sir, I don't have, in pursuit of my duties, any reason that I know of, in regard to the NASA space program, not to inform them. I am in the business of informing people.

However, as you well know, these are matters that are determined outside of NASA. I can't go beyond that.

Mr. REID. I am trying to indicate a broad question here, but I hope it is clear. Do you think the American people are entitled to information on Soviet space failures?

Dr. SIMPSON. Sir, in my job the presumption, the premise is that the American people are entitled to all information.

When their duly elected representatives in the Congress, and the people in the executive branch who are executing statutes passed by the Congress, classify certain information, then, as you know, that is another matter.

Mr. Moss. Dr. Simpson, I think Congressman Reid asked if you felt in a specific area the American people were entitled to the information.

Now, if you are under some restraint here because it is your conviction that this touches upon classified material, then I think you

should straightforwardly tell the committee that. Otherwise, I think you should respond to the question of Mr. Reid.

Dr. SIMPSON. All right, sir. This gets over into an area of classification.

#### SOVIET FAILURES TERMED CLASSIFIED

Mr. REID. Am I to understand from your response to the chairman that there is no area here this morning, on behalf of NASA, that you can report to the American people on, with regard to Soviet space failures?

Dr. SIMPSON. There is no area that we can report on?

Mr. REID. Here this morning on Soviet space failures.

Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir.

Mr. REID. So, to put the question the other way, any space failure in your judgment at this time is classified?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir, unless released by the appropriate agency.

Mr. REID. Now, that is a technical judgment as to the authority, and whether it is national security, and so on.

But, I think the American people might infer from your comment here this morning that there is nothing that they can be told about Soviet space failures at this time. Is that a correct implication, or isn't it? Either it is classified or it isn't.

Dr. SIMPSON. It is classified; yes, sir.

Mr. REID. Then there is nothing on Soviet space failures here this morning you can report to the American people that is not classified?

Dr. SIMPSON. Any Soviet failure that is unclassified has appeared in the satellite situation report. I don't know exactly how many. I know the two that you referred to last August and September are in the satellite situation report. They would be classified.

Mr. REID. Can we ask you another question here? Do you know of any Russian launches—more particularly, Russian failures—that have not been reported to the American people?

Dr. SIMPSON. I will be happy to answer that question in executive session, sir.

Mr. REID. This isn't a classified query, in my judgment. You merely have to say there are Russian failures that have not been reported, and you think, for reasons of classification, they shouldn't be.

Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir.

Mr. REID. What I am trying to get is a yes or no.

Dr. SIMPSON. Please, sir, you are asking me to report in open session on information which I received through classified sources. I will do whatever the chairman directs me to do. If he thinks it is proper for me to do it, I will. I don't think so.

Mr. MEADER. I don't understand that answering that question yes or no would in itself be a release of classified information.

Mr. HARDY. It could be.

Mr. MOSS. The chairman is very, very sympathetic to the convictions of the gentleman from New York, and shares his concern over the inability to get an answer.

But, having worked with classified information for a period of some 8 years, I recognize that, on occasion, it may not be proper for a witness to respond to a question, in an open hearing, and therefore



the Chair will not direct an answer; but, we will request that the next witness from NASA be prepared to respond fully to that when the gentleman places the question to him again in executive session.

Mr. REID. Thank you. And just to keep the record clear, let me just add a clearly unclassified question in open session on behalf of this committee, my colleagues, the American people. Is there anything that you can comment on, that you want to add to your comments or to the record, on Soviet space failures?

Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir, I don't have any.

#### SOVIET FAILURES LISTED IN LETTER

Mr. MEADER. You would not object, Dr. Simpson, to putting in our record this correspondence between the two chairmen of the space committees of Congress and the Administrator of NASA—letter of September 4, 1962 and September 5, 1962—which I understand does not have classified information, and does report on six Soviet space failures?

Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir. I referred to that letter. I assumed you meant general statements or anything other than that. No, sir; I referred to that letter. Yes, sir.

Mr. MEADER. May I ask you this question, then? I don't know how that letter of September 5, 1962, could have been released so fast, if it contained classified information. This letter must have been hand delivered the next day. I never saw such speed in any Government agency to answer a letter the following day. It says and recites—

Mr. HARDY. They promoted the inquiry, perhaps, George.

Mr. MEADER (reading):

In response to this proposal, inquiry was made appropriate agencies of this Government. The response was as follows.

And then the rest is all in quotation marks, and identifies the six failures by date, and with apparently rather complete information.

Now, my question is this. Subsequent to September 5, 1962, have there been other releases of information by NASA, or any other agency of the Government, to your knowledge, concerning Russian space failures?

Dr. SIMPSON. I don't know of any. I want to be sure about this. I do not, myself, remember any. No, sir; not to my knowledge, no, sir.

Mr. MEADER. I have a question on another subject that I would like to ask if I may.

Mr. MOSS. I wonder if we could pursue this just a moment. Dr. Simpson, at my direction the staff prepared some questions which were submitted to you about a week ago.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MOSS. They relate to this letter from Mr. Webb, Administrator of the Space Agency. If you cannot respond to these questions, I hope you will indicate very briefly that you cannot.

Mr. MEADER. First, are you going to put these letters in the record?

Mr. MOSS. Is there objection to the inclusion of the correspondence between the chairman of the House and Senate committees and the Space Administrator? Hearing none, it will be included in the record at this point.



(The letters referred to follow:)

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES,  
September 4, 1962.

HON. JAMES E. WEBB,  
*Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration,*  
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR DIRECTOR WEBB: In the past weeks there have been two reports in the press which have troubled us as chairmen of the House and Senate Committees on Space: (1) The Saturday morning newspapers carried an article reporting that the Soviet Union failed in an attempt to successfully send a space vehicle to Venus on August 25, 1962. (2) On August 30, 1962, Dr. L. I. Sedov, a leading Soviet space expert was interviewed by a professor of Tokyo University. The question was asked: Since the Soviet Union has never made an advance announcement of launchings, some people suspect that there have been unsuccessful launchings in the past; would you tell me the truth, say, confidentially? Sedov: The Soviet Union makes an announcement as soon as a rocket is launched. There is no substantial difference between the Soviet Union and the United States in the way of announcement. If there is any failure, it must be known to the world.

It is our clear understanding that the Soviet Union does not announce all of its shots and therefore Dr. Sedov's answer appears to be in conflict with the information in our possession. Dr. Sedov's statement and the report of the Venus shot failure are so patently at variance that we feel it is important that if the United States Government possesses any information relative to unsuccessful attempts by the Soviet Union to launch a spacecraft to Venus, or other planetary probes, that this information should be made available to our committees and to the American people.

The world must of necessity admire the remarkable achievements of the Soviet Union in the field of space. A shadow is thrown over the entire space effort through their refusal to admit to failures. The United States is not without its failures, but we operate in a free society and our failures, as well as our successes, are made known to all.

We would appreciate an answer to this letter promptly.

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE P. MILLER,  
*Chairman, House Committee on Science and Astronautics.*  
ROBERT S. KERR,  
*Chairman, Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee.*

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION,  
Washington, D.C., September 5, 1962.

HON. ROBERT S. KERR,  
*Chairman, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, U.S. Senate,*  
*Washington, D.C.*

HON. GEORGE P. MILLER,  
*Chairman, Committee on Science and Astronautics, House of Representatives,*  
*Washington, D.C.*

GENTLEMEN: I agree. The Soviet's broad policy of announcing successes but declining to admit failure does cast a shadow over their entire space effort—remarkable as it might be.

You jointly proposed that if the U.S. Government possesses any information relative to unsuccessful planetary probes by the Soviet Union, that this information should be made available to your committees and to the American people.

In response to this proposal, inquiry was made of appropriate agencies of this Government. The response was as follows:

"The Soviet Union has pursued a vigorous but unsuccessful program to send instrumented space probes to the planets. Thus far, two attempts have been made to send spacecraft to Mars and four to Venus. Of these six attempts, only one probe was successfully launched on an interplanetary path, the Venus probe of February 12, 1961. However, it was only a qualified success because its radio transmission failed after several days, long before it reached Venus. None of the five remaining attempts achieved a successful trajectory because of rocket vehicle malfunctions.

"The same mission-planning philosophy and vehicle combination was used on each of the Soviet interplanetary series. A parking orbit technique is consistently exploited, whereby the first three stages attempt to launch the payload into a low Earth-satellite orbit as in the U.S. Mariner program. After one passage around the Earth, the fourth or ejection stage is fired over Africa. If successful, this sends the instrumented probe on a ballistic path to the planets. Had the launching been successful in each of the six cases listed below, the probe would have arrived at Venus or Mars with too high a velocity to have been orbited around either planet. Optimum conditions were chosen for each launching attempted thus far so as to simplify the task of either guidance or performance—or both.

"(1) October 10, 1960: An unannounced attempt to send a probe to Mars failed before a parking orbit was achieved. Had this probe been successful, it would have reached Mars in about 230 days.

"(2) October 14, 1960: A second attempt to send a probe to Mars using virtually the same trajectory also failed before a parking orbit was achieved.

"(3) February 4, 1961: The first attempt to send a spacecraft to Venus was successfully placed in its Earth-parking orbit, but could not be ejected into its planned Venus trajectory. The Soviet Union announced the launching as a successful Earth satellite Sputnik VII and claimed for it a new weight in orbit record of 14,300 pounds. Had this probe been successfully ejected, it would have taken about 105 days to reach Venus.

"(4) February 12, 1961: A partially successful attempt to send a 1,400-pound spacecraft to Venus was made on this date. All vehicle stages functioned normally, and the probe was correctly placed on its interplanetary path. The Soviet Union correctly announced that this was the first time that a spacecraft was successfully ejected outward from orbit. The probe took 97 days to reach the vicinity of Venus. The Soviets apparently experienced a failure in the power supply or radio transmitter, and the probe was last heard from at a distance of 4.5 million miles from the Earth.

"(5) August 25, 1962: A third attempt to send a probe to Venus was made on this date. The payload was successfully placed into its satellite parking orbit, but apparently could not be ejected. Had this shot been successful, the probe would have arrived at Venus on about December 7, 1962, ahead of the U.S. Mariner II. It appears that the normal flight time of 112 days for this date was intentionally shortened to 104 days by sacrificing spacecraft weight. This launching attempt has not yet been announced by the Soviet Union.

"(6) September 1, 1962: The fourth attempt to reach Venus was also successfully placed into a satellite parking orbit, but could not be ejected. The Soviet Union has not yet announced this attempt nor the presence of the unused components in orbit."

Sincerely,

JAMES E. WEBB, *Administrator.*

Mr. Moss. Now we have here an instance where, in response to the demands of the chairman of the House and Senate committees, an immediate release was made. Therefore, we could reasonably assume that there was a very quick conference, and the material was declassified or that it had never been classified. Can you tell me which was the case?

Dr. SIMPSON. I do not know, sir. I had just got to town that very day, and I was not involved in this at that time at all.

Mr. Moss. Now if security was not breached in this instance, then why cannot similar information be publicly disclosed now.

Dr. SIMPSON. That is a classified matter, sir.

#### INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO CONGRESS

Mr. Moss. Is this type of information always available to the appropriate committees of the House and the Senate?

Dr. SIMPSON. I would think so. I don't of my own knowledge know that this is true, because I don't deal with this information in my department.

Mr. MOSS. Would you determine that?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MOSS. And supply it to the staff administrator of this subcommittee for inclusion in the record at this point, a definite response to that question.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

(The information referred to follows:)

It has been the policy of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the policy continues, to cooperate completely in satisfying the legitimate needs of all committees on informational matters.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Meader, do you wish to continue now?

Mr. MEADER. Dr. Simpson, I note from your biographical sketch that you were Assistant Administrator for Public Affairs of NASA until March 21 of this year, having assumed that position on September 1, 1962.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

#### NASA INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Mr. MEADER. I have been interested in the number of people and the amount of money involved in publicity and propaganda activities of agencies of the Government.

Could you give this committee any information about the number of people in NASA that are engaged in press relations and public relations and publications work?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir. In our NASA operations here we have a total of 173 on board. May I break this down?

Mr. MEADER. Yes.

Dr. SIMPSON. We have a total of 173 on board in my office here in Washington, of which 29, sir, are at work in the public information office. That is the core of what I take it you are talking about.

Sixty-five in the Office of Educational Programs and Services, which deals primarily with the development of educational materials for secondary education, and with the spacemobile program, which is scheduled primarily through the schools, although it is a general information activity.

Another 54 in the Office of Scientific and Technical Information, and if I may, sir, come back to our earlier discussion, it is the responsibility of this office to gather all scientific and technical information in NASA, in general in this country and throughout the world, for publication to our people and to our own scientific community.

There are 10 people at work in the Office of Technology Utilization, and the transfer of this office to my responsibility is part of the reason for the recent change of title.

These people are concerned with working out ways to transfer the fruits, the results of the NASA research and development effort to the civilian economy.

There are in addition, then, 15 other people, including myself and my secretary, my deputy, our office staff and this kind of thing.

So, very briefly, the 29 in public service and information are the core, that is the press release group, the direct and immediate information group. The next group of 65 are primarily concerned with educational materials, with exhibits, and this kind of thing. And the others I have given.

Mr. MEADER. What is your annual budget for these 173 people?

Dr. SIMPSON. In fiscal 1963 it is \$14.7 million.

Mr. MEADER. You spoke of your Washington office. Now do you have people outside of Washington?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir. I may not have them. We do have in each Center, and I will get this if I don't have it here, but in each Center there is a group of people who perform essentially these same functions, not as duplication, but I mean we do have in each Center a public information group. We also have in each Center an educational services function, and this kind of thing. We do have people in each Center, Houston, Huntsville.

Mr. MEADER. Those are in addition to the 173?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MEADER. And the \$14.7 million?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MEADER. Is that correct?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MEADER. But you do not have those figures here.

Dr. SIMPSON. Let me just see, sir. I will get them for you, but I don't believe I have them at this moment. No, sir; but this will run to a very substantial group.

Mr. Moss. For clarification, on the \$14.7 million, that is not solely for personnel?

Dr. SIMPSON. Oh, no, sir. There are three major items here, sir.

In a sense it is personnel in the first item, that is the data storage and retrieved process which is a computer process of recording scientific and technical information, which occupies a very large part of this, some \$6 million.

Another large part is involved in the exhibit program, and another very large part in the spacemobile program. These are the major elements in this thing of expense.

Mr. MEADER. The data computer activity, collection of information and the exhibit and the spacemobile have both materials and services combined; do they, or do you separate out salaries from that?

Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir. These figures do not include salaries. These are operating funds, funds for the purchase of spacemobiles, and so on.

