

which have given reactors or sold reactors to some of these nations without this kind of safeguard.

We have pressed to have all of these under safeguards. The danger is that under the pressures of security requirements, having available this kind of material, the pressures of their own security might lead them to breaching the safeguards and telling us not to come in because this is a contractual relationship and we have to come in of course with the permission granted under the agreements we have, but in some cases these bilateral agreements are a timed length for the safeguard, and when these expire as in some cases they have, the question is, Will we always be able to renew them or will we be able to transfer it to the IAEA? If a country decided that all of its neighbors were going the route of nuclear weapons, I think the safeguard system would be under tremendous pressure, and, therefore, this creates a hazard.

What I intended to imply was that this created a hazard around the world that these might go in this direction and particularly in the case of those countries which are not under U.S. safeguards or under the IAEA safeguards.

Mr. McDOWELL. Isn't this then directly in conflict with the efforts of your Agency to stop this proliferation and to bring about hopefully at some time some reduction in nuclear development in other countries?

It seems to me the two agencies are in conflict with each other.

Mr. FOSTER. [Security deletion.] One could say that it has the possibilities within it of being somewhat inconsistent in that it does contain some small element of risk that they might go the weapons route down the years. I think the risk of their going that way, however, can be minimized by a continued cooperation by us in the safeguards program and further strengthened if we can get the kind of universal agreement on nonproliferation on the part of the nonaligned powers. Every one of the nonaligned powers almost has at one time or another indicated it does not want to go the nuclear route. The nuclear route is not all peaches and cream, as we have found in our own activities. It is an extremely expensive club. It has a great responsibility.

It certainly increases the threat to nations of nuclear attack by other nations with nuclear capabilities. This is not a black and white choice. This we think is something that you have to go down both paths to some degree and we think the risk of their using this in this way is minimized at least by the provisions of safeguards which are in all our contracts.

We think also the atoms-for-peace program does have great possibilities in strengthening the economies of many of these nations and making them stronger in the main so they can avoid their difficulties in the unsettlements that come with economic chaos.

Mr. McDOWELL. It seems to me though that certainly within the next decade we are going to go one way or another. We are going to come to some international agreement, or we are going to have a rather widespread development of nuclear potential in many countries.

Mr. FOSTER. I would like to respond to one point further in connection with this. I haven't mentioned this before. But it is perfectly clear that if we continue a massive buildup of our own nuclear weapons and the Russians do the same, the opportunities to get everybody else to come into this nonnuclear arrangement will be minimized.