

not through this Agency but through the VELA program in DOD—at the rate of \$60 to \$70 million a year just testing that one area of monitoring nuclear tests, in space, in the atmosphere, underground, and under the ocean. Because of that we are able to accept a limited nuclear test ban treaty without outside ramifications with assurance that we know what is going on. That kind of thing is very costly, much more costly than a look at proliferation which is a question of how do you develop safeguards.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. What you are saying now is important. It has not been said so far.

You said in your statement on page 2 that "Agency research, back-stopping, and negotiating efforts contributed to the limited nuclear test ban treaty." However, I would suppose that what your Agency did in the form of research was of no particular significance?

Mr. FOSTER. That is not so, sir.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I am asking the question to get a response, not because I know. I would assume that it was the research of the Department of Defense that was crucial, that allowed us to enter into such a treaty, and take the gamble that we would be able to detect a violation, technical or otherwise, such as may have occurred on the 15th of January.

I am not saying this in any derogatory sense. I am trying to find out to what extent research in your own Agency has been helpful and why you feel such a considerable stepping up is essential.

Mr. FOSTER. The objectives of the Department of Defense are at variance with the objectives of this Agency in one way, in that they are concerned with building up if potential adversaries build up. We are concerned with how safely you can reduce and cut down the arms of ourselves and potential adversaries by agreement.

The VELA program is a very fine program. It has made great contributions to this. But until we came and pointed out how some of their findings could be used in this way there was no action in this field.

In 1962, based on these contributions which we have made in our Science and Technology Bureau, and a great deal of time that Mr. Fisher has spent in this, a great deal of time I have spent in this, we were able to tackle a limited nuclear test ban treaty on August 6, which was what the Soviets after a year of talks accepted in July of 1963. In the best of all possible worlds, and could we get the money, we would get further if we could run the VELA program. We can't.

We haven't the personnel. We haven't the money. We can't come up with these things. We come up and bleed and die for \$9 million. We came up with \$15 million and this committee reported out \$15 million. On the floor it was cut to \$10 million, and the appropriation we got was \$7½ million.

As a result many of the things that we could have done sooner that contributed to these things had to be put off. We have recognized the practicalities of life. We have set forth a research program which has many of these items and we put in just what we believe on balance can be put in each year. Two-thirds is toward verification and inspection, which is the greatest stumbling block to the achievement of meaningful arms reduction.