I am not knowledgeable about cryptologic information, but the way I read this paragraph it is restricted to National Security Agency cryptologic information, and my question is: What about those individuals within the Department of Defense who have access to exactly the same information that you are referring to with respect to From the way I understand it from this, it is conceivable there is a different requirement of NSA cryptopeople, and DOD? Is that a correct assumption, or incorrect?

Mr. Skallerup. It is correct and I believe this was set forth in the course of the executive session that you had with NSA the day before yesterday.

Mr. Rumsfeld. I understand the NSA situation. I would like to ask the question, if you can answer it in an open session: What prompted a different handling of individuals simply, on the surface, by agency, when these individuals, despite the fact that they are in different agencies, are dealing with exactly the same type of informa-

Mr. Skallerup. The thing that prompted it was the recognition that at the headquarters of NSA, you draw together this information from many, many sources; that makes it a much more sensitive agency. It is a much more obvious target for hostile intelligence services, so the NSA established security standards which were much more stringent than the security standards which were used by military

Mr. Rumsfeld. Then you are saying that you feel NSA, by virtue of its activities, could be described as being of a more sensitive nature than DIA, CIA or the Defense Department activities? Is that way

Mr. Skallerup. It is not way off the track. This is a very difficult thing to assess. The fact of the matter is that polygraph screening as a condition of employment at NSA has been established for a number of years. It is working there. It has not been deemed desirable or necessary in the other Defense Department agencies that

Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, that doesn't, and I am not being critical of your answer, because you are from one department, but from the standpoint of a member of the Government Operations Committee, which is concerned with all of government, it doesn't make a whale of a lot of sense to me, that simply because it is going on in one place and working, that people in the Government that are dealing with exactly the same types of information, shouldn't be treated on a similar basis. Why wouldn't it be equally as appropriate in your Agency, or department, or somewhere else.

It strikes me that this is an area that the subcommittee should interest itself in.

There was a quotation also in this article where Mr. Moss said that— Hopefully this new policy will put an end to giving the polygraph test to military personnel accused of disciplinary matters.

As I read the directive, that is not going to be the case. Is that correct?

Mr. Skallerup. As I interpret Chairman Moss' remarks, he meant that the polygraph should not be used in cases of, what you might call, minor disciplinary matters. The directive provides that its use in