They include salaries in the computing operation, because that is a contract operation, and therefore the salaries of those people would be included. They do not include salaries of Government people.

Mr. MEADER. Do you have any item which would show salaries only for the 173 people?

Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir, I do not, not with me. I will get that for you.

Mr. Moss. We will hold the record at this point and receive that information.

Dr. SIMPSON. All right, sir.

(The information referred to follows:)

ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR TECHNOLOGY  
UTILIZATION AND POLICY PLANNING

*Summary of personnel and salaries—total, technology utilization and policy planning*

| <i>Category</i>                                           | <i>Number of employees</i> | <i>Annual salaries</i> |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|
| Professional.....                                         | 121                        | \$1,404,610            |
| Secretarial and clerical.....                             | 52                         | 280,410                |
| Total.....                                                | 173                        | 1,685,020              |
| <b>Office of the Assistant Administrator:<sup>1</sup></b> |                            |                        |
| Professional.....                                         | 8                          | 111,065                |
| Secretarial and clerical.....                             | 7                          | 39,930                 |
| Total.....                                                | 15                         | 150,995                |
| <b>Public services and information:</b>                   |                            |                        |
| Professional.....                                         | 20                         | 227,185                |
| Secretarial and clerical.....                             | 9                          | 44,305                 |
| Total.....                                                | 29                         | 271,490                |
| <b>Educational programs and services:</b>                 |                            |                        |
| Professional.....                                         | 44                         | 550,420                |
| Secretarial and clerical.....                             | 21                         | 113,250                |
| Total.....                                                | 65                         | 663,670                |
| <b>Scientific and technical information:</b>              |                            |                        |
| Professional.....                                         | 41                         | 423,110                |
| Secretarial and clerical.....                             | 13                         | 72,835                 |
| Total.....                                                | 54                         | 495,945                |
| <b>Office of Technology Utilization:</b>                  |                            |                        |
| Professional.....                                         | 8                          | 92,830                 |
| Secretarial and clerical.....                             | 2                          | 10,090                 |
| Total.....                                                | 10                         | 102,920                |

<sup>1</sup> Includes program development.

Mr. MEADER. And you also are supplying similar information about your field offices?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

NASA FIELD CENTER PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN FUNCTIONS COMPARABLE TO THOSE PERFORMED IN THE OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY UTILIZATION AND POLICY PLANNING—  
NASA HQ

| Category                                           | Total, all functions | Number of employees | Annual salaries |
|----------------------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-----------------|
| Professional                                       | -----                | 336                 | \$2,958,408     |
| Secretarial-clerical                               | -----                | 412                 | 1,930,090       |
| Total                                              | -----                | 748                 | 4,888,507       |
| Public services and information:                   |                      |                     |                 |
| Professional                                       | -----                | 54                  | 531,600         |
| Secretarial-clerical                               | -----                | 24                  | 103,990         |
| Total                                              | -----                | 78                  | 635,590         |
| Educational programs and services: <sup>1</sup>    |                      |                     |                 |
| Professional                                       | -----                | 92                  | 731,379         |
| Secretarial-clerical                               | -----                | 31                  | 142,100         |
| Total                                              | -----                | 123                 | 873,479         |
| Scientific and technical information: <sup>1</sup> |                      |                     |                 |
| Professional                                       | -----                | 165                 | 1,433,729       |
| Secretarial-clerical                               | -----                | 349                 | 1,646,909       |
| Total                                              | -----                | 514                 | 3,080,633       |
| Technology utilization:                            |                      |                     |                 |
| Professional                                       | -----                | 25                  | 261,700         |
| Secretarial-clerical                               | -----                | 8                   | 37,100          |
| Total                                              | -----                | 33                  | 298,800         |

<sup>1</sup> Contains some estimated data.

Mr. MEADER. Do you have any operations overseas?

Dr. SIMPSON. We have no permanent outpost. We do pay attention to the foreign area. We service the U.S. Information Agency on a number of occasions.

For instance, we will send a capsule to a particular place, if it is indicated as being worthwhile, this kind of thing, but we do not ourselves have any outposts or any one station overseas. We have had one man in my office who has sort of looked at this not exclusively but in general. That is about our basic operation. Our basic operation overseas is in terms of requests by the USIA and this kind of thing. This is exclusive, sir, of the scientists who deal with other scientists abroad.

That is another area which in many respects is more important than just what you put out on Telstar or this kind of thing. We encourage this because this is where you make a fundamental impact.

Mr. MEADER. How do you go about developing information on foreign space activity? You don't have any people stationed overseas for that purpose, as I understand your statement.

Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir.

Mr. MEADER. How do you get the information on foreign space activities, just depend upon the press?



Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir. We make a thorough search and review of all published material and particularly the scientific journals, of course.

Mr. MEADER. And for that purpose you have your own translators and so on?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAY. We have a translation program. It costs the Agency about \$225,000, exclusive of salaries.

Mr. MEADER. It costs the Agency \$225,000 a year?

Mr. DAY. Yes.

Mr. MEADER. Exclusive of salaries?

Mr. DAY. Exclusive of our small core group in our translation group; yes, sir. This is \$225,000, but I just mention it as part of the \$6 million-some that Dr. Simpson mentioned as being a cost of the scientific and technical information program, sir.

Mr. HARDY. Do you want to volunteer something?

#### POLICY PLANNING

Dr. SIMPSON. Sir, this is an unusual experience for me. I am volunteering all the time.

If I may say so, Mr. Chairman, this is an unusual experience for me to be clamming up. I would like to, if I may, make one remark.

It seems to me I have not done either myself or the Administrator justice on this policy planning proposition. This is a new thing. It relates to those areas that are nontechnical. That is, I am on the other side of the fence. It relates to the preparation of materials of a non-technical nature.

This is why, if I may say so, I don't have to have the entire full, complete and latest technical information to do this job. I do need to know certain things, and I think I am possessed of those things.

Mr. HARDY. You would plan the policy with respect to dissemination of information to the public?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir. That is true, and I can only say, sir—

Mr. HARDY. But you can't do it out of ignorance?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir, and I have to assume that other people in NASA other than I—

Mr. MEADER. I think I was laboring under a misapprehension, until I read your biographical sketch, and I am not sure that clears it up. I thought an Assistant Administrator for Technology Utilization and Policy Planning would be a real scientific brain.

Mr. HARDY. Well, don't think he isn't one.

Mr. MEADER. I said scientific, who would fully understand at least in general all of this space technology and be able to make plans.

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MEADER. Who would be able to decide which areas would be more fruitful for exploration, research, and so on. But you are a professor of sociology.

Dr. SIMPSON. My job, technology utilization, sir, relates to taking from the NASA effort, say, an infrared sensor that has been developed for the Mercury spacecraft, and seeing what the applications of that are, how that might be used by civilian industry.

Now that does require technical competence. We have that. A big part of the problem, however, is, of course, how do you organize this, how do you get the people involved to do it. I had my wonder as to why Mr. Webb, in some respects, wanted me to do this job, but I have had some background in this general area of developing scientific activity before I came here, so if that is any help to you—

Mr. MEADER. Do I understand that your responsibility includes the planning of the policy of NASA in how it should spend its money?

Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir.

Mr. MEADER. And how much money it should ask for?

Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir.

Mr. MEADER. That is not your kind of policy planning?

Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir.

Mr. MEADER. Your policy planing is related only to the utilization?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir, to those policies of NASA that affect the nontechnical, how much and what should we do in this utilization of technology, this kind of thing.

Mr. MEADER. Is there any other NASA policy planning, other than yourself?

Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir. The technical decisions, that is what is the next configuration, that is done by the technical people, and it is done—the title is not policy planing, but that is what it amount to in terms of what the new programs should be.

The term, program planning, is more apt there. I am not trying to make a big thing out of this. I just wanted you to understand that I did not accept a job that required me to know everything that was to know about the Russian space program.

Mr. HARDY.. Policy planning in other areas just happens? It isn't planned because they don't have anybody to do it?

Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir; there are people who do that. They just go by another title.

Mr. HARDY. They just don't have the right title.

Mr. MEADER. You have a title that sounds very important, Dr. Simpson. Your title would indicate you were running the agency and deciding in which direction it was going to go, and how many billions of dollars the American people should devote to this activity. Apparently you don't have that responsibility at all.

Dr. SIMPSON. No, sir. I think that belongs to the Administrator and to other members of the Government, including the Congress. I would participate in that, but that is not my—

Mr. HARDY. Thank you for giving us a little share of it.

Dr. SIMPSON. Thank you for contributing to the education of a college professor.

Mr. HARDY. And I will tell you right now any time we get a good Tarheel college professor, he has got the makings of a topnotcher.

Dr. SIMPSON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Archibald?

Mr. ARCHIBALD. Is Mr. Julian Scheer your deputy now for information matters, Doctor?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ARCHIBALD. Was a report recently just the other day that Col. John A. Powers resigned as the spokesman for the Mercury project because of a dispute with Mr. Scheer over the release of information?

The report was that Mr. Scheer wanted to release the flight plan for Major Cooper's MA-9 mission. Do you know anything about that situation?

Dr. SIMPSON. I don't know that this is why Mr. Powers threatened to resign. He has not threatened to resign to me.

Mr. ARCHIBALD. Was there a controversy over the release of the MA-9 flight plan?

Dr. SIMPSON. There was no controversy. There was a discussion of the matter, and the flight plan was released.

Mr. ARCHIBALD. It was released?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ARCHIBALD. Now, one other area. When you flashed the satellite situation report on the board, it listed Faith 7. If Faith 7 had not gone into orbit, would it have been listed in that report.

Dr. SIMPSON. It would have been listed as a launch—

Mr. BROCKETT. If it had not gone into orbit, it would not have been listed in the report.

Mr. ARCHIBALD. How does the American public then find out about failures from your reports about satellite shots?

Dr. SIMPSON. Well, we report the failures in other ways. We report it through press releases and announcements. It is all out in the open.

Mr. ARCHIBALD. But U.S. failures would not be included necessarily in the satellite situation report?

Dr. SIMPSON. I would not think—no, I would not think so.

Mr. ARCHIBALD. Is there any other listing of satellite situation information which would include information about failures not in the satellite situation report?

Dr. SIMPSON. I don't know of any compilation except in the open records of NASA. I mean obviously we keep records of NASA, a compilation there, and I have no reason to think these are not available or that any review of failures request would not be given.

But I do not myself know of any compilation that lists failures as such.

Mr. ARCHIBALD. What about the other document that was displayed up there? Isn't that a more regular document that is put out more often than the satellite situation report?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, it is published more often. It is not entirely regular in its frequency, but I think over a year it would be published more frequently.

Mr. ARCHIBALD. So that failures which were not included in the satellite situation report would not necessarily be in the other report either?

Dr. SIMPSON. No; I don't think so. This is in a way a new area here. I don't believe—no.

Mr. ARCHIBALD. But any information NASA has on failures would be publicly available through your routine sources?

Dr. SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ARCHIBALD. I have nothing else.

Mr. Moss. Are there any further questions? If not, Doctor, we want to thank you for your appearance. I hope it has not been an onerous experience, and that we have in fact contributed to your education. We are not trying to make things difficult for anyone. We are merely seeking information.

Dr. SIMPSON. I understand that, sir, and at the conclusion may I say that we are in the business of putting it out, and we have nothing to conceal in NASA.

Mr. Moss. The subcommittee will now adjourn. Our first witness when we next meet will be Roger Hillsman, Assistant Secretary of State, Far Eastern Affairs.

This will be in executive session, in order to gather information which previously was discussed and where answers were declined by Robert Manning, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, during the March 25 hearing.

(Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the hearing was recessed to reconvene at 10:15 a.m., Thursday, June 6, 1963.)

For the year ending 31st March 1900

By the Hon. the Secretary of State for the Colonies

LONDON: H.M.S.O. 1900

Price 1s. 6d.

Printed by the Government Printer

## **GOVERNMENT INFORMATION PLANS AND POLICIES**

### **(Part 5—National Aeronautics and Space Administration)**

**THURSDAY, JUNE 6, 1963**

**HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND  
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SUBCOMMITTEE  
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,  
Washington, D.C.**

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room 1501-B, Longworth Office Building, Hon. John E. Moss (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives John E. Moss, Porter Hardy, Jr., Henry S. Reuss, George Meader, and Ogden R. Reid.

Also present: Samuel J. Archibald, staff administrator; Jack Matteson, chief investigator; Benny L. Kass, counsel, and David Glick, counsel.

Mr. Moss. The subcommittee will be in order. We have as our witness this morning Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, Deputy Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, who is here in response to a request of the subcommittee that a spokesman of the Space Administration appear and answer questions which were not answered at the time of the appearance of Dr. George Simpson. Dr. Dryden, do you have a statement?

#### **TESTIMONY OF DR. HUGH L. DRYDEN, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION; AC- COMPANIED BY PAUL G. DEMBLING, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS**

Dr. DRYDEN. I have no formal statement, Mr. Chairman. I have one opening remark which is to say that the provision of the law which is under consideration, is one which I have been very heartily in favor of—you may recall that I carried the ball for the administration, the last administration, in presenting the legislation for the Space Act. This is one aspect in which I personally was much interested, and I appreciate your part in getting this provision into the law.

We try to implement this policy to the fullest extent. It is difficult as you know, with an organization of 30,000 people, to be sure that a random approach to any individual will get the proper expression of this policy. However, thanks to the work of this committee and others to keep us on our toes, we do have the opportunity to discover weak areas and to try to correct them.

So I just want to begin with this statement that we are heartily in favor of this policy in the Space Administration, which is not to say that we are neglecting classification problems either of the Department of Defense or the necessary classification that we may have within our own agency. But as an ideal to aim toward, and to implement as fully as possible, I believe very much in this provision of law, and our agency does.

Mr. MOSS. Thank you. I certainly would take the opportunity to have this record reflect the fact that there was a very cooperative attitude on your part at the time we were working on the final draft of this provision. I think we both know what the intent of the Congress was when it was placed in there.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes, very clearly.

Mr. MOSS. I think, Doctor, that in accordance with the practice in this series of hearings, I will ask you to be sworn.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes, indeed, sir.

Mr. MOSS. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give the subcommittee shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. DRYDEN. I do, sir.

Mr. MOSS. Will you identify yourself for the record.

Dr. DRYDEN. For the record, I am Hugh L. Dryden, Deputy Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Reid, do you have any questions at this time?

Mr. REID. Yes. I certainly want to thank Dr. Dryden formally for coming. I appreciate very much the opportunity of getting his thinking on behalf of NASA.

