PAGENO="0001" ~o1o'~a'c4Ib 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT OF THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETIETH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ON H.R. 4450, H.R. 6470 (Superseded by H.R. 10340) MARCH 14, 15, 16, 20, AND 21, 1967 [No. 2] Part2 Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Astronautics 0 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 76-2650 WASHINGTON : 1967 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $4.00 ~~1O ~5 PAGENO="0002" COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS GEORGE P. MILLER, California, Chairman OLIN E. TEAGIJE, Texas JOSEPH E. KARTH, Minnesota KEN HECHLER, West Virginia EMILIO Q. DADDARIO, Connecticut J. EDWARD ROIISH, Indiana JOHN W. DAVIS, Georgia WILLIAM F. RYAN, New York THOMAS N. DOWNJIiG, Virginia JOE D. WAGGON~NER, JR., Louisiana DON FUQUA, Florida GEORGE E. BROWN, Ja., California LESTER L. WOLFF, New York WILLIAM J. GREEN, Pennsylvania EARLE CABELL, Texas JACK BRINKLEY, Georgia BOB ECKHARDT, Texas CHARLES F. DUCANDER, Enecutive Director ~ncZ Chief Counsel JOHN A. CARSTARPHEN, Jr.,, Chief Clerk and Counsel PHILIP B. YEAGER, Counsel FRANK R. HAMMILL, Jr., Counsel W. H. BOONE, Chier Technical Consuit~snt RICHARD P. HINEs, Staff Consultant PETER A. GERARDI, Technical Consultant JAMES E. WILSON, Technical Consultant HAROLD A. GoULD, Technical Consultant PHILIP P. DICKINSON, Technical Consultant JOSEPH M. FELTON, Counsel ELIZABETH S. KERNAN, Scientific Research Assistant FRANK J. GIRoux, Clerk DENIS C. QUIGLEY, Publications Clerk EMILIO Q. DADDARIO, Connecticut JAMES G. FUIJTON, Pennsylvania JOE D. WAGGONNER, JR., Louisiana RICHARD L. ROUDEBUSH, Indiana DON FUQIJA, Florida ALPHONZO BELL, California WILLIAM J. GREEN, Pennsylvania EDWARD J. GURNEY, Florida EARLE CABELL, Texas DONALD RUMSFELD, Illinois JAMES G. FULTON, Pennsylvania CHARLES A. MOSHER, Ohio RICHARD L. ROUDEBUSH, Indiana ALPHONZO RELL~ California THOMAS M. PELLY, Washington DONALD RUMSFELD, Illinois EDWARD J. GURNEY, Florida JOEN W. WYDLER, New York GUY VANDER JAGT, Michigan LARRY WINN, JR., Kansas JERRY L. PETTIS, California D. E. (BUZ) LUKENS, Ohio JOHN B. HUNT, New Jersey SUBOOMM!TTEE Oh MANNED SPACE FLIGHT OLIN E. `TEAGUE, Texas, Chairman II PAGENO="0003" CONTENTS STATEMENTS March 14, 1967: Mueller, Dr. George E., Associate Administrator for Manned Space Page Flight, NASA 2 Prepared statement 63 March 15, 1967: Mueller, Dr. George E., Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, NASA 203 March 16, 1967: Mueller, Dr. George E., Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, NASA; accompanied by William E. Lilly, Director, Manned Space Flight Program Control, NASA; Robert F. Freitag, Director, MSF, Field Center Development, NASA; Charles W. Mathews, Director, Saturn Apollo Applications, NASA; and John H. Disher, Deputy Director, Saturn Apollo Applications, NASA 255 March 20, 1967: Mueller, Dr. George E., Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, NASA; accompanied by William E. Lilly, Director, Manned Space Flight Program Control, NASA; Charles Mathews, Director of the Saturn Apollo Applications, NASA; Robert F. Freitag, Di- rector, MSF, Field Center Development, NASA; and Edward Z. Gray, Advanced Manned Missions Program Director, NASA - - - 301 March 21, 1967: Mueller, Dr. George E., Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, NASA, accompanied by William E. Lilly, Director, Manned Space Flight Program Control, NASA 389 Answers to questions submitted for the public record in executive session by members of the Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, April 4, 1967 551 Additional questions for the record; replies submitted by Dr. George E. Mueller, Associate Administrator, Office of Manned Space Flight, NASA: Apolloprogram 553 Apollo applications (set No. 1) 562 Apollo applications (set No.2) 570 Apollo applications (set No.3) 577 Advanced missions 581 Construction of facilities 583 Administrative operations 597 ummary of appendixes 609 APPENDIXES ppendix A-Hearings of the Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, Grumman Aircraft Engineering Co., Bethpage, Long Island 615 ppendix B-Hearings of the Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, Boeing Co., Michoud Assembly Facility, New Orleans, La 671 ppendix C-Hearings of the Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, Chrysler Corp., Michoud Assembly Facility, New Orleans, La 711 ppendix D-Hearings of the Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, North American Aviation, Inc., Seal Beach, Calif 755 III PAGENO="0004" IV CONTENTS Appendix E-Hearings of the Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, Page Douglas Aircraft Corp., Huntington Beach, Calif 853 Appendix F-Hearings of the Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Ala 922 Appendix 0-Hearings of the Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, Kennedy Space Center, Cape Kennedy, Fla 1063 Appendix H-Hearings of the Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, Manned Space Flight Center, Houston, Tex 1211 Supplemental Appendix 1415 PAGENO="0005" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION TUESDAY, MAB~CH 14, [967 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, Wa8hii2Øon, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, in room 2318, Rayburn House Office Building, at 10 a.m., the Honorable Olin E. Teague (chairman of the subcommittee,) presiding. Mr. TEAGUE. The committee will come to order. Dr. Mueller, it is a pleasure to welcome you and members of your staff to our first subcommittee meeting on NASA's fiscal year 1967 authorization. The successful completion of the Gemini program and the major success that NASA has achieved in the Apollo program speaks well for the dedication and capability of NASA's managers, engineers, and scientists who are contributing not only to a successful lunar landing, but also to the technological vitality of the country. The recent tragic accident at Cape Kennedy serves to highlight for all of us not only the dangers but the complexity of the tasks which you and all personnel both in NASA and in industry have undertaken. We look forward to a thorough and candid report on the causes and the remedial actions necessary to maintain national confidence in our manned space effort. Based on a recent survey by the NASA Oversight Subcommittee, we have reason to have confidence in NASA's ability to meet the problems identified in this recent accident as well as to surmount the continuing engineering problems that a program such as Apollo is bound to have. The identification of an Apollo Applications program during these hearings is most important. As I have said before, NASA's plans for manned space effort after the initial lunar landing need to provide a aximum return on our current investment in the national space rogram. I urge you to take full advantage of these hearings to present to the ubcommittee, the Congress, and to the people a clear statement of lan and purpose in manned flight. I assume you are going to summarize your statement? Dr. MUELLER. I will summarize the statement, although, with the hairman's permission, I will read some of it. Mr. TEAGUE. The members may break in and ask questions as we o along. 1 PAGENO="0006" 2 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION STATEMENT OP DR GEORGE E MUELLER, ASSOCIATE ADMINIS TL~TOR FOR MANNED SPACE PLIGHT, NASA Dr. MUELLER. I would like to begin with a review of the Gemini program, Mr. Chairman, and its accomplishments during the past year. GEMINI PROGRAM Gemini, of course, is the Nation's second major manned space flight program, completed its flight phase on November 15, 1966, with the recovery of the Gemini XII spacecraft Since that date, personnel, equipment, and facilities from the Gemini program have been inte grated into other manned space flight programs such as the Apollo, Apollo Applications, Advanced Manned Missions, and the Depart ment of Defense's Manned Orbiting Laboratory By the end of fiscal year 1967 all Gemini contracts will have been terminated, but the technical and information utilization phase of the program will con tmue in follow on programs During this presentation, I will discuss the transition from Gemini in more detail, attempting to show the contribution of Gemini to overall manned space flight The past year was a year in which the operational capabilities of manned space flight were further demonstrated and the operational techniques expanded with the Gemini program looking toward the Apollo and Apollo Applications activity of the future In the five manned Gemini flights accomplished in 1966, rendezvous missions directly contributing to the Apollo rendezvous requirements for lunar flight were explored and the technologies demonstrated In this pres entation, I would like to show how the Gemini flights contributed to meeting the Gemini obiectives and then how meeting these objectives contributes to the Apollo, Apollo Applications and the potential fu ture space flight mission I will begin by updating the information presented to this subcommittee last year, covering the accomplish ments of the Gemini program during 1966 GEMINI VIII Last year I reported on the Gemini missions through Gemini VII Gemini VIII, the sixth manned flight and the first mission to htwe a successful Agena target vehicle flight, was launched in March 1966 F his mission accomplished rendezvous and achieved the first docking (fig 1, MG67-5812) of two vehicles in space, before early termination of the mission because of a spacecraft control system malfunction The crew landed successfully in a secondary recovery area in th western Pacific Recovery was carried out quickly by a secondar iecovery force using planned emergency procedures A significant payoff of the Gemini VIII flight was the demonstr't tion of techniques required for the rendezvous and docking of th Apollo spacecraft command and lunar modules in lunar orbit dunn the lunar landing mission The accomplishment of rendezvous am docking also paves the way for future assembly of the orbital work shop planned in the Apollo Applications program as well as spac stations of the future PAGENO="0007" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 3 Open-ended mi&~ion concept You will recall that the Gemini VIII flight was terminated early as a result of a short circuit in the wiring to a spacecraft thruster. Nevertheless, the primary mission objectives had been met and a phi- losophy which I described to the full committee on March 7 as the opeil ended mission concept continued to evolve with that mission. This concept will be implemented upon Apollo and Apollo Applications flights. All future Apollo/Saturn missions will be open ended; that is, the duration of each mission and the operational sequences attempted will not be rigidly limited by the flight plan. This concept of open ended flight tests essentially says that we will continue a flight toward the ultimate mission goals so long as either there is no problem with the crew or the basic hardware or so long as we have sufficient expendable. upplies for continued operations. At various points during the mission the decision can be made to )roceed to the next decision point or to terminate the mission, depend- ng upon its current status. In this way, the accomplishments of each ission will not be limited to predetermined levels, and we will be ~ble to take full advantage of success as it occurs. At the same time, e will have the option of terminating the mission at any intermediate ecision point because of problems or operating limitations encount- red. FIGURE 1 PAGENO="0008" 4 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION GEMINI IX Use of a~gnwnted target dockirtg adapter The Gemini IX flight which was attempted on May 17, 1966, almost 2 months to the day after the Gemini VIII flight, was scrubbed due to the failure of the Atlas to propel the target vehicle into orbit. To obtain a suitable rendezvous target vehicle for Gemini IX, the Aug- niented Target Docking Adapter (ATDA) was then prepared for launch. This contingency vehicle development had been initiated following the failure of the Gemini VI target vehicle in October 1965. The ATDA illustrated here was in essence a target vehicle without propulsion but with an attitude control system and with a docking adapter (fig. 2, MG66-8988). FIGuRE; 2 The early delivery of target launch vehicles permitted the Gemini IX mission, now designated Gemini IX-A, to be rescheduled and launched on June 3, 1966. The ATDA heat shield failed to separate, and docking was precluded after rendezvous. The configuration o the unseparated heat shield became known as the "angry al'igator' shown in this view (fig. 3, MG67-5813). Shift to alternate ni~i ~si on With the primary mission of Gemini IX-A precluded, a decisio was made to shift to the preplanned alternate mission. This alternat mission provided significant scientific and technological informatio Three different rendezvous were completed. The initial rendezvou PAGENO="0009" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 5 Fiauiii~ 3 simulated the planned Apollo lunar module rendezvous with the command and service module. Two additional rendezvous maneuvers were later executed, the last being an extremely difficult lunar module abort simulation. Numerous experiments were performed and a long period of extra- vehicular activity (EVA) was conducted. The excessive work levels experienced during EVA on this mission required termination of this activity earler than intended. From this experience, we recognize the requirement for additional study of EVA training, procedures, work- loads, and restraints. The shift to the alternate mission for Gemini IX, as well as the early termination of Gemini VIII, had further significance. These experiences led to further development of the open ended mission con- cept previously described. GEMINI x Gemini X was launched on July 18, 1966 and rendezvoused and docked as planned with the Agena X target vehicle during the fourth spacecraft revolution, using the ascent rendezvous mode. Later, the Agena X primary and secondary. propulsion systems were used in docked vehicle maneuvers to raise the combined vehicle to an altitude record of 414 nautical miles, and to position Gemini X for rendezvous with the Agena VIII target vehicle still orbiting from the Gemini VIII mission. After separation from Agena X, the Gemini X space- PAGENO="0010" 6 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION craft then rendezvoused with Agena VIII, completing the first double rendezvous maneuvers in space. These rendezvousing, docking, and maneuvering exercises laid the foundation for the design of future applications missions. The maneuvering of one vehicle, using the propulsion of a second to rendezvous with a third craft previously parked in orbit, combines the precise elements involved in the first Apollo Applications program alternate mission. During the EVA on the Gemini X mission, the astronaut micro- meteorite experiment was retrieved by the astronaut from the Agena VIII target vehicle where it had been collecting data over a 2-month period. Thus the astronaut demonstrated capability to perform use- ful work outside the spacecraft. A previous standup EVA had been cut short due to eye irritation and the umbilical EVA involving re- trieval of the experiment from the Agena VIII was shortened because of low maneuvering fuel supply. GEMINI XI Gemini XI was launched on September 12, 1~66, and completed a rendezvous with the target vehicle during its first revolution, using on-board computer information exclusively. This rendezvous was most efficient as far as time is concerned and will find future applica- tion such as in the resupply of spacecraft where time may be a factor in rendezvous. Later in the mission a second rendezvous called a coin- cident orbit rendezvous was performed. This type of rendezvous is most efficient in conserving fuel, but requires significant tracking time. It will find later application on missions where fuel efficiency is re- quired. During a period of unbilical EVA performed while the spacecraft and target vehicle were docked, several experiments were accomplished and the astronaut succeeded in attaching a 100-foot tether connecting the two vehicles. 1,~Tith the docking maneuver the Gemini spacecraft and propulsion stage were assembled into a new spacecraft combination and launched out of the Agena orbit into a new, high orbit of 741 nautical miles al- titude. These assembly techniques will be essential in Apollo and Apollo Applications when the Apollo spacecraft is docked with the lunar module and the orbital workshop, Apollo telescope mount, and lunar mapping and survey system are assembled for the Apollo Appli- cations mission. Following the orbital maneuver, Gemini XI carried out a number of photographic experiments during more than 3 hours of high altitude, high velocity orbiting. Photogra~phic observations of our Earth's surface and its characteristics during Gemini XI and other Gemini missions are important because of the applicability of these experi- ments to man's benefit on Earth. During a later period of EVA standup after return to low earth orbit, a number of astronomical observations, as well as scientific ex- periments, were successfully completed. Similar experiments will be continued in the Apollo program and to a greater degree in Apollo Applications missions. PAGENO="0011" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 7 Use of tether for station keeping Of considerable importance to the future was the tether exercise con- ducted on this mission. The experiment involved undocking the two vehicles, extending the connected tether to its full 100-foot length, and rotating the systems of two vehicles using the spacecraft thrusters. This method of multivehicle station keeping, which requires a mini- mum use of fuel, will be invaluable for application in future programs, since centrifugal force produced by this technique provides a radial- acceleration which may find application as a means of providing a special artificial gravity. GEMINI XII The Gemini XII mission commenced on November 11, 1966, and a rendezvous and docking with an Agena target vehicle was accom- plished during the third spacecraft revolution. A planned high altitude excursion using the Agena propulsion sys- tems was deleted because of a suspected anomaly in the Agena. In lieu of this, a rendezvous with a solar eclipse on November 1~, 1966, was executed by the combined Gemini Agena vehicle and eclipse photographs free from the effects of our atmosphere were obtained. Success ful extravehicular activity For the Gemini XII mission great care was taken with EVA prep- arations because of the difficulties which had been experienced earlier. EVA tasks were carefully redesigned and training was intensified. The EVA was designed to provide more fundamental baseline infor- mation on man's ability to function in the space environment to insure that this constraint does not exist in Apollo and Apollo Applications. Three separate periods of EVA were conducted on Gemini XII and all were completely successful. A special EVA report now in prep- aration will provide future planners and astronauts with a complete synopsis and analysis of all of the Gemini EVA experience as a base for further use of man as a worker in space. Before continuing this discussion of the Gemini program with a review of the six Gemini objectives, I would like first to show a film which summarizes the Gemini achievements. Tbe script for the film is attached as appendix B to this statement. GEMINI OBJECTIVES I would now like to turn to the six Gemini objectives; first showing how these objectives were met and then how in meeting the objectives Gemini has laid the foundation for future space activity. INVESTIGATE LONG DtJRATION FLIGHT The Gemini objectives are shown on this chart (fig. 4, M65-5187). At the close of 1965, long duration flights of up to 14 days were com- pleted. The analysis of these flight data has opened the way for the 28- and 56-day missions planned in the Apollo Applications program and other follow-on programs for the immediate future. The total Mercury and Gemini space flights experience provide approximately 2,000 man-hours weightless exposure for evaluating predicted effects of space flight versus actual findings. PAGENO="0012" 8 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION GEMINI OBJECTIVES TO INCREASE OPERATIONAL PROFICIENCY AND KNOWLEDGE OF TECHNOLOGY IN MANNED SPACE FLIGHT * INVESTIGATE LONG DURATION FLIGHT * DEVELOP RENDEZVOUS TECHNIQUES AND POST DOCKING MANEUVERS * DEVELOP RE-ENTRY FLIGHT PATH CONTROL * ATTAIN FLIGHT AND GROUND CREW PROFICIENCY * DEVELOP EXTRA VEHICULAR CAPABILITY * CONDUCT SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENTS NASA M65-5187 1/26/65 FIGuRE 4 In general, the environmental hazards and effects on man appear to be of less magnitude than originally anticipated. The principal physi- ological changes noted were orthostatism for some 50 hours postflight as measured with a tilt table; reduced red-cell mass of 5 to 20 percent; and reduced X-ray density (calcium) in the oscalcis and the small finger. No abnormal psychological reactions have been observed, and no vestibular disturbances have occurred that were related to flight. Although much remains to be learned, it appears that if man is prop- erly supported his limitations will not be a barrier to the exploration of the universe. Medical easperiment~ program Specifically, the four major objectives of the medical experiments program, which was a major activity in the investigation of long dura- tion flights, were to determine effects, mechanisms, predictive means, and most effective preventive or correct measures. All of the Gemini experiments were directed toward the first objec- tive, the determination of the effects of space flight on man and the time courses of these effects. Experiments such as the phonoelectro- cardiogram, bioassay of body fluids, mineral balance, human otolith function, and the red cell mass and blood volume studies are all con- tributing data on mechanisms by which these effects are manifested. The in-flight exerciser may prove to be of value as an in-flight predic- tive ind~x of circulatory changes as they might unfavorably affect postflight activities. Cardiovascular reflex is the evaluation of a technique to prevent circulatory de-adaptation during space flight. PAGENO="0013" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 9 The medical experiments program as designed enables us to effec- tively plan to carry out long duration manned missions of the future. Our data appear to confirm from a medical viewpoint the feasibility of the Apollo lunar landing mission and they support the practicality of currently planning a 28- to 30-day mission. For example, the phonoelectrocardiographic experiment brought forth no evidence of change relatable to the space environment. This is in contrast to Soviet interpretations of their seismocardiographic data. The validity of these negative findings is given some support by the absence of evidence of myocardial disturbance by any other method of measurement utilized. The bioassay of body fluids has provided a beginning insight into the mechanisms of several physiological responses of man to space flight. The continuation of this effort in future missions will be fol- lowed with very close interest by those who have a responsibility for flight crew support in manned space flight. The bone densitometry experiment has demonstrated what has long been anticipated that there is ineed a reduction of bone density during space flight. Although these changes have not been severe, this ex- periment has further shown that bone density reduction in the non- weight bearing bones of the upper extremities was clearly more pro- nounced than that seen in the same areas during equivalent periods of bed rest on earth. Paradoxically, bone density was seemingly less affected by the 14-day flight than by either the 4- or 8-day flights. The reasons for this are not clear but here again, individual variation must be separated from the favorable influences of diminished thermal stress, increased food and water intake, and increased exercise pro- gram which charaoterized environment and events of the 14-day flight. The mineral balance experiment has `shown a moderately eleva:ted calcium output and a greater than anticipated output of nitrogen and phosphorus. The need for a simple and accurate urinary sampling system is apparent as the value of this investigative effort to prognosti- cations of flight crew support for protractive manned flights of the future. The electroencephalographic analysis of sleep has accurately portrayed the sleep patterns which did occur during flight. Human otolith function experiment elicited little or no evidence to suggest a change in otolith function during flights of up to 14 days in the Gemini configuration. The Soviets indicated that their astronauts had experienced space flight nausea and postflight difficulties. The absence of this adverse experience in our own flights tends to verify our crew selection criteria and training procedures as compared with those employed by the Soviets. While our total data points are still too few to establish the absolute absence of otolith effect, we can now assume with reasonable confidence that there probably will be no untoward otolith effect of practical significance within 14 days. The pursuit of this investigation in Apollo flight crews who, like the Soviet cosmonauts will not be re- strained within the spacecraft, will add further clarifying data. Repetition during longer flights of the future will be necessary to extend the time line since the possibility of the later occurrence of PAGENO="0014" 10 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION otolith changes cannot be ruled out The investigation of semicircular canal effects is planned for the Apollo Applications program. Although the medical program is very young, it has also yielded data which promise to contribute to our knowledge of basic physiology, particularly in the areas of red cell enzymology, and dehydration and fluid balance In summary, we have investigated long dur'thon flights up to 14 days and have obtained data which provide a basis for ex pecting man to be able to function in space for a period of up to 28 days The investigations begun in the Mercury program and carried a step further in the Gemini program will be further expanded during Apollo and carried forward a major step in Apollo Applications, eventually leading to data in support of longer duration manned flights, flights of up to 1 year or more in the future. DEVELOP RENDEZVOUS TECHNIQUES; POSTDOCKING MANEUVERS; REENTRY FLIGHT PATH CONTROL The second Gemini objective, to develop rendezvous techniques and postdocking maneuvers, has been demonstrated on several Gemini flights, as has the objective to develop reentry flight path control I have discussed these elements briefly in my introductory remarks and they have been further depicted in a Gemini film shown here today You will recall that last year before this committee we presented a film showing the various modes of rendezvous that would be attempted on the Gemini program All of these rendezvous modes have been successfully demonstrated, providing basic information for meeting the rendezvous requirements of the Apollo and Apollo Applications programs and advanced missions under study FLIGHT AND GROUND CREW PROFICIENCY The fourth Gemini objective, to attain flight ground crew profi ciency, has been demonstrated throughout the 12 Gemini flight pro gram As the Gemini flight program progressed, more mission ele ments were included in each successive flight This intensification of the activity during a mission impacted on all facets of the space flight organization-from prelaunch preparation to crew training, equip ment readiness, checkout, flight planning, mission scheduling and crew workload; from mission control to postflight data recovery, crew de- briefing, mission analysis, and documentation The latter Gemini missions were both training and testing to deter mine how far the manner flight organization ha~1 come toward develop ing the operational proficiency so essential to future programs During the last flights a number of serious anomalies were encoun tered The operational capability, however, had matured to a level required for the Gemini program and developed to the point that it was possible to cope with these anomalies, work around them, and still achieve our mission objectives The experience and data gained from the Gemini program will be invaluable during the review of our planning for the more complex Apollo and Apollo Applications missions PAGENO="0015" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 11 DEVELOP EXTRAVEHICULAR CAPABILITY The fifth Gemini objective, to develop extravehicular capability, has been previously covered and was illustrated in the Gemini film. We have developed techniques in over 12 hours of EVA which will be valuable in Apollo. These techniques provide a solid baseline from which we can develop the more sophisticated EVA requirements required in Apollo Applications. I would therefore like to move on to the last Gemini objective, the conduct of scientific experiments, and spend a few moments discussing the results obtained and their contri- bution to science and the follow-on manned space flight effort. GEMINI EXPERIMENTS The Gemini experiments introduced many scientific and technical organizations into the Nation's space program. Some of the Nation's leading scientists were the principal investigators on the manned experiment platform provided by Gemini. In accomplishing this manned space flight objective on Gemini, the experiment program pro- vided additional information on man's ability to perform useful func- tions in the space environment, and provided data which will mate- rially aid the design of many Apollo and Apollo Applications experi- ments as those programs progress. Fifty-two different experiments were conducted in the Gemini pro- gram, as summarized in this chart (fig. 5, M067-5877). Generally EXPERIMENT PROGRAM SUMMARY SPONSORING NO. OF TOTAL EXP AGENCY EXPERIMENTS MISSIONS S SCIENTIFIC * OSSA(S) 17 * TECHNOLOGICAL *OART (T) 2 * OMSF (MSC) 1o.~ * DOD (D) 15 * MEDICAL * MEDICAL (M) 8 TOTALS 52 47 2 18 26 18 111 NASA HQ MC 67-5877 2/23/67 FGimE 5 PAGENO="0016" 12 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION each experiment was flown several times to take advantage of varying flight conditions. This resulted in 11 experiment missions with an average of 11 ex- periments per mission. The largest number of experiments, 20, was carried on the 14-day Gemini VII mission. SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL, AND MEDICAL EXPERIMENPS The experiments were divided into three categories, scientific, tech- nological, and medical. There were 17 scientific experiments con- ducted during the program. The scientific experiment program was interdisciplinary in character and comprised investigations in the fields of astronomy, biology, geology, meteorology, and physics. Over half of the experiments were photographic in technique, indicating that the investigators wished to take advantage of the flight crew avail- ability to guide and select the targets and to return the film for a per- inanent record. A photograph frequently clarifies data which other- wise are ambiguous. The 27 technological experiments were conducted in support of spacecraft development and operational techniques. The eight med- ical experiments, each conducted a number of times, were directed toward determining more subtle effects than might be determined from the regular operational medical measurements in preflight and post- flight examinations. EXPERIMENT INVESTIGATORS The Gemini experiments were proposed from many sources includ- ing universities, laboratories, hospitals, industry, and various Govern- ment agencies. Several investigators were often associated with a single experiment and they in turn may have had different affilia- tions. This table presents the principal investigators of the Gemini experiments and their affiliations together with the missions for which the experiments were assigned (figs. 6, 7, 8, and 9, MC67-5880-81-82- 83). Subsequent to the selections of the experiments and the principal investigators, a very close personal association was maintained with the experimenter, the spacecraft contractor, the crew, mission planner, and the real time operations personnel. This experience will provide a basis for relationships in the future with the Apollo and Apollo Applications programs where experiment capacity is significantly in- creased over that of the Gemini program. CREW TRAINING The diversity of the Gemini experiments required considerable training by the crew. The training began with briefings by the ex- perimenter to explain the experiment, the proposed method of opera- tion, the probable training required, and the expected results. After the techniques were evolved for the various experiments, plans for crew training were developed. Planetarium briefings were included as well as flight simulator training with celestial backgrounds. Also included were aircraft flights to provide operational familiarity with hardware; zero gravity aircraft flights for experiments requiring ex- PAGENO="0017" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 13 CLOUD TOP SPECTROMETER VISUAL ACUITY NUCLEAR EMULSION AGENA MICRO COLLECT AIRGIOW PHOTOGRAPHY MICROMETEORITE COLLECT UV ASTRONOMICAL CAMERA ION WAKE MEASUREMENT LIBRATION PHOTOGRAPHY DIM SKY ORTHICON DAYTIME SODIUM CLOUD AFFIL MISSIONS UOFM V., VIII, IX,X AMES III AMES V.111, XII AEC III,X1 GSFC ViI,X,XI,XII USWB &,V.~VI,VJI,X,X1,XII ESSA V., V.111 U OFCV.~VJ1 NRL V11IXI GSFC DUDLEY Vi11,IX,X,X11 NRL IX,XI,XIJ DUDLEY IX,X,X11 NWU X,X1,XII EOS X,XI USGS XII DUDLEY Xl CNRS XII PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS AND AFFILIATIONS PART U _______ EXPERIMENTER AFFIL SCHROEDER LRC f SMITH AMES LCREER PR INC IPAL INVESTIGATORS AND AFFILIATIONS PART I NAME EXPERIMENJ~R ____ ________ ZODIACAL PHOTOGRAPHY NEY SEA URCHIN EGG GROWTH YOUNG FROG EGG GROWTH YOUNG RADIATION ON BLOOD BENDER TERRAIN PHOTOGRAPHY LOWMAN WEATHER PHOTOGRAPHY SAIEDY DUNTLEY fSHAPIRO LFICHTEL HEMEN WAY KOOMEN HEMEN WAY HENIZE MEDVED MORRIS HEMEN WAY BLAMONT FIGURE 6 NASA HQ MC 67-5880 2/23/67 NAME REENTRY COMMUNICATIONS MANUAL SPACE NAVIGATION ELECTROSTATIC CHARGE PROTON-ELECTRON SPECTROMETER FLUX-GATE MAGNETOMETER OPTICAL COMMUNICATION LUNAR SPECTRAL REFLECTANCE BETA SPECTROMETER BREMSSTRAHLUNG SPECTROMETER COLOR PATCH PHOTOGRAPHY EARTHS LIMB PHOTOGRAPHY LANDMARK MEASUREMENTS LAFFERTY MARBACH WOMACK LILLY STOKES MARBACH LINDSEY BRINKMAN PETERSEN MANRY MISSIONS In Xff ILVfl &,VJI,X, XII VII X,XII X,XII X & ViI,X NASA EQ MC MSC MSC MSC MSC MSC MSC MSC MSC MIT MSC FIGuRE 7 76-265 O-67---pt. 2~-2 PAGENO="0018" EXPERIM ENTER KOZUMA KOZUMA HAMBORSKI BRENTNALL JORRIS KOZUMA 10 V Eli JANNI SILVA SAGALYN GIVENS DUNTLEY ELLIS SHOPPLE MAY FIGURE 8 AFFIL MISSIONS SSD Y SSD ~ SSD ~III, XI SSD YSVfl AFAL ~JI,X SSD ! AFCRL YI21I AFWL I~,V1 AFAL W,~JI AFCRL I, XII SSD IX UOFC YIVII NRL V1EI,IX NADC ~III,X1 AFAPL ~I1I,XI NASA HQ MC 67-5882 2/23/67 PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS AND AFFILIATIONS PART I~ DIETLEIN MSC ~, Yfi RAPP MSC &, ~, Vii WI vii JOHNSON MSC LIPSCOMB MSC MACK TWU IV, ~, vii WHEDON NIH Ill KELLOWAY BAYLOR VII GRAYBIEL USNSAM V, VII I 14 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS AND AFFILIATIONS PART]I[ NAME BASIC OBJECT PHOTO NEARBY OBJECT PHOTO MASS DETERMINATION SPACE OBJ RADIOMETRY STAR OCCULTATION NAVIG SURFACE PHOTOGRAPHY CELESTIAL RADIOMETRY RADIATION IN SC SIMPLE NAVIGATION ION ATTITUDE CONTROL MANEUVERING UNIT ASTRONAUT VISIBILITY yHF-VHF POLARIZATION IMAGE INTENSIFICATION POWER TOOL EXPERIMENTER AFFIL MISSIONS NAME CARDIOVASCULAR CONDITIONING EXERCISER PHONOCARDIOGRAM BIOASSAYS BODY FLUIDS BONE DEMINERALIZATION CALCIUM BALANCE STUDY INFLIGHT SLEEP ANALYSIS HUMAN OTOLITH FUNCTION Vii, VIII, rx FIGURE 9 NASA HQ MC `67-5883 2/23/67 PAGENO="0019" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 15 travehicular activity; and baseline studies for medical and visibility experiments. These activities and others coupled with the continued discussions between crew and experimenters were considered essential to the suc- cessful completion of the experiment. Mr. FULTON. The ion wake measurement, is that just the turbulence of the ions or is that an ion engine starter? Dr. MUELLER. That is the wake that is associated with the re-entry maneuver and has to do with the ionization of the air. Actually, there are two. One was an attempt to make measurements of the ionization in space and the other was to measure the ionization dur- ing re-entry so we actually have two such experiments. Mr. FULTON. Glenn saw something going along with him. Have they ever identified what that was? Dr. MUELLER. The presumption is that these were-the so-called snowflakes that he saw, is that what you are referring to, Mr. Ful- ton? Mr. FULTON. Yes. Dr. MUELLER. These were identified as recombination products of the exhaust of the little thrusters. Mr. FULTON. Hydrogen peroxide? Dr. MUELLER. I suppose in that case it was. Mr. FULTON. On the dim sky orthicon, could you describe that? Dr. MUELLER. Yes, that was a very sensitive orthicon designed to permit you to see very light and very dark objects-not black. Mr. FULTON. You would see, hear, and taste an orthicon? Dr. MUELLER. The orthicon is used in your television transmitter system. It will detect light of lower intensity than your eyes can detect. It provides a light amplification. Mr. FULTON. What happens on your eggs? Dr. MUELLER. The egg experiment conducted by Dr. Young was a very interesting experiment, I saw it when Dr. Young and I were on board the carrier. Mr. FULT0N. It sounds interesting, that is why I asked. Dr. MUELLER. It allows frog eggs to develop in a zero gravity en- vironment, and then fixing them to see whether in the course of their development there were any changes in the growth pattern because of the zero gravity environment. From that set of experiments we found there were no changes in the development. Dr. Young had ex- pected to see some bifurcation of the embryo but that did not occur. Mr. GURNEY. Dr. Mueller, I have two questions: I expect you have requests for many experiments on these Gemini flights. Who deter- mines what experiments are to be performed and can you give us a specific example of how man's useful knowledge has been materially increased by any of these experiments? Dr. MUELLER. In answer to your first question, there is a selection process involved in each of the classes of experiments. In the case of the science experiments, for example, the original screening is done by subcommittees of the NASA Planning O~ordination Steering COm- mittee. They, in turn, then pass the experiments to a second group that look into their feasibility and desirability and there they are PAGENO="0020" 16 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION categorized. The lunar exploration working group of that committee recommends experiments to Dr. Newell. Dr. Newell selects the experi- ments and recommends them to the Manned Space Flight Experiments board where all the experiments from technology, science, applications and medicine are brought together and a priority is established for their flight and these, in turn, are passed on to the program office for implementation on flights, so the final assignment is by the Manned Space Flights Experiments Board which includes Dr. Newell, Dr. Adams, Dr. Fink of the Department of Defense and `General Ferguson of the Air Force, and I am the chairman of that board, so that we have a cross-section of the agency in the selection of the experiments and it is a joint operation of the Department of Defense and ourselves. That same board, incidentally, is also responsible for assigning science, applications and technological experiments to the Manned Orbiting Laboratory. We have a joint agreement in this area. With respect to direct results from the flight program, those have been, up to this time in a couple of areas; perhaps the most significant from the standpoint of the man on the street have been the pictures taken by the Gemini crews of the Earth and of the air masses that give you an understanding of the meteorology. It has been found out from the experience of the scientists who have been analyzing these pictures that the addition of color to the kinds of pictures that they were able to obtain from the unmanned satellites has been a. significant improvement in their ability to carry out and understand the geology and meteorology of the systems. One thing, for example, they were able to determine that a crater which had been thought to be an impact crater was in fact caused by erosion effects of a volcanic intrusion and I have another example as I go through this. I was discussing the training for carrying out the experiments. An understanding by the crew, not only of the mechanical operation of the experiment, but also the objectives and underlying principles, was required to allow the crew to exercise their selective and visual capabilities. `The crew served, literally, as laboratory assistants to the scientists stationed on the Earth. Future flight crews with a scientist astronaut member will provide increased support to the ex- perimenter on Earth. In some instances the scientist astronaut will be the investigator and designer of the experiment. The integration of the experiments into the spacecraft and into the flight operation is a large, often underestimated, task. EXPERIMENTS INTEGRATION The experiments generally have a variety of requirements which often conflicted or interacted. Modifications incorporated in the flight operations had tO maintain the integrity of the experiments while at the same time they had to represent a compromise when con- flicting `activity was involved. Since one major objective of Gemini was to provide an orbiting experiment platform, the conduct of ex- periments had a priority second only to astronaut safety and mission success. PAGENO="0021" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 17 The fundamentals developed in handling numerous experiments on the Gemini program have contributed significantly to the planning on the Apollo program and the Apollo Applications program. In summing up the experiment integration activity and looking forward to the future, it can be concluded that the success of an experiment is highly dependent upon the participation of the experimenter in many phases of the program. These phases include design integration, mis- sion planning, crew training, checkout and real-time support of the operation. Of course, crew understanding is vital to achieving maxi- mum benefit from man in sp:ace. This experience has done much to smooth experiment integration in the Apollo, Apollo Applications, and Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) programs. SYNOPTIC TERRAIN PHOTOGRAPHY I believe it would be worthwhile spending just a moment looking at some of the experiments conducted on the Gemini program. One ex- periment called synoptic terrain photography was devoted to a study of the Earth's terrain and was performed successfully on the Gemini IV, V, VI--A, VII, TX-A, X, XTI, and XII missions. Approximately 2,400 color pictures were obtained and are' usable for geology, geog- raphy, oceanography, hydrology, egrology, and agronomy. As an example, a photograph shown here taken on Gemini XII, appears to have considerable potential value in the study of continental drifts PAGENO="0022" 18 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION (fig 10, MC67-5874) Proponents of this theory consider that the Red Sea, which structurally is a large down dropped block, represents in cipient continental drift, that is, the Arabian Peninsula is considered to be drifting away and rotating from Africa The photograph may pro vide new evidence on this possibility by providing a synoptic view of the regional geology Further studies of this sort are planned on Apollo and Apollo Applications programs The next photograph, also taken on Gemini XII, demonstrates the potential value of orbital photography in studies of recent sedimentation (fig. 11, MC67-5876). FIGURE 11 The portion of the Gulf of Mexico shown in this photograph has been extensively studied and, when used in conjunction with other Gemini photographs, may provide an extremely useful standard area for inter- pretation of similar pictures of near shore areas. Also evident in this photograph to the trained eye are indications of shrimp feeding grounds and water pollution. Notice also the flow of air pollution in the atmosphere. These earlier Gemini studies have provided only a brief look at the planet we live on and have served principally as a stimulus to the scien- tific and industrial communities to devise new experiments and appli- cations for the forthcoming Apollo and Apollo Applications programs. To enable the many scientific disciplines and industrial interests to glean information from space photographs of the Earth's terrain and weather, collections of color photographs of the Earth from the PAGENO="0023" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 19 various Gemini missions are being published by the Government Printing Office in a series of atlases. The first, covering Gemini flights III, IV, and V, will be available after March 1967 as document No. NASA SP-129. These atlases are to be printed in full color, giving a true translation of the photographic color negatives which various scientists have found can yield more information than can black and white photographs. Scientists in various disciplines from the United States and foreign countries are already using these photo- graphs in research, projects involving the Earth's sciences, such as meteorology and oceanography. The space photographs of the Earth are also being incorporated in textbooks for high schools and colleges and in many cases add a new dimension to study by researchers and students. It is planned that photographs taken during Gemini mis- sions VI-A through VII will be published in subsequent volumes. EXPERIMENTS FROGRAM SUCCESS The success of the Gemini experiments program is measured by new or confirmed information provided for engineering management and scientific disciplines, as indicated by the performance summary shown in this table (fig. 12, MC67-5910). The experience gained from the EXPERIMENT PERFORMANCE STATUS GEMINI MISSION LAUNCHED ACCOMPLISHED PROBLEMS ffl 3 2 EQUIP I~, 11 `11 17 16 MISSION V1-A 3 3 ~fl 20 17 `EQUIP ~ff[ 10 1 MISSION [X-A ~7 6 MISSION X 15 12 MISSION XE 11 10' MISSION ~4.. ~. EQUIP TOTALS 111 90 NASA HQ MC 67-5910 2/24/67 Fiouiu~ 12 emini experiments program has provided an invaluable baseline of nowledge and experience for future manned space flight programs nd has provided insight into the benefits to mankind that may be PAGENO="0024" 20 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION realized as we progress further toward applying this new knowledge and technology to the more advanced Apollo and Apollo Applications missions, and to the Air Force Manned Orbiting Laboratory program. UTILIZATION OF GEMINI RESOURCES Earlier in this statement I mentioned briefly the utilization of the resources developed under the Gemini program; that is, the personnel, the hardware, and facilities. I would like to spend a few moments now discussing this aspect of the Gemini program in more detail. You recognize that the Gemini resources fall into many categories. There is, of course, the flight hardware and its associated checkout and test equipment. Also I would like now to say a few words about the results of our management of the Gemini program. May I have the next slide, please? As we see here (fig. 13, MG66-8791), this is what we call a trend chart as most of you have had an opportunity to see in times past. It represents a continuing record as to when you predict a launch will occur and when it actually occurs. As you can see, beginning in about 1963, we predicted that Gemini I would be launched at the end of that year. In fact, it was launched a few months later in March of 1964. If you look at Gemini II which was the equivalent of our Apollo Saturn 201 or 202 flights where we had an unmanned spacecraft for PAGENO="0025" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 21 a reentry heat shield test, it was in 1963 predicted to be launched sometime in 1964. In fact, because of the series of events, not the least of which was a set of hurricanes and almost everything that could possibly happen, seemed to have happened to Gemini II, we finally launched it in January of 1965. Gemini III, our first manned Gemini flight, was launched some 3 months later. As we continued downstream, you will note the phenomena that we are quite proud of in the Gemini program and that is as we gained experience, we were beginning to be able to move the launch dates forward, so that by the time we reached Gemini XII, we actually completed the program some 2 months or more ahead of the schedule that we established in 1963. I think this represents the ability to capitalize on the maturity of the spacecraft, the ability to use the experience that you gained earlier to improve your schedule posture. I might also add that during the course of this set of flights, we did introduce rather major modifications from flight to flight `based upon the experience that we gained in the preceding flight. So that many changes, for example, a new set of experiments in EVA and a new set of restraints, were implemented on Gemini XI and XII in 3 months. We achieved a level of maturity in the organization, so that we are able to accomplish rather major changes from flight to flight and yet maintain a fairly tight and efficient launch schedule. One of the reasons for desiring to have a relatively short turn around from flight to flight is the maintenance of proficiency of the launch crews themselves and of the flight operation crews. It is important in being sure that you can carry out these missions so as to have a reasonable frequency of launches so that the crew does not forget from flight to flight how to carry on the next mission. The nexit slide (fig. 14, MG 67-5821) is another way of looking at our experience in Gemini. This measures the number of man-hours required to complete the acceptance testing of the Gemini spacecraft. You will note on Gemini II it took some 600,000 man-hours to go through acceptance testing. By Gemini III, we were around 300,000 man-hours and by Gemini IV we were down to 120,000 man-hours. This represents the kind of learning one expects to gain in going through the early phases of checkout and gaining an understandin of the problems involved in the acceptance testing of these involve spacecraft. We ended up with between 116 and 120,000 hours for each of the succeeding spacecraft. Next slide (fig. 15, MG 66-9430) : I thought it would be interesting to note the variation in cost and the manpower in the McDonnell contract as an example of the interaction of the management of the program, the maturity of the program, and the phasing of the program with respect to the actual flight schedules. You will note here that a combination of actions were taken in 1964, the fiscal year 1964; one of these was to establish an effective date for an incentive contract in about April of that year. Another was to introduce our configuration control board, which we introduced about that time throughout our Manned Space Flight PAGENO="0026" 22 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION GEMINI ACCEPTANCE TEST IMPROVEMENT 001, 60C - - ._ - - - - - - - ~- - - - 54(, - - - - - - - - - l) 48C - - - - - - - - 1~) - - - - - - - 420 - 240 - - - -. - - - - 180 - - - - - - - - - 120 - - - = = ~1 -,--- - -~ - - - 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 SPACECRAFT NUMBER NASA HQ MC67-5821 2-21-67. FIGU1iE 14 programs. At certain times during the course of the contract, we also had to impose cost ceilings in order to live within our budget That was a constraint that wasn't necessarily good, but at least it made it possible to stay within the budget You will note that after the first flight, the actual manpower curve began to fall off very rapidly, in fact it began to fall off before the first flight and continued to fall off at a pretty rapid rate as our learning curve improved The same thing is true as to costs because the manpower and cost curves of these contracts follow fairly closely together; although there is not a 1-to-i relationship, clearly the man- power is going down and the cost should go down as well. The rea- son I brrng this out is that it explains in part the phase we are in in the Apollo program and why we expect the actual cost to go down in future years even though the flight program will be increasing in intensity It turns out the development phase requires considerably more manpower both because of the rather extensive ground pro gram and because of the design effort which is phasing out which permits us to go down in this fashion Next slide (fig 16, MG 66-8768) I thought it would be worthwhile to look at the overall cost trend. The final cost is not in on Gemini at this point, but to some extent we were able to finish the program early and while to some extent, we 0 12 PAGENO="0027" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 23 FIGuRE 15 were learning how to operate more efficiently, the actual cost projec- tions for completion have gone from $1.350 billion in fiscal 1964 down to $1.290 billion by the end of fiscal 1967. Now, earlier in this statement I mentioned briefly the utilization of the resources developed under the Gemini program; that is, the per- sonnel, the hardware, and facilities. I would like to spend a few moments now discussing this aspect of the Gemini program in more detail. You recognize that the Gemini resources fall into many categories. There is, of course, the flight hardware and its associated checkout and test equipment. Also launch, flight, and recovery operations which were provided as a service function to Gemini were a major program resource. Finally, the people who managed and directed the program and who are in fact responsible for its st~ccess are the most important resources because their experience cannot be replaced. PLIGHT HARDWARE Gemini hardware is finding its way into many programs and ac- tivities. One of these is the Air Force Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL), because of certain basic similarities is making use of signifi- cant amounts of both flight and ground equipment. Two flown Gemiiii spacecraft have been transferred and a third will be transferred this spring. The Air Force has estimated that the saving to the MOL program realized by reusing Gemini equipment may equal $50 million. PAGENO="0028" 24 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 16 An additional saving of approximately $10 million was realized dur- ing the development of the heat shield qualification spacecraft. This program involved refui~bishing the Gemini II spacecraft and provid- ing it with a new heat shield that incorporated a personnel transfer hatch. The program was managed by the Gemini program office under Air Force direction and was highly successful. In addition to the MOL program, numerous other uses have been made of Gemini equipment. Gemini fuel cells, for example, have been transferred to the NASA biosatellite program and to the Navy's Marine Engineering Laboratory for experimental use. Flight com- puters are being put to such diverse use as components of a collision avoidance experiment to be undertaken by the Federal Aviation Agency; components of a development program by the Department of Defense; and as part of an experiment for the Apollo Applications program. The Apollo and Apollo Applications program will reuse significant amounts of Gemini equipment in direct support. Finally, Gemini spacecraft have `been exhibited in a number of foreign coun- tries and have been viewed by more than 1 million people. A space- craft to be exhibited at the Canadian International Exposition will be seen by an estimated 45 million visitors. OPERATIONAL RESOURCES The operational resources developed and perfected during Gemini are now available to support Apollo and Apollo Applications pro- PAGENO="0029" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 25 grams. The Air Force personnel who provided `Gemini with such magnificent support have moved on to Air Force programs, principally MOb. The facilities such as the Mission Control Center that were de- veloped and perfected during Gemini are now being configured to support the Apollo flight program. The personnel who manned the Gemini Program Offices in the Manned Spacecraft Center and the Headquarters have been reassigned. Of the Gemini people in Houston, about one-third have been as- signed to the new Apollo Applications Office and one-third to the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office. The balance were assigned within the Engineering and Development and Flight Operations Directorates of the Center. Headquarters Gemini Program Office personnel have been reassigned to all elements of Manned Space Flight, the largest number going to the Apollo Applications Program Office. Flight op- erations and launch operations personnel have been integrated into the Apollo program. Tltili2ation of experience A major effort is being made to assure that every possible utiliza- tion is made of Gemini experience. In the area of personnel Charles W. Mathews, formerly the Gemini Program Manager at MS'C, has been assigned as the Apollo Applications Program Director; and William C. Schneider, formerly Gemini Mission Director, will be heading the Mission Operations Directorate for the Apollo Applications program. Another example is Leroy Day, formerly Deputy Director, Gemini Test, who is now the Director Apollo Test. Summary documentation is being prepared and like all periodic Gemini reports will be widely distributed. Special reports and topics judged to be especially pertinent to Apollo and Apollo Applications are being written. A report by the Gemini Executives Group to the Apollo Executives Group in January resulted in the exchange of the information relating to experience of Gemini's major contractors to Apollo's major contractors. The reports were frank and thorough, providing technical and managerial experiences and ideas that are ex- pected to benefit Apollo significantly. CONCLUSION In summary, 1966 was a successful year for the Gemini program. Five manned missions were conducted during the year with the 12th and last mission coming in November. Each mission made significant contributions to Gemini objectives and to national space goals. The program objectives were met; moreover, the techniques and procedures used to pursue all objectives including safety were examined in pains- taking detail. They were varied from mission to mission, and in certain instances during a mission, to achieve maximum `breadth and depth of experience. `Gemini has fulfilled its promise to provide a base- line of technology needed for future Manned Space Flight. During 1966, development of the Gemini operational flight system was refined and completed. Flight systems reached a level of pro- ficiency that made possible continued progress on every mission in spite of several anomalies. Multiple vehicle techniques, contingency PAGENO="0030" 26 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION and alternate planning philosophies, training plans, and mission plan- ning techniques were devised and perfected for use in later missions. These data will provide significant inputs into the Apollo and Apollo Applications programs, which in turn will provide information re- quired to ultimately attain continuous operations of man in space Gemini's contributions to the Nation's expanding technology will enable the Nation's scientists and industry to exploit the new dimen sion of space and to apply this knowledge to a wide variety of beneficial programs, many of which I will discuss as we proceed in these hearings through the Apollo, Apollo Applications, and Ad vanced Manned Missions programs PAGENO="0031" APPENDIX A Launch date: April 8, 1964. Designation: Gemini I. Crew : Unmanned. Remarks: Gemini spacecraft launched into orbit by modified Titan II booster. Spacecraft decayed during 69th orbit over South Atlantic Ocean, with all tests objectives achieved. Purpose of flight was to test the Titan launch vehicle system; Gemini spacecraft structural in- tegrity; spacecraft launch vehicle compatibility; and to demonstrate the launch vehicle and guidance systems. Launch date: January 19,1965. Designation: Gemini II. Crew: Unmanned. Remarks: Gemini spacecraft launched into suborbital flight, splash- ing down approximately 1,848 nautical miles southeast of Cape Ken- nedy, Fla. Major mission objectives, all successfully accomplished, were to demonstrate basic structural integrity of spacecra.ft through- out the flight environment; and to verify the adequacy of reentry heat protection. In addition, satisfactory performance was demon- strated by flight control, life support, retrograde rocket, recovery and landing, and other systems critical to flight safety and mission suc- cess. Duration, 22 minutes. Launch date : March 23, 1965. Designation: Gemini III. Crew : Virgil I. Grissom and John W. Young. Remarks: Gemini spacecraft launched into three-revolution orbital flight by modified Titan II booster (Gemini-Titan 3). First U.S. two- man spaceflight, Grissom first man in space for second time. One orbital maneuver was conducted in each of the three orbits. During first orbit the apogee was lowered from 139 miles to 105 miles and the perigee from 100 miles to 98 miles; in second orbit a series of maneuvers produced a translational movement changing inclination by one- fiftieth of a degree; in third orbit the perigee was lowered to 52 miles. Manual control was exercised throughout the reentry phase, using the limited lifting characteristics of the spacecraft to steer toward touch- down. Two of three experiments were performed; experiment on ef- fect of weightlessness on sea-urchin eggs during fertilization and cell division failed; successful experiments were eli!ect of weightlessness in interaction with radiation on white blood cells and injection of fluid into the reentry plasma sheath in attempt to attenuate communication blackout. Duration, 4 hours, 53 minutes. Launch date: June 3, 1965. Designation: Gemini IV. Crew: James A. McDivitt and Edward H. White II. 27 PAGENO="0032" 28 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Remarks: Gemini spacecraft launched into orbit by modified Titan II booster (Gemini-Titan 4). Four-day, 62-revolution endurance mis- sion to test crew and spacecraft in buildup to longer missions. Eleven scientific and engineering experiments, in addition to basic medical checks on 4 days of exposure to the space environment, measured radia- tion, electrostatic charge, proton-electron flow, and geomagnetic fields. Synoptic weather and terrain photography was accomplished, as well as two-color photographs of the earth's limb. Navigation measure- ments were conducted, in-flight phonocardiograms taken, and bone demineralization measurements made. Attempt to rendezvous with spent second stage was abandoned when spacecraft fuel consumption became excessive. White spent 22 minutes outside the spacecraft in extravehicular activity, propelling himself with an oxygen-jet gun. During spacewalk he was attached to the spacecraft with a 25-ft. tether-and-oxygen line; he carried emergency oxygen and camera. Spacecraft computer malfunction necessitated a ballistic reentry Se- (luence. First mission controlled from new Mission Control Center at Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, Tex. Duration, 97 hours, 56 minutes. Launch date: August 21, 1965. Designation: Gemini V. Crew: L. Gordon Cooper, Jr., and Charles Conrad, Jr. Remarks: Gemini spacecraft launched into orbit by modified Titan II booster (Gemini-Titan 5). Eight-day, 120-revolution endurance mission confirmed the physiological feasibility of Apollo lunar landing mission. Several major records set by United States: longest manned spaceflight in time and distance, total man-hours in space, and most manned flights. First flight of fuel cell electrical power system. During first orbit, perigee was raised to 106 miles from initial 100 miles. At beginning of second orbit a Radar Evaluation Pod was ejected; the Gemini V rendezvous radar furnished range and range rate data on this target for 40 minutes. On August 23 a simulated rendezvous was conducted with a series of four maneuvers through two orbits which raised the perigee to 124 miles and lowered the apogee to 192.6 miles. Sixteen of seventeen experiments were successfully conducted: five medical experiments measured physiological effects; extensive weather and terrain photography was conducted; visual observations of missile launches and ground patterns were made; and zodiacal light was photographed. 