surplus revenues from the Hoover and Parker-Davis projects when they are paid out, and from the Pacific Northwest-Pacific Southwest power intertie located in the state of Arizona and Nevada. The basin fund in last year's bill would have built up to around $3 billion by the year 2050. This fund, without those two controversial dams, will still generate about $1.3 billion. And I think we're going to develop other revenue-producing projects in the next few years to add to that.

There is something else we can do, I believe, that will more than make up for the loss of those dams. In our bill last year we had a little feature that went almost completely unnoticed, and there was little controversy about it. That feature provided that the federal government would assume the Mexican Treaty burden, picking up the tab for the first 2.5 million acre feet of augmentation of the river. That little item, all by itself, could mean perhaps about $2.5 billion to the states of the Colorado River Basin, the equivalent of about two Hualapai Dams. I think such a transfer of that burden is still possible and ought to be getting our maximum attention and effort. I think what we can do for ourselves in this area is a lot more important than grousing about the loss of those two dams.

IV

Finally, we come to item four on the back of that envelope—what happens if the river is still short in the 1990s and thereafter—the 4.4 guarantee issue. Let's all stop a moment and take a good, hard, cold unemotional look at this. Of the four essential parts of the 1966 agreement this was really the least important. The other three dealt with water, with progress, with people's needs. But this one dealt only with words on a piece of paper—with emotions, with face, pride, fear and all the rest. On both sides of the river we found ourselves mesmerized with a paper controversy that actually didn't involve the life or death stakes Arizonans and Californians attributed to it. It had a lot of importance psychologically, or as a test of good faith, but in terms of bedrock problems it just didn't mean much.

The fundamental fact for all of us is that the Colorado River will be short in the 1990s—not now, but 25 years from now. If you manage to defeat and obstruct the Central Arizona Project, the river will still be short, and your long-term needs won't be met by the 4.4 you are entitled to—or even the 5.1 million acre feet you are using temporarily now.

If we beat you and pass the project without a guarantee, the river will still be short in the 1990s—short for you and for us as well. And if Arizona "goes it alone," the river will be short also.

Indeed, even if we capitulate and give you last year's guarantee, the river will still be short in the 1990s—in that case, short for you and even shorter for us.

The fact is, my friends, we will all be in trouble—guarantee or no guarantee—win, lose or draw—unless and until we take steps to make augmentation a reality. When that is done, there will be enough water in the river and the question of paper guarantees will be entirely academic—which, in the final analysis, is about what it now is.

For thirty long years now you have had your aqueducts. You've used your share of water and some of ours too. In the Senate bill passed this year Arizona consents to your continued priority over our uses for *another* 27 years. But your state says there can be no compromise; the guarantee must run until the river is fully augmented or Gabriel blows his horn. I see two things wrong with this California position:

1—The first of these is your leaders' insistence that, even if given a guarantee of 4.4, there can be no credit for water added to the basin through such programs as I have outlined unless that water is dumped physically into the Colorado River itself. Let me illustrate why this position makes no sense.

I have indicated that four large desalting plants, built in stages, could give our water-short region enough new water to make up for anticipated deficiencies in the basin. Suppose now that we give you a guarantee lasting until new water is found to relieve the basin of the Mexican Treaty burden of 1.5 million acre feet. And suppose that our engineers tell us the best place to build the first of these plants is the Los Angeles area along the seacoast.

All right. Now let's assume that Congress authorizes the project, and we pay for it with federal funds, perhaps out of the basin account. The plant is built and begins to pump brand new $70 water into the basin, cutting down the regional shortage for all of us. A reasonable person might expect that this new water would