Have you had a chance, Dr. Dryden, to read the record at the time Dr. Simpson appeared?

Dr. DRYDEN. I generally read it, not every word. I know the general content of it, yes.

Mr. REID. I think there were several points that were raised that we thought perhaps you could respond to.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes. I will be very happy to.

#### RUSSIAN SPACE EVALUATION

Mr. REID. First of all, I think we were not wholly clear whether NASA itself had felt that it had every opportunity to evaluate for the American people the Soviet space effort which would include Soviet space failures.

Dr. Simpson seemed to indicate that your evaluation and pronouncements and what you could make public had some relationship to the Department of Defense—that there were some areas of classification involved.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. REID. We queried him as to what he could say of a nonclassified character.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. REID. I think it was somewhat the sense of the committee that as the U.S. space program has the President's support and as it involves potentially something on the order of \$5 billion, that the American people and the Congress should have a responsible evaluation from NASA, in the first instance as to exactly the nature and



success of our own space effort, measured and evaluated against the Soviet space effort, and that this was a primary responsibility. That is a very general inquiry.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes. I think as I read the testimony, there was a good bit of misunderstanding. I don't want to lecture the committee on things they already know.

We have expressed in testimony before the Congress and in speeches such general judgments on where we stand with reference to the Soviets. We have no formal bulletin issued periodically or anything of this sort. It is, however, not possible to include the detailed information obtained from intelligence activities.

As you know, NASA has no intelligence function. It is not our job to set up instrumentation and intelligence activities in order to discover what the Russian program is. This is a function essentially of the Central Intelligence Agency, assisted by the Defense Department and other agencies of the Government.

There are a limited number of people in NASA, a very limited number, who do receive regular intelligence briefings and daily information I think on all of the information that is obtained.

However, if you have had any experience with the clearances required for that information you know that you sign a statement that you will not reveal information to other people in your own organization or anywhere else, and will not discuss it except with people who have the required clearance.

So what I am trying to say is that we have, and will be ready at any time to express judgments based on all of the information which is available to us. We cannot spell out by chapter and verse the details which we get from the intelligence agency.

The Congress has available to it the power to ask the CIA to give you a briefing directly on these matters, but I am not free to transmit the information in detail.

Mr. REID. First a general comment and then a question, if I may.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. REID. I have had a little opportunity, as have other members of this committee, to see intelligence information and I would be frank to say that with one or two exceptions I have found very little in the Government, when I was in the executive, that could not be presented in some fashion in broad outline to the American public. The U-2 might be an example of an exception where a few of us did have some knowledge of it.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. REID. And that was properly classified. But there is a clear tendency in recent administrations in my judgment to overclassify, and I would be frank to say there are very, very few things that I think the American people cannot be told in a responsible fashion.

Now in my understanding—I don't have the law in front of me—the statute imposes a clear responsibility on NASA to make certain information and evaluations available to the American people and the Congress.

Dr. DRYDEN. We have testified, for example, before committees of Congress that we know there have been Soviet failures; that the record is not appreciably better than our own, but as far as spelling out chapter and verse, we are unable to do that, because our information comes from intelligence sources.

Mr. REID. I would like to get down to a few of the specifics on that, if I may.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

#### CLASSIFICATION OF SOVIET FAILURES

Mr. REID. First, is it the policy of NASA or is it the policy of the Department of Defense or a joint policy to release no information on Soviet peaceful space failures unless this is first announced by the Soviet Union and confirmed by Norad and such other tracking intelligence information as we may have?

Dr. DRYDEN. We have no information within NASA, except that which comes from the Department of Defense or from the intelligence agencies. We have no independent—

Mr. REID. Is it the policy?

Dr. DRYDEN. It is the policy to release all unclassified information.

Mr. REID. I am sure, but do the Soviets—

Dr. DRYDEN. We do not control classification either of the intelligence material or the Department of Defense material.

Mr. REID. There I think you are starting to turn over the responsibility to Defense. They are not necessarily the best people to declassify material.

Am I correct that no information on Soviet space failures is made available by NASA, unless it is first announced by the Soviet Union? Is that a correct statement?

Dr. DRYDEN. I think that is reasonably correct, because the only source of failures other than those that you can see—you can see that a shot misses the moon by 5,000 miles and you know that it is a failure. The same with the Soviet Mars probe.

Mr. REID. If I may, Dr. Dryden, let me ask, is it the practice of the Soviet Union to announce their failures?

Dr. DRYDEN. They have had to announce those which are obviously visible to people.

Mr. REID. Those that are not obviously visible?

Dr. DRYDEN. They do not announce.

Mr. REID. How can the American people find out therefore that there are Soviet space failures?

Dr. DRYDEN. This information comes, as I have said, from the intelligence agencies. There have been a few instances when through the mechanisms that are set up for the declassification of such information, it has been made available. But this is not within the control of NASA.

Mr. REID. It may not be wholly within the control of NASA, but I think the question is whether NASA under the statute and under a broader concept of NASA's responsibility, feels the American people should or should not be informed as to the overall peaceful Soviet space effort?

I am sure that you can always get intelligence folks in the room who, if given half a chance, will tend to overclassify. What I am interested in is your judgment as to whether you think this is right.

Dr. DRYDEN. I personally do not believe that this information is overclassified. We are represented, have been represented at the

higher levels of government, who have made decisions to declassify certain material related to space, which I think you do want to discuss, judging from the record.

But we have no intelligence responsibility for attempting to run an espionage operation. This cannot be done in the open.

I am just expressing a personal judgment that I do not believe that it is wrong to classify the details.

Mr. REID. Do you think it is impossible to tell the American people in broad outline the truth?

Dr. DRYDEN. No.

Mr. REID. About the Soviet space effort?

Dr. DRYDEN. No. As I say, we have. We have testified that we have known of the Soviet failures. The experience is roughly the same.

I think in both cases we have improved through the years. Certainly in NASA's case we started with 30 or 40 percent failures, and it went down so that now our successes are 50 or 60. Last year every scientific satellite was successful, thanks to the experience gained with the Delta vehicle.

Our early experiments with Ranger were all unsuccessful. We will have successful Ranger experiments as we deal with those difficulties.

Now the Soviets have had similar experiences in general, and not greatly different from our own. I think that much should be and has been told to the American people.

#### DECLASSIFICATION HANDLED AT HIGHEST LEVELS

Mr. REID. Might I ask this: There was introduced in the record at a previous hearing a letter directed from Members of the Congress to NASA with regard to Soviet space failures.

In response to that communication, NASA did indicate a certain number that had been involved. This was a joint letter from Senator Kerr and Congressman Miller under date of September 5, 1962, to Mr. Webb.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. REID. And in his response he indicated certain space failures in 1960, 1961, and 1962. Was there some reason why those could be announced, and previous or subsequent ones cannot be?

Dr. DRYDEN. The matter of the declassification of this particular information was handled at the highest levels of Government. NASA was represented in the discussions. The group dealing with the release decided to release it in this particular way.

Now I might tell you that today I believe there will be a second exception, and a release of information on Soviet failures, in this case, connected with the U.N. registration problem. The Soviets have failed to announce certain launches which have left objects in earth orbit.

The Secretary of State, in accordance with this procedure, has authorized Mr. Stevenson to send a letter to the Secretary General of the U.N. giving the dates of these launchings.

Previous to this, the Secretary has taken up with the Russian Ambassador and said, "If you do not report these yourselves to the United Nations we intend to do so." It is my understanding that

that letter was delivered this morning, and probably will be in the press this afternoon.

This again is another exception to the general policy. Even in this case I should say the only information released is the dates of the launchings, and that is all.

Mr. REID. Could you give us any approximate or somewhat more precise detail on the number of Soviet peaceful launches that were failures?

Dr. DRYDEN. I am afraid that this is information that you can get from a presentation from the CIA, but when I get such information, I am not authorized to pass it even to members of NASA. There are about a dozen people in NASA who are cleared to receive this type of information.

Mr. REID. Might I ask who is cleared to receive it? I am not interested in the names, but what kind of people.

Dr. DRYDEN. Essentially those of us who have the responsibility for determining the U.S. program.

This is information we need in order to plan our own program, what are they doing, what is the general experience.

\* \* \* \* \*

Mr. REID. Might I ask why you feel that more of this information cannot be made available? I understand from your comments that the intelligence community has reached a certain judgment.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. REID. But could you give us your evaluation of that judgment?

Dr. DRYDEN. I have only very limited knowledge of the techniques used by the intelligence community in getting information. I think this is a question that could only be discussed adequately by the intelligence agencies.

\* \* \* \* \*

Mr. REID. As I understood you just now, you said that you were not completely familiar with the techniques.

Dr. DRYDEN. The techniques, exactly.

Mr. REID. Are you familiar with the—with the results?

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. REID. Do you get some of it or all of it?

Dr. DRYDEN. We are briefed on the results.

Mr. REID. Is NASA privy to all of this?

Dr. DRYDEN. To all of the results.

Mr. REID. All of the results?

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. REID. But you say from the receipt of information of that character you would not be able to determine the techniques?

Dr. DRYDEN. No; you cannot.

Mr. REID. But you think that while you could not, the Soviets could?

Dr. DRYDEN. I think they could \* \* \*

Mr. REID. Have you made any serious effort to find out from the intelligence community whether some of this could be made available, without prejudicing our collection techniques? Have you evaluated that yourself?

## CLASSIFICATION NOT EVALUATED

Dr. DRYDEN. No; this is not my responsibility to evaluate the desirability. In fact, the policies on classification of such information I believe are carried out at the very highest levels of the Government.

Mr. REID. There, of course, is where personally I——

Dr. DRYDEN. The President himself has an advisory board on such matters.

Mr. REID. I know, I have been a little familiar with some of this.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. REID. But it seems to me NASA has a responsibility that it must assume in relation to the Congress and the American people.

I think you have to give some kind of an evaluation as to whether the judgments of the intelligence community are valid. If you just abdicate that responsibility and say you will accept the judgment of the intelligence community in this Government of ours, the tendency always will be to resolve everything in favor of the intelligence side.

I sometimes think it is more important for the American people to know certain things than for them not to be told with some attendant risks, perhaps.

But what you are saying is that you have made no evaluation from the standpoint of your responsibility and that of Mr. Webb's and NASA, which as I understand it is a clear statutory——

Dr. DRYDEN. As to what should be released. We have no responsibility for collection, classification, or release of the intelligence information.

Mr. REID. My distinguished colleague, Mr. Porter Hardy, is just coming in, and he developed this concept I thought with considerable clarity at the last meeting, and it was my understanding of his comments that his interpretation of the statute that NASA did have a clear responsibility to evaluate for the Congress and the American people. If you take no responsibility for trying to analyze the——

Dr. DRYDEN. I said we do take that responsibility, but it must be done without the detailed release of intelligence information.

Mr. REID. But you have just indicated that this is so comprehensive in character that it rather drastically limits what you can do.

My query therefore is to the extent that it does limit your opportunity to evaluate this. Why can you not sit down with the intelligence community and evaluate their judgment as to whether the release of some of this information would really prejudice the intelligence collection? In the absence of your evaluation of that, it seems to me that——

Dr. DRYDEN. We have participated in such discussions in the cases where exceptions have been made.

Mr. REID. But you have just said that the net result, as I understand it, of all of this is that the American people are not informed of any Soviet space failures, except under two conditions. A, as the Soviets may announce it and B, as there may be special instances of——

Dr. DRYDEN. Of release through appropriate channels of government.

Mr. REID. Such as the release which occurred following the letter of September 5.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

## INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE

Mr. REID. Now under the act, as I have it here, access to information:

Section 303. Information obtained or developed by the Administrator who performs his functions under the Act shall be made available for public inspection except information authorized or required by Federal statutes to be withheld, and information—

Dr. DRYDEN. This is what I would claim intelligence information is.

Mr. REID. Yes; but I don't know any senior official of the Government who is in total agreement with the classification procedure of the intelligence community.

Dr. DRYDEN. However, there are procedures. You have indicated in specific cases there is the opportunity to ask for a consideration of declassification.

We have not taken the initiative in this case, and do not believe it appropriate to do so. We have in particular cases of classification within the Department of Defense asked reconsideration. This is the normal procedure. Sometimes a matter may be declassified. Other times the classification may be kept.

Mr. REID. But you have never made a serious overall assessment of whether or not the broad field is overclassified, and that it could be to some extent declassified.

Dr. DRYDEN. I do not believe an intelligence operation can be carried out in the open before the public generally.

Mr. REID. I am not suggesting that.

Dr. DRYDEN. Well, you are suggesting that the results be given.

Mr. REID. I am suggesting that NASA assume its full responsibilities under the statute.

Dr. DRYDEN. We will.

Mr. REID. And as pertinent to that you could properly sit down and review the overall intelligence picture to determine whether there are areas that could be made available.

Dr. DRYDEN. We will review the general relative progress of the United States and Russia at any time the committee wishes, and we will use in our judgments and what we say all the information that is available. But we cannot give you the chapter, verse, detail of intelligence information.

Mr. REID. That is not quite the thrust of my inquiry. I will just ask one more question and then be silent.

But have you ever sat down with the intelligence community, consistent with your authority under the statute for NASA, to study whether or not a greater degree of information with regard to Soviet space failures could be presented in some fashion, without danger to our intelligence collection techniques?

Dr. DRYDEN. I do not personally see what the public has to gain from anything other than the general knowledge that there are failures, and that they are roughly of the same order that we have \* \* \*.

Mr. REID. That is, it seems to me a value judgment as to what the American people should be told. But might I ask whether you have ever gone through this process in your capacity and responsibility for NASA with the intelligence community, to see whether there are areas that could be presented to the American people?



Dr. DRYDEN. We have not taken the initiative in any case. We have been a party to the discussions in the case of—

Mr. REID. But on instant matters from time to time.

Dr. DRYDEN. Instant matters from time to time.

Mr. REID. So I am correct therefore in assuming that you have never made a broad assessment as to whether there could be some fundamental changes that would inform the Congress and the American people more precisely, without—

Dr. DRYDEN. We have no responsibility for intelligence classification policy.

Mr. REID. But you have a responsibility to the American people.

Dr. DRYDEN. You say I have a responsibility to get it changed. I say I have no responsibility in that area.

Mr. REID. I think you have a responsibility to the American people to evaluate the programs.

Dr. DRYDEN. I agree with that, but this does not involve as the exception in the act itself says, the release of information classified by other agencies.

Mr. REID. Yes, but I think you have some responsibility to evaluate what is national security in this regard.

Dr. DRYDEN. We have responsibility for classification of our own work, and we do have things which are classified in our own work.

Mr. REID. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Hardy.