0n1y experiment canceled was photography of the Radar Evaluation Pod. Voice communication was conducted with Sea Lab II under the Pacific Ocean. Duration, 190 hours, 55 minutes. Launch date : December 4, 1965. Designation: Gemini VII: Crew: Frank Borman and James A. Lovell, Jr. Remarks: Gemini spacecraft boosted into orbit by modified Titan II booster (Gemini-Titan 7). Fourteen-day, 206-revolution endur- ance mission, longest scheduled flight in Gemini program. Station- keeping conducted with booster second stage after separation; space- craft maneuvered to raise apogee from original 100 miles to 138 miles to serve as rendezvous target for Gemini VI. On December 7 orbi PAGENO="0033" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 29 was adjusted to 197 miles apogee 145 miles perigee, then on December 9 perigee was raised to 185.8 miles and apogee lowered to 188.3 miles. Missile reentry was observed over Pacific on December 14. Accurate controlled reentry was made, landing 7.6 miles from target. One astronaut a.t a time doffed his pressure suit to enhance comfort. No adverse physiological effects from 2 weeks in the space environment. Twenty experiments were incorporated into the mission, ranging from detailed medical measurements and sleep analysis to earth photo- graphy and radiometry measurements. Duration, 330 hours, 35 minutes. Launch date: December 15, 1965. Designation: Gemini VI-A. Crew: Walter M. Schirra, Jr., and Thomas P. Stafford. Remarks: Gemini spacecraft launched into 16 revolution orbital flight by modified Titan II booster (Gemini-Titan 6). This space- craft-booster combination was originally ready for launch on October 25 but held when Agena target vehicle failed to orbit. Rescheduled to rendezvous with Gemini VII as target, launch attemped on Decem- ber 12 but aborted when the first stage engine shut down immediately after ignition. Initial orbit was: apogee, 161 miles, perigee 100 miles; a series of posigrade maneuvers began the rendezvous chase and shortened the initial 1,200 miles separation distance to 730 miles. During second revolution the distance was reduced to 300 miles with another thruster firing, followed by a plane change to match Gemini Vii's orbit. Orbit was adjusted to near circular at beginning of third revolution; as fourth revolution began, the terminal phase of rendez- vous was initiated, resulting in approach to within 1 foot of Gemini VII. Stationkeeping and fly-around maneuvers were conducted for 5 hours, 19 minutes. Controlled reentry to landing within 13 miles of prime recovery ship. Duration-25 hours, 51 minutes. Launch date: March 16 1966. Designation: Gemini VIII. Crew: Neil A. Armstrong and David R. Scott. Remarks: Gemini spacecraft launched into orbit by modified Titan II booster, 1 hour 41 minutes after Gemini Agena Target Vehicle (GATV) Atlas booster combination. Rendezvous with the GATV was accomplished in fourth orbit, 6 hours after launch, and first dock- ing of two vehicles in. space achieved 33 minutes later. After 28 minutes of flight in the docked configuration a thruster in the orbital attitude maneuvering system stuck open and spacecraft began to spin. Gemini spacecraft was undocked from GATV and, after 25 minutes, was stabilized by use of reentry control system. Mission terminated early after 61/2 revolutions, landing in secondary recovery area in ester. Pacific.. Scheduled extravehicular activity (EVA) was not ccomplished. GATV was placed in a "storage" orbit for later use s a rendezvous target. Duration-lO hours, 41 minutes. Launch date: June 3, 1966. Designation: Gemini TX-A. Crew: Thomas P. Stafford and Eugene A. Cernan. Remarks: First mission attempt made on May 17 when an Atlas ooster engine failed at 121 seconds after lift off, and the GATV failed 76-2&5 O-67---pt. 2r-3 PAGENO="0034" 30 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION to reach orbit. A backup mission utilizing Augmented Target Dock- ing Adap~ter (ATDA) as the target, scheduled for June 1. The ADTA was placed into orbit on June 1 with an Atlas booster, but inability of Gemini spacecraft to receive final guidance informa- tion caused postponement of Gemini launch to June 3 when spacecraft was launched into 45-revolution orbital flight by its modified Titan II booster. Rendezvous with ATDA achieved on third orbit.. Crew con- firmed that shroud covering the docking collar had failed to separate and docking was canceled. Two additional rendezvous performed as planned, one using visual techniques and the last from above the ATDA. EVA delayed from June 4 to June 5 due to crew fatigue. After 1 hour of EVA, Cernan's visor accumulated fog and communica- tions between Stafford and Cernan were poor as Cernan checked out the Astronaut Maneuvering Unit (AMU) in the adapter section of the spacecraft. Planned use of the self-contained life support and pro- pulsion systems to maneuver with the AMU was canceled. Total 2 hours, 7 minutes EVA. Radio polarization and photographic experi- ments were conducted in addition to micrometoroid collection. Con- trolled reentry to 0.42 miles of target. Duration-72 hours, 21 minutes. Launch date: July 18, 1966. Designation: Gemini X. Crew: John W. Young and Michael Collins. Remarks: GATV-Atlas booster combination launched 100 minutes before Gemini spacecraft launched iulo orbit by modified Titan II booster. Rendezvous and docking with GATV accomplished in fourth orbit of 43-revolution flight. GATV engine used to propel the docked combination to record altitude, then proper orbit to rendezvous with GATV from Gemini VIII. After separation from GATV, Gemini IX-A effected rendezvous with the passive target. First period of stand up EVA was terminated at 50 minutes when both crewmen suf- fered eye irritation. Second EVA period, after rendezvous with pas- sive GATV, consisted of Collins on umbilical moving to GATV and recovering micrometeorite experiment package. Umbilical EVA ter- minated after 39 minutes to conserve maneuvering fuel. Of 14 sched- uled experiments, data was obtained on 12. First rendezvous with two different spacecraft, first extensive test of docked spacecraft, first post- docking maneuvers using propulsion unit and fuel of target vehicle, first crewman to touch another spacecraft. New altitude and speed (17,700 statute mile per hour) records for manned space flight. Dura- tion-10 hours, 47 minutes. Launch date: September 12, 1966. Designation: Gemini XI. Crew: Charles Conrad, Jr., and Richard F. Gordon, Jr. Remarks: GATV-Atlas booster combination launched 1 hour 3 minutes before Gemini spacecraft launched into orbit by modifi Titan II booster within 2-second launch window. Rendezvous ac complishes on first orbit of 44-revolution flight using on-board infor mation exclusively. Docking at 1 hour 34 minutes after launch Docking accomplished twice by each crewman. During umbilica EVA, Gordon removed the nuclear emulsion experiment package an PAGENO="0035" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 31 attached tether between Gemini spacecraft and GATV. Excessive fatigue from these activities caused early termination of EVA at 33 minutes. After returning to, and repressurizing spacecraft, the hatch was opened for 3 minutes to jettison umbilical EVA equipment. Using GATV primary propulsion system, docked configuration was propelled to new altitude and speed (17,943 statute miles. per hour) records. Hatch opened third time for 2 hours 10 minutes standup EVA during which scheduled photography was accomplished. Two spacecraft undocked and station keeping by use of 100 feet nylon tether exercised with a slow spin rate imparted to the tethered combi- nation. After separation of the tether, a second rendezvous with GATV was conducted from 25 mile separation. Reentry sequence was fully automatic for the first time with impact 2.9 miles from the aimingpoint. Ten of eleven scheduled experiments were conducted as planned, power tool evaluation canceled due to shortened umbilical EVA. Duration-71 hours, 17 minutes. Launch date: November 11, 166. Designation: Gemini XII. Crew: James A. Lovell, Jr., and Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr. Remarks: GATV-Atlas booster combination launched 1 hour 38 minutes before Gemini spacecraft launched into orbit by modified Titan II booster. Rendezvous accomplished in third orbit of 59- revolution flight with docking 4 hours 14 minutes after Gemini launch. Scheduled boost of docked Gemini-GATV combination into higher orbit canceled due to pressure fluctuations in GATV primary propulsion system. The docked combination was maneuvered to ob- tain photographs of solar eclipse during the 10th revolution. Two standup EVA periods, on first and third days, totaled 3 hours 34 minutes. On second day, Aldrin conducted 2 hours 6 minutes umbili- cal EVA, testing restraint devices to overcome body positioning problems experienced on. prior flights. Resting frequently, Aldrin utilized portable hand rails, foot restraints, and various tethers. He completed 19 tasks, demonstrating useful EVA work was feasible with proper planning and restraint devices. Gemini and GATV spacecraft undocked, remaining joined by 100 foot tether for station keeping and gravity gradient stabilization experiment. Fourteen experiments conducted. Automatic reentry sequence used for second time. Dura- tion-94 hours, 35 minutes. APPENDIX B SCRIpr FOR THE 12 GEMINI (16-mm. color-sound motion picture) I~TATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION Gemini III was the first manned Gemini to be launched. It had been preceded by two earlier unmanned test flights. Ten manned test flights would tackle six objectives. The program ould- Investigate long-duration flight; Develop rendezvous techniques and postdocking maneuvers; PAGENO="0036" 32 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION Develop reentry flight path control; Develop extra vehicular capability; Attain flight and ground crew proficiency; and Conduct scientific experiments. Gemini III completed three successful orbits on March 23, 1965. It had begun 19 months of manned spaceflight accomplishments. On the very next flight, the long-duration mission headed the list of objectives. Long duration is fundamental to spaceflight. If Man could not withstand a zero-gravity environment for extended periods, two things were obvious. Either our future flights would be limited, or gravity would have to be induced artificially in flight. There were three long-duration missions: 4 days of Gemini IV, 8 days of Gemini V-the length of a lunar mission-and an extended mission of 14 days on Gemini VII. Long duration was a test of the endurance of both spacecraft and crew. On the spacecraft side, Gemini V was powered by fuel cells for the first time. They replaced conventional batteries. Fuel cells were also flown successfully on all missions from VII through XIL This is important because batteries are inadequate for many future space missions at the power levels needed. Apollo, for example, will use similar fuel cells. Medical aspects of the flight were closely studied: for such everyday matters as the ability to eat and sleep in space and for longer term results. When Fank Borman and Jim Lovell completed 14 days in Gemini VII, we had basic answers. We can medically commit crews to flights up to 30 days-a necessary condition for Man's role in Apollo and the Orbital Workshop. The first rendezvous in space occurred December 15, 1965, between two spacecraft: Gemini VIA and Gemini VII. Over Hawaii, in the fourth orbit, Pilot Stafford reported the de- creasing distance between the two spacecraft: "One hundred fifty feet. "One hundred fifty feet, and holding, Wally." As station keeping continued, Gemini VIA moved within a foot of Gemini VII. It was a successful beginning which saw Gemini com- plete ten rendezvous with target vehicles in less than a year. Seve different modes were investigated. An 11th rendezvous to photograph a solar eclipse was achieved o Gemini XII. To those of us who followed the flights from the sidelines-listenin to reports from television-rendezvous seemed almost like an auto matic exercise. But because something is done well does not mean tha it was easy to do. Rendezvous required 3 years of theoretical prepara tion-integrating space mathematics into the constraints of the missiol and hardware. Approximately 100,000 hours were spent on computer computation When crews were assigned to specific rendezvous flights, each prim and each backup crew trained for approximately 400 hours in simula PAGENO="0037" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 33 tors-a total of almost 5,000 man-hours of rendezvous simulation. It was never automatic. Gemini IXA gave us our first sophisticated rendezvous experience. Command Pilot Stafford, a veteran of Gemini VIA, completed three different rendezvous within 24 hours with his angry alligator. Within 12 orbits, Astronaut Stafford completed his initial rendez- vous, then performed an optical rerendezvous using onboard calcula- tions of the pilot as a backup, and finally simulated a type of rendez- vous above the target vehicle which would follow a lunar abort. A dual rendezvous was performed between Gemini X and the Agena VIII target vehicle still in orbit from an earlier launch. It was a passive target vehicle. Gemini XI achieved an M equals one rendezvous-or rendezvous in the first orbit. This was a direct ascent rendezvous and simulated still another type of rendezvous following a lunar abort. During the first rendezvous, Gemini VIA had moved within 1 foot of Gemini VII, but, of course, the two spacecraft could not dock. The first space dock came in March 1966. The spacecraft was Gemini VIII. Astronaut Armstrong moves in very slowly, making his final approach, until he is about 3 feet from the target. He then holds his position, reading the status display panel on the Agena. When he docks, the Gemini-Agena configuration will remain stable for almost 30 minutes. The control problems which developed were unrelated to the first successful dock in space. Gemini completed nine successful dockings. Both crew members performed dockings on the final two missions, XI and XII. One important aspect of docking is that it allows a crew to utilize the propulsion system of another spacecraft for further maneuvers. The Agena Target Vehicle has a primary propulsion system with 16,000 pounds of thrust. The primary propulsion system of Agena was first ignited in docked configuration by Command Pilot Young on Gemini X-and it lifted his spacecraft to a new orbital altitude record of 414 nautical miles. Again on Gemini XI, the primary propulsion system was lit in a white blaze of energy, and quickly propelled the crew to 741 nautical miles, shattering the previous record. "Carnarvan~ this is Gemini Eleven." "Go ahead, Eleven." "The world really is round from up here." "Got a good view, have you?" "Have we ever! I mean it is spectacular-fantastic." A major postdockiug maneuver was the experiment with a 100-foot Dacron line, or tether, connected to both spacecraft. The command pilot gradually plays out the tether until it becomes taut. On Gemini XI and again Gemini XII, we stabilized the spacecraft n the tether without further use of thrusters. Two techniques were used: the spinup mode on Gemini XI and the gravity gradient on emini XII. Gemini's demonstration of docking and postdocking techniques- oupled with a long duration capability-has helped emphasize the ~ontinuing utility of manned space missions. PAGENO="0038" 34 1068 NASA AtTTHORIZATION Man can assemble vehicles by docking and by tether. He can maneuver them with propulsion burns of spa~cecraft al- ready in orbit. He can maintain a fixed orientation of space stations without ex- pending maneuvering fuel. In short, we can assemble an Orbital Workshop and conduct scien- tific investigations in it for periods up to a month. Controlled reentry was an objective on all flights. We are looking at the glowing air in the wake of spacecraft reentry. The command pilot controlled reentry on the first eight manned flights. On the final two missions, the computer alone automatically controlled the descent. (Of course, the pilot was available for backup control.) On the first three manned flights, Gemini III through V, our land ing accuracy was only 575 nautical miles from the planned impact point. This distance soon improved. Wally Schirra landed Gemini VT-A within 7 nautical miles of the planned impact point. Gemini VIII, despite an orbital abort, landed within 1.1 nautical miles of the planned secondary impact point. Although it caine down 8,000 miles from the primary target area, it achieved the second best landing accuracy. Tom Stafford shaved that distance to four-tenths of a mile on Gemini TX-A, establishing a remarkable record. Overall, the average miss distance of the last seven flights was 3.6 nautical miles. This gives us confidence in planning Apollo. Crews will be re- turning from the Moon at about 25,000 miles an hour. To land safely within a 3,200-mile footprint, they must hit a reentry corridor within 20 of the planned flight path The sheer act of a man opening the Gemini hatch and going into space made extra vehicular activity unique among the program ob- jectives. Ed White completed a successful 22 minute space ~ alk during Gemini IV. He experienced no disorientation. He maneuvered well with the handheld maneuvering unit And his physiological reactions were very close to what had been predicted from ground tests Four additional EVA flights were flown as Gemini progressed from relatively uncomplicated space walking to meaningful space work by an EVA pilot. On three flights, Gemini TX-A, X, and XT, the pilot faced problems of body control and workload. Two answers evolved: A new underwater training program for crews and the increased use of body restraints during work sessions. Astronaut Cernan had nine pieces of body restraint equipment dur- in~ in his Gemini TX-A flight We progressively developed and refined restraint equipment until 44 pieces were flown on Gemini XII We also added underwater simulation of zero gravity condition to train the prime and backup crews of Gemini XII This gave them a greater continuity of training than is possible in the parabola of aircraft flight Buzz Aldrin put to work the experience gained from four fligh and underwater training. PAGENO="0039" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 35 He completed 19 tasks in a 2-hour 9-minute EVA. He performed such fundamental space work as: activating an experiment, tightening and untightening bolts with an Apollo torque wrench, making electri- cal connections, and cleaning up his work area. In all, Gemini amassed 12 hours, 22 minutes of EVA experience. It included space walking, standup EVA for photography, and space work. Gemini EVA has given us assurance that man can work and explore in the vacuum of space, whether that work be on the Moon or on orbit- ing space stations. The Gemini program provided depth in both flight and ground crew proficiency. It trained a staff of flight controllers skilled in handling complex missions. It was therefore quite logical that a Gemini flight director was at the same console for the first Apollo flight. The experience of many other Gemini controllers will also be utilized by Apollo. We came to take for granted the work of the crews at Cape Kennedy who successfully launched 12 Gemini vehicles. In addition, they demonstrated a dual launch capability. Four Agena target vehicles and one augmented target docking adapter were launched successfully. Recovery personnel of the Department of Defense and NASA re- duced the number of recovery ships 50 percent between Gemini IV and Gemini XII. At the same time, they increased spacecraft retrieval efficiency by 50 percent. The record of the flight crews is, of course, better known. When the last spacecraft splashed down, Gemini had logged 1,940 man-hours Almost 40 times as great as Mercury. In cooperation with the scientific community, Gemini flew 52 experi- ments. Participating were scientists such as Dr. E. P. Ney, director of the institute of physics at the University of Minnesota. Over 2,400 synoptic weather and terrain photographs were taken. Two thousand of these supplied useful information to scientists. The aerial mapping potential of manned flights is best illustrated by the Gemini TX-A flight over Peru. In one pass, Gemini TX-A mapped 80 percent of the country. It took just 3 minutes. These photographs were supplied to the Peruvian Government. Commercial uses have been many. This Texas coastal area shows the larval distribution of shrimp. One commercial fisherman reported that he learned more by study- ing this photograph than by fishing the gulf for 25 years. Weather photographs have been equally rewarding, enabling us to tudy the vortex of storms, and buildup of storm regions in succes- we photo passes. Gemini has also photographed sources of air pollution over cities, hannels of rivers, and the flow of jet streams. The International PAGENO="0040" 36 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION Affairs Office of NASA makes available such information to interested scientists of all countries. These 52 experiments-the 1,940 man-hours of the 12 Gemini-and the six objectives are now over. But the 12 Gemini have given us experience and confidence to tackle the next goals of manned spaceflight: to land for the first time oil the Moon, explore it, and return to Earth-to acquire new scientific knowledge in orbital workshops-and to reach out toward interplane- tary exploration. Now, Mr. Chairman, that finishes what I had planned to say about Gemini. If there are questions, I can answer them. Mr. TE.AGUE. Are there any questions? I believe there are no questions. Mr. Waggonner would like to ask a question. Mr. WAGGONNER. You said the final Gemini cost had not yet been determined. What is the present estimate? Dr. MUELLER. The best estimate we have is $1.29 billion. The con- tracts terminations are still being negotiated, though, and it will be several months before those are complete. Mr. WAGGONNER. At one point you estimated it might be $1.35 bil- lion. Do you attribute that to your cost plus fixed fee contract? Dr. MUELLER. The cost plus percentage fee did, in fact, contribute I believe, substantially. Those incentives were also designed in a way to make it evident that the Government wished to move forward with the program and help also to move the schedule forward. Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Roudebush, did you have a question? Mr. ROUDEBUSH. Just one quick one, George. I have a purpose in asking `this. On the Gemini capsules, we bought 15 originally and we utilized 12. Dr. MUELLER. As I understand it we bought and utilized a total of 12 Gemini spacecraft. Mr. ROUDEBUSH. We purchased 12. Dr. MUELLER. Yes. Mr. ROUDEBUSH. What has been the disposition of these capsules? Where are they? Dr. MUELLER. Three are being transferred to the Air Force. Two of them are being used, or at least the subsystems were being used, for the Apollo Applications program. There are `several that are being exhibited, one i's being selected for permanent exhibit in the Smith- sonian and I would assume that most of them will be disposed of in this fashion. Mr. ROUDEBUSH. You have no specific plans. The reason I bring this up, these are historic aircraft. I hope we will be able to maintain some for viewing by the future generations. How about our Mer- curys, too, George? Where are they? Dr. MUELLER. I believe that the Mercury capsules have all been as- signed to exhibitions, that is to museums or used for some of the travel- ing expositions that, for example, go to the Paris Air Show or the Canadian World's Fair. Mr. ROUDEBU5H. You haven't given any of these away, have you? They are just on loan. PAGENO="0041" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 37 Dr. MUELLER. That is correct. Mr Rouoir~irnsH. Thank you. (Following for the record:) DIsPosITIoN OF GEMINI SPACECRAFT Gemini 1: Not recovered. Gemini 2: MOL Program. Gemini 3: MOL Program. Gemini 3A: MOL Program (test article). Gemini 4: Smithsonian Institution. Gemini 5: On display at MSC. Gemini 6: In storage at St. Louis. Gemini 7: Expo-67. Gemini 8: In storage at St. Louis. Gemini 9: In storage at 1VISO. Gemini 10: In Australia on tour. Gemini 11: In storage at St. Louis. Gemini 12: In storage at St. Louis. Dr. MUELLER. I would like to turn now to our annual report for the fiscal year beginning in July. I had previously submitted supple- mental data to the statement I presented before the full committee on March 7 and will, with the permission of the chairman, during the next several days brin~ out the key elements of the supplemental data which describe the activities and programs of Manned Space Flight, accomplishments over the past year, and activities planned with the fiscal year 1968 budget under consideration by the committee. Before going into the Manned Space Flight program in depth, I would like to reiterate the key points brought out by Dr. Seamans in his testimony before the full committee on March 1. He stated as follows: First, this FY 1968 request represents the first true post-Apollo decisions. These decisions reflect our thinking, the review and endorsements of the Bureau of the Budget and the President's Science Advisory Oommittee, and the judg- ment of the President. As such, the important aspects to stress is that these are real and forthright decisions, ones that can be clearly accepted or rejected but that are not susceptible to compromises or halfway measures. Their crux is the question of a determination to continue a dynamic U.S. presence in space- or, of an overt decision to abandon the challenges, difficulties, and rewards of space capability. Second, nearly all of the budget is dedicated, not to the steps planned to forward the Nation's capability in new areas, but to the support and completion of those major space and aeronautics tasks that have been authorized and funded in the past. This on-going effort has been the successful backbone of our scientific and technological advances since the inception of the Agency, and commands the greatest part of our management attention and of our re- sources, both manpower and money. Third, every major undertaking in the field of rosearch and developmenit has built in an inherent risk, an uncertainty factor. I would like to underline this characteristic in our budget today. The exampel of the Apollo 204 accident during simulated launch conditions must be a reminder that we must work at the far edge of today's technology in order to build tomorrow's and that we can not always accurately assess in advance the cost in time or money, and most importantly in lives, of reaching national objec- tives and achieving national goals. The budget before you was prepared before the accident; our first impression is that the corrective actions we plan can be balanced within the overall totals by unavoidable delays and judicious re- scheduling of effort, but we are not yet clear as to the full Impact of the accident upon both our FY 1967 and 1968 resource planning. More than ever In the past, the unexpected has added uncertainty to our program. I believe that these points made by Dr. Seamans are significant to our discussions as the subcommittee considers the fiscal year 1968 budget PAGENO="0042" 38 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION for Manned Space Flight. We have just presented the results of a highly success±ul Gemini program which has now been completed. Mr. RTJMSFELD. You read Dr. Seamans' statement that this budget can be either accepted or rejected, but that it is not susceptible to compromise or halfway measures. What does this mean, George? Dr. MUELLER. That essentially by the time the Bureau of the Budget and the President have completed their examination of the budget that we have presented, it was pared down to those elements that were con- sidered to be essential if we were to have a continuing space program and in particular, a continuing manned space program. The basic problem that we have has quite clearly been stated before this committee last year and was approved by this committee last year in terms of holding open an option to go forward in fiscal 1968 with a Manned Space Flight program. I believe that Dr. Seamans is pointing out that you have to make a decision this year either to go forward or not to go forward. There isn't any way of holding the option open 1 more year by a small amount of moi~ley this year. Mr. RUMSFELD. I don't want to belabor the point, but, with all re- spect, I am not impressed by that statement by Dr. Seamans. There are some who suggest this budget doesn't provide for a dyna~nic space program, as Dr. Seamans alleges. Further, I don't see how he can suggest that this budget is not susceptible to changes by Congress. Certainly it is. It seems to me that every year NASA comes in and says: We are at the crossroads, Congress must do exactly what is re- quested or we are going to go down to the road to something terrible. Nothing can be changed or the program is over, and so forth. Admittedly, you don't do this, and I should have brought it up with Dr. Seamans instead of you, but I believe the Congress should look at this budget request and make its decisions. It is not, as Dr. Seamans suggests, a take it or leave it proposition. I don't believe the statement by Dr. Seamans contributes much to these hearings. Dr. MUELLER. I'm sorry, Mr. Rumsfeld, I didn't mean to waste your time. Mr. TEAGUE. Any other questions? What is this investigation going to cost? Can you make an esti- mate? Dr. MUELLER. You mean of the basic investigation itself? Mr. TEAGUE. The basic investigation itself. Dr. MUELLER. I presume that one could evaluate that in terms of the number of people that we have working on the problem and the time. We have about 1,500 people now engaged in one aspect or an- other of investigating the accident and they will have worked for some- thing like 2 months, so that we will have some 3,000 man-months of effort going into the accident itself. As I recall, our average cost per man-year at the present time is about $11,000, so that if my arithmetic doesn't fail me, we have about 250 man-years times $17,000 or about $4 million. Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Waggonner? PAGENO="0043" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 39 Mr. WA000NNER. Did I understand you to say that this budget was prepared before the 204 accident and that it is your opinion and the opinion of NASA that whatever changes that are made mandatory when the investigation i~ finally completed in the program can be taken care of within the framework of the budget which was proposed prior to the accident `by reprograming or reallocating the Apollo money? Dr. MUELLER. As you will recall in the testimony that we presented to the Senate Space Committee a couple of weeks ago, we had an early look at the results of the investigation and an early look at the kinds of things or possibilities that `we were studying, among which choices would have to be made. If those projections of the problem are correct, then the changes will be of such a magnitude that I believe they can be accommodated within the basic Apollo budget, that we have both in fiscal 1961 and in fiscal 1968. What this reflects, actually, is somewhat better than anticipated experience in the launch vehicle and a poorer than anticipated expen- ence in the spacecraft. There will have to be a reallocation of funds within the launch ve- hicle and spacecraft, but the total would `appear to be within our ability to accommodate. Mr. WAGGONNER. You `are not saying you predict the changes in the spacecraft will be of no magnitude? Dr. MUELLER. N~, sir. Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Gurney? Mr. GURNEY. Since we are touching upon the `accident, let me ask one or two questions. I notice we are going into this thing in detail later on w'hen the report comes out, but there have been some disturbing news stories coming ~ut recently `and it might be well to comment on it right here. There was one, in `Sunday's Post, by an A.P. writer. Statements in it were made like this: That there were so many troubles in the Apollo spacecraft program that some people in industry felt the Apollo pro)- ect was falling apart at `the seams. Then `there was another statement that quoted one ~f the NASA peo- ple telling newsmen that `there were something like 20,000 failures at one time or another in `the test of the Apollo cabin and engine sections. What I am saying is `that the news reports or speculation reports on the accident certainly are giving a different e~lor to the fact that there was something wrong with the program. Do you just want to comment on that generally? Dr. MUELLER. Let me say that the material, by and large, `that was presented in that particular article had been covered and was taken actually from the testimony prepared by NASA for the Senate Space Committee and earlier reports which NASA had made to the industry and the country. Particularly, "20,000 failures" was a part of the discussion that was held at the symposium ~f the Manned Spacecraft Center several months ago in trying to bring the public up to date on the status of the program. You will recall that I had a history of the acceptance testing of the Gemini `spacecraft in the presentation I gave just a few moments ago PAGENO="0044" 40 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION and you will notice the very large number of hours that were required in the first checkout and acceptance of the Gemini spacecraft. Those large number of hours, sometimes like 10 times the eventual hours required to check it out, represented the discrepancies that had to be fixed, "squawks" `that something had to be done about. Now, if you recognize, too, that the Apollo spacecraft is 10 times as complex as the Gemini spacecraft, it is not surprising that you have 20,000 discrepancies. In fact, we have regarded this as being a nominal situation in the first model `of a' development spacecraft. Maybe half of those represent problems in getting the paperwork up to date be- cause we do keep a very careful record of each of `the spacecraft com- ponents and we do want to make sure `that the records are up to date before it leaves `the factory. So every paper that isn't properly filled out, properly signed `and `so on, there is a record made of it ~and~the proper action has to be taken before we will accept the spacecraft and that goes right on `through. Now, I think that one has to recognize that in any development pro- gram the way you learn is by finding things wrong and fixing them and the way the people learn to manufacture and the way the people learn to carry out the checkout, the way the people learn to think for launch, is not by doing everything right the first time because you don't know enough about the spacecraft to be able to do it right without having gone through the procedures once and found out how they really worked. I don't recall the Apollo program in an overall sense as being in difficulty. I sincerely believe that the basic Apollo spacecraft design is sound and `that the reason we can accommodate the changes that we are anticipating within our budget is that the design was basically sound and the changes that are required are going to be relatively nominal. That doesn't mean they are negligible. They aren't large changes. They don't represent basic design flaws and basic difficulties in the test and checkout areas. Mr. GURNEY. In other words, the many discrepancies that were re- ferred to, perhaps it might be fair to say show the worth and excellence of the test program and the discrepancies that you have are not more than you would normally expect? Dr. MUELLER. That is correct. Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Rumsfeld? Mr. RUMSFELD. On this same subject, not with respect to the specifics of the accident but'on procedures, I notice on page 21 of your supple- mental material you say "Our procedures have in the past required that each test be conducted, be reviewed from the safety standpoint." On page 11, you say "most of the spacecraft systems are adequate for safety" and so forth. That review is conducted within NASA, is that correct? Dr. MUELLER. As a matter of fact as I guess I explained last year, we have a series of reviews of the spacecraft and the launch vehicle. Mr. RUMSFELD. Are any apart from NASA? Dr. MUELLER. The President's Science Advisory Committee h'ad a subcommittee under Dr. Frank Long that spent 6 months reviewing in great detail, the designs and procedures and so on that were used. PAGENO="0045" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 41 You will recall they have a paragraph in their report to the President on the future programs and I believe that their conclusion was that we were doing all that one could do and they were relatively optimistic about the results of what we were doing. Mr. RUMSFELD. I am advised that in the development of the nu- clear submarines and the Polaris submarines there were independent review boards that were apart from the AEC and apart from the Navy. They were not connected with the Government or Navy and they participated in an independent review. I am further advised that the concept of an independent review is credited with some of the successes achieved. I quite agree with you the way you learn is by trying things, but to the extent that they can be talked through prior to some unfortunate situation, this is what we are all seeking. Has that possibility of an independent review board within NASA been considered and rejected or does one exist? Dr. MUELLER. Several actually exist at varing degrees of inde- pendence. The Science and Technology Committee has participated in the PSAO Convnittee review and also conducted its own independ- ent reviews of the work we are doing. That Committee is composed of some of our outstanding engineers and scientists in the country who have had great previous experience in this kind of activity. We also, of course, use a system of design reviews internal to both contractor and our own organization. Generally the design reviews are conducted by people who are independent of the people that did the design in the first instance. In other words, we take expertise from elsewhere in our organiza- tion, apply it to the problems associated with our anticipated prob- lems. We ha.ve also established a design certification review board which is composed of myself and the center directors where we rather care- fully go through the design itself and the procedures that have been developed for using the equipment. Mr. RUMSFELD. Are these essentially safety review boards? Dr. Mtrm4r~R. In the case of design certification review board, it is devoted almost entirely to whether this system is safe for man to fly. That is the one aim it has and if you will notice the pro- ceedings of this board, you will find that at the end of each engineers systems presentation, he certifies that his system is ready for manned flight. We have tried very carefully to get a meaningful set of checks and balances in both the design, the implementation, and the opera- tions areas. Mr. RUMSFELD. Are you personally familiar with the independent review boards that I was referring to with respect to the nuclear sub- marines? Dr. Mumi~n. Yes, I am. Mr. RUMseELD. Do you compare what NASA has with that and say they are similar? Dr. MUELLER. I think they are both similar and independent. We actually penetrate rather deeper in the design than they did. We had a similar setup too in the ballistic missile program. What we tried to do was to add to that rather than subtract from it. PAGENO="0046" 42 1968 NASA AUTH0E~IZAPI0N Mr. RUMSFELD. Thank you. Mr T1o~rnE Mr Roudebush? Mr. ROUDEBtT&H. In conjunction with Mr. Gurney's line of ques- tioning, I wonder how the number of failures in the Apollo that you have experienced so far compares `with the number of failures you had in Gemini and previous to that in Mercury before your first flight? Dr. MUELLER. I am trying to gather that data together right now. Mr. ROUDEBUSH. Will you submit it for the record? (The information as requested is as follows:) In conjunction with Mr Gurney s line of questioning I wonder how the num ber of failures in the Apollo that you have experienced so far compares with the number of failures you had In Gemini and previous to that In Mercury before your first flight'? Answer Summarized in the table below Is a direct comparison of the number of failures prior to the first manned flight in the Apollo spacecraft to the Mercury and Gemini programs. (Notice there was an error in the original number of 20,000 failures for the Apollo OSM. This number is more accurately subscribed to the total Apollo spacecraft.) The increase reflects the Increasing size and complexity of the programs. There are, for example, 21,600 drawIngs of 1,500,0(X) parts and assemblies on Apollo as contrasted with 6 100 drawings of 268 000 parts and assemblies on Gemini Item Mercury Gemini_-~ Apollo Failures-prior to 1st manned flight 1,300 I 4,600 I 15, 100 The use of the term failure can be misleading. The failure reporting system makes no distinction between a material defect, a broken part, a procedural error, or out-of-specification operation. Each failure report does mean, however, that a senior member of the appropriate engineering staff reviews the item for proper action. Mr. TEAGUE. A newspaper article said they were practically the same-about either Gemini or Mercury. Dr. MUELLER. I believe that we will find that certainly with respect to the complexity, if you take into account the difference in complexity of the vehicle, it is better in the Apollo than it was in Gemini or Mercury. Mr. FUQTJA. There were press reports since the Apollo tragedy that the prime contractor was doing a very important job and there was some feeling in NASA that maybe another contractor should take over that job. I wonder if you could add a little light to this? Dr. MUELLER. Well, the prime contractor in the Apollo program is at this point in time doing a creditable job in my view. Mr. FUQUA. At this point? Dr. Mu1i'1u~ER. At this point in time. Now, I think that one has to put this in perspective and look at what happens to each of our ex- periences with each of our major contractors. You have got to recognize that we really are learning a new tech- nology. We are also learning how to manage very large programs, programs that are different than any program that the Nation has undertaken in the past. The program that we are doing is one that is producing a very comple.x system and we are only producing something like 15 Saturn V's and 12 Saturn I-B's and the requisite spacecraft, so you don't PAGENO="0047" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 43 have the same kind of production base and the same kind of ability to learn by breaking equipment. In every case-that ~includes our experience on Mercury and Gemini, it includes our experience on the launch vehicles, the Gemini launch vehicles as well as the stage contractors on the Saturn V-there has been a period in the development cycle where we had difficulties, both with the management of the program, the orpnization of the con- tractor, and in many cases our own organizational setup and in the technical details of how to carry out the program. We have adopted a system of working with the contractor trying to transfer from contractor to contractor knowledge, from the NASA people to the contractor the knowledge that we have. In the course of doing this, we have adopted various techniques, we have created, if you will, for the McDonnell Co. a new method of managing their subcontractors or subsystem development and that works successfully in McDonnell and we apply it to other companies in the organization. So I think that you will find that there is a cycle and there is a period of time when everybody is discouraged because that first article is having problems and you have to learn how to do it, you have to transfer enough knowledge and enough energy and cause people to learn how to do this thing both themselves and with help from outside. I would say that North American has had more problems than other contractors but on the other hand it is, in fact, our largest contractor, but in proportion to the size of the task they have, I would say that they have fewer problems and certainly at the present time they are comparable to any of our other contractors. Mr. FUQUA. Getting back to my original question, was consideration ever given in NASA to changing their contractors if they had so many problems that they appeared insurmountable, so you did give con- sideration to changing contractors? Dr. MUELLER. I don't know of any case where we really looked at changing contractors in the present programs. Mr. FUQUA. Then that report then is false? Dr. MUELLER. To my knowledge, yes. Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Gurney? Mr. GURNEY. Let us talk a little about your checking-up system. I know the contractors have quality control people an.d safety people whose job it is specifically to look after those areas and make sure that the contractors do their job. What kind of a system do you have to sort of check up on the checkers? I mean by that most systems have sort of a surprise inspection to make sure that people who are charged with the jøb are doing the job; do you have that kind of a system? Dr. MtrEu~1t. Yes. Mr. GURNEY. Let us be a little more specific about it. Take down at the. Cape, for example, as a flight is being readied and there are certain safety procedures to be adhered to, the contractor is supposed to be doing his job here and so is NASA, but these people work together and it is a human thing, for example, for your Government man, I suppose, to be considered as - unpopular - that is his job. He has PAGENO="0048" 44 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION got to be that in order to do his job. It is also human that no one likes to be in that role. How do you make sure that he does continue to be unpopular, as he is supposed to be in order to get the job done and he doesn't. get a nice working relationship with his counterpart on the contractor's side and maybe something slips by that shouldn't? Do you have a headquarters man that comes down occasionally and checks up? How do you practically go about that human thing of making sure that people are doing the quality job and safety job? Dr. MUELLER. We have a reliability and quality group at head- quarters which does do field inspections; we also, before submitting to a flight have a. final review by our senior people who have not been involved in the checkout, both headquarters and field centers, other than Kennedy, that do go down through and audit it. For example, that goes back to the factory. Before we accept the spacecraft, there is a team that spends several weeks going through the spacecraft making sure `that all of the proper forms have been filled out, catching any discrepancies `that have not been picked up before. Since the accident, we have of course been very carefully examining both 012 and 014 in an attempt to find out whether our quality proc- esses were good. That is one of the basic questions and so far the results indicate that they were good. We also have `been going `back looking at other spacecraft just to be sure that our procedures are good. We do, therefore, have both quality audits, if you will, by independent groups from headquarters and from the centers other than those directly involved and we also have final inspections by program people who have not been directly involved in the checkout whose one objective is to make this go. There is a continuing observation and check and balance by the flight crews themselves who really do an effective and independent job of assessing the quality of the spacecraft and have a very considerable effect on making sure that the quality is good. Mr. GURNEY. Your field people from headquarters, do .they make surprise inspections to see what is going on? Dr. MUELLER. Yes, sir; so do our program managers. Mr. TEAGtTE. Do you have any questions? Mr. ROUDEBUSIE. George, I don't want to prolong this Apollo acci- dent, but I think it is very important to get it clarified in our com- mittee's mind. Was there any pessimism expressed by the astronauts about the success of the Apollo mission? One of `the newspapers said one of our astronauts expressed a great deal of pessimism about the success and reliability of it. He, according to the newspaper article, "Hung a lemon on it." Are you aware of any such criticism, and how much attention do you pay to the reports of the astronauts after these simulated training flights? Dr. MUELLER. Let me try to answer that in two phases, if I may, since you have asked two questions, I think. One, with respect to ~the spacecraft itself, I always have an oppor- tunity to talk to the crew sort of separate from the normal day-to-day PAGENO="0049" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 45 operations and the flight crew for 204 did early in the checkout proce- dure raise some questions about the quality of that spacecraft. Those questions were answered, corrective measures were taken, and before the spacecraft left the factory, they were completely satisfied that this spacecraft was as good as any spacecraft they have had experi- ence with and that was their personal opinion. We continued that as we got down to the cape and they continued to hold that opinion so that they had no doubt about the flight-worthi- ness of the spacecraft itself during the course of the checkout operation. I think as we had earlier in Gemini, there were working problems and there are still problems in getting the simulators up to full opera- tional capacity. In the early Gemini flights we had -some problems in getting the simulators into the final flight configurations. The reason is that the simulators have to follow the flight hardware in a development cycle so they are several months behind in the flight hard- ware configurations in the course of the development cycles. Also in the case of the Apollo program, we have taken advantage of what we learned in the Gemini and we have considerably more sophisticated simulated training equipment, and it has to be, because we are trying to develop here the capability of carrying out the lunar landing. So there is a more sophisticated training equipment that is now in operation and was in operation during the course of the last several months of the Apollo training cycle. I think that again this problem has been solved. First you have to recognize that you have problems before you can solve them. It is an unfortunate thing that the first time we build something it doesn't work perfectly-that is just characteristic of a complex system. Mr. ROUDEBUSH. All of the complaints of the astronauts concerning the preliminary operation were looked into? Dr. MUELLER. Yes, sir, and all of the real complaints were corrected. Mr. ROUDEBUSH. What do you mean by real complaints? Dr. MUELLER. Well, sometimes people will just complain about the color of the paint or something like that, but anything that had any real impact on the trainer or on the program had been corrected. Mr. TEAGUE. George, I would like to ask a couple of the committee- men a question and they can answer or not. Two of them have been to North American, Los Angeles, and have been through the spacecraft and they have been through the cleaning room. I would like to ask them what their impression was. Mr. Gurney. Mr. GURNEY. It looked like a pretty( thorough job to me. I am not an engineer. Mr. Ti~rn~. Mr. Cabell. Mr. CABELL. I was definitely impressed by the enthusiasm and by the keen interest they were taking iii their work, even down to the mechanics and certainly I was not competent to be able to judge the quality of the work other than by the atmosphere which I thought was good. I thought it was, under the circumstances out at North American, for example, excellent. 76-265 O-67~---pt. 2---4 PAGENO="0050" 46 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Mr. TEAouE. Please continue. Dr. MUELLER. The interest of this committee is well known as re- ~ards the future national space objectives. The report on this subject issued by Mr. Teague, the chairman of the Subcommittee on NASA Oversight on July 26, 1966, entitled "Future National Space Objec- tives," succinctly brought forth the considerations. With. the chair- man's permission I would like to quote several excerpts from this report.. In the letter of the report to the Honorable George P. Miller, chair- man of the Committee on Science and Aeronautics, the Honorable Olin E. Teague, chairman of the Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, stated the following: Most Important, however, Is the identification of the need to make positive bold decisions on future national goals in space at the earliest possible time. To fur- ther delay these important decisions fails to serve the best interest of the people of `this country and the free world. In the conclusions of the report it was stated "the technology base now exists * * * to define objectives for a concerted program of ex- ploration and exploitation in space during the 1970's." It further provided "criteria to develop a balanced well ordered national space program" and went on to state that "within the framework of the criteria * * * the national space program may be considered in ref- erence to its near term-1967-76-and long term-1976-85-as to emphasis. For the near term, it is possible to utilize existing tech- nology base to extend orbital stay time eventually leading to the establishment of a manned earth orbital system, and to extend the manned lunar stay time capability-possibly utilizing the lunar sur- face for an operational base-while expanding early detailed un- manned scientific exploration of the solar system and initiating manned flybys of the planets. For the longer term it is feasible to extend manned operation to landings on other planetary bodies and to extend the unmanned scientific explorations of space to the limits of our solar system and beyond." In fiscal year 1966 the committee supported the Manned Space Flight efforts to define a follow-on program to Apollo. Further, in fiscal year 1967, this committee permitted us to hold open the options, thus permitting the maintenance of the technology base built over the past several years for the Apollo program. As we proceed through these hearings, I think the foresight of this committee's conclusions as published in the report of future national space objectives will be- come clearly evident. We will be showing plans to utilize the existing technology base to extend orbital stay time. We will be showing our plans to extend manned lunar stay time as well as our study effort leading to manned planetary flyby and to eventual manned planetary landings. We will also be showing the activity in Apollo Applica- tions which will lead to the development of subsystems necessary to longer space flights. With these considerations in mind, let me now review our progress against the objectives of Manned Space Flight. Here (M64-68) are the general objectives which are unchanged. Next (M64-61) are the specific objectives of the three manned space flight programs, Mercury, PAGENO="0051" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 47 Gemini, and Apollo. These objectives for Gemini and Apollo also remain unchanged from last year. The achievements of the past year reflect substantial progress toward the accomplishment of all of these objectives, both general and specific. We have completed all of the Gemini program objectives as I discussed earlier this morning. We did not accomplish the Gemini program objectives and the flights dur- ing the past year without difficulties, nor is it realistic to assume that we can accomplish the Apollo objectives without experiencing diffi- culties. During the discussion of Apollo, I will cover the program status in detail and will show the accomplishments and the difficulties we have experienced over the last year in their total view. I believe it is important that the Apollo program progress be looked at in its total context, particularly in light of the recent unfortunate accident. There has been significant progress made which has been. overshadowed by the tragic loss of three brave men-close colleagues to all of us in the program. It is only in retrospect that this shadow can be pierced to place the total Apollo program in its proper balance. The efforts of upward to 300,000 people have been devoted to this great challenge of landing a man on the Moon and returning him safely to Earth in this decade. The astronauts who have given their lives for this pro- gram were devoted to this goal. The greatest tribute that this Nation can pay to these brave men is to accomplish the goals that they worked so hard and gave their lives to help us meet. As I stated before the full committee, I do believe that we still have a reasonable possibility of meeting the major milestones for the Ajrnllo program which were established in 1963 (MC65-5185). In particular, although the proba- bility is lowered, I believe we will be able to land men on the Moon and return them safely to Earth before 1970. In all our considerations of the current Apollo program and future programs, we have had the benefit of information and studies from several sources. The Committee on Science and Astronautics has pro- vided us with invaluable information over the past several years. I have cited today the study effort published in 1966 on the "Future National Space Objectives." The studies on "Apollo Program and Progress" which were conducted last year and again this year have proven to be extremely useful in our program considerations, as have the new publications on "Space Flight Emergencies and Space Flight Safety" and the "Practical Values of the National Space Program" (fig. 15, MC67-5996). The President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) published a report in February 1967 titled "Space Program in the Post-Apollo Period." I would like to spend a few moments discussing this report as it affects the Manned Space Flight future and relate the Manned Space Flight program you are considering today to the recommenda- tions of the President's Science Advisory Committee. I will brief the recommendations from the PSAC report which have a significant impact on Manned Space Flight, then relate these recommendations to the Apollo Applications program. Under lunar exploration, PSAC recommends manned expeditions at the rate of one and two per year (fig. 16, MC67-5990). TJnder the Apollo Applications program plans for our follow-on Apollo PAGENO="0052" 48 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION CONGRESSIONAL AND OTHER REPORTS AFFECTING MANNED SPACE FLIGHT * APOLLO PROGRAM AND PROGRESS * SPACE FLIGHT EMERGENCIES AND SPACE FLIGHT SAFETY-A SURVEY * PRACTICAL VALUES OF THE NATIONAL SPACE PROGRAM * PRESIDENT'S SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT- FEBRUARY, 1961- SPACE PROGRAM IN THE POST-APOLLO PERIOD NASA HO MC61- 5996 3/13/67 FIGURE 15 PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEEREPORT FEBRUARY, 1967 RECOMMENDATIONS AFFECTING APOLLO APPLICATIONS MANNED SPACE FLIGHT PLAN LUNAR EXPLORATION MANNED EXPEDITIONS PRIME OBJECTIVE - ONE AND TWO PER YEAR FOLLOW-ON MISSIONS MANNED LOGISTICS SUPPORT LUNAR MODULE (LM) SHELTER/TAXI EXPLORE PARTS OF MOON NOT ACCESSIBLE TO APOLLO- FOLLOW-ON MISSIONS SYSTEM DURING 1975-80 OBJECTIVE NASA HQ. MC 67-5990 3/13/67 FIGURE 16 PAGENO="0053" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 49 Applications missions, this is a prime objective, as shown on the chart (fig. 17, M067-5412)-extended lunar exploration. A second recommendation under lunar exploration is that a manned logistics support system should be developed for lunar stay. Under Apollo Appplications planning we have a program to develop a lunar module shelter taxi which I discussed before this committee last year as an advanced manned mission study effort. Later I will cover this in more detail when we discuss the Apollo Applications j~rogram. A third recommendation of PSAC was to exl?lore during 1975-80 parts of the Moon not accessible to Apollo. This, too, is a follow-on missions objective of the Apollo Applications and currently in our advanced manned mission plans there are definition and design studies on mobile lunar exploration. Mr. RTIMSFELD. Are there any safety recommendations made by PSAC that will show up in these slides? Dr. MUELLER. Are you thinking of space rescue versus safety? Mr. RUMSFELD. As I recall in your response to my questions, you indicated that P8kG represented to some extent something compara- ble to an independent review board and you were mentioning their recommendation in manned space flight. Do you have any recom- mendations from them that relate to safety? Dr. MUELLER. To the best of my knowledge, although they did look into our safety practices, they did not recommend any changes. I be- lieve there are no recommendations in their report on safety per Se. Mr. RtTMSFELD. Thank you. Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Gurney? MAJOR APOLLO APPLICATIONS OBJECTIVES * USE APOLLO DEVELOPMENT TO: * DETERMINE USEFULNESS OF MAN IN SPACE. * CONDUCT ASTRONOMY OBSERVATIONS. * DEVELOP CAPABILITY FOR ECONOMICAL SPACE FLIGHT THROUGH HARDWARE REUSE AND LONG DURATION FLIGHT. * EXTEND LUNAR EXPLORATION. NASA HG MC67-5412 1-9-67 FIGURE 17 PAGENO="0054" 50 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Mr. GURNEY. I think our chairman, Mr. Teague, has made comment from time `to time on the possibility of a rescue vehicle. DO you con- template this taxi concept as a rescue vehicle also? Dr. MUELLER. So far, our studies of the extended lunar operations have not led us to believe that a taxi as a rescue vehicle would be a reasonable next step and the reason is the very long st:orage time that would be required on the lunar surface and the problems that are as- sociated with that long storage time. However, that is one of the things that we are lookm~ at in the course of these studies. Mr. GURNEY. I was thmking more of the rescue vehicle in connec- tion with earth orbital missions rather than lunar missions. Dr. MUELLER. We are jointly with the Air Force looking at various means for rescuing people from earth orbit, and there are studies go- ing on in this area. The shelter taxi, itself, is not adaptable to that. Mr. GURNEY. What is your time schedule if you have any on rescue vehicles? Dr. MUELLER. At the present time, there is not a program nor a schedule for the development of a rescue vehicle. Mr. TEAGtJE. Well, George, isn't it true, though, that each thing you have done in the Gemini program has made some contribution `to an eventual rescue- Dr. MUELLER. Yes, sir. Mr. TEAGUE. Your docking and extra vehicle dock all contribute to a rescue capability? Dr. MUELLER. All those are steps which lead to the capability of carrying out a rescue mission. Mr. TEAGUE. Continue. Dr. MUELLER. Under the Planetary Exploration section of this re- port (fig. 18, MC67-5995) they recommend an early integrated study of relative effectiveness of man in planetary flyby and orbiter missions aiid that the effectiveness should be considered both for the manned and unmanned mode. This recommendation is in line with one of our major Apollo Ap- plications program objectives shown previously on figure 18 (MC67- 5412)-to determine the usefulness of man in space. PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT FEBRUARY, 1967 RECOMMENDATIONS AFFECTING APOLLO APPLICATIONS MANNED SPACE FLIGHT PLAN PLANETARY EXPLORATION EARLY INTEGRATED STUDY OF IN LINE WITH MAJOR AAP RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF OBJECTIVE - DETERMINE MAN IN PLANETARY FLYBY USEFULNESS OF MAN IN AND ORBITER MISSIONS - SPACE CONSIDER MANNED AND UNMANNED MODES. NASA HQ MC 67-5995 3113167 FIGURE 18 PAGENO="0055" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 51 IJnder our Advanced Manned Missions study effort, we have a joint action group involving several elements of NASA studying the manned planetary flyby system requirements and manned planetary landing requirements. As you know from the presentation by Dr. Newell be- fore the full committee, we have reeom'mendations before the Congress to approve funding for the Voyager program in the fiscal year 1968 budget. This program will provide useful data through unmanned flight to the planets. These flights will in turn, be significant to manned plane- tary activity. The Marshall Space Flight Center is a major partaci- pant in the Voyager program, thus providing a close tie between the manned and unmanned activity. Additionally, Dr. Adams in his presentation `before the full committee defined the activities related to the nuclear engine NERVA II, which is an important development to a manned planetary landing program in the future. Both the Voyager and the NERVA II systems require a launch ve- hicle of the Saturn V class for development and mission activity. The Apollo Applications program as we have presented it to the Congress will maintain the Saturn V capability for this useful work in meet- ing the Apollo Applications objectives as well as providing this capa- bility for two programs. Under t.he recommendations for a Manned Space Station (fig. 19, MC6T-5994), the President's Science Advisory `Committee report states that a launch in mid-197Q's for `the first module of the space PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT FEBRUARY, 1961 RECOMMENDATIONS AFFECTING APOLLO APPLICATIONS MANNED SPACE FLIGHT PLANS MANNED SPACE STATION LAUNCH IN MID 1910'S ORBITAL WORKSHOP LONG FIRST MODULE OF A SPACE DURATION FLIGHTS AND STATION FOR VERY PRO- EXPERIMENTS LONGED BIOLOGICAL STUDIES OF MAN, ANIMALS, AND OTHER ORGANIZMS IN EARTH ORBIT PLANS FOR SPACE STATIONS ORBITAL WORKSHOP LONG WITH TESTS IN SPACE OF DURATION FLIGHTS AF4D EQUI PMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL EXPERIMENTS CONTROL, POWER SUPPLY, COM- MUNICATION, ETC., ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO THEIR LONG- TERM RELIABILITY. NASA HQ MC 61-5994 1I1~I61 FIGURE 19 PAGENO="0056" 52 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION station for very prolonged biological studies of, man, animal, `and other organisms in Earth `orbit is recommended. `Within the Apollo Appli- cations plans, the first step toward `meeting this recommendation is `t'he orbital workshop which can lead to long duration flights up to 2 months and experiments to determine the capability of `man `to function in this environment for periods up to 1 year. In the advanced manned mis- sion planning effort we have a joint action group consisting of repre- sent'atives of `the NASA program offices who are studying Earth orbital missions `of 1 year duration and longer. The second recommendation `of the Committee's report under Manned Space Station was for plans for space stations with test in space of equipment, especially that equipment related `to long-term reliability. In the Apollo Applications plans, the orbital workshop will provide a testbed for experimentation in long duration flight sub- systems an'd systems. The advanced manned missions Earth'orbital studies will extrapolate this information to the longer duration capability which in turn will be `tested in followon Apo'llo Applicati'ons missions of up to 1' year duration, recommended `by the President's Science Advisory Com- mittee. Mr. GURNEY. Back to the question I asked about a rescue vehicle, why wouldn't it be possible to have a vehicle with a dual capability, taxi, or shuttle vehicle and a rescue vehicle? Dr. MUELLER. I am sure that it is possible, Mr. Gurney. There are limitations as to the availability, the ability of vehicles to rendezvous in orbit. There are only a few minutes on several orbits during the day in which one can actually carry out a rendezvous. So we are look- ing at not only a possi'bility of a rescue vehicle coming up from the ground but also incorporation of the equivalent of lifeboats with the orbiting vehicle so that you can return from orbit in the event of a failure. Mr. GURNEY. Well, I know, of course, that you have a limited time to effect a rendezvous, but I can't understand why a vehicle can't have a dual capability. It has to get up, it has to get to the vehicle up- stairs. These people have to get back. Why can't you incorporate both capabilities? Why don't you look at both capabilities? Dr. MUELLER. We are looking at both capabilities, Mr. Gurney, in a single vehicle. Mr. GURNEY. Let me put it this way: I thought your answer was that you are looking at the air taxi concept in connection with the Apollo Applications program of the long workshop flights, but you were not looking at a rescue capability in connection with the same program. That was something else over here and an entirely different thing. My question is in your Apollo Applications program, you are going to have a vehicl~ that goes from Earth up to this workshop and back again, isn't that correct? Dr. MuELLr~ii. Yes, sir. Mr. GURNEY. Why does it not also include a rescue capability? Why couldn't it? Dr. MUELLER. Well, let me be sure I can clarify an earlier point. The shelter taxi that I was discussing is a development that has to do with landing on the Moon, a dual landing. PAGENO="0057" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 53 Mr. GURNEY. I am talking about Earth orbital missions. Dr. MUELLER. The spacecraft that we are using for the resupply of the orbital workshop is, of course, c~pable of returning some individ- uals from the orbital workshop. The problem we have is that in order to carry out the rendezvous we need to send at least one man and normally two men up into the orbital workshop that then leaves at most one or two, generally speaking, one vacant seat to bring some- one down. Therefore one would have to have three of these devices if you used a two-man flight to go up there. That will be considerably improved if we can in fact develop the land landing capability with the Apollo spacecraft and the ability to carry six men because then that would carry four or five people back from orbit on a single vehi* cle that might have a reasonable rescue capability. So in a. sense, w~ are working on that, we are trying to develop the capability for this kind of an operation. Mr. GURNEY. I guess you have answered ~ny questions. Let me finish it off with another question. In examining the air taxi concept or shuttle concept, is your rescue mission or factor in this being given as much emphasis as recently the shuttle capability ~ Dr. MUELLER. In all honesty at this point in time, we are primarily concerned with the development of the capability of rendezvousing and refueling. Mr. GURNEY. Don't you think it would be a good idea to think of the other thing. You have the propulsion that is sufficient enough even for a six-man spacecraft. Dr. MUELLER. I only pointed out that we are, in fact, looki.ng at the other as well, but the constraints of, among other things, the budget limits the amount of effort we can devote to many things that would be very desirable. Mr. TEAGUE. Do you have any questions, Mr. Roudebush? Mr. ROTJDEBUSH. No. Dr. MUELLER. In the area, of Space Science in Earth Orbit, the PSAC recommended the establishment and Earth orbit of a number of astronomical facilities which by the end of the 1970's will constitute an orbiting astronomical observatory (fig. 20, MC67-5993). We will present to this committee as part of the Apollo Applications missions, the Apollo Telescope Mount, which is a necessary preliminary step toward achieving this goal. The Apollo Telescope Mount will place in orbit astronomical instruments capable. of gathering important solar scientific data. Later, if the advanced manned missions studies reach fruition, manned Earth orbital telescopes of 38-inch, 60-inch, and finally 120-inch configurations can be placed in Earth orbit. It is of interest to note that even a 38-inch telescope in Earth orbit would be superior to the 200-inch Mount Palomar telescope in effective resolution capability as well as in spectral range. The 120-inch tele- scope should increase our capability for resolving celestial objects by a factor of 20, extend range by four magnitudes of brightness and allow observations to detect planets the size of ~Jupiter in orbit about the closest star Alpha Centauri. Continuing on with the recommendations of the PSAC report in the area of Biomedical Studies and the Qualifications of Manned Pro- longed Space Missions (fig. 21, MC67-5989), they recommend that PAGENO="0058" 54 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT FEBRUARY, 1961 RECOMMENDATIONS AFFECTING APOLLO APPLICATIONS MANNED SPACE FLIGHT PLANS SPACE SCIENCE IN EARTH ORBIT ESTABLISH IN EARTH ORBIT ATM EXPERIMENT A NUMBER OF ASTRONOMICAL NECESSARY PRELIMINARY FACILITIES, WHICH BY THE STEP - MAJOR AAP END OF THE 1970'S WILL OBJECTIVE CONSITUTE AN ORBITING ASTRONOMICAL OBSERVATORY. NASA HQ MC 67 5993 3/13/67 FIGu1~ 20 PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT FEBRUARY, 1967 RECOMMENDATIONS AFFECTINC APOLLO APPLICATIONS MANNED SPACE FLI~I1T PLANS RIOMEDICAL STUDIES AND THE QUALIFICATION OF MAN FOR LONG SPACE MISSIONS 1. PHYSIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL 1. IN LINE WITH DETERMINING STUDIES OF MAN POR EXTENDED USEFULNESS OF MAN IN SPACE PERIODS IN SPACE. THESE EXPERI- AND LONG DURATION FLIGHT MENTS TO BE USEFUL IN PREDICTING OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS PERFORMANCE IN INTERPLANETARY FLIGHT 2. ORBITAL WORKSHOP EXPERIMENT SHOULD 2. PART OF AAP PROCEED MISSIONS 3 STUDY BE MADE OF THE SUITABILITY 3 PART OF THE FUNCTION OF COST AND AVAI1.ABI1JTY OF TITAN Ill/MOL THE MANNED SPACE FLIGHT SYSTEMS FOR BIOMEDICAL STUDIES OF MAN EXPERIMENTS BOARD AND THE FOR PERIODS UP TO 60 DAYS. AACB 4 USE THE MOL PROGRAM AS SOURCE OF DATA 4 PART OF THE FUNCTION OF ON THE CAPABILITIES OF MAN FOR MISSIONS THE MANNED SPACE FLIGHT LASTING 14 TO 30 DAYS. EXPERIMENTS BOARD WHICH IS JOINTLY CHAIRED BY THE DOD. 5. BIOMEDICAL STUDIES INVOLVE EXTENDED DURATION FLIGHTS OF 100 DAYS OR MORE, 5. PART OF THE FUNCTION OF AND WILL REQUIRE MAJOR REDESIGN OF MOL THE AACB AND MSFEB COMPONENTS, OR MAJQR NEW DEVELOPMENTS IF BASED ON APOLLO HARDWARE. NASA MUST DETERMINE MOST EFFECTIVE AND ECONOMICAL APPROACH. NASA HQ MC 67-5989 3/13/67 FIGURE 21 PAGENO="0059" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 55 physiological and psychological studies of man for extended periods in space be conducted and these experiments would be useful in predict- ing man's performance in interplanetary flight. In the Apollo Appli- cations program the first objective as shown previously on figure 18 (MC67-5412) is to determine the usefulness of man in space and further, the PSAC recommendation ties in with our objective to perform longer duration flight as well as experiments. Second, they believe as we do that the orbital workshop experiment should proceed. This will be covered during the Apollo Applications presentation as part of the alternate Apollo Applications mission planning. The third recommendation in this category is that a study be made of the suitability, cost, and availability of Titan III Manned Orbiting Laboratory systems for biomedical studies of man for periods up to 60 days (fig. 22, MLGG-9'T87). Last year in my presentation covering the experiments program we mentioned the fact the Department of Defense does participate in the Manned Space Flight Experiments Board and as shown on the chart on the right they are continuing to participate. In addition, the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board is familiar to the members of the committee and does take such studies under its consideration and is continuing to study this area. Similarly, the fourth recommendation is the use of the MOL pro- gram as a source of data on capabilities of man for missions lasting 14 to 30 days. This, too, is tied in with the function of the Manned MSF EXPERIMENT PROCEDURE DEFINITION III.