Dr. MUELLER. That is correct.
Mr. ROUDEBUSH. Thank you.
(Following for the record:)

DISPOSITION OF GEMINI SPACECRAFT

Gemini 1: Not recovered.
Gemini 2: MOL Program.
Gemini 3: MOL Program.
Gemini 3A: MOL Program (test article).
Gemini 4: Smithsonian Institution.
Gemini 5: On display at MSC.
Gemini 6: In storage at St. Louis.
Gemini 7: Expo–67.
Gemini 8: In storage at St. Louis.
Gemini 9: In storage at MSC.
Gemini 10: In Australia on tour.
Gemini 11: In storage at St. Louis.
Gemini 12: In storage at St. Louis.

Dr. MUELLER. I would like to turn now to our annual report for the fiscal year beginning in July. I had previously submitted supplemental data to the statement I presented before the full committee on March 7 and will, with the permission of the chairman, during the next several days bring out the key elements of the supplemental data which describe the activities and programs of Manned Space Flight, accomplishments over the past year, and activities planned with the fiscal year 1968 budget under consideration by the committee.

Before going into the Manned Space Flight program in depth, I would like to reiterate the key points brought out by Dr. Seamans in his testimony before the full committee on March 1. He stated as follows:

> First, this FY 1968 request represents the first true post-Apollo decisions. These decisions reflect our thinking, the review and endorsements of the Bureau of the Budget and the President's Science Advisory Committee, and the judgment of the President. As such, the important aspects to stress is that these are real and forthright decisions, ones that can be clearly accepted or rejected but that are not susceptible to compromises or halfway measures. Their crux is the question of a determination to continue a dynamic U.S. presence in space—or, of an overt decision to abandon the challenges, difficulties, and rewards of space capability. Second, nearly all of the budget is dedicated, not to the steps planned to forward the Nation's capability in new areas, but to the support and completion of those major space and aeronautics tasks that have been authorized and funded in the past. This on-going effort has been the successful backbone of our scientific and technological advances since the inception of the Agency, and commands the greatest part of our management attention and of our resources, both manpower and money. Third, every major undertaking in the field of research and development has built in an inherent risk, an uncertainty factor. I would like to underline this characteristic in our budget today. The exampel of the Apollo 204 accident during simulated launch conditions must be a reminder that we must work at the far edge of today's technology in order to build tomorrow's and that we can not always accurately assess in advance the cost in time or money, and most importantly in lives, of reaching national objectives and achieving national goals. The budget before you was prepared before the accident; our first impression is that the corrective actions we plan can be balanced within the overall totals by unavoidable delays and judicious rescheduling of effort, but we are not yet clear as to the full impact of the accident upon both our FY 1967 and 1968 resource planning. More than ever in the past, the unexpected has added uncertainty to our program.

I believe that these points made by Dr. Seamans are significant to our discussions as the subcommittee considers the fiscal year 1968 budget