#### INFORMATION TO THE CONGRESS

Mr. HARDY. I am a little bit worried about some of this testimony. While certainly none of us on this committee would suggest that classified information ought to be indiscriminately declassified, and certainly I think all of us realize that intelligence information is something that has to be handled with extreme care, on the other hand I find myself a little at a loss to understand some of the approaches to this thing, or the doctor's suggestion that NASA does not think that the Congress is entitled to—

Dr. DRYDEN. I did not say that, sir, because the Congress—

Mr. HARDY. Let's see if we can understand just exactly what you do mean.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. HARDY. Because frankly I get an impression that you did not intend.

Dr. DRYDEN. I did not intend such an impression.

Mr. HARDY. I am concerned about lack of information to the Congress. I don't want to get into a position of suggesting that the Congress should seek to publicize intelligence information that in the interests of national security needs to be held classified. But I think we ought to understand just what the policy of NASA is with respect to making available to Congress full information about Russian achievements.

Dr. DRYDEN. What I said before you came in, sir, was that NASA has no intelligence collection responsibilities, dissemination responsibilities. The committees of Congress can get this information by



going to the Central Intelligence Agency, which is the Agency responsible for—

Mr. HARDY. Let's just back up a minute and see where we are. NASA doesn't have any intelligence responsibility as such?

Dr. DRYDEN. This is correct.

Mr. HARDY. But NASA does collect information that has intelligence value; isn't that correct?

Dr. DRYDEN. We do not track Russian satellites. We do not—

Mr. HARDY. Maybe you don't. Maybe you don't ever get any information on your own that has intelligence—

Dr. DRYDEN. That is right. We get it through other agencies of Government.

Mr. HARDY. You don't on your own get any information about what Russia is doing.

Dr. DRYDEN. Not of a character such as is being discussed here.

Mr. HARDY. Well, let's talk about this. I am talking now about what the Russian achievements are in her space effort. You don't find out anything about that on your own.

Dr. DRYDEN. Except what we get from Russian announcements, conversation with Russians. We have no means of secret collection of intelligence data. This is the function of other agencies of Government.

Mr. HARDY. I don't think we are necessarily talking about intelligence data as such. Of course, the Congress created the CIA.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. HARDY. And we created it for a specific purpose. I was on the committee at the time, and I don't know whether any of the rest of the gentlemen present were, but I have got a pretty good recollection of what went on in the original legislation which established the Central Intelligence Agency. And, of course, I appreciate the fact that NASA is not an intelligence gathering agency as such.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. HARDY. But NASA does have some responsibility under the statute for knowing what is going on in the space effort throughout the world.

Dr. DRYDEN. I think I may have said before you came in that we have testified before congressional committees.

We make speeches, are ready to give you our assessment of the relative position at any time. And in doing that we will use all the information that is available to us.

Mr. HARDY. So you are going to spoon feed us and tell us what you think we ought to know.

Dr. DRYDEN. No, no.

Mr. HARDY. Well then, let's understand this. Now you made a statement a while ago, if I understood you correctly, the American people should not know the details of the Russian space effort.

Dr. DRYDEN. Of how we obtain information about—

Mr. HARDY. Nobody is talking about how you obtain information.

Dr. DRYDEN. I don't know how we are failing to understand each other then.

Mr. HARDY. Well, we certainly are failing to understand each other apparently, either that or you and I are at opposite ends of the pole.

Dr. DRYDEN. I am saying that the \* \* \* information which we get through intelligence sources cannot even be communicated to members of NASA. There are a few people who are cleared to receive this information. They are briefed securitywise. They sign a statement that they will not communicate this information to any other person, and will not discuss it, except with those within the intelligence community who are cleared.

I am saying that instead of asking me to pass on such information to the committee, the committee should get it directly from the source.

Mr. HARDY. Don't misunderstand me. I have no hesitation in asking anybody in Government for any information that I think I would like to have, and so I certainly would not hesitate to go to the CIA or to any other agency on something that seems to be important to what I am doing.

Dr. DRYDEN. That is correct.

Mr. HARDY. And don't misunderstand me to ask you to divulge information which is of an intelligence nature which has been furnished you by the CIA and somebody else's classification is on that.

Dr. DRYDEN. I hope you are not.

Mr. HARDY. Well, I am not going to do that.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. HARDY. I don't need to go through anybody, through any intermediary, I don't think.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

#### NASA'S DUTIES UNDER STATUTE

Mr. HARDY. But I am concerned about the action of NASA itself in carrying out its statutory responsibility. How does the statute read? What is NASA's responsibility?

Dr. DRYDEN. There are two exceptions there, sir.

Mr. HARDY. I am not talking about the dissemination of information. I am not talking about what you are supposed to do. As far as making the information available is concerned, I recognize the limitation insofar as somebody else's classifications are concerned.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. HARDY. But I am talking about information which NASA develops, and I would think that you have a responsibility for developing some information yourself.

Dr. DRYDEN. We do have classified information, and are responsible for our own classification policies.

I think all of you would agree that Project Mercury has been a pretty open project, and yet there are classified aspects of Project Mercury which are necessary. For example, the frequency used in communication with the astronauts. This is a simple matter of protecting from interference with the operation.

We do not want to give the Russians complete details of all of our technology, and so we would not like to publish exactly what the performance of the little thrust-control rockets or the retro-rockets is.

We talk about nominal performance, but as far as the detailed performance, that is classified information. I think in the Mercury

project we have followed the policy of telling just as much to the American people as possible. We do not give them detailed drawings of the capsules so they can go off and design and build one. This is true throughout the NASA program.

Now we do scrutinize this matter of classification internally very carefully. The recommendations for classification originate at the project and program level, but we do have review boards. We do have boards which set up policy guides within specific projects interpreting broad policy.

And as far as our classified publications are concerned, we have the policy of periodic review and declassification. In fact, one of the most effective programs I think along that line in the Government is this program. So I am not concerned about the parts of information that NASA itself classifies.

I think again this committee has been very helpful from time to time. You discover cases where you think we are wrong. We appreciate your bringing them to our attention. We try to do something about them.

But the intent of my testimony is simply to say that we are not free under this language to pass along information which Defense has classified or which the intelligence agency has classified, and that is the only intent. I believe in the fullest disclosure to the American people as possible.

Mr. HARDY. I certainly completely understand the necessity for classification of intelligence data and security information.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. HARDY. But what I am concerned about right now more than the question of releasing information is whether or not the agency itself is carrying out its responsibilities under the act.

Dr. DRYDEN. We are supposed to make the United States the leader, to operate our own programs.

Mr. HARDY. And if you don't know what the Russians are doing you can't do that, can you?

Dr. DRYDEN. That is correct, and we get that information which does guide us in our programs.

Mr. HARDY. But you don't get any of it on your own initiative.

Dr. DRYDEN. That is correct.

Mr. HARDY. You just have to get somebody else to tell you about it.

Dr. DRYDEN. This is correct.

\* \* \* \* \*

That \* \* \* area \* \* \* is assigned to other agencies of the Government. The results of the information we get. It guides us in our own programs.

Mr. HARDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Meader.

Mr. MEADER. Dr. Dryden, you referred to this exchange of correspondence.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

#### LETTER REGARDING SOVIET FAILURES EXPLAINED

Mr. MEADER. Between the chairman of the two Space Committees of the Congress and the Administrator of NASA, the letter of September 4 and the letter of September 5, 1962. I was puzzled when

Dr. Simpson was before us about the speed with which NASA—  
Dr. DRYDEN. Yes. He is not familiar with the background of it. As a matter of fact, I was not personally involved. I happened to be in London at that time.

But I do know what went on, and have been involved in similar incidents including one that I mentioned that is happening today.

There was a meeting at the highest levels of government, and a discussion of the release of this information. I do not know the background of all the reasons that entered into this decision.

As you know, we had had some failures in our own program in the Ranger series. I suppose this is one element of the matter, I do not know. At any rate, this was considered at the highest level, and this particular form of release was chosen.

I think you and I know the letter was written one day and NASA's the next. I would prefer not to put that—this record is not open?

Mr. Moss. This is an executive record.

Dr. DRYDEN. I will tell you what this is, that this is not a letter written in answer the next day. This is a method adopted for the release of that particular information.

In other cases another method may be chosen. The Secretary of State is doing it with reference to the U.N. registrations, so I am completely frank with the committee on this, I hope.

Mr. MEADER. Another thing that bothered me was the six episodes reported in the letter of September 5, 1962, which seemed to have quite a good deal of detail. For instance, No. 1 says:

October 10, 1960:

An unannounced attempt to send a probe to Mars failed before a parking orbit was achieved. Had this probe been successful it would have reached Mars in about 230 days.

And then the episode which apparently prompted the inquiry, No. 5 on the list:

August 25, 1962:

A third attempt to send a probe to Venus was made on this date. The payload was successfully placed into its satellite parking orbit, but apparently could not be ejected. Had this shot been successful, the probe would have arrived at Venus on or about December 7, 1962, ahead of the U.S. Mariner II. It appears that the normal flight time of 112 days for this was intentionally shortened to 104 days by sacrificing spacecraft weight. This launching attempt has not yet been announced by the Soviet Union.

It seems to have a great deal of detail in it.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes. Much of that detail, however, is obvious. You can only shoot for Mars and Venus on certain dates within a few days really, a month at the most, and the window occurs about every 2 years. So that the purpose of these particular flights can be determined from the date at which they are launched.

The same way with the Moon. You have to launch at the Moon at certain times of the month. We can figure, ahead of time, what days are optimum for the Russians to send something to the Moon, knowing the location of their launch site and the location of the Moon. It can only occur at certain periods.

Now a manned space flight can happen at any time. You can't tell about that. So much of the detail that is apparently in there is obvious from the dates. Now some of the rest of it, I think, is pretty

obvious. We have NORAD and its associate facilities, which keep track of every object that comes over the United States.

In these particular cases, they were things in orbit, and, in these particular cases something happened, certainly nothing went on the way to Venus or Mars. This could be determined from direct tracking.

#### MONITORING TECHNIQUES INVOLVED

Mr. MEADER. I think you really anticipated the question I was going to ask, Dr. Dryden, by your explanation; but I will ask the question anyhow.

Dr. DRYDEN. There is considerable detail.

Mr. MEADER. And then you can answer. You apparently feel that in these six instances which were released on September 5, 1962, there was no danger of revealing your monitoring techniques.

Dr. DRYDEN. Because there was something in space which everybody knows our NORAD tracking system can see.

Mr. MEADER. Then let me ask this question: Why could not all such failures, which failed to reveal monitoring techniques, be released to the public?

Dr. DRYDEN. Well, I think this is the reason for the second exception that has happened today.

They are of the same type. They are launchings not reported to the U.N., although not only our tracking people but, in England and everywhere else, they track these satellites.

Unfortunately one element in this picture is that they are interpreted as U.S. secret military satellites, and I suppose this is one factor in deciding to open this up. They are not U.S. military secret satellites. They are Russian satellites.

I am just anticipating what may have gone on in the decision to make this kind of release. I think you are right that this is the same sort of thing. \* \* \*

Mr. MEADER. In other words, you would subscribe to the general proposition that any episode, the revelation of which would not impair the security of our monitoring techniques, should be released to the public.

Dr. DRYDEN. Certainly a fair candidate for release. I think this has been done in a number of cases.

I think the important thing, there is a mechanism by which this information can be declassified for release. It does operate in some instances. It operated in the Cuban affair, as you all know.

Mr. MEADER. I have been looking through the testimony of Dr. Simpson, and I don't find the passage for which I was looking, and I think the question I am going to ask bears somewhat on the line of questioning that Mr. Hardy conducted.

#### REPORTING OF RUSSIAN SPACE ACTIVITIES

As I understood Dr. Simpson's statement, information concerning the space activities released by foreign governments, made public to the press, might, nevertheless, be classified by the Defense Department.

Dr. DRYDEN. He was incorrect in that statement.

Mr. MEADER. In such a way as to prohibit NASA—

Dr. DRYDEN. No; he was incorrect in that statement, and I can see, because of the technicalities, the fact that he has been with us for a relatively short time, why he might not have gotten the background on this.

The satellite situation report that is put out is based on our measurements of the orbital characteristics. We do not want to dilute that by putting in Russian statements in that particular report.

But we published in the past—I just noticed before I came over, I thought I would bring it, but it is so old I decided not to—the staff of the Senate committee put out a report on the Russian space program, and for that report we did give them what was known about everything from Sputnik I on down, based on not only what came out of NORAD but what was published, but might have been announced by the Russians as well.

Dr. Simpson was wrong in that statement. We certainly have the freedom to publish anything that is published in Pravda.

Mr. MEADER. He indicated that perhaps the Russian statement was inaccurate, and until it had been checked and verified by NORAD—

Dr. DRYDEN. This is the reason we don't want to include it in the list of NORAD orbital elements. And this technicality is the thing that threw him off the track.

Mr. HARDY. Yes; but as I recall it, his testimony was that even if it had been—

Dr. DRYDEN. No; he was incorrect.

Mr. HARDY. Confirmed; you couldn't release it unless the Department of Defense said you could do so.

Dr. DRYDEN. No; and this is also confusing, because in the ground rules of the DOD this is one of the categories that was unclassified.

Mr. HARDY. If the gentleman will permit, there is one other aspect of that same general subject that was not concluded according to my way of thinking, and that was with respect to the published report on orbital bodies.

I believe it was stated that there probably were a number of others about which we had knowledge which was not included in this, even though they had been confirmed.

Dr. DRYDEN. I think he reviewed the history of this episode which occurred shortly after he came with the agency. We had been publishing information from NORAD on all objects.

The Department of Defense then moved from the unclassified area into the classified area, information on DOD launches, certain information on DOD launches. These then led us to say, well, maybe the simplest thing is just for NASA to report its own, and let DOD report the information it gets itself. There was a short period in which Dr. Simpson thought that DOD had agreed with this.

However, at higher levels the matter was taken up again, and it was said, "Look, let's don't have two publications of unclassified data on satellites. Let's go back to the original system," and that is what was done.

So there was an interval of a few months there when, through this misunderstanding, we published only NASA data.

Now I believe that these launches which the Russians did not report to the U.N. also made a kind of a perturbation which probably led to the matter that you are discussing. There is an attempt to put

down everything in space in an orderly number. We happen to use Greek letters. In other words, it is like a serial numbering.

And in the reports from NORAD, space had been left. In other words, you come down to five and then you jump to seven. Where is six? The Russians did not report those launches. And so the table showed gaps which were the ones that are being reported to the U.N. now.

We have had a very difficult time, of course, with the press, who picked up things like that, and we try to do the best we can with it. I think it is on a sound basis now. I don't think there is much difficulty.

