

The Department of the Army, in commenting on the matters presented in this report, generally disagreed with our findings and conclusions. The Department stated that three principal changes in conditions occurred between 1959, when the decision was made to increase the length of the lock to 1,000 feet, and 1962, when the decision was made to increase the length of the lock to 1,200 feet. The changes referred to by the Department relate primarily to technological changes in ship construction and in processing of low-grade ores and to improvements in the Great Lakes connecting channels. Although these principal changes would probably affect the date at which larger Great Lakes ships would be placed in service, we believe that sufficient information was available in 1959 to place the Corps on notice that these changes would occur during the economic life of the lock and we believe that the Corps should have considered the effect of these changes in determining the size of the New Second Lock.

These and several additional comments by the Department have been considered in our report and are included as appendix II.

Existing regulations and procedures provide general guidelines to be used in the planning and designing of locks, and we are not recommending that these be revised or that more detailed guidelines be established because we recognize that numerous factors are involved in determining the size of a lock and that these factors vary depending on the type of vessels and traffic which will use the lock. Because the decision as to the size of each lock to be constructed—as in the case of the New Second Lock—involves the exercise of judgment, we believe that it is particularly important that the information compiled during the lock-size studies and the recommendations made by the district engineers based on these studies be critically reviewed and evaluated by responsible officials in the division and in the Office of the Chief of Engineers.

Accordingly, we are recommending that, in order to minimize the possible occurrence of similar situations, the Chief of Engineers bring this report to the attention of all district engineers to stress the importance of conducting thorough studies before building new locks. We are recommending also that the Chief of Engineers bring this report to the attention of the division engineers and officials in the Office of the Chief of Engineers to demonstrate the need for more critical evaluations of representations and proposed actions of the district engineers to ensure that the representations and actions are in line with current and forecast lock-size requirements.

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REVIEW OF SELECTED ASPECTS OF SCHEDULING FOR DESIGN, INTEGRATION, AND TEST OF NIMBUS SPACECRAFT, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

The primary objective of the Nimbus project at its outset was to develop a meteorological satellite system which would be capable of meeting operational, as well as research and development, needs of the nation's atmospheric and weather services. We undertook a review of selected aspects of the management of the Nimbus project,