

subsidizing things that are against what we believe in.

Mr. MILLS. Has the gentleman looked into this matter close enough to realize that in the case of a third party running for the first time in 1968 even if the party gets over 5 million votes, it would not get anything in 1968?

Mr. CURTIS. But if he is also running under a third party, his third party would.

Mr. MILLS. No, I must say to the gentleman, I am right. That third party would not be eligible to get anything until the campaign in 1972.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLS. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. CURTIS. The gentleman speaks with such positiveness—let me emphasize again that we did not hold a single bit of hearings.

Mr. MILLS. We did not have any hearings. I agree with the gentleman.

Mr. CURTIS. All we had was some discussion in the conference room off there for maybe about three-quarters of an hour. That is the most the gentleman knows about it and it is the most that I know.

Mr. MILLS. The gentleman cannot say how much I know of this, I did a lot of studying of it.

Mr. CURTIS. There have been no hearings as I said as far as the House is concerned and we do not know beans about it.

Mr. MILLS. The gentleman is right.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLS. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. FRASER. I just want to commend the chairman. I think it is an excellent proposal. I think it ought to be tried. If particular provisions need to be modified, we can take a look at it next year. But this is a wonderful opportunity to free our political system from dependence on large contributors. I feel very strongly about it.

Mr. MILLS. I thank the gentleman very much.

Mr. VIVIAN. Mr. Speaker, the conference report now before us on H.R. 13103, proposes, as has been thoroughly discussed this evening, that starting in 1967 each individual taxpayer be given an option to divert exactly \$1 per year of his Federal income tax payment to a special Treasury fund. This fund would be equitably allocated between the major national political parties to help defray the costs of presidential campaigns.

Mr. Speaker, this scheme definitely does have some merit. In particular, it provides a simple, direct, and practical

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process by which large numbers of people individually can contribute a small amount to national political campaigns, sufficient to fund these campaigns mod-

erately well, and thereby relieving the candidates of the necessity of depending on a limited number of affluent givers. This scheme therefore would reduce the influence of wealthy individuals or organizations upon the National Government.

Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, there are two very basic faults of this scheme which overshadows its merits: First, the funds are to be available only for presidential elections, rather than all elections at all levels of government; and the funds will be dispersed according to the inclinations of national party leaders, persons who to date seldom have been known to the public, and hardly immediately subject to broad public choice.

Mr. Speaker, this good idea is being applied wrongly.

Suppose instead, these funds were allocated in proportion to the number of voters each delegate receives directly to the control of the local precinct delegates elected precinct by precinct throughout the Nation by the voters of each party. These delegates, who would be your neighbors, and probably well known to you, in turn would distribute the funds over which they gained control to the local, State, and National candidates and party organizations as they so desired, or more particularly, as they would have promised prior to their own election.

The control of political party activities and finances then would stem from where it should—the neighborhood level, the grassroots of politics, rather than from the Nation's political center.

Today, a national TV network, or a national news service, surely can more strongly influence legislation than can, for example, any one or a few Members of Congress, such as myself.

Today, the Nation's political party leaders, of both parties, and particularly of whichever party controls the agencies or controls the congressional committees, surely can wield "the carrot and the stick" to gain frequent conformity of action of representatives from many districts.

Now I personally do not desire to increase this centralization of political power. Therefore I have decided to vote against the conference report.

Of course, in doing so, I recognize that I will be voting against a number of other provisions encompassed in the report, some of which I certainly support, particularly the provision liberalizing tax deductibility of contributions to pension plans by self-employed individuals. I was a sponsor of that provision. But because the other body, the Senate, has imposed this unamendable conference report upon us, I will have no opportunity to separate the provisions.

Mr. Speaker, the Senate should not have accepted the election fund scheme, and neither should we.