Mr. HARDY. The only question in my mind, if the gentleman will permit me to pursue it just a bit further, was whether this published report was complete insofar as we had confirmed the existence of Russian or foreign space objects.

Dr. DRYDEN. As you heard in his testimony, the policy under which NORAD is operating does not release such information unless the Russians have announced it.

Mr. HARDY. So then, my understanding was accurate that we are releasing this report of orbiting bodies?

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. HARDY. With the full knowledge that there are others which have been launched by the Russians which we have confirmed?

Dr. DRYDEN. I think most of these are now getting out into the open. But your statement is correct. This has been true.

Mr. HARDY. So then, that is a misleading document if we understood it to be a complete documentation.

Dr. DRYDEN. It turned out not to be misleading, because blanks had been left in the numbers for these, which the press picked up.

Mr. HARDY. Thank you.

#### DR. SIMPSON'S DUTIES OUTLINED

Mr. MEADER. Dr. Dryden, I notice that subsequent to our hearing with Dr. Simpson on Thursday, May 23, there has been submitted his job description.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes, he has a very broad responsibility.

Mr. MEADER. I have just been reading it. It sounds like quite a job.

Dr. DRYDEN. Well, it is.

Mr. MEADER. His title is a high sounding title, Assistant Administrator for Technology Utilization Policy Planning.

I gathered that since he was a professor of social science, that he was not really a scientist in the field of space techniques.

Dr. DRYDEN. Not in the physical sciences; that is correct.

Mr. MEADER. Yet here under item No. 3 of this document entitled "General management instructions effective date, April 26, 1963," it reads:

Responsibility: the Assistant Administrator for Technology Utilization and Policy Planning is responsible for assisting in the planning and integration of agency policy, evaluating the socioeconomic impact of aeronautics and space programs, dissemination of public information, technical information and educational materials and services, and insuring the most effective utilization of technological and scientific innovations arising from the national space program.



Now the thing that kind of bothers me is that in the planning and integration of agency policy just what——

Dr. DRYDEN. May I try to translate this personnel jargon. He has three major areas of responsibility.

One is what is generally called public relations, press, and all of this. That is one segment that he looks after in more detail than Mr. Webb and myself can. That of course includes all the activities at Cape Canaveral, all the relations of press, the television, and the radio. That is one segment.

Now there are two others. Well, there is one other classical one. He has the scientific and technical information distribution problem. I think I did bring along this——

Mr. MEADER. You mean like a satellite situation report?

Dr. DRYDEN. No. This refers to the more technical reports. I guess I forgot to bring along one of our technical abstract bulletins.

This is addressed to the scientific and engineering audience, where we send titles, abstracts not only of our own publications but we try to cover the whole field. This is part of our activities in the dissemination of information. Related to that is material for use in education. This is the dissemination of information to schools and teachers.

We have talked about dissemination to the general public. It comes under the press area.

Now this third area, you have heard Mr. Webb and you know of his great personal interest in seeing that there is just as much transfer of information derived from the space program to other industries as is possible, the so-called spinoff problem. What can the Agency do to accelerate that process?

There is always that transfer from one industry to another. We now have aluminum in buses, our windows, and homes. It used to be a specialized material for aircraft, but this transfer happened over a great many years. What can be done to get the technical information of the space program into the hands of other types of industry.

Third, since he is a sociologist, he has the responsibility within the act there, if you will recall the paragraph, to study the social and economic impact of the space program. It is from this point of view that in policy planning, he represents the element that has to do with the ultimate effect of the space program in industry and society, as distinguished from the technical, the detailed technical planning of the technical program.

So he is dealing with three specific areas. It is always hard to find titles. The personnel people do that. But those are his three principal areas of responsibility.

Mr. MEADER. His title relating to policy planning is misleading; isn't it?

Dr. DRYDEN. He is involved in one aspect of policy planning.

Mr. MEADER. He said there was nobody else that had a title including policy planning. He was the only one who had it.

Dr. DRYDEN. This is true. The policies of course are determined ultimately by Mr. Webb and myself along with Dr. Seamans and other staff officers whom we have, depending on what the policy is about. It may be drafted initially by the legal counsel, the personnel

people, administrative, procurement, and so on. But Dr. Simpson has to do with these very broad implications of the space program on our economy and relations with society.

Mr. MEADER. Basically he is a public information officer, isn't he?

Dr. DRYDEN. This is one-third of his duties, or two-thirds, if you lump public information along with this more specialized technical information.

Mr. MEADER. Don't you think they are the same thing?

Dr. DRYDEN. No. It takes a different kind of person to deal with newspapers than that required to deal with scientists and engineers.

Mr. HARDY. It takes an expert to know which to conceal and which to put out.

Dr. DRYDEN. No.

Mr. MEADER. In this other area—I am sure what he does about the socioeconomic impact of the space activities. That is kind of vague.

Dr. DRYDEN. For example, new welding techniques have been developed at our Huntsville center for building these big boosters. Now part of his job is how to get that knowledge to other people who are interested in welding, but who are not interested in space at all.

Or another little detail on the Mercury program, there is an attitude control device that picks up the horizon. Now some industries who are extruding plastic cylinders found that this makes a good device to control the diameter of the cylinders. I don't know how, but they have adapted it to control of a manufacturing process.

It is Dr. Simpson's business to develop techniques and means by which we can make these new developments available to people in other industries. Now it is an experimental program very frankly to do as much as you can to accelerate the natural processes.

But there is so much information coming out of the spending of these large sums of money, that it is important to the country to get the widest utilization, not only in space but in other areas.

Mr. MEADER. I guess I understand better what his job is, but I still think it is rather misleading to have the title of policy planning in connection with his responsibilities, when he really doesn't seem to have much to do with any policy planning.

Dr. DRYDEN. Only the socioeconomic aspects of it.

Mr. HARDY. Mr. Reuss.

#### WHO KEEPS PUBLIC INFORMED?

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Chairman, I have just a couple of questions since the ground has been pretty well covered, or the space has been pretty well covered.

There seems to be general agreement, Dr. Dryden, including on your part, that provided that the means whereby we acquire information about Russian space activities is kept secure that the public interest is best served by the prompt and full dissemination of information on it.

Dr. DRYDEN. As wide a disclosure as possible.

Mr. REUSS. Secondly, I have gathered from your testimony, though I mention it because I want to be correct if I misgather it, that NASA is an operating agency, not an intelligence agency.

Dr. DRYDEN. That is right.

Mr. REUSS. And that—check me on this point particularly—NASA is not really the focal point within the executive branch for the dissemination of information that we gather about the Russians.

Dr. DRYDEN. That is correct.

Mr. REUSS. And I note that you have spent I think 45 years in the Federal Government service.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. REUSS. So that you certainly know how things operate there. I then come to my question, which is: Where in the executive branch is the responsibility lodged for seeing that the American public is promptly told everything that is can be about Russian space activities?

Dr. DRYDEN. I think it lies with almost every agency of Government with respect to the particular information which they themselves originate and are responsible for.

Mr. REUSS. Isn't this then a matter of what is everybody's business is nobody's business? CIA acquires most of this information, whether by paying 1960 Mata Hari's, whether by U-2's, or other gee whiz methods that we find out about later.

CIA I am sure doesn't conceive of itself as the medium for letting the American public doesn't know what the other side is up to, and God help us if they ever do so conceive of themselves. NASA doesn't.

You have in effect said, "Look, we are the people who apply science to our American space program." Whose job is it to keep the public informed?

You have said congressional committees occasionally stumble across some of this stuff and release it. You did not say stumble, but occasionally come across some of this stuff.

Dr. DRYDEN. I don't know that committees have ever released any intelligence.

Mr. REUSS. I did not mean that, but I refer to that part of your testimony where you have said that frequently NASA will voluntarily disclose information of this sort in the course of a congressional hearing.

Dr. DRYDEN. This is public testimony. We do this in speeches. Almost every reporter who comes in wants to know how we stand with the Russians, discusses what weight can we put in space, what weight can they put in space, how is space science going. We engage in that kind of discussion all the time. We just don't have a journal that appears every month or anything of that kind.

Mr. REUSS. Yes. I have the impression though that the release of this information is rather accidental. It depends whether a congressional committee asks. It depends whether a reporter asks. It depends whether a NASA official has a speech coming up some place and wants to put something topical and interesting in it.

I don't gather, however, that NASA concedes it as its task to keep the public currently informed as an affirmative duty, and when I ask who in the executive branch does have that function, I am not sure that you are able to give me an answer. Again I am taking you outside your NASA function.

## CLASSIFIED INFORMATION ROLE NOT CENTRALIZED

Dr. DRYDEN. What you are asking, who has the responsibility of riding herd on the Defense Department, ourselves, the intelligence agencies, who puts the pressure in the direction of declassification?

Mr. REUSS. Exactly.

Dr. DRYDEN. I do not know of any centralized Government agency. Most large agencies like our own have a review mechanism.

Mr. REUSS. What about the provision of section 203(3) of the National Aeronautics and Space Act as amended which says the administration, the NASA administration, "In order to carry out the purposes of this act shall provide for the widest practicable and appropriate dissemination of information concerning its activities and the results thereof?"

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes. That refers solely to our own activities.

Mr. REUSS. Yes.

Dr. DRYDEN. And we try to do this.

Mr. REUSS. I think we have discovered a hole in our total executive branch operation here.

It seems to me that the American public has as much right to know, within security requirements, what the Russians are up to as they have to know what we are up to. They are both equally important elements for informed citizenry.

Dr. DRYDEN. A tremendous lot of information is available, and is available about this.

Mr. REUSS. In a haphazard fashion.

Dr. DRYDEN. No. We have been getting into arguments about little specific details of Russian failures, but certainly the general purpose and intent of the Russian program and what they are able to do has been discussed repeatedly.

We have discussed the fact that they apparently can put up two weights in earth orbit, Vostok 10,000 pounds, the Venus satellite and probe 14,000 pounds.

We ourselves before this year is out will be able to put up about 20,000 pounds. So far the Russians have not shown a larger booster.

We know that they have got to have a larger booster before they can go to the moon. But all of these questions have been repeatedly discussed. The columnists write on them all the time. I suppose what you are thinking of is two things. One, some more or less systematic official publication. The other is a different matter.

I think you have put your finger on the problem of whether there should be some kind of a review agency on classification policies Government wide.

Now maybe some of my colleagues who are more familiar know whether there is such a review mechanism. I know internally within DOD and within NASA there are classification review groups and also in the AEC with the positive responsibility of declassifying everything they can. I don't know whether the CIA has any such group or not. I just don't know. But certainly I don't know of any central group.

## INTENT OF SPACE ACT DISCUSSED

Mr. REUSS. Would it not be worth considering that the section of the National Aeronautics and Space Act that I have been referring to, be amended? As it now reads, section 203(a)(3) requires NASA to—

Provide for the widest practicable and appropriate dissemination of information concerning its activities and the results thereof.

Suppose there were added to that sentence the following:

, and concerning the activities in aeronautics and space of other countries.

Under that amendment, while you could not disseminate what you don't know, in practice I think the American public would be well informed if they knew as much about it as you did.

Dr. DRYDEN. I think it is covered in the other section of the act that you quoted before. It says any information we get shall be made available.

We have made available information on programs in foreign countries, what is going on. Here again we have done this repeatedly. What I am saying, I don't think it is necessary to—

Mr. MOSS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. REUSS. Yes.

Mr. MOSS. I think it is quite clear in section 303.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes; I think it is covered in 303.

Mr. MOSS. And I had intended to explore this more fully with Dr. Dryden. Information obtained or developed by the Administrator is the type of information we are discussing.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. MOSS. And we have had careful questioning as to the responsibility of NASA itself in determining whether the limitations on information made available to it by other agencies of Government goes beyond the mere acceptance of their classification of whether it should question or determine whether there is justification for the classification.

Mr. REUSS. And what is the answer on that? Does it?

Dr. DRYDEN. We do not take that responsibility.

Mr. MOSS. They do not assume the responsibility. Now, of course, reading the statute on its face we have two exceptions: First information authorized or required by Federal statute, which is a very limited field. Second, information to protect national security. This is the bulk of the type they are dealing with.

Dr. DRYDEN. That is right.

Mr. MOSS. But we go on here with a proviso which does not deal with either of the exceptions, but rather with the information obtained or developed.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes; that is my interpretation of it.

Mr. MOSS. Your response to Mr. Reid, which I think, sir, was erroneous—

Dr. DRYDEN. This publication we have includes foreign documents.

Mr. MOSS. But where the Congress itself is concerned, the exceptions do not apply, nor were they so intended to apply.

Dr. DRYDEN. They do not apply except—

Mr. MOSS. They go to any information obtained or developed—

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. MOSS (continuing). And shall be made available to the Congress. I don't think it is fruitful at the moment for this committee to go to the extent of insisting on the inclusion of that information which came to you because of arrangements made by NASA. Remember, always, that you are only bound on this CIA information and Defense Intelligence information by an agreement made by you.

Dr. DRYDEN. Well, it is a personal thing, if you are familiar with it. It is a very special sort of arrangement.

Mr. MOSS. Because it was felt in the case of CIA that it would be more economical, certainly more feasible, for NASA to arrange for the collection of this data.

Dr. DRYDEN. No; I am sorry.

Mr. MOSS. From other existing agencies.

Dr. DRYDEN. I am sorry. We are simply like other agencies of the Government in receiving the services of the CIA.

Mr. MOSS. That is right.

Dr. DRYDEN. That is right.

Mr. MOSS. But does CIA have the right to tell you and to restrict you absolutely in the use of the information?

Dr. DRYDEN. They don't have to give it to you, and they won't give it to you unless you make an agreement that you won't tell it to other members of your own organization.

#### QUESTION OF LAW VIOLATIONS RAISED

Mr. HARDY. Doesn't that put you in the position of violating the law?

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes, essentially.

Mr. HARDY. So you have to violate this statute in order to get the information from CIA.

Dr. DRYDEN. No; I don't think so.

Mr. MOSS. It then becomes a rather interesting question. We have to go back to the original CIA statute.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. MOSS. Which is the more compelling under law, the agreement with CIA or the statutory language drafted by the Congress?

Dr. DRYDEN. There is no problem with the ordinary classified information, confidential, secret, top secret. This committee is entitled to it, if we have it, whether it is a Defense document or a NASA document. There is only this one very special area.

Mr. MOSS. But I think it was clearly the intent of this provision that the fullest possible dissemination of information be provided. The two exceptions applying to public disclosure relate to those classified or authorized and directed to be withheld by statute, and those classified under Executive Order 10501.