~O~IIII1 E~SA OMSF OART SUBMISSION EMANNED SPACE FLIGHT EXPERIMENTS BOARD 1 RECOMMENDATION L (MS~FEB) J APPROVAL ç[I~SF L~1 IMPLEMENTATION MOL ~i~Ii~J APOLLO AAP NASA HA MLB69181 111566 FIGuRE 22 PAGENO="0060" 56 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Space Flight Experiment Board which is, as I mentioned, jointly chaired by the Department of Defense and the other associate admin- istrators of the NASA program offices. The fifth recommendation relating to biomedical studies during ex- tended flights of 100 days or more and determining the most effective and economical approach to this activity is carried out in the Apollo Applications plans through the orbital workshop-an embryonic space station that I mentioned during the full committee hearings, and which I will cover in more detail under Apollo Applications. With this mission and subsequent flights, we would be revisiting this equip- ment in orbit as shown on the third objective of the Apollo Applica- tions program. Revisiting the cluster in orbit with a resupply of expendables and crew would be, in effect, making the first reuse of hardware which we consider the most economical approach at this time. It is our present thinking that through th~ reuse of hardware placed in orbit and through the extension of long duration flight to 28, 56, and upwards to 180 days and then a full year duration we gain the most cost effective utilization of space equipments. The next recommendation of the PSAC report covers Space Appli- cations-Manned and Unmanned (fig. 23, MC67-5991). The first PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT FEBRUARY, 1967 RECOMMENDATI ONS AFFECTING MANNED SPACE FLIGHT APOLLO APPLICATIONS PLANS SPACE APPLICATIONS - MANNED AND UNMANNED WHETHER SPACE APPLICATION SYSTEMS ARE MANNED OR UNMANNED MUST BE ASSESSED. BEFORE MANNED EARTH RESOURCES SURVEY IS INCLUDED IN THE APOLLO APPLICATIONS PROGRAM, DETAILED COST-BENEFIT STUDIES BE COMPLETED WHICH TREAT MANNED VERSUS UNMANNED METHODS FOR ACCOMPLISHING THESE TASKS. THAT A CAREFUL EXAMINATION BE MADE OF THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF MAN IN THE WEATHER SATELLITE PROGRAMS. IN LINE WITH AAP MAJOR OBJECTIVE - DETERMINE USEFULNESS OF MAN IN SPACE IN LINE WITH AAP MAJOR OBJECTIVE - DETERMINE USEFULNESS OF MAN IN SPACE IN LINE WITH AAP MAJOR OBJECTIVE - DETERMINE USEFULNESS OF MAN IN SPACE NASA HQ MC 67-5991 3/13/67 FIGuRE 23 PAGENO="0061" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 57 recommendation under this category considers that an assessment must be made of whether space applications should be manned or un- manned. I believe that this area probably requires some clarification. There appears to be some confusion with respect to the applications program of NASA and the Apollo Applications program. Mr. Jaffe presented to the full committee the applications program of NASA. Under the Office of Space Sciences and Applications, he is heading an overall NASA program to define applications in space regardless of the manned or unmanned aspect which in all instances requires select- ing the most effective and economical means of getting the greatest return on our investment. The Apollo Applications program is one element of this overall ap- plications plan. In the Apollo Applications program there will be a capability for utilizing the launch vehicles and the spacecraft in un- manned as well as manned modes. We in Manned Space Flight are principally concerned with the manned aspect of the Apollo Applica- tions program. As I have mentioned, however, the equipment de- veloped under Apollo can be used in many areas. In any event, this PSAC recommendation is being met initially by one of the major objectives of AAP to determine how useful man is in space and in what activities will his capabilities best be utilized. The second recorrunendation covers the cost-benefit studies neces- sary to an applications program for earth resources prior to inclusion in the Apollo Applications program. This also ties in with the first objective of Apollo Applications. Further, this particular aspect is one of the considerations that has led NASA to initiate a Practical Application symposium. The third recommendation in the category of space applications is that a careful examination be made of the potential role of man in the weather satellite programs. This, too, is in line with the objectives of the Apollo Applications program and further is an area of con- siderable study by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Environmental Science Services Administration (ESSA). They are conducting studies of promising ways in which future manned and unmanned plat- forms might be used in assisting ESSA to ca.rry forward their mis- sion responsibilities. The last area where we feel the recommendatioi~s of the PSAC re- port have a direct effect on the Manned Space Flight program is the area shown on this chart-Post Apollo Production Rates for the Saturn V, Apollo Spacecraft Modules, and Uprated Saturn I (fig. 24, MC(VT-5992) In their report PSAO recommended a Saturn V pro- duction rate of four per year. As shown the Apollo Applications pro- gram planned rate is four per year. Secondly, they recommend a production of a minimum number of uprated Saturn I vehicles and we have established a production rate on the Apollo Applications program which we consider is the minimum level of effort to maintain this capability and it is for an average of four per year. Thirdly, the study of the feasibility of four-man and six-man Apollo Command Module ferry systems is one of the follow-on mission ob- jectives of the Apollo Applications program, that is, this conversion can result from developing a land-landing capability by modifying PAGENO="0062" POST-APOLLO PRODUCTION RATES FOR THE SATURN V, APOLLO SPACE- CRAFT MODULES, AND UPRATED SATURN I \~ 1. SATURN V PRODUCTION - 1. AAP PLANNED RATE IS FOUR PER YEAR FOUR PER YEAR 2 PRODUCTION OF MINIMUM 2 AAP PLANNED RATE IS NUMBER UPRATED SATURN I FOUR PER YEAR VEHICLES 3 (a) STUDY FEASIBILITY OF A FOUR-MAN AND SIX-MAN APOLLO COMMAND MODULE FERRY-SYSTEM (b) COMPARATIVE STUDY OF APOLLO COMMAND MODULE LAUNCHED BY AN UPRATED SATURN I BOOSTER OR BY A TITAN III-M BOOSTER. FIGURE 24 the Apollo Command Module, thus leading to a four man or six man configuration Additionally, under that recommendation, PSAC sug gests a comparative study of the Apollo Command Module launched by an uprated Saturn I booster and a Titan hIM booster. Studies of this natur~ are underway and have been for some time before the Astronautics and Aeronautics Coordinating Board (AACB) and will be continued in the future. I believe that in the total analysis of the PSAC recommendations and the planning done for Apollo Applications in our advanced mis sion planning, that there is a considerable degree of congruence be tween our recommendations to the Congress and those of the PSAC to the President Under the present tight budgetary limitations placed on NASA and Manned Space Flight, we are not able to meet all the recommendations of the PSAC and in some instances we are not able to carry them quite as far as they recommend However, on balance, we feel that we have submitted to the Congress a pro gram which will maintain a vigorous progress in space while pro viding worthwhile benefits in the several areas recommended by PSAC, although on a somewhat austere basis In concluding these introductary remarks, I would like to again go back to my presentation before the full committee and cite some 58 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT FEBRUARY, 1961 RECOMMENDATIONS AFFECTI NC APOLLO APPLI CATIONS MANNED SPACE FLIGHT PLANS 3. (a)FOLLOW ON MISSION OBJECTIVE (b)AACB JURISDICTION NASA HQ MC 67-5992 3/13/67 PAGENO="0063" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 59 reasons why the Manned Space Flight program merits your support at this time (fig. 25, MCG7-5971). There are points shown on this chart which I consider significant and worthy of some short discus- sion. First, through your support of the Manned Space Flight pro- gram, we will maintain the `orderly pace of our progress in the space age at a time when there may `be o~portuniti.es to move ahead of the Soviets in space achievement. It will guard against the possibility of technological "surprise" by supporting the continued advance of an industrial technology. I would like to digress at this point to show you an outstanding example of this advancement in industrial technology which has evolved from the Manned Space Flight program-from the Gemini and more significantly from the Apollo developments. Figure 26, (MC67-5987) shows a young lady standing with a console which. is called a Powercel Model 1OA. This is a natural gas fuel cell power- plant being developed by Pratt-Whitney Aircraft. It provides more than 3,750 watts of electrical power. This air-cooled unit operates silently and has clean exhaust products, that is, carbon dioxide and water. Pratt-Whitney Aircraft has' delivered a unit of this type to a commercial gas distributor, for research and investigation of fuel cell REASONS TO SUPPORT MANNED SPACE FLIGHT PROGRAM * MAINTAIN ORDERLY PACE OF OUR PROGRESS * GUARD AGAINST TECHNOLOGICAL "SURPRISE" * MAINTAIN COMPETITIVE POSITION IN THE WORLD MARKET PLACE * SUPPORT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT VITAL TO SECURITY * AVOID DISSIPATION OF SPACE CAPABILITY * HOLD OPPORTUNITY TO RETURN DIRECT BENEFITS TO MAN * TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXPANSION OF KNOWLEDGE * PROVIDE THE MEANS TO MEET THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE AT MODEST COST * PROVIDE THE CAPABILITY TO EXPAND OUR SPACE ACTIVITY IF INTERNATIONAL SITUATION SHOULD CHANGE NASA HQ MC67-5971 3-7-67 FIGURE 25 PAGENO="0064" 60 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGuRE 26 operating characteristics for household use. Jointly the Pratt- Whitney Corp. and 25 gas companies have invested about $26 million into the development and marketing of power cells. The forcing func- tion which is permitting the development of this equipment as a marketable household item was the Apollo fuel cell which supplies the electrical j~ower and drinking water for the Apollo Command Module. This unit, which is an innovation of the Apollo fuel cell technology, is a self-contained system that may provide heat, air conditioning, and electrical power for homes at a higher efficiency than conventional sys- tems while at the same time eliminating much of the air pollution re- suiting from power generation and home heating. Additionally, it would provide a system that would not be subjected to the conditions that developed in the New York area last year. The next chart (fig. 27, MC67-5986) shows the relative efficiencies of fuel cell in comparison to a gasoline generator, a diesel generator, and a steam turbine generator system. As you can see the fuel cell is con- siderably more efficient in the production of electrical power. It has been estimated that if this fuel cell project is successful, then they see themselves marketing this product for homes in about 9 years. They feel that no new distribution lines will be needed to carry the extra gas to the homes because only a 20-percent increase in usage would be in- volved, an amount which they claim can be easily accommodated with PAGENO="0065" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 61 POWER SYSTEM EFFICIENCY RELATIONSHIPS SIZE EFFICIENCY RELATIONSHIP - ~ 10 100 1000 10.000 100.000 POWER OUTPUT- KILOWATTS COMPETITIVE POWER SYSTEM EFFICIENCY PROJECTION 20 EFFICIENCY-28 OF SPECIFIC 16 - SPECIFIC VOLUME 12 VOLUME 70 5KW FUEL CELL 0 - - _I L_ - - 962 66 YEAR 2 -- BOILER STEAM * 250 FUEL 40 PROJECTION 200 EFFICIENCY-00 - _t.:> ~ ~ GENERATOR OF SPECIFIC 50 - -, DIESEL h11\~_) 30 SPECIFIC WEIGHT 100 L_____~L«= GENERATOR WEIGHT LB KS GASO - 5KW FUEL CELL 1966 65581012 LINK GENERATOR 18 YEAR NASA HQ MC67-5986 3-10-67 FIGURE 27 the present system. I feel that the committee would be interested in this technology transfer from the space program, particularly in the light of advancing industrial technology and forming new markets for the civilian economy, which in the final analysis is the base of our economic posture. Going on with the reasons (see fig. 25, M06'T-5971) for supporting Manned Space Flight at this time-it will maintain the forward mo- mentum that space technology has given our competitive position and the world marketplace through research and development for our in- dustrial technology. Here again, the example I have just cited is significant. Further, the MSF program will support the broad base of research and development vital to our security as a nation. It will take advantage of the tremendous opportunities for expan- sion of knowledge at a time when space-based astronomy and explora- tion embracing the whole field of space science show promise of break- ing through into an era of real discovery. It will provide the means to meet the challenge of the future in space at a relatively modest cost as measured against a percentage of gross iational product. The peak was in fiscal year 1966 when NASA ex- 76-265 0-67-pt. 2---5 PAGENO="0066" 62 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION penditures totaled eighty-three hundredths of 1 percent of the gross national product. In the current fiscal year they are about seven-tenths of 1 percent. In the budget proposed for FY 1968 the total would be about sixty-six hundredths of 1 percent. And finally it will provide the capability to expand our space activ- ity if the international situation should change. The resulting stabil- izing benefits would thus be insured because this proposed program would keep the space team together and in a position to respond to economic developments on the national scene. A recent article in Fortune magazine of March 1967, titled "U.S. Economy Enters a New Era" which discusses the need for economics stimuli, states- That the great boom has come to an end and the performance is not likely to be matched in the next few years. rfhis article brings out important areas related to the space activity. The article shows that national defense, space, and other Federal purchases represent a narrow segment of the total gross national product. Sigmficantly, the article indicates that in an economy so big and so dynamic many possibilities are open for stimulation. It indicates that- Technological innovations favor the kind of investment that results in the introduction of new products that may enlarge consumer demand. Many new consumer products only displace other products, but now and then a product comes along like that creates demand which wasn't there before. Such con- sumer products, in turn, engender new capital investment to make and market them. Looking ahead beyond 5 years to the middle seventies, :the article goes on to state, it is possible to discern potentialities for invigoi ated demand in accelerated growth-the evolution of new technologies and new ways of thinking systematically about the future will result in, among other things an increase in overall economic efficiency, `u~ array of products novel enough to create new demand for both pro ducer and consumer goods, and an improved capacity to translate social aspirations into effective action It further states that- It takes time to move from technological innovations to marketable new products and it takes time also for new ways of thinking * * * During the next several years some of the most important new products will not be counted in the national income and product tabulations. `These new products' will be the new concepts plans and formulations that will gradually diminish the ga between our aspirations to achieve a greater society and our dimmed notions o how to achie~ e it or even of what it will be like when we do Yet space is a perfect example of Government funding which set the pace of technology. However, as the article states: That although the space purchases came to around $6 billion last year, thai with the Apollo development costs pa at their peak they will be declining in tlu next couple of years. (The complete prepared statement of. George E. Mueller follows:) PAGENO="0067" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 63 PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEORGE E. MUELLER, ASSOCIATE ADMIN- ISTRATOR FOR MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION CONTENTS Page Apollo Program 65 Introduction 65 AS-204 Accident 66 Efforts Resulting From AS-204 Fire 66 Program Progress 68 Mission Objectives 68 Program Phasing 68 Flight Mission Timetable 69 Apollo/Saturn I Missions 70 AS-201 Unmanned Flight 70 AS-203 Unmanned Flight 70 AS-202 Unmanned Flight 70 Loss of Apollo/Saturn 204 73 Work of Apollo 204 Review Board 73 Phases of Fire 74 Reevaluation and Redesign Effort 75 Lunar Module Flight Test (Unmanned) 78 Apollo/Saturn I Manned Flights 78 Dual Mission Flights 79 Apollo/Saturn V Unmanned Missions 79 Schedule Adjustments 79 AS-50i/2 Unmanned Missions 80 Apollo/Saturn V Manned Missions 80 Program Hardware and Software 81 Review of Design and Implementation in Light of the AS-204 Accident 82 Procedures 82 Electrical System 82 Communications System 82 Fire Detection 83 Fire Extinguishing 83 Cabin Materials 84 Objectives 84 Relative Propagation Rates Classes of Materials 86 Spacecraft Atmosphere 87 Pad Operations 87 Launch Phase 87 Space Flight 88 Reentry 88 Emergency Egress 88 Environmental Control System 91 Hardware Development 92 Uprated Saturn I Launch Vehicle 92 1st Stage 92 2nd Stage 93 Instrument Unit 93 Saturn V Launch Vehicle 94 500-F Facilities Checkout Vehicle 94 1st Stage 94 lndStage 97 3rd Stage 97 Saturn Launch Vehicle Engines 99 H-i Engine 99 1-2 Engine 99 F-i Engine 101 Apollo Spacecraft 101 Adapter Section 102 Lunar Module 102 Command and Service Module Development 104 Stress Corrosion of Titanium Propellant Tanks 104 Environmental Control Unit los Lunar Module Development 105 Landing Radar los Engines 105 Weight of Lunar Module 105 Checkout, Test, and Launch Operation Facilities 105 Launch Vehicle Checkout Facilities 105 Michoud Assembly Facility 105 Mississippi Test Facility 107 Seal Beach, California 107 Huntsville, Alabama 107 Spacecraft Factory Checkout Facilities 107 Command and Service Module Checkout 107 Lunar Module Checkout 108 Spacecraft Checkout Facilities at KSC 108 PAGENO="0068" 64 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION CONTENTS-Continued Apollo Program-Continued Checkout, Test, and Launch Operation Facilities-Continued Pagc Launch Operation Facilities 108 Launch Complex 34/37 108 Launch Complex 39 108 Software 110 Launch Operations 110 Training of Personnel 110 Checkout Systems 112 Computer Programs 112 Swing Arms 112 Launch Complex 39 Liquid Oxygen Propellant System 113 Reliability and Quality Assurance 113 Apollo Management 114 Baseline Management Concept 114 Reviews 114 Data Management 115 Automated Data Management Information System 115 Automated Document Distribution Control System 115 Data Costing, Accounting and Reductions 115 Configuration Management 116 Logistics 116 Agreement Regarding Propellants and Pressurants 117 Transportation 117 Marine Transportation 117 Air Transport 117 Experiments 118 Resources 120 Summary 122 Apollo Applications Program 122 Introduction 122 Background 123 Prospects 123 Objectives 125 Reuse of Hardware and Long Duration Flight 125 Extended Lunar Exploration 126 Apollo Applications Missions 126 Alternate and Follow-On Categories 126 Alternate Missions 127 Lunar Mapping and Survey System Test 127 Orbital Workshop 128 Advantages of Orbital Workshop 130 Orbital Workshop Experiments 130 Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) Experiment 130 Apollo Applications Alternate Missions Operations 134 Follow-On Missions 134 Long Duration Flight Capability 138 Land Landing Capability 140 Increased Astronaut Accommodations 142 Life Sciences Experiments 142 Weightlessness 142 Earth-Oriented Applications 143 Meteorology 143 Economic Value of Improved Forecasting 144 Earth Resources 144 Agriculture and Forestry Resources 144 Geology and Mineral Resources 144 Geography, Cartography, and Cultural Resources 144 Hydrology and Water Resources 145 Oceanography 145 Political and Social Benefits 145 Communications and Navigation Experiments 145 AstronomyandSpacePhysicsObservations 147 Orbiting Optical Telescope 147 Space Physics Experiments 147 Technology Experiments 147 Follow-On Lunar Exploration Missions 148 Biology 148 Geology 151 Geochemistry 151 Geophysics 151 Geodesy/Cartography 152 Astronomy 152 Lunar Physics 153 Timing of Apollo Applications Program 153 Summary 155 MissionOperations 156 A Year Of Initial Flight Test 156 Software Programs 15 Interface Checkout Problems 1 Manned Space Flight Network 15 Ground Stations 15 Communication Satellites - 16 ShipsandAircraft 16 Recovery Force 16 Operational Constraints 16 PAGENO="0069" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 65 CONTENTS-Continued Page Advanced Manned Missions. .... Introduction -- - - 165 Basic Objectives Unchanged MSF Program Evolution-Baseline Program 166 Manned Space Station 166 Manned Planetary Missions 168 Manned Lunar Exploration 166 Hardware for Advanced Missions -. 168 Step-By-Step Program Decisions 168 Earth Orbital Missions Primary Objectives 168 Mission Requirements - -- - -- - 168 Manned Earth Orbital Telescope 170 Space ~tation Alternatives. 171 Orbital Workshop~.. 172 Ferry/Logistics Concepts 173 Planetary Missions 173 Manned Mars/Venus Reconnaissance Missions 174 Mission Opportunities 174 Mission Description and Scientific Return 175 Manned Mars Landing 178 Future Manned Planetary Mission Studies 178 Lunar Missions 179 Study Objectives 179 Support for Scientific Goals 179 Evolution of Lunar Exploration Program 179 Apollo Applications Missions 179 Mobile Lunar Exploration 180 Expected Planning 183 Flight Vehicles 183 Saturn Systems TJprating/Improvement 183 Operations Support 183 Advanced VehF'le Systems . .. .. 184 Summary~ 185 Manned Space Flight Funding Requirements . 185 Research and Development 186 Apollo Program 186 Spacecraft .. -- 187 Command and Service Modules . 187 Lunar Modules 188 Guidance and Navigation .. . - - . - 188 Integration, Reliability, and Checkout -. 189 Spacecraft Support 189 Uprated Saturn I .. - 189 Stages (S-lB and S-IVB) 190 Instrument Unit - - - 190 Ground Support Equipment 191 H-landl-2Engines 191, Vehicle Support 191 Saturn V 191 1st Stage (S-IC) 191 2nd Stage (S-I!) 193 3rd Stage (S-IVB) 193 Instrument Unit 193 Ground Support Equipment - . 194 F-I and 1-2 Engines 194 Vehicle Support 194 Engine Development and Mission Support 194 Apollo Applications - 195 Space Vehicles 197 Experiments and Mission SupporL 198 Experiments 198 Mission Support 199 AdvancedMissions. 199 Conclusion 200 APolLo PROGRAM INTRODUCTION In the Apollo program (fig. 1, MAO6-9411), three Apollo/Saturn missions were successfully flown in 1966. We have experienced difficulties which we must expect when working, as we are, at the far edge of today's technology. We have been relatively successful in taking management actions to overcome these obstacles. However, the tragic accident of January 27, 1967, which took the lives of the three Apollo 204 astronauts, confronted us with a situation that eclipsed in severity any difficulties we have experienced to date in the program. As Mr. Webb mentioned to you on February 28, I will today discuss the pattern of work that we are undertaking as a result of the Apollo 204 accident. PAGENO="0070" FIGuRE 1 A~-2O4 accident The fire in the Apollo spacecraft cabin occurred under conditions and using procedures which had been verified by 7 years of manned spacecraft operational experience Standards of design manufacture test and operations which have been developed over the years had demonstrated that the possibility of a fire in the spacecraft cabin was remote. This background led to our considering this type of test as nonhazardous. The fire proves the approach we had been using of preventing fires by preventing their ignition is inadequate. We are intro- ducing a three prong approach to the prevention of fire in the future (fig 2 MC67-5961) We will continue to minimize the poss~,bility of ignition but will recognize that this possibility will always exist. We will take steps to limit and insofar as possible, eliminate the chance of a fire propagating once it is started and finally, we will arrange to minimize the consequences of a fire to the crew. Efforts resulting from A~-2O4 flrc The Apollo organization of government, industry and universities has devoted all applicable talent and resources to matters arising from the AS-204 fire since it occurred In our work we have given highest priority to supporting the Apollo AS-204 Review Board in its investigation. We have concurrently under- taken analyses and design studies with the objective of identifying such changes in design or procedure as are necessary to assure a satisfactory solution of the fire hazard problem. The work we are doing is in five general areas (fig. 3, MC67-5938). First, there is support of the Board in understanding the causes of the AS-204 fire and its propagation Second we are simulating the various phases of the fire through materials test, boilerplate ground tests and special experiments. Third, we are reviewing the Apollo design and im.plementatipn in light of the knowledge we have gained from the fire. This effort includes a review of all of our procedures to insure a reevaluation from a safety standpoint as well as a reevaluation of 66 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION PAGENO="0071" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 67 APPROACH IGNITiON * REDUCE PROBABILITY - CANNOT ABSOLUTELY ELIMINATE * AREAS OF INVESTIGATION * MATERIALS * ELECTRICAL * QUALITY PROPAGATION * SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE - POSSIBLY ELIMINATE * AREAS OF INVESTIGATION * MATERIALS LAYOUT * CONFIGURATION CONTROL CONSEQUENCE * AFFECTED BY * MATERIALS * CREW PROTECTION * FIRE DETECTION * FIRE EXTINGUISHER * ESCAPE PROVISIONS PROCEDURES NASA HQTRS. 1~C67-5961 FIGURE 2 LINE OF ACTION * UNDERSTAND THE AS-204 FIRE * IGNITION SOURCES * FIRE PROPAGATION * SIMULATE PHASES OF FIRE * MATERIAL TESTS * BOILER PLATE GROUND TESTS * SPECIAL EXPERIMENTS * REVIEW APOLLO DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION IN LIGHT OF FIRE * MAKE NECESSARY CHANGES * DESIGN * PROCEDURES * EVALUATE REDESIGN * MATERIAL TESTS * BOILER PLATE GROUND TESTS * SPECIAL EXPERIMENTS NASA HQ MC67-5938 3-1-67 FIGURE 3 PAGENO="0072" 68 1 9 6 8 NASA AUTHORIZATION electrical power systems and cabling, communication systems, related specifica- tions and qualification requirements, and quality control and inspection stand- ards. The fourth area is the conduct of those designs and analyses that will implement changes identified by the Beard and by our own review. . Finally, we will need to evaluate the new designs and the new procedures to be sure that they are sound. Specific actions, which 1 will cover in detail later, are jeing taken in fire detection, fire extinguishing, materials, cabin configuration, emergency egress, spacecraft atmospheres, and environmental control systems. PROGRAM PROGRESS Apollo/Saturn missions, ground testing at the Manned Spacecraft Center, the demonstration of the launch complex at Kennedy Space Center, and other events give us encouragement. The difficulties we have encountered in unmanned ground testing, though disappointing, yield engineering knowledge to the pro- gram. The many successes of 1966 and our capacity to react to expected obstacles demonstrate the overall stability of the program. This stability rests upon our program objectives, unchanged since 1963 when they were first defined. The operational accomplishments of the Gemini program during 1966 have contributed considerably to our prime objectives of attaining United States leadership in manned space flight. The Apollo program is prepar- ing to advance this objective as we move toward the lunar missions which will demonstrate a new level of manned space flight capability. MISSION OBJECTIVES Program pleasing The basic logic of our flight program incorporates seven major phases for the Apollo/Saturn flight schedule. This plan employs both the uprated. Saturn I launch vehicle and the Saturn V (fig. 4, MC66-1O,262) . The sequence of the I & CSM LM CSM LONG CSM-LM DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT ~ OPERATIONS LUNAR LUNAR L V & S C MISSION LANDING DEVELOP E I SIMULATION MISSIONS NAt H ~ M~ ` ~ W REV. 2~I5 67 FIGURE 4 PAGENO="0073" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 69 manned Command-Service Module flights and Lunar Module development flights on the uprated Saturn I launch vehicle has now been adjusted in the light of recent events. The first Apollo/Saturn I program phase included unmanned launch vehicle and Command-Service Module flights and was completed with the successful AS-202 mission in August 1966. Remaining phases include unmanned Lunar Module development, manned Command-Service Module long duration operations, and manned missions involving orbital operation of the Command-Service Module with the Lunar Module. This last phase was planned to utilize uprated Saturn I vehicles in dual launches. All of the Apollo/Saturn I flights are limited to low earth orbits. The first Saturn V phase consists of unmanned launch vehicle and spacecraft development flights. Manned lunar mission simulation flights with the Apollo Saturn V are the next to last phase of the program. The Apollo flight prograni will continue in the Apollo/Saturn V missions achieving manned lunar landing and return. Flight mission timetable To accomplish the manned lunar landing before the end of 1969, we established some time ago, a timetable for carrying out each of the flight mission phases (fig. 5, MC65-5185). Changes to the Apollo/Saturn schedule within these mile- stones were announced in November 1966 as the result of certain launch ve- hicle and spacecraft development difficulties. Because of the spacecraft fire in January 1967, the schedule was further modified in February 1967 (fig. 6, MC67-5782). We plan to continue with the three unmanned launches-AS-206, 501, and 502- scheduled for 1967. AS-206 will be an unmanned qualification of the Lunar Module, while AS-501 and AS-502 will be unmanned qualification flights for the Saturn V launch vehicle and Com~nand and Service Modules. Manned flights, however, scheduled to begin in 1967, are under study and will be adjusted as necessary after the findings of the Apollo 204 Board have been assessed. MAJOR MSF MILESTONES GEMINI 1964 - 1ST GEMINI FLIGHT 1965- 1ST GEMINI MANNED FLIGHT 1966- 1ST GEMINI RENDEZVOUS FLIGHT 1967 GEMINI OPERATIONS APOLLO 1966 . 1ST APOLLO UPRATED SAT I UNMANNED FLIGHT 1967 . 1ST APOLLO UPRATED SATURN I MANNED FLIGHT 1967- 1ST APOLLO SATURN V UNMANNED FLIGHT 1968 - 1ST APOLLO SATURN V MANNED FLIGHT 1969 - APOLLO OPERATIONS NASA MC65-5~85 1/26/65 FIGURE 5 PAGENO="0074" 70 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION ( SCHEDULE MODIFICATION FEBRUARY 1961 DECISIONS AS 206 UNMANNED LM AS 501 UNMANNED 1/V QUALIFICATION AS 502 BIK II HEAT SHIELD QUAL NASA HQ MC-67 5782 2-13-67 FIGURE 6 Apollo/Saturn I mi8sions AS-201 unmanned flight Three Apollo/Saturn I unmanned missions were completed in 1966 (fig. 7, MA66-9805). These unmanned flights were of major significance because the Apollo/Saturn I space vehicle represents a hard-core configuration upon which much of our launch vehicle and spacecraft development and operational tech- niques are based These missions in 1966 represent the beginning of the payoff of the intense ground testing site activation and management system develop ments that have characterized the program The AS-201 space vehicle, comprising the uprated Saturn I launch vehicle and Apollo spacecraft, was successfully flown from Launch Complex 34 at Cape Kennedy on February 26, 1966 (fig. 8, MA66-9105). It was placed on a sub- orbital tra)ectory with flight termination near Ascension Island The purpose of this unmanned development flight test was to obtain information on the structural integrity and compatibility of the launch vehicle and the space- craft and spacecraft heat shield performance during high heat rate entry. AS-203 unmanned flight The second Apollo/Saturn I space vehicle, AS-203, was successfully launched from Launch Complex ~7 at Cape Kennedy on July 5, 1966 (fig. 9, MA66-7663). The threefold purpose of this unmanned mission was to verify the Saturn V upper stage system performance and operation early in the Apollo program; provide technological data pertinent to the behavior and management of liquid hydrogen in earth orbit; and continue development of the space vehicle for manned flights (fig. 10, MCO6-10263). The space vehicle consisted of an operational uprated Saturn I 1st stage and a Saturn I 2nd stage modified to simulate a Saturn V 3rd stage configuration. The 2nd stage was instrumented to obtain data on liquid hydrogen behavior. No spacecraft was flown on this mission The 2nd stage Instrument Unit and nose cone represented the heaviest U.S. satellite ever placed in orbit, with a weight of approximately 58,500 pounds. AS-202 unmanned flight The third Apollo/Saturn I space vehicle, AS-202, was successfully launched from Complex 34 at Cape Kennedy on August 25, 1966 (fig. 11, MA66-9171). This unmanned suborbital flight terminated in recovery of the Command Module in the vicinity of Wake Island in the Pacific The purpose of the mission was to PAGENO="0075" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 71 FIGURE 7 FIGURE 8 PAGENO="0076" 72 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 9 PAGENO="0077" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 73 demonstrate the performance of the space vehicle in preparation for manned orbital missions. The mission provided the determination that the Command Module heat shield was adequately designed for entry from earth orbital missions'. The space vehicle consisted of an uprated Saturn I l~unch vehicle and a Block I Command and Service Module spacecraft with essentially all systems opera- tional. This third and very complex mission was a major milestone in prepara. tion for manned flight. Lo&~ of Apollo/Saturn 204 The success of the first three Apollo/Saturn I missions led to a decision to proceed to the second phase of the program, the Apollo/Saturn 204 manned mission. The flight was scheduled for launch February 21, 1967. As I mentioned earlier, the AS-204 accident occurred under conditions and using procedures which had been verified by 7 years of manned spacecraft opera- tional experience (fig. 12, MC67-5768; fig. 13, MC67-5765). Work of Apollo 204 Review Board Almost immediately, an Apollo 204 Review Board was appointed consisting of the following members: Dr. Floyd L. Tompson, Director, Langley Research Center, NASA, Chairman; Col. Frank Bornian, Astronaut, Manned Spacecraft Center, NASA; Maxime Faget, Director, Engineering & Development, Manned Spacecraft Center, NASA; E. Barton Geer, Associate Chief, Flight Vehicles & Systems Division, Langley Research Center, NASA; Col. Charles F. Strang, Chief of Missiles & Space Safety Division, Air Force Inspector General, Norton Air Force Base, California; George C. White, Jr., Director, Reliability & Quality, Apollo Program Office, Headquarters, NASA; John Williams, Director, Space- craft Operations, Kennedy Space Center, NASA; and Dr. Robert W. Van Dolab, Research Director, Bureau of Mines, ExplosIve Research Center. To assist the Board in its investigation, an undamaged Block I Apollo space- I craft, Command Module 014, was shipped from the contractor plant to the Kennedy Space Center. This spacecraft was employed as a control to establish the conditions existing prior to the accident. Detailed disassembly of the burned FIGURE 11 PAGENO="0078" 74 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION spacecraft and the control spacecraft was undertaken on a parallel, step-by-step basis. In addition to analyses of recorded and physical data and equipment, the Board defined a series of investigative tasks and assigned them to 21 panels for execu- tion. To date more than 1,500 individuals, from nine government agencies and departments in addition to NASA, from 31 industrial groups, and from several universities, have participated in this review and analysis. Phases of fire The Board has not identified the source of ignition. By the time it has com- pleted its final report, it expects to have significantly narrowed the list of igni- tion sources that had a relatively high possibility of contributing to the initiation of a fire, but the possibility exists that no single source will ever be pinpointed. Present evidence indicates that the fire had three distinct phases. The fire originated in the left, or command pilot side, in the front corner of the space- craft, near the floor. It probably burned for several seconds without being noticed by the crew or recorded on instrumentation. Because it was below the couch level it was not visible a!t this stage. The fire spread and fed on nylon netting (installed to prevent objects from floating into equipment crevices while in zero g), Velcro fastening material (used to fasten equipment to the space- craft interior), and the Environmental Control Unit insulation. The cabin pressure began to rise rapidly as the atmosphere became heated reaching an internal pressure estimated at 36 pounds per square inch, and the sealed cabin ruptured. With the rupture of the cabin and the rush of flame and gas outside, the oxygen content of the cabin atmosphere was quickly reduced and the fire smoked heavily, laying a film of soot on many interior surfaces. This final phase of the fire was also characterized by continued localized burning. The environmental control system uses a water/glycol coolant that leaked from burnt or burst pipes. Both high and low pressure oxygen lines were connected with solder joints that FIGURE 12 PAGENO="0079" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 75 fail at temperatures below 400° F. The glycol mixture from the cooling system, acting as a fuel and supported by the flowing oxygen from the failed lines, caused continued hot burning in the left corner and melted a large hole in the floor there. Reeva~uation~ and redesign effort The work of the Board will continue as the burned spacecraft and the 014 control spacecraft are carefully disassembled. In the meantime our review and reevaluation of decisions is paralleling the work of the Board. I would like to outline ~nme of the salient features of this effort. In particular, we are initiating actions to be responsive to each of the pre- liminary recommendations of `the Apollo AS-204 Review Board. In this regard, we are taking steps to apply certain newly developed materials which are non- flammable in every possible place in the spacecraft. The non-metallic materials will be arranged `so as to maintain fire breaks and the systems that contain oxygen and liquid combustibles will be made more fire and heat resistant. This new cabin configuration will be verified by full boilerplate flame tests. A new hatch is now being designed. Emergency procedures throughout the program are be- ing revised to recognize the possibility 0f cabin fire. A comprehensive review of the specification, design, and qualification of spacecraft systems is under way. Studies of the tradeoffs between one and two gas atmospheres as well as studies of means to implement the Board recommendation for the elimination of pure oxygen at atmospheric pressures in prelaunch operations are under way. You recognize, I am sure, that it will `take time to complete the review and carry through the new designs to a point where proper decisions can be made. The work of the program is directed at a point where we can have sufficient in- formation and test results to make the right set of decisions, which will provide a sound basis upon which to continue the orderly execution of the Apollo program. PAGENO="0080" 76 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION There is intense activity in progress throughout the Apollo program organiza- tion to determine the specific actions required to correct conditions which could have contributed to the AS-204 fire. Engineering design, procurement and fabrication are under way in many areas, in others we are still making studies to determine the best course of action to take. As we have frequently stated before this Committee, crew safety is the prin- cipal consideration in scheduling manned space flight missions. We have never taken any step, either to save time or to save money, If that step would imperil the astronauts. We will continue to be guided by this overriding principle. We plan to continue spacecraft manufacturing and checkout except that which in- volves checkout in a pure oxygen atmosphere in the spacecraft. We have a block concept in the Apollo program and we intend to stay with it. That means that we ir~troduce those things in the first Block II spacecraft that we expect to have at the end of Block II. The firbt Block II spacecraft Command and Service Module, number 101, is the next spacecraft in the line at the North American Aviation plant at Downey, Calif. We plan to incorporate in spacecraft 101 all changes determined to be necessary as the result of the findings of the investigation of this accident. Meanwhile, we plan to continue the manufacturing and checkout of space- craft 101, since the review thus far indicates that most of the spacecraft systems are adequate for safety; thus they will not require changes. We expect to gain valuable experience in this first use of the operational checkout procedures for Block II spacecraft. In parallel with this continued checkout of spacecraft 101 we will be carrying out the studies, tests and designs which I mentioned earlier. We believe that by early April the results of such studies, tests and designs, taken together with the findings and recommendations of the AS-204 Review Board, will permit us to make decisions on specific configuration and procedural changes. These decisions and the designs so developed will then be the basis for fabrication of such parts and subsystems as may be required. As the necessary parts and subsystems become available we will progress through a period of rework and inspection. Whatever changes may be involved will be made on spacecraft 101 (fig. 14, MC67-~5937). How long this change implementation period will take cannot be determined at this time, but we expect to be able to make reasonable estimates early in April. PROGRAM PLAN CSM 2 TV-i FACTORY CHECKOUT COMPLETIONS~ REWORK ) REVERIFY HOUStON CHECKOUTI THERM VAC CSM 101 FACTORY CHECKOUT COMPLETION~ WORK PERIOD & INSPECTIOd RERUN FACTORY C/O] KSC ACTIVITY I U 4 1 I 23 MOS. 3/~ MOS. MAR. 31 NASA ACCEPT & SHIP CH DESIGN DETAIUNG CONFIGURATION I~ -~---4-6WEEKS (PARTS & SUB1~t) FABRICATION / [REQUALIFICATION&SPECIAL ~ 3 ~ CSM 011 ~ L CSM 020 MATERIALS STUDIES I FLAME PROPOGATION TESTS ~ VERIFY REDESIGN SPECIAL TESTS1 NASA HQ MC67-5937 3-1-67 FIGURE 14 PAGENO="0081" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 77 Following the change period, spacecraft 101 will then again undergo checkout. With the experience gained in the current checkout we might expect this to proceed smoothly and to require from. two to three months. Following checkout of spacecraft 101, we plan to conduct the normal contract acceptance readiness review. The spacecraft will then be shipped to the Kennedy Space Center where it will undergo approximately four months of preparation, test and checkout prior to launch. In parallel with the design and configuration decisions we must also decide ~`i.rhich items will require requalification and what special tests must be con- ducted. Involved here is the normal program function of allocating units to flight spacecraft versus ground test and qualification test. To perform any unmanned flight tests that we may determine to be necessary, we have two spacecraft, numbers 017 and 020, which are scheduled for the first two Saturn V flights. We are planning to conduct these unmanned flights this year-to flight test the launch vehicle, to evaluate the performance of the spacecraft heat shield and to verify the spacecraft in orbital flight. These missions will afford the opportunity to flight test those changes that affect flight safety that may be made in procedures or hardware. For ground test of spacecraft changes we have the 2TV-1, that is the thermal vacuum test article for Block II spacecraft. This test article, like spacecraft 101, is currently progressing through an initial series of operational checkout procedures. This article will be delivered to the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston for the overall ground qualification of the Block II spacecraft. We plan that it will also be reworked and reverified before delivery to Houston for checkout and thermal vacuum tests, which are required to be successfully com- pleted prior to launch of a manned Block II spacecraft. This, then, is our current plan with respect to the Block II spacecraft. The impact on the first manned launch cannot be stated until we have determined the time required for rework and requalification. It is quite possible that we will experience some impact also in our Lunar Module development program (fig. 15 MC67-5939). We have deferred detailed ACTIONS LUNAR MODULE * EVALUATE IN LiGHT OF AS-204 FIRE * CHANGE AS REQUIRED NASA HQ MC67-5939 3-1-67 FIGURE 15 76-2:65 0-6.7-pt. 2-6 PAGENO="0082" 78 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION consideration of the Lunar Module until a basic understanding of the AS-204 accident could `be developed. We will reevaluate the Lunar Module program in the context of changes in the Command Module and expect to complete this review in the next two months. To support this effort which we will `begin shortly, we have had several representatives of the Lunar Module contractor, Grumman, participating in our studies and design reviews on the Command and Service Modules. More will be included as time goes on. With respect to Lunar Module flight test, we plan to carry out the unmanned fight this year on AS-206. This will be primarily a test of the propulsion systems in orbital flight. LTA-8, the Lunar Module thermimal vacuum test article will be available for ground test of any changes we may find necessary in the Lunar Module configuration. In summary, then, we have a plan for the orderly accomplishment of required actions in the Apollo spacecraft program. We cannot at this time present a schedule of missions beyond the three unmanned launches planned for this year Further definition of our schedules must await decisions yet to be made on the nature and extent of `changes, which in turn will be based on the careful evaluation of the board findings and recommendations as well as the studies and tests now in progress'. We will include in our schedules the time necessary to conduct a thorough program of reverification and requalification of changes The general nature of our requalification will be similar to those we have' con- ducted in the past, modified as appropriate to provide depth in selected areas based on wha't we have learned from the AS-204 accident and on wha't our analyses and tests indicate. Our policy of full qualification prior to manned flight will remain unchanged. , With respect to the overall Apollo program effort we plan to maintain the present orderly pace of effort in the many areas' of current activity, such as launch vehicles facilities ground support software training and so forth Much of our capability to cope with unforeseen difficulties is dependent on maintaining the planned rate of progress in all possible facets of the program This carefully developed planning has enabled us to accommodate previous prob. lems in both the Gemini and Apollo programs, and most importantly, maintains the flexibility that will enable us to schedule our flight opera'tions as necessary to continue our progress in Apollo Lunar Module flight test (unmanned) Turning again to the Apollo program phasing, the next step is the unmanned flight test of the Luna'r Module in low orbit with the upra'ted Saturn I. Ftrmer- ly scheduled to follow the manned Apollo/Saturn I flight, it will now be flown first in view of the deferment cxf the manned flight pending the accident report evaluations. The Lunar Module itself constitutes a major advance in manned spacecraft It is the first manned spacecraft designed to' operate exclusively outside `the earth's atmosphere. We are now reaching the peak of the effort `on the Lunar Module. In our unmanned flight schedule, we will carry out the AS-206 first test flight of the Lunar Module during calendar year 1967. The objective of this flight phase is to verify~that the Lunar Module is ready for manned flight (fig. 16, MC67-5779 fIg 17 MC67-5793) Apollo/saturn I manned flights The manned phase of `the Apollo/Saturn I flights, when rescheduled,, will con- sist of long-duration manned operations of the Command and Service Modules. One objective will be to demonstrate spacecraft and crew operations for missions as long as 14 days. The second is to evaluate performance `of the spacecraft~ hardware in a low earth-orbital environment. These are the same objectives originally planned for the AS-204 mission. Since the operational life o'f the spacecraft subsystems has. not yet been demon- strated in flight, we `have planned all of the manned Apollo missions as open- ended. By this we mean that the mission is' laid out `to consist of a series of decision points at which critical events: occur. The `decision points are separated by periods of continuing activity. Before and after each of these critical events, a complete review of vital systems, expenda'bles! and other aspects of PAGENO="0083" 79 FIGURE 16 mission status is made. Each review leads to a decision, whether to proceed to the next period of continuing activity to an alternate mission or return to earth Dual mi8sion flights In the final phase of flight tests planned for the uprated Saturn I launch ye hide each mission except the last (AS-212) consists of two flights In the dual missions one vehicle carries the manned Command Service Module The second carries the unmanned Lunar Module launched about a day later The objectives are to achieve rendezvous and docking of the two vehicles in earth orbit followed by astronaut transfer to the Lunar Module and manned operatioii to verify its functional capability The astronauts will return to the Command Module to conclude the flight with entry splashdo~ n and recovery Apollo/Saturn V unmanned mzssions In parallel with the Apollo/Saturn I ~e are de% eloping the Apollo/Saturn V launch vehicle which is designed for the lunar missions Two of the three stages are as yet untested in flight The 3rd stage and the Instrument Unit benefit from the experience being gained with these systems in the Saturn I program Schedule adjustments As I mentioned earlier development difficulties caused a revision to the Apollo/Saturn V program schedule in `\ovember 1966 Spacecraft and launch vehicle concerns particularly those connected with the 2nd stage of the Saturn V launch vehicle caused us to adjust the first two Apollo/Saturn V missions The first Saturn V flight an unmanned orbital mission was moved from the first to the second quarter of 1967 The second Saturn ~i flight also unmanned, was rescheduled from the first to the second half of 1967 No rescheduling was re quired by the loss of a Saturn V 3rd stage during test in January 1967 because of the favorable production status of subsequent stages 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION PAGENO="0084" 80 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION A~-5O1/2 unmanned missions Unmanned flights of the Apollo/Saturn V space vehicle will begin with the AS-501 and AS-502 missions (fig. 18, MC6G-10,266A). The main objectives of the unmanned flight phase are to develop the Saturn V space vehicle for manned flight and to demonstrate the adequacy of the Command Module heat protection and other systems for entry into the atmosphere at the speed of lunar return (fig. 19, MC6T-5794; fig. 20, MC67-5795). Apo~o1f~urn V manned missions The next to last phase of the Apollo program will be the use of the Apollo Saturn V space vehicle for manned lunar mission simulations in elliptical earth orbit. In these flights, all phases of a lunar landing mission will be simulated on the same time schedule as the actual mission. Here again, we will be using open-ended flight plans. There are nine periods of continuing activity during a lunar mission in which some time is available for considered review of mission status. They are prelaunch, earth parking orbit, translunar coast, lunar orbit prior to Lunar Module descent, Lunar Module descent, lunar surface stay, Lunar Module ascent, lunar orbit after rendezvous, and transearth coast. In the earth orbital simulation mission all of these periods are available except lunar surface stay. The first attempt at a lunar landing would be scheduled as an open-ended mission in line with previous practice. I have confidence that the mission can be carried out within the approved program of 27 uprated Saturn I and Saturn V vehicles and the associated Apollo spacecraft. Under present planning, 13 of the 15 Saturn V vehicles are to be launched by 1970. I do believe that we still have a reasonable possibility of meeting the major milestones for the Apollo program which were established in 1963. In particular, although the probability is lowered, I believe we will be able to land men on the moon and return them safely to earth before 1970. FIGUBu 17 PAGENO="0085" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 81 FIGURE 18 PROGRAM HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE Space vehicle ground qualificationand certification for flight have been a major Apollo effort during 1966. This extensive qualification and test program is con- ducted to assure that the hardware h~s reached a point of maturity where sub- sequent flight verification tests are likely to be successful. Ground qualification and flight certification for the Apollo Saturn I launch vehicle were completed in 1966 while similar effort for the Saturn V launch vehicle is nearing completion. The spacecraft for the A!S-204 mission had gone through the scheduled ex- haustive test program, beginning with spacecraft subsystem acceptance tests. Further testing was conducted from the time the subsystems had been assembled in the Command Module in March 1966, through a series of integrated tests at the factory ending in August 1966, and continuing at Kennedy Space Center after delivery of the Command Module in August. During the entire fabrication and test program leading toward the scheduled launch of this Apollo spacecraft, a number of Qualification Tests or Certification Test Requirements were completed on the most critical components to ensure the adequacy of the spacecraft for manned flight. All of these test conditions are more exacting than those the spacecraft components would be expected to en- counter during an actual mission. Approximately one-half of the qualification and certification testing for the Block I Command-Service Module is applicable to the Block II configuration. The testing required to complete the certification of the Block II Command- Service Module and Lunar Module is progressing. I would like next to describe the work and the progress of our studies and designs. I will cover our activities in reviewing the Apollo design as well as specific actions being taken in fire detection, fire extinguishing, materials, cabin configuration, emergency egress, spacecraft atmospheres, and environmental con- trol systems. PAGENO="0086" 82 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGuRE 19 REVIEW OF DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION IN LIGHT OF THE AS-204 ACCIDENT Procedures Our procedures have in the past required that each test to be conducted be reviewed from the safety standpoint. We will now ensure that the review as- sume the possibility of fire in the spacecraft cabin and provide for careful iden- tification of hazardous test conditions and establishment of appropriate emer- gency equipment, personnel procedures, and training. We will tighten procedures and safeguards to ensure that materials in the spacecraft cabin are controlled, recognizing the possibility of fire, and that the test configuration of the spacecraft fully take this possibility into account. Finally, we are taking steps to ensure the early availability of procedures so that adequate reviews are carried out. Electrica~ system A reevaluation of the electrical power system and cabling is under way to de- termine whether or not changes of cable design, fabrication and routing will pro- vide greater assurance of protection from damage and therefore improved assur- ance that we havedone all that is practical to minimize potential ignition sources. Communications system The AS-204 accident occurred while the checkout countdown was being held to rectify communications difficulties. While there is no indication that this was directly a factor in the fire it is nevertheless important that the many inter connecting orgamzational elements be able to communicate efficiently at all times We are therefore reviewing all circuits interconnections monitoring and check out procedures to determine whether or not changes are required to improve the total communications system. PAGENO="0087" FIGURE 20 Fire detection Equipment with which to. detect fire in space vehicles has always been a matter of interest; however, suitable detectors with adequate reliability have been diffi- cult to develop. We have made some progress in our continuing development pro- gram and we are now evaluating those developments and also checking with other organizations to determine whether or not we can now incorporate suitable and reliable sensors into the Apollo spacecraft. Fire eajtin~guishing Much work has been done to develop equipment and techniques for extinguish- ing fires in space vehicles. Since the AS-204 fire, we have accelerated our work and have undertaken additional test programs. The extinguishment methods under study and test include chemical extinguish- ing agents, dilution of the oxygen atmosphere with inert gases, cabin depres surization and water sprays. In the fire extinguishmeiit tests to date, it appears that chemical and inert gas extinguishers are ineffective. The gas streams for such extinguishers entrain sufficient oxygen from the spacecraft atmosphere to cause the fire to burn more vigorously rather than to be extinguished. This is true even for such chemicals as bromotrifluorornethane (CF3Bn) which appears to be quite effective for aircraft fires. The tests performed using inert gases such as nitrogen as a dilutant indicate that the turbulence caused by the introduction of the gas causes more intense burning. The most effective fire extinguisher we have found to date is a water spray. On the other hand the detrimental effects of water on electrical equipment to- gether with complexity and weight considerations make the usefulness of this system doubtful. 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 83 PAGENO="0088" 84 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION Additional tests are planned to determine combustion characteristics in simu- lated Command Module interiors. The Command Module for these tests will be a boilerplate spacecraft and will include tests with both present and modified interior arrangements. Special tests have been and are being performed to understand the combustion characteristics of various materials in zero gravity. Test results to date indi- cate that, after ignitian, flames disapear due to lack of convection currents, then reappear when convection is reestablished. We believe that in a spacecraft there will be `sufficient movement of the atmosphere by fans or crew motion so that this cannot be counted on as a reliable method of fire extinguishment. The results of the many `tests run to date have not been encouraging. Addi- tional effort is under way, however, and every possibility is being reexamined. Careful consideration must `be given to the tradeoffs involved. The provision of a limited capability for fire extinguishment at the expense of reduced reliabil- ity and increase in the possibility of a toxic environment must be carefully weighed before any decision is possible. Cabin materials With regard to the materials used and contained in the spacecraft cabin, I would like to summarize why we attach so much significance to materials selec- tion and control. For a fire to exist `there must be an atmosphere containing sufficient oxygen to support combustion; there must be a source of ignition; and there must be combustible materials available to be ignited. As far as the atmosphere is concerned, an atmosphere which will support life will also support combustion. Therefore, the first answer `to the fire hazard problem must be fire prevention in terms of strict control of both potential ignition sources and combustible materials. The fact is now clear that we will not be able to eliminate completely ignition sources in `the cabin. We will continue to take every precaution to minimize possible ignition sources, but we cannot expect perfecton. This means that the remaining technique of fire prevention-materials selection and the control of the geometry of their use-demands our utmost in care and attention. Objectives Our objectives in the selection and use of materials are many. First, we are reviewing the latest developments in material technology so as to replace pc~tentially combustible materials with less flammable or non-flammable materials. Some needs can only be met using potentially flammable materials; the `astronauts' food is an example. However, care must be taken that at every opportunity, materials are `selected which give us `the most fire protection while still satisfying the~basic need. Second, we want to locate materials physically so as to inhibit ignition (fig. 21, MC67-5955). Ordinarily this requires that any potentially combustible mate- rials be kept `some distance `away from possible ignition sources. Third, we want to arrange m'aterials to inhibit fire propagation. This is usually accomplished by assuring physical separation `between small pieces of materials which might be poten'tially combustible. Fourth, we want to store potentially flammable materials in fire resistant containers. Fifth, we want to minimize the amount of potentially combustible materials exposed in the cabin at any one time, either on the ground or in flight. Sixth, we want to exercise rigorous control over the introduction of materials into the cabin during manufacture and test. This includes both flight articles such as the astronauts' spacesuits and non-flight articles., such as test procedures books. We believe we have exercised care in every one of these areas in the past. However, in light of the AS-204 accident, we are reviewing e'ach area to make sure that we are doing everything that we should. I would like to report in more detail on our status in the area of new materials. Relative propagation rates This chart shows the relative propagation rates of nomex, which is the material used in our spacesuits, as compared with two new materials: teflon and fiberglass (fig. 22, MC67-5964). As you can see, the rate of propagation of fire does vary PAGENO="0089" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 85 ACTIONS CABIN CONFIGURATION * ARRANGE MATERIALS TO INHIBIT IGNITION AND PROPAGATION * FOOD STORED IN FIRE RESISTANT CONTAiNERS NASA HQTRS. iv~67-5955 FIGURE 21 COMBUSTION AS A FUNCTION OF 02 TOTAL PRESSURE, °2 PARTIAL PRESSURE, TYPE OF MATERIAL .4 - 100/0 100/0 ~: (/~NoMEx 7 60/40 - 02/N2, PERCENT * 1 i ,/` TEFLON: 0.003 Q Fl BERGLASS: 0.0 ~ - 20 °2 PRESSURE, PSIA NASA HQTRS. M67-5964 FIGURE 22 PAGENO="0090" 86 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION with the partial pressure of oxygen and with a mixture of oxygen and nitrogen. The important point to make is that over the range of oxygen pressures In which we operate, the variation and propagation is only a factor of two or three, while by going to totally new material, such as teflon, the propagation rate at the 5 pounds per square inch pressure of pure oxygen-which we have used in our spacecraft cabins-is zero, as is that of fiberglass. Our approach then is one of selecting materials insofar as is possible which do not propagate flame in any atmosphere. Glasses of materials We can divide the materials in the spacecraft cabin into a number of different classes, but I would like to discuss four with you today; fabrics, fasteners, films and foams (fig. 23, MC67-5965). FABRIC DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS OR ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES * BETA FIBER MELTING TEMP 1540°F FABRICATION TECHNI QUES DOES NOT BURN ABRASION RESISTANCE * TEFLON MATERIAL MELTING TEMP 550°F FABRICATION TECHNIQUES SELF EXTINGUISHING TOXICITY NASA HQTRS. M67-5965 Fiounz 23 In fabrics, we are considering, among other materials, the use of Beta cloth, which is a new glass fiber cloth, to replace our current fabric material which melts in the range of 400-700° F and will support combustion. The new fiber has a melting temperature of about 15000 F and does not burn. One of the prob- lems with the new fiber is that making garments o~it of it requires the develop- ment of new fabrication techniques. At this point it appears promising. We believe that enough of it can be produced to meet Ôur requirements and that the fabrication problems can be solved. I might mention also that one of the problems with previous glass fibers has been the dermatological effects when the fabric is worn next to the skin Pre liminary tests of prototype clothing made with the new fiber appear promising in this respect also. A number of people have worn underclothing of this mate- rial for some months without any adverse reaction. A second problem with Beta cloth is that of abrasion resistance. Many of the applications, such as in the outer covering for a spacesuit, require a high order of resistance to abrasion and so far it has not been possible to develop a tight enough weave to provide adequate abrasion resistance in this cloth. A second fabric that is being evaluated and in which there have been some recent develop- inents is that of teflon. Teflon has the advantage of being self-extinguishing in a 5 pounds per square inch oxygen atmosphere. Because of its hardness and smoothness new techniques for fabrication have to be developed before we can apply it. Also, in the thin cross-sections required for nets and similar materials, we need to evaluate the possible toxicity when exposed to flame. PAGENO="0091" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 87 We do feel that these two materials can be developed and applied to meet most of the requirements for low or zero flammability materials in the spacecraft. We are also considering new materials for fasteners. Some type of fastener must be available for crew convenience while operating in the weightless environ- ment. Otherwise, it could be most cumbersome keeping everything "tied down." In the past, the fastener material has been Nyloim Velcro which supports comnbus- tion in a pure oxygen atmosphere. We are considering several possibilities for replacing this material. One is a steel Velcro, which has excellent fire protection properties, but has been judged to be too abrasive for our use when fabricated as a hook and pile fastener using the currently available techniques. Another material being considered is teflon. This material is self-extinguishing in terms of its burning characteristics, but fabrication techniques have not been developed. We do know, however, that using more conventional fasteners such as snaps and hooks and eyes will meet the need for fire resistant fasteners in the spacecraft. In the meantime we are continuing to. explore the use of new materials for this application. Films are used in the spacecraft cabin in the form of bags for containing food, for fecal collection and for containing various small articles of equipment. Here again we are considering teflon as a possible replacement material, but for this application the oxygen permeability of the material as a film must be verified. Other new materials are also being considered. Foams are used for thermal insulation and for equipment protection inside the cabin. A high density teflon foam is available now. A low density foam is preferred and is being developed. We are also investigating the availability and applicability of silicone foams. Our investigations in this area are promis- ing, but some development work is undoubtedly required. In summary, we (10 expect to be able to replace or protect all time very flam- mable materials in the spacecraft. ~S~pacccraft atm osph crc We are continuing tradeoff studies on spacecraft atmosphere for each opera- tional phase of the Apollo program. These studies include one versus: two gas tradeoffs, evaluation of the prelamich atmosphere and a fire resistant oxygen system. Ped opciatwns With regard to the spacecraft atmosphere during pad checkout and launch operations, our tradeoff studies, which are still in process, are indicating that serious consideration should be given to the use of air in the cabin, with the crew on pure oxygen in the spacesuit loop, to improve safety. Air, which comitains 79 percent nitrogen, is attractive for the cabin atmosphere, because it greatly decreases the fire hazard while providing the capability to sup- Port life if there is a failure in the oxygen supply to the suit loop. This do- crease in fire hazard, in conjunction with a reduction of cabin combustibles, im- proved egress capability and the normal i.