

He has estimated that it would be at least 5 years before the technology would be available to do this sort of a job.

Mr. SELDEN. In other words, you feel that in a period of 5 years technology will be advanced to a point where this can be done without violating the treaty?

Mr. FOSTER. I wouldn't go that far. I think probably it would also require some modification of the treaty.

Mr. SELDEN. In modifying the treaty, would you have to get the consent of all the signers or just the consent of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States?

Mr. FOSTER. You have to have the consent of the three original parties to the treaty; that is the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and ourselves, and a majority of all parties.

Mr. SELDEN. Are we making any effort toward negotiating some sort of a revision in the event that technological advances do not reach the point that a canal can be dug without violating the present test ban treaty?

Mr. FOSTER. No direct attempt to amend it in this direction. You will recall, however, during the negotiation of the treaty there was expressed on the part of the top Soviet officials an interest in this same sort of thing. If I may go off the record for one moment.

(Discussion off the record.)

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Mr. Foster about his emphasis yesterday on the urgency of doing something about the nonproliferation problem. He pointed out that some kind of an agreement is needed in order to reduce the possibility that there will be a proliferation of nuclear weapons. It isn't clear to me whether you anticipate in the absence of such an agreement, which presumably would be with those who now have weapons, that there will be a transfer to countries which do not now have either the know-how to develop a weapon or the capacity to develop a delivery system.

I would suppose that the danger doesn't really rest in the possibility that there will be a transfer either of the weapon or the delivery system so much as the fact that on their own other countries may develop this know-how. An agreement with the Soviet Union with respect to the nontransfer either of weapons or delivery systems would not really reduce the danger of proliferation, which you say is your most urgent concern, would it?

Mr. FOSTER. You are quite correct. The real danger is not the Soviet Union. We really think that she does not want to disseminate her information or her weapons to, let's say, someone less experienced. And the danger lies with countries like India, Japan, Pakistan—

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. China, I think, might be even more an obvious example of possible trouble.

Mr. FOSTER. I think China also probably has no desire to transfer what she has so little of at the moment. We would think that all the nuclear powers have an interest in having no more nuclear powers, or even less. As you know, the United Kingdom in its proposals for an allied nuclear force has offered to give up its nuclear capabilities. No, the real problem is what you do to get the nonnuclears not to receive or not to develop their own.

However, the agreement would have not nearly so much force unless the nuclear powers or at least most of them were to join in