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make my point, which is this: That while section 303, that is the access to information section, does say that the NASA Administrator, "shall make available for public inspection" information he develops, it doesn't put upon him as I read it the same affirmative obligation to see that the public



is informed, and is put on him with respect to its own activities by section 203(a) (3).

As I read section 303, he complies with that by ponying up when somebody comes in and asks him. He isn't under an affirmative obligation to keep the public currently informed, and I gather, Dr. Dryden, that that seems to be your reading of it, that there is a difference in the dissemination duties of the Administrator, depending on whether it is information concerning NASA's own activities as opposed to information concerning other information.

Dr. DRYDEN. I don't think we make that distinction.

Mr. REUSS. You do as much disseminating of information concerning Russian activities?

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes; of course it is activities in broad terms. We are not interpreting this as applying solely to what you might call administrative information.

Mr. MOSS. I think it is activities taken in context with the statute itself in its entirety. Inherently we are making this agency responsible for full knowledge of space. That is part of its activities to possess this knowledge.

Mr. REUSS. Domestic and foreign.

Mr. MOSS. The problem you have in drafting an information statute, which gives a positive mandate to disseminate information, is the very practical one of the limitations imposed annually by the Appropriations Committee on the availability of manpower and funds for the developing of this information.

Dr. DRYDEN. That is one of the limiting circumstances.

Mr. MOSS. And putting it out. While we could authorize a maximum in the basic statute, we would still have to be limited by whatever the appropriations provide.

Mr. REUSS. Yes; but it does not take a vast USIA-type operation to see that there is regularly available to the interested press and public the essential facts, and I gather what we are talking about this morning is the fact that for various periods of time in the past the American public has not been put in possession of current information about Russian space activities.

Mr. MOSS. That is correct.

Mr. REUSS. That is so; is it not?

Mr. MOSS. And that is why we protested the suspension of the publication of the satellite situation report, which has now been resumed.

Mr. REID. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. REUSS. Yes.

#### CHANGES IN SATELLITE SITUATION REPORT

Mr. REID. According to the memorandum we have here, it says in 1960 NASA was putting out regular reports on all satellites in orbit as a scientific and public information service; is that correct?

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. REID. Then it says in January 1961 the reports suddenly were halted; is that correct?

Dr. DRYDEN. I am not sure specifically what is talked about.

Mr. REID. But were resumed after the subcommittee intervention as indicated.



Dr. DRYDEN. What happened, as I explained, there was an interim period when we said it would be simpler if NASA puts out information on just its own satellites and the Defense Department puts out the others.

Mr. REID. Then this goes on to indicate later, after the Department of Defense issued its new directive requiring secrecy about all military satellite activities, NASA's satellite situation report was changed to delete much of the scientific information it contained.

After that the report suddenly deleted information about foreign satellites, although some of the information about Russian satellites was made public, such as launching failures.

Dr. DRYDEN. Just one action I think.

Mr. REID. And then in January 1963 NASA suddenly stopped publishing information about any satellites, except those which the Agency itself attempted to orbit. This appears to me—

Dr. DRYDEN. This earlier discussion refers to a time when we put out a rather elaborate sheet, sort of fact data sheet on each satellite.

The volume got pretty large to keep that up, in that form and there are other groups. Almost every technical journal makes a summary of all the launches once a year. It is just a question whether we needed to put the manpower into that type of compilation.

Mr. REID. My only question is this: It appears that during a previous period NASA was putting out certain information that it is not now putting out, that there were certain policy determinations made by NASA, and in the Government, to curtail some of this information.

Dr. DRYDEN. I don't think it was a curtailing of information. It was curtailing a particular way of putting it out.

Mr. REID. Could you respond to the factors that caused you to change what you were doing up to January 1961 that caused you to cut down the amount of information, and if this is a correct assessment during the Eisenhower administration, wherein it says in 1960 at least NASA was putting out regular reports on all satellites?

Dr. DRYDEN. We were putting out a kind of a fact sheet. Now we are putting out a much more elaborate fact sheet on NASA's satellites.

Mr. REID. What were the factors that caused you to curtail or eliminate certain information, if this is a correct statement of the committee staff, that you used to put out? Why did you stop doing what you were doing, in other words?

Dr. DRYDEN. I can't remember in detail. I think it was the matter of the public information people themselves changing the form in which the information was available.

Mr. MOSS. Will you yield at that point?

Mr. REID. Certainly.

Mr. MOSS. In January of 1960 DOD and NASA entered into an agreement.

Dr. DRYDEN. Whereby we would put out information—

Mr. MOSS. Which resulted in a curtailment of information which previously had been made available through NASA.

Dr. DRYDEN. No. I don't understand that. The agreement, that was the initial agreement that we would put out the information on all scientific satellites. It went beyond that.

Mr. MOSS. Unclassified space launchings.

Mr. DRYDEN. It went beyond that. It means we took a part of the workload of NORAD by agreeing to supply them with information on all NASA satellites so they did not have to run a separate operation to take those out of their catalog of what things were in the sky.

But it was agreed at that time that we would be the agency to publish all data on scientific satellites. That includes scientific satellites of the Department of Defense.

Mr. MOSS. It is the agreement—

Dr. DRYDEN. Do you have that agreement?

Mr. MOSS. Yes.

Dr. DRYDEN. It is a classified one, isn't it?

Mr. MOSS. That is the classified agreement of January 13, 1961, signed by Herbert York, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, on the 16th and by yourself on the 13th.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes. I haven't looked at it for a long time, so I don't remember it exactly. As I recall, it was to the effect that we would be responsible—

Mr. MOSS. For the unclassified.

Dr. DRYDEN. For the unclassified, yes, not only on the information side but on actually supplying to them the orbital data, positions, and so forth.

Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Reid yielded to me.

Mr. REID. Mr. Reuss yielded to me. He was very generous.

Mr. REUSS. Does the chairman yield back to Mr. Reid, and are you through?

Mr. MOSS. The chairman recognizes the right of the gentleman from Wisconsin to resume.

Mr. REID. I thank the chairman and yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. HARDY. Could I just take another tack for a moment. I think I would like to compliment the Space Agency, NASA, for the handling of this most recent Cooper flight.

Dr. DRYDEN. We profited by the criticisms.

#### NEED FOR COMPARATIVE STANDING IN SPACE FIELD

Mr. HARDY. That aspect of its release of information on its own activities I think was handled very, very well. I am more concerned at the moment though that the American people have some idea about our comparative standing in the space field, particularly with the Russians.

Now the release—and so far as I know this has been the only significant release of any detailed information on the Russian progress—was that contained in Mr. Webb's letter of September 5, addressed to Senator Kerr and George Miller. Now it seems to be that the only way you can get information is to have it appear somewhere in the press, and then have the committee call attention to the press

articles, and then right quickly somebody comes ahead and tells what the truth is about the thing.

Dr. DRYDEN. What is dissemination to the public other than to the press? Is this the point?

Mr. HARDY. No.

Dr. DRYDEN. Is there some difference?

Mr. HARDY. I don't know, maybe I have missed something, but I don't recall any detailed information on Soviet accomplishments in space, other than that which was contained in Mr. Webb's letter back last September.

Dr. DRYDEN. Accomplishments, I think I could dig these up, but not failures, but accomplishments I think there have been a lot of detailed discussions of what the Soviets got out of particular flights.

Mr. HARDY. Of course we don't know how full that is or how accurate it is, whether you are just spoon-feeding us, telling us what you want us to know or concealing from the American people what you think they have got no business knowing anyway.

Dr. DRYDEN. We are not concealing anything.

Mr. HARDY. Well, we have no way of knowing that, Doctor. That is the key to the whole thing.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. HARDY. Now you took the position a while ago in your testimony that you don't know why the American people need this detailed information.

Dr. DRYDEN. I was saying to the average citizen it means nothing except that there was a failure.

Mr. HARDY. The average citizen of the United States makes up the overall public opinion of this country.

Dr. DRYDEN. That is right.

Mr. HARDY. And if he does not know these things, how in the world is he going to get a composite?

Dr. DRYDEN. He has been told repeatedly that there are Russian failures. Now the question is does he need to know that this particular thing blew up in the air or whether it failed to separate? I don't think he understands what those words mean.

Mr. HARDY. You know I wouldn't attribute to the American people the kind of dumbness that you apparently do.

Dr. DRYDEN. No. There are a lot of people in the technical side who are greatly fascinated and interested in all these details.

Mr. HARDY. I don't think you have to be a technician to be able to understand the significance of some of the details which were contained in the letter which Mr. Webb signed and sent on September 5, 1962.

Dr. DRYDEN. I agree with you.

Mr. HARDY. Now I haven't seen that kind of information at any other time I don't believe.

Dr. DRYDEN. Well, I say on the Russian successful flights——

Mr. HARDY. This dealt with failures.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. HARDY. And you, don't you think the American people should know about these? You might even develop a little bit better support for NASA if they understood that we were making some progress when Russia wasn't doing too well.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes. I think the American people do believe we are making progress.

Mr. HARDY. I think they believe we are making progress, but I am not at all sure they are convinced that the Russians aren't making progress too, and I don't know that you are convinced of that.

Dr. DRYDEN. I am sure the Russians are making progress. You see it in every flight.

Mr. HARDY. But how do we measure the relative situation?

Dr. DRYDEN. This I would be glad to do, if the committee wants to start on an evaluation, I will be very happy to undertake this.

Mr. HARDY. I am not trying to get into that now.

Dr. DRYDEN. That is what I understood.

#### METHODS OF RELEASING INFORMATION

Mr. HARDY. I am trying to look at the problem of how we would do it. I am not talking about trying to undertake it at the moment.

But I just have a little trouble understanding why it is that the only way you can shake loose this kind of information is to have a joint letter from the chairmen of the two committees of the Congress, pointing out that these statements have appeared in the public press, and asking for specific information, and if we have got to wait for something like that to happen, every time for some outside reporter to come in with the news—

Dr. DRYDEN. The actual mechanism of this was a consideration by the mechanisms that are set up to declassify intelligence information, the same mechanisms that operated in the case of the Cuban situation.

Mr. HARDY. The letter that provoked the reply from Mr. Webb was the letter signed by Mr. George Miller and Senator Kerr.

Dr. DRYDEN. The letters were prepared after the decision was made.

Mr. HARDY. Well, in other words, NASA asked George and Senator Kerr to ask for the information, so you would have a basis for telling us, is that what you are telling the committee?

Dr. DRYDEN. We told the Congressmen that this information was available, and they immediately asked for it. I think that is a natural reaction.

Mr. HARDY. So then this was window dressing. George Miller put in his letter:

The Saturday morning newspapers carried an article reporting that the Soviet Union failed in an attempt to successfully send a space vehicle to Venus on August 25, 1962—

and then it goes on to say—

Dr. DRYDEN. I said before I cannot testify in detail on this, because I was in London at the time.

Mr. HARDY. The letter starts out though with this statement:

In the past week there have been two reports in the press which have troubled us as chairmen of the House and Senate Committees on Space— and then they go into these stories. And you tell us now that actually the committees of the Congress were prompted to ask you for this business.

Dr. DRYDEN. I said they were told that the information was available, and they immediately asked for it. I think this is natural. I think George wrote the letter. I don't know anything about it.

Mr. HARDY. George didn't have knowledge enough to write this letter on his own initiative, because this stuff appeared in the paper, and he wasn't really troubled at all? This is just window dressing?

Dr. DRYDEN. I think he was troubled. I think he had asked informally as he does repeatedly ask about the information available.

Mr. HARDY. And then you refuse to tell him, so he comes along with this letter after you say, "Okay, if you will ask us officially for something we can release it to the public, and dress it up real nice so they will think we are really giving them something. You go ahead and ask us for it and we will reply in a letter right quick."

Dr. DRYDEN. I did not choose the method. I wasn't here at the time. I don't know the circumstances.

Mr. HARDY. I think it would be interesting to know who did choose the method, and how it was originated. Do you know who participated in this decision?

Dr. DRYDEN. Mr. Webb, as far as our agency was concerned. I have mentioned the one today that will be released this afternoon, where a totally different method is used, because it has to do with the failure of the Russians to register at the U.N. In this case the Secretary of State has authorized Mr. Stevenson to write to Mr. U Thant.

Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, this whole procedure just completely baffles me. We are playing a cat and mouse game in Government, with the American people and with the committees of the Congress.

Dr. DRYDEN. I think, sir, it is the nature of intelligence activities.

Mr. HARDY. Doctor, I am not talking about intelligence information.

Dr. DRYDEN. That is what this is. This is an exception. This is one of two or three exceptions.

Mr. HARDY. You determine that it is in our interests to tell the American people about this?

Dr. DRYDEN. No, I did not, and Mr. Webb did not. This was determined at a higher level in the Government.

Mr. HARDY. All right, let's say the White House did, I don't care. Maybe Mr. Kennedy did.

Dr. DRYDEN. It is the mechanisms that are set up for declassifying intelligence information. They are the people who do this.

Mr. HARDY. So this is a subterfuge which is used as a mechanism for declassifying intelligence information.

Who in the Sam Hill are we kidding? I just don't believe the American people are as stupid as you all seem to think they are. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Moss. Mr. Reid.

#### RESPONSIBILITIES OF NASA

Mr. REID. Mr. Chairman, I have just one or two brief questions and one request. I believe that the chairman requested that Mr. Webb appear before the committee, and I think, in the light of the line of inquiry that Mr. Hardy has developed, and some other questions here this morning, it would be very helpful if we could hear not only from Dr. Dryden but also from Mr. Webb.

I have one minor question, and then I would like to develop this line of inquiry a little further. As a point of interest, was Dr. Simpson 1 of the 12 who has access to intelligence information?

Dr. DRYDEN. I will have to check that.

Mr. REID. You don't know?

Dr. DRYDEN. I do not know at the moment.

Mr. REID. There is some doubt? The only reason I ask is because—

Dr. DRYDEN. I would not discuss such matters without checking with him, without checking with the security office.

Mr. HARDY. You mean you can't even tell us?

Dr. DRYDEN. No. The information, if you wanted a list of the people who are cleared, we could furnish that to the committee. That is no problem. I just don't happen to remember those.

Mr. REID. Let me get to the heart of this, because I don't think this is quite as jocular a matter as it may appear.

This committee is duly constituted by the Congress, and it asked Dr. Simpson to appear to testify seriously with regard to matters of importance to the Congress and the American people, and if Dr. Simpson was not in a position to respond to this committee, it seems to me NASA should have so informed the committee.

Dr. DRYDEN. I have tried to say repeatedly none of our people are able to respond to questions about the details of intelligence.