~rovisions for pad rescue and fire fight- ing instituted durmg hazardous operations, will greatly reduce the crew risk during pad operations. A cabin atmosphere of ~mre nitrogen would further re- duce the fire hazard but is not favored because it will not support life in case of a stilt disconnect or other suit leak. During time prelaunch period as a pre- caution against dysbarisin (bends) after ascent, the suit loop would be held at slightly higher pressure than time cabin, and continuously monitored by gas sensors to assure complete denitrogenation of the crew at launch. Launch pliasc During time launch ascemit phase, time cabin and suit 1001) would bleed down to space flight pressure. With time crew remaining on the suit loop, oxygen would then be supplied to time cabin to enrich its atmosphere. We are studying several alternative procedures for this enrichment. These immclude (1) cabin decom- pression, followed by repressurization: (2) partial decompression followed by oxygen replenishment; amid (3) gradual enrichment by replenishment of normal cabin leakage with oxygen. These procedures offer tradeoffs, which are now being considered, between the system weight, amid the time which is required to achieve the desired atmosphere. PAGENO="0092" 88 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION space flight For the atmosphere in space flight, we continue to favor the choice of oxygen for the cabin and suit loop at 5 pounds per square inch absolute (psia). The following five factors are included among those being considered. First, pure oxygen eliminates the danger of dysbarism (bends) in case of sudden decompression. Second, physiological considerations require that the partial pressure of oxy- gen be maintained no lower than the equivalent of 3.5 pounds per square inch absolute of 100 percent oxygen for life support, and no higher than the equiva- lent of 7.5 psia 100 percent oxygen for extended exposure to avoid toxicity. Third, an oxygen partial pressure somewhat higher than 3.5 psia equivalent is desirable to increase the margin of safety in event of cabin leak from micro- meteoroid puncture or other cause. Fourth, a one-gas system is' simpler than a multigas system, Since it uses less components, requires no partial pressure gauges, and thus offers greater reliability. Fifth, pure oxygen in the pressure range required for life support presents a definite fire hazard. A physiologically acceptable two-gas `system at a pressure within the present spacecraft structural limitation does not appear to offer a large reduction in fire hazard over aS psia pure oxygen atmos'phere. Our `tradeoff studies continue to indicate that for missions of Apollo duration, within feasible limits of pressure for structures and space suits, `and coupled with an intensive cabin materials selection process, the 5 psia oxygen atmosphere provides the highest over-all crew safety. In continuing comparisons with candi- date two gas atmospheres, it appears to provide the best balance among fire hazard, system reliability and physiological risks. Reentry Our current `planning is to retain the present practice of initiating reentry with the 5 psia oxygen atmosphere in the cabin. During reentry, atmospheric venting into the cabin begins as the Command Module descends below about 27,000 feet. Continuing dilution of the oxygen cabin atmosphere during descent will result in a 47 percent oxygen content at splashdown, and the post-landing ventilation system will quickly replace this with normal atmosphere. Initiation of reentry wi'th the oxygen cabin atmosphere appears preferable to decom- pression or replacement of oxygen with an inert gas because it eliminates' the risk of asphyxiation in event of trouble `with the suit loop. We `are currently reexamining the fire risks during the brief periods of high deceleration during reentry to `see if the tradeoffs are affected. A final point on `spacecraft atmosphere is that we are considering the use- fulness to the crew of individual, fire resistant emergency oxygen supplies: and masks similar to those used in aircraft practice. It appears that such a system might provide additional protection for the crew in the event of fire. Emergency egress In the area of emergency egress we are proceeding with a complete review of the spacecraft design and procedures (fig. 24, MC67-5958) - In this review we are including a `study of rapi'd opening hatches, modifications to the launch complex `to improve egress, `and the tradeoffs between prelaunch safety and safety during flight and recovery. One of the most significant changes already in work is `the redesign of the crew hatch. Our objective is to provide a hatch which permits safe and reliable operations under normal conditions' while pro- viding for rapid egress or rescue in the event of an emergency condition on the ground. Concurrently it's reliability must be such that it will operate only when required. In other words the emergency condition must no't be triggered by external heat, structural loads or other mechanical or electrical operations. In the course of our review, several hatch concepts have been considered. Before discussing some of the alternatives, I will `briefly review the present hatch configuration. The requirements for return from the moon have dictated a different spacecraft design from that of Mercury and Gemini. Both structural and heat loads are substantially higher. Therefore, the Apollo heat shield surrounds the inner pressure cell. Consequently, the present Apollo hatch is a multiple hatch system consisting of a heat shield hatch and an inner hatch. The heat shield hatch is hinged and swings outward after being mechanically PAGENO="0093" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 89 ACTIONS EMERGENCY EGRESS * RAPID OPENING HATCH * PAD CONSIDERATIONS * FLIGHT SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS * RECOVERY CONSIDERATIONS NASA HQTRS. ?vC67 -5958 FIGURE 24 unlatched as a manual operation. The inner hatch is not hinged and opens inward. Internal pressure provides sealing loads on thi inner hatch, thus resulting in a lightweight system. One concept we have examined involves minimum modification to the present two hatch system. It utilizes a hot gas generator system to release the heat shield hatch and a Mercury-type "hatch within a hatch," for the inner hatch. The inner hatch is opened by a mild detonating cord which fractures the ring of bolts, thus providing an opening for emergency egress. This system is complex and does not appear to satisfy both the normal mission requirements and the emergency egress needs. A second consideration was a three-man size hatch to provide an opening large enough for simultaneous three-man egress. This concept presents the prob- lem of a major spacecraft redesign `because new load paths must be provided in the structure. Although the opening could be cut with a linear shaped charge, such `an operation may aggravate the emergency and, of course, represents a potentially dangerous failure point during flight and during water recovery. We all remember the dangerous situation that Grissom experienced on an early Mercury flight when the blow-of! hatch of the capsule was inadvertently ac- tuated when he was on the water. The spacecraft was lost in the Atlantic and Grissorn barely escaped drowning. The third concept we have examined is the unified or integrated hatch system shown here (fig. 25, MC67-5969). This system has been selected as the most promising, and detailed design work is under way. It is a single hatch which swings outward with a latch mechanism. similar to' that used on the present heat shield hatch and on the Gemini hatch. It can be opened in about two' sec- onds `by pressure generated by a hot gas' actuator which is' triggered by a percus- sion initiator. A manual mechanism is provided to open or close the hatch from either the inside or outside under normal operating conditions. It is a non-load carrying hatch with a Gemini type seal. In carrying out this design, we are making use of the same type of hatch closure that was developed in the Gemini program. However, because of the two-shell structure, it is necessary to develop, as may be seen in the next chart (fig. 26, MtJ67-5968), a means for sealing the heat shield joint against reentry heat penetration under all possible relative motions of the outer heat shield seal with respect to the inner pressure seal~ At the same time the inner pres- PAGENO="0094" 90 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION UNIFIED HATCH NASA HQFRS. M67-5969 - HEATSHIELD INNER ADJUSTMENT STRUCTURE NASA HQTRS. M67-5968 FIGURE 26 LATCH AND LI NKAGE MECHANISM BOOST COVER HATCH EMERGENCY RELEASE HINGE (INTERNAL) I MANUAL OPERATE FIGURE 25 UNIFIED HATCH LNEW INNER / 5'~X HATCH LLATCH AND `ADAPTER\ LINKAGE FRAME PAGENO="0095" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 91 sure shell seal must be capable of multiple opening and closing and carrying out extravehicular activities in flight. The approach we have adopted is shown in the chart and has the advantage of being applicable with minor modifications to the present structure of the spacecraft. The redesigned hatch must be fully tested and qualified before manned flight. We are also reviewing the launch complex to identify changes that will be necessary to mate with the redesigned hatch and to insure that the emergency egress route permits as rapid movement of the crew as possible. Environmenta~ Controi System The Environmental Control System is being reexamined with emphasis on materials, failure modes, choice of fluids, maintenance and servicing. Particular attention is being devoted to improving fire resistance by careful selection of materials used and the types of plumbing connections with the aim of minimizing the potential of leakage or joint failure as well as improving the maintenance and servicing of the system (fig. 27, M'C67-5967). Ohanges being APOLLO ECS FIGuRE 27 studied include the incorporation of improved mechanical or pressure joints, the relative merits of mechanical versus brazed joints, the feasibility of eliminat- ing soldered joints, and the relative merits of steel versus aluminum tubing. We are analyzing and conducting tradeoff studies to determine the feasibility of eliminating the present coolant fluid' from the crew compartment. In this connection we are investigating other coo1ant fluids to determine if an alternate fluid with better fire resistance than water glycol could be used. Of all the fluids considered, approximately 46, four have `been selected as potential candi- dates. None of the alternate fluids have thermal characteristics comparable to water glycol; however, three are considered non-combustible in air. Substitution of any of these coolant fluids will result in increased electrical power require- ments, weight, increased water boiling during maximum heating, a new pump design and verification testing. == ~L NASA HqFRS. ~67-5967 PAGENO="0096" 92 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION A second approach is replacement of the glycol in the cabin by water while leaving the mixture of water and glycol in the Service Module. This can be accomplished by adding heat exchangers and additional pumps. A third approach involves the examination of the flammability characteristics of other mixtures of water and glycol. In any event the thermal characteristics of the Apollo spacecraft are quite delicately balanced and care must be taken in evaluating tradeoff studies that any changes do not decrease the possibility of success not only of the mission but of the performance of the environmental control system, since the safety of the astronauts depends directly upon its successful operations. Finally, the design of the environmental control system is being reviewed with a view to improving its maintainability and serviceability. HARDWARE DEVELOPMENT llprated Saturn I launch vehicle The three successful unmanned missions in 1966 verified the design of the uprated Saturn I vehicle and the use of liquid hydrogen as a fuel in the upper stage. In September, a Design Oertification Review Board was convened to assess the maturity of the design of the uprated Saturn I for manned flight. Based on the results of this review and successful completion of qualification testing, the uprated Saturn I is considered man-rated. 1st stage During 1966 the 1st stage of the uprated Saturn I performed well (fig. 28, MA66-1O,267). Five stages have been delivered to KSC. Three of these per- formed nominally in flight and t*o are being readied for flights in 1967. The remaining seven flight stages are `in various conditions of fabrication, assembly, PAGENO="0097" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 93 or checkout (fig. 29, MA66-9694A.). Four of these will be delivered to KSC during 1967 and the last three during 1968. Qualification of all 1st stage flight critical components was completed during 1966. 2nd stage During 1966 the uprated Saturn I 2nd stage (.S-IVB) also performed well (fig. 30, MA6O-10,268). Five stages have been delivered to KSO and three have been flown successfully. The remaining seven flight stages are in the pipeline with four to be delivered in 1967 and the last three in 1908. The 2nd stage of the uprated Saturn' I also serves as the 3rd stage of the Saturn V launch vehicle. S-4VB stages for the Saturn V are also in the pipeline. It was a stage of this configuration that was destroyed prior to a test firing January 20, 1967 at the Sacramento Test Facility. One Saturn V stage was delivered to KSC in 1966 and six others are in varying degrees of fabrication or checkout. The remaining eight stages for the Saturn V will be in the pipeline in 1907 and completed in 1968 and 1969. In.~t'rument Unit The Instrument Unit, common `to both uprated Saturn I and Saturn V, houses electrical and mechanical equipment which guides, controls, and monitors vehicle performance from liftoff to payload injection (fig. 31, MA6O-10,2843). During 1966 we completed ground qualification testing of nearly all components of the Instrument Unit for both the uprated Saturn I and Saturn V launch vehicles. The Instrument Unit successfully operated during the flights of AS- 201, AS-203 and AS-202 and, as a result, we have high confidence in its flight performance. Two additional Saturn I Units were delivered to KSO and the Instrument Unit for the first Apollo/Saturn manned flight started through check- out at the launch site in 1966 in preparation for a 1907 launch. Follow-on procurement of uprated Saturn I vehicles which offer a versatile means for conducting a variety of earth orbital missions, will be discussed under Apollo Applications. PAGENO="0098" Fiouiui 30 Saturn V launch vehicle 1967 will be the year of flight test for the Saturn V launch vehicle. The years of design and ground development are nearly complete The first flight vehicle has been delivered to the launch site, backed up by a full pipeline of vehicles and complete maturity in manufacturing capability (fig. 32, MA66-9694-B). As part of the 1966 activities we completed nearly all of the major stage ground testing efforts The major portions of the components qualification were accom phshed and only a small portion of the qualification program remains to be com pleted in 1967 500-F facil%ties checkout vehicle In 1966 we delivered the Saturn V 500-F vehicle to KSO and used it to verify the operations and functions of the Saturn V launch facilities These included the Launch Umbilical Tower, the Mobile Service Structure, Launch Control Center Firing Room No 1 and Launch Pad 39A at Launch Complex 39 (fig 33 MCO6-10 397) This non flight facilities checkout version of the Saturn V pro vided the necessary verification and valuable training prior to operations with flight hardware 1st stage Component qualification testing was essentially completed ~n 1966 for the Saturn V 1st stage (fig 34 MA66-9237) Reliability testing will be completed by about midyear 1967 The 1st stage program pipeline was filled with the delivery of the first flight article to Launch Complex 39 This was accomplished without any significant hardware or procedural problems. During 1966 we successfully completed acceptance test firings on the first three flight stages of the 1st stage S-IC-3 the third of these flight stages was the first contractor produced 1st stage to be static fired We delivered S-IC-i to KSC in September 1966 where the stage was later erected on Launch Umbilical Tower No 1 to begin checkout of the first Saturn V launch vehicle 94 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION PAGENO="0099" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 95 FIGURE 31 FIGURE 32 PAGENO="0100" 96 FIGuRE 34 J 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 14 IGURE 33 PAGENO="0101" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 97 During 1967 we plan to static fire three more stages for flight acceptance; 5- 10-4, -5, and -6, and we plan to deliver S-IC-2, -3, -4, and -5 to KSC. The S-IC All Systems stage that successfully completed ground test in early 1966, was delivered to Mississippi Test Facility in October for checkout of the first S-IC All Systems stage will include a static firing to be accomplished in the first quarter of 1967. In May 1966 the S-IC-Dynamic stage was placed in the Saturn V dynamic test stand at MSFO for checkout of the stand and its data acquisition system in preparation for the Saturn V launch vehicle dynamic testing. On March 3, 1967 the first firing of the S-IC-T stage was successfully carried out at Missis- sippi Test Facility. 2nd stage Although the Saturn V 2nd stage continues to be the pacing item in the develop- ment of the launch vehicle, positive progress was made during 1966 (fig. 35, MC65-ii,367). Further confidence was gained from the manufacturing check- out results of the flight hardware and the two successful static firings of the first flight 2nd stage at the Mississippi Test Facility late in 1966. Along with the static firings of S-Il-i, we completed manufacturing checkout on S-II-2 (MC65-ii,367). The manufacturing checkout results of all the 2nd stages processed to date, the S-II-T, S-Il-i, and S-II-2, confirm the design of the mechanical and electrical/electronic systems. In 1967 we plan to deliver three stages to MTF for acceptance testing, and to complete manufacturing and checkout on four stages. In May 1966 we lost the S-Il All Systems Stage (fig. 36, MA66-9250). When the accident occurred, we bad completed 773 seconds of a planned 885 seconds static firing program in preparation for the acceptance firing of the flight stage's. lie destruction of the stage resulted from an inadvertent over-pressurization of the liquid hydrogen tank with gaseous helium during a leak test. Damage to the test stand was minor. Subsequent to the loss of this ground test article, we inaugurated a Saturn V 2nd stage confidence improvement program to verify the design of this stage and provide confidence to commit it first to unmanned flight and later to a manned launch. The confidence improvement program consists of further test firings of the Battleship as well as the first and second flight stages prior to their delivery to the launch area where they will be integrated into early Saturn V flight vehicles. In order to make most efficient use of our hardware, the S-Il All-Systems Stage was also to be utilized in the Saturn V 500-D vehicle for the dynamic test program. The loss of this stage made it necessary to realign our plans. After carefully reviewing the program requirements and available alternatives, we assigned the S-Il Facility stage to the dynamic test program. This resulted in a slight delay of the dynamic testing since the facility stage was being em- ployed in the Saturn V 500-F facilities testing at KSC. In spite of the delays, our ground test schedule supports the flight tests which will be starting this year. The impact of the All-Systems stage loss on the launch of the AS-501 space vehicle amounted essentially to the additional time required for the static firings conducted with the first flight stage (S-TI-i). To minimize the impact at KSC of the delayed delivery of the S-TI stage, an S-Il "spacer," already constructed, was shipped to Cape Kennedy to enable the 3rd stage and spacecraft to be stacked for checkout purposes in the Vehicle Assembly Building (fig. 37, MA67-5796). This inexpensive expedient will sig- nificantly minimize the delay of the AS-50i launch. It will also be used in the checkout of the AS-502 and AS-503 vehicles since the S-IT delivery is also pacing these launch dates. 3rd stage The `first 3rd stage flight stage arrived at KSC in August 1966 for prelaunch checkout in preparation for the first Saturn V unmanned mission (AS-50i). The second 3rd stage flight stage was delivered to KSC on February 21, 1967. This stage will go through prelaunch checkout for the second Saturn V unmanned mission (AS-502). On January 20 the 3rd stage of the AS-503 flight vehicle was inadvertently destroyed during countdown for a test firing. The accident took place at the Douglas Sacramento test facility in California. The stage was completely destroyed while the test stand received substantial, but repairable, damage (fig. 38, MC67-5707). PAGENO="0102" 98 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGuRE 35 PAGENO="0103" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 99 There is no impact on the early phases of our current launch schedule since the production schedule is at a point where it can accommodate an advancement of the stages to the next earlier flight. I~Iat urn launch vehicle engines In 1966 we completed the qualification of our launch vehicle engines-the H-i, J-2, and F-i (fig. 39, MA66-92i5). The H-i engine is used in a cluster of 8 on the uprated Saturn I ist stage. The J-2 engine is used singly in the S-IVB stage, which serves as the 2nd stage for the uprated Saturn I and the 3rd stage for Saturn V, and in a cluster of 5 on the 2nd stage for Saturn V. The F-i engine is used in a cluster of 5 on the Saturn V ist stage. H-i engine The H-i engine was uprated to 205,960 pounds thrust and completed requali- ficatlon at this level in June 1966. This uprating, accomplished with minimum modification to the engine, provides additional payload margin on the uprated Saturn I vehicle, Our flight worthiness verification testing I~ continuing under the sustaining engineering effort together with the flight program. H-i pro- duction engine deliveries for the first stage of the uprated Saturn I were completed in 1966. J-2 engine Qualification of the uprated J-2 engine was completed in September 1966. Thrust of the uprated J-2 varies from 205,000 to 230,000 pounds depending upon the fuel mixture ratio. This uprated engine will be used in the upper stages of both the uprated Saturn I (effective on AS-207) and Saturn V (effective on AS-504), providing greater payload margins for these manned vehicles. Sus- taining engineering and flight support will continue through 1967. FIGURE 37 PAGENO="0104" 100 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 38 PAGENO="0105" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 101 F-i engine The F-i engine, now rated as 1,522,000 pound thrust, completed qualification in September 1966 and will be flown for the first time in the AS-501 vehicle early this year. As a result of this uprating from the F-i original 1,500,000 pound thrust, the total thrust of the Saturn V 1st stage Is now 7,610,000 pounds. Sustaining engineering and flight support for the F-i engine will continue in 1967. Fifty-one engines have been delivered from F-i engine production in support of ground testing and flight 1st stages. During 1967, 30 additional engines will be delivered. Apollo production will be completed in 1968. Apollo spacecraft As with the launch vehicles, flight spacecraft and spacecraft test articles have been shipped to the launch site in Florida from the manufacturers' plants (fig. 40, MA66-9695-B). Most of the subsystems ground testing for the Command and Service Module Block I spacecraft was completed by mid 1966. The Com- mand and Service Module Launch Escape System testing on Little Joe II vehicles at White Sands was concluded and personnel and equipment were withdrawn. Lunar Module subsystems testing was started in the first half of 1966 on about half the key subsystems, subsystems testing to be completed in 1967. By the end of 1966, the majority of the first Lunar Module flight constraining ground tests were completed. Lunar Module propulsion testing at White Sands will continue into 1967. During 1966, Critical Design Reviews were conducted on the Block II Com- mand-Service Module and on the Lunar Module. As I mentioned earlier, we are carefully reviewing our procedures and will be instituting design modifica- tions as data becomes available from the AS-204 Review Board. Ground testing of the Block II Command and Service Module, configured for lunar flights, has begun on flight test type spacecraft, restrained from any PAGENO="0106" 102 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION testing using a pure oxygen environment pending findings of the Review Board. The Block II is similar to the Block I with the addition of a docking configura tion It was initiated in 1962 when the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous Mode for lunar landing was selected The adapters for Block II are the same as fio~n ~ ith the Bloc! I spacecraft and require no additional testing Adapter section Testing of the Adapter Sections which will house the Apollo Lunar Module spacecraft on future flights was successfully concluded Adapter Section units for Apollo Saturn flights with the Lunar Module are now being fabricated at Tulsa and delivered to KSC and MSC by helicopter (fig. 41, MC66-1O,271). Lunar Module The Lunar Module development program follows the Command and Service Modules by about one year Qualification and major ground testing will be (ompleted in 1967 although as I mentioned it is quite possible that we will eAperience some impact from the AS-204 accident in our Lunar Module develop inent program During 1966 major components were integrated in various subsystem tests and their operation was verified The component qualification test program started last year is continuing The Lunar Module subsystem and vehicle development is supported by a num- ber of major hardware articles, including Engineering Test Models, Propulsion Test Rigs, and Lunar Module Test Articles. Engineering Test Models are con- tinuing in use to obtain specific design performance information, such as thermal- acuum and RF transmission characteristics Propulsion Test Rigs have been actively used at the engine contractors Arnold Engineering Development Center and the White Sands Test Facility. The engine test program at the Arnohl Center has been completed on the ascent and descent engines and supplemental testing is continuing at the engine contractor's plant. FIGURE 41 PAGENO="0107" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 103 Lunar Module Test Articles are used in the development program to verify subsystem and vehicle operational and performance requirements Major tests include structural dynamic propulsion thermal vacuum and integrated systems and each of these vehicles removes specific ground test constraints on initial flight missions Two of these ground test articles have been refurbished for flight tests on the first two Saturn V flights During 1966 fabrication and assembly effort increased on a number of flight and test vehicles The structural test article LTA-3 successfully completed its tests at MSC The electrical integration test article LTA-1 has completed tests at the Grumman plant in Long Island New York The thermal vacuum test vehicle LTA-8 is undergoing final tests at the contractor s facility before being sent to the thermal vacuum chamber at MSC. The first flight test vehicle LTA-1OR a refurbished test article has been de livered to KSC The refurbished vehicle is ballasted for overall weight and ap proximate center of gravity and moment of inertia of the Lunar Module It is instrumented and will be flown on the first Saturn V booster (AS-501) to deter mine compatibility structural integrity and response of the simulated Lunar Module to the boost environment The first flight Lunar Module LM-1 is near ing completion at the contractor s plant and will be flown unmanned on the AS-206 mission to verify subsyctem operation in the space environment The module will be programmed for a complete series of propulsion tests In addition to the first and second Lunar Modules now in the checkout phase at Grumman five other vehicles are in various stages of fabribation assembly and installation Long lead procurement has been initiated on all of the remain ing Lunar Modules Four of these vehicles will be delivered in 1967 (fig 42 MAO6-9695--A) FIGURE 42 PAGENO="0108" 104 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Command and service Module development Command and Service Module development difficulties have been encountered during 1966, principally in the service propulsion tanks and in the Environmental Control System. $tress corrosion of titanium propellant tanks Last year I reported the problem of stress corrosion with the titanium propel- lant tanks and the nitrogen tetroxide oxidizer. We resolved that problem by adding an inhibiting agent to nitrogen tetroxide, allowing us to use the tanks safely without a hardware change. An extensive test program has verified that a small amount of nitric oxide (less than 1 percent) effectively stops the stress corrosion. More recently, another fluid incompatibility with titanium has been encoun- tered: methyl alcohol (methanol). In late October 1906, one of the titanium tanks in the Service Module of Spacecraft 017, planned for use on the first Apollo/Saturn V flight, failed during pressure test at the North American Avia- tion plant (fig. 43, MA66-9169). One of the two main fuel tanks exploded, causing extensive damage to the Service Module. Methyl alcohol was used for this test to avoid using the actual propellant, a hydrazine blend which is toxic. The tank `that failed had successfully passed several acceptance "proof" pressure tests previously at significantly higher levels of stress than that at which it failed. From analysis of the failed tank and from laboratory specimen tests at the Manned Spacecraft Center, Langley Research Center, North American Avia- tion, and Boeing Co., we have determined that the titanium alloy from which these tanks are made is very susceptible to stress corrosion cracking under methyl alcohol exposure. This phenomenon has been observed and verified at stress levels of approximately 100,000 psi, which corresponds to our tank operating pressure. We immediately alerted the technical community to this incompatibility and are documenting and making available all test data. Although the use of methyl alcohol as a test fluid has been stopped, this difficulty highlights the importance. FIGURE 43 PAGENO="0109" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 105 of the emphasis we have already placed on the subjects of stress corrosion and material incompatibility. As the Apollo program progresses these technical discoveries push the technology frontier a little further out. An Apollo program directive has been issued which requires thorough test re- validation of the compatibility of all use fluids with their tank materials. Environmental Control Unit The Environmental Control Unit experienced technical difficulties during the past year that resulted in delays to the test program requiring redesign and requalification of the system. As a result of this occurrence, early in November we placed a modified En- vironmental Control System in the Command and Service Module of the AS-204 space vehicle undergoing prelaunch testing at KSC. Spacecraft for all flights will now use the requalified Environmental Control System. Lunar Module development We foresee no major engineering problems remaining to be resolved in the development of the Lunar Module. We have experienced the type of difficulties you might expect in such a development effort. However, additional ground and flight testing is required to demonstrate that the configuration is acceptable for the lunar mission. Landing radar The need for additional testing is particularly true of the landing radar, where performance under flight conditions has yet to be demonstrated. An intensive ground test program is being conducted including flight tests with radar installed on helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. Tests are also planned on the Lunar Module development flight missions to measure radar performance in the vibra- tion, temperature, and engine plume environment of the spacecraft. We were much encouraged by the performance of the Surveyor I radar, which is similar to the one used on the Lunar Module. Engines In the descent and ascent engine area, we encountered obstacles which delayed the start of the qualification program (fig. 44, MA66-9185; fig. 45, MA66-918fl). The descent engine was experiencing erosion of the ablative engine throat and low performance which were corrected by minor changes to the injector design. The ascent engine had difficulties with chamber erosion and instability, both of which were related to injector construction methods. The results of the LM-1 flight tests are expected to verify performance of the propulsion systems. Weight of Lunar Module Last year we were faced with a potentially serious weight growth trend on the Lunar Module and a weight improvement program was started. This effort has reflected in a continuing weight decrease during 1906. The vehicle is below the control weight at this time. The weight margin can be used to advantage in loading additional propellant on board. CHECKOUT, TEST, AND LAUNCH OPERATION FACILITIES Launch vehicle checkout facilities Activation of the stage checkout facilities to support the Saturn V program continued as planned during the past year. Static test stands aiid factory post- static test facilities became operational for the checkout of the 1st, 2nd and 8rd stages, and the Instrument Unit. Michoud Assembly Facility The second factory checkout position for the Saturn V 1st stage was activated at the Michoud Assembly Facility near New Orleans, Louisiana in August and handled the factory checkout of the S-IC--4. Analysis of our experiences shows thalt the two checkout positions can handle the maximum planned flow rate of six stages per year in both factory and post-static checkout. PAGENO="0110" 106 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 44 FIGURE 45 PAGENO="0111" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 107 M3ssissippi Test Facility At Mississippi Test Facility, the first Saturn V 2nd stage static test stand became operational in April 1966 (fig. 46; MA6(}-9226). Work progressed toward operational status in early 1967 for both the second S-TI static test stand and the first side of the 1st stage dual static test stand. The second position of the latter stand will not be activated unless required later in the program. seal Beach, California Activation of the first factory checkout station at Seal Beach, California, was completed in April 1966 to accept the arrival of the S-TI-i Saturn V 2nd stage. Activation of the second factory checkout station at Seal Beach is underway and will be completed by mid-1967. Huntsville, Alabama IBM activated the Instrument Unit Checkout station at Huntsville in May 1966 in time for the factory checkout of the first Saturn V Instrument Unit. This facility completes our planned Factory Checkout capability for the Instru- ment Unit. MSFC activated the Saturn V System Development Facility in April. This breadboard facility is designed to verify the operational capability of our launch vehicle checkout equipment and to develop and validate the checkout procedures and computer programs. ~SJpacccraft factory cit eckout facilities Command and Scrvicc Module checkout During 1966, we increased our checkout capability from three to four Inte- grated Test Stands for Command and Service Module checkout at the North American Aviation plant. This was made possible by overhaul and activation PAGENO="0112" 108 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION of a test stand previously used for developmental testing of the house spacecraft. The four stations were constructed as two sets of two stations each and share much common ground support equipment. Approximately 50 additional ground equipment units were required to support the checkout of the Block II spacecraft. Definition and manufacture of these pew requirements were completed during 1966. Later, the first complete activation was accomplished for Block II testing in two test stands at North American Aviation. Lunar Module checkout Four factory integrated test stands were activated last year at Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation. Three stands are to be used for acceptance checkout of completed Lunar Modules. The fourth, which is a wooden stand used for electro-magnetic compatibility tests, was used for house spacecraft developmental testing. A large quantity of ground support equipment produced `for Command and Service Module use also has been allocated to satisfy ground support need's for the Lunar Module. This common use equipment consists mainly of test signal command devices and fluid servicing equipment. The requirement for a third Automatic Checkout Equipment `station for Lunar Module checkout became apparent during 1966. The last station to be produced was expedited and its timely installation at Grumman averted a checkout bottle neck before it occurred. During the `summer of 1967, this checkout pro1blem will no longer exist and the added Automatic Checkout Equipment `station will be removed from Bethpage for installation as the fifth station at KS'C. $paceoraft checkout facilities at K$C The Industrial Area Facilities at 1(50 have been activated for the Block I Apollo Saturn I missions. Ground support equipment modifications will be required, however, for Block II Command and Service Module ~beckout at the propulsion static firing pad and in the altitude chamber. These modifications will be accomplished early in 1967. Ground support equipment installation and a'ssociated activation tasks started during the early fall of 1966 and are almost completed to support Lunar Module checkout. During the summer of 1966, the installation of a third and fourth Automatic `0l~eckout Equipment station was completed for spacecraft checkout support. We have deferred installation of the fifth station until the summer of 1967, allowing additional support for factory checkout of the Lunar Module. Launch operation facilities Launch Compleci~ 34/37 Launch Complex 34, whose conversion for launching the' uprated Saturn 1 was completed last year, was `since utilized for two unmanned Saturn I launches and will be used for the first manned Apollo Saturn I mission (fig. 47, MC66-5457). Possible changes required in the launch pad as a `result of the AS-204 Saturn I was launched from this complex (fig. 48, MC66-5449). Launch Complex 37 for uprated Saturn I `launches was `completed in 1966 and an Apollo! Saturn I was launched from this complex (fig 48, MC66-5449). Launch Complex 37 also has now been modified for Lunar Module launches with the Apollo/Saturn I. Assembly of the Apollo/Saturn i is performed on Launch Complexes 34 and 37 as the stages are received from the factory. The spacecraft modules are checked out in the Industrial Area at KS'O prior to mating with the launch vehicle. Launch Complex 34 currently has the capability of assembling, checking out, and launching the Saturn I wi'th the Apollo Command and Service Module. Launch Complex 37, when modifications are completed early in 1967, will have the capa'bility of launching the uprated Apollo/Saturn I with the Lunar Module. Plans are now proceeding so that in 1968 Launch Complex 37 will also be able to launch an Apollo/Saturn I with a Command and Service Module. Launch Complec 39 Construction of Launch Complex 39 (fig. 49, MC66-5446) for the Saturn V launch vehicle is well along, and we have completed the Wet Test of Pad A utilizing the 500-F vehicle. Individual stage propellant as well as multiple simultaneous propellant loading was demonstrated, proving the capa'bilities of PAGENO="0113" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 109 FIGURE 47 76-265 0-67--pt. 2-8 PAGENO="0114" 110 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Launch Complex 39 for the first Saturn V launch. Since we resolved the bearing problem, the Crawler-Transporters have performed satisfactorily in several moves of the Launch Umbilical Tower, both unloaded and loaded with the 500-F vehicle. Tests also were performed by moving the Mobile Service Structure to Pad A for a compatibility check with the Launch Umbilical Power and the 500-F vehicle (fig. 50, MC67-5429). Launch Complex 39 will be fully operational in 1968. At that time, it will have three of its four high bay areas activated and will have two Crawler-Trans- porters, three Launch Umbilical Towers, one Mobile Service Structure, two pads and three instrumented firing rooms in operation One Launch Umbilical Tower and one firing room have been completed to date Modifications to the Instrument Unit 2nd stage and 3rd stage can be per formed in the low bay area of the Vehicle Assembly Building at Launch Corn plex 39 The entire Saturn V vehicle is erected on the Launch Umbilical Tower in the high bay area of the Vehicle Assembly Building (fig 51 MC67-5011) Checkout is performed in this protected area prior to the move to the launch pads S~oftware Following the delivery of operating systems and test programs for AS-201 the Marshall Space Flight Center delivered on schedule the succeeding computer programs for AS-20Z AS-203 and AS-204 Each new programming package has included software for automating additional test functions Lcwn,ch operations Training of personnel Last year I reported on an anticipated problem in the training of certain per sonnel required for operation of the Vehicle Assembly Building at KSC (fig 52 MC66-10,276). Since then we have been able to provide training for all launch Fiounu 49 PAGENO="0115" 1908 NASA AUTHORIZATION 111, FIGURE 51 PAGENO="0116" 112 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION (~J~) LAUNCH OPERATIONS PROBLEMS RESOLVED TRAINING OF PERSONNEL * CHECK OUT SYSTEMS COMPUTER PROGRAMS VAB CRANES SWING ARMS LOX FAILURE NASA SQ MC66-10,276 12-30-66 FIGURE 52 support personnel in connection with the extensive facility checkout operations with the Saturn V 500-F vehicle at KSC last summer. This operation not only verified the mechanical and electrical interfaces of the systems, but it provided personnel training and experience in handling large quantities of liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen; the operation of the Crawler-Transporter under load con- ditions; the operation of cranes in the Vehicle Assembly Building; and assembly, check-out and disassembly by the large checkout team which prepares the Apollo/Saturn space vehicle for launch. Checkout syst ems The checkout system for the Saturn V launch vehicle consists of seven com- puters and more than 1300 panels of electrical support equipment. More than 3000 cables are required to interconnect all this equipment. We successfully manufactured, installed and tested on schedule the first Saturn V checkout system and utilized it for the Wet Test of 500-F at Launch Complex 39, Pad A, as well as checkout of AS-501. This success was achieved by utilization of advanced management techniques, the excellent support of the industrial suppliers, and the hard work of the personnel furnished by our industrial support team. Computer programs We overcame our major computer program difficulties in 1966, completing computer program tasks on schedule. Computer programs for the Wet Test at 500-F at Pad A and for the checkout of AS-501 were developed and delivered. The timely delivery of working programs was achieved by the cooperative efforts of the support contractor. Swing arms We have been able to expedite the lagging deliveries of swing arms by working closely with the contractor. Qualification of the first set of arms, originally intended for use with the AS-501 flight, was delayed until after Pad A activation so that a set of arms would be available to support the 500-F Wet Test in April. The second set of arms was qualified in time to support the erection and check- out of AS-501 in October. The third set of arms is expected to be qualified PAGENO="0117" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 113 early in 1967 in time to support AS-502. Qualification of the original set is expected to be completed in mid 1967. Launch Uompleo~ 39 liquid anygen propellant system~ A flexible section of an 18-inch liquid oxygen transfer line ruptured during a Pad 39A facility checkout test in August 1966. The tank inner shell dimpled from low internal pressure resulting from the liquid oxygen discharge. The liquid oxygen discharge also displaced piping and caused minor damage to the tank foundations and nearby machinery (fig. 53, MA66-9029). All damage was repaired and modifications to the system were made to prevent a recurrence. The complete repair, modification, and tank refilling was accom- plished in approximately one month. RELIABILITY AND QUALITY ASSURANOE Reliabijity and Quality engineering disciplines in the Apollo program help to provide check and balance between systems engineering and manufacturing activities and to certify that the hardware for a mission is in a state of readiness. Proven reliability engineering techniques are being applied by Manned Space Flight Reliability and Quality Assurance. The reliability disciplines previously applied in the program ground test actvities had to be modified in the past year to satisfy the new requirements imposed by flight test. A number of reliability engineering disciplines con- tribute to and culminate with the Flight Readiness Review. Workmanship and quality are as important, if not more important to the reliability and safety of equipment as is the fundamental design. We bEdieve we have maintained a vigorous and effective quality control *and inspection program. The careful disassembly of the AS-204 spacecraft being accomplished under the direction of the AS-2~l4 Review Board provides a unique opportunity to determine whether or not there have been shortcomings in this area. We will follow this disassembly through step by step and take such actions as are Indicated if quality and inspection deficiencies are found. PAGENO="0118" 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION 114 APOLLO MANAGEMENT Baseline management concept On previous occasions we have emphasized the importance of defining an in tegrated and balanced schedule cost performance baseline for the Apollo pro gram, and having sufficient visibility through all elements of the program to measure progress against the baseline (fig. 54, MC65-6041). It is equally im- portant to the Apollo Applications program and is being carried forward into that effort. Problems cause the various elements of the program to get out of balance It is the responsibility of management to evaluate existing conditions and prepare to make whatever material and programmatic changes necessary, while con- currently moving all other elements of the effort along at an appropriate pace. I believe that the total Apollo management team is proving itself effective in this respect. The prevailing challenge to management is to minimize the impact of manage ment and engineering difficulties on the overall program. The passage of time will validate our success in this endeavor. Reviews Reviews and assessments continue to play an Important part in the manage ment process The Management Council on which both my Center Directors and I serve reviews on a monthly basis the Apollo program progress and problems as they are presented by the Apollo Program Director his staff and the Center Program Managers These presentations are followed by an Executive Session in which major problem areas are discussed Additionally a series of reviews has been developed and undertaken to assure the technical adequacy of the system and equipment (fig. 55, MA66-9614A). FIGURE 54 PAGENO="0119" PJBPtflflS tIOflBO~flUOpj pun 2upunoaoB ~oO Jo; oafl~mmooqns aoq pu tw jo UOflBOfl 1cci ~noq~ ~q2noaq ueaq s~q uoçpnpaa ~soo no UO~~tI~u9OUoO aatpanj sttondnpdJ PUt? DUflUfl000l? `Dufls!oo V$V~[ paanpaa uaaq svq pa~nq~qs~p ptw paonposl s~jdoa ~uemiwop ;o aaqmnu aq; pun `peanpei uaeq srnj sa~doo ~uatxmoop ;o suflpuBq trnma~pp~}~ `popeeu Si IT 9WJ4 Otfl p3 4~ ~8U OtJM OSoq~ 03 aTP3TTLS1~ eptim eq o~ UOflGTUJOJUT unn2 -ouT se~qBue uopnqp;sJp v-temnoop Jo 10J4t100 eq; aoj mv~2uad pejumo;nB uy waj&flg jo.qnoo uoflnq;.q&;p qusutnoop pa~rnuo~n~ xapu~ paoMLe~j u q2noaq~ ~p ~ptzemnoop o~ sseaa~~ :pei~p S'PJOJJB put? `s~uemnoop trnuSoad Le~ jo ~flT~1~ ~uenno sepJAoacT meTsfl UOflBUUOJUJ eqj~ majsLs eq~ 2TXJSU suoçp~zpiv2ao iru Sq m~up eq; ;o esu ~peqp eq; e~B~J~~zng qo~t~Ai suue; pm? sapoa prnpufls JO OSU aip qSnonp peqs~jdmoo -;yu s~ e2uuqoae~u~ s~qj~ ea~o WUJSOJd oijodv eq; prn~ sae~uao ~jq2~jj eamis pauuujç 5ROJJBA eq~ uee~~eq uopm~uemnaop ~noq~ i~p jo e2tnnpae~u~ eq~ aoj OpTAOld o~ padoiesep SUM ttli3TSLS uoTprnuo;uT Tueme2Buuw iqup pe~~mo~n~ u~ uia$$/Z9 uo;ipuuofu; ~uautaDvurnu ~ojvp pa~vuto~ny . (t896-99vw `9~7 2u) asothud SJtfl JOJ pe~tueue2 eie~ sthe~sLs ou~oeds IBJ~A8S 45o0 pesve~oep putt £ouepge pesuenu~ tpoq ;o s;seae~u~ aq~ tq mua2oid oliody etp UT UOflU~~4B Suoi:js eATeoeJ o~ penu~uoo s~q ~ueme~urn~ur m~ip jo ~en~ eqj~ ~UDWa5VUVW viva ~uemqs~~dmoaau UOTSSTUI OT JOTJd me~s&s eq~ jo £~Ta2eTuT etp eupuJe~ep ~ 2uflse~ ptw `eanfljurn3w `u2~sep jo srqm~s eq; jo peu~m~qo ~T L~~JJqJs~A ~uejowns ~ `apSe e;~j mUiSoad etp UT s~uTod eluTadoadcth ~ `eansu~ LTeATSSex2oJcT £eqj mu~2o.id OTIOdV eq~ ;o seSUqd UOTSSTUT prn~ ~juemdo~eAep en~prøq eq~ o~ pepxapo exu suo~;uo~piao puu `suoçpedsu~ `s~ta~sei eseqj~ ~ ~ ~ ,~ ,~ rr ~ ~ ~t~uqccgru ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ` ~ ~ ` ~ ~ ~ vPt9o 9WW ~ YSYN iHWi~*v; ~;t2st?t:Mu;s$~;1- fi ~ ~ - ~ ~ rU~03~ $"~ s~* fi ~-~** ~_,c~*st 1YNOILVd3dO ~ ~ 1NSptsv4~vW ~ NOlSJOr-4NOIItNIJ3D r~= `~;zttc:i~at'4mrrra t - 4ik~: ~ _L_~ ~ ~ :c:* ~ ~ ~ , ~ A ~ ~ I ~ `~IJ& A raW~SiM SS330Ud M3tA3~ OllOclV (A~~ ~ itflO5$~uffl ______ ~ 4A;A: gj j NOLLVZIUOHJJ1V VSVN 8961 PAGENO="0120" 116 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION cost guidelines and cost criteria in data management are being applied to Apollo and other Manned Space Flight programs at a resulting reduction in data cost. Other data management progress has been achieved through the initiation of data value engineering, data preparation standards, an automated cost sum- mary system, and maximum use of Apollo-generated data. Configuration management We have been implementing the techniques and disciplines of configuration management on Apollo for the past several years. These methods of managing the adequacy and accuracy of each major element of Apollo hardware and soft- ware have provided us with the technical design requirements and hardware baselines on which our research and development is based. We have instituted rigid change control disciplines at all Center and contractor levels to minimize the number of changes being made and approve only those absolutely necessary (fig. 57, MA65-9332). LOGISTICS Development of the Apollo Saturn logistics base during the past year has re- sulted in identification and implementation of the various elements of the sup- port program as they apply to the mission. The Apollo Logistics Requirements Plan, which established the principles of the logistics base, has become the guide- line and evaluation medium for the Manned Space Flight Centers and con- tractors. The need for early, adequate, and continuous emphasis in the logistics support areas was acknowledged and underscored during the NASA Manned Space Flight Logistics Symposium at Huntsville, Alabama In August. The symposium was attended by top management from NASA, the Department of Defense, and industry. FIGURE 56 PAGENO="0121" 1988 NASA AUTHORIZATION 117 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT LEVELS OF CHANGE AUTHORITY APOLLO [i~'OLLO PROGRAM SPECIFICATION REOUREMENTS PROGRAM OFFICE PROGRAM CONTROL SCHEDULES AND (LEVEL I( HARDWARE QUANTITIES PROGRAM SPACECRAFT AND LAUNCH VEHICLE PERFORMANCE REOTS PROJECT I SYSTEM SPECS MANAGER INTERFACES BETWEEN LAUNCH VEHICLE STAGES AND ENGINES OFFICES INTERFACES BETWEEN SPACECRAFT MODULES (CENTERS) OPERATION OF SYSTEMS COMMON TO MORE THAN ONE STAGE OR MODULE (LEVEL II) INTERFACES BETWEEN NASA CENTERS AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY CHANGES IN EXCESS OF SCHEDULE & MONETARY LIMITS AT LEVEL III STAGE AND SYSTEM CONTRACTUAL REQTS FOR INDIVIDUAL STAGES. MODULES. GS(, ETC MANAGER PERFORMANCE CHANGES NOT AFFECTING LEVELS I OR II CEl SPECS~ OFFICES INDIVIDUAL STAGE AND MODULE SCHEDULED MILESTONES (CENTERS CHANGES COSTING LESS THAN $300,000 (MSC ONLY) (LEVEL III( CONTRACTOR CHANGES WHICH DO NOT AFFECT LEVELS I, II OR III CHANGE CHANGES WHICH DO NOT AFFECT CONTRACTUALLY REQD SPECIFICATIONS AUTHORITY CHANGES WHICH AFFECT ONLY INTERNAL CONTRACTOR OPERATIONS FIGURE 57 Assessment of the logistics program in 1966, carried out on a continuing basis in the light of overall program goals, disclosed the need for additional policy guidelines in the maintenance and supply areas and the possibility of signifi- cant reductions in program support requirements. Agreement regarding propeflants and pressurants Based on an agreement in 1966 between the Air Force and NASA, the Air Force Logistics Command will procure, distribute and manage certain pro- pellants and pressurants for both agencies under the single manager concept. Air Force support will be effected at those locations where analyses and ex- perience by NASA and the Air Force indicate that such support will be of ad- vantage to the Government and in the public interest through economy and efficiency of operations. Transportation Marine transportation Progress of considerable magnitude in the marine shipment of Saturn items has been accomplished during the past year (fig. 58, MA66-9713A). We have barged five uprated Saturn I 1st stages from Huntsville, Alabama to KSC. Delivery of the 1st stage of the Saturn V was made by the specially con- verted USN ship, PT. BARROW, from Michoud to KSC. This ship is provided by the DOD to NASA on a cross-servicing agreement at much lower cost than could be obtained in the commercial market. Air transport During 1966 we delivered three 2nd stages for the uprated Saturn I from California to KSC, utiliring the Super Guppy Aircraft. This aircraft, supple'- mented by the Guppy, an Air Force C-133B, and military helicopters, has pro- vided responsive program support to meet NASA critical test objectives by PAGENO="0122" 118 196.8 NASA AUTHORIZATION delivery of the major Saturn/ApollQ/Gemini end items. Hardware shipped to meet these objectives includes Apollo Command Modules, Service Modules, and heat shields: Lunar Module Adapters; Saturn Instrument Units; Lunar Module Test Articles; mockups and simulators; F-i engines; Gemini spacecraft and launch vehicles (fig. 59, MA66-9713B). EXPERIMENTS As with the Gemini program, the accumulation of experimental data in a variety of categories is an objective of Apollo. Experiments can be broken down into three areas of emphasis; in~fligh't, long-term lunar surface experimentation, and geological (fig. 60, MA6O-9770). During `the part of the Apollo program when earth orbital flights are being conducted to qualify systems for the lunar landing mission, some weight and volume capability and crew time will be available for the conduct of experiments. Many of these experiments, particularly in the medical field, will be expanded or improved to carry further the work initiated on the Gemini program. Others will be directed toward improved spacecraft design `and `operational techniques. A number of new scientifically oriented experiments are being introduced, to con- duct `astronomical investigations not possible from under the earth's atmosphere or to take advantage of the extended stay times under zero gravity conditions. The long-term lunar surface study is carried `out by the Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package (ALSEP). This is a self-contained package of technically advanced scientific instruments which will be placed on the moon by the astro nauts in a deployed condition to make measurements for one year or more after astronaut departure (fig. 6i, MA66-9806). Passive and active seismic experi- ments, lunar heat flow experiments, solar wind and charged particle lunar environment experiments are some of the major items to be performed by this array. Electric power for controlling the experiments and transmitting data to earth will be supplied by `a radioisotopic thermoelectric generator. FIGURE 58 I PAGENO="0123" 1 9 6 8 NASA AUTHORIZATION 119 ~ \a3~ ~ ~ 2 ~ / ~ : APOLLO PROGRAM ~ ~. ~ . , > ~ 1'~~ APOLILO TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT ~W' ~ rfl4$$fØ U~~Q4j~~ 14A$SPOQtATIQN - ~ ~ ~ ~ , ~ : ~ i~rtü* T 1' tt ` ` ~ ~ ~ ~:2:~~ ~ ~ , ANNUAL MU1* I I L~Th~ I U J t~ UTIlIZATION / 200,000 ~ a MILES SUPER GUPPY ,F I ENGINE SM IM a~ 4 a 220,000 IUPPY TM NEAT $NIELU USE SM ~ieLa~4 ~4j iooooo MAC C 133 A*PRAFT PYR~TECNNIC SP&CECRAFT (EDO AA/OUICATRARIO( CM / SPARES &`DSE DEVICES FLUUS // 20,000 T~3S USAT RAPID / / / / / // / / / / // MILES / REACTION (RAIRGINCY) EMERGENCY / IPACECRAPY / / / / / / / / ~// SUPPORT AIRCRAFT SPARE PARTS //~ / FLUlDS~. / // / / / / / / / PRIMARY MODE 111 SECONDARY OS G$I( UP MOOt ~ NAGAIU P000871 FIGURE 59 A - APOLLO PROGRAM THE APOLLO EXPERIMENTS PROGRAM * IN FLIGHT EXPERIMENTS AIRLOCK MEDICAL SCIENTIFIC TECHNOLOGICAL DOD * APOLLO LUNAR SURFACE EXPERIMENTS PACKAGE MAGNETOMETER SOLAR WIND ION DETECTOR HEAT FLOW SEISMOMETERS ELECTRON/PROTON * LUNAR GEOLOGICAL AND SURVEY HAND TOOLS SAMPLE CONTAINER ~IIPIZNG AND SURVEY SYSTEM NASA HOMA66-9770 FIGURE 60 PAGENO="0124" 120 196.8 NASA AUTHORIZATION The Lunar Geological Experiment is designed to make maximum use of the astronauts as geological observers. This experiment will involve selection of lunar samples, recording by photography the sampling sites, packaging and r~turning the samples to earth. The samples, to be used for biology, geochemistry, geophysics and other scien- tific disciplines, will be delivered to the Lunar Receiving Laboratory at the Manned Spacecraft Center. This facility is under construction for use in the initial receipt, processing, and safeguarding the integrity of, and biological con- tainment of, lunar material returned to earth by Apollo missions; and for bio- logically isolating the returned spacecraft, astronauts, and associated support personnel. The receiving laboratory will provide the means to certify the safe release of all material and personnel and to perform highly time dependent experiments such as radiation counting and gas analysis. RESOURCES Last year a potential cost problem for fiscal year 1967 on the order of $200 million was identified. Time validated our concern, and as a consequence we took stern action to turn the cost curve down (fig. 62, MC66-10277). We enjoined the presidents of our major contractors to find ways of reducing costs by about 10 percent. Members of my staff and I visited these plants per- sonatly to emphasize this need~ Reductions in support activities at the centers also were effected by the Center Directors. The effects of our cost reduction activities is reflected in cost rates. The average monthly cost rate for total Apollo R&D for the second quarter of fiscal year 1967 was $250 million compared with $282 million for the third quarter of fiscal year 1966. We emphasized reductions in contractor manpower since that represents the bulk of our costs. Although the critical design stages and periods of peak pro- duction have passed in some areas, our reductions are being carried out with care to preclude schedule and performance degradation. PAGENO="0125" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 121 Our efforts to reduce cost are succeeding. Although the fiscal year 1967 fund- ing situation remains tight we nevertheless are hopeful that we will be able to cover all of our requirements. Our estimated requirements for fiscal year 1968 are a logical extension of contractor and center effort into that year. However, estimates covering ac.tions resulting from the AS-20~ accident are not included. Our current estimates represent an extremely tight management of dollars, with our uncosted obligations providing little or no flexibility to cover additional costs. Our current estimates of costs would project uncosted obligations of approximately $170 million by the end of fiscal year 1967. This amount must cover a large number of outstanding contractual obligations and is about the minimum amount against which we could manage. It would provide little or no flexibility to cover problems when they arise. We are not clear as to the full impact of the AS-204 accident upon our fiscal year 1967 and fiscal year 1968 resources planning. We are certain that there will be an effect and it will be larger in fiscal year 1968 than in fiscal year 1969. Should the AS-204 findings require actions having a sizeable cost impact, we shall be faced with financial problems even more challenging than those of the past year. At this time, we are concerned that program detractors will use the recent unfortunate accident to suggest that a slowdown in our effort will result in savings. Aside from the fact that our colleagues gave their lives for this chal- lenging program there is false economy in cutting back now. The Apollo program has advanced to a point that the flexibility for making program cuts to avoid cost becomes extremely limited from a management viewpoint. During the initial design phase of a program, there is an opportunity for decisions which affect costs. During this period in Apollo, the overall scope of the program was determined, an optimum time span for overall development and operations established, and design alternatives selected which determined total cost. When the program moved from the design to the test phase, flexibility in curtailing costs was greatly reduced because management alternatives were FIGURE 62 PAGENO="0126" 122 19 68 NASA AUTHO1IIZAPION limited. Once the program reached the production phase, opportunities for reducing cost were further limited to substitutions of components and materials, improved manufacturing techniques, and the like. Today, a's the Apollo program moves toward the flight operations phase, all of the hardware i~ either in being, in advanced stages of production or on procurement for long lead items. I know of no possible plan for completing the missions and achieving program objectives which can be implemented with lower funding than the program presented to the Congress. A program stretch- out would result in a greater overall program cost than will the plans we are now following. In fact, a cutback in our rate of funding in fiscal year 1968 would actually increase our costs substantially in fiscal year 1969 because the rate of decline of people on the program is, as you can see, already perilously fast. To increase the rate would intolerably introduce inefficiencies and dislocations that would force costs up to fiscal year 1069 as well as delaying the program. For example, all of the long lead time items for the last Apollo/Saturn V space- craft and launch vehicles have already been placed on order and we would have to revise our whole procurement scheduling if our resources were reduced. SUMMARY In summary, 1966 has been a period of great activity as we move toward attainment of our program goals. With respect to the overall Apollo program effort, we plan to maintain the present orderly pace of effort in the many areas of current activity, such as launch vehicles facilities ground support software training and so forth Much of our capability to cope with unforeseen difficulties is dependent on maintaining planned rates of progress in all possible facets of the program This carefully developed planning has enabled us to accommodate previous problems in both the Gemini and Apollo programs and most importantly main tains the flexibility that will enable us to schedule our flight operations as necessary to continue our progress in Apollo. I have reviewed the seven development phases planned to meet the Apollo major milestones. The first major phase-unmanned Apollo flights with the uprated Saturn I launch vehicle-was completed ir~ 1966. The remaining phases planned for 1967, 1968, and 1969 require a series of earth orbital flights followed by a series of lunar configured flights culminating in the lunar landing mission These phases include the unmanned flights of the Lunar Module Apollo/Saturn I manned flights Apollo/Saturn V unmanned flights dual mission flights of the manned Apollo/Saturn I and the Lunar Module, Apollo/Saturn V manned flights in earth orbit to simulate the lunar mission, and Apollo/Saturn V open-ended missions leading to lunar operations. I do believe that we still have a reasonable possibility of meeting the major milestones for the Apollo program which were established in 1963 In particular although the probability is lowered I believe we will be able to land men on the moon and return them safely to earth before 1970. APOLLO APPLICATIONS PROGRAM INTRODUCTION I would now like to turn to a major post-Apollo program effort recommended for authorization this year. The Apollo Project is a great endeavor to achieve preeminence in space to be demonstrated by landing men on the moon and re- turning them safely to earth. In achieving this goal, the United States will have developed a broad base of equipment, trained manpower and industrial sapport that is capable of carrying out space missions beyond the manned lunar flights. Looking to the future, we have completed the definition of a program to follow Apollo. The Apollo Applications program conceived is the best means of utilizing this broad-based Apollo capability and represents an effort as important and far- reaching in its implications as the Apollo effort upon which it is based. The program will begin to investigate man's role in the effective exploitation of the environment of space to meet the needs of mankind on the earth and, in the long term, to determine man's contribution to the exploration of the universe. There are many reasons for undertaking this post-Apollo effort at this time. To cite a few: PAGENO="0127" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 123 Apollo Applications will maintain the orderly pace of our progress in the space age at e time when there may be opportunities to move ahead of the Soviets in space achievement. This program will guard against the possibility of technological "surprise" by supporting the continued advancement of an industrial technology. At the same time, it will maintain the forward momen- tum that space technology has given our competitive position in the world mar- ket place through research and development for our industrial technology. Apollo Applications will support the broad base of research and development vital to our security as a nation. It will avoid the waste, the dissipation of a space capability assembled in painstaking fashion over the period of a decade. Furthermore, it will hold open the opportunity to return direct benefits to man on earth in the next phases of space activity, maintaining the momentum achieved thus far. This first post-Apollo program will take advantage of the tremendous oppor- tunities for expansion of knowledge at a time when space-based astronomy and exploration embracing the whole field of space science show promise of break- ing through into an era of real discovery. It will provide the means to meet the challenge of the future in space at a relatively modest cost as measured against a percentage of the gross national product. The peak was in fiscal year 1966, when NASA expenditures totaled 0.83 of 1 percent of the gross na- tional product. In the current fiscal year they are 0.73 of 1 percent. In the budget proposed for fiscal year 1968, the total would be 0.66 of 1 percent. Finally, Apollo Applications will provide the capability to expand our space activity if the international situation should change. The resulting stabilizing benefits would thus be insured because this proposed program would keep the space team together, and in a position to respond to economic developments on the national scene. Background Through the Mercury and the Gemini programs, we have learned much about man's capabilities and limitations in space flight. We have demonstrated the utility of space crews and their ability to carry out complex mission plans, to conduct experiments, to accomplish extra-vehicular activity and to navigate in space both with and without ground based assistance. We will learn much more from the early Apollo missions. Prior to 1970, the Gemini and Apollo programs, building on results of Mercury and Saturn I, will have provided the capability to explore space out to 250,000 miles from earth and to conduct manned operations and experiments on flights of up to two weeks duration. The uprated Saturn I and Saturn V boosters will have injected 20 to 140 tons of payload per launch, respectively, into near-earth orbit. The Saturn V will have sent 49 tons to the vicinity of the moon. The Apollo spacecraft will have sustained a three-man crew for two weeks in a two-compartment, modular, maneuverable vehicle and will have landed two men on the moon and returned them, with samples of lunar material, to earth. The U.S. manned space flight programs will have logged more than 500 man days in space, during which data and experience will have been acquired from more tharm 100 in-flight experiments~ Pro8pects There are many exciting prospects for manned and unmanned space activities which potentially could reap great benefits, not only for this nation, but for the entire world. Such possibilities could include meterological stations to track and study the nature and behavior of the atmosphere amid the effects of solar activity on weather. It has been estimated by the National Academy of Sciences that through better weather forecasting alone, farmers, fuel producers, public utilities, com~struction industries, and water managers can save about $2.5 billion annually. A secomul possibility is research stations to map and study the earth's resources which could provide a better way of life for millions of people and prepare to meet the future needs resulting from the current population "explosion." Astronomical observatorie;s to conduct solar and stellar observations outside the filtering effects of the earth's atmosphere are a third possibility. A fourth is assembly, maintenance and operaton of communication stations potentially capable of significantly increasing reliable world-wide communications and television coverage. PAGENO="0128" 124 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION A fifth po~sibility is navigation and traffic control stations to achieve increased efficiency of transportation, particularly the operation of ships and aircraft. A sixth possibility is furthering space technology by developing and using man's ability to assemble, test, repair and maintain large space structures. In addition, the pre~ence of man in space with his abilities to reason, to analyze, to make decisions, and to improvise can contribute much to the scope and range of space activity. For example, Apollo Applications experiments performed by man on a wide variety of sensing devices can test the feasibility and utility of advanced types of meteorological observations and earth resource surveys from space. These experiments and tests will provide the data for decisions on future space systems-manned or unmanned-to derive adcliitional practical benefits from ~pace observations To develop the capabilities to carry out such missions, we must learn much more about man's capabilities and limitations in space flight. We must determine, for example, how long man can operate effectively in ~pace without returning to earth. We must learn the most effective means of accomplishing extravehicular activities such as those which would be required for the assembly of large structures in space and we must develop the most efficient and economical means of control and communications. The Apollo-developed hardware give~ us the means to study these requirements and to do it economically. The Apollo Applications program is designed to make use of this capability, by revisitation of hardware in orbit, by resupply, and by minor modification to provide expendables for longer duration of the spacecraft themselves. Basically, the space vehicle designs developed to conduct the Apollo program will be used for Apollo Applications (fig. 63, MPR66~-7783). New development requirements to adapt this hardware for Apollo Applications missions are modest and center primarily on increasing the life span of basic systems and sub- systems to meet the requirements of longer duration missions. We plan to demonstrate our ability to reuse basic orbiting space vehicle hard- ware. An orbital workshop will be established in space by using the spent 2nd stage of the uprated Saturn I launch vehicle which places a mission payload in orbit. This orbital workshop will provide an economical and convenient sheltered area for many operations in space capable of reactivation and reuse on subsequent launches. Its airlock and adapter, using Gemini subsystems and the capability of resupply, will provide for long duration missions. We believe PAGENO="0129" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 125 that by 1969 this assembly, which, in effect, is an embryonic economical space station, can be successfully established and used for a one month mission and can be left in orbit and functioning for reactivation and reuse on a later mission. In the Apollo Applications program planning we have claJs~ifleci the flight activity into two categories-alternate missions and follow-on missions. The mission planning will be discussed in detail later, however. The program of investigations and development to be carried forward in the Apollo Applications program will meet two basic objectives: to make unique contributions to practical applications, operational capabilities, science, and tech- nology; and, at the same time, to place the nation in a position to assess, on the basis of valid scientific experimentation and actual experience, the value and feasibility of future space flight and the interrelated roles of manned and unmanned systems. In support of these objectives, the principal areas toward which the fiscal year 1968 effort will be directed are the development of an extended flight capability, the conduct of manned astronomical observations from space, and the extended exploration of the moon. Objectives The major Apollo Applications objectives are shown in this chart (fig. 64, M067-5412). The usefulness of man in space will be tested and evaluated in a large, controlled space station-like environment to evaluate human per- formance and engineering requirements. Man will perform scientific and ap- plications experiments in this embryo space station to assess the value and feasibility of future space flight operations and the interrelated roles of manned and unmanned systems. The acquisition of maximum yield of solar data during the next solar maximum is an alternate mission task under astronomy observations. During the al- ternate mission time cycle, operating modules for reuse will be placed in orbit. Reuse of' hardware and Zong duration flight In the past I have described the all-up concept of testing; that is, to flight test the entire hardware system on one flight instead of incremental flight-testing of subsystems, modules and stages. I have already described in this presentation MAJOR APOLLO APPLICATIONS OBJECTIVES * USE APOLLO DEVELOPMENT TO: * DETERMINE USEFULNESS OF MAN IN SPACE. * CONDUCT ASTRONOMY OBSERVATIONS. * DEVELOP CAPABILITY FOR ECONOMICAL SPACE FLIGHT THROUGH HARDWARE REUSE AND LONG DURATION FLIGHT. * EXTEND LUNAR EXPLORATION. NASA f~Q MC67-5412 1-9-67 13~IGURE 64 76-265 0-67-pt. 2---9 PAGENO="0130" 126 1 9 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION our open-ended mission concept, `allowing each mission to proceed as far as it is capable of doing. In Apollo Applications we will implement a third concept- the reusability of hardware This will be accomplished by resupply and reuse of hardware that is left in orbit from a previous mission All of these concepts not only will give us the greatest opportunity to progress, but offer a significant advantage in letting us progress at a rate which is not expensive when compared to our previous manned space flight programs The early development of long duration flight capability is clearly one of the most important areas to be pressed forward in that it is a key requirement for most of the possible significant advances in manned flight Apollo Applications flights of up to one year or more in duration will represent a significant increase in the nation's operational capabilities in space and opportunities for important scientific and technological experimentation. Apollo Applications experiments with a wide variety of sensing devices will test the feasibility and utility of advanced types of meteorological observation and earth resource survey systems from space. These experiments will provide the data for decisions on future systems-unmanned or manned-to derive addi- tional practical benefits from space observations. Extended duration flight experience is also necessary to provide a sound basis for those future decisions on manned programs of the greatest interest and P0 tential such as permanent manned facilities in space or manned flights to the planets Year long flights can be achieved on the most economical basis by reus ing modified Apollo space vehicles with resupply Evtended lanar es~ploratwn The Apollo Applications program will follow-up the first Apollo landings with additional lunar exploration missions of up to 14 days on the surface and for observation and mapping from lunar orbit. These missions will yield important additional scientific data about the moon and will also provide the information necessary for deciding whether our manned capabilities for exploration of the moon should be further developed and exploited. APOLLO APPLICATIONS MISSIONS The Apollo Applications program proposed for initiation in the fiscal year 1968 budget is based on an :average annual launch rate of four uprated Saturn I and four Saturn V flights per year following those required for the manned lunar landing The planned program will avoid any hiatus in the continued develop ment of United States manned flight capability, will continue the availability of the nation's two most powerful rocket vehicles, and will not affect the on-going Apollo effort. Maximum economy will be achieved through the full utilization and extension of Apollo and Saturn developments. The experimental payloads included in the Apolk~ Applications program are designed to provide significant data on the capabilities of man and equipment, and on their potential ability, as promptly and as economically as possible. These plans have the flexibility of employing for new missions any spacecraft and launch vehicles currently on order for the Apollo program that, in the event of early successes, are not required to meet Apollo objectives. The Apollo Applications missions will build upon the base of flight experience ground facilities and trained manpower developed in past and current programs Each mission is designed to take full advantage of the Apollo/Saturn system to make significant contributions to a wide range of objectives. Missions are planned to concurrently gain experience, test theory, perform experiments, and collect data. By establishing multiple objectives for each flight mission, a pro- gram limited to a minimum economical launch rate can achieve rapid progress and make great gains at low cost. Key elements of this planning include the decision to use, modify and expand present Apollo systems capabilities rather than `move toward whole new develop- ments; the strategy of reusing basic hardware for many missions by storing it in orbit and returning later with fresh crews and expendables; and the approach of designing experiments that will gather important data while at the same time testing the experimental concepts themselves. Alternate and follow-on categories In the Apollo Applications program the flight activity is classified into t~ 0 categories, alternate missions and follow-on missions (fig. 65, MC66-5173). PAGENO="0131" 1968 NASA. AUTHORIZATION 127 APOLLO APPLICATIONS* MISSION CONCEPTS ALTERNATE MISSIONS USE OF BASIC LUNAR MISSION SPACE VEHICLES WHICH MAY BECOME AVAILABLE FROM THE APOLLO PROGRAM FOR APOLLO APPLICATIONS MISSIONS. FOLLOW-ON MISSIONS USE OF MODIFIED APOLLO SPACECRAFT WITH STANDARD SATURN LAUNCH VEHICLES FOR LONG DURATION MISSIONS IN EARTH AND LUNAR ORBIT AND ON THE LUNAR SURFACE. NASA MC 66-5, 173 REV. 1-9-67 FIGURE 65 ALTERNATE MISSIONS Alternate missions to the basic Apollo program in 1968-1969 will use those basic lunar mission space vehicles which may become available from the Apollo program (fig. 66, M067-5409). By that time, it is very possible that the main- stream of manned flights in the Apollo program will have shifted to the Saturn V launch vehicle and the remaining four uprated Saturn I launch vehicles and their associated spacecraft may become available for these alternate missions. Apollo Applications operations during 1968-1969 will involve three kinds of missions. The first is qualification in earth orbit of the Apollo-developed Lunar Mapping and `Survey System which will ultimately be used in Apollo Applica- tions lunar orbit flights to map and survey the entire lunar surface. The second is long duration flights from 28-56 days, with associated experiments to be performed utilizing the orbital workshop facility. The third mission category is astronomical observatons to acquire solar data during the period of maximum solar activity. These missions also would develop the techniques of manned astronomical observations in space and assess their value and future possibilities. I~unar Mapping and Survey System Test The alternate Apollo mission program will be utilized to test in earth orbit the Apollo-developed Lunar Mapping and `Survey System which will be used in follow- on Apollo Applications missions to `study the moon in great detail. This system will be used in the llflO's in manned lunar orbiters to collect data for the purpose of compilation of complete lunar topographic map series at various scalea from 1 :2,500,000 to 1:250,000 with selected areas at still larger scales. Complete cam- era systems will be operated utilizing optical, infrared and other multi-spectral sensors. In addition to topographic maps, synoptic and detailed geologic maps of the total lunar surface will be prepared. The remote sensing equipment will also collect data on the gross compositional characteristics of lunar surface material for geochemical purposes and measure geophysical parameters from depths of microns to several kilometers. The Lunar Mapping and Survey System tests may permit us to carry out at least elementary earth observations which will provide us with an early base of practical space flight experience to shape our long range earth resources program. In addition, data gathered in earth orbit by the mu1ti~spectral cameras will be PAGENO="0132" 128 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION APOLLO APPLICATIONS APOLLO ALTERNATE MISSIONS * USE OF BASIC APOLLO SPACE VEHICLES WHICH MAY BECOME AVAILABLE FROM THE MANNED LUNAR LANDING PROGRAM TO: 1. ACQUIRE THE MAXIMUM YIELD OF SOLAR DATA DURING THE SOLAR MAXIMUM. 