

change in the communication gear. But, all in all, it looks as though this hardware is extremely versatile with very minor changes.

The conclusion (fig. 42) of the S-IVB program report—just to repeat a few points I would like to make—is that we are experiencing substantial underruns in manpower, under what we predicted last year. Discounting the effects of the 503 incident, in general, we are either on schedule or ahead of schedule in delivering stages for the Government need date. We have had a failure, we have determined the cause, and have taken preventive action. We can meet our commitments to Cape Kennedy.

If the program is to continue to run in an efficient manner, we will need timely contract authorization for the follow-on stages in the coming year.

Generally, it looks as though the S-IVB is a very versatile piece of hardware, that with minor modifications can be made to do many other missions than the current Apollo mission.

CONCLUSIONS

- SUBSTANTIAL UNDERRUN FOR FY '67 COST AND MANPOWER PROJECTIONS PREPARED LAST YEAR
- PROGRAM DELIVERIES IN ADVANCE OF CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS
- CAUSE OF 503 INCIDENT DETERMINED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION BEING TAKEN
- KSC STAGE REQUIREMENTS CAN GENERALLY BE MET
- TIMELY CONTRACT AUTHORIZATION FOR FOLLOW-ON PROCUREMENT REQUIRED
- S-IVB STAGES ADAPTABLE TO ADVANCE MISSIONS, SUCH AS ORBITAL WORKSHOP AND SYNCHRONOUS ORBIT

FIGURE 42