Mr. REID. That is not my point. My point is that anybody who appears before this committee should be able to testify appropriately with regard to broad questions affecting NASA.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. REID. Now if Dr. Simpson was not in the possession of information that would permit him to testify broadly, I don't think you should have apprised the staff of this committee that he was in a position to testify.

Dr. DRYDEN. I don't think we ever made the representation that he was in a position to testify on intelligence information.

Mr. REID. I did not say that.

Mr. HARDY. If the gentleman would permit, I just don't believe that there has been a single question asked of you or to Dr. Simpson which would require the revealing of any intelligence information, and why in the world you keep getting behind that dodge—we are not talking about giving us intelligence information at the moment. We are trying to understand a procedure. Excuse me.

Mr. REID. Thank you. Well, I would be interested to know whether Dr. Simpson, who apparently has some policy responsibility in the agency, has access to intelligence information or not.

Dr. DRYDEN. I will let you know, sir. I will telephone you this afternoon.

Mr. REID. Now the principal line of inquiry: Am I correct that NASA is an independent agency of the Government?

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. REID. Am I correct that you and Dr. Webb report to the President?

Dr. DRYDEN. That is correct.

Mr. REID. And you have nobody in between you that you have to report to?

Dr. DRYDEN. That is correct.

Mr. REID. Therefore you do have a clear independent responsibility as set up by the Congress.



Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. REID. However that may be defined.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. REID. But it is a clear responsibility.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. REID. Let me say this: I have had a little opportunity overseas as American Ambassador to see the reaction on foreign governments of the Soviet space effort and of our space effort.

Dr. DRYDEN. Right.

Mr. REID. I do not believe it to be an understatement to say that certainly a few years back, and my guess is it would be true today, that many people throughout the world—Africa, Asia, and the Near East—are inclined to think that the Soviets are making very marked progress in comparison to us.

Dr. DRYDEN. This has changed very radically in the last 2 years.

Mr. REID. Let's pursue this a little bit further. That in essence we are second best. Now this at least was the impression. Now maybe it has changed a little, I don't know.

To the extent that the average fellow in the street, whether it is in Baghdad, Jidda, Tel Aviv, or Addis Ababa or Cairo thinks we are second best, can you not appreciate that this damages seriously the stature of the United States, the credibility of our power and the effectiveness of our foreign policy?

Dr. DRYDEN. No question about it.

#### CITES NEED TO REVEAL SOVIET FAILURES

Mr. REID. Therefore, if this is so, should not NASA seriously undertake to put the Soviet effort, particularly its failures, in clear perspective to the world?

Now you repeatedly have invoked national security and the intelligence community. You have tended I think to indicate that the American people do not need to be told certain details, that they would not understand certain details. I frankly question that point of view.

I think they could be told and should be told much more. But leaving that question aside for the moment, in my judgment NASA may not have fulfilled its full responsibilities. It may have been derelict and indeed it may have damaged the administration and the effectiveness of our foreign policy to the extent it has not assessed or assessed in conjunction with the President the shortcomings of the Soviet effort, because if you make the Soviets 10 feet tall, and you know that they are not, then you have advanced Soviet foreign policy unwittingly.

It seems to me that serious consideration should be given to fully informing the American people and the rest of the world that the Soviets have had, from your testimony today, very real and serious space failures.

I do not think that this has registered throughout the world. I do not indeed think it has registered to the American people.

Therefore, my query is what can you now do, consistent with your responsibilities, to put the Soviet space failures in clear and unquestioned perspective, because I submit that that is not now the case.



Dr. DRYDEN. I don't know whether I can answer your question thoroughly. I should say we do have a USIA man working intimately with us. We do provide information for USIA to issue to foreign countries. This aspect is certainly one which is involved in representing the U.S. position abroad.

I don't know exactly whether I can put my hands on specific pieces of paper which cover the sort of thing which you would like to see done. I am under the impression that there are stories on the average of once a month attempting to put this in context.

Now the second best has always been based on this weight-lifting capacity, which NASA set out to remedy just as soon as it was formed in October of 1958. It has taken from October of 1958 until today for Wernher von Braun to bring the Saturn vehicle to operational stage. It is expected to launch a satellite in the order of 20,000 pounds this year.

If the Russians have not launched something heavier than 14,000 pounds by that date, then for a brief moment anyway the United States is higher in the weight-lifting capacity.

It is recognized, I think, throughout the world that the scientific explorations of NASA greatly exceed those of the Russians. This is demonstrated in every forum, every international forum, such as the one now going on in Warsaw where there are repeated expressions to this country thanking us for cooperation. They get up and talk about relationships. There is no cooperation with the Russians, with anyone.

In the area of weather communications, it is recognized that the Russians have done nothing. So this matter of the exact relative position too often is hung solely on this question of weight-lifting capacity, which we think will soon be remedied.

Mr. REID. Might I merely ask you this, and then yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Would it be possible for you and Mr. Webb, after consultation with the President, to appear again before this committee to advise us as to the responsibilities of NASA in this regard, to the extent that NASA feels that it should not assume them, to indicate clearly who in the Government will assume this, to inform the Congress and the American people, and to inform through our information services the rest of the world, on the Soviet space failures?

To put it in clear perspective, because I submit that I do not think that it is now in perspective. Either NASA must assume this responsibility or the President should direct someone else so to do, so that the responsibility will be assumed by the administration.

I do not think the record here today, or Dr. Simpson's testimony, has been responsive to the central point of the American people and the rest of the world being clearly informed and adequately informed as to Soviet space failures and to an evaluation thereof.

Dr. DRYDEN. I think probably the request should go directly to the President, if you want him to take some action on the matter.

Mr. REID. You do not feel that NASA has any responsibility in this regard?

Dr. DRYDEN. I have said repeatedly we have, that we have talked to newspapermen.

We have given newspapermen information about our assessment of the relative positions, discussed all these matters in great detail, the

weight-lifting capacity, exactly what they are doing in science and what the prospects are of the Russians doing something in meteorology, because they say they are going to. I think the problem is one of the forum that you have in mind.

Mr. REID. Do you think you are presently discharging this responsibility?

Dr. DRYDEN. I do not say that the American people or that the world understands this clearly, because this takes a massive, a very massive effort. I think the press has discussed this matter many times. I think they are continuing to discuss it.

Mr. REID. But do you think you are affirmatively discharging this responsibility?

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. REID. You do?

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. REID. And yet in your testimony I think you are quite clear as I understood it in indicating that much of this is now classified, and further that much of this is classified at the direction not of NASA but of the intelligence community. Therefore I don't see how you can be discharging it.

Dr. DRYDEN. No Government agency can have the power to ride over the CIA. I don't understand the logic of this at all.

Mr. REID. I don't quite follow your logic in assuming that CIA is necessarily correct. The President has to assume—

Dr. DRYDEN. No agency is necessarily correct, but the President assumes the responsibility for the overall operation of the Government.

Mr. REID. Yes, but you have a responsibility it seems to me to put this whole thing in perspective to the United States, the people, the Congress, the rest of the world.

Dr. DRYDEN. Which we do to the best of our ability, without getting involved in matters which we are not authorized to disclose.

Mr. REID. Yes, but you invoke automatically here in most of your responses this business of the intelligence community.

The intelligence community can be wrong. I think you have an affirmative responsibility to advise the President that this is overclassified, that the U.S. interests would be better served if some of it—

Dr. DRYDEN. I honestly don't think it is. This is the fundamental difficulty. I don't think it is overclassified.

Mr. REID. Therefore it would be helpful if we could have some further testimony on this

#### RESPONSIBILITY OF CLASSIFICATION

Mr. Moss. Let me say first, Mr. Reid, I find myself in very substantial agreement with the observations you have made.

I think there is danger in Government when an agency reaches the point where it says that a question is illogical.

Dr. DRYDEN. I don't think I said that.

Mr. Moss. You said you could see no logic—I just turned it around, because I think clearly it conveyed the conviction that to question CIA would be illogical.

Dr. DRYDEN. No, I did not say that.

Mr. MOSS. I feel that I have the responsibility under those terms to be illogical, because you are not contending to this committee that knowledge of failures would enhance the prestige of the United States, diminish that of the Soviet Union, and add to the general store of knowledge of the American people, permitting a better evaluation of the whole space effort, are you?

Dr. DRYDEN. I think the American people have been told repeatedly through many voices of the Government that there have been failures.

Mr. MOSS. They have been told very recently that Russia had a number of manned failures.

Dr. DRYDEN. Not by any official of the Government.

Mr. MOSS. That is right, not by any official of the Government.

Dr. DRYDEN. And to the best of my knowledge I might say there have been no such failures.

Mr. MOSS. That is fine, but now you have an interesting—

Dr. DRYDEN. I so stated to the press when asked about it.

Mr. MOSS. Yes, I realize that. I have followed that.

Dr. DRYDEN. We have no information that they have had a manned failure. This is a story which originated in Czechoslovakia. It has been repeated every few months.

Mr. MOSS. Right. I read it, I think, in an aviation publication a long time ago.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. MOSS. But nevertheless it is repeated, and of course the Russians say this is an attempt by the Americans out of spitefulness to degrade their program; that they have always told everyone, told everything, and yet our Government knows that they have not told everything.

Now we are going today to show that we have not been told of their failures. But it is not your contention that knowledge of the failures would not be beneficial, but only that it might reveal means of collecting intelligence information, isn't that correct?

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes. I have never said that the public should not be told of the failures. I have said that the \* \* \* information from which that knowledge is obtained—

Mr. MOSS. Suppose we were not talking of detailed information. Supposing that our Government would officially say at this point that during the calendar year 1962 the Soviet Union had  $x$  number of failures. Now what information do we divulge?

Dr. DRYDEN. I think you would have to consult the people who have that responsibility to find out their opinion. My reaction at a distance would be the same as your own, that this particular bit of information would not. But I don't know.

Mr. MOSS. Let me as a critique for my statement make it clear that we are going to consult with these people.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. MOSS. Because for us to fail to do that at this point would leave a very cloudy record.

Dr. DRYDEN. It is quite proper for you to raise the issue, I would think.

Mr. MOSS. But the thing that troubles me is that the space agency apparently has not questioned even to the point of saying, "Well,

now what compromise would be involved if we were merely to summarize periodically the total Soviet space failure."

The initiative here I think should come from NASA, because of the clear language of the statute, and you realize as I do that at the time this was originally proposed, it was mildly controversial.

Dr. DRYDEN. I haven't read the debate recently, but the intent was not to get into classified matters.

Mr. Moss. The intent was not to disclose classified information.

Dr. DRYDEN. That is correct.

Mr. Moss. And this subcommittee is not interested in disclosing classified information.

Dr. DRYDEN. But the information you are talking about at present is classified.

Mr. Moss. But this committee feels that it has a responsibility to question the wisdom of classification.

Dr. DRYDEN. That is something else.

Mr. Moss. And we have done so repeatedly.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes, I think this is certainly a matter which the committee can and should raise. The matter which we have been talking about is classified. There is a mechanism for its declassification.

Mr. Moss. Then let me ask you this, sir, because we are very familiar with the mechanisms of declassification.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

#### CLASSIFICATION NOT REVIEWED BY NASA

Mr. Moss. I have spent 8 years dealing with them. But are you satisfied at the moment that the total dimension of classification is fully justified?

Dr. DRYDEN. No.

Mr. Moss. So you do have a question in your own mind as to whether or not it is appropriately classified?

Dr. DRYDEN. In some instances, yes.

Mr. Moss. In some instances. But has the agency then, through either you or Director Webb, raised this question?

Dr. DRYDEN. We do not undertake to review the classification policies of other coordinate branches of the executive branch. This is a matter to be taken up at a higher level.

Mr. Moss. Wasn't CIA created in part as a service agency to gather information at a central point, rather than having all of the departments and agencies of Government engaged in this activity?

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. Moss. So it is, in effect, in part at least, a service agency. It is there to meet your needs, to gather the information which you require.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. Moss. In fully discharging the responsibilities imposed upon you by the Congress. Of course we can argue this one for a long time.

Dr. DRYDEN. However, we have no jurisdiction over Mr. McCone. I think it is a little unfair to expect that we are going to review his classification policies.

Mr. Moss. I did not say that you had jurisdiction, Dr. Dryden, but I say you have a right.

Dr. DRYDEN. We do.

Mr. MOSS. To question the wisdom of CIA in applying classifications too broadly. I have no doubt that everything they develop, if left solely to themselves in their own judgment, would be classified.

Dr. DRYDEN. I think I would be in a position to judge this only if I had access to all the information that is available to Mr. McCone, and I am sure I don't.

Mr. MOSS. I think that you are forced then to operate almost in a vacuum where it comes to the judgments of CIA.

They say, "We are going to give you this information which you require, and which we were created by the Congress to provide, but we are only going to give it to you if you accept without question—"

Dr. DRYDEN. It must be protected for security reasons.

Mr. MOSS. Without question.

Dr. DRYDEN. You can't take such an obligation—

Mr. MOSS. Which agency has the greater competence in the field of space technology, CIA or NASA?

Dr. DRYDEN. The CIA has a very excellent competence in space technology, I might say.

Mr. MOSS. I asked which agency had the greater.

Dr. DRYDEN. We probably have the greater. We are consulted by them on technical matters.

Mr. MOSS. I would hope that you would have the greater.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes. However, you are talking about a policy of declassification, which is a slightly different thing from competence in space technology.

Mr. MOSS. No, because you know an ingredient—and this is a thing which has disturbed me for many years, because I have noted its lack on too many occasions—an ingredient in evaluating the classification is whether we achieve greater security by classifying it—

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. MOSS. And remember Dr. Walter Brode, I believe, who was scientific adviser to President Eisenhower, who expressed before this committee a fear that at some future date we would be called upon to fight a war with little scraps of paper marked secret.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes, I remember that statement.

Mr. MOSS. And I remember Dr. Furness, who was under Charles Wilson in research and development, who expressed substantially the same fear, so that there is a need in discharging your obligations to not just accept without question.

Dr. DRYDEN. I know both these men very well, and I know what they are talking about. They are talking about the run-of-the-mill classification in Defense and NASA.

This is quite true. You find somebody trying to classify Newton's laws, which is silly. We do run into such instances. I don't think they were talking about intelligence information.

Mr. MOSS. Do you think the intelligence field is one of—

Dr. DRYDEN. Very special.

Mr. MOSS. Is one of mystery and something which a person of obvious intellect which you possess should not question or challenge?

Dr. DRYDEN. I think unless you are acquainted with the whole picture, that you can likely make very serious errors.

Mr. MOSS. It is staffed by mortals, isn't it, Doctor?