2. PLACE IN ORBIT OPERATING MODULES FOR RE-USE. 3. PROVIDE AN EARLY CAPABILITY FOR A LARGE ENVIRONMENTALLY CONTROLLED VOLUME TO EVALUATE HUMAN PERFORMANCE, ENGINEERING CONCEPTS AND TECHNOLOGY LEADING TO A SPACE STATION. 4. DEMONSTRATE UP TO THREE MONTH ORBITAL FLIGHT CAPABILITY. NASA HQ MC67-5409 2-2~-67 FIGURE 66 utilized for reference and calibration purposes for the Lunar Mapping and Survey mission, which in turn may prove invaluable as a tool to unlock the mystery of the origin of the solar system. Orbital workshop The orbital workshop concept permits `Apollo astronauts to work and perform experiments in the empty hydrogen tank of a spent Saturn I 2nd stage by means of a 65-inch diameter airlock between the Apollo spacecraft and hydrogen tank (fig. 67, MGO6-8987). A hatch in the airlock will permit egress into space with- out depressurization of the tank or the spacecraft. In orbital flight the Command and Service Modules will dock with the airlock and the crew will activate systems to pressurize the spent hydrogen tank for habitation. The orbital workshop will enable us to investigate the feasibility of using a launch vehicle spent stage in orbit as a large habitable `space structure and de- velop the capability to carry out long duration manned space flight missions in such a structure. The Airlock and `Spent Saturn 1 2nd Stage experiment, called the orbital work- shop, i's `shown here (fig. 68, `1\~EG6G-9G11A). The airlock provides a physical connection between the docked Command Module and the uprated Saturn I 2nd stage. It also provides an airlock connection between the `Command Module and the habitable 2n'd stage hydrogen tank; oxygen and nitrogen for pressurization of the `hydrogen `tank; solar cell panel's to provide electrical power for experiments in the airlock and for those to be performed in the spent stage; and environmental control for the airlock and the hydrogen tank. Extension of `the lifetime of the assembly is provided for by additional ex- penda'bles stored on the airlock to support activities in the Command and Service Module and the orbital workshop. Experiment equipment for use in the orbital workshop is to be stored within the airlock during transport to orbit. The interior of this tank will be modified t'o permit certain experimental op- erations `to be conducted in a shirtsleeve environment within its 10,000 cubic foot enclosed space. A two-gas (oxygen/nitrogen) atmosphere life support and environmental control system, a modification of the Apollo system, is also planned. Efforts will include development of nitrogen storage tanks, partial pressure atmosphere sensors, and controls and the integration of associated hardware in the spacecraft. `Gemini and Apollo subsystems, `subassemblies, corn- ponents and methods will be utiliz?d wherever feasible. PAGENO="0133" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 129 FIGURE 67 FIGURE 68 PAGENO="0134" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 130 Adva~ntages of orbital workshop Successful completion of this experiment would provide several important advantages. The use of this orbital workshop experiment module involves minimal new development, thus allowing basic exploration of space station re- quirements within a reasonable funding level. It provides an early capability for a large, controlled environment to evaluate human performance and secure engineering data for future subsy~tem designs for both manned and unmanned spacecraft. It enables low-cost design validation and checkout of equipment re- quirements for long `term habitability in zero gravity. Finally, this large pro- tected volume in space can supplement a more sophisticated system for special purposes, such as biomedical experiments and protected tests of complete extra- vehicular operations. The orbital workshop is an important new concept for an economical embryonic space station. Using manned vehicles as space platforms, the space station will provide t.he capability for carrying out many experiments in earth orbit. It in- creases our useful habitable workspace volume by a factor some 30 times greater than the Apollo Command Module itself provides. A space station can be exploited to make many contributions in the major fields of space science, earth-oriented applications, and support for space operations. Space Science experiments will be undertaken primarily for acquisition and expansion of fundamental knowledge encompassing the disciplines of astronomy! astrophysics, bioscience and the physical sciences. Earth-oriented Applications will be those for which jotemitial ecoimomic and social benefits can be identified. These include the areas of atmospheric science and technology including meteorology, aeronomy and air pollution ; communica- tions and navigation/traffic control; and earth-sciences and resources including agriculture/forestry, geology/hydrology, oceanography/marine technology, and geography. `Support for space operations will be aimed at developing techniques and technologies for advancing space applications, exploration and travel to other parts of the solar system. Specific areas of interest include those of biomedicine! behavior, advanced technology and supporting research, extravehicular engineer- ing activities, operations techniques, and advanced mission spacecraft sub- systems. Orbital workshop c~periin en ts The next chart (fig. 69, ML6G-9785) lists engineering, medical, technology, and Department of Defense experiments which are planned `to be flown on alternate Apollo missions. The orbital workshop experiments will be most useful in the development of a long duration space station which has potentially highly pro- ductive returns in terms of broad benefits to humanity. Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) c.rpcrinicnt The Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) provides a new capability for a variety of solar and stellar scientific experiments to be performed above the earth's atmos- phere (fig. 70, ML66-9610). The ATM provides a stabilized platform which can be carried on alternate Apollo missions to accommodate experiment instru- ments having a requirement for finely controlled pointing. The ATM includes scientific instruments and supporting subsystems mounted in a structural rack attached to the ascent stage of an Apollo Lunar Module. The Lunar Module descent stage will not be used on ATM missions. The ATM rack will be equipped with a pointing control system consisting of control moment gyroscopes, fine control vernier gimbals, electronic control circuitry, and appro- priate astronaut controls and displays. A thermal control system and a com- munications and data handling system are also included. Electrical power will be furnished by a solar array mounted to the ATM rack, with rechargeable bat- teries to maintain system loads during periods of darkness. With such a configuration, the ATM can be operated in several possible modes to obtain the maximum amount of solar data within the limits of available astro- naut time and the possible degrading effects of motion and contamination disturbances. The ATM configured Lunar Module can be opera'ted either docked to the primary crew living quarters or separated from them by a tether if required to isolate the solar instruments from contamination or vehicle PAGENO="0135" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 131 APOLLO APPLICATIONS ORBITAL WORKSHOP EXPERIMENTS ENGINEERING M466 SUITS & LUNAR HARDWARE M469 ST-124 REMOVAL AND DISASSEMBLY M419 ZERO-G FLAMMABILITY M486 ASTRONAUT EVA EQUIPMENT M481 HABITABILITY/CREW QUARTERS M488 HIGH PRESSUKE GAS EXPULSION M489 HEAT EXCHANGER SERVICE M491 SURFACE ADSORBED MATERIALS M492 TUBE JOINING IN SPACE M493 ELECTRON BEAM WELDING MEDICAL M018 VECTORCARDIOGRAM M050 METABOLIC ACTIVITY MO51 CARDIOVASCULAR FUNCTION ASSESSMENT M052 BONE AND MUSCLE CHANGES MO53 HUMAN VESTIBULAR FUNCTION M054 NEUROLOGICAL STUDY (EEGJ MO55 TIME AND MOTION STUDY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE D018 INTEGRATED MAINTENANCE D019 SUIT DONNING AND SLEEP STATION EVALUATION DO2O ALTERNATE RESTRAINTS EVALUATION D021 EXPANDABLE AIRLOCK TECHNOLOGY TECHNOLOGY TOll METEOROID IMPACT AND EROSION 1020 JET SHOES TO21 METEOROID VELOCITY 1022 HEAT PIPE NASA HQ ML66-9785 REV. 2-7-67 FIGURE 69 FIGURE 70 PAGENO="0136" 132 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION motions. This assembly can be stabilized by gravity gradient forces as demon- strated with Gemini-Agena tethering on Gemini XII. The ATM is controlled by .the astronauts to orient telescopes to selected solar activity regions or specific stellar targets, using a television monitor to locate targets of scientific value (fig. 71, ML643~-9678). The ATM enables experiments to be conducted using the data gathering features of recoverable photographic film as well as of photometric techniques. Communications from scientists on the ground to the astronaut-observer will aid in the selection of targets and the data to be recorded. The ATM pointing control system can hold alignment with selected targets for long term photographic exposures. The initial launch of the ATM is planned to conduct solar observations from low earth orbits beginning in 1969 to obtain data from the next period of maximum solar activity. A mission duration of up to 56 days is expected for the initial flight. The ATM for the solar missions will accommodate the acquisition and holding of solar instruments to within 2.5 arc seconds of a target selected by the astro- naut. The astronaut will have the capability of offsetting solar instruments up to 20 arc-minutes from the center of the solar disc. Offset pointing capa- bilities for other targets will be determined by the specific orientation sensors used. The ATM provides the desirable capability of conducting space experiments with photographic data recovery. Film magazines can be recovered from the telescope cameras by the astronauts and stowed in the Command Module for the return to earth. Experiment designs selected for the first ATM launch take full advantage of this technique. Five basic experiments to obtain solar data during the period of maximum solar activity have been selected for development for the initial ATM launches (fig. 72, ML67-5554). Supporting instruments are also being developed to make the scientific experiment instruments effective (fig. 73, ML67-5555). The com- bination of instruments involved in the overall ATM experiment platform will MAN IN APOLLO TELESCOPE MOUNT 1. SENSING * INITIAL ACQUISITION AND POINTING *FINE ALIGNMENT AND TRIM 2. COMPUTING * TRIM FOR STABILITY DURING "DRIFT MODE" OBSERVING PERIODS * SETS AND CONTROLS CAMERA EXPOSURE SEQUENCES~ 3. MAINTENANCE * MONITORS EXPERIMENT OPERATION * INSURES PROPER FUNCTIONING OF ATM 4 .DATA ACQUISITION * RECOVERS EXPOSED FILM AND MAGNETIC TAPES 5.SCIENTIST * DETERMINES SOLAR EVENTS OF INTEREST AND DIRECTS SYSTEM TO OBSERVE NASA HO. ML66-9678 1-5-67 FIGtJBE 71 PAGENO="0137" 133 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION ATM SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENTS EXPERIMENT NUMBERS ORGANIZATION PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR INSTRUMENT PURPOSE S052 HAO DR. G. NEWKIRK CORONAGRAPH MONITOR THE BRIGHTNESS, FORM AND POLARIZATION OF THE SOLAR CORONA IN WHITE LIGHT. . S053 NRL MR. J. 0. PURCELL CORONAL SPECTROHELIOGRAPH MAKE HIGH-SPATIAL RESOLUTION MONOCHROMETRIC SOLAR IMAGES IN THE 60-650 ANGSTROM RANGE CHROMOSPHERIC SPECTROGRAPH RECORD SOLAR SPECTRA IN THE 800-3000 ANGSTROM RANGE WITH HIGH SPECTRAL RESOLUTION S054 AS&E DR. R. GIACCONI SPECTROGRAPHIC X-RAY TELESCOPE STUDY SOLAR FLARE EMISSIONS IN THE SOFF X-RAY WAVELENGTHS (2-60 ANGSTROMS) S055 HCO DR. L, GOLDBERG SPECTROHELIOMETRIC UV TELESCOPE MAKE HIGH SPATIAL RESOLUTION SOLAR IMAGES IN THE 300-1400 ANGSTROM RANGE SPECTROMETRIC UV TELESCOPE STUDY SOLAR SPECTRAL EMISSIONS WITH HIGH SPATIAL RESOLUTION IN THE 450-2250 ANGSTROM RANGE HYDROGEN-ALPHA SPECTROHELIOGRAPH * MAKE HYDROGEN-ALPHA SPECTRO- HELIOGRAMS OF THE ENTIRE SOLAR DISC S056 GSFC MR. J. E. MILLIGAN HI-RESOLUTION X-RAY TELESCOPE OBTAIN TIME-HISTORIES OF THE DYNAMICS OF THE SOLAR ATMOSPHERE IN X-RAYS IN THE 3-100 A'NGSTROM RANGE Fiotriuo 72 ATM SUPPORTING INSTRUMENTS NASA HG. ML 67-5554 1-25-67 ORGANIZATION PRINCIPAL INVEStIGATOR INSTRUMENT PURPOSE . HAO DR. G. NEWKIRK OCCULTING DISC ALIGNMENT SYSTEM CENTER INTERNAL OCCULTING DISK TO MINIMIZE SCATTEI~ED LIGHT NRL MR. J. D. PURCELL EUV DISPLAY TELESCOPE SOLAR DISPLAY IN EUV FOR MAIN TELESCOPE ORIENTATION AS&E DR. R. GIACCONI X-RAY IMAGE DISSECTOR TUBE X-RAY FLUX DETECTOR TO ORIENT X-RAY TELESCOPE GSFC MR. J. E. MILLIGAN PROPORTIONAL COUNTERS X-RAY FLUX DETECTOR TO ORIENT X-RAY TELESCOPE MSFC N.A. HYDROGEN-ALPHA DISPLAY TELESCOPE PRIMARY DISPLAY OF SOLAR DISC FOR TARGET SELECTION BY ASTRONAUT NASA HQ. ML 67-5555 -25-67 Fiourno 73 PAGENO="0138" 134 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION provide a wide spectral view of the phenomena that occur during the next solar activity cycle and should yield information of considerable value to our under- standing of the basic processes: of solar activity. Apollo Applications alternate missions operations The first mission (AAP-1) is planned for launch in 1968, with a payload and orbital configuration as shown in the next chart (fig. 74, ML66-9782A). The Command and Service Module carries three astronauts. The primary purpose of this mission is to test the Apollo-developed Lunar Mapping and Survey System. Test operations will be performed on the Lunar Mapping and Survey System in low earth orbit for 3-5 days. The ne~t chart (fig. 75, ML6-10,044) shows `the mission sequence of how the first alternate mission (AAP-1) is supplemented by means of orbital transfer and rendezvous with the second alternate mission (AAP-2). After the Lunar Mapping and Survey System is in low altitude circular orbit for about 4 to 5 days, `a Saturn I 2nd stage with airlock and docking adapter is launched unmanned into a high altitude circular orbit for use as an orbital workshop. The astron'atits in the AAP-1 mission configuration perform a Hohmann transfer and rendezvous with the unmanned AAP-2 configuration. The orbital configura- tion of alternate missions AA'P-l and AAP-2 after rendezvous and docking is shown here (fig. 76, ML66-9611A). With this orbital configuration, the astro- nauts conduct airlock and spent stage operations for the remainder of the mission and perform experiments. Upon completion of the orbital mission, the astronauts return to the Conunand and Service Moduie, separate it from the docking adapter, Lunar Mapping and Survey System and airlock and leave the airlock, adapter and spent stage in orbit in a gravity gradient orientation. The Command and Service Module performs a de-boost operation, the Command Module separates, enters the atmosphere and the scientist-astronauts are returned to earth. This completes the AAjP-1 and A:AP-2 missions with the orbital workshop remaining in orbital storage for the next series of alternate mission operations. Apollo Applications mission AAP3 utilizes a Saturn I launch vehicle to place a Command and Service Module into a parking orbit with three astronauts aboard together with supplies and expendables for a mission of 28-56 days duration (fig. 77, ML6-10,043). The next mission, APP-4, takes Place by launch- ing the Apollo Telescope Mount attached to the Lunar Module ascent stage into a high parking orbit about a day later. The astronauts in the Command and Service Module perform a Hohmann transfer to a high altitude orbit and per- form rendezvous operations with the Lunar Module/Apollo Telescope Mount (LM/ATM). Next this configuration achieves rendezvous with the orbital work- shop in orbit from the AAP1 and AAP2 missions. This configuration is shown here (fig. 78, ML66-9611). ATM solar observatory experiments are then conducted along with biomedical and other experiments. After about 28-56 days of opera- tions in space in the orbital workshop, the astronauts enter the C~mmaud and Service Module, separate from the orbital workshop and de-boost. The Com- mand Module is then separated from the Service Module and the astronauts reenter the earth's atmosphere and return to earth. The entire sequence of the AAP1, AAP2, AAP3, and AAP4 missions is showim here (fig. 79, ML66-8975). The major benefits from the orbital workshop and ATM missions are indicated in the next chart (fig. 80, ML66-9790). FOLLOW-ON MISSIONS Follow-on missions are being planned to use modified Apollo flight hardware with Standard Saturn. launch vehicles. The program of investigations and development to be carried forward in the follow-on missions will be directed toward the development of a long duration flight capability. In addition, manned and unmanned flights in earth orbit are under consideration to meet earth oriented applications and requirements including meteorology, communications and earth resources analysis. Flights in earth orbit, including high inclination aiid synchronous orbits, are also under study for astronomical observations and space physics experiments. Space operations and technology experiments are also being planned. The extended exploration of the moon in the follow-on missions program will involve a series of orbital surveys and lunar surface PAGENO="0139" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FloijEE 74 135 FIGum~ 75 PAGENO="0140" 136 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 76 FIGURE 77 PAGENO="0141" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 137 FIGURE 78 FIGURE 79 PAGENO="0142" 138 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION exploration operations. The Nerva II nuclear stage is planned for test as an upper stage on the Saturn V launch vehicle. An example of the kinds of experiments payload packages under development for the follow-on missions program is shown here (fig. 81, ML66-9876). This chart shows a concept of a meteorology payload package assembled to meet a number of objectives These include the flight testing of experimental meteor ological instrumentation and the use of man s ability to direct sensors to meteor ological events of moment to permit the improvement of knowledge of atmospheric composition and structure needed for long term forecasting of the weather Another example of an experiment payload package being considered for Apollo Applications follow on mission involves Earth resources experiments (fig 82 MLO6-9873). Earth resources experiments will determine the agricultural, geo- logical, and oceanographic information that can be obtained from orbit that would be useful for the evolution of earth resources on a global basis. The above examples are typical of the payload packages under consideration in Apollo Applications follow-on missions. I shall now describe the overall follow on missions program Long duration flight ~apalnltty The early development of long duration flight capability is clearly one of the most important areas to be press&iforwrard in the follow-on missions program. It is a key requirement for most of the possible significant advances in manned flight Apollo Applications flights of up to 1 year or more in duration will represent a significant increase in the nation's operational capabilities in space and opportumties for important scientific and technological experimentation Extended duration flight experience is also necessary to provide a sound basis for those future decisions on manned programs of the greatest interest and poten- tial, such as permanent manned facilities in space or manned flights to the planets. Year long flights can be achieved on a cost-effective basis by reusing modified Apollo space vehicles with resupply. The long duration flight objectives are to measure the effects on men and on manned systems of space flights of increasing duration; and to acquire opera- tional experience with increasingly longer manned space flights. A third objec- tive is to accomplish these flight objectives through modifications and adaptations MAJOR BENEFITS FROM WORKSHOP AND ATM MISSIONS * OBTAIN SOLAR ASTRONOMICAL OBSERVATIONS DURING PERIOD OF SOLAR MAXIMUM ACTIVITY * DETERMINE MAN'S EFFECTIVENESS AS AN ASTRONOMICAL OBSERVER IN SPACE * TEST ALTERNATE OPERATING MODES FOR FUTURE LARGE MANNED ORBITAL TELESCOPE * DEVELOP CAPABILITY FOR REUSE OF SPACE HARDWARE WHICH WILL REDUCE PROGRAM COSTS * DETERMINE EFFECTS OF EXTENDED DURATION SPACE ENVIRONMENT ON MEN AND SYSTEMS * DETERMINE EFFECTS OF ARTIFICIAL GRAVITY ON MEN AND SYSTEMS * DEVELOP EFFECTIVE MANNED EXTRAVEHICULAR CAPABILITY NASA N$ MLII $710 15$? FIGURE 80 PAGENO="0143" 139 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION METEOROLOGY PAYLOAD PACKAGE (APP-A) OBJECTIVES * FLIGHT TEST EXPERIMENTAL METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION * USE MANS ABILITY TO DIRECT SENSORS TO METEOROLOGICAL EVENTS OF MOMENT. * COMBINE NUMEROUS SENSORS FOR SIMULTANEOUS OBSERVATION AND CORRELATION OF DATA. * CONFIRM SPECTRAL SIGNATURES OF EARTH RESOURCES. * FLIGHT TEST SOME INSTRUMENTS WHICH MAY CONTRIBUTE TO THE DETECTION OF AIR POLLUTION. * IMPROVE KNOWLEDGE OF ATMOSPHERIC COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE. * TAKE ADVANTAGE OF INCREASED PAYLOAD CAPACITY AND VOLUME PROVIDED BY AAP MISSIONS. OBJECTIVES * ESTABLISH FEASIBILITY OF OBTAINING USEFUL DATA FROM ACTIVE AND PASSIVE REMOTE SENSORS * DEVELOP TECHNIQUES FOR EXTRAPOLATION AND CORRELATION OF DATA OBTAINED SIMULTANEOUSLY FROM SEVERAL REMOTE SENSORS. * VERIFY METHODS FOR TRANSMISSION AND ANALYSIS OF LARGE AMOUNTS OF DATA. * DETERMINE USEFULNESS OF MAN IN EARTH ORBITAL APPLICATIONS SPACECRAFT OBTAIN EVIDENCE ON THE NEED FOR OPERATIONAL EARTH RESOURCES SPACE MISSION. * UTILIZE PAYLOAD CAPACITY OF AAP MISSION. PRINCIPAL EXPERIMENTS * MULTIBAND CAMERA * METRIC CAMERA * PANORAMIC CAMERA * TRACKING TELESCOPE * WIDE-RANGE IMAGER * RADAR IMAGER EXPECTED FLIGHT READINESS DATE: MID 1970 PRINCIPAL EXPERIMENTS S DAY- NIGHT CAMERA SYSTEM * DIELECTRIC TAPE CAMERA SYSTEM * MILLIMETER WAVE PROPAGATION * MULTI -SPECTRAL PHOTOGRAPHY * IR TEMPERATURE SOUNDING `02 & H20 MICROWAVE RADIOMETER * IR FILTER WEDGE SPECTROMETER * VISIBLE RADIATION POLARIZATION MEASUREMENTS * STELLAR REFRACTION DENSITY MEASUREMENTS * UHF SFERICS DETECTION * IR INTERFEROMETER SPECTROMETER * 15 MICRON GRATING SPECTROMETER * MULTI-CHANNEL RADIOMETER * SELECTIVE CHOPPER RADIOMETER EXPECTED FLIGHT READINESS DATE: MID 1969 NASA HG ML66-9876 11 - 15-66 FIGURE 81 EARTH RESOURCES PAYLOAD PACKAGE (APP-B) * RADAR ALTIMETER AND SCATTEROMETER * LASER ALTIMETER * IR SPECTROMETER AND RADIOMETER * PASSIVE MICROWAVE IMAGER AND RADIOMETER * ABSORPTION SPECTROSCOPE * UV SPECTROMETER NASA HG ML66-9873 11 -15-66 FIGURE 82 PAGENO="0144" 140 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION of existing systems without a major new launch vehicle or spacecraft develop- ment. The existing systems used as modified for this program can serve as im- portant elements of the systems that would be required for one or more of the projected next generation of manned space flight goals (fig. 83, MC67-5410) During 1968-1969, extended mission duration can be achieved by packaging additional expendable supplies to supplement the nominal 14-day cap'ability in- herent in the basic Apollo spacecraft. The additional expendables can be pack- aged in modular form for transport to orbit either with the original spacecraft or subsequently on another launch vehicle for resupply as required. By this means, missions ranging from 28 to possibly 56 days duration are possible. Beginning in 1969, mission duration could be progressively extended from ap- proximately two months to one year or more. During 1971, the initial flight of a Command Module having a land landing capability is scheduled to take place. This system would allow establishing land landing as the primary mode, lead- ing to cost recovery savings and facilitating refurbishment and reuse of the Com- mand Module. In conjunction with land landing provision, the interior of the Command Module will be arranged to make provision for carrying 4 to 6 astro- nauts for short duration ferry missions. In 1971, the objective is a one-year mission involving a Saturn V launch of a crew module derived from the Saturn S-IVB stage, with resupply by uprated Apollo spacecraft launched on the Saturn I. The objectives for 1972 and 1973 are missions of greater than one year's dura- tion as precursors of later earth orbital space stations or manned planetary flights. Suitable biomedical instrumentation is planned to monitor the effects on the crews of these long duration flights. Land landing capability The land landing dapability planned for the Apollo Applications program will represent a major step ih the advancement of a technology which will reduce the possibilities of crew injury and equipment damage during emergency landings, provide flexibility in the accomplishment of Apollo Applications and future manned space flight missions, and facilitate reuse of command modules returned from space. First flight availability is planned for 1971 with incorporation of APOLLO APPLICATIONS LONG DURATION FLIGHT OBJECTIVES * MEASURE EFFECTS OF LONG DURATION FLIGHTS ON MEN AND SYSTEMS. * ACQUIRE OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE. * DEVELOP SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR NEXT GENERATION OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHT. * PERFORM EXPERIMENTS NASA HQ MC67-5410 REV. 2-7-67 FIGURE 83 PAGENO="0145" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 141 the system in all follow-on Apollo Applications missions. The technical objectives of a land landing system encompass the capabilities of the descent system to provide a greater glide range with maneuvering controls necessary to provide the crew with the ability to make a controlled touchdown (fIg. 84, MC67-5768). The system will provide decreased impact velocities and the capability to return heavier payloads. In addition, the system retains the original water landing capability. Since many of the Apollo Applications program missions are of long duration and open-ended, the capability to effect a land landing as well as a water land- ing, increases mission abort flexibility and capability with greater assurance of crew safety. The lower impact velocities will lessen the chances of crew injury during touchdown in abnormal landing conditions. For several years, the NASA supporting development programs have investi- gated various configurations of descent systems for manned spacecraft (fig. 85, MC 67-5516). To meet the technical objectives of the Apollo Applications land- ing system, several gliding parachutes have been identified and tests performed on small scale models. They `are the cloverleaf, the parawing, and the sallwing. Sufficient development effort on the cloverleaf configuration has verified its capa- bility when used in conjunction with retro rockets for impact attenuation. Mod- ifications to the Command Module are minimum and consist of structural configu- rations for storage and deployment of the parachutes and the mounting of the retro rockets. The parawing and the sailwing have greater glide ranges and maneuverability control and if selected for the Apollo Applications program, could obviate the necessity for the retro rockets. It is planned to continue development and test of larger scale models of the sailwing and parawing to a point where a firm de- APOLLO APPLICATIONS LAND LANDING * DESIGN OBJECTIVES * COMMAND MODULE REUSABILITY * INCREASED CREW COMPLEMENT * REDUCED WATER RECOVERY FORCES * INCREASED LAN DING FLEXIBILITY * DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS * GLIDING CHUTES * MANEUVERABILITY CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS NASA HQ MC67-5763 2-21-67 FIGURE 84 76-205 O-67-pt. 2--b PAGENO="0146" 142 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION cision can be made, at which point end-item and interface specifications will be prepared for full scale development of the selected system. This' decision would be made `by 1968. Integrated systems development and test would be accom- plished during 1968 and 1969 with first flight system available in 1970. Increased astronaut accommodations The reduced landing accelerations resulting from the land landing system minimize current crew seat requirements resulting in more useable volume in the Command Module. This will permit removal of existing couches and replace- ment with storable light-weight net couches, making the provision for carrying 4 to 6 astronauts for short `duration ferry missions (fig. 86, ML67-6005). It further provides more crew volume for experimentation and other mission re- quired operations. Studies are currently `being conducted on refurbishment and reuse of Apollo Command Modules. Soft land landing recovery and reuse pro- vides potential savings in refurbishment costs over that of water recovered space- craft because of the n'oncorrosive land environments. Life sciences e~vpersments Using the long duj~ation follow on missions in Apollo Applications observations and experiments can be made to test man s behavior and his reactions to the spacecraft environment over long periods of time Apollo Applications may not only permit exten'ding man's time in space, but provide the capability for in- cluding trained medical observers on the mission and for investigating se~ eral means of therapy `to counteract possible adverse effects of space flight. Weightlessness The effects of weightlessness on the cardiovascular and musculoskeletal sys- tems are major areas of interest. No potential problems have been identified to date, even though blood pooling in the legs, dizziness, or a loss of calcium from the system had `been anticipated as problems prior to the 14-day Gemini VII mission. Such symptoms could result from longer time exposure. It is there- fore planned to carry out a well controlled series of medical experiments. For FIGURE 85 PAGENO="0147" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 143 APOLLO APPLICATIONS CONCEPT FOR 6 MAN COMMAND MODULE RIGID COUCH SUPPORT LINKS COUCH IMPACT + x / ~~TTENUATORS COUCH EXCURSION IN Y-Y PLANE ±5.0 INCHES NASA HQ ML67-6005 FIGURE 86 these experiments measurements would be made to monitor adequately the bug term effects of weightlessness. Various means of counteracting the zero gravity effects of space will be in- vestigated in Apollo Applications. Conditioning exercises may be used. In addition, the creation of an artificial gravity environment such as a centrifuge or rotating spacecraft may also be needed. These needs would have extensive effects on plans for longer duration missions and for follow-on planetary missions. Earth -oricn tc~i ~i/~p iications In the whole broad area of the Space Applicatiouis program, follow-on Apollo Applications missions afford an excellent opportunity to conduct those Space Applications experiments for which concepts have beeui developed under the Sup- porting Research and Technology program of NASA but which must have these concepts verified iii orbital flight before they are ready to be applied, to long-life automated satellites for operational applications use. Thus, in general we expect to fly on the Applications follow-on Apollo Applica- tions flights, advanced instrument~ which would still require several years of additional development if we were to go directly to the automated spacecraft. While the basic rationale of the NASA Space Applications program, as well as its description and justification, is obviously under the purview of Dr. Homer Newell and the Office of Space Science and Applications, certain of the implica- tions of these possibilities are covered in my ensuing discussion as a function of the potential of the follow-oui Apollo Applications missions. Meteorology In Apollo 4pplicatiouis, we will ultimately have the capability for manned synchronous and high inclination earth orbital operations beginning in 1969- 1970. Emphasis can `be placed on manned operatiomus but some experiments may be directed toward ultimate unmanned or intermittently manned systems. In these cases, man would `be utilized to optimize measurement techniques and sensors, to evaluate, calibrate and checkout equipment in the space environment. By this means, highly reliable equipment could eventually be placed in auto- COUCH EXCURSION IN ZZ PLANE ±7.5 INCHES PAGENO="0148" 144 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION mated satellites for some applications. Man would also be utilized to repair or replace malfunctioning units in large sophisticated earth orbital systems. As a result of meteorological experiments in the Apollo Applications pro- gram, many benefits can be realized. The two basic purposes for the continued research and development in meteorology, both automated and manned, are (1) to explore and understand the motion and behavior of the atmosphere; and (2) to reduce the impact of the weather on daily operations private and public, and upon the economy of nations. Economic value of im~proved forecasting Improved weather forecasting techniques provided `by manned earth-orbital weather station could afford annual savings of about $2.5 billion based on a recent report of the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council. The report states: "~ * * we arrive at a total :~f around $2.5 billion (annually) that would be saved `by farmers, fuel producers, public utilities, builders, and water managers if they were equipped with better forecasting tools. This does not `take into account the economic benefits that might be obtained in the various industries associated with tourism and recreation, or the intangible savings to individual families." Improved forecasting techniques could permit optimum routing of connnercial ships and aircraft and provide a good weather warning service to commercial fishermen. Earth resources Apollo Applications follow-on manned flight operations will provide a platform for many earth sciences and resources experiments. The overall objectives of the Earth Resources Survey program are to determine those earth resource data which can be best acquired from space and to develop technological capa- bilities for the acquisition and utilization of such data. As in meteorology, Apollo Applications follow-on missions will `support this discipline by providing a test bed for the multi-spectral sensors that are required to obtain earth resources data. To a greater extent than in meteorology, man in space will play an important role in this effort and some of the follow-on mission operational flights will be manned. Five broad areas related to the earth's resources have been identified as potentially beneficial for the application of space technology. These areas are Agriculture and Forestry Resources'; Geology and Mineral Resources; Geography, Cartography and Cultural Resources; Hydrology and Water Resources; and Oceanography. Agriculture and forestry resources The ultimate responsibility of adequately feeding, clothing and sheltering today's expanding population rests in large part with the `agriculture and forestry community. Since the land, water and mineral resources are finite quantities, these resources must be utilized efficiently to meet present and future needs. The broad earth resources experiments program objectives are (1) increasing the yield/quality from lands in cultivation; (2) decreasing losses in production from infestation and forest fires; and (3) increasing cultivated acreage. Geology and mineral resources Geology is the science of the earth, its composition, structure, stratigraphy, and history. Mineral resources include iron, copper, and gold'; oil and gas; sand, gravel, and limestone. The main objectives in this program of spacecraftborne remote sensing instru- ments are (1) to develop means of mapping geology `and geophysics on a regional basis; (2) to develop methods of predicting earthquakes and volcanic eruptions; (3) to delineate regions of mineral potential for subsequent detailed study; and (4) to provide new methods of investigating major structural units. Geography, cartography, and cultural resources Geography is specifically concerned with the spatial relationships of human activity and natural processes. This includes the static and dynamic patterns of the spatial distribution of man's activity, rural and urban settlement patterns and land use, and transportation networks. PAGENO="0149" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 145 Oartography is the science of map making and map revision. Both developing and industrial nations require accurate, current maps depicting natural re- sources, cultural features, and related topography. Follow-on Apollo Applica- tions flights~ in earth orbit will enable man by the use of cameras and other remote sensors to scientifically photograph and obtain multi-spectral data from the entire `surface of the earth to fulfill these requirements. Hydrology and water resources Hydrology is the science concerned with the study of the distribution, corn- po'si:tion, quality and quantity of surface water and ground water on the land areas of the earth. Because water is generally a dynamic resource, it should be continuously evaluated, both in time and space, with respect to climatic and physical factors and human use. The availability of water is essential to the continuous human occupancy of any land area on the globe and an abundancy of water is needed for vigorous industrial or agricultural progress. Long duration manned flight operations will provide a platform for experiments to develop techniques for the study and inventory of large segments of our water supplies. Oceanography Oceanography is that collective science concerned with the understanding of the oceans. By its very nature, it is closely allied to a large number of separate scientific disciplines including biology, hydrology, geology, physics, meteorology, chemistry, and geodesy. Our knowledge of the oceans is not increasing coni- mensurately with our ever increasing activity on `and within the ocean itself. A major ob'jective of Apollo Applications follow-on missions experiments will be to develop methods to effectively utilize the vast economic potential of the oceans. Increased production of fish and other food from the sea is foreseen as well as the increased reliability of predicting sea state conditions. Synoptic and longrun monitoring of the sea/state can be made from orbital space plat- forms, with attendant estimates of wind strength and direction of the gross storm derived energy flux near coastlines, and of oceanic climatology. Sea ice movement and remote arctic and tropical floods could be monitored, and improved geologic mapping in structurally complex areas could be conducted. Political and socia' benefits The potential benefits in the application of remote multi-spectral sensing are impressive. Today more than two-thirds of the, world's people suffer from hunger or malnutrition. The major political and social concerns of many na- tional governments revolve about the problems of feeding their people. A host of international regional, national and private organizations are engaged in "food for peace" and "freedom from hunger" campaighs. All these activities have political and social as well as economic implications. The economic development `of African, Asian and South American countries is highly dependent upon improvement in their agriculture. All programs of agriculture development involve data gathering and processing. In the food- and-fiber surplus countries a continual seiirch goes on for refinements and im- provements in their survey and analytical methods. In many food-and.fiber deficient countries, programs are being initiated to develop systems of data gathering and analysis. In both groups of countries remote sensing techniques could greatly accelerate and expand the operations of data gathering and proc- essing. Since individual nations would be involved, `an overall policy sanc- tioned by the United Nations would have to be developed on how this data would be shared and made available to all nations. Communications and navigation eaperiments Within the Apollo Applications capabilities for communications operations in earth orbit and in the vicinity of the moon, some specific follow-on missions ex~ periments under consideration will have a direct impact on the lives of the average citizen of the world during the early 1970's. For example, an Apollo Applications mission `in synchronous, equatorial orbit has an enormous potential for conducting advanced communications experiments which involve in par- ticular a combination of multi-kilowatt space power systems and large space erectable antennas; and also very large diameter lenticular passive radio reflec- tors. The tremendous payload capability of Apollo launch vehicles could `be used PAGENO="0150" 146 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION to demonstrate a capability in space for jroadcasting either aural or television program material more directly to the user. The possible application of Apollo hardware and astronaut participation in these communications areas is being studied by the Office of Space Science and Applications. A TV broadcast satellite could relay broadcasts to local dis- tribution stations and enable television viewers in North America, South America, Europe and Africa to observe developing weather patterns on their home televi- sion sets (fig. 87, MC66_5200). Narrower beams could broadcast television direct to conventional TV receivers equipped with directional antennas and possibly preamplifiers. These experimental, automated, earth orbiting communications satellites, ca- pable of broadcasting voice or television directly to home or specialized community receivers, could provide worldwide coverage o~ events and entertainment. These stations could also provide access to educational facilities through transmission of educational programs, and could be of great use for broadcasting to a nation's entire population~ Earth orbiting communications satellites could accomplish much more. They could show how advanced space technology might help speed up the socio- economic development in critical areas of the world. They could further associ- ate the U.S. with the peaceful exploration of space. At the same time, in a strik- ing way, they could project U.S. concern with helping the developing areas of the world. They could bring the advantages of modern mass communications to regions lacking ground telecommunications or broadcast networks. They could bring modern teaching techniques to areas where educational facilities are limited or non existent promote health and hygiene and population control They could provide news and informational facilities previously lacking in under developed regions They could fortify tendencies toward national unity provide more widespread cross-cultural fertilization and promote the utilization of a single language in areas where multiple languages or dialects are used. During emergencies, they could provide vital services as a supplement to terrestrial communications systems. FIGuRE 87 I PAGENO="0151" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 147 Experiments in the Apollo Applications flights could lead to manned or auto- mated earth orbiting navigation and traffic control systems which could provide many benefits. Improved position fixing may reasonably be expected to increase efficiency of operation of all types of ships and aircraft by saving transit time and allowing greater margins of safety in passing obstructions. In addition to the savings afforded by faster passages, merchant ship opera- tions would benefit from better maintenance of schedules and avoidance of over- time and idle paid time of stevedores. Better position information is par- ticularly needed when a vessel approaches landfall after several days at sea. Commercial fishing vessels can improve their economic situation if ~they can return expeditiously and accurately to favorable fishing areas. Astronomy and SPOCC p/s ysics observations Apollo Applications follow-on missions operations will provide opportunities for experimenters in the fields of Astronomy and Space Physics. Apollo Appli- cations experiments will permit important and unique observations of the sun starting in 1969. At the same time, they will provide experience that is essential for the design and operation of future large telescopes in space, whether they be manned or unmanned, opening up a whole new chapter in the explo:ra- tion and understanding of the universe. Ultimately, the knowledge to be gained from a manned orbiting observatory in space may result in earthly benefits-benefits to each and every citizen of the world which far exceed that of any other application of the space program. This understanding could lead to the development of new sources of energy; to the acquisition of new and presently unknown materials; eventually to the contact of our culture with other cultures in other solar systems in the universe with results which are beyond our ability to predict or to comprehend. Orbiting optical telescope A typical orbital operational area concerns manned orbital astronomical ob- servations using optical telescopes. Astronomical observations may be made on all stellar objects and the sun. Particularly, solar astronomy will be con- centrated in the 1969-1971 period of peak solar activity which will not recur for 11 years. The orbital vantage point would allow optical astronomy free of atmospheric distortion and filtering. Once a telescope is mounted on the Apollo spacecraft and placed in orbit, the astronauts would adjust and operate it. The film and plates would be returned by the astronaut at the end of the first mission, and it may be feasible for the telescope to be left in orbit to be reactivated when the astronaut returns on subse- quent missions. It is estimated that both the quality and quantity of the data from these experi- ments would be greater. than what has been obtained previously. Man's ability to operate and maintain orbital telescopes would be tested, as well as systems and subsystems for future manned and unmanned astronomical missions. Space Physics eceperiments Space Physics experiments are also planned for astronomy missions. X-ray astronomy, ultra-violet spectroscopy, ion wake physics, and investigations of particles and fields are in this category. Technology e~rperirnents Technology experiments planned for follow-on Apollo Applications missions are focused upon the procurement of data in a space environment as needed for development of advanced systems for future missions. Initially, the required work space in orbit will be provided by a spent uprated Saturn I 2nd stage used as an orbital laboratory or workshop. Extravehicular activity experiments may involve the manned assembly and test of large structures such as radio and optical antennas; and the development of procedures for transfer, launch and recovery in space. Examples of the development of manipulative capability ex- periments include optical technology, manned locomotion and maneuvering (fig. 88, ML67-5534), maintenance and repair techniques, and the launch of unmanned satellites after they have been calibrated and checked out in orbit. Such launches may provide for a higher probability of successful operation and more accurate insertion into orbit. PAGENO="0152" 148 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Follow-on lunar erploration missions In addition to the earth orbital effort in Apollo Applications, follow-on lunar exploration missions are intended to extend knowledge of the moon gained from earlier programs, and to provide the basis for manned lunar stations. The mis- sions include month-long lunar orbital missions with mapping survey, cameras (fig. 89, ML66-9782) and multi-spectral sensors, and lunar surface explorations lasting two weeks with small surface vehicles, subsurface drills, and the emplace- ment of automatic scientific stations. Follow-on Apollo Applications lunar mis- sion objectives also Include the evaluation of the lunar surface for astronomical experiments. With increased mission duration and extended area coverage potential of Apollo Applications, it will be possible to obtain definitive answers to a number of fundamental questions pertaining to the origin and history of the moon by means of lunar orbital missions (fig. 90, MLO6-8965) and lunar surface explora- tion (fig. 91, MT6-1O,142). Consistent with the basic objective of lunar explora- tion, various scientists have proposed experiments or investigations in such fields as biology, geology, geochemistry, geophysics, geodesy/cartography, astronomy and particles and fields. These experiments are under consideration for Apollo Applications follow-on missions and are described in the following discussion. Biology The scientists have recommended that biosciences should be pursued to the maximum in answering the fundamental questions regarding the origin of life and the development of life or life-precursors. To achieve this objective, investi- gations should be conducted primarily in organic chemistry and microbiology. A FIGURE 88 The Office of Space Science and Applications Voyager program will require the capability of the Saturn V launch for its planetary missions. PAGENO="0153" 149 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGuRE 89 FIGURE 90 PAGENO="0154" 150 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 91 comprehensive program of organic-chemical aiid biological analysis of returned samples is reconunended. The organic chemistry experimentation should involvo the search for proto- organic matter or organic material that would indicate, for example, whether the moon's present state represents a stage of the evolution of the earth prior to the emergence of living forms. The microbiological experiments should involve the search for viable or non- viable organisms on or below the lunar surfaces. The search might logically include attempts to detect viable systems that biochemically or otherwise are completely different from known, reproducing earth forms. Also included should be a search for life-associated macro-molecules and other entities such as enzymes. To conduct these searches, lunar surface materials should be sampled from various locations. Great care should be taken that these samples are not con- taminated by earth material that w-ould give a false indication of organic material on the moon. As longer stay times, longer traverses and greater variety of sites become avail- able, these searches should be continued. Of particular biological interest will be samples returned from deep below- the surface or samples associated with traces of water. It will be desirable, when possible, to perform screening of samples on the nioon by taking inicrographs at high resolutions. It would also be advantageous to use the manned orbiting spacecraft to put down probes that would contain packages for wet chemical analysis in remote locations not readily accessible to manned landings. Later, when special facilities and biologists can be brought to the lunar sur- face, it should be possible to perform experiments with biological specimens on the moon. However, this phase should come after analyses have provided clear determinations of organic and microbiologic content on the moon. PAGENO="0155" 1 9 6 8 NASA AUTHORIZATION 151 Gcology The recommended exploration program for fo11o~ on missions should provide the data for a detailed analysis of the geologic history of the moon and the major processes that have acted upon the surface and interior In the early Apollo missions the major objective should be studies of the fine structure of the moon as revealed by study of the surface mainly in the maria or plains areas which appear to be surfaces formed by deposition and modified by post depositional processes of several kinds These areas include not only the marias, or lunar "seas," but also the plain-like features of certain upland regions In the limi ed time available for geological investigation on these missions the primary question should be the nature and origin of the material underly ing these plains Specifically the question is whether they are composed of lava flows and range from solid rock to rock froth or whethei they are ash or granular material pulverized by explosions of various types Another important question will be the nature and rate of the extremely slow processes that have operated on the moon's surface. To obtain early answers to these questions, the explorers should gather lunar samples with the use of simple hand tools and should undertake lunal traverses Immediately after the first Apollo landings a systematic program of geologic mapping should be carried out with the use of data from manned missions in lunar orbit, preferably over the moon's poles for complete coverage. The orbiting spacecraft should be capable of carrying and distributing lunar surface probes that would make measurements for calibrating remote sensors, characterize the fine geological features of the local area, and emplace scientific instruments. In the lunar surface missions of the first 5 sears following the initial Apollo landings the geological objective should be to test detailed theories of the nature of the three major types of lunar terrain-the maria or lunar seas the cratered highlands and a presumed thermally active crater such as Aiphonsus In the latter half of the decade the objective should be to obtain a broad reg monal integrated picture of the surface geology and crustal sti ucture of the moon by means of a series of traverses along the equatorial belt. Geochemistry The return to earth of lunar samples for analysis the most important scien tific objective of Apollo has particular application to geochemistry Seven objectives of geochemistry investigations on the returned samples have been recommended These are (1) to compare the composition of the earth and the moon in ternis of bulk chemistry and the ratios of certain elements and isotopes (2) to compare the time scale of events in the moon s history w ith that of the earth s history (3) to determine the evolution of the moon by establishing the ielative ages of major events in its history (4) to establish whether there is evidence of chemical differentiation on the moon or w hether it has i emained essentially unchanged since it was originally formed; (5) to establish the gross composition of the lunar surface as a whole; (6) to establish the relative roles played by internal and external processes in shaping the present surface topog- raphy; and (7) to determine whether the moon should be surveyed more exhaustively foi resources such as water oxygen and energy sources which would simplify lunar phase supplying and enable it to be used as a staging area for planetary exploration Analysis of lunar samples returned to earth should include determination of the abundance of elements evidence of gas formation separation of metallic phases isotope investigations and other tests where suitable As it becomes possible for the explorer to spend longer times omi the moon field selection of samples will be necessary and some tests should be done on the moon particularly of materials that may be altered by return to earth ~nalytical devices should be carried to extend the power of the observer on the lunar surface to differentiate materials that are virtually similar and make an optimum selection of samples to be returned to earth for detailed examination Geophysics The lunar surface experiment packages to be carried on the early Apollo missions represent a major opportunity for performing geophysical research The packages should include the following instruments magnetometer heat flow probe passive seismometer active seismometer lunar atmosphere detector micrometeorite detectors and, if weight permits, a gravimeter. PAGENO="0156" 152 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Since geophysical observations are usually synoptic, it would be desirable to build up a net of observation points on the moon. In the follow-on Apollo Applications flights, traverses of about 10 kilometers from the landing point would be desirable to permit the emplacement of such a net. Probes dropped to the surface from lunar orbit would also contribute to the net. When roving vehicles become available, gravity and magnetic anomalies asso- ciated with local and regional subsurface structures should be studied. Active seismic experiments with 10 kilometer profiles should be conducted. If the magnetic field of the moon proves sufficiently strong, a magnetic survey from low orbit should be made. Also from orbit, use of an electro-magnetic pulse probe would provide significant geophysical information. As more payload space becomes available, studies should be conducted to determine the maximum sensitivity that can be attained by seismometers em- placed on the moon and the efficiency of explosive and impact energy sources, which will transmit acoustic signals tjirough the moon's interior. Analysis of these signals will provide information on the moon's interior, just as an under- standing of the earth's interior is gained through analysis of the transmission of seismic reports of earthquakes. After the average heat flow is determined, studies should lie made of regions where the heat flow is anomalous. For detailed study of specific features of interest, dense networks of passive seismic stations should be emplaced, and seismic refraction, gravity and magnetic surveys conducted. Geodesy/cartoirraphy Geodetic and cartographic information is required for the moon in support of other scientific disciplines, especially geology and geophysics, since it provides the means of correlating theoretical and experimental results. Tasks to be carried out include establishment of a coordinate system centered on the moon, description of the moon's gravitational field, derivation of the moon's center~of gravity and distribution of mass, and establishment of a three- dimensional geodetic control system. Other tasks include systems for the col- lection, reduction, and presentation of photogrammetric data for lunar maps; measurements for complementary data such as rotation, librations, and lunar tides; and research and development programs for improving lunar geodetic information. Intensive study should be undertaken to determine the design features of optimum camera systems for lunar geodesy and cartography. The cartographic camera should be coupled directly with a stellar camera and precise time should be available on the spacecraft. Precise altimetry is also necessary. Second priority should be assigned to the development of a high-resolution camera sys- tern. Information on the lunar gravitational field would best be obtained by tracking lunar satellites from the moon itself. Laser altimeters should be developed for use from lunar orbits and radar and laser ranging should be undertaken from the earth to the moon to improve our knowledge of the moon's orbit and librations. Astronomy The moon offers a potential base for astronomical research. At the present time, available engineering and environmental information is insufficient to predict whether the moon's surface or a high earth orbit is better for this purpose. Studies should be started as soon as possible to determine the environment of the moon as it relates to an astronomical base. In radio astronomy, a small, low-frequency radio telescope should be placed on the moon as early as possible to assist in obtaining environmental data. Feasibility studies should begin for a radio telescope array on the order of several kilometers, and a 100-foot dish antenna, both for operation in the latter portion of the 1970's. In optical astronomy, a pilot telescope should be located on the moon in the early 1970's as an environment testing device. This telescope could serve as a research instrument as well as for site testing and could act as a prototype for the design and operation of a 100-inch telescope, should it prove desirable to place such an instrument on the moon. A lead time of about 15 years may be required for the construction of a 100-inch lunar telescope. In X-ray and gamma ray astronomy, experiments should be conducted in the early 1970's to determine whether the lunar horizon or a crater rim might be used in locating such sources in space by the occultation method. PAGENO="0157" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 153 Lunar phy8ios Investigation should be conducted on the moon's surface to determine the relationship between the lunar magnetic field, if any, the solar wind and any shock front that might result from their interaction. Particles and fields measurements should be carried out in lunar orbit and on the lunar surface by three-axis magnetometers and particle detectors. These instruments should be included simultaneously in the lunar surface experiment packages to be emplaced on the early Apollo missions and on lunar orbiting spacecraft. Measurements should also be made of the vertical component of the lunar electric field, as early as possible in the Apollo program. Additional measure- ments should be made in orbit of reflected cosmic rays and neutrons, with the latter assisting in the search for water or ice on the moon. In the early missions following the initial Apollo flights, coordinated measure- inents should be made of particles and fields at different attitudes, on the surface, about 10 meters above it, and in orbit of about 40 kilometers altitude. Timing of' Apollo Applications program So far I have discussed what we can do. with the Apollo equipment; now I would like to explain in more detail why it is essential to proceed with the Apollo Applications progrnm in the fiscal year 1968 budget. The charts (fig. 92, MC67- 5907; fig. 93, MC67-5906) show the status of Apollo Saturn launch vehicle and spacecraft procurement as of February 1967. Note that all of the uprated Saturn I launch vehicles have been procured and that the last of these are now in fabrication and assembly. Of the 15 Saturn V launch vehicles needed for the manned lunar landing, all have been ordered except the last five. However, long lead procurement has been authorized for these vehicles and they will soon be in the Apollo pipeline. Of the 21 Command and Service Modules, all have heeii ordered except the last three and again long lead procurement for these has been initiated. All of the 15 Lunar Modules have been ordered and they are in various stages of activity in the Apollo pipeline. This chart (fig. 94, MC67-5917) shows the lead time relationship between the launch vehicles for the basic Apollo project and the follow-on Apollo Applica- tions project. APOLLO SPACECRAFT PROCUREMENT STATUS AS OF FEB. 25, 1961 LONG BLOCK ~ IN FABRI - ORDERED BUT LEAD SPACECRAFT DESIGN- USED "a" CATION AND NOT YET IN PROCURE- TOTAL __________ ATION COMPLETED ASSEMBLY FABRICATION MENT - COMMAND BLOCK I 3 3 - - 6 BLOCK I MODULE BLOCK II - 2 1 3 3 15 BLOCK II GRAND TOTAL=21 SERVICE BLOCK I 3 3 - - 6 BLOCK I MODULE BLOCK II - 2 1 3 3 15 BLOCK II GRAND TOTAL=21 MODULE 3 4 8 GRAND TOTAL=15 NASA HQ MC67-5907 2-27-67 FIGURE 92 PAGENO="0158" 154 1 9 6 8 NASA AUTHORIZATION SATURN LAUNCH VEHICLE PROCUREMENT STATUS AS OF FEB. 25, 1961 IN FABRI - ORDERED BUT LONG LAUNCH STAGE USED ASSEMBLY CATION AND NOT YET IN LEAD TOTAL VEHICLE COMPLETED ASSEMBLY FABRICATION PROCURE UPRATED S-lB 3 1 2 12 S-lB SATURN I S-IVB 3 7 2 12 S-IVB LU. 3 * 4 5 121U. SATURN V S-1C 5 5 - 5 15 S-1C S-Il - 3 7 - 5 155-lI S-IVB 1 4 .5 - 6 16S-IVB LU. - 3 5 2 5 15LU. NASA HQ MCÔ6-5906 2-27-67 FIGURE 93 ~ \ ~~c\~4 Z~Z)~~t I t~'~$. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ UPRAT!DSATURNI %~ H t t tto tAStAPOLLO RA*a at ` `* ~ ~ ~`3~a~ ~ ~ ~k~st ~2~~cc ~ ~ ~ \~c~e~M ~ b~~?I ~ ~ ~ ~h~S ~ L~c:;~~~: ~r t ~ ~Aj*~ ~ ~;*~~qL) i,ia ~ Ls ~ 361 j , ~ itto ;~ ~ ~ ~~tCt~ ~ r*k :~~~)4 ~ ~ \~ Mu1i%~ !:~t~t~ :~ ;~1r ~ ~ ~ ~ k M ~ ~ ~ ;; ~ ~a%%~1 ~ ~ " ~ * ~d~*W?:,~t s~ i: ~ k~?