

(The information follows:)

Contract research program—Long-range program plans

[In millions of dollars]

Category	Fiscal year 1964 (actual)	Fiscal year 1965 (planned)	Fiscal year 1966 (re- quested)	Fiscal year 1967 (pro- jected)	Fiscal year 1968 (pro- jected)	Fiscal year 1969 (pro- jected)
I. Measures directed at the control and reduction of armaments and armed forces.....	0.901	0.722	1.02	1.1	1.3	1.3
II. Measures calculated to lessen the risk of war.....	.008	.574	1.10	1.1	1.2	1.2
III. Inspection and verification.....	.976	1.672	2.18	2.3	3.0	3.0
IV. Arms control field tests.....	1.005	1.000	1.40	1.6	2.6	2.6
V. Economic social international political and other factors related to the achievement of arms control.....	.600	.546	1.10	1.1	1.1	1.1
VI. The impact of arms control and disarmament measures.....	.356	.510	1.00	1.0	1.0	1.0
VII. Supporting activities.....	.138	.376	.40	.4	.5	.5
Total.....	4.034	5.400	8.20	8.6	10.7	10.7

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Culver.

Mr. CULVER. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I notice in your prepared statement, Mr. Foster, you speak several times about the urgency of the problem with regard to proliferation of nuclear experience. Can you give us any idea in terms of time—and you speak also of 40 nations that now possess reactors—what are we faced with in terms of time here in the development of nuclear weapons?

Mr. FOSTER. I would say the most urgent single situation is perhaps that of India, in which there is a good deal of political pressure to go the route of nuclear weapons. The head of their atomic activities is a Dr. Bhaba, who has said that he could develop from the knowledge he has and from the access to materials which he has a nuclear device in a matter of some months. The decision could be made any day. Therefore this is a matter of immediate urgency.

The Indian Government has taken the decision publicly that it will not go the route of nuclear weapons. But there are several parties in their setup who are pressing for them to go that route. Once India does, you can immediately see the pressure on Pakistan, perhaps Japan, on account of the Chinese thing, so this is a question of—I think President Kennedy expressed it best. He said "Once the genie is out of the bottle"—and the genie could be the Indian decision, and this could be a matter of weeks or months until or unless we can do something that reassures India that she will not be alone in denying herself this weapon.

Mr. HAMILTON. What part of your staff is concerned with this area, proliferation of nuclear weapons? How many?

Mr. FOSTER. Whatever time I have left from other things, I spend on it. The Science and Technology Bureau is concerned with it.