Dr. DRYDEN. I am not talking about what I might do if I were sitting in Mr. McCone's chair. I am talking about this in the position where I am now.

Mr. MOSS. I think where we create your position it is one of great responsibility, and it carries with it tremendous public trust, but there is there the need for and the right for you to question even Mr. McCone.

Dr. DRYDEN. I have not discussed this before. In matters of this kind I would say that my position has generally been on the side of urging for release wherever possible. I have not taken the narrow view.

Mr. MOSS. Let me say that from the contacts that I have had with you and your Agency over the period of its existence, that I would underwrite that statement. I think that that is the truth very sincerely stated.

Dr. DRYDEN. This is where my own personal influence is thrown in these matters.

Mr. MEADER. I would like to ask one more question. Dr. Dryden, I was interested to hear you reply to the Chairman's question with the statement that you believe that in some instances there had been information classified which should not have been?

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

#### INSTANCES OF DECLASSIFICATION

Mr. MEADER. Aside from the episode of September of 1962 where the six incidents were revealed, are there any other instances in which information which you thought should not have been classified was declassified due to your insistence, or that of your Agency?

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes. One of the areas is in that of small sounding rockets which are very useful in international programs. We have had both successes and failures, if you want to call it that, with regard to classification.

I think again in the case where it was refused, it was probably right. The cases where we do not get declassification are those where because of propellants which were used were the same propellants as used in Minuteman and Polaris. I think that is a pretty valid reason for continuing classification. There are other cases where there has been release of some of these devices for use in the open space program.

Mr. MEADER. And I would take it from your statement that you believe there are still areas of information which are classified which could very well be declassified?

Dr. DRYDEN. I would be surprised if there weren't, because every time our review committees go over a group of reports, they are always declassifying a large number of them.

Mr. MEADER. And I understand that you do have a continuing policy and effort to secure declassification of information which you think can be released?

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes; reviewing the whole thing periodically.

Mr. MEADER. I only want to add, Mr. Chairman, that I have enjoyed listening and participating in this discussion this morning.

I don't believe I have had the occasion to deal with Dr. Dryden at least in this atmosphere since I was counsel for the Senate War

Investigating Committee and under Senator Mitchell of Washington we conducted an inquiry into the activities of the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics.

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. REID. Mr. Chairman, just one quick question or two, Dr. Dryden, and one inquiry of the Chair. Is it my understanding that the committee will call Mr. Webb and Dr. Dryden to pursue this further as it has not been fully developed in the testimony today?

Dr. DRYDEN. The only thing he possibly can contribute would relate to the details.

Mr. REID. I have just one final question, Dr. Dryden, and again I want to thank you for coming and for your discussion this morning.

#### UNITED STATES-SOVIET SPACE EFFORTS COMPARED

Could you give us in very simple outline those areas in space where you feel that the United States is ahead of the Soviet Union, and in those areas where you feel the Soviet Union is ahead of the United States, to encompass to the extent appropriate both peaceful and military applications of space?

Dr. DRYDEN. Well, we don't know of any real Soviet military space applications. We don't know of any obvious ones. Perhaps the military does.

But on the peaceful side, the Soviets have been ahead in weight lifting capacity. This has carried with it the ability to make longer flights, manned flights than we are able to. Our last flight represents about the limit of the Mercury capsule. It was designed for a three-orbit mission, and we have extended it to 22, and we are about through as far as Mercury is concerned.

I would expect the Russians within the next few months anyway to do an 8-day flight or something of this general order of magnitude, and there will be a period here in which they still continue to be able to do a little better as far as weight goes, as far as duration of flight, which technically at least keeps them ahead in that area. This is the manned space area.

It is probable that they are somewhat ahead in space medicine, although we don't know. The evidence is a little bit troublesome.

You remember Titov got nauseated or something. We have not experienced that at all with any of our people. This worried them, and then they sent up two men at the same time to see whether the two men were affected differently. They certainly have been working longer in the space medicine field than we have.

Now in almost all the other areas that I can think of, I think we are definitely ahead. As I have mentioned, they so far have not done weather satellites, although \* \* \* they do expect to be able to have meteorological satellites in 1964.

In communication satellites, judging from talks with them, they are not in a position to do anything. They refused an invitation to participate in the Telstar and Relay demonstrations. We think it may be because they just haven't developed the technology to the point where they are ready to do this.

In the space science area, which is a rather complex and wide area, I think there is very little question that we have produced a greater volume, variety, greater accuracy of results than in the Soviet space program.



We are getting a little better reading of this at the present time in the meeting of the Committee on Space Research of the International Council of Scientific Unions being held in Warsaw this week. I read by the paper that the Russians have presented some of the results from the cosmos series of satellites which were essentially supposed to be devoted to space science.

This is a very brief account. In booster capacity we know what they have demonstrated. \* \* \*

Blagonravov made some statements about general plans in very vague terms which were interpreted by the newspapermen to be the 1963 program, but obviously he was talking about the future, because he spoke about flights to Mars and Venus, which cannot be made until 1964, and he simply said that they would send several cosmonauts into space, and fly more manned flights which we know anyhow.

I think one of the areas of greatest interest is their position with regard to sending men to the moon. I think all we can say about that at this time is that they will have to develop a larger booster. There will have to be signs of other activity, \* \* \*

The Russians ignored the moon after the first three shots, until very recently when they tried it again and had a failure. We assume that this was, just as our own Ranger flight, intended—it probably went beyond Ranger. They probably were trying to soft land a package of instruments on the moon, and they missed the moon completely, and some of the failures were in connection with lunar attempts.

We got to Venus first. It looked as if they would get to Mars first but their Mars probe failed. It did not come anywhere near the planet Mars, so that is still an open race.

At the next Mars opportunity both of us will be firing again, and it remains to be seen who is successful. So in the science areas, in the practical application area we are ahead. They are still ahead in booster capacity, and in the things that they are able to do in manned space flight. That is a kind of a thumbnail sketch.

Mr. REID. Thank you very much.

Mr. MEADER. How about electronics, Dr. Dryden?

Dr. DRYDEN. The Russians have had such a big margin of weight that they have no need to go into the refinement of electronics.

I mentioned the communications satellite. We have been talking with them about making some measurements on an echo balloon. Judging from the conversations, they are not very far along on the higher frequency communications, thousands of megacycles. They just don't seem to be ready to get into that field at least on a power basis, that is of communications systems.

In electronics, the visitors who have been there and seen a little of it find it very spotty. They are able to and have made some experiments with miniaturization, but most of their equipment is of the more classical type.

\* \* \* \* \*

Mr. Moss. I am going to ask unanimous consent to hold the record open at this point to receive answers to some written questions which will be directed to you by the subcommittee. We will now adjourn.

(Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.)

## APPENDIX

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### CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN CONGRESSMAN JOHN E. MOSS AND HON. JAMES E. WEBB, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

(Chairman John E. Moss by letter dated September 20, 1963, submitted a series of written questions to Administrator James E. Webb of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The chairman's letter and Administrator Webb's letter or response, under date of November 4, 1963, follow:)

SEPTEMBER 20, 1963.

HON. JAMES E. WEBB,  
*Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration,*  
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. WEBB: Staff members of the Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee have discussed the question of information about Russian satellite activities with you, with other officials of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, with representatives of the Goddard Space Flight Center, and with officials of the North American Air Defense Command in Colorado Springs, Colo. As you know, this problem was considered at two subcommittee hearings, and the subcommittee considered calling you as a witness.

Instead of holding another hearing at this time, the subcommittee has decided to request from you written answers to questions which were planned for the hearing. The questions are enclosed. The subjects covered have been fully discussed with you and with other officials, and the subcommittee staff is available for any consultation you wish.

If any of the answers to the questions must be classified under Executive Order 10501, please indicate the specific material which is classified. If any of the answers are the type which could be provided only in executive session of the subcommittee, also indicate that material.

The subcommittee agreed that a full hearing will be held if the answers are not fully responsive. I hope you will be able to provide the requested information as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

JOHN E. MOSS, *Chairman.*

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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION,  
OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR,  
*Washington, D.C., November 4, 1963.*

HON. JOHN E. MOSS,  
*Chairman, Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee,*  
*Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Washing-*  
*ton, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This replies to your letter of September 20, 1963, transmitting a series of 13 questions in connection with the subcommittee's study of the release of information on American and Soviet satellite launches. The information given here takes the form of quotation of the questions submitted by you, followed in each case by our answer. It supplements data already submitted by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to the subcommittee in the testimony of Dr. George L. Simpson, Assistant Administrator for Technology Utilization and Policy Planning, on May 23, 1963, and by Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, Deputy Administrator, on June 6, 1963.

Question 1. What U.S. Government, private, or other Government organizations supply NASA with satellite tracking information?

Answer. On a regular basis, the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) supplies the National Aeronautics and Space Administration with information on Department of Defense and Soviet and foreign launches. In addition, NASA receives information on its own launches from the NASA networks and the Baker-Nunn Camera Satellite Tracking Network operated by the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory. The Atlantic Missile Range, the White Sands Missile Range, and the Pacific Missile Range facilities are used during launches from their respective sites and they also participate in the NASA Manned Space Flight Network. The FPS-16 radar of the Commonwealth of Australia's Department of Supply has participated as part of the Manned Space Flight Network, and, in some cases, NASA gets support from private groups: for example, a South African Astronomical Observatory was able to provide sightings which enabled us to confirm the orbit of Syncom I when the tracking beacon failed. In addition, when requested, NORAD supplies the NASA tracking information on some satellites during the early orbits after launch in order to help the latter determine the orbit quickly.

Question 2. What effect did the January 1961 agreement with the Department of Defense have on the statutory responsibilities set out in section 303 of the act creating NASA?

Answer. None. Section 303 of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (72 Stat. 426, 433) provides:

"Information obtained or developed by the Administrator in the performance of his functions under this Act shall be made available for public inspection, except (A) information authorized or required by Federal statute to be withheld, and (B) information classified to protect the national security: *Provided*, That nothing in this Act shall authorize the withholding of information by the Administrator from the duly authorized committees of the Congress."

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is not charged with the duty of acquiring information on Soviet and other foreign launches. Under the cited agreement, this agency receives certain such information from agencies which have the acquisition responsibility. The latter are responsible by law for such security classifications as they may attach to the information they acquire, and NASA is obligated to respect those classifications and safeguard the information accordingly. Section 303, quoted above, does not impose a duty of public dissemination upon NASA. It deals with the availability for public inspection of "information obtained or developed by the Administrator in the performance of his functions under this Act." The section specifically exempts "information classified to protect the national security."

Question 3. Dr. Simpson testified that in 1961 and 1962 there was a drying up of certain information on DOD satellites and Soviet space vehicles.

- (a) What was the agency's reaction to this?
- (b) What did the agency do, if anything?
- (c) Did the agency protest this reduction in information?

Answer. There was a drying up only in the sense that less information was made public in the Satellite Information Report. There was no drying up in the information made available to NASA. Starting in September 1962, the Department of Defense classified all information on Russian satellites that it sent out. Therefore, as explained in the reply to question 2, above, NASA could not publish it. Information on Russian launchings had occasionally been included in reports prior to September 1962. The policy was modified in April 1963. We understand that the files of the subcommittee contain a letter dated April 20, 1963, from the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Arthur Sylvester, with respect to the modification. NASA recognized the effect of this action; it found that its own operations were not affected because NASA was not cut off from the information. It had no reason to protest the action or to substitute its judgment for that of the responsible agency.

Question 4. In September 1962 information on Soviet space efforts was completely withdrawn from the Satellite Situation Report. Why?

Answer. As indicated above, the responsible agency found it necessary to classify the information, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration considered itself obligated to respect that action.

Question 5. Why were these reports not published between August 31 and October 10, 1962?

Answer. In effect, two reports were skipped in this period. The change in policy by the Department of Defense under which foreign launch data was classified occasioned a restudy of the scope and coverage of the Satellite Situation Report.

Question 6. Who determines the number designation used in Satellite Situation Reports for objects in orbit?

Answer. The North American Air Defense Command.

Question 7. The October 10, 1962, issue of the report, volume 2, No. 16, contains a gap in the Greek-designated numbering sequence for 1962: namely, "A-Tau."

(a) Why was reference to "A-Tau" omitted from the report?

(b) Who determined that the report should be published without listing "A-Tau"?

(c) Were the security aspects of the gap in the numbering sequence of objects in orbit considered before publishing this report? If so, please explain what government agencies or organizations were consulted.

Answer. The reference to "A-Tau" was omitted because it referred to a classified launch. Under the principles discussed above, it could not be included by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in an unclassified report. The gap aspect was called to the attention of the Department of Defense, and the gaps have been carried with the full knowledge of that agency.

Question 8. On two occasions—September 5, 1962, in a letter from the NASA Administrator to the Honorable Robert S. Kerr and the Honorable George P. Miller, and on June 6, 1963, in a letter from Ambassador Stevenson to the Secretary General of the United Nations—information on Soviet-launched objects in orbit, which had not been released publicly or contained in NASA Satellite Situation Reports, was made public. Please explain why the letters dealing with Soviet space failures were released at the time they were. If it was not considered to be against the national interest to release the information contained in each letter at the time of release, why is similar information not released as soon as it is gathered?

Answer. In both cases the announcements were carefully measured against the yardstick of the national interest. They reflected detailed appraisals and determinations made at the highest level of government. No single agency was solely responsible for the actions.

Question 9. Do the terms of the DOD Directive No. 5200.13, entitled "Security Policy for Military Space Programs" prevent or impair the Administrator's fulfillment of the requirements of section 303 of the act creating NASA?

Answer. No. See discussion under question 2, above.

Question 10. Has NASA questioned DOD classification of information relating to Soviet space efforts? If so, when and who held discussions on the problem?

Answer. No. NASA has never questioned the right of the Department of Defense to classify its own material. A meeting was held on November 29, 1962, attended by representatives of the DOD, NASA, and the State Department at which compilation and content of the Satellite Situation Report were discussed.

Question 11. Does NASA have knowledge of the basis for DOD classification of satellite tracking information?

Answer. No.

Question 12. Has NASA agreed in every instance to DOD restriction upon satellite tracking information?

Answer. It has not been a question of agreeing or disagreeing. As indicated above, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration has been under no obligation to agree and under no responsibility to disagree. The classifications were the legal responsibility of the Department of Defense, and it was the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's duty to respect the Department of Defense action.

Question 13. If not, what steps have been taken under section 204(c) of the NASA organic act?

Answer. The answer to question 12 makes unnecessary an answer to this question; however, it should be noted that the actions of the Department of Defense were not considered "adverse to the responsibilities of the Administration" within the terms of section 204(c) of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES E. WEBB.

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