

No; in answering your question specifically, it is possible to intensify it for a year and then drop it. This is not what he wants to do. I think he wants to make it perfectly clear that this would be a major objective of his and it has been under three previous Presidents.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. In your own justification for this program, you claim that a 4-year program would be more conducive to long-range research planning.

What advantage is long-range planning in this area? Why can't you do this under a 2-year authorization?

Mr. FOSTER. I think it has great merit. As we look to new weapons and the opportunities which will come about by reduction of some of these things, I think this is very necessary to long-range planning and I think many of these can't possibly be studied effectively in the period of 1 year.

I think laying out a program, and that is the basis of these numbers which we have put down, we think of various things we can do as time goes on. As I said earlier, we had asked for much more money—

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You have not projected very fully for the committee how you plan to spend this money. As I read the table in the back of the book, there is going to be a very modest increase in what you describe as our most urgent problem, the question of whether we can control the spread of nuclear weapons.

An increase of about \$300,000 is projected for next year, but there was a reduction this year in that area of almost \$200,000.

If the urgency of the problem now requires the spending of more money, why did you spend less this year? Or doesn't the spending of more money have anything to do with the urgency of the problem? By far the biggest spending increases seem to be inspection, verification, and field tests.

Is that because it is expensive to develop instruments enabling you to detect? We have no breakdown of what is involved here, either from the point of view of how the money is going to be spent or why there is to be such a rapid expansion.

As I understand it, you propose an expansion of about 65 percent over what you actually had available this year. Just over 10 percent is to be made available for the most crucial area of all—how we can prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

Mr. FOSTER. The urgency does not necessarily—is not necessarily reflected quantitatively. If you have a most urgent problem it may be a modest requirement moneywise. The verification area is the one thing that prevents the major kind of cutback that we are interested in, a nuclear freeze.

If we could find ways to verify and inspect this without a major amount of intrusion into the Soviet territory, this would indeed be the greatest way to cut back the nuclear arms race. We spend a great deal of money on this particular kind of thing.

If we could achieve this, this would be the greatest thing that has ever happened in the way of arms reduction. The verification methods can be complicated, can be simple. We have simplified through our research what we had originally asked.

I will point to another area in which this has proved out very greatly, namely, the verification of nuclear testing. We have been spending—