other than this mistake. It is a certified company. Every product he's made with the right wire more than exceeds all the specifications.

Mr. TEAGUE. It was done by one person in his organization, and you'd probably destroy his company if you went too far.

Mr. SMITH. This is a decision that will have to be made between ourselves and Marshall. We have confronted the company. I met with their general manager, their inspection head, their chief design engineer, along with our procurement head and our legal counsel Thursday. We showed them the records, the findings we had made from examining their records, and presented them as fact. We did indicate that we had drawn these conclusions from the records. We asked them to study the records and to come back again next Thursday and see if they could contribute anything to the factual evidence. We have been in contact with Marshall's Chief Counsel Ed Guillan, and we'll make a decision on how to proceed.

Mr. WINN. Let me continue on the line we are in. If this man or woman that received the bad wire knew it was bad, then through the job of the various remaining people involved in the installation of this wire—did anybody—anyone speak up and say this doesn't seem like the right stuff we're putting in here?

Mr. SMITH. If you'd like to pursue that a minute——

Mr. WINN. Since you are the prime contractor, am I wrong in assuming that you are responsible for the results of their work?

Mr. SMITH. We are fully responsible to the Government, for our prime contract obligations, yes. You have to be aware that in all Government contracts, certain disciplines are laid down on the prime contractor. There is a point at which there isn't enough money in the world to have one prime contractor man for every one of the subtier vendors. That is why we strive to select subcontractors of proven competence. This particular bottle vendor has four additional subcontracts: forging supplier, weld wire supplier, heat treating subcontractor, and testing contractor; and the amount of money involved putting absolute surveillance in all these things is almost beyond comprehension. When you consider that this one is just one of perhaps two or three hundred that Douglas uses for the Saturn program, one of two or three thousand in the Apollo program.

Mr. FRIETAG. 20,000 is closer.

Mr. DOUGLAS. 20,000 is closer, Bob.

Mr. SMITH. On the other hand, we are certainly going to take a good look at our own procedures.

As a result of this, we are starting to look at hardware—we look at hardware in many ways. Are they critical to the flight? Are they critical to the safety of the astronaut? We are starting to look at them in terms of: Do they contain enough potential energy to destroy the stage? On these we will go back and review our requirements: Do our requirements, if followed, insure that every piece of hardware that comes out of the vendor is proper? Then we will look to see whether or not we have the disciplines that insure he is following those requirements. I'm sure that as a result of this incident, both ourselves and other NASA contractors, Government contractors, will change some of their methods of surveillance of these potentially dangerous components.