

The same problem that troubled Mr. Zablocki, troubles me. Why should we authorize a program for 4 years ahead on the basis of such an assumption? It might well be that we will thoroughly explore the various possibilities and could reduce the planned doubling of research programming in 1968 and 1969. And if you do need more at that time, then would be the time to justify it. Why do we project needs on an assumption that the more knowledge you get the more ignorant you are going to be and the less realistic, which seems to be what you are arguing?

You argue you must spend more money in order to know that you were right in the conclusions that you reached originally. I wonder if that is a proper assumption.

Mr. FOSTER. I don't think so, sir. I call your attention to the fact that as long as 2 years ago we were planning and hoping to get, in order to examine the whole field, a research budget of \$11 million. That was cut back so that we got \$4.1 million 2 years ago. Last year we again asked for this \$11 million to carry out a number of additional studies which we could not, which would add to our amount of knowledge, and I can assure you in this field the knowledge that one acquires is extensive. I would call your attention to the fact we are presumed to have knowledge concerning political, economic, scientific, psychological, legal, and sociological matters bearing on this field.

We have a very small group to do that.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Five minutes doesn't afford enough time for this kind of discussion, unfortunately, Mr. Foster. If the most urgent mission for the Agency today is the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, I don't see how research will secure much of a solution in that area. The proposals you make seem to be primarily agreements you hope to reach with the Soviet Union. This would not seem to touch on the basic problem of how do you get these other nations which have potential power, maybe not immediate potential power, which could be utilized in the wrong way. How would an agreement with a major power which already has such weapons not to transfer these to others prevent those so-called underdeveloped or more backward nations from developing this know-how on their own?

Mr. FOSTER. What we hope to find is an appropriate way to safeguard against the diversion of materials produced in peaceful reactors to weapons use.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. As I understand it, the problem is not to prevent the diversion of nuclear weapons from the powers which presently have this material to other nations. Other nations, such as Red China specifically, already have the know-how. China could be a threat even without receiving any material from some other nation, because of her instability and aggressiveness.

Chairman MORGAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Farbstein.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FOSTER, your Agency is supposed to have some political knowledge; do I understand from your statement that is correct?

Mr. FOSTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Do you advise with the President? Do you advise the President? Are you part of policymaking decisions?

Mr. FOSTER. In this field; yes, sir.