

of the Army—involved in the acquisition of 234 new-type cargo trucks for use by ground support elements of four Marine Corps air units. Because this diffusion of responsibility was not adequately coordinated, the new trucks, which cost over \$1.8 million, were purchased without combat essential spare parts. During the period that the spare parts were not available, the air units were required to use old, deteriorated trucks. As a result, the readiness of the four units was affected for a period of 14 months after the delivery of the trucks.

The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management), by letter dated November 10, 1965, informed us that the Navy concurred in our findings. We were also furnished copies of instructions covering policies and procedures issued with the intent of preventing the recurrence of deficiencies of the type noted in our report.

Under the present procedures in the Department of Defense, various organizations will continue to be responsible, and properly so, for different segments of equipment procurement programs. In order that there be adequate management control, we recommended to the Commandant of the Marine Corps that the basic responsibility for the coordination and supervision over all aspects of major equipment procurement programs including the end items and related spare parts be assigned to a specific organization within the Marine Corps.

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REVIEW OF READINESS STATUS OF IDLE AMMUNITION-PRODUCTION FACILITIES, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

The General Accounting Office made a review of the readiness status of a selected Department of the Army idle ammunition production facility.

Our review and a broader study later conducted by the Army indicated that many facilities considered essential for mobilization purposes would probably not be available for emergency ammunition production when needed. Certain other facilities apparently are not required for immediate production but have been maintained in a high state of readiness at considerable cost under contracts with various contractors. This resulted, in our opinion, from a general lack of attention to this critical area and the fact that too few qualified persons were assigned to industrial readiness planning.

Our review of one production facility showed that the equipment had been maintained by contractors for about 6 years in a leased plant at costs totaling more than \$500,000, on the basis that military requirements dictated that 90 mm shell production be started within 3 months in the event of mobilization. We found, however, that these facilities probably could not have been made ready for production in less than 6 months because of the need for certain special tooling and plant preparation. This is about the same length of time that would have been required to prepare for production if the equipment had been placed in Government-owned storage facilities at much lower cost. Furthermore, the need for maintaining the equipment in readiness to produce shells within 3 months was questionable because