% ~ ~ ~ ~ C ~ I I ~ ~Q 4;' ç~ ~ *, ~ ~t*;i:~: ~ ~ `~ ~t isJ~: 1pt~tbr~ ~ ~it~t ~S k ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r~r ~ \~%;pts4~ ~ tpt ~ ~ ~ ~ t6 ~) 1~ ~ t ~ ~ ~2:L5 1~ ~*f~kflkk ~ ~ ~ ~;v~; ~ ~ ~; : FIGURE 94 PAGENO="0159" 1 9 6 8 NASA AUTHORIZATION 155 The various elements of the launch vehicles have slightly different lead times but planning is such that all launch vehicle entities arrive at the Cape at the proper time for integration and launch For clarity the total vehicle lead times are shown in this chart. The chart does not begin to show th~ complexity of the follow-on procurement situation for Apollo Applications I believe however in the time available it will help to clarify our funding requirements for fiscal year 1968 The lead time problems we are currently facing-maintaining continuity of the capability developed for Apollo-are evident in this chart Similar situa tlOiL5 exist for the spacecraft and other Apollo equipments. For Apollo we have an established production rate which delivers 4 uprated Saturn I launch vehicles per year to KSC The top bar on this chart shows that we initiated the procurement of long lead time items for the last Apollo uprated Saturn I vehicle at the beginning of fiscal year 1966. This last vehicle will be delivered to the Kennedy Space Center the latter part of fiscal year 1968 The second bar on the chart represents the procurement through delivery cycle for the first uprated Saturn I to be used for the follow on Apollo Applica tions missions Note that we initiated long lead time items last year Moving to the third and fourth bars on the chart w e are show ing sinulai data for the Saturn V launch vehicle. In comparing the initiation of procurement for the Saturn V vehicles it should be noted that there is a change in production rates for follow on procurement This change i esults in different requirements for phasing the initial procure ment in order to permit a smooth transition from higher to low ei production levels In fiscal year 1968 we have planned a nunimum level of effort for the Saturn V. We then phased this effort with the current production rate to obtain the most effective cost structure. This approach requires utilization of the capability needed to n1aintain the minimum level of effort over the shortest period. The ordering of follow-on Apollo Applications hardware as shown on the chart (MC67-5917 see p. 154) `tccoinplishes the desired results This effort will permit us to accomplish significant results with the first follow-on Apollo Applications Saturn V vehicles and it will provide a means of maintaining the national capability referred to earhei It w ill also `illow `L foui per year rate in the future to meet the follow-on mission goals. The President's Science Advisory Committee in their report published in Februaiy 1967 i ecommended an average four per year rate for the S'iturn V which w e c'ui provide if the required funding is available. Similarly we are requesting funding for experiments and mission support associated with this reduced rate of space vehicle delivery to use these vehicles in a broad spectrum of investigations of great value to human knowledge and to our national strength Specifically the equipment and mission support is provided for the Apollo Applications program missions I discussed earlier `md the definition of other experiments and payloads for follow on missions In summary FY 1968 is a key year for exercising the options that this Corn mittee permitted us to hold open in fiscal year 1967. If we fail to exercise the options we will begin to phase down the manned space flight activities `md "mothball" the facilities. As I mentioned if we exercise our option we will maintain the momentum and capability of the space team' that has been so painstakingly assembled over the past decade We can provide near term scientific and practical benefits We can open up tremendous opportunities for the expansion of knowledge at a time when space based astronomy and exploration show promise of breaking through into an era of real discovery We can provide opportunities to return real bene fits to the man in the street We will maintain the forward momentum of U S technology in support of international competition and national security We will develop options to guard against the possibility of technological "surprise." And we can provide a bridge to space explor'mtion of the future in time resulting in manned exploration of the solar system SUMMARY In sumniai y Apollo Applications will maintain the oi derly pace of our progress in the space age at a time when there m'iy be opportumties to move ahead of the Soviets in space `ichievement PAGENO="0160" 156 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION It will guard against the possibility of technological "surprise" by supporting the continued advancement of an industrial technology. It will maintain the forward momentum that space technology has given our competitive position in the world market place through research and development for our industrial technology. It will support the broad base of research and development vital to our security as a nation. It will avoid the waste, the dissipation of a space capability assembled in painstaking fashion over the period of a decade. It will hold open the opportunity to return direct benefits to man on earth in the next phases of space activity, maintaining the momentum achieved thus far. It will take advantage of the tremendous opportunities for expansion of knowledge at a time when space-based astronomy and exploration embracing the whole field of space science show promise of breaking through into an era of real discovery. It will provide the means to meet the challenge of the future in space at a relatively modest cost as measured against a percentage of the gross national product. The peak was in fiscal year 1966, when NASA expenditures totaled 0.83 of 1 percent of the gross national product. In the current fiscal year they are 0.73 of 1 percent. In the budget proposed for fiscal year 1968, the total would be 0.66 of 1 percent. Finally, it will provide the capability to expand our space activity if the international situation should change. The resulting stabilizing benefits would thus be insured because this proposed program would keep the space team together, and in a position to respond to economic developments' on the national scene. MISSION OPERATIONS A YEAR OF INITIAL FLIGHT TEST For mission operations, 1966 was a year of initial flight test of the Apollo space vehicle and exercise of mission `operations support equipment (fig. 95, MA66-9631). Two of the successful unmanned Apollo flights were from Launch Complex 34, and one from Launch Complex 37. We encountered a number of problems during 1966 __ YEAR OF INITIAL FLIGHT TEST * THREE SUCCESSFUL UNMANNED FLIGHTS * SHAKEDOWN OF L/C 34 & 31 * SHAKEDOWN OF APOLLO LAUNCH DATA SYSTEM * DELIVERY OF APOLLO MISSION SIMULATORS * INSTALLATION OF USB EQUIPMENT AND DATA PROCESSORS * DELIVERY OF FIRST APOLLO SHIP * USED TWO CONTROL ROOMS AT SAME TIME * TRAINING OF LAUNCH, FLIGHT, NETWORK AND RECOVERY PERSONNEL * DEVELOPMENT OF LAUNCH AND FLIGHT ORGANIZATIONS AND PROCEDURES NASA HG MA669631 111566 FIGURE 95 PAGENO="0161" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 157 the checkout of these pads which had been modified for launching uprated vehicles. Launch Complex 37 is now undergoing modifications for the Lunar Module and we still have Block II modifications to be made to Launch Complex 34. However, we have succeeded in eliminating the major problems from. these two launch complexes, and now we are well along with Launch Complex 39 for the Saturn V flights. In our flights, we had little difficulty after getting to the launch pad with our flight hardware. Most of the problems were in the ground support equip- ment and facility items. The Apollo launch data system, which is located in the Central Instrumentation Facility at KSC, became operational in December 1965. This system replaces the similar Gemini launch data system which was located primarily in the Mission Control Center at Cape Kennedy. Except for a few minor programing problems during our three missions, performance of the Apollo launch data sys- tem was successful. Two of our three Apollo mission simulators were delivered early in the year. These two simulators have been used in the preliminary training for our flight crews. We are supported in our mission operations by NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center and the Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition. Both Goddard and OTDA and their contractors made excellent progress during the `year in facility construction and in installation of the equipment associated with the Unified S-Band equipment. We were able `to give three of the stations a limited test on AS-202. Final system testing for `design confirmation will occur on later flights. As we install the Unified S-Band equipment, we are also in the process of putting in new data processing equipment at most of our manned space flight netw'ork sites. We are upgrading to the UNIVAC 642-B computer which is replacing the smaller UNIVAC 1218 computer. This work will continue through 1967. We have had success with the first equipments put on line, and they will provide support during upcoming missions. Our first Apollo instrumentation ship, the VANGUARD, arrived at the Eastern Test Range in the fall of 1966 to undergo testing. The ship went out to an instrumented portion of the range for a check of metric tracking accuracy, and during the Gemini XII mission did some C-Band tracking and some communi- cations work. As you may recall, when we originally designed the Mission Control Cente'r at Houston we had the capability of conducting a live mission from one floor and conducting simulated training exercises on the second floor. This was not used until last year when, at some time during all three of our preparations for Apollo shots, we were conducting training exercises on the se'cond floor while live Gemini flights were flown from the third floor. This capability is now being upgraded so that two unrelated simultaneous live missions will soon be possible. The training of our operations personnel which commenced late in 1965, progressed throughout 1966. As the Gemini program began to phase down, many experienced Gemini personnel were made available for use in the Apollo pro- gram. rn the middle of 1966, some of our more experienced people in the Apollo Saturn I program also began to move over and prepare for the Apollo Saturn V missions. One fundamental change in our launch and flight organizations was made from those used in the Gemini program. The change reflects the organizational responsibility arising from use of the NASA Saturn launch vehicles instead of Air Force Titan boosters. Phi~ internal realignment at KSC, along with the realignment of personnel, served to strengthen our launch organization. SOFTWARE PROGRAMS I would now like to discuss some of the software involved in the operations programing for the equipment shown here (fig. 96, MA66-9660). This chart is really divided into two phases. On the lefthand side of the chart are the facilities used for processing the data during the launch phase. On the right- hand side are those used basically during the orbital phase of the mission. The box at the top represents the two pieces of flight hardware, the launch vehicle digital computer and the Apollo guidance computer. 76-265 0-67-pt. 2-11 PAGENO="0162" 158 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION MSF TELEMETRY/COMMAND COMPUTER SYSTEM DOWN RANGE - I USB &VHF GBI MILA USB USB 4, ~, 4 P [fiL CM 1/1 CM I 1642B642B 642b6~Bj 51.2 K/S FIGtTBE 96 Information in the form of commands to the space vehicle and telemetry to the ground is processed by the three stat~ons which aie located in the Cape Kennedy area to cover the launch, and processed into the Data COre equipment, which is located in the Central Instrumentation Ii acuity at the Cape Data then is passed back to the Mission Control Center tt Houston where it is processed by the UNIVAC 494 s and IBM 360 s We also are processing data to Huntsville where we can provide real time off line advice and assistance to the launch vehicle area After we get into orbit the information is processed by the Manned Space Flight Network stations It proceeds on to the 494 computers at Goddard Space Flight Center, then into the Control ~nter at Houston. During the three orbit life of the launch vehicle these data are passed to Huntsville Interface chec1~out pi obtems One of the major problems that we have is working out the interfaces between the various software programs and making sure that they operate together properly as we progress towards the mission. Based upon our present experience, we estimate it will take us something like 48 days from the time we have all of the software available to mate it progres- sively, until we have checked it out with the launch pad, the Control Center and the Manned Space Flight Network Our software programs pre~~ared by Goddard must be available for delivery to the Manned Space Flight I\etwork stations approximately two weeks before launch so that we then can conduct our final flight controller training Checkout of this software first progresses within the Mission Control Center where all of the hardware and software systems must be checked out. Next it ANT USB T/L CM 642B 642B UNIVAC I LIEF GE GE 1108 ] 635#1 635#2 HOSC CIF HUNTSVILLE KSC LAUNCH PHASE LEGEND HOSC HUNTSVILLE OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER LIEF LAUNCH INFORMATION EXCHANGE PACILITY ALDS APOLLO LAUNCH DATA SYSTEM KB/S KILOBITS PER SECOND CIF CENTRAL INSTRUMENTATION FACILITY ORBIT PHASE T/L TELEMETRY LINK CM COMMAND LINK USE UNIFIED S BAND DDP DIGITAL DATA PROCESSOR NASA HO MA6B9660 REV. 1-27-67 PAGENO="0163" 1968 NAS4 AUTHO1UZATION 159 is integrated with the Manned Space Flight Network stations, using their remote site data processor progranis. Then, after all of these interfaces have been checked, we mate it with the space vehicle on the launch pad, giving us our final overall verification. In the case of the Apollo Saturn 202 flight, we were required to go through this process several times before we were able to debug the software. After we acquire more experience, we expect gradually to reduce the amount of testing required to resolve all of the interfaces. At the present time such testing is one of the major factors in our 61-day turn around time. This is the time between the completion of one mission and the launch of the next mission, i1 they are being conducted from the same floor of the Control Center. MANNED 5PACE FLIGhT NETWORK Next, I wish to talk about the Manned Space Flight Network (fig. 97, MAO6- 8951). Ground stations This chart indicates the development of our Manned Space Flight ground stations, starting with the initial facilities when the equipment is delivered, as it progresses through system evaluation and testing, through network integration, and finally to operational status. We have shown here the eleven 30-foot dish stations and the three 85-foot "deep-space" stations. At the bottom are some of the Gemini stations which will continue to be used for some time yet in the Apollo program. As I pointed out earlier, three of the stations supported the AS-202 mission and gave us a limited test of our Unified S-Band tracking and communications capa- bility. These were Merritt Island (MILA), Bermuda, and Carnarvon. All of the stations except Antigua and Canary will support the first manned flight. Prior to the time we get to the first Apollo Saturn V manned flight, all of them will be available to support our launches. FIGURE 97 PAGENO="0164" 160 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION We have arranged with the Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition and with Goddard Space Flight Center to use these stations on a limited basis as they be- come operational, and then gradually to increase the system use to meet full requirements as we enter a completely operational configuration. Coin inunication satcilitcs As you know, our Manned Space Flight Network will utilize satellite commu- nication services provided by the Communications Satellite Corporation. We have shown here the three stations which already have a Comsat ground facility. Service began February 5, 1967 using a Pacific satellite. A satellite for Atlantic coverage will be launched in March 1967. We also will have three stations which are capable of handling live television- Merritt Island, Madrid, and Goldstone. The MILA capability is already in op- eration and will be used on the first manned mission, while the other two stations will come in at a later point iii time, prior to the first lunar mission. ~hip$ and a.ir&aft This chart shows the implementation schedule for the ships and the eight in- strumented aircraft (fig. 98, MA66-8950). Ships include three Apollo instru- mentation ships, two reentry ships, and the two Gemini ships which will con- tinue to be used until the Apollo ships become operationaL The VANGUARD is undergoing testing at Cape Kennedy and is ready for support of Apollo missions. It does not have a Comsat capability at the present time but will be brought back into the yard at a later date for modification. The REDSTONE and the MERCURY will have the Comsat capability when they are delivered. Fiounu 98 PAGENO="0165" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 161 In the case of the aircraft, the first aircraft was used in the final Gemini flight on a test basis. It was able to receive Very High Frequency band telem- etry and also to act as a voice relay from the Cape area back to the Mission Control Center at Houston. We will use three aircraft on the first manned mission. As we get into the latter part of 1967, all of these aircraft will reach their full operational status. We plan to use them on a progressively increasing basis as we develop and check-out their capability. I have several views of the ships and aircraft carrying communication equip- ment. This is the VANGUARD, showing the telemetry antenna, the Unified S-Band antenna, and other radar equipment (fig. 99, MA66-9418). The next view shows more clearly a modification `to the VANGUARD for the Comsat satellite capability in the forward portion of the ship (fig. 100, MA66- 9633). To accommodate `this rather large antenna it was necessary to modify the bridge area to maintain adequate visibility for navigation. These are pictures of the first Apollo reentry ship and `the instrumentation aircraft (fig. 101, MA66-9807; fig. 102, MA66-8958). RECOVERY FORCE I will discuss next the recovery force for manned space flight missions and recommendations that have been made for changes. Early last year we were informed by the Navy that they saw difficulty in meet- ing our Apollo recovery requirements, particularly in 1968 (fig. 103, MA66-9919). As a result of a continued series of discussions with the Navy, NASA reviewed its recovery requirements. This review continued throughout most of the sum- mer, and by October of 1966 we had forwarded a revised list of ship requirements to General L. I. Davis, the DOD Manager of Manned Space Flight Support Opera- tions. Most of the reductions which we were able to effect were in `the AS-503 FIGURE 99 PAGENO="0166" 162 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 100 FIGURE 101 PAGENO="0167" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 163 APOLLO PROGRAM PROPOSED SPECIAL DOD RECOVERY FORCE * NAVY HAS INDICATED INADEQUATE RESOURCES FOR RECOVERY SUPPORT * NASA HAS REVIEWED APOLLO RECOVERY REQUIREMENTS * NAVY HAS RECOMMENDED ACTIVATION OF A DEDICATED RECOVERY FORCE TO JCS * JCS HAS RECOMMENDED APPROVAL OF NAVY PROGRAM CHANGE TO SECDEF * AIR FORCE HAS RECOMMENDED RECOVERY BY HEAVY HELICOPTERS TO DOD * DOD HAS RECOMMENDED NASA-DOD STUDY NASA HO MA66-9919 U -15 .66 FIGURE 102 FIGURE 103 PAGENO="0168" 164 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION and AS-504 time periods. In the case of AS-503, we were able to reduce our ship requirements from 10 to 6, and in the case of AS-504 from 17 to' 11. OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS As a final comment regarding Missions Operations, I would like to mention three of the potential constraints in the operations area which have been dis- cussed previously (fig. 104, MAOO-9832). Based upon our present experience, we are constrained to a minimum of 61 days turn around time from the splash of one mission to the launch of the next mission. I believe `that as we get `additional experience with our software and new equipment, that we ~vi1l be able to reduce this time required. But at the moment it is one of our items of concern. I have discussed also the availability of Apollo simulators and I have covered the `status of the Apollo `ships. It `will be necessary for us to follow carefully the completion of this program throughout 1967 to make sure that the hard- ware stays on schedule and can provide the support that we need to `meet our launch schedule. In summary, 1967 will be a~ demanding year `as we prepare for lunar flight (fig. 105, MA6O-9588). Among the mission "firsts" planned are a Lunar Module flight and flights of the Apollo Saturn V space vehicle, which I have previously described in my discussion of the Apollo flight schedule. In addition, we will achieve operational status of the huge and intricate Launch `Complex 39. The Mission Control Center at Houston, Texas, will be converted to third-generation computers. The Manned `Space Flight Network will `be made completely operational for Apollo. The remaining Apollo training equipment and facilities will be made operational. And finally, our astronauts, flight `controllers, and launch crews will be train- ing in prepa'ration for lunar flight APOLLO PROGRAM A POTENTIAL CONSTRAINTS * MCC-H/MSFN TURNAROUND TIME BETWEEN MISSIONS * SIMULATOR AVAILABILITY * OPERATIONAL READINESS OF APOLLO SHIPS NASA HO MA66-9832 REV. 1-17-67 FIGURE 104 PAGENO="0169" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 165 1967 THE YEAR OF LUNAR FLIGHT PREPARATIONS *LAUNCH COMPLEX - 39 OPERATIONAL *FIRST SATURN V OPERATION *FIRST LUNAR MODULE FLIGHT *MISSION CONTROL CENTER - HOUSTON CONVERTED TO THIRD GENERATION COMPUTERS. * MANNED SPACEFLIGHT NETWORK COMPLETELY OPERATIONAL FOR APOLLO - SHIPS, AIRCRAFT, FIXED SITES, COMSAT * REMAINING APOLLO TRAINING RESOURCES OPERATIONAL * ASTRONAUTS, FLIGHT AND LAUNCH CREWS TRAINING FOR LUNAR FLIGHT NASA HQ MA 66-9588 3/1/67 FIGURE 105 ADVANCED MANNED MISSIONS INTRODUCTION Just as our Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and Apollo Applications programs have evolved from advanced studies of the past, so will the programs of the future evolve from our present advanced manned mission studies. The potential future missions defined by these studies have involved many considerations, not only those of NASA and other government agencies, but those of the scientific community as well as the recommendations of the President's Science Advisory Committee. Although our presently defined advanced program does not meet all of the specific recommendations contained in the President's Science Advisory Committee report published in February 1967, we are consistent in direction. The applications program including the Apollo and near post-Apollo period are being discussed in some detail for this Committee by the Associate Admin- istrator for Space Science and Applications, Dr. Homer Newell. I should like to review for you now some of the potential applications for a period farther into the 1970's and 1980's, as developed in our advanced manned mission studies. The NASA effort to define our future missions has resulted in a well planned and carefully arranged program of studies. Within Manned Space Flight, we formed two Joint Planning Groups; one responsible for a study on manned planetary exploration and the other for a study on manned lunar exploration. In addition, results of several years of complete studies now have been re- viewed by these Joint Planning Groups. Key technical and management people in NASA, both at the centers and in headquarters were involved in these reviews thus insuring an adequate technical depth. This NASA-wide effort was directed by a Planning Coordination Steering Com- mittee, comprising members at the Deputy Associate Administrator level from the Offices of Manned Space Flight, Space Science and Applications, Advanced Research and Technology, Tracking and Data Acquisition, and other key indi- viduals from each program office, providing a broad assessment. Reporting to this Steering Committee were NASA-wide working groups in Lunar Exploration, Planetary Exploration, Earth-Oriented Applications, Astronomy, and Life Sci- PAGENO="0170" 166 i 9 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION ences. A Space Station Working Group later was added to integrate require- ments and to consider corresponding configurations in earth orbit. These in house activities have of course drawn heavily upon the information obtained from our Advanced Study program over the past several years But more Important, the Planning Coordination Steering Committee has recognized the need for an integrated program utilizing each mode of operation, manned or unmanned where it is most effective. Basic objectives unchanged Throughout these planning efforts, the basic objectives we have previously re- viewed with you have remained unchanged. We wish to explore the moon and the near planets we wish to develop our capability to conduct earth orbital operations to serve science particularly astronomy to realize economic benefits to life on earth through earth oriented applications and to enhance our national security through R&D support of the Department of Defense and by developing new capabilities which are available for defense applications if needed The pacing and scope of implementation while recognizing current budgetary con straints must be such as to stimulate a vigorous technology development which will lead toward U.S. preeminence in space activity. M~F program ev'o1ution~-Baseline program The planning efforts I have described now enable us to define, as an example of possible options a baseline program which eventually could logically grow out of Apollo Applications. This baseline program would provide long-duration earth orbital flight with a 9 to 12 man space station and lead to manned plane tary reconnaissance/exploration with the possibility of planetary sample return Three assumptions that we have made as the basic premise in defining the baseline program were that man will be used in space missions that we will have an orbital laboratory workshop in being by 1970 and that we will maintain con tinuous space operations in the 1970's. Our Immediate objectives will be to determine the uses of men in space in four broad areas: `to work over long periods of time; to make effective observations; to reduce the cost of acquiring scientific practical applications and operational data; and to perform extended lunar exploration. Manned space station Such a baseline program i~, illustrated in these charts (fig 106 MT66-10 256 fig 107 MO66-53~8A) In Apollo Applications we could have 56 to 180 day earth orbital flights Iii 1968-69 evolving to 240 day missions in 1970 and a 1 year capability with resupply and crew rotation in 1971 By 1973 we could fly a space station with an inherent ~ year lifetime which can have the potential of serving as the 2 year mission module for manned planetary exploration in 19Th In addition it can provide a research and development and capability to advance our knowledge of astronomy communi cations and earth resources At some point during the 1970 s we would achieve the capability for continuous earth orbit During this same time period un manned Mariner/Voyager missions would provide the necessary design validation data for the manned planetary spacecraft Manned planetary missions A 1975 manned Mars exploration mission could have the capabilities of exploring Mars by remote sensors and, by means of an unmanned probe, of returning a sample of Mars surface material and atmosphere to earth for sub sequent laboratory analysis This mission could be followed by a triple planetary reconnaissance Venus/Mars/Venus in 1977 This later mission offers particular promise of early exploratory data on both nearby planets in the solar system with the possibility of sample return. It is important to note, however, that the opportunity for such a triple encounter may not occur again for a decade or more Manned lunar ecoploration During this time period manned lunar exploration could continue starting with the Apollo Applications 3-14 day missions Payload `Lnd mobility capability would be increased employing a lunar survey module for surface exploration near the landing site Later manned scientific stations might be established with operational life times up to 3 months PAGENO="0171" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 167 EXAMPLE) TA TI 10 73 74 75 76 I CAPABILITY ~s*vs 10* S LUNA 160 DAYS 7 N SURF. O400AYS 4 DAYS SN LUNAR SURF. YR. RESUPPI.6S) - OSNTRAURUA OPEITI~~YAS RESUPPLERI) - RATER- PSANETARY NOORSAPPLY - -~-- MISSIONS LOW EARTH ONRDT SYNCH EARTH OANIT LUNAR EXPLORATION L SPACU STATION L I -~ EU MARS EXPLORATION ROCONNAISSANC RTh ORRYAL AXONS - TRIPLE PLANET EXPLORATION - MARS/ VENUS EOPLORATIS - MARS EXPLURATION IRECONNAIS - . SUPPORTING PROGRAMS SURVEYOR,4IRBITER MARINER VOYAGER PIONEER - - RAD 710* EXPERIN NTS METEOROIO ~DPORMENTS ~"` OPERATIONAL FUGHTS _ flAIO~~ LIMITED EXPANDED EXTENDED LUNAR LUNAR LUNAR EXPLORATION EXPLORATION EXPLORATION CA PA B IL IT IES GEMINI APOLLO APPLICATIONS + EXPETIMENTS STAflON PLANETARY LAND~G EXPERIMENTS EXPERIMENTS APPLICATIONS PLANETARY RESEARCH INE.O. FEASIBILITY EXPLORATION FACILITY & TECHNOLOGY REFUEUNG EXPER IMENTS NASA MC66-535U-A 4-1U-66 Fiaunn 107 Decisions regarding the pace of mobility and payload delivery improvement after the Apollo Applications program will depend upon the scientific results of the Apollo Applications missions. Nevertheless, eventual establishment of a lunar base for extensive surface exploration remains an important scientific goal. In addition to its intrinsic scientific value, this advanced lunar activity could provide essential insight and system development required for interpreting planetary reconnaissance data as well as for undertaking planetary surface exploration. CV AR OR MSF EVOLUTIONARY BASELINE SPACE PROGRAM ACE) DEVELOPMENT PHASES MAN'S CAPAOLTIES DEVELOPMENT SF EOUIPMENT DEVELOP AND PROVE RAREQUAVIVAL AD EES'M'MTS FOR AND PROCEDURES FOR EQUIPMENT I PROCEDURES AND SUPPORT ] EXTENDED DURATION LOMODURATION MANNER RESEARCH - MANNED RESEARCH AND OPERATIONS CAPARILTY FIGURE 106 MSF PROGRAM EVOLUTION PAGENO="0172" 168 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION Hardware for advanced missions The space hardware required for this evolutionary program would be based, to the greatest extent possible, on a common family of modules which would have application to several missions. A space station could serve as the mission module for planetary reconnaissance as well as an advanced shelter on the lunar surface or as a lunar orbiting station. Similarly, certain of the modules for a Mars mission could also serve as the basis for the direct flight stages in the advanced lunar missions. Step-by-step program decisions In discussing possible future planetary missions, I want to emphasize that these missions may be viewed in terms of goals rather than in terms of early programmatic decisions implying long-term commitments. In fact, this example of an evolutionary baseline program has the unique advantage that the commit- ment for each step can be made complete in itself. Although each such decision prepares the way for the next development, it does not require a premature com- mitment to the next mission. All of the proposed operations of Apollo Applications provide direct progress toward the manned space station capability. While meeting the experiment requirements of such a program, we also would be resolving basic questions with application to future programs, without future commitment. We thus can con- tinue our evolutionary progress toward increased knowledge of space and towards a capability in the application of space technology. I will now describe briefly the proposed implementation of the baseline pro- gram discussed, and indicate the studies required to support it. EARTH ORBITAL MISSIONS The manned earth orbital program is based on a progression of missions and experiments which began with the Mercury system. Advancement of the program has been achieved with Gemini and will continue to advance with the Apollo and the planned Apollo Applications programs. The earth orbit experiment program objectives which I discussed here last year are still valid. Our inherent capability to carry them out has increased with our additional in-orbit manned flight experience and the availability of larger and more versatile payload carriers. This experience and hardware availa- bility, coupled with the unique capabilities of man as an on-board investigator, indicates that manned spaceborne research is now both practical and potentially highly productive in terms of broad beneficial returns to humanity. In addition, missions now under study could also promote the capability to safely conduct deep space travel, and could provide continued effective research and development support to the Department of Defense. Primary objectives To meet our broad overall objectives, we are carrying on a study program with five succinct objectives (fig. 108, MT66-7996). First, we identify potentially important manned earth orbital missions and derive from these missions the system requirements. Based on the mission-derived system requirements, we determine attractive overall space station concepts capable of meeting these re- quirements. Then by comparative analyses of space station concepts and consid- erations of the projected technology base, we formulate an implementation plan, including station configuration for manned earth orbital missions. In addition, we define and evaluate supporting ferry/logistics/rescue concepts and auxiliary experiment facilities as an adjunct to the planned space station. Finally, we identify research and development technology requirements needed for space station implementation by analysis of realistic station configurations. Mission requirements As we progress into considerations of continuing manned earth orbital space flight capabilities, it becomes clear that a significant broadening of the total scope of experimentation utilizing man will occur. The catalytic ingredients necessary for an effective earth orbital experiment program are shown in this chart (fig. 109, M066-5361). PAGENO="0173" 169 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MANNED EARTH ORBITAL ADVANCED STUDIES PRIMARY OBJECTIVES: DEVELOP EARTH ORBITAL PROGRAM PLANNING ALTERNATIVES TO SUPPORT MAJOR OBJECTIVES * IDENTIFY IMPORTANT MANNED EARTH ORBITAL MISSIONS AND THEIR PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS * EXPLORE ATTRACTIVE SYSTEMS CONCEPTS FOR IDENTIFIED MISS~NS * EVALUATE LOGICAL PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES * EVALUATE SUPPORTING FERRY/LOGISTICS/RESCUE CONCEPTS AND EXPERIMENT MODULES * IDENTIFY R&D TECHNOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS FIGuRE 108 NASA HQ MT66-7996 12-30-66 FIGURE 109 PAGENO="0174" 170 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION In the past eight years of orbital experimentation we have measured the en vironment in terms of radiation and meteoroid flux. We know the effects of up to 14 days of weightlessness on man and have performed space rendezvous and extravehicular operations. We know how to design and fabricate spacecraft :to protect man and supply him with a shirtsleeve environment, electric power and sustenance for long mission durations. Our booster capability using the Saturn V launch vehicle will be nearly 100 times the capability of the Atlas which was used on the first manned flight This increased launch vehicle capability makes possible the use of optimized instrumentation without weight limitation, such as that developed for airplane or ground military usages, with resultant cost savings. We also expect to have a nuclear stage in the late 1970's. These accomplishments sum to give the United States a major capability to perform space experimenta tion. The availability of man in space as a participating scientist, coupled with our space technology experience and rapidly increasing payload capability, puts us in the position where we can begin to apply the research program experiences and approaches developed in ground laboratories to the planning and development of an effective orbital experiment program. The ground-based research experience has demonstrated the value of orienting the research program towards specific user goals and laying out systematic programs to accomplish these goals. Manned earth orbital telescope A proposed national facility offering large potential returns in terms of deter- mining the dimensions and origins of the universe is the manned earth orbital telescope (fig 110 M066-5366) This instrument with 120 inch near diffraction limited optics, should increase our capability for resolving celestial objects by a factor of 20, extend range by four magnitudes of brightness, and allow observa- tions into the infrared and ultraviolet ranges. Such a telescope should be able to detect planets the size of Jupiter in orbit about the closest star, Alpha Centauri. Fiouna 110 PAGENO="0175" 1 9 6 8 NASA AUTHORIZATION 171 We foresee this instrument as an ultimate space capability to be obtained through a step-by-step program growing from a 38-inch telescope through a 60-inch size and finally to the 120-inch configuration. Some comparisons of orbital tele- scope capabilities with ground-based instruments are shown in the next chart (fig. 111, M066-5597). It is of interest to note that even a 38-inch telescope in earth orbit will be superior to the 200-inch Mt. Palomar telescope in effective resolution capability as well as in spectral range. Space station alternatives Only during the past few years have we begun to focus on the use of a manned orbital space station for experimentation in areas other than those dealing di- rectly with man's ability to survive in the orbital environment We are currently identifying experiments as part of an integrated science and applications program. Some key trends have developed from this overview of the total manned earth orbital experiment potential. Our total projected orbital experiment workload has grown from 10,000 man-hours at the end of 1963 to about 20,000 man-hours at the end of 1964 and at the end of 1965 approximately 50,000 man-hours had been identified for possible future implementation. A future annual workload of up to 50,000 or more experimental man-hours seems plausible to predict at this time. About this projection we have structured a potential program of orbital experimental man-hours to meet the anticipated experiment workload. From the studies completed we have concluded that the Apollo Applications program will perform many of the critical pivotal experiments identified to date. These are the experiments which will facilitate effective future utilization of a larger station in a low-earth orbit of either a moderate latitude or a polar orbit Current trends in experiment identification indicate that in the early 1970's a crew of nine men would be fully occupied on a continuous basis in space. This appears to be well within our technical capabilities for such a time perIod. We can further foresee the possible desirability of a station in synchronous orbit, primarily to exploit the advantages of continuous synoptic coverage of a ~ ~ `! ~"vyiI1~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e: ~ ~ ~ < ~ ~ ~ " ;t;L~:t ~ ~ ~` ,~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t , ~ ~-* ~ , t~; ` ~! ~ ~`4$4~~y'~ ,` ~ ~- ~r> ~ ~ ~ , a~ ~ `~r ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r~ ~ `.~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ;~ ~ ~ 4 ~ ~ c ~~t~e~;t ~nV~'~~W ~ ~ ~ t~ w~ ~ ~ t~/ ~ an* 4jI~h2d~ `5~j~ rs~W4~~~ I *iàti~ ~ ~j:jp ~ te~ ~ :j~I ~rifl! ~ ~ Mtt$r?N~ ~eL4b~ ~ ~ ~ 4 *~ s~j~~ga St~fl~4 I : ~ :~s~ia kIP~sIi $ 2 1 ~ I `1W~ ;s~cifr% ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ TaIW ~` ~~a~kSt it at*n~~a *~S ~ S ~ ~ ~ ~ ,~w ~ y I~ j~ -tdk *J?Mr 4Yt~~ 44I~ ~ ~3 - $t ~ i::~:Si ~jt,?t1 ? ~ I' ` ~ %~4r~4: giii~i;~ Si ~i~7~aSäit~ ~ ? ?~`°~S r3~~~C1f $;~r~ ~D~4 ~r ~ ~ ~ ~ NpI~(ts~: 4~%;g ~ ~$ ~ t~~> i:t ~ r ~ jt8sI ~ ~ ) I ~ _ ~ ~- ~ ~i: ~ ~ `~ ~ - ~`y ~ ~-~÷~-`::~ `~c ~ ;:~` ~` ~ -> ~ a~ ~w'~c~ ,:- ~ Fieunz 111 PAGENO="0176" 172 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION major segment of the earth that this orbit offers. This combination of a low-earth-orbit station and a synchronous station could provide a capability for approximately 50,000 experimental man-hours per year. We have concluded from our mission studies that a long duration space station provides a critical connection between current plans. and such major future decis&on as manned planetary exploration. There are a number of optional experimental paths being considered for the development of the space station. Inherent in each path is the introduction into the Apollo Ap- plications program of a low-cost test article involving no new development, thus allowing basic exploration of space station requirements within a reason- able funding level. This type of approach will provide the necessary assurance that the ultimate space station design will meet all the experiment requirements and will resolve basic questions such as the desirability of artificial gravity~ Orbital workshop One of the attractive alternatives utilizes a spent Saturn S-IVB stage as an orbital workshop (fig. 112, MCG6-8987). The objective of this S-fl/B experiment module would be to establish the feasibility of exploiting launch vehicle and spacecraft hardware placed into orbit for purposes beyond its basic function. Existing subsystems are used to provide and control the atmosphere. The ad- ditional advantages of the successful completion of the experiment would include (1) an early capability for a large, controlled environment to evaluate human performance and secure engineering data for future subsystem designs; (2) low-cost design validation and checkout of equipment requirements for long- term habitability in zero g; and (3) large protected volume in space which can supplement a more sophisticated system for special purposes such as bio- logical experiments. Initial flights would require assembly of S-IVB orbital workshop components while in earth orbit; later missions of increased capability would be ground assembled. FiGuim 112 PAGENO="0177" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 173 Ferry/logistics concepts In considering future operation of space stations which require resupply, it is important to note the relationship between the original cost of the laboratory and the costs accumulated during the ferry/resupply operations to support the laboratory. Based on the resupply cost for a single six-to-nine man orbital laboratory using a logistics system based on an Apollo Command Module, in a single year the logistics cost equals the laboratory cost. In five years these costs more than double the original laboratory costs. This type of cost analysis has led us to consider more efficient resupply systems. We are currently considering systems made up of the components shown on this chart (fig. 113, MT5-9715). Normally a logistics system would be made up of three major modular components. The first would be the reentry crew module which will contain the six-to-nine man crew during orbit insertion and during reentry. The second section of the logistics system would contain the cargo. This cargo compartment would be designed for maximum operational flexibility. The nominal configuration would contain the fuels, oxygen and foods to support the station and crew. A specially configured version could con- tain a large experiment instrument such as a telescope or a complete set of experimental subsystems. The third or propulsion section of the ferry/logistics vehicle is designed to meet the differing maneuverability requirement for rendez- vous and de-orbit in near-earth or in synchronous orbits. PLANETARY M15510N5 Some interesting potentialities have developed as a result of recent studies in the area of advanced manned planetary missions. Considerable attention has been directed toward the formulation of an integrated planetary exploration plan that will provide the proper mix of manned and unmanned space exploration capabilities. MODULAR FERRY/LOGISTICS CONCEPTS REENTRY CREW MODULE APOLLO CM L/D~2.9 VARIBLE GEOMETRY LIFTING BODY WINGED BODY SPACECRAFT SPACECRAFT SPACECRAFT FLEXIBLE CARGO MODULE `~ ~ ~ I? / \J ~ ,~-` ~ CARGO LARGE EXPERIMENTAL EQUIPMENT SUB SYSTEMS ENGINE ROOM PROPULSION MODULE LOW ORBIT INSERTION & DE ORBIT c~I SYNCHRONOUS ORBIT INSERTION & DE ORBIT Fiouaz 113 NASA SQMN -~ 76-265 0-67--pt. 2-12 PAGENO="0178" 174 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION The inclusion of manned reconnaissance missions in planetary exploration activities could provide an opportunity to integrate the unique capabilities of both the manned and unmanned systems approaches to obtain data on the universe. In previous presentations, I have outlined the primary objectives of planetary exploration These have not changed Our goal remains to improve man s knowledge of the origin and evolution of the solar system and the origin and evolution of life Manned Mar81 Venus reconnaissance missions The ob3ectives of a possible manned Mars/Venus reconnaissance are shown here (fig. 114, MT66-10,201). Paramount is the capability to obtain and return to earth a sample of Martian surface ~nd near surface atmosphere This Martian sample is obtained through deployment of an unmanned Mars Surface Sample Return probe. The manned Mars/Venus reconnaissance system allows significant increases in data acquisition capability, as well as major improvements ni the quality of data obtained The probability of successfully arrying out the experiments is enhanced by the piesence of man and his ability to perform checkout maintenance and repair and to cope with the unanticipated ~fission opportunities The Mars and Venus free return reconnaissance mission possibilities that are of practical interest in the 1975 to 1980 time period are summarized in this chart (fig. 115, MT66r-10,222). Opportunities for lowest energy Mars recon- naissance missions in this operational period occur approximately every 25 months High energy missions are not considered to be within the capability of available chemical propulsion; the low energy reconnaissance missions are considered to have the meet promise for use of systems based on Apollo/Saturn hardware. These low energy missions are characterized by relatively short outbound trips of 130 to 145 days and longer inbound mission times for total mission durations of 660 to 690 days. The planet will be under observation, and scientific measure- ments will be taken for many weeks prior to and after actual encounter. OBJECTIVES OF MANNED MARS/VENUS RECONNAISANCE * RETURN OF MARTIAN SURFACE SAMPLE * RECONNAISSANCE AND MAPPING OF MARS AND VENUS * ASTRONOMICAL OBSERVATIONS OF THE PLANETS,SUN AND OTHER BODIES * MANNED PLANETARY SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT AND PROOF TESTING * MANNED PLANETARY OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE * UTILIZATION OF PRESENTLY EVOLVING TECHNOLOGY TO EMBARK ON MANNED PLANETARY EXPLORATION * ACQUIRE ENGINEERING DESIGN INPUT DATA FOR APPLICATION TO FUTURE SYSTEMS * ENHANCEMENT OF NATIONAL PRESTIGE NASA HQ MT66-1O,201 12.30-66 Fiauim 114 PAGENO="0179" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 175 Opportunities for reconnaissance missions to Venus occur every 19.2 months. Venus reconnaissance missions are less demanding than Mars missions, total mission time being on the order of 1 year and energy requirements being approx- imately 80 percent of that required for Mars twilight missions. Several mission variations on the basic Mars reconnaissance mission are available as possible follow-ons to a 1975 Mars twilight mission. Of particular interest among these are multiplaxiet reconnaissance missions. Multiplanet missions appear attractive because of the opportunity of exploring Venus, as well as avoiding mission profiles that go much beyond the Mars orbit near the asteroid belt. However, to date, only `two opportunities for multi-planet recon- naissance missions have been Identified during the 1975-1980 time period of interest. Mission description and scientific ret nra Such a reconnaissance mission is a single impulse fligtht which makes a hyperbolic encounter with the planet, or planets, and provides a free return to earth. The manned reconnaissance spacecraft could carry a crew of four to six, a payload for inflight experiments and observations, planetary orbiting, im- pacting, and landing probes and a Mars Surface Sample Return probe. This flight system would be capable of experimentation in all fields of interest, including photography, exobiology, solid body and surface properties, and atmos- pheric properties, in addition to enroute experiments in astronomy, physics, and bio-medicine. This chart shows a typical Mars Mission Profile (fig 116, MT66-10,212). The spacecraft proceeds along its trajectory with attitude control provided as neces- sary `to maintain the desired orientation. During the interplanetary journey, many observations and measurements are made, and enroute experiments per- formed. Prior to Mars encounter, probes `and orbiters are launched from the reconnaissance `spacecraft. They are timed to arrive ahead of encounter, that is, `the time of closest planetary approach by the manned spacecraft. TYPICAL MARS/VENUS RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHT OPPORTUNITIES LAUNCH DATE LEGS IN DAYS DURATION IN DAYS ~V INJECTION FEET PER SECOND REENTRY VELOCITY FEET PER SECOND MARS SEPT. `15 OCT. `11 NOV. `19 130/537 145/533 132/554 661 618 686 15,400 14,800 14,800 49,100 48,100 41,400 VENUS JUNE `15 JAN. `11 AUG. `18 APR. `80 111/250 111/251 116/249 109/250 361 314 365 359 12,000 11,800 11,800 12,000 44,600 44,800 43,300 45,000 VENUS/MARS DEC. `18 142/230/253 625 16,000 45,000 VENUS/MARS/VENUS FEB. `11 115 13,000 39,100 NASA HO MT66-1O,222 2-30-66 FIGURE 115 PAGENO="0180" 176 19 68 NAS~A AUTHORIZATION The principal scientific probe is the Mars Surface Sample Return probe. In addition, the payload could include orbiters, geological landers, and aerodrag impact probes. The Surface Sample Return probe gathers surface and atmos- phere samples, and takes pictures. Upon completion of the sample gathering, the samples and film are launched with a return vehicle to rendezvous with the manned reconnaissance spacecraft. On the return leg of the trip, portions of the Mars samples and other reconnaissance data are analyzed and the significant results transmitted to earth. Some days prior to earth encounter, the crew will transfer into the Earth Entry Module to perform final checkout, adjustment and stowage operations. The module is then separated from the interplanetary spacecraft and proceeds toward its atmospheric entry to earth. Landing and recovery are made on either land or sea at a location predictable well in advance. We have studied a number of alternative flight systems to establish technical soundness of the mission concept as described in this presentation. Our studies have firmly established the potential scientific contributions, as well as the apparent feasibility of the manned mission concept. Perhaps, at this time, I should present in condensed format the significant results which are to be gained from a Manned Mars/Venus reconnaissance mis- sion. Such a summary of results is provided by these two charts (fig. 117, MT66-1O,203; fig. 118, MTGfi-1O,202). I have tried to establish that, in the design of the flight system, we have leaned heavily on the concept of utilization and/or modification of present sys- tems. This chart (fig. 119, MT66-6708) summarizes the major components of the mission and their development base. Also indicated are the technology ex- tensions required. Let me make it clear that no major engineering break- Fiouiu~ 116 PAGENO="0181" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 177 SIGNIFICANT RESULTS FROM MANNED MARS RECONNAISSANCE SCIENTIFIC RETURNED SURFACE SAMPLE: * CHEMICAL COMPOSITION OF RETURNED SURFACE SAMPLE OF MARS. * EXISTING OR FOSSIL LIFE FORM IN RETURNED SAMPLE. * PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF RETURNED SAMPLE. PHOTOGRAPHY: * MAPPING OF 85% OF MARTIAN SURFACE WITH RESOLUTION BETTER THAN ONE KM. * SEASONAL VARIATIONS IN SUFACE AND ATMOSPHERE. * MULTISPECTRAL IMAGING OF SURFACE AND ATMOSPHERE FOR COMPOSITITION, STRUCTURE,AND TEMPERATURE DISTRIBUTION. * PHYSICAL SHAPE OF PLANET MARS. ATMOSPHERE: * ALTITUDE PROFILES OF ATMOSPHERIC TEMPERATURE, PRESSURE,DENSITY, AND COMPOSITION. * LOCAL WEATHER VARIATION ON MARS SURFACE. NASA HQ MT66-10,203 12-30-66 FIGURE 117 SIGNIFICANT RESULTS FROM MANNED MARS RECONNAI SSANCE (CON `T) SOLID BODY PROPERTIES * INTERNAL ACTIVITY OF PLANET. * GRAVITATIONAL AND MAGNETIC HELD OF PLANET. * PHYSICAL PROPERTES OF SURFACE. ENROUTE EXPERIMENTS * TELESCOPIC OBSERVATIONS OF MOONS OF MARS. * STEREOPHOTOGRAPHS OF SOLAR EVENTS. * LEE HISTORY OF SUN SPOTS AND FLARES. * VISUAL OBSERVATIONS OF SOLAR SYSTEM AND STELLAR OBJECTS. TECHNOLOGICAL * LONG TERM SPACE SYSTEMS CAPABLITES. * EXPLOITATION OF EXISTING HARDWARE. * ENGINEERING DESION DATA FOR FUTURE SYSTEMS. * VERFICATION OF ENGINEERING DESION PHIOSOPHES FOR PLANETARY MISSIONS. * PLANETARY OPERATIONS EXPERENCE. PRESTIGE * FIRST MANNED INTERPLANETARY FLIOHTS. NASA HQ MT66-10,202 12-30-66 FIGURE 118 PAGENO="0182" 178 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MAJOR COMPONENTS EARTH ENTRY MODULE MISSION MODULE SPACECRAFT PROPULSION EARTH ORBIT ESCAPE STAGE PROPELLANT TANKERS LAUNCH SYSTEM LAUNCH FACILITIES MISSION CONTROL CENTER COMMUNICATION AND CONTROL NET DEVELOPMENT BASE WOOFED APOLLO COMMAND MODULE GROWTH FROM EARTH ORBITAL ACTIVITES APOLLO SERVICE MODULE AND IN MODIFED SATURN S-Il OR SATURN S-IV B STAGES MODIFED S-Il SATURN V SATURN V APOLLO APOLLO + DSIF throughs are necessary for the accomplishment of a Mars/Venus reconnaissance in 1975.' In fact, additional data on the target planet environments is not essen- tial but would be useful to increase experiment return by improved systems measurement capabihty / Manned Mars landing `Manned planetary reconnaissance missions are a logical step to obtaining the depth of information needed for making decisions regarding the objectives and systems requirements for manned landing missions When the role of the reconnaissance mission is considered as an evolutionary step in developing a landing mission capability, then its major utility results from manned planetary systems development, proof testing and providing a base of operational experi- ence. Whereas the reconnaissance mission is basically a~ relatively simple ex- trapolation of the Apollo and space station hardware, the landing or orbiting missions require many new hardware and systems developments. As shown on this chart a Mars landing mission would require uprating of the Saturn V or development of a more efficient post-Saturn launch vehicle (M067-5865, see p. 184). Significant technological advancements in earth entry speed capabilities, environmental control/life support, and electrical power sources are indicated for planetary landing missions. Propulsion phases using nuclear rockets such as the Nerva Stage appear necessary for capture mission's with manned Mars landing. Future mansied planetary mission studies During the coming year more detailed analyses of systems and subsystems re- lated to the Mars/Venus reconnaissance mission capability are to be undertaken. Particular emphasis should be continued in the area of experiment definition incorporated in both the unmanned and manned spacecraft systems Examination of new systems capabilities to meet Mars/Venus manned mission requirements in a more efficient manner than provided by technology extrapola- tion is desirable. These studies will provide direction for technology in de- veloping more advanced capability for solar system exploration. Definition of the experiments and s3rstems development activities required of earlier programs must be accomplished to provide the best inputs for planning of manned planetary missions. MARS/VENUS RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM FEATURES UTILIZATION AND MODIFICATION OF PRESENT SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY EXTENSIONS ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS HYPERBOLIC ENTRY LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS LONG-TERM RELIABIlITY CONCEPTS ASTRIONICS (GUIOANCE COMMUNICATIONS ETCI LONG TERM SPACE STORABLE PROPELLANTS ORBITAL OPERATIONS STERLIZAT1ON TECHNN1UES NASA HQ MTO6-17C6 12-3066 FIGURE 119 PAGENO="0183" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 179 LUNAR MISSIONS Study objectives The lunar mission studies of the past year have concentrated on two objectives. One was to finalize the definition of Apollo Applications system elements in prepa- ration for their development. The second was to establish a realistic basis for the objectives, requirements and systems for lunar exploration beyond that anticipated to be accomplished within the scope of the Apollo Applications program. Oontinued support of the scientific community in the establishment of overall objectives has helped in providing focus to the program with respect to both scope and sequence. Engineering studies of potential systems have sharpened our understanding of the capabilities and costs of the follow-on program options which are being considered. The accomplishments of the Surveyor and Orbiter programs, however, have emphasized the need to develop plans which will as- sure the opportunity to incorporate incremental learning in our downstream program elements. Support for scientific goals As we progress beyond Apollo, the lunar exploration program is increasingly influenced by the nature of the scientific program which it supports. Although the scientific accomplishments of the Apollo program will have a significant in- fluence on our understanding of the moon, the system elements of the program have been predominantly influenced by operational rather than scientific re- quirements. Logical program evolution beyond Apollo, on the other hand, is directly related to the objectives and requirements of scientific goals. As we have analyzed the implications of these goals, it has become apparent that the early findings of the program may have a profound influence on the re- quirements `to be imposed on later program systenTs. For this reason, it is not appropriate at this time to finalize the duration of the lunar portions of the Apollo Applicaltions program, the specific sites which shall be explored during the program or the detailed experimental composition of latter missions. It Is, l1owever, appropriate and timely to examine the most effective methods of ac- complishing projected goals so that, as we are able to establish specific goals, we can proceed with system development and mission operations without undue delay. Evol'u tio'n of lunar erpiora tion program In following this logic, and in anticipation of the results of the Apollo and Apollo Applications lunar lai~ding missions, a candidate lunar exploration pro- gram has been laid out. The program follows the step-by-step concept discussed earlier and is shown in this chart (fig. 120, MC6G-10.245). This concept pre- sumes a motivation and resource capability to carry out a reasonably comprehen- sive lunar exploration. The program is phased to permit the results of early missions to have maxi- mum impact upon later system developments and missions. It delays the require- miient for major new developments until after initial Apollo landings and projects the introduction of new system capability which can efficiently support missions over a wide range of expanding or diminishing program commitment. Both our broad and detailed program and system analysis is being performed against such a candidate program structure. Three major scientific goals have been set for lunar exploration. The first is to develop, through scientific investigations, a comprehensive understanding of the lunar surface and interior. The second is to develop perspective in under- standing our own planet and the solar system in which it resides. The third is to establish the role of the moon in future astronomical and space investigations of the solar system. Apollo Applications missions Since less than 1 percent of the moon will be studied during proposed surface missions, our broad understanding of the moon will come from information gath- ered by remote sensors flown in lunar orbit. The types of information which. these sensors are best designed to obtain are topographic, geologic, magnetic, radiation temperature, gravity, and radiation and micrometeorite fluxes. In addition to, and possibly simultaneously with the orbital missions, it would be necessary to conduct surface missions in order to make direct observations and PAGENO="0184" 180 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION EVOLUTION OF LUNAR EXPLORATION LONG RANGE RANRFR r--~ r- MOBILITY ORBiiiI~sJ P 1 L__.] APOLLO PERMANENT IURvEYOJL.,IA ~ APPLICATIONS BASE I INCREASED ON-SITE STAYTIME AND `OBSERVATORY SCIENTIFIC PAYLOAD ~ I MAIOR FEATURE SURVEYS I * DEEP DRLL*G * * RITRA-FEATURE RITERPR(TATION * ASTRONOMRAL RIVESTRIATIONS * RESOURCE SURVEYS * GEOLOGIOAL AND GEOPHYSIOAL AREA SURVEYS * COMPREHENSIVE EMPLACED STATION `OR-SITE AMALYTIOAL PITERPRETATION * CORE SAMPLMG AND HOLE LOGGING * ATMOSPHERA ANALYSIS * ORBITAL SURVEYS `MANNED LUNAR OPERATIONS * SAMPLE RETURN * LOCAL GEOLUGGAL INTERPRETATION `SMALL EMPLACED STATION `TOPOGRAPHH~ DATA `LANDING DYNAMIOS `SOIL MECHANIOS `LURITED SOURCE FOR GEOLOGEAL AND GEODETG RITERPRETATION ~SA HQMT66-1(~245 FIGURE 120 measurements. These measurements could have unique objectives as well as helping to support the interpretation of the orbital data. Among the primary objectives which have been identified for surface missions are selective collection of surface and subsurface samples; geological mapping; geophysical surveys; logging of drill holes; and geodetic measurements. Other primary objectives are geochemical and petrological analysis to aid in selection of samples in situ analyses to measure unique properties that may be destroyed in transit; and physical properties measurements of lunar soils and surface materials. Example payloads have been conceived for the surface missions in order to test operational concepts, payload and subsystem capabilities and to frame scien- tifically significant missions. This chart (fig. 121, MCG6-1O,246) lists a potential payload for a two-man 14 day mission. Major pieces of equipment and long-lead-time experiment support systems are now under study. Among these are a moderate depth drill, a lunar surveying system, logging tools, and a large emplaced scientific station (fig. 122, MTO6- 8685). These pieces of equipment and the lunar scientific survey module (LSSM) are the major building blocks of the surface missions around which the scien- tific experiments and operational activities would be structured (fig. 123, MTfi6- 9608). Mobile lu'nar ewploration It has been recommended by NASA's scientific consultants that a mobile ex- ploration phase utilizing vehicles with long range capabilities be initiated. The three objectives of the mobile exploration phase would be to (1) broaden our knowledge of the moon in regional studies, (2) complete the evaluation of the moon as a site for observatories and laboratories, and (3) select candidate sites for future bases (fig. 124, MT66-10,247). If at the end of the above phase, the feasibility of permanent bases was proven, the final stages of exploration could begin. Although the objectives for such a phase are necessarily incompletely understood, it is felt that such a base might be utilized primarily as an observatory and as a laboratory with the possibility that the processing of lunar materials to support the base would ;be carried out. PAGENO="0185" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 181 EXAMPLE AAP LUNAR SURFACE EXPLORATION PAYLOAD (LM SHELTER/TAXI MODE) 1. LUNAR SCENTFIC SURVEY MODULE 2. GEOPHYSICAL STATION 3. LUNAR SCIENTFIC SURVEY MODULE MOUNTED DRILL 4. MULTIOAND PHOTOGRAPHY/RADIOMETRY 5. LUNAR SURVEYING SYSTEM 6. TOPOGRAPHIC/GEODETIC 7. ACTIVE SEISMIC 8. GRAVITY SURVEY / 9. MAGNETIC SURVEY 10. PORTABLE GEOCHEMISTRY 11. GAS ANALYZER FIGURE 121 12. SURFACE ELECTRICAL SURVEY 13. EROSION/EXPOSURE PANELS 14. BORE.HOLE LOG 15. HAND TOOLS 16. SAMPLE CONTAINERS 17. PHYSICAL PROPERTiES EQUIP. 18. DATA HANDUNG SUBSYSTEM 19. NAVIGATION SUBSYSTEM 20. SYSTEMS INTEGRATION EQUIP. 21. LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS NASA HQ M166-1O,246 12-30-66 FIGURE 122 PAGENO="0186" FIGURE 123 OBJECTIVES OF MOBILE LUNAR EXPLORATION PHASE PRIMARY - BROADEN AND INTEGRATE OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE MOON THROUGH LONG RANGE, LONG DURATION REGIONAL STUDIES. MOBILE MODE REQUIRED TO: 1. STUDY WIDELY SEPARATED SITES YET OBTAIN CORRELATIVE INTER-SITE ~FORMATION. 2. PERFORM GEOPHYSICAL SURVEYS WITH WIDE STATION SPACING. 3. CONDUCT INTEGRATED SAMPLING WHICH CROSSES MAJORITY OF STRATIGRAPHN~ UNITS. 4. PROVIDE CONTINUOUSNGROUND TRUTH" DATA FOR INTERPRETING ORBITAL SENSORS. SECONDARY . COMPLETE EVALUATION OF MOON AS A SITE FOR OBSERVATORIES AND LABORATORIES. - SELECT CANDIDATE SITES FOR FUTURE BASES. NASA HQ MT66-1O,247 12-30-66 182 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 124 PAGENO="0187" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 183 Eo~pected planning During this coming year we expect to further refine our advanced manned mis- sions analysis of sequential program requirements and systems. This effort will be conducted in order to assess with more accuracy the program resource require- ments and cost/effectiveness relationships. We will continue to work closely in 1967 with the scientific community in the determination of valid scientific objectives. The coming Surveyor and Orbiter missions will provide additional data for site selection from the standpoints of suitability and scientific interest. As Apollo Applications supporting systems proceed into detailed design and development phases, major concentration will be applied to the definition of the detailed accomplishments of Apollo Applications missions, to a better under- standing of the probable effective duration of that phase of the program, and to an actual definition of follow-on phase system options. As indicated earlier, planning of a lunar scientific exploration program in- volves a continual adjustment to growth in understanding of the moon itself, to change in emphasis as progress in scientific and space systems technology opens up new fields of opportunity, and to changes in resource availability. It is appropriate, therefore, that we avoid prejudging the total magnitude or span of lunar exploration. Our intent is, instead, one of developing adequate data on a number of paths to support valid decisions at the time that leadtime requires those decisions to ~e made. FLIGHT VEHICLES Flight vehicle studies have stressed three areas critical to future programs. These are Saturn Systems Uprating/Improvement, Operations Support, and Advanced Vehicle Systems. The dominant element of this study program is examination of the ways and means of exploiting the capabilities of existing Saturn systems and facilities for economic and versatile transportation support of future manned or unmanned programs in the 1970-1980 time period. These studies are in direct support of near- and far-term manned missions planning for earth orbital, lunar and planetary flights. Saturn systems uprating/improi~ement Exploratory studies of the Saturn I, Saturn V and Saturn Intermediates are being conducted to extend the payload capabilities and provide potential cost effective launch vehicles for future mission requirements. Saturn Intermediates are essentially 2-stage versions of the existing or uprated Saturn V configura- tions and bridge the payload performance regime between the potential capa- bilities of the Saturn I systems and the Saturn V. Uprating considerations cover large solid rocket motors such as Minuteman, 120-inch, 156-inch and 260-inch diameter motors as well as improved and uprated Saturn engines, advanced upper-stage engine configurations (chemical and nu- clear), liquid strap-on pods/engines, increased and new propellant implications, and advanced materials/structural applications. These studies provide guid- ance for NASA's research and technology efforts as well as providing program- related information such as payload performance, cost projections, development schedules and facility requirements. It is evident from vehicle studies to date that a wide variety of Saturn vehicle options are possible which can substantially increase the Saturn family's mis- sion performance for future programs. The potential indicated for the Saturn I ranges from the current 40.000 to 110,000 pounds payload in low earth orbit; the Saturn V from the current 280,000 pounds to 700,000 pounds; and the Sat- urn Intermediates from 110,000 to 260,000 pounds payload in low earth orj~it. Operations support Supporting studies are being conducted to determine launch facility impli- cations and improved operational concepts for launch of basic and improved Saturn vehicles for future missions and to establish both nonrecurring and recurring facility costs and development schedules accordingly. Future manned space missions could be' dependent in varying degrees on in-orbit propellants transfer, systems assembly, maintenance and checkout, to support both earth orbital missions and orbital launch operations for planetary missions; study of in-orbit propellants transfer is being initiated to determine PAGENO="0188" 184 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION conceptual techniques for the transfer and checkout of cryogenic and non- cryogenic liquids under zero g conditions and to aid in determining both ground and inifight experiments for validating conceptual system designs. Advanced vehicie .systems Recovery and reuse of Saturn stages could have a major cost impact on future space operations; conceptual studies have been conducted of the recovery and reuse of large ballistic stages such as the Saturn V first stage. Economic promise was indicated for modest launch programs, but basic questions are as yet unanswered concerning system design and operations which critically affect the estimated economic impact for the ballistic mode of recovery. An experi- mental program could aid in reducing uncertainties relating to ballistic flight and terminal recovery, refurbishment operations, and stage or major subsystem reuse, as applicable to both existing Titan and Saturn stages and future ballistic launch vehicle systems. A study has been initiated to determine and to assess the test program alternatives that could aid in verifying the feasibility of ballistic stage recovery and reuse and which could provide data that are presently not available to designers. A second area of interest here is the evolution of a versatile second-generation aerospace transportation system that could provide routine earth surface to orbit and return transportation for passengers and cargo. These reusable logistics support systems are being investigated to determine system candidates that can offer order of magnitude changes in improved operational flexibility and in reduced operational costs. Air transport type operational features in- cluding reliability, economy, payload flexibility, passenger safety/comfort, and inflight/intact abort capability have been considered in this planning activity. Such studies of advanced vehicle systems and operational modes for future earth orbital flight operations are being performed to determine and compare the options for cost-effective space logistics support and to provide advanced technology requirements. Transportation trends for manned programs support are summarized in these charts (fig. 125, MT66-8032; fig. 126, MT67-5865). The area's as shown TRANSPORTATION TRENDS - EARTH TO ORBIT AND RETURN (MANNED PROGRAM SUPPORT I TIME PERIOD CURRENT INTERMEDIATE FUTURE GENERALIZED VEHICLE CONCEPTS £ ~ ~ 1~\ ~ U L~\ `~ L~\ OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES DESIRED VEHICLE CHARACTERISTICS EXPERIMENTAL SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENTS `EXPLORATORY SPACE PROGRAMS * EXPENDABLE LAUNCH AND SPACECRAFT VEHICLES INITIAL SPACE SYSTEMS LOGISTIC SUPPORT * IMPROVED OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY * GROWTH IN SPACE FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY FLEXIBLE MAN.RATED LAUNCH VEHICLE CAPABILITIES `REUSABLE ENTRY SPACECRAFT * ORBITAL MANEUVERING PROPULSION `NOMINAL LAND-RECOVERY OF SPACECRAFT *INCREASED LOGISTICS TRAFFIC `INCREASED SPACE SYSTEMS CAPABILITY *REDUCED OPERATIONAL AND SUPPORT SYSTEMS COST * IMPROVED OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS.NOMINAL AND CONTINGENCY * FULLY-REUSABLE VEHICLE `WATER RECOVERY OF SPACECRAFT SYSTEMS E- EXPENDABLE UNIT R . REUSABLE UNIT NASA HQ MT664032 FIGURE 125 PAGENO="0189" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 185 have been studied extensively. We are determining the interrelationship of operational objectives and desired vehicle characteristics with advanced tech- nology requirements, systems integration and operational characteristics. SUMMARY During the past year we have continued in a well planned and orderly fashion to explore the options which are open to us in our quest to determine the next major national space goal. We have evolved a step-by-step concept and have devised a base-line plan for a manned space flight program of the type which permits us to proceed with a minimum of commitment to the long range future. We foresee the capability for continuous operations in earth orbit becoming available to us in the 1970's, leading to manned planetary reconnaissance and extended exploration of the lunar surface, in that same time period. All in turn could be pointed toward a possible manned mars landing in the decade of the 1980's, should such a national space goal be selected. The funds requested for Advanced Manned Missions activity in fiscal year 1968 will permit us to pursue this program recognizing, however, that these efforts do not satisfy all the recommendations made by the scientific community and in the President's Science Advisory Committee report published in Feb- ruary 1967. We consider this program as being austere in its funding while moving toward a firmer understanding of the technology required to meet future needs. MANNED SPACE FLIolir FUNDING REQUIREMENTS Let me turn next to the fiscal year 1968 funding required to maintain the Na- tion's Manned Space Flight Program. As outlined on this chart (fig. 127, MP67- 5440), the fiscal year 1968 Manned Space Flight R. & D. requirements are $3,069.2 million. We are also requesting $27.9 million for Construction of Facili- ties, and $323.5 million for Administrative Operations at the three Manned Space FIGURE 126 PAGENO="0190" 186 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION NASA MANNED SPACE FLIGHT FY 1968 BUDGET ESTIMATE (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) FY 1966 FY 1961 FY 1968 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT APOLLO $3,199 5 2,941 0 $3024 0 2916 2 $3,069 2 2,606 5 APOLLO APPLICATIONS 51.2 80.0 454.7 ADVANCED MISSIONS 10 0 6 2 8 0 GEMINI 197.3 21.6 -0- CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES 17 5 43 8 27 9 ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS 296.9 315.4 323.5 TOTAL $3513.9 $3,383.2 $3,420.6 NASA HQ MP67-5440 1-15-67 FIGURE 127 Flight Centers. I plan to address my remarks to our R. & D. requirements only, since Dr Seamans will be covering the overall Agency requirements for Con struction of Facilities and Administrative Operations. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT Our fiscal year 1968 R. & P. requirements, amounting to $3,069.2 million, are broken into three line items Apollo ($2 6035 million) Apollo Applications ($454 7 million) and Advanced Missions ($80 million) Fiscal year 1967 was the last year of funding for the Gemini program. APOLLO PROGRAM The $2,606,5 million required to support our Apollo activity in fiscal year 1968 represents a decrease of $3097 million from the fiscal year 1967 level As mdi cated on this chart (fig. 128, MPO7-5441), the fiscal year 1968 Apollo budget is divided into five line items: Spacecraft, Uprated Saturn I, Saturn V, and Engine Development, all of which show a decrease from fiscal year 1967; and Mission Support, which necessarily rises in fiscal year 1968 to meet the increased tempo of operational activity. This budget request was submitted before the accident on AS-204 and until the findings of the board have been analyzed, we will be unable to determine the extent of the work required or if additional costs may be involved As you know, our fiscal year 1967 Apollo funds are supporting peak activity in the production of spacecraft and launch ~ehicle hardware as well as an in tensive period of ground and flight qualification testing. During FY 1968, we will be heavily involved in assembly, checkout, and delivery of Apollo spacecraft PAGENO="0191" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 187 and Saturn launch vehicle hardware to meet the planned flight schedule Fiscal year 1968 funds will also cover the increased requirements for pre launch check out and launch operations at the Kennedy Space Center mission control activi ties at the Manned Spacecraft Center and reimbursement to the Department of Defense for recovery forces as we move deeper into the operational phi~se of Apollo. Spacecraft Fiscal year 1968 funding requirements for the Apollo spacecraft are $1,036.3 million The next chart (fig 129 MP67-5438) shows the line items that are contained in this amount which provides for continued production test check out, and delivery of the spacecraft hardware-Command and Service Modules, Lunar Modules and associated guidance and navigation units as well as the integration, reliability, and checkout operations, and the important spacecraft support activities. Command and Service Modules The $494 million required for the Command and Service Modules in fiscal year 1968 continues the production checkout and delivery of flight articles equipped for long duration missions and rendezvous and docking maneuvers The funds in this line item also provide for the development procurement inte gration, and installation of Apollo experimental hardware and flight experiments into the Command and Service Modules During fiscal year 1968 the first two Command and Service Modules capable of rendezvous and docking will be undergoing checkout at. the Kennedy Space Center. Six additional Apollo Command and Service Modules are scheduled for completion of assembiy and checkout at North American s Downey California plant, followed by shipment to Kennedy in preparation for uprated Saturn I MANNED SPACE FLIGHT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT APOLLO FY 1968 BUDGET ESTIMATE (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) FY 1966 FY 1961 FY 1968 SPACECRAFT UPRATED SATURN I SATURN V ENGINE DEVELOPMENT MISSION SUPPORT $1,233.8 214.8 1,134.9 133.2 164.3 $1,250.3 236.6 1,135.6 49.8 243.9 $1,036.3 156.2 1,108 5 24.5 281.0 TOTAL $2,941.0 $2,916.2 $2,606.5 NASA HQ MP67-5441 1-15-67 Fiourus 128 PAGENO="0192" 188 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MANNED SPACE FLIGHT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT APOLLO SPACECRAFT FY 1968 BUDGET ESTIMATE (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) FY1966 FY19B1 FY1968 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES 612~8 560.4 494.0 LUNAR MODULE 362.6 412.5 313.1 GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION 137.2 16.6 55.4 INTEGRATION, RELIABILITY *AND CHECKOUT 32.3 30.0 23.2 SPAcECRAFT SUPPORT 88.9 110.8 90.6 TOTAL $ 1,233.8 $1,250.3 $1,036.3 NASA HQ MP67-5438 1-15-67 FIGURE 129 and Saturn V launches. The remaining seven Command and Service Modules configured for rendezvous and docking will be in various phases of assembly, systems installation, and in-plant checkout. Lunar Modules Our fiscal year 1968 estimate for the Lunar Module line item is $373.1 million. These funds provide for the work being done by the prime contractor, Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation, Bethpage, New York, as well as the experi- ments and experimental hardware that will be carried in the Lunar Module. Included are the Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package (ALSEP) and the tools that will be used to obtain samples from the lunar surface. During FY 1968 a Lunar Module Test Article, refurbished after use in the Apollo Saturn V dynamic testing at Marshall, is scheduled to be launched on the second unmanned Saturn V qualification flight. In addition, major emphasis will be placed on the production, checkout, and delivery of flight lunar modules for manned rendezvous and docking missions. Five Lunar Modules are scheci- uled for delivery to Kennedy and the remaining seven will be undergoing struc- tural assembly, subsystem installation, and in-plant checkout. Guidavee and navigation Moving down to the next line item, we are requesting $55.4 million for the Apollo spacecraft guidance and navigation system in fiscal year 1968. This sys- tem was designed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Prime con- tractor for the assembly and test of the production units is General Motors, AC Electronics Division in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The on-board navigational com- puter and the optical subsystem, including a space sextant, sunfinders, and nec- essary display equipment, are produced, under subcontract, by the Raytheon Company of Waltham, Massachusetts, and the Kollsman Instrument Company of Elmhurst, New York, respectively. PAGENO="0193" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 189 During FY 1968, six guidance and navigation units for manned Apollo Com- mand Modules will be delivered. Six Lunar Module units will also be delivered. By the end of the fiscal year, all but three guidance and navigation units will be in assembly or checkout. Integration, reliability, and checkout The fiscal year 1968 requirements for integration, reliability, and checkout, amounting to $23.2 million, provide for two basic areas. The first category in- cludes engineering support to the Manned Spacecraft Center for activities such as maintenance and review of the Apollo spacecraft specifications, systems per- formance analyses, reliability and quality assurance, trend analysis of failure reports, mission planning and analysis, and interface control. Consistent with the increasing rate of hardware deliveries and flight missions, the FY 1968 activity will focus on spacecraft hardware verification, mission planning and analysis, and post-flight documentation. The second category is the funding for the 12 Automatic Checkout Stations (ACE stations), which are located at the key Apollo spacecraft sites across the country. Three spacecraft ACE stations operate at North American's Downey plant; three at the Grumman plant; two at the Manned Spacecraft Center's Space Environmental Simulation Lab; and four at the Kennedy Space Center. These stations are required for rapid and reliable checkout of the separate and com- bined spacecraft systems in the process from fabrication and test to launch. Fiscal year 1968 funds cover the operation, maintenance, and updating of the ACE stations to meet mission requirements. Spa~cecraft support Apollo Spacecraft Support activities include the funding for test operations at contractor, NASA, and other government installations; crew equipment-in- cluding space suits; logistics; and instrumentation and scientific equipment. The $90.6 million requested for these activities in FY 1968 includes support of the various spacecraft test programs. Typical examples are the spacecraft and equipment environmental tests in Houston's vacuum chambers, spacecraft propulsion tests at the White Sands Test Facility in New Mexico, reaction con- trol system testing at the Arnold Engineering Development Center in Tullahoma, Tennessee, and altitude chamber tests at the Kennedy Space Center. The FY 1968 funds also provide for development and procurement of Apollo space suits and related crew equipment, EVA umbilicals, survival equipment, personal hygiene systems, and bioinstrumentation. Major effort will be de- voted to manufacture and test of a space suit and portable life support system for lunar surface activities. Logistic funds are included for transportation of spacecraft hardware between locations, reimbursement to the Department of Defense for inspection services, and procurement of spacecraft fuels and propellants used in the test programs that I mentioned earlier. In addition, these support funds cover development and procurement of specialized flight research and test instrumentation for spacecraft development, such as signal conditioners, sensors, transmitters, ground support equipment, cameras, and radiation-measuring devices. Uprated &tturn I Moving on to the Saturn-class launch vehicles, the next chart (fig. 130, MP67- 5437) identifies our fiscal year 1968 funding requirements for the uprated ver- sion of the Saturn I. As you are well aware, our record to date with the original and the uprated versions of the Saturn I vehicle has been excellent: 13 successes in 13 launches. Our FY 1968 request for the uprated Saturn I is $156.2 million- a decrease of $80.4 million from the FY 1967 level. Time evolution from hardware production and delivery to operational use explains this decrease. Half of the ve- hicles in the currently approved program of 12 unrated Saturn I's have already been delivered to the Kennedy Space Center. Four additional launch vehicles are scheduled for delivery before the end of 1967, and the remaining two up- rated Saturn I's are in fabrication, leading to delivery to Kennedy during 1968. Follow-on procurement of uprated Saturn I vehicles, which represent a major addition to our Nation's inventory of large launch vehicles and offer a versatile means for conducting a variety of earth orbital missions, will be discussed under Apollo Applications. Each line item within the uprated Saturn I project, as you can see, is decreasing from the FY 1967 level. 76-265 0-67-pt. 2-13 PAGENO="0194" 190 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MANNED SPACE FLIGHT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT UPRATED SATURN I FY 1968 BUDGET ESTIMATES (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) FY 1966 FY 1961 FY 1968 1stSTAGE(SIB) 2nd STAGE (SIVB) INSTRUMENT UNIT GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT H1ENGINES J-2 ENGINES VEHICLE SUPPORT 516 640 47 7 26.6 101 13.5 61.3 431 569 40 6 11.5 81 6.7 69.7 305 371 22 6 6.5 52 .9 53.4 TOTAL $ 214.8 $ 236.6 $156.2 NASA HQ MP67-5437 1 15 67 FIGURE 130 stages (~-IB and S-IVB) We are requesting $305 million for the Chrysler produced 1st stage (S-IB) and $37 1 million for the Douglas produced 2nd stage (S-IVB) in fiscal year 1968. These funds support completion of the eighth through twelfth flight stages, which are currently phased into manufacturing, assembly, acceptance testing, or checkout. In terms of the 1st stage requirements, the FY 1968 funds requested support delivery and pre-launch checkout of the eighth and ninth flight stages; acceptance test, and shipment of the tenth and eleventh stages to Kennedy Space Center; and final assembly, in-factory checkout, acceptance test, and delivery of the last stage. The FY 1968 funding for the Saturn I/S-IVB supports delivery of the last five flight stages for Apollo missions to the Kennedy Space Center. The eighth and ninth will arrive at the Center and undergo pre launch checkout the tenth and eleventh will complete acceptance testing at Sacramento and will subse quently be shipped to the Kennedy Space Center. The twelfth flight stage Is scheduled to be through assembly, in-plant checkout, acceptance testing, and post- static checkout in preparation for shipment. Instrwment Unit Fiscal year 1968 funds in the amount of $22.6 million are required for the Instrument Unit-the nerve center of the launch vehicle which contains the all-important primary guidance, control, measuring and telemetry systems. The Instrument Units are produced by the International Business Machines Corpora- tion in Huntsville Alabama The FX 1968 funds piovide for completion of PAGENO="0195" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 191 assembly, checkout, and delivery of the remaining five Instrument Units' required for Apollo Saturn I vehicles. Ground support equipment The automatic checkout system used to verify the launch readiness of the vehicles is designed to maximize `the level of reliability and efficiency and to minimize the time and cost involved in checking out the hardware. Engineering support is provided by the General Electric Company for the electrical support equipment and by the Chrysler Corporation Space Division for the mechanical support equipment. We are requesting $6.5 million in fiscal year 1968 to cover operation and up- dating of stage and vehicle ground support equipment to meet specific mission requirements. Operational requirements for the Marshall breadboard facility, which is used to validate the computer programs for each miss,ion, are also included. H-i and J-2 engines The fiscal year 1968 request includes requirements of $5.2 million for H-I engines and $.9 million for J-2 engines. The liquid oxygen-refined kerosene H-i engine is used in a cluster of eight `to power the first stage of the Saturn I, and a single hydrogen-fueled J-2 engine is used in the second stage. Both engines are produced by the Rocketdyne Division of North American Aviation, Canoga Park, California. Fiscal year 1966 was the last full year of funding the H-i contractor field and engineering support under the "Engine Development" project. Following com- pletion of H-i qualification in June 1966, funding of the contractor's work on flight evaluation and problem-solving, maintenance of test engines in a con- figuration for rapid response to problems encountered during flight, and periodic verification on flight worthiness was transferred to this account. The FY 1968 funds required for the H-i and J-2 engines cover continued support of the flight program, evaluation of flight results for use in subsequent missions, and rapid response to flight problems that may arise. Vehicle Support The final line item under the uprated Saturn I project is Vehicle Support, which provides for studies, services and equipment that are common to more than one stage of the vehicle. Our FY 1968 requirements are $53.4 million, covering the support requirements during a period of intensive launch activity. During FY 1968, heavy emphasis will be placed on uprated Saturn I prelaunch and launch support and postlaunch pad refurbishment at the K~nnedy Space Center. The funds also cover component and subsystem failure analyses, post- flight reliability reports, and guidance and control system studies. In addition, the requirements include transportation of stages and instrument units via barge or aircraft. Saturn V Next we come to the fiscal year 1968 funding requirements for the most power- ful of the Saturn family of launch vehicles-the three-stage Saturn V. We are beginning to come down the curve on Saturn V funding, as shown in this chart (fig. 131, MP 67-5436). In addition to the intensive ground test program that has been underway, FY 1967 marks' the peak year for Saturn V hardware pro- duction to meet the scheduled flight missions. The funding requested for FY 1968, amounting to $1,108.5 million, is critical to sustaining the production rate, consistent with hardware need-dates at Kennedy. Equally important is the funding that provides for vehicle support activities, including static test support at our Mississippi Test Facility, checkout support at the Kennedy Space Center, systems integration to assure proper interface control, and reliability and flight evaluation programs. Fiscal year 1968 will be a decisive one in moving us closer to the immediate goal of manned lunar landing and return. Let me go into the detail of the Saturn V requirements for FY 1968, beginning with the 1st Stage (S-IC). 1st stage (S-IC) We are requesting $174.7 million in fiscal year 1968 to carry forward the manu- facture, test, and checkout of Saturn V 1st stages on a time-scale consistent with the planned flight schedule. PAGENO="0196" 192 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION MANNED SPACE FLIGHT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SATURN V FY 1968 BUDGET ESTIMATE (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) FY 1966 FY 1961 FY 1968 1st STAGE IS-IC) 191.9 184.9 114.1 2nd STAGE (S-Il) 256.2 248.6 245.9 3rd STAGE (S-IVB) 162.0 154.0 151.2 INSTRUMENT UNIT 67.8 12.9 15.1 GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT 101.6 609 35.8 F-i ENGINES 66.2 92.3 105.3 J-2 ENGINES 61.2 83.5 18.5 VEHICLE SUPPORT 216.0 238.5 242.0 TOTAL $1,134.9 $ 1,135,6 $1,108.5 NASA HQ MP67-5436 1- 15-67 FIGuRE 131 This stage, which generates approximately 7.5 million pounds of thrust, 15 the most powerful developed by this country to date. The S-IC is powered by five liquid oxygen-kerosene F-i engines, each developing about 1.5 million pounds of thrust. At launch, the S-IC will be lifting a total space vehicle weight of 6 million pounds. During flight, the stage burns for 2'/2 minutes, consuming about 15 tons of propellant a second. The Marshall Space Flight Center, with the assistance of the Boeing Corp., manufactured the structural test components, the first ground test stage, and the first two flight stages at Huntsville, Alabama. Manufacuring of the first flight stage began at Huntsville in July, 1964. Boeing was awarded the contract to manufacture two other ground test stages (dynamic and facilities checkout) and 13 flight stages at the Government-owned Miehoud Assembly Facility near New Orleans, Louisiana. Activity in FY 1967 has been highlighted by the delivery of the first flight stage to the Kennedy Space Center. The second flight article has completed post-static checkout and the third has passed its acceptance test firing at Mar- shall. The fourth flight stage will be delivered to the Mississippi Test Facility to inaugurate acceptance testing at this location. The fifth and sixth are sched- uled to complete manufacturing, and the remaining nine will be phased into manufacturing or long-lead procurement by the end of FY 1967. The FY 1968 funds support completion of the S-IC structural test program and continuation of assembly, in-plant checkout, acceptance testing, and ship- ment of flight stages to the Kennedy Space Center. The fourth, fifth, and sixth stages will be put through post-static checkout at Michoud, and delivered to the Kennedy Space Center. The seventh and eighth 1st stages are scheduled to complete assembly, in-plant checkout, and static testing; and the ninth and tenth are scheduled to be through manufacturing and checkout at Michoud. The five remaining stages will be in manufacturing during FY 1968. PAGENO="0197" 1968 NASA AUTHOIUZATION 193 2nd $tc~ge (S-Il) Moving down to the next line item, our FY 1968 Saturn V requirements, include $245.9 million for the 2nd stage (S-Il). This stage-powered by a cluster of five liquid oxygen-liquid hydrogen ~-2 en- gines-produces a total thrust o'f approximately 1 million pounds at altitude. It is the Nation's largest liquid-hydrogen powered stage. The aluminum alloy skin on the initial stages is only .153 inches thick and will be reduced to .128 inches in subsequent stages. Starting off on the launch pad, its gross weight, including engines, is about one million pounds-90 percent of which consists of propellants. During flight, the stage burns for 6'/2 minutes and must be capable of withstanding temperatures ranging from about +400 to -400 degrees Fahrenheit. The component qualification requirements for the S-IT are particularly stringent because the stage stretches to the utmost existing hydrogen propulsion technology and related manufacturing techniques. The prime contractor, North American Aviation Space and Information Sys- tems Division carries out manufacturing, assembly, and factory checkout at gov- ernment-owned facilities at Seal Beach, California. North American conducts developmental ground testing at its Santa Susana Static Test Laboratory. Flight stages are shipped through the Panama Canal to the Mississippi Test Facility to undergo acceptance firing before being delivered to the Kennedy Space Center. Fiscal year 1967 activity to date has been marked by intensive ground quali- fication testing, acceptance testing of the first flight stage at the Mississippi Test Facility, delivery of this stage to Kennedy in preparation for the first Saturn V launch, and continued production of flight stages for subsequent missions. Fiscal year 1968 activity will continue to emphasize production of hardware in support of the Apollo Saturn V flight requirements. The third, fourth, fifth, and sixth flight stages are scheduled for completion of acceptance test, poststatic checkout, and shipment to the Kennedy Space Center. The tempo of hardware production for the following flights must also be sustained. The stages for the seventh through twelfth Saturn V vehicles will be in an intensive period of manufacturing, assembly, in-plant checkout, or acceptance firing to support the planned launch rate. In addition, procurement activity will be underway on the three remaining flight stages. 3rd $tage (S-IVB) The next line item on the chart shows the funding estimate for the 3rd stage of the Saturn V-the S-IVB. We are requesting $151.2 million to cover these re- quirements in fiscal year 1968. Basic development costs for this stage, which is also used as the upper stage of the Saturn I, are funded in this line item. The S-IVB was developed and is being produced and tested by the Douglas Aircraft Company's Missile and Space Systems Division. The stages are manufactured at the Douglas Space Center, Huntington Beach, California; acceptance testing is conducted at the Sacramento Test Operations Site. Fiscal year 1968 activity will focus on continued pfoduction and delivery of flight stages to support the Apollo Saturn V schedule. The fourth flight stage will be shipped from the West Coast to the Kennedy Space Center for prelaunch checkout. The next two flight stages are scheduled for completion of fabrication and in-plant checkout, as well as acceptance testing and post-static checkout, in preparation for shipment to the Kennedy Space Center. Fabrication, assembly, in-plant checkout, and acceptance testing of the seventh and eighth flight stages are planned, and the ninth and tenth will be through fabrication and assemhly in preparation for acceptance firing at Sacramento. The remaining five flight stages will be in various phases of manufacture and assembly. Instrument Un4t' Our fiscal year 1968 funding requirements for the Saturn V Instrument Unit total $75.1 million. These funds will maintain the necessary delivery rate of flight units during FY 1968. The fourth, fifth, and sixth Saturn V Instrument Units will be checked out and delivered to Kennedy, and assembly, inspection, and checkout of the seventh unit will be completed. Work on the remaining Instrument Units will also be underway at IBM, Huntsville, during the fiscal year. PAGENO="0198" 194 1 9 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION Ground $upport equipment We are requesting $35.8 million for the Saturn V ground support equipment in FY 1968 This equipment consists of electrical and mechanical support equip- ment required to test and check out the stages, instrument units, and associated hardware. The checkout procedures developed for the Saturn V are based on the concept that improved vehicle reliability and minimum time at the launch site can be attained by using a computer-controlled system in which the opera tional soundness of components is automatically verified. The General Electric Co. is under contract for design, fabrication, checkout, and logistic support of the Saturn V electrical support equipment, and the Boeing Co. is responsible for the integration and logistic support of all mechani- cal support equipment. The Radio Corporation of America is providing the computer system and Sanders Associates the display systems. Fiscal year 1968 funds support preparation and verification of computer tapes for $aturn V missions. In addition, these funds cover completion of Saturn V-related ground support equipment for the third launch umbilical tower, high-bay, and firing room at Launch Complex 39. F-i and J-2 engines The FY 1968 Saturn V engine requirements are 4$105 3 million for the F-i and $785 million for the J-2 Produced by the Rocketdyne Division of North American Aviation a cluster of five F-i engines powers the Saturn V 1st stage a cluster of five J-2 engines is used to power the 2nd stage; and a single J-2 engine, with re-start capability, powers the 3rd stage. The last full year of funding the contractor development effort under the Engine Development project line item was FY 1966 After completion of qualification (October 1966) for the F-i and January 1967 for the J-2 the con tractor effort for field and engineering support was transferred to this account. Fiscal yeai 1968 funds provide for continued delivery of F-i and J-2 flight en gines required for the Saturn V stages A total of 34 F-i engines and 36 ~-2 engines are scheduled for delivery during this period The FY 1968 funds also support flight evaluation maintaining test engines in a configuration for quick analysis and solution of problems component and engine system testing and periodic verification of flight worthiness Vehicle support As I indicated earlier the Vehicle support line item covers studies services and equipment that are common to more than one stage of the vehicle. In the case of the Saturn V the fiscal year 1968 funding requirements amounting to $2420 million provide for an intensive support effort at the test and launch sites These funds cover a wide range of activities that support test checkout transportation launch readiness and post flight analysis Included are sys tems integration engineering services quality control and inspection services i eliability assessments and contract administration Major emphasis will be placed on support of static testing at our Mississippi Test Facility where we will be heavily involved in acceptance testing of Saturn V 1st and 2nd stages. In ad- dition, the workload at the Kennedy Space Center will increase in support of the Saturn V launches. Engine development and mission support My last chart on Apollo funding includes engine development and mission support (fig. 132, MP67-5439). We are requesting $24.5 million in fiscal year 1968 for Engine Development, a significant drop from FY 1966 and 1967 require- ments, since all three of our major vehicle engines are now qualified. Upon com- pletion of engine qualification, funding of contractor effort was transferred to the respective engine account of the Saturn launch vehicles. The FY 1968 funds requested will provide for government-furnished propel- lants, reimbursement to the Department of Defense for contract administration and quality assurance services, and a continuing program of evaluation and analysis of engine hardware. The major activity in this area is the J-2 engine environmental test program conducted at the Air Force Arnold Engineering Development Center, Tullahoma, Tennessee. Mission support requirements for FY 1968 are $281.0 million and reflect the increasing tempo of flight activity, since this line item provides for the overall PAGENO="0199" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 195 MANNED SPACE FLIGHT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ENGINE DEVELOPMENT & MISSION SUPPORT FY 1968 BUDGET ESTIMATES (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) FY 1966 FY 1967 FY 1968 ENGINE DEVELOPMENT $133.2 $ 49.8 $ 24.5 MISSION SUPPORT $164.3 $ 243.9 $ 281.0 OPERATIONS 112 9 196 9 229 0 SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 20.0 20.0 20.0 SUPPORTING DEVELOPMENT 31.4 27.0 32.0 NASA HQ MP67-5439 1-15-67 FIGURE 132 launch, flight, crew and recovery operations; program-wide systems engineering; and supporting development necessary for the successful accomplishment of manned space flights. The Operations area accounts for the major share-$229.0 million, and includes activities at the Kennedy Space Center and the Manned Spacecraft Center that support the launch, flight, and recovery phases of Apollo missions. For Kennedy, it includes the operation of checkout, launch, and instrumentation facilities; contractor services; equipment and supplies; and reimbursement for services provided by the Air Force. At Houston, it includes mission control for Apollo flights; support of astronaut training and flight crew requirements; mission planning and analysis; remote-site operations; and recovery equipment and operations, including reimbursement to the Department of Defense for recovery forces. Systems engineering, for which $20 million is requested, provides for inte- grated technical support, review, and analysis of manned space flight missions. These services include the development of functional and performance standards for the program, consistent with mission objectives; mission planning; test objectives and integration; program and systems specifications; trajectory analysis; checkout effectiveness; and technical documentation. The $32 million for supporting development will continue activities which involve selected engineering efforts to eliminate potential deficiencies in Apollo and to provide a firm base for hardware decisions related to extensions of the program. This category also includes the development of improved hardware or manufacturing, test, and evaluation techniques to reduce cost and enhance reliability and efficiency. APOLLO APPLICATIONS Now I want to discuss Apollo Applications, for which we are requesting $454.7 million (fig. 133, MPO7-5725). This is now a program line item, comparable to Apollo and Advanced Missions. Funding shown for fiscal years 1966 and 1967 was carried under Apollo and in the Space Sciences budget. PAGENO="0200" 196 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MANNED SPACE FLIGHT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT APOLLO APPLICATIONS FY 1968 BUDGET ESTIMATES (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS( FY66 FY61 FY68 SPACE VEHICLES EXPERIMENTS MISSION SUPPORT $ 8.5 40.3 2.4 $ 38.6 35.6 5.8 $ 263.1 140.1 50.3 TOTAL $51.2 $ 80.0 $ 454.1 NASA HQ MPR67-5725 2-2-67 FIGURE 133 Apollo Applications builds upon the strong base of flight experience, ground facilities, and trained manpower developed in past and current programs. Each mission is designed to take full advantage of the Apollo Saturn system to make significant contributions to a wide range of objectives. Missions are planned to concurrently gain experience, test theory, perform experiments, and collect data. By establishing multiple objectives for each flight mission, a program limited to a minimum economical launch rate can achieve rapid progress and make great gains at low cost. Planning includes the decision to use, modify, and expand present Apollo systems capabilities rather than move toward whole new developments, the strategy of reusing basic hardware for many missions by storing it in orbit and returning later with fresh crews and expendables, and the approach of designing experiments that will gather important data while at the same time testing the experimental concepts themselves. The program of investigations and development to be carried forward in the Apollo Applications program will meet two basic objectives; to make unique con- tributions to practical applications, operational capabilities, science, and tech- nology; and, at the same time, to place the nation in a position to assess, on the basis of valid scientific experimentation and actual experience, the value and feasibility of future space flight and the interrelated roles of manned and unmanned systems. In support of these objectives, the principal areas toward which the fiscal year 1968 effort will be directed are the development of an extended flight capability, the conduct of manned astronomical and earth observations from space, and the continued exploration of the moon. Specific program elements have been selected for initiation in FY 1967 and 1968 that, in combination, provide the greatest contribution to the Nation's space objectives at the lowest cost. These are: The spent, orbiting 2nd stage of an uprated Saturn I will be converted into a habitable, 10,000 cubic foot oi~bital workshop. Provided with an air- lock, the workshop will provide in 1968 an economical long duration manned shelter for many experimental activities and will be revisited and reused during the course of the program. The support systems of the basic Apollo Command and Service Modules will be modified for long duration operations. The Lunar Module will be modified to serve as a base for manned lunar investigations of up to two weeks. PAGENO="0201" 1988 NASA AUTHORIZATION 197 The Apollo developed Lunar Mapping and Survey System will be used to complete the cartography of the moon. The Command Module will be modified to carry up to 6 men for short duration ferry and resupply missions and will be provided a land landing capability, thereby reducing costs and increasing operating flexibility. Specialized payloads will be developed for operation in various orbits and on the moon, including multispectral earth and weather sensors, biological and biomedical experiments, mobile lunar vehicles, and communications systems. A manned solar telescope system, forerunner of long-lived orbital astro~ nomical facilities, will be flown during the peak of solar activity. ~paco veMcle~ Fiscal year 1968 funding requirements for space vehicles total $263.7 million, of which $167.4 million is for the first three line items (fig. 134, MP67-5709). This request provides for continued incremental funding of the follow-on uprated Saturn I procurements initiated in FY 1966 and 1967 and for the initial funding for follow-on Saturn V vehicles and Command and Service Modules (CSM). The first follow-on uprated Saturn I will be delivered in late 1968. The delivery of the first follow-on OSM is planned late in 1960. The first follow-on Saturn V will be delivered in mid-1970. The remaining requirements, totaling $96.3 million, support the continuation of the design and development efforts, begun in FY 1966 and FY 1967, required to furnish modified Apollo spacecraft systems for the planned missions. Apollo spacecraft systems, including the electrical power, life support and environmental control systems, are currently being subjected to extensive tests to determine their ability to operate in the environments and for the durations proposed for the Apollo Applications missions. To minimize the cost of this phase of the program, the plan is to incorporate only those changes required by the planned missions. Fiscal year 1968 funding also includes the initiation of development of a land landing capability for the Command Module, which will allow elimination of water landing as the primary recovery mode, thereby providing greater operating MANNED SPACE FLIGHT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT APOLLO APPLICATIONS FY 1968 BUDGET ESTIMATES (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) F Y66 FY61 FY68 SPACE VEHICLES $8.5 $38.6 $263.1 CSM PROCUREMENT -0- -0- 43.3 UPRATED SATURN I PROCUREMENT * 1.0 24.0 18.5 SATURN V PROCUREMENT -0- -0- 45.6 SPACECRAFT MODIFICATION 1.5 14.6 91.3 LAUNCH VEHICLE MODIFICATION -0- -0- 5.0 NASA HQ MP67-5709 ~-15-67 Fiouna 134 PAGENO="0202" 198 196:8 NASA AUTHORIZATION flexibility, allowing refurbishment and reuse of command modules, and reducing recovery and new procurement costs. The changes to the spacecraft that permit incorporation of the land landing capability will also allow the interior of the Command Module to be rearranged to accommodate up to three additional astronauts for short duration ferry and resupply missions. Limited develop- ment of a Lunar Module (LM) shelter/taxi to extend lunar surface exploration time beyond that planned for the Apollo program will also commence in FY 1968. Ea'perrments and `mis8rOn sl6pport My next chart (fig 135 MP67-5708) shows the remainder of the funding being requested for Apollo Applications-$140 7 for experiments and $503 million for mission support Eo,perv,ne,t~ts Of the experiment funding $33 7 million is for definition and $107 million is for development. Apollo Applications experiments cover a wide range of objec- tives in the fields of space medicine, science, applications, technology, and en- gineering. The definition and development of experiment payloads to meet these objectiveswill include activity by elements of NASA, o.ther government agencies, and the scientific and industrial communities. Effort in FY 1966 and FY 1967 was primarily confined to definition of experi- ments and experiment hardware for use in the early Apollo Applications missions. Included In these efforts were studies which led to the Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) and the spent stage S-IVB orbital workshop now under development The fiscal year 1968 effort will continue the development of the Apollo Tele scope Mount and the orbital workshop and will define and develop other experi- ment payloads for follow-on Apollo Applications missions These experiments have already been discussed in considerable detail MANNED SPACE FLIGHT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT APOLLO APPLICATIONS FY 1968 BUDGET ESTIMATES ______________________________ (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) FY66 FY67 FY68 EXPERIMENTS $40 3 $35 6 $140 7 DEFINITION 34 4 12 0 33 7 DEVELOPMENT 59 236 1070 MISSION SUPPORT $2 4 $58 $ 50 3 PAYLOAD INTEGRATION 1 4 4 40 0 OPERATIONS 2.3 1.4 10.3 Frounu 135 NASA HQ MP67-5708 1- 15-67 PAGENO="0203" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 199 M'iassion 8~bppOrt Payload integration, for which $40 million of the $50.3 million requested for mission support is earmarked, includes' the system analysis and develop- ment effort required to assemble experiments into mission compatible payloads, and the effort required to physically install and qualify them for flight readiness. This activity includes definition, design and development, modification, and in- stallation. The definition phase of payload integration was initiated during FY 1966 and will be essentially completed by the end of FY 1967. Design and development includes control documentation, interface, qualification *and ac- ceptance test specifications, and testing plans. Modification and installation provide for changes to space vehicles and experiment carriers to accommodate experiments and physical installation of experiments Into applicable carriers. The FY 1968 effort will provide for the analyses of payloads to determine de- tailed payload integration requirements and the implementation of design and development activities for the initial Apollo Applications flights. Operations will require $10.3 million and include efforts' at the Kennedy Space Center and the Manned Spacecraft Center that are directly concerned with launch, flight, crew, and recovery activity. Basic support is provided in the Apollo program for those missions currently scheduled as alternate Apollo Applications flights. FY 1968 funding will also provide for initiation of operations support for missions including the augmentation of the mission con- trol center located at the Manned Spacecraft Center required to support the in- creased data demands resulting from the enlarged experiment and operational activity associated with the Apollo Applications program. ADVANCED MISSIONS The Advanced Missions program, for which we are requesting $8.0 million in fiscal year 1968, allows us to investigate advanced manned space flight con- cepts. The studies examine logical extension of the NASA space capability through analysis of the growth potential of present hardware systems; assesses requirements for future systems; furnish guidance for research and technology activities; provide technical information and cost data upon which future pro- gram decisions can be based; and permit initiation of the definition, preliminary design, and specification of probably future missions. By conducting these advanced studies, we build a solid base for planning and selecting future manned space flight missions'. Specific areas of investiga- tion include manned earth orbital, lunar, and planetary missions and launch vehicles. Fiscal year 19641 and 1967 studies provided support for the evolvin.g Apollo Applications program, including the definition of experiments and other mission payloads and analysis of the cost-effectiveness of alternate flight equip- ment approaches. The FY 1966 and 1967 studies also examined the feasibility of a long-duration space station module. In addition to considering various earth orbital applications, the space station study includes analysis to Identify features common to manned planetary flight requirements. In the area of Earth Orbital Studies, we have been analyzing a one-year earth orbital workshop which could evolve into a continuous-operation space station. Alternate approaches for an eventual one-year workshop included module configurations utilizing the third-stage structure of the Saturn V; a Saturn V-launched module containing all expendables for a one-year duration; and a system based on a flexible subsystem module. We are also defining rescue concepts and space station resupply and logistic systems, and continuing work on the selection and definition of candidate experiments. The potential economic benefits that can be derived from space station operations are also being assessed. Based on the results of the conceptual studies, preliminary definition of a one- year workshop module will be initiated, together with the preliminary definition of a modular spacecraft to allow us to carry out earth resources experiments and astronomical observations. The FY 1968 studies will concentrate on the definition of a versatile space station designed for earth applications, astronomy, and biomedical research, as well as interplanetary exploration. We are also conducting Planetary Mission Studies, examining various mission modes and systems concepts for manned Mars and Venus reconnaissance, sample retrieval from the Martian surface and, ultimately, Mars landing missions. These studies have established the practicability of using Apollo space vehicle PAGENO="0204" 200 19 ~ NASA AUTHORIZATION hardware for sample retrieval or reconnaissance missions, and have provided us with spacecraft concepts for manned Mars landing missions in the future. The fiscal year 1068 study program will focus on continued definition of tech- nology requirements and concepts for a Mars sample-retrieval mission. This type of manned mission offers the unique advantage of bringing samples of the Mar- tian surface and atmosphere back to earth for scientific analysis. The manned spacecraft, which would also allow for scientific research and observations on the way to and returning from the planet, would be used to aim, launch, and retrieve an bnmanned sample return probe. During FY 1968, the study effort will include preliminary definition of the mission spacecraft, and the associated propulsion stages, in addition to the onboard experiments that could be conducted by the crew members during the mission. The studies will define the total system fQr Mars sample retrieval in enough depth to permit definitive planning of the fund- ing requirements, the technological development program required to support this mission, and the total program support required within NASA. Fiscal year 1968 Lunar Mission Studies will provide for updating the current plan for lunar exploration so that the accompanying conceptual designs can be developed. This integrated exploration plan will review the basis for a continuing series of manned and unmanned missions. Finally, Launch Vehicles Studies to support earth orbital, planetary and lunar missions will be continued during fiscal year 1968. These studies will stress preliminary definition of improved Saturn vehicles, analysis of reusable reentry vehicles, and determination of the facilities and support requirements. CoNcLusIoN Now, in conclusion, why does the manned space flight program merit support at this time? I believe there are many reasons. It will maintain the orderly pace of our progress in the space age at a time when there may be opportunities to move ahead of the Soviets in `space achieve- ment. It will guard against the possibility of technological "surprise" by supporting the continued advancement of an industrial technology. It will maintain the forward momentum that space `technology has given our competitive position in the world market place through research and develop~ mont for our industrial technology. It will support the broa'd base of research and development vital to our security as a nation. It will avoid the waste, the dissipation of a space capability assembled in painstaking fashion over the period of a decade. It will hold open the opportunity to return direct benefits to man on earth in the next phases `of space activity, maintaining the momentum achieved thus far. It will take `advantage of the tremendous opportunities for expansion of knowledge at a time when space-based as'tronomy and exploration embracing the whole field of space science show promise of breaking through into an era of real discovery. It will provide the mOans to meet the challenge of the future in space at a rela- `tively modest cost as measured against a percentage of the gross national product. The peak was In fiscal year 1966, when NASA expenditures totaled 0.83 of 1 percent of the gross national product. In the current fiscal year they are 0.73 of 1 percent. In the budget proposed for fiscal year 1968, the total would be 0.66 of 1 percent. Finally, it will provide the capability to expand our space activity if the inter- national situation should change. The resulting stabilizing benefits would thus be insured because this proposed program would keep the space team together, and in a position to respond to economic developments on the national scene. To summarize, I have reviewed the major activities of `the manned `space flight program. As you recall, I began by citing `our general objectives in manned space flight. These are the `broad `objectives that have motivated our efforts in specific programs. We have worked for the establishment of man's capabilities; for development of a national competence for manned `space flight as represented by an industrial base, trained personnel, ground facilities, launch vehicles, space- craft, and operational experience, for the exploration of space; and for United States leadership in space. Now we propose we move forward and use this national capa'bili~y. PAGENO="0205" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 201 In Apollo Applications I have presented the program which resulted from the study effort authorized by this Committee in fiscal year 1966. This careful planning was further supported by this C~mmittee in FY 1967 when funds were authorized to keep the options open one more year. We are now asking you to exercise these options. The Apollo Applications funds you provided last year defined a follow~o'n effort to the Apollo program that resulted in an effective program to capitalize on the investment th~s country has made in space. This program has been reviewed and endorsed by the Bureau of the Budget, the President's Science Advisory Committee and the President. They recommend that we press onward in the investigation of man's role in space, the inter- relationship between man and machine in space exploration, scientific experi- mentation and operational systems. They recommend the Nation not be deprived of the ultimate benefits to mankind this capability offers. In this presentation in support of our budget request for fiscal year 1968, we are asking that you approve the continuance of our efforts toward these national objectives. I believe the example I have shown in the development of the Powercel as a potentially new household item to produce power, reduce pollution, and provide a better way of life for mankind ties in closely with not only the reasons for supporting manned space flight activity but also to the gist of the Fortune magazine article just quoted. Mr. TEAGUE. For your information and the information of the committee, the hearings will start each morning at 10. Thank you. (Whereupon, at 12 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned until 10 a.m. on Wednesday, March 15, 1967.) PAGENO="0206" J PAGENO="0207" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION WEDNESDAY, MARCH 15, 1967 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, Wa$hington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, in room 2318, Rayburn House Office Building, at 10 a.m., the Honorable Olin E. Teague (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. WAGG0NNER (presiding). The committee is in order. Proceed, Dr. Mueller. STATEMENT OF DR. GEORGE E. MUELLER, ASSOCIATE ADMINIS- TRATOR FOR MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, NASA Dr. MUELLER. This morning I would like to review the Apollo pro- gram and the progress that has been made in the past year on Apollo. I will not discuss the accident further since we will have a considerable discussion of that later when the results of the Accident Review Board are in. With your permission, however, I will discuss all of the other aspects of the program for the past year. Turning to the first viewgraph (fig. 1, MA 66-9411); the Apollo program, itself, involves not just the spacecraft and the launch ve- hicle, but a complex of launch facilities, manufacturing facilities, and test facilities that stretch across the Nation. It involves the logistic support for making those facilities useful and it involves the worldwide tracking network that provides the information to the Mission Control Center that permits the safe control of the flight. It involves the support fleet and it involves the crews and their training. It involves many things that have to be coordinated and brought to focus and made to operate together effectively if the program is to succeed. The Apollo program itself is divided into seven phases (fig. 2, MA66-10,262). We have completed the first phase, the unmanned flight program on the uprated Saturn I and completed the unmanned flight of the command and service module. The next phase that we will be entering later this summer is the unmanned flight of the lunar module. From there we expect to qualify the command and service module for manned flight and to carry out open end missions for pe- riods of up to 2 weeks. From there we plan to go to combined op- erations. The Saturn V unmanned flight program will test both the 203 PAGENO="0208" 204 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 1 FIGURE 2 PAGENO="0209" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 205 launch vehicle and the reentry heat shield of the spacecraft as well as its control systems during this year leading to the first manned flights on Saturn V in Earth orbit in the next year. We will be carrying out simulations of the lunar missions on the Saturn V and Earth orbit until such time as we develop the proce- dures and verify the operations of the equipment so that we can pro- ceed to the final lunar landing mission. Turning to the next pair of viewgraphs (figs. 3 and 4, MA66-9171 and MC66-10263), I would like to review just briefly the results of the flights of the Apollo/Saturn 201, 202, and 203 which took place dur- ing 1966. The first of these, 201, and the third, 202, were tests of the launch vehicle with its new second stage, the SIVB and tests of the reentry heat shields. One of these flights was designed to provide us with information concerning a peak heat impulse, the peak heating rate that will occur coming back from the Moon. The other, a flight profile, which provided a maximum total heat input which again was equal to that which we will experience coming back from the Moon. It was necessary to divide the test into those two parts because of the limited velocities that we can attain with the uprated Saturn I. These were passed successfully and the design certification preview board in November and December declared the command and service module and the launch vehicle ready for manned flight. The hydro- gen experiment carried out on AS203 last summer was also a com- pletely successful test of what was and is a relatively new field of en- gineering which is the distribution and control of liquids in a zero gravity environment. Now, although we speak of a zero gravity environment there is enough air drag in the upper reaches of the atmosphere so that there is some deceleration of these vehicles when they are traveling around the Earth. In order to counteract that and to provide enough countergravity or counteracceleration to keep the liquids at the bottom of the tank, we introduced a new concept. This was to use the normal vent gases of the hydrogen to provide thrust in a forward direction thus more than counteracting the drag in the atmosphere and keeping the fluid at the bottom of the tanks. It was questionable whether you could actually control the thrust to the degree required to keep the fluid settled. We are talking about something on the order of a thousandth of a G which is a thousandth of the gravitational pull of the Earth. At these very low levels, it was just not understood what would happen to large quantities of hy- drogen in that kind of environment. In fact, it settled nicely. The importance of the test was that this is the method we had planned to use with the third stage of the Saturn V and we had need of being sure that it would in fact work before we committed the Saturn V to it. That experiment again was completely successful. Mr. FULTON. Could you submit in a short statement as to how it works? Dr. MUELLER. I will be pleased to. (The information requested follows:) LIQUID HYDROGEN EXPERIMENT A main point of concern in the orbital use of hydrogen is assurance that the fuel can be settled to the lower bulkhead or bottom of the fuel tank and kept there, covering the engine pump inlet and ready to supply the engine pump with fluid-not gas-when it is time to restart the main engine, 76-265 0-67-pt. 2--~14 PAGENO="0210" 206 196 S NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 3 FIGURE 4 PAGENO="0211" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 207 A second aspect of this is the necessity of keeping the gas produced by boiloff of the liquid in the top portion of the tank, so that gas alone-not liquid-will be vented overboard. In space there is no natural force to seat the propellant and keep it in place. To maintain the hydrogen in a settled condition-as if the vehicle were stand- ing upright on earth-designers must create an artificial gravity for the orbiting vehicle. The simplest way to do this is to accelerate the vehicle slightly, con- tinuously, in Its orbit. This acceleration must be sufficient to keep the hydrogen settled once the stage's small ullage rockets have settled it initially but must not use up too much fuel or accelerate the vehicle enough to change its orbit appreciably. The most promising way of providing this small continuing thrust is by venting the hydrogen tank itself-expelling beneficially the gases created within the tank by evaporation due to the heat input. Boiloff gases expelled through two small nozzles pointing rearward gives the stage a minimum of about six pounds forward push which helps maintain the proper condition in the tank. This constant forward thrust keeps the propel- lants essentially settled. In the Saturn V mission, two 70-pound thrusters will fire just prior to restart of the main engine to "finish the job" and assure a completely acceptable state within the tank. The LH2 orbital experiment conducted on the A/S 203 flight verified the ade- quacy of the liquid hydrogen continuous propulsive venting system. The hydro- gen fuel tank was instrumented to report to ground stations. Among the instrumentation was a television camera which sent pictures to four ground sta- tions. Engineers observing TV monitors at the stations were able to see to what degree the fuel management techniques were successful. In February, after the accident, we made several decisions. One of those was to proceed with the unmanned flights of the lunar module and the Saturn V Command and Service Module in the year 1967 (fig. 5, MC67-5782). Those decisions then are reflected in our planning. The next slide shows the mission objectives of the AS-206 flight, which is an unmanned Lunar Module development flight (fig. 6, MC67-5779). There are three primary objectives, one is to verify the ascent and descent propulsion system and the Lunar Module structure. The second is to evaluate the staging. Here we have a basic kind of a SCHEDULE-FEBRUARY 1961 DECISION TO PROCEED WITH: AS 206 UNMANNED IM AS 501 UNMANNED 1/V QUALIFICATION AS 502 BIK II HEAT SHIELD OVAL. NASA HQ MC-67 5782 3- 15-67 Fiouzu 5 PAGENO="0212" 208 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION physical phenomena that occurs when you fire an engine into a closed or essentially closed volume as we do when the ascent stage takes off from the lunar surface. We want to verify in fact that the engine would work properly under those conditions. The third is to verify that the uprated H-i engine, where we have gone from 200,000 to 205,000 pounds of thrust, will yield the performance on the uprated Saturn I that we expect. The mission sequence is shown on the right-hand side (fig. 7, MC67-5793). It begins with the insertion into an 85 to i20 nautical, mile elliptical orbit and then use the descent engine to achieve a cir- cular orbit. There are actually two burns of the descent engine fol- lowed by an ascent burn which places the ascent stage into a higher elliptical orbit. In addition to that, you have an elliptical orbit with a `higher apogee and it provides us with a test of an ascent burn. It results in a larger orbital altitude. The problem that we have in designing this mission profile is to provide that the burns take place over places where we have tracking stations on the ground. There is a fair amount of work that has been done to be sure that we make the burns which resemble as closely as we can, the burns that are go- ing to be used in carrying out the lunar mission itself. Also, that those burns occur over places on the Earth where we have tracking stations. Generally we prefer to have these burns take place over the United States. You can't do all of them over the United States because you have to fire both at perigee and apogee to control it. FIGURE 6 PAGENO="0213" Turning to the next set of missions (fig. 8, MC66-10266A) thGSè flights have five primary objectives, one is to demonstrate the struc- tural and thermal integrity of the launch vehicle and spacecraft ciur- ing the launch environment and reentry. The second is to demonstrate that the stage separations occur properly. The third is to verify the operation of the critical subsystems, the fourth is to evaluate the performance of the emergency detection sys- tem. That is a system that measures how well the launch vehicle is doing. It is a system that, if it is not doing well, tells the astronauts that they should abort. In fact, during the early phases of the launch, it automatically aborts. The last is to demonstrate mission support facilities capabilities. That involves both the network and launch ships themselves. The AS-501 and AS-502 missions are similar. I will use the AS-501 as an example (fig. 9, MC 67-5794). One of the major objectives of it is to test the reentry heat shield. Much of the flight~ path is deter- mined by that requirement. The original launch is into a 1O~ nautical-mile circular orbit. We inject into a 9,000-nautical-mile apogee and that is followed by another Service Module burn which raises the apogee to 9,900 nautical miles. We then burn the Service Module for a long burn to give us both a test of the long duration burning of the service module and build FIGuRE 7 PAGENO="0214" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 210 FIGURE 8 FIGURE 9 PAGENO="0215" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 211 up* the velocity that is required for reproducing the reentry con- ditions. Obviously, we have to provide more velocity during the reentry phase of the mission in order to simulate the effect of coming back from the 240,000 miles of the lunar distance. The final Service Module burn provides an entry velocity of 36,000 feet per second which is the equivalent of the reentry velocity from the Moon. Recovery will take place in the Pacific Ocean near Hawaii. Mr. FULTON. When we approach the Moon on the Apollo manned mission, we will be doing it for the first time. Why don't we have a mission that has a long elliptical orbit that includes both the Earth and the Moon as focal points and perform some of these operations in the vicinity of the Moon to see how these experiments work under real conditions rather than under simulated Earth conditions? Dr. MUELLER. Mr. Fulton, we have examined that as one of the alternatives. The basic constraint we have is we have to operate the spacecraft unmanned and that requires the addition of supplementary equipment that takes the place of the men, which adds to the com- plexity of the equipment. In applying the mission as we have out- lined it we have about an 8- to 9-hour mission. If we went the full distance to the Moon, we would be going to a mission that had a duration of several days, something like a minimum of 4 days, going that far and having to operate that far would require a different kind of a programing device. This can be self-timed so that it does not require, except in an override instance, commands from the ground. Basically it is a self-operating programer. On a 4-day mission the discrepancies in time become such that you would have to depend upon ground command. Mr. FtJLTON. Does the Russian booster have a big enough power booster to do that? Do we? For example, I felt possibly that the U.S.S.R. would have a manned mission in a long elliptical orbit that would circle the Moon and return to Earth. Can they do it? Can we? Dr. MUELLER. We do not have that capability at the present time. Mr. WAGGONNER. Dr. Mueller, have you given any consideration to a manned flyby before the actual landing itself? Dr. MUELLER. The way our missions are planned, once we have veri- fied the equipment will operate satisfactorily for the lunar mission, we will establish a set of decision points that will allow us to go as far as the equipment and the procedures that we have developed will permit. What that means is that the first step will be a commitment to actu- ally take off from Earth, orbit and then go to the Moon. During the course of the mission we can in fact fly by it in the event that our service module propulsion engine malfunctions in some way. If we do fly by we will automatically fly around the Moon and come back to the Earth. If the service module is working we will use it to go into lunar orbit. At that point in time we can either stay in lunar orbit or we can commit to the lunar landing itself. That will depend upon whether or not the Lunar Module at that time is ready to carry out the landing phase itself. So we make a conscious decision in each step as to whether to proceed to the next step, it may very well be that the PAGENO="0216" 212 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION first flight will circle the Moon. Our planning says we will go as far as it is safe to go. Mr. RouDEBUsI~. Why don't we plan to recover the first unmanned shot? Dr. MUELLER. 17~Te do. Mr. ROUDEBUSH. I thought on our first unmanned shot we didn~t intend to recover it? Dr. MUELLER. No, sir. Mr. ROUDEBUSH. I understood we were going to. I understood you said we were not. Dr. MUELLER. No, sir, we plan to recover near Hawaii. And the sec- ond unmanned will be recovered also. Mr. R0UDEBU5TI. Both are being recovered? Dr. MUELLER. Yes. Mr. ROUDEBUSH. I misunderstood. Dr. MUELLER. We are exercising the full recovery fleet at the same time. We will have a complete test of the whole system. Mr. WA000NNER. Dr. Mueller, for future reference, is there going to be any change in the numbering of these follow-on flights as a result of the accident or do you intend to continue as you had planned prior to the accident? Dr. MUELLER. We don't plan to change the numbers because of the accident. There may be some shifting of launch vehicles and space- craft numbers. Also, because of the complexity involved in the phrase Apollo/Saturn 206 flight and the difficulty of CAPCOM, communi- cating with the spacecraft, we are looking at the possibility of chang- ing the nomenclature to call it perhaps Apollo II, Apollo IV, Apollo V, o~ something like that, just to make it simpler for the public to know what is going on. Mr. FULTON. Why are you using oxygen for stationary ground capsules used for astronauts practice? Why would yOu not do as well with normal air pressures? Dr. MUELLER. We don't as a rule use pure oxygen. The only time that we use it is where we are trying to simulate exactly what we are going to do in the actual flight itself. Actually there are three tests up to the launch that use pure oxygen in the capsule. One is an un- manned test in the vacuum chamber; the second is a manned test in the vacuum chamber; and the third is a plugs-in plugs-out test on the pad. Mr. FULTON. Will you make a statement on these proposed tests as to their purpose and duration, the type of atmosphere used and whether there is a mixture of oxygen, hydrogen or helium? Dr. MUELLER. That is under review. Mr. FULTON. I am saying for the future. Dr. MUELLER. So with your permission, I would like to ask if we could delay that until we have completed the studies that will lead to a recommendation in this area Mr. FULTON. That is perfectly all right. Dr. MUELLER. Turning now to what we have planned in 1966 versus what we have accomplished. On the left-hand chart (fig. 10, ML 66- 10,399) you will see that we have, in the case of the launch vehicles PAGENO="0217" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 213 APOLLO PROGRAM ~ MAJOR 1966 PLANNED ACTIVITIES LAUNCH VEHICLES ACCOMPLISHED UPRATED SATURN * COMPLETE QUALIFICATION TESTING PROGRAM DEC. * COMPLETE VEHICLE GSE FOR LAUNCH COMPLEX 37B FEB. * BEGIN UNMANNED FLIGHT PROGRAM- FEB. * COMPLETE ALL STRUCTURAL TESTING OF THE FIRST STAGE - - MAY * START ASSEMBLY OF THE TWELFTH FLIGHT ARTICLE OF THE FIRST AND SECOND STAGES AUG * COMPLETE 205K H-i ENGINE QUALIFICATION JUNE * DELIVER FIFTY 205K PRODUCTION H-i ENGINES AUG. * COMPLETE H-i FIRST FLIGHT WORTHINESS VERIFICATION OCT. SATURN V * DELIVER FIRST FLIGHT STAGES TO KSC JAN.67 * DELIVER GSE AND PROGRAM TAPES REQUIRED FOR LAUNCH AS~5O1 DEC. * BEGIN CHECKOUT OF FIRST POSITION OF FIRST STAGE ACCEPTANCE TEST STAND AT MTF - DEC. * ACTIVATE BOTH SECOND STAGE ACCEPTANCE TEST STANDS AT MTF - MAR. `61 * COMPLETE F-i ENGINE QUALIFICATION TESTS - - SEPT. * COMPLETE J-2 ENGINE 205,000 POUND THRUST QUALIFICATION - AUG. NASA SQ ML66-IS,399 REV. 2/15/67 FIGURE 10 and the uprated Saturn I, completed the qualification testing pro- gram, and we have completed the vehicle ground support equipment for launch complex 37B. We have begun our unmanned flight pro- gram, and have completed all structural testing of the first stage. For the benefit of those that are new to the committee, I might point out that what we have tried to do is identify our major planned activities for the coming year. Then the following year see how well we did with respect to that plan. We did complete the structural testing of the first stage. We did start the assembly of the 12th flight article of the first and second stages. We did complete the 205,000 pound thrust engine qualifica- tion for the first stage (fig. 11, MA66-9215). We did deliver some 50 of these production H-i engines which completed our order for those engines. We did complete the H-i first flightworthiness verification. In Saturn V we delivered our first flight stages to KSC (fig. 12, MC67-600). We were late with the second stage. Instead of that being done in October and November as we had planned, it came in January. We did deliver the ground support equipment and program tapes required for the launch of AS. 501. We did begin the checkout of the first position of the first stage acceptance test stand at Missis- sippi and, as a matter of fact, at this point in time, the first test firing has been completed (fig. 13, MC67-5'T37). I don't know that I have a view of that at this point here but that was done just about a week ago. We did activate both second stage acceptance test stands at Mississippi. We were behind schedule on the second one and it is activated at this point in time. We did corn- PAGENO="0218" 214 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 11 FIGURE 12 PAGENO="0219" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 215 plete the F-i engine qualification test and the J-2 engine, 205,000- pound thrust qualification. Mr. WAGGONNER. Hasn't the J-2 been uprated? Dr. MUELLER. Up about 5,000 pounds. It has developed a higher specific impulse so instead of being at the lower end of its specifica- tion, it is near the upper end which results in higher performance. Mr. WAGGONNER. Is this higher performance essential? Dr. MUELLER. Yes, as the spacecraft design has been completed, we found that there have been increases in the weight and we have been able, by virtue of the fact that the performance of the launch vehicle was improved to accommodate those increases in weight. Mr. WAGGONNER. Was this 5,000-pound increase in the J-2 engine, was this a fractional increase that was necessary for the mission performance? Dr. MUELLER. No, actually it is part of our normal experience in these engines as they mature, it is relatively easy to raise their per- formance as a normal course of evolution. Mr. FULT0N. There was an article appearing in the Sunday Wash- ington Post to the effect that there were 20,000 mistakes in the Apollo program already. I would like to have in the record you~ comments in answer to some of those statements. I think it shouldn't go unanswered. Mr. WAGGONNER. I think you will find that in yesterday's record. (The information requested follows:) FIGURE 13 PAGENO="0220" 216 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION The Washington Post article was a quotation taken from the Apollo News Media symposium which was held at MSC Houston, December 15 and 16, 1966. The statement represented a small portion of a more comprehensive discussion. This discussion which places the statement in context is as follows: "Those subsystems, not the ones that are going to fly but the ones like the ones that are going to fly, are put through a series of qualification tests, which involve, to the best of our ability to estimate environments, the environments that the hardware is going to see, either singly or combined. And we have invested a fair amount in facilities around the country to improve our ability to do that kind of environmental testing. You see a whole bunch of them here, you see them at White Sands, you see them at Mississippi, you see them at the Cape, and you see them at the contractor plants. We also, in addition to the sub- system testing, we do testing at the system level. Now, whether we like it o~ not, that testing frequently shows up problems, a surprising large number of problems. To give you some idea of the magnitude of this, we keep book on every failure that occurs in the program. The inspector that notes the failure and the engineer that sees the failure has to fill out a form. That form goes into the data processing system so that we can trace the failures. The reason we are doing this isn't so much to keep book, because we believe that the way we are going to get reliability in the system is by rooting out the failure. In other words, take every failure, force somebody competent to understand it and take whatever corrective action is necessary to remove that as a possible cause of failure. But through the Block I program, on the command service module alone, we have logged something like 20,000 of these kind of failures. That is a relatively large number of things. All of them aren't hard failures, some of them are failures associated with something being out of specification, and we then have the problem of judging literally how good is good enough? If you think of the world of failures, you can break it into these two parts, those that obviously have to be fixed, and those that represent, for instance, a piece of in- strumention being out of spec by a few percent." In examination of these failures, it was found that the number 20,000 more accurately represented the failures at that time in all of the Apollo spacecraft. The comparable number for the CSM alone was 15,100. As mentioned in the testimony, the complexities between Apollo, Gemini and Mercury must be considered in using this type of data and on this basis Apollo represents a significant improvement over the Gemini and Mercury programs. For example, on the CSM, 21,600 drawings of parts and assemblies are required for the 1,500,000 parts as compared with 6,100 drawing for 268,000 parts on Gemini. Mr. FULTON. I would like to have listed in the record these com- panies who have a high rating on meeting time deadlines, qualification tests, and conforming to the programing that you have set out and, if you will, I would like to have the major deadlines the companies have not met so that some other means that have not been devised yet may provide for that. (The information requested follows:) The complexities of the Apollo project, design and fabrication, support to the contractors by NASA advancement in the state of the art, etc., makes a com- parative rating of companies subjective rather than objective. For purposes of incentive fee settlement, we do rate the contractors in terms of performance, cost and schedule. The relationship of these three factors varies from contractor to contractor depending upon our judgment of the diffi- culty the contractor will experience in meeting the milestones for performance, cost and schedule. Additionally, we assess each major hardware element to determine the status at various times throughout the development cycle. These ratings have been provided the Subcommittee on NASA Oversight for use in their study of the Apollo Program Pace and Progress in 1965 and 1966, respectively. En~losed as attachment No. 1 is the status of hardware provided the Subcom- mittee on NASA Oversight on July 10, 196~. This data is organized to reflect the hardware status and in meeting the major MSF Apollo milestones that is', first unmanned Saturn lB first manned Saturn lB first manned Lunar Configuration Spacecraft first manned Saturn V Apollo Lunar Landing PAGENO="0221" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 217 ATTACHMENT I FIRST `UNMANNED SATURN lB 1966 SUCCESSFULLY LAUNCHED C GOOD SHAPE MINOR WEAKNESS ~H WEAKNESS CRITICAL 26 February 1966 Douglas 1 International North American All contraCtOrs hryslcr Aircraft ~Ius. Michines Aviation S 18 [S - WB/1B~ S - 10/TB BIKI CSM GSE UI. I I I'Li `I. FIRST MANNED SATURN lB 1967 P~OOD SHAPE ~MIN OR ~-~SS I MAJOR WEAKNESS CRITICAL I Douglas International North i~erican Chrysler S - lB ~~5~/IB Ihi~ ~ff~7f~ B~R5Th%M 11 C~n~r~ctbrs~ ~ I I IH liii ILi PAGENO="0222" FIRST MANNED LU Chrysler SATURN lB LAUNCH - VEHICLE GOOD SHAPE NAR CONFIGURATION SPACECRAFT [SATURN IB) Douglas 1967 Aircraft Crumman Aircraft All Contractors OSSA BLOCKfl LEM CSM GSE NETWORK MINOR WEAKNESS MAJOR WEAKNESS I I The chart (MA5-9143) dated 7/66 shows that the Block I Command Service Module was ;f~ a minor weakness as reported in July 1965 hut was in good sha~ as of July 1966. The break in the bar represents the report provided to the Sulbcommittee on NASA Oversight 1965. The portion above the break repre- sents the status as of July1966. Attachment No. 2 contains charts showing the same data as of November 1966. Again, locating the Block I, `Ooniuiand Service Module, first manned Saturn lB the bar indIcated as of that date a minor weakness. 218 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIRST MANNED SATURN V 1968 North North Anterican Douglas Acricais Grunaian Boeing Aviation ~ ~- Tint . -. S-IC~ S~U GOOD L~APE MINOR LWEAK MAJOR ~AKNE~ CRITICAL PAGENO="0223" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION ATTACHMENT II FIRST UNMANNED SATURN lB 1966 SUCCESSFULLYLAUNCHED FIRST MANNED SATURN lB 1961 219 PAGENO="0224" 220 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIRST MANNED LUNAR CONFIGURATION SPACECRAFT [SATURN IB) North 1967 American ~1eL Aviation SATURN lB I BLOCKI! LAW'~CH CSM VEHICLE FIRST UNMANNED SATURN V PAGENO="0225" APOLLO LUNAR LANDING 1969 221 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIRST MANNED SATURN IL 968. 76-265 0-67-pt. 2-15 PAGENO="0226" 222 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION APOLLO LUNAR LANDING 1969 SATURNV , LAUNCH APOLLO GSE NETWORK VEHICLE SPACECRAFT GOOD J~ I I . I . TI The dotted line represents the location of the bar in the previous report ~u1y 1966. As I mentioned the charts show the condition of the major Apollo elements and thus reflect the overall performance of the contractors, his subcontractors, venders, and suppliers. It also demon~trates that the status of individual hardware elements can vary from month to month depending upon the many conditions outlined in the first paragraph of this statement. The status is also dependent on the phase the particular program element is going through at the time i e ground testing flight testing qualification testing etc Mr. BELL. I assume you have read this article a hundred times; is that true? Dr MUELLER I have read it but not `~ hundred times Mr. BELL. I was rather curious at the comments supposedly made by one of the astronauts, Grissom. Had you heard of the comments he made? Dr. MUELLER. We did discuss that yesterday, Mr. Bell, to some ex- tent I had not heard before the article that it v~ as `r lemon I h'rd discussions with Gus Grissom and some of the other cre~ members and got their views on the spacecraft Mr BELL Were these views unsatisfactory md ~ ere they dis pleased with the oper'rtion ~ Dr MUELLER They `~ ere ple'rsed ~s ith the spaceer `tft before it was delivered When they first went `thoard the sp~cecr'~ft ~tnd par ticipated in the testing, they found things th'mt they were not satisfied with; those were carefully considered and carefully worked off. Mr. BELL. What were some of those things? PAGENO="0227" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 223 Dr. MUELLER. Well, they had to do with the procedures and how they were being carried out. Some of the practices with respect to the testing itself, the rigor with which the inspection of the com- ponents were carried out, those kinds of things. The astronauts tend to be quite critical in their evaluation of the performance and do, in fact, serve a very effective role in causing the people that are working on the spacecraft to find solutions, and in this case they did better and Gus Grissom was pleased with the spacecraft when it was de- livered. There is a second thing that the article referred which is our trainers. As I said yesterday, the trainers follow behind the spacecraft by several months in the development cycle and each one, of course, is enough different so that you have to get it into operation. Gus and his crew went through the development cycle of the trainer at Houston and then they were going through it again down at the Cape. In this particular case, Gus had a very good working relation and a very real appreciation of the work that the crew was doing. The occurrence, as I understand it, took place after about a period of some 12 successful runs of the trainer and was sort of an anticlimax in the sense that they had trouble earlier; they finally got the troubles fixed. It was working well and my understanding was that it was sort of a private joke between him and the test conductor on the trainer to highlight the fact that he had now solved the problems. Mr. BELL. I am already starting to hear from my constituency on some of these things mentioned in this article. I also note that the article states that there was not any firefighting equipment or person- nel for the specific purpose of handling an emergency, like a fire. Is that true? Dr. MUELLER. There were people on deck. Mr. BELL. 1 mean on the same level, the same location ready to help out in case of an emergency. Dr. MUELLER. There were people who were. ready to help out in case of an emergency. They were not, however, prepared for this par- ticular emergency and that, of course, goes back to the fact that this test was not regarded as hazardous. Mr. FULTON. `When you go visit the field installations and talk to the people on the spot, have you uncovered how many change orders or engineering deficiencies were pasted on that particular equipment when it arrived at the test stand? What were these deficiencies? Will you put that in the record? I heard that on some equipment there have been as many as two or three hundred deficiencies by the contractor prior to acceptance. With the chairman's permission, we would like to have a general statement on that. Dr. MUELLER. We will put a statement in the record. I also would say that we try to balance the workload in the various places that we carry out work. There is a certain amount of work that is always done after a stage arrives at the test stand. (The information requested follows:) S-IC-T was sent to the Mississippi Test Facility in November of 1966 to de- termine the readiness if the S-IC test stand to accept the S-IC-4 stage. Upon arrival at MTF 198 man-hours of open work was required: PAGENO="0228" 224 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Remove 4 GSE fittings from Actuator Arms 12 Install Actuator Heat Shield Support at Structural Fins A & B 40 Install Actuator Heat Shield Panel at Fins A & B 60 Install 4 Boot Assemblies at Fins at A & B 40 Remove Fuel Emergency Drain Cover 2 Remove 2 LOX tank Module Covers 2 Remove Module Assembly Cover (Connect to OSE) 4 LOX Emergency Direct (Connect to GSE) 8 LOX Emergency Drain Valve (Connect to GSE) 9 Install Coupling 3 Install Timer Distributor 8 Install Environmental Duct Adapter 6 Install LOX Fill & Drain Line 4 Mr. FULTON. We all realize that is what the contractor has not done. When they have the change orders pasted on the side, you didn't expect them ~ Dr. MUELLER. That is what I was going to say. We do make delivery decisions to transfer work from one plant to another. Mr. FULTON. That is what I am asking about. Dr. MUELLER. But that is not a contractor that does that. It is the Government itself that does it. That is the point I am trying to make. Mr. FULTON. Will you give us some little history about it ~ Dr. MUELLER. We will be pleased to. (The information requested follows:) In the spacecraft and launch vehicle areas, a series of NASA board actions precede the turnover of the item vehicle to NASA. The contractor identifies to the board, in writing, the known changes or deficiencies that are outstanding at the time of turnover. The board, with the assistance of working groups evalu- ates the documentation, the physical vehicle and test results. A decision is made to accept the vehicle with certain "open" work to be accomplished later or make the contractor bring the vehicle up to an acceptable level of completion before acceptance. For the spacecraft this turnover action occurs at the contractor's facility since the spacecraft is then delivered to KSC. For launch vehicles, the turnover point is usually after acceptance testing at a facility such as SACTO or MTF since acceptance firing cannot be conducted at the contractor's plant. In either case, the turnover is formally documented with known outstanding work positively identified. In the case of launch vehicles, the move from the contractor's facility to the acceptance test facility is preceded by a formal review board but there is no written acceptance by the government of the stage. The vehicle still belongs to the contractor and tests are conducted by the contractor with supervision and assistance by NASA to insure the tests are run in conformance of govern- ment requirements. The demonstration of the launch vehicle is a prerequisite for government acceptance. For spacecraft, there are a series of in-plant tests that represent this same demonstration of performance. There are several reasons for accepting a piece of hardware with known open work still to be performed. We, of course, refer only to items of a rela- tively minor nature. Were a discrepancy of a major nature to appear, it is `held for correction where it can best be handled, schedules not `withstanding. Dur- ing the early part of a program where time is a factor, initial production over- laps, to an extent, the later phases of the ground test and verification effort. Refinements and modifications which result continue even through delivery dates of these earlier units. Discrepancies found by inspections just prior to delivery must be accommodated. Discrepancies are uncovered during testing which follows manufacture. In all cases `the modifications which are dictated by these occurrences are evaluated by both the contractor and NASA on the basis of schedule impact versus work complexity to determine the be'st place in the total vehicle flow to make the change or correct the fault. There is `a certain amount of work that is always done after a stage arrives at a test stand or a vehicle arrives at KSC. Any deferred or added work is also scheduled into the flow. Neither we nor the contractor like to defer work. PAGENO="0229" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 225 We would both prefer to do this work in the normal manufacturing sequence of a vehicle. Moreover, we are acutely aware of the potential for this deferral of work to grow. We have taken definite management actions to decrease this growth so that we can establish normal test cycles at the field test sites and at I~SC. Due to the nature of a development program, the first vehicles have transferred work due to the phase of design, testing and manufacturing. There is a significant downward trend in the amount of open work transferred with each succeeding vehicle. We have included a clause in our incentive contracts that allows us to deduct fee for discrepancies or open work existing at the time of turnover of hardware to the government. We are never satisfied with any amount of transferred work. We have and will continue to exert NASA and contractor emphasis to reduce the level. Mr. WAGGONNER. Isn't this one of the reasons you have contractor personnel on the scene at `these facilities to do last-minute things that can better be done there than at the point of fabrication? Dr. MUELLER. Yes. Mr. WAGGONNER. These pastings are to point out what remains to be done. for safety purposes. Dr. MUELLER. And there are, of course, things that are picked up when you go to the new place. That is why we static fire these ve- hicles, and carry through the complete inspection at the far end, to find those things that are incompatible in the design. Mr. FULTON. The point of my question is whether the contractor is meeting the reauirements on vehicles and components. Dr. MUELLER. Yes. Here is one of the problems we encountered last year. On the left you see the second stage, the second or third firing of the all-systems stage at the Mississippi Testing Facility (fig. 14, MA66-9226). Fol- FIGURE 14 PAGENO="0230" 226 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION lowing the completion of the firing testing down there, we had planned to take the stage down and move it to Marshall for use in the dynamic test vehicle We successfully completed the firing of the all-systems stage and were in the course of the dismantling of it from the test stand. Certain things had happened during static firings and they were being repaired and tested before shipping them to Marshall There was an accident caused by overpressurization of the second stage and that, in turn, resulted in the destruction of the stage (fig. 15, MA- 66-9250). That had several consequences, the principal one was that we had to divert our structural test stage from the testing down at the cape to the dynamic test vehicle at Huntsville. That meant that we had to make one stage do the work of several stages. Fortunately for us, it had completed its firings and therefore it had provided us with the information we needed to go forward with the flight stage itself. Mr. FULTON. Is that a personnel error or equipment failure? Dr. MUELLER. There was a report prepared by the Accident Review Board. They attributed the failure to a combination of personnel error and also to an overstressing of the stage itself, so it was a com- bination of two errors, if you will. Mr. FULTON. Do you mean the personnel error was an error in planning or an error in real-time operations? FIGURE 15 PAGENO="0231" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 227 Dr. MUELLER. It was an error in real-time operations. The pres- sure gage on the stage was not operating, the test conductor continued to pressurize the stage without an operating pressure gage, and the re- sult was destruction of the stage. Mr. FULTON. Why wasn't the pressure gage operating? That looks like an equipment failure of a small routine nature. Dr. MUELLER. The pressure gage was inoperable because it had been, as I understand it, disconnected. Mr. RTJMSFELD. You said that the Accident Review Board looked into this. What accident review board? A board created just to look at this accident? Dr. MUELLER. Yes, headed by Dr. Kurt Debus with membership from other centers who reviewed in some detail the complete sequence of events. Mr. RUMSFELD. There is no way this board could be described as an independent review board? They were NASA people or contractor people? Mr. MUELLER. There were NASA people on the board, although they were from different centers, and were not associated with the ac- tual test or the' carrying out of the test. The test itself was under a con- tractor's cupervision at the time. The stage had been turned back to the contractor to prepare for shipment and in this particular case there was not a NASA test supervisor. It was in a repair-rework cycle. Mr. RTJMSFELD. For the sake of definition when I use the word "in- dependent", I would not include other NASA personnel even though they may not have been involved in the project. That is what I mean by the word. Also, did the President's Scientific Advisory Board take a look at this? Dr. MUELLER. I don't know the answer to that, Mr. Rumsfeld. My timing is a little vague today. I don't know whether they actually looked at that particular failure or not. Mr. WAGGONNER. This isn't a proper functioi~ of the Board, is it? Dr. MUELLER. No. Mr. RUMSFELD. I am trying to understand the general procedure. You indicate it is not a function of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee. That was my understanding. Yet your response yester- day led me to believe that you considered this body somewhat of an in- dependent review board over NASA. Dr. MUELLER. I said that they did review the Apollo program, Mr. Rumsfeld, from end to end. They did review the various failures. 1 don't know whether this failure occurred after the time that their review was completed or not. I belie~ it occurred after their review was complete. They do not serve as a case by case review board. Mr. WAGGONNER. Will you yield? Just before you came in, Mr. Fulton asked the same question on review boards for the same purpose, did he hot? Mr. FULTON. I asked about practices and procedures and I asked that it be put in the record. Mr. RUM5FELD. I am aware of that. I asked a number of questions on it yesterday. I am still interested. Mr. WAGGONNER. Proceed. PAGENO="0232" 228 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Mr. RUMSFELD. Did you agree with Mr. Waggonner that this was not a function of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee? Dr. MUELLER. It is not their function to review accidents per Se. They reviewed the Apollo program including our failure history be- fore arriving at a conclusion about both the management and prog- ress. Mr. RUMSFELD. How would you describe this failure or accideUt, as a major one? Dr. MUELLER. In terms of when it occurred, it would not have a major impact on the program, so I guess I would describe it as not of major significance. The reason I am not saying it is a minor accident is that I don't regard any accident or any failure in the pro- gram as minor and we treat each and every incident of this sort with a great deal of care, with a great deal of attention, so that we can understand the causes of the failure and be sure that it doesn't occur again. I would like to say one word about independence of our accident review boards. Although they are composed of NASA personnel in large part, they, nevertheless, are carefully selected to bring new viewpoints, but also a good understanding of the actual problems to the review. In such. complex systems as these, it is essential that people under- stand what the system is, how it should work, and be able to identify what was wrong in order, that corrective actions can be taken. Mr. BELL. Mr. Chairman? Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Bell. Mr. BELL. You say major or minor. How do you measure that? Financewise or whether it slows the program? Dr. MUELLER. That was my point. I regard all accidents as major. Mr. BELL. When you say it is not of major proportion, do you mean because of the cost? Dr. MUELLER. We did not have to add substantial cost to the pro- gram to compensate for this failure because it had completed the major part of the work we planned to do with it in the program. Mr. FUQUA. Dr. Mueller, in the review of this accident, what rec- ommendations did this review board make so that this type of thing does not happen again? What do you do about the personnel who continued with pressurizing, when it was obvious that the pressure gage was not working? Is there any disciplinary action involved? Dr. MUELLER. There are specific actions that are taken in each case. It depends on the circumstances as to whether or not there is disciplinary action taken. It is not always the best thing to do to just fire the individual because he isn't likely to pressurize the stage again without having a pressure gage working. Clearly, however, he is disciplined. In this particular case several actions were taken including a change in our own procedures to be sure that we did have proper supervision of all the operations in the test stands and to be sure that the responsible people were supervising the tests on the con- tractors side, so there are specific actions taken in every case. In some cases the board recommends a set of actions. In every case the center involved carries on an independent review and takes additional actions. PAGENO="0233" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 229 Mr. FUQUA. You try to take corrective action so that this same indi- vidual will not go to sleep at the switch again, so to speak? Dr. MUELLER. Yes, sir. Mr. FUQtTA. Because this can get rather expensive. Dr. MUELLER. So far, we have not, to my knowledge, repeated an accident in the program. We have learned from each one, we have learned enough to avoid doing that again. Now, it is not, however, true that we haven't had the same or similar kinds of accidents in various contractors plants because there are different ways of doing things and, occasionally, we will have a simi- lar accident occur in a different contractors plant for different reasons. Mr. FUQUA. In short, you try to take corrective action so that this same type of situation will not develop again? Dr. MUELLER. We take very positive corrective actions and we have had good experience in this regard. Mr. FUQUA. Thank you. Mr. GURNEY. I would like to bring to the attention of the subcom- mittee that, on the trip of the subcommittee to California this year, this accident was gone into at great length in our hearings with the contractor involved and it will be in the report of the hearings. One of the interesting* things was the fact that the contractor itself, on its own initiative, pinpointed the cause of this accident almost within a matter of hours after its own investigation into the accident in great detail, and also has revised its procedure to see that nothing like this occurs again. I think that should be brought out in the hearing at this time. Mr. RUMSFELD. Dr. Mueller, you made the statement that you never repeated an accident. This, of course, is good. On the other hand, if an overall procedure is defective and therefore permits new and different accidents to occur from time to time; this, in essence, is equal if not more serious than repeating a specific accident. The point I am raising is this question of the possibility of a truly independent review board. My thought is that if one existed-and it does not now exist, and there seems to be no inclination to create one-this type of mechanism could, over a period of time, help to pin- point potential difficulties befo~e they lead to accidents and thus would be very useful. You made a comment on this subject which interested me. You indicated the importance of having people who understand the system well enough to serve on these accident review boards with respect to this one you mentioned. Are you suggesting that there are not people who are not NASA employees or contractor employees who have sufficient competence in these areas to serve on such a board? Dr. MUELLER. Well, no, I wouldn't say that at all. The problem one finds, of course, is that the number of people with experience in this kind of development program, with this kind of equipment and this kind of operation is quite limited. You can't draw on a very large number of people in universities, for example~ because this is a different thing than universities are accustomed to. You can draw on the Air Force for competence in this area because they have had experience in ballistic missiles but then to a very large PAGENO="0234" 230 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION extent, we `tre already drawing on the An Force for this I think ~ ou have to recognize that ~ e `tre developing ct new technology, `uid I `think, in all honesty, you also ought to recognize the people involved in this development process in the Government and among the con- tractors are probably among the most objective and dedicated people that you will find anywhere. Our progress is `determined by their willingness to examine objec- tively the things that they did wrong and take corrective action. It is always true that looking back you can say "Well, gee, this guy shouldn't have done `that," and that is right, 20/20 hindsight is just marvelous. But in terms of your overlook at the procedures, you must determine, is our general attack on the problem proper? That is something that the President s Science Advisory Bo'trd did look at very carefully and tried `to evaluate whether or not our ap- proach was a sound one. The result of that investigation was a clear feeling on their part that we were using the best practices that they could conceive of. They didn't rubberstamp it. They are a group that has competence in this field and are outside of our organization completely, `but they did feel that we were doing everything that they thought one could do in this kind of an area. Now, that doesn't say that you couldn't do better and we are striving very hard to find ways to do things better. I would only point out that independent review boards of specific accidents of the sort we have here are unlikely to be able to contribute effectively in a short time to curing the problem. That is not because I am against an independent review board. I am enthusiastic about it. One has to get the proper people to serve, the proper amount of time, and it does take a fair amount of time, as you know, to know enough about these systems to be able to do something constructive. Mr. RUMSFELD. You mentioned that these men are dedicated. Cer- tainly I don't question in `my ~ `ty their dedic'ttion You `tiso men tioned the word "objectivity" `tnd this is the `tre'i, th'tt I `tm probing in You `idso mentioned that it is nice to h't~ e 20/20 hindsight, `md I am not raising that question at all a:bout the advance of `hindsight in knowing that the pressure gage should have been working, but I am talking about this broader question of a review `board. You indicate that the President's Science Advisory Committee has tried to evaluate whether this program makes sense from a safety standpoint. I have trouble und'erstanding the extent to which they went into `the safety question in view of the fact that, according to you, they did not make any recommendations in the area. It raises the question in my mind, was this even a minor part of their interest, let alone a major part? I am not referring to an independent review board with respect to specific accidents. I am thinking of an independent review board that would not have the problem that you mentioned of becoming knowledgeable enough to do a competent job after a specific accident. I am talking about an in- dependent review board that would look at t'he overall picture, as you proceeded, to prevent accidents and to ask the hard questions that someone possibly too close to it isn't asking. PAGENO="0235" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 231 I think maybe one of the ways I can better understand this would be if I could see the number of accidents you have had that resulted in a cost of excess of $100,000 and the type of people that were on the boards that investigated those accidents. Dr. MTJELLER. I will be glad to find that. We are going to put together some material in this area that Mr. Fulton has asked for. We will try to do just that. Mr. RUMSPELD. I don't understand how the Navy and the AEC can do it with respect to the Polaris submarine, how they could get this independent review and why it couldn't and shouldn't be done by NASA. I want to see what the differences are. At some point we better understand this problem. Mr. WAGGONNER. The chairman wants to finish Apollo today. Will the gentlemen agree that any other questions he may have will be given to Dr. Mueller in writing? Mr. RUM5FELD. I have written to Mr. Webb. Since the first 50 pages was on the accident, I thought it would be appropriate. Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Rumsfeld, the investigation hearing on the acci- dent will be broad, and you are invited to attend. Safety questions might better be asked there. Mr. RUMSFELD. I am not privileged to serve on the Oversight Committee. Mr. TEAGiJE. You will be invited to attend whether you serve on it or not. Mr. RUMSFELD. Fine. Dr. MUELLER. Turning to the second stage, we also have problems on it with respect to getting the first flight stage down to Mississippi. To put this in perspective, you have to recognize that the second stage is perhaps the most difficult technical development in the Saturn V vehicle. It represents a step forward, a rather considerable step forward in that it is the largest cryogenic stage we have yet developed. We did, in order to proceed with the program, substitute in our initial checkout of the Saturn V, at Cape Kennedy, a spacer (fig. 16, MA 67-5796) that permitted us to check the ground support equip- inent, the electrical support equipment of the first stage, third stage, the instrument unit and the spacecraft while waiting for the initial second stage to complete its firing at the Mississippi test facility. That was successfully completed at the end of 1966 (fig. 17, MC 67-5998) and the complete vehicle is now being stacked up in Florida. Another problem that we ran into was the loss of the third stage for AS-503 at Sacramento during its static firing test (fig. 18, MC 67-5707). We found here a problem that occurred in a vendor's plant, a substitution of a pure titanium welding rod for the right kind of welding rod which caused the pressure vessels in the stage to burst. These are titanium tanks that contain high pressure helium and over a period of time there was sufficient growth of a titanium alloy hydride in the joint of the weld to cause a fracture and this resulted in the loss of a stage. We were able to trace it all the way back to the manufacturing process that failed and again it turned out in this case to be a human error. The inspector said it was the wrong welding rod and the welder PAGENO="0236" 232 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 16 FIGURE 17 PAGENO="0237" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 233 welded it again. We have gone back through and we have found techniques for detecting the use of the wrong welding rod. We re- placed all the pressure vessels that had the `basic problem and we are proceeding with the testing of the next stage in line. There is a monetary `impact on `the program because of `this failure. It is, however, in a stage that has been ahead of its basic schedule over the past several months, so that the stage, the. third stage for AS-504 which is now in test on Beta. 1 at Sacramento is able to maintain the schedule (fig. 19, MC 67-6002). I think this is an illustration of the fact that we have tried, through- out the program, to provide some flexibility by establishing our con- tract structure in a way that provides stages early, spacecraft early, where it is possible because of the development cycle to do so. In this particular case we were sufficiently far ahead of schedule in this third stage delivery so that we are able to maintain the `basic Saturn V schedule without an impact. Our status on the launch vehicles can be summarized by looking at these next two charts (fig. 20, MA66-9694A). The gray area rep- resents the amount of the stage that is completed and as you can see, we have begun working and are about a fourth of the way through the last stage of manufacturing on AS-212, the last of the present Apollo Saturn ones. In the case of the Saturn V (fig. 21, MA66-9694B), we have the first two vehicles completely manufactured and as you can see, the FIGuRE 18 PAGENO="0238" 234 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 19 FIGURE 20 PAGENO="0239" 1968 NASA AUTHO1~UZATION 235 others are in some stage of manufacture or long leadtime procurement The last three are in the process of long leadtime procurement Mr FULTON When we see a whole group of Saturns such as that, is that `t covey ~ An `trray ~ What is it ~ What is the technical term? Dr MUELLER That is our complete contractual commitment Mr. FULTON. If you see quail, it is a covey of quail or a pride of lions. What is it of Saturns? Dr. MUELLER. Mr. Fulton, they haven't developed, it- Mr. WAGGONER. A bevy, of boosters would do, wouldn't it? Dr. MUELLER. Turning to the planned activities and accomplish- inents in the spacecraft area (fig. 22, MC66-10398). We did plan to initiate flight `tests of the block I spacecraft. We did plan to activate the Houston thermal vacuum chamber and carry out tests on C'SM 008 in support of CSM 012 and this was ac- complished, as you can see on the right, the thermal vacuum test model CSM 008 is in the chamber at Houston (fig 23, MC 67-5414) We expected to complete the Service Module and subsystem tests in support of CSM 011 and CSM 012. That was done. We did complete the block I Command and Service Module struc- tural and thermal test. We began the initial testing of the block II spacecraft. FIGURE 21 PAGENO="0240" 236 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION APOLLO PROGRAM ~y) MAJOR 1966 PLANNED ACTIVITIES SPACECRAFT ACCOMPLISHED CSM * INITIATE FLIGHT TEST OF BLOCK I SPACECRAFT. - FEB. * ACTIVATE THE HOUSTON THERMAL VACUUM CHAMBER. - MAY * COMPLETE 008 TESTS IN SUPPORT OF 012 - AUG * COMPLETE SERVICE MODULE-OO1 SUBSYSTEM TESTS IN SUPPORT OF 011,012 ~JUL * COMPLETE BLOCK I COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE STRUCTURAL AND THERMAL TESTS JUL * BEGIN INITIAL TESTING OF BLOCK II SPACECRAFT . JUL LM * STRUCTURAL LOAD TESTS JUL 66-NOV 61 * CONTINUE PROPULSION TESTS * DELIVER FIRST FLIGHT VEHICLE TO KSC FLIGHT TEST ARTICLE - SEPT FLIGHT VEHICLE MAY 67 CHECKOUT * ACTIVATE FIRST TEST STAND FOR INITIATION OF FIRST BLOCK II SPACECRAFT CHECKOUT - SEPT * SPACE ENVIRONMENT SIMULATION LABORATORY AT MSC OPERATIONAL MAY NASA HQ MC66- 10,398 REV. 3-1-67 FIGURE 22 In the lunar module area we began structural load tests (fig. 24, MA66-9114). We expect to complete them later this year. We are continuing our propulsion tests and we have delivered t.he first flight test article to KSC, but not the flight vehicle. We are several months behind in the first flight Lunar Module. Checkout. We did activate the first test stand for initiation of the first block II spacecraft checkout. We do expect the Space Environment Simulation Laboratory at MSC to be operational. It is. That was completed in May. One of our problems in the Service Module (fig. 25, MA66-0169) was, in fact, a form of stress corrosion. We found it in the test of Service Module for the CSM 017 which was the Service Module to be flown on AS5O1, the first unmanned flight of the Saturn V. We were using methyl alcohol as a fluid to pressure test the Service Module tanks and had been doing this for a number of vehicles. At the time that this explosion occurred, we went into, again, a rather intensive investigation. The investigation was carried out by the contractor since this was an early stage of the manufacturing process of the Service Module. We found that methyl alcohol, under PAGENO="0241" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 237 FIGuRE 23 76-265 0-67--pt. 2-16 FIGURE 24 PAGENO="0242" 238 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION pressure will, in fact, induce stress corrosion in titanium. We found that we ha.d to change the Service Module tanks on all of our spacecraft that had gone through this test cycle in order to be sure that they were safe. Mr. FULTON. On the possible or probable change of insulation, couldn't you almost judge that you should get started on changing to the fiberglass insulation which is, of course, really flame resistant? in the tests we saw at Houston, there was a world of difference between that type of insulation and the type currently used. My point is when you can see that you are going to have to make some sort of change in insulation, why aren't we getting started so there will be no further delay on this equipment? Dr. MUELLER. Mr. Fulton, there are studies being made of the changes that are required in order to make the spacecraft safe. Those studies are underway and we have felt that it would be better to under- stand the total problem be.fore beginning to solve it piecemeal. Now, that doesn't say that we aren't going forward with the development of fiberglass replacements. It just, however, takes time to develop sources and to carry through the qualification testing of these sources. We would expect to be able to report to you again on that some time after the end of this month. Mr. FULTON. When I saw that Rube Goldberg complex of wires in this particular illustration, it certainly pointed up to me the amount of change and the amount of time that might be necessary. Dr. MUELLER. I understand and it is of concern to us. I might point out that this is an example of the kinds of things you learn in FIGURE 25 PAGENO="0243" the course of the development program. The accident that we had with the CSM 017 tank has contributed to our knowledge of titanium and its characteristics; it has triggered a rather extensive test program that will permit us to have a good understanding of the various forms of stress corrosion to which titanium is subjected. I think this is an example where we are adding to knowledge by doing. Mr. WAGGONNER. Proceed, Dr. Mueller. Dr. MUELLER. Looking at our production situation on the spacecraft (fig. 26, MA66-9695B), we are essentially complete with the block I; the block II spacecraft are in test at Downey, now, and in various stages of production in the factory. We do have a long-lead-time procurement on all spacecraft of both the command and Service Module and the Lunar Modules. Our major planned activity in 1967 in the spacecraft and launch vehicle areas are shown in figures 27 and 28 (MC66-9695A and MC67- 5148). In the case of the spacecraft (fig. 29, MC67-5149), we expect to complete the block I and block II CSM ground test program, we expect. to complete the Block II CSM subsystem certification and, of course, we still are finishing out the certification process because we are still flying two of the unmanned Block I spacecraft. We will expect that to be complete some time this summer. We will complete the qualification of the Block II extra vehicular Mobility Unit. That is the space suit. Extensive changes have been introduced that will give us more mobility. We will activate Apollo mission simulators, complete delivery of five spacecraft adapters to KSC and complete delivery of Block I CSM to KSC. In the case of Lunar Modules, we expect. to complete LM 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 239 FIGURE 26 PAGENO="0244" 240 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1961 PLANNED MAJOR ACTIVITIES LAUNCH VEHICLES (L/V) UPRATED SATURN I * DELIVER STAGES FOR FOUR 1/V TO KSC * COMPLETE FABRICATION, ASSEMBLY AND FACTORY CHECKOUT OF STAGES FOR LAST THREE 1/V'S IN PROGRAM * DELIVER LAST J-2 ENGINES SATURN V * COMPLETE DELIVERY OF FIRST L/V TO KSC * DELIVER STAGES FOR NEXT THREE L/V TO KSC * COMPLETE DYNAMIC TEST PROGRAM * ACTIVATE 1st STAGE ACCEPTANCE TEST STAND AT MTF * ACTIVATE SECOND POSITION 2nd STAGE ACCEPTANCE TEST STAND AT MTF * DEMONSTRATE 3rd STAGE RESTART CAPABILITY FIGIJRE 27 NASA HQ MC67-5148 REV. 2-13-67 PAGENO="0245" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 241 1961 PLANNED MAJOR ACTIVITIES SPACECRAFT (S/C) COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE (CSM) * COMPLETE BLOCK I AND BLOCK II CSM GROUND TEST PROGRAM * COMPLETE BLOCK II CSM SUBSYSTEM CERTIFICATION * COMPLETE QUALIFICATION OF BLOCK II EXTRA-VEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT [SPACE SUIT) * ACTIVATE LAST APOLLO MISSION SIMULATORS * DELIVER FIVE S/C ADAPTERS TO KSC * COMPLETE DELIVERY OF BLOCK I CSM'S TO KSC LUNAR MODULES * COMPLETE LM GROUND TESTING CONSTRAINING EARTH ORBITAL AND LUNAR MISSIONS * COMPLETE PRODUCTION HARDWARE QUALIFICATION TESTS * DELIVER LAST REFURBISHED GROUND TEST VEHICLE FOR SATURN V L/V QUALIFICATION FLIGHT NASA HQ MC 67-5149 REV. 2-15-67 FIGURE 29 ground testing constraining earth orbital and lunar missions, we expect to complete the production hardware qualification tests and deliver last refurbished ground test vehicle for the Saturn V launch vehicle qualification flight. We do not have a schedule for delivery of flight Lunar Modules to the cape, depending upon what, if any, changes are required. Turning to the experiments program (fig. 30, A66-9770), we have a number of experiments being developed for Apollo. The in-flight experiments include medical, scientific, technological, and a few DOD experiments. These, in turn, however, are few in number as compared to the Gemini and Apollo Applications program. We are tending to shift experiments that aren't directly related to the lunar mission itself into the Apollo Applications program. In the case of the Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package (fig. 31, MA66-9806), we do have six experiments being developed. As you can see in the right-hand chart, the general concept consists of a central data gathering and transmitting system with outlying sensors to provide the information that is then transmitted back to earth. It is designed for operation for about a year on the lunar surface, both night and clay. We are also developing equipment for geological survey of the lunar surface; they include handtools, sample containers, and, of course, the mapping and survey system. PAGENO="0246" 242 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION A APOLLO PROGRAM THE APOLLO EXPERIMENTS PROGRAM * IN FLIGHT EXPERIMENTS MEDICAL SCIENTIFIC TECHNOLOGICAL DOD * APOLLO LUNAR SURFACE EXPERIMENTS PACKAGE MAGNETOMETER SOLAR WIND ION DETECTOR HEAT FLOW SEISMOMETERS ELECTRON /PROTON * LUNAR GEOLOGICAL AND SURVEY HAND TOOLS SAMPLE CONTAINER LM TV MAPPING AND SURVEY SYSTEM NASA HQ MA66-9770 REV. 3-15-67 FIG~-RE :~o With respect to the present position of the Apollo R. & D. program (fig. 32, MC66-10, 277), our costs per month have been decreasing in fiscal year 1967 and we project. a continuing decrease through fiscal year 1968. As you can see, in terms of the cost, ~ e hit t peak in April `tnd May of last year and ha~'e been going down fairly r'tpidly ever since Th'tt, of course, is due to the manpower curves that you see on the right-hand screen. These are total Manned Space Flight employment figures, about from this point on, almost all of that is Apollo. There are only a relatively few people involved in things other than the Apollo program (fig. 33, MC67-5724). We went through our peak of about 300,000 people in May of last year and we have been going down rapidly since then. You can see that that decrease will continue on the basis of the Apollo program from no~ on In fact, we are going down ~tt a rate which is about `ts precipitous `ts you can go and still maintain the basic integrity of the contractors' structure. If you go too fast, then the organization tends to react. Now, if I may turn to the budget book, I would like to, Mr. Chair- man, very briefly, summarize the material in the book. First let me turn to the fiscal year 1968 funding required to main- tain the Apollo program If you turn to volume V, pages RD 1 `tnd PAGENO="0247" g8 ~LUflDL~T 19-cL-c Ail 11t0199)W OH YSYN 8961 AD I L961 A9 J 9961 A3 I 9961 13 f -~- 8961 Ai L961 Al ,[,~ 9961 AJ *003 ~ P1IIP**a11¾ O3NNV1d ¾¾¾,. / 1VflI3V ~1t. / U, ¾ai ~ t%4*uuIuu.s_t#_##__##_ . og~ *OOE HINOIN N3cI .LSOO WVN9ONd 0 ~X H OllOdV 1VIOI 18 ~ ~< ~ ~ ~ t~ct~t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~, ~ ~; .. ~% ~ ~ ~` ~ ~ ~ ` `~ > ~ ~ :~ :~ ~ ~~z( ~ ~ h~ ~ ~ ~4$r j lWt ~4Vt I ~ ~ Ac 4ai1n ~M~\ A ~ ~ p ~t ~ ~ ~*a ~ %t N I ~f ~k ~`11W1 ~ ~ ~ p~C ~ /, ~`~k ~~~Ô1SH$3* ~ ~ I iasaWovi~*r t' ~\ 31$I 3flflsj ~ / j~ iJ4~Q~$I~J4V* z HO4$ ~ hE iVftt Yt4NU4 p~Issn Asid 4vai )f*St3t~AU3v / U1O1~flVHHfl9WWrA~T SIN] WIHBdX3 33V38nS HYNflI OhlOdY ~iij~Q 8frg NOJJ4VZIILOHII1V VSVN 8961 PAGENO="0248" 244 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 400,000 350,000 300,000 250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000 50,000 MANNED SPACE FLIGHT TOTAL EMPLOYMENT FIGURE 33 2 of the budget estimates you will see that the $2,606.5 million re- quired to support our Apollo activity in fiscal year 1968 represents a decrease of $309.7 million from the fiscal year 1967 level. As indi- cated on this chart (fig. 34, MP67-5441), the fiscal year 1968 Apollo budget is divided into five line items: Spacecraft, TJprated Saturn I, Saturn V, Engine Development, all of which show a decrease from fiscal year 1967; and mission support, which necessarily rises in fiscal year 1968 to meet the increased tempo of operational activity. This budget request was submitted before the accident on AS-204, and until the findings of the board have been analyzed, we will be unable to determine the extent of the work required or if additional costs may be involved. We feel that we will be able to continue our Apollo program within the total resources detailed in the fiscal years 1967 and 1968 budgets. As you know, our fiscal year 1967 Apollo funds are supporting peak activity in the production of spacecraft and launch vehicle hardware, as well as an intensive period of ground and flight qualification test- ing. During fiscal year 1968, we will be heavily involved in assembly, checkout, and launch operations at the Kennedy Space Center, mission control activities at the Manned Spacecraft Center, and reimburse- CY61 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1961 1968 1969 1910 NASA HO MC61*5124 2-2-61 PAGENO="0249" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 245 MANNED SPACE FLIGHT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT APOLLO FY 1968 BUDGET ESTIMATE (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) FY 1966 FY 1967 FY 1968 SPACECRAFT $ 1,233.8 $1,250.3 $1,036.3 UPRATED SATURN I 274.8 236.6 156.2 SATURN V 1,134.9 1,135.6 1,108.5 ENGINE DEVELOPMENT 133.2 49.8 24.5 MISSION SUPPORT 164.3 243.9 281.0 TOTAL $2,941.0 $2,916.2 $2,606.5 NASA HQ MP67-5441 1-15-67 FIGURE 34 ment to the Department of Defense for recovery forces as we move deeper into the operational phase of Apollo. SPACECRAFT Fiscal year 1968 funding requirements for the Apollo spacecraft are $1,036.3 million. The next chart. (fig. 35, MP67-5438) shows the line items that. are contained in this amount, which provides for con- tinued production, test, checkout, and delivery of the spacecraft hard- ware-Command and Service Modules, Lunar Modules, and associated guidance and navigation units, as well as the integration, reliability and checkout operations, and the important spacecraft support activities. Coimm~and and Service Module$.-The $494 million required for the Command and Service Modules in fiscal year 1968 continued the production, checkout., and delivery of flight articles equipped for long- duration missions and rendezvous and docking maneuvers. The funds in this line item also provide for the development, procurement, inte- gration, and installation of Apollo experimental hardware and flight experiments into the Command and Service Modules. PAGENO="0250" 246 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MANNED SPACE FLIGHT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT APOLLO SPACECRAFT FY 1968 BUDGET ESTIMATE IMILLIONS OF DOLLARS) FY 1966 FY 1961 FY 1968 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES 612~8 560.4 494.0 LUNAR MODULE 362 6 412 5 313 1 GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION 131.2 76.6 55.4 INTEGRATION, RELIABILITY AND CHECKOUT 32.3 30.0 23.2 SPACECRAFT SUPPORT 88 9 110 8 90 6 TOTAL $ 1,2338 $1,250.3 $1,036.3 NASA HQ MP67-5438 1-15-67 FIGURE 35 During fiscal year 1968, the first two Command and Service Modules capable of rendezvous and docking will be undergoing checkout at the Kennedy Space Center. Six additional Apollo Command and Service Modules are scheduled for completion of assembly and checkout at North American's Downey, Ca:lif., plant, followed by shipment to Ken- nedy in preparation for uprated Saturn I and Saturn V launches. The remaining seven Command and `Service Modules configured for rendez- vous and docking will be in various phases of assembly, systems in- stallation, and in-plant checkout. Lunar Module$.-Our fiscal year 1968 estimate for the Lunar Module line item is $373.1 million. These funds provide for the work being done by the prime contractor, Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., Bethpage, N. Y., as well as the experiments and experimental hard- ware that will be carried in the Lunar Module. Included are the Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package (ALSEP) and the tools that will be used to obtain samples from the lunar surface. During fiscal year 1968 a Lunar Module Test Article, refurbished after use in the Apollo Saturn V dynamic testing at Marshall, is scheduled to be launched on the second unmanned Saturn V qualifica- tion flight. In addition, major emphasis will be placed on the pro- duction, checkout, `and delivery of flight Lunar Modules for manned rendezvous and docking missions Five Lunar Modules `tre scheduled for delivery to Kennedy and the remaining seven will be undergoing PAGENO="0251" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 247 structural assembly, subsystem installation, and in-plant checkout. The five Lunar Modules will be delivered to KS'C, depending on the changes that are required as a result of our ongoing assessment. Guidance and Navigation.-Moving down to the next item, we are requesting $55.4 million for the Apollo spacecraft guidance and navi- gation system in fiscal year 1968. During fiscal year 1968, six guidance and navigation units for manned Apollo command modules will be delivered. Six Lunar Mod- ule units will also be delivered. By the end of the fiscal year, all but three guidance and navigation units will be in assembly or checkout. Integration, Reliability, and (Theckovt.-The fiscal year 1968 require- inents for integration, reliability, and checkout, amounting to $23.2 million, provide for two basic areas. The first category includes en- gineering support to the Manned Spacecraft Center for activities such as maintenance and review of the Apollo spacecraft specifications, systems performance analyses, reliability and quality assurance, trend analysis of failure reports, mission ~1anning and analysis, and inter- face control. Consistent with the increasing rate of hardware de- liveries and flight mission the fiscal year 1968 activity will focus on spacecraft hardware verification, mission planning and analysis, and postflight documentation. Fiscal year 1968 funds also cover the operation, maintenance, and updating of the 12 ACE stations to meet mission requirements, located at key Apollo spacecraft sites across the country. Spacecraft Support.-Apollo spacecraft support activities include the funding for test operations at contractor, NASA, and other Gov- ernment installations; crew equipment-including space suits; logis- tics; and instrumentation and scientific equipment. The $90.6 million requested for these activities in fiscal year 1968 includes support of the various spacecraft test programs. Typical examples are the space- craft and equipment environmental tests in Houston's vacuum cham- bers, spacecraft propulsion tests at the White Sands Test Facility in New Mexico, reaction control system testing at the Arnold Engineer- ing Development Center in Tullahoma, Tenn., and altitude chamber tests at the Kennedy Space Center. The fiscal year 1968 funds also provide for development and pro- curement of Apollo space suits and related crew equipment, EVA um- bilicals, survival equipment, personal hygiene systems, and bioinstru- mentation. Major effort will be devoted to manufacture and test of a space suit and portable life support system for lunar surface activities. Uprated Saturi't 1.-Moving on to the Saturn-class launch vehicles, the next chart (fig. 36, MP 67-5437) identifies our fiscal year 1968 funding requirements for the uprated version of the Saturn I. As you are well aware, our record to date with the original and the uprated versions of the Saturn I vehicle has been excellent: 13 successes in 13 launches. Our fiscal year 1968 request for the uprated Saturn I is $156.2 million-a decrease of $80.4 million from the fiscal year 1967 level. The evolution from hardware production and delivery to operational use explains this decrease. Half of the vehicles in the currently approved program of 12 uprated Saturn I's have already been delivered. Four additional launch vehicles are scheduled for PAGENO="0252" 248 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MANNED SPACE FLIGHT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT UPRATED SATURN I FY 1968 BUDGET ESTIMATES (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) FY 1966 FY 1961 FY 1968 1st STAGE fS-IB) 2nd STAGE (S-IVB) INSTRUMENT UNIT GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT H-i ENGINES J-2 ENGINES VEHICLE SUPPORT 51.6 64.0 41.7 26.6 10.1 13.5 61.3 43.1 56.9 40.6 11.5 8.1 6.1 69.1 30.5 31.1 22.6 6.5 5.2 .9 53.4 TOTAL $ 274.8 $ 236.6 $156.2 NASA HQ MP67-5437 1-15-67 FIGURE 36 delivery before the end of 1967, and the remaining two uprated Saturn I's are in fabrication leading to delivery to Kennedy during 1968. Follow-on procurement of uprated Saturn I vehicles, which represent a major addition to our Nation's inventory of large launch vehicles and offer a versatile means for conducting a variety of Earth orbital missions, will be discussed under Apollo Applications. Each line item within the uprated Saturn I project, as you can see, is decreasing from the fiscal year 1967 level. Stages S-TB and S-IVB: We are requesting $30.5 million for the Chrysler-produced first stage (S-TB) and $37.1 million for the Doug- las-produced second stage (S-IVB) in fiscal year 1968. These funds support completion of the 8th through 12th flight stages, which are currently phased into manufacturing, assembly, acceptance testing, or checkout. Thstrument unit and GSE: Fiscal year 1968 funds in the amount of $22.6 million are required for the instrument unit. The fiscal year 1968 funds provide for completion of assembly, checkout, and delivery of the remaining five instrument units required for Apollo-Saturn I vehicles. We are also requesting $6.5 million in fiscal year 1968 to cover the operation and updating of stage and vehicle ground support equip- ment to meet specific mission requirements. Operational requirements for the Marshall breadboard facility, which is also used to validate the computer programs for each mission, are also included. PAGENO="0253" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 249 H-i and J-2 engines: The fiscal year 1968 request includes require- ments of $5.2 million for H-i engines and $0.9 million for J-2 engines. Fiscal year 1966 was the last full year of funding the H-i contractor field and engineering support under the Engine Development project. Following completion of H-i qualification in June 1966, funding of the contractor's work on flight evaluation and problem solving, mainte- nance of test engines in a configuration for rapid response to problems encountered during flight, and periodic verification of flight worthi- ness was transferred to this account. The fiscal year 1968 funds required for the H-i and J-2 engines cover continued support of the flight program, evaluation of flight results for use in subsequent missions, and rapid response to flight problems that may arise. Vehicle support: The final line item under the uprated Saturn I project is vehicle support, which provides for studies, services, and equipment that are common to more than one stage of the vehicle. Our fiscal year 1968 requirements are $53.4 million, covering the sup- port requirements during a period of intensive launch activity. Dur- ing fiscal year 1968, heavy emphasis will be placed on uprated Saturn I prelaunch and launch support. Saturn V: Next we come to the fiscal year 1968 funding requirements for the most powerful of the Saturn family of launch vehiclesr-~the three-stage Saturn V. We are beginning to come down the curve on Saturn V funding, as shown on this chart (fig. 37, MP 67-5436). In MANNED SPACE FLIGHT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SATURN V FY 1968 BUDGET ESTIMATE (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) FY 1966 FY 1961 FY 1968 1st STAGE IS-IC1 2nd STAGE (S-II.j 3rd STAGE (S-IVB) INSTRUMENT UNIT GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT F-i ENGINES J-2 ENGINES VEHICLE SUPPORT 191.9 256.2 162.0 67.8 107.6 66.2 67.2 216.0 184.9 248.6 154.0 72.9 609 92.3 83.5 238.5 114.1 245.9 151.2 15.1 35.8 105.3 78.5 242.0 TOTAL $1,134.9 $ 1,135,6 $1,108.5 NASA HQ MP67-5436 1- 15-67 FIGURE 37 PAGENO="0254" 250 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION addition to the intensive ground test program that has been underway, fiscal year 1967 marks the peak year for Saturn V hardware produc tion to meet the scheduled flight missions The funding requested for fiscal year 1968, amounting to $1,108.5 million, is critical to sustain- ing the production rate, consistent with hardware need dates at Ken nedy. Equally important is the funding that provides for vehicle sup- port activities, including static test support at our Mississippi Test Facility, checkout support at the Kennedy Space Center, systems inte- gration to assure proper interface control, and reliability and flight evaluation programs. Let me go into the detail of the Saturn V requirements for fiscal year 1968, beginning with the first stage (S-IC) First stage (S-IC) : We are requesting $174.7 million in fiscal year 1968 to carry forward the manufacture, test, and checkout of Saturn V first stages on `t time scale consistent with the planned flight schedule The fiscal year 1968 funds support completion of the S-IC structural test program and continuation of assembly, in-plant checkout, accept- ance testing, and shipment of flight stages to the Kennedy Space Center. The fourth, fifth, and sixth stages will be put through post- static checkout at Michoud, and delivered to the Kennedy Space Center The 7th and 8th first stages are scheduled to complete `issembly, in plant checkout, and static testing; and the 9th and 10th are scheduled to be through manufacturing and checkout at Michoud The five re maining stages will be in manufacturing during fiscal year 1968. Second stage (S-IT) : Moving down to the next line item, our fiscal year 1968 Saturn V requirements include $245 9 million for the second stage (S-Il). Fiscal year 1968 activity will continue to emphasize production of hardware in support of the Apollo Saturn V flight requirements. The third, fourth, fifth and sixth flight stages are scheduled for completion of acceptance test, poststatic checkout, and shipment to the Kennedy Space Center. The tempo of hardware production for the following flights must also be sustained. The stages for the 7th through 12th Saturn V vehicles will be in an intensive period of manufacturing, as- sembly, in-plant checkout, or acceptance firing to support the planned launch rate. In addition, procurement activity will be underway on the three remaining flight stages. Third stage (S-IVB) : The next line item on the chart shows the funding estimate for the third stage of the Saturn V-the S-IVB. We are requesting $151.2 million to cover these requirements in fiscal year 1968 Basic development costs for this stage, which is also used as the upper stage of the 1Tprated Saturn I, tre funded in this p'trticu ]ar line item. Fiscal year 1968 activity will focus on continued production and delivery of flight stages to suppOrt the Apollo-Saturn V schedule. The fourth flight stage will be shipped from the west coast to the Kennedy Space Center for prelaunch checkout. The next two flight stages are scheduled for completion of fabrication and in-plant check- out, as well as acceptance testing and poststatic checkout, in prepara- tion for shipment to Kennedy Space Center. Fabrication, assembly, in-plant checkout, and acceptance testing of the 7th and 8th flight PAGENO="0255" 1 9 6 8 NASA AUTHORIZATION 251 tages are planned, and the 9th and 10th will be through fabrication and assembly in preparation for acceptance firing at Sacramento by the £nd of the year The remaining five flight stages will be in various phases of manufacture and assembly Instrument Unit: Our fiscal year 1968 funding requirements for the Saturn V instrument unit total $75.1 million. These funds will main- tain the necessary delivery rate of flight units during fiscal year 1968. The fourth, fifth and sixth Saturn V instrument units will be checked out and delivered to Kennedy, and assembly, inspection, and checkout of the seventh unit will be completed Work on the remaining instru ment units will also be underway at IBM, Huntsville, during the fiscal year. Ground support equipment: We are requesting $35.8 million for the Saturn V ground support equipment in fiscal year 1968. Fiscal year 1968 funds support preparation and verification of com- puter tapes for Saturn V missions. In addition, these funds cover completion of Saturn V-related ground support equipment for the third Launch TJmbiiical Tower, high-bay, and firing room at Launch Complex 39. F-i and J-2 engines: The fiscal year 1968 Saturn V engine require- ment are $105 3 million for the F-i `md $78 5 million for the J-2 The last full year of funding the contractor development effort under the engine development project line item was fiscal year 1966 After completion of qualification in October 1966 for the F-i and January 1967 for the J-2, the contractor effort for field and engineering support was transferred to this account. Fiscal year 1968 funds provide for continued delivery of F-i and J-2 flight engines required for the Saturn V stages. A total of 34 F-i ngines and 36 J-2 engines are scheduled for delivery during this period The fiscal year 1968 funds also support flight evaluation, maintaining test engines in a configuration for quick analysis and solu- tion of problems, component and engine system testing, and periodic verification of flight worthiness Vehicle Support: As I indicated earlier, t~e vehicle support line item covers studies, services, and equipment that are common to more thaii one stage of the vehicle In the case of the Saturn V, the fiscal ye'mr 1968 funding requirements, amounting to $242.0 million, provide for `tn intensive support effort at the test and launch sites These funds cover a wide range of activities that support test, checkout, transport'm tion, launch readiness, and postfhght analysis Included are systems integration engineering services, quality control and inspection ser vices, reliability assessments, and contract administration Majrn emphasis will be placed on support of static testing at our Mississippi Test Facility, where we will be heavily mvolvea in acceptance testing of Saturn V first and second stages In addition, the workload at the Kennedy Space Center will increase in support of the Saturn V hunches Engine Development and Mission Support: My last chart on Apollo funding includes engine development and mission support (fig 38, MP67-5439) We are requesting $245 million in fiscal year 1968 for engine development, a significant drop from fiscal year 1966 and i967 requirements, since `mU three of our major vehicle engines `tre now PAGENO="0256" 252 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MANNED SPACE FLIGHT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ENGINE DEVELOPMENT & MISSION SUPPORT FY 1968 BUDGET ESTIMATES (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) FY 1966 FY 1967 FY 1968 ENGINE DEVELOPMENT $133.2 $ 49.8 $ 24.5 MISSION SUPPORT $164.3 $ 243.9 $ 281.0 OPERATIONS 112.9 196.9 229.0 SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 20.0 20.0 20.0 SUPPORTING DEVELOPMENT 31.4 27.0 32.0 NASA HO MP67-5439 1- 15-67 FIGURE 38 qualified. Upon completion of engine qualification, funding of con- tractor effort was transferred to the respective engine account of the Saturn launch vehicles. The fiscal year 1968 funds requested will provide for Government- furnished propellants, reimbursement to the Department of Defense for contract administration and quality assurance services, and a con- tinuing program of evaluation and analysis of engine hardware. The major activity in this area is the J-2 engine environmental test pro- gram conducted at the Air Force Arnold Engineering Development Center, Tullahoma, Tenn. Misssion support requirements for fiscal year 1968 are $281.0 million and' reflect the increasing tempo of flight activity, since this line item provides for the overall launch, flight, crew and recovery operations; programwide systems engineering; and supporting development necessary for the successful accomplishment of manned space flights. The operations ai~ea accounts for `the major share-$229.O million, and includes activities at the Kennedy Space Center and the Manned Spacecraft Center that support the launch, flight, and recovery phases of Apollo missions. For Kennedy, it includes the operation of check- out, launch, and instrumentation facilities; contractor services; equip- ment and supplies; and reimbursement for services provided by the Air Force. At Houston, it includes mission control for Apollo flights; support of astronaut training and flight crew requirements; mission planning and analysis; remote-site operations; and recovery equip- PAGENO="0257" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 253 ment and operations, including reimbursement to the Department of Defense for recovery forces. Systems engineering, for which $20.0 million is requested, provides for integrated technical support, review, and analysis of manned space flight missions. The $32.0 million for supporting development will continue activi- ties which involve selected engineering efforts to eliminate potential deficiencies in Apollo and to provide a firm base for hardware deci- sions related to extensions of the program. This category also in- cludes the development of improved hardware or manufacturing, test, and evaluation techniques to reduce cost and enhance reliability and efficiency. Mr. WA000NNER. Thank you. Any questions? Mr. RUMSFELD. Yes; on page R.D. 1-2, is it correct that the $60 million shown there is your estimate of unobligated funds as of June 30, this year? Mr. LILLY. No, sir. The President imposed a restriction on all agencies and pulled back certain moneys which are not available to us this year. The amount pulled back from NASA was $60 million, which is subsequently being made available to cover our cost in fiscal year 1968. Mr. RUMSFELD. Where is the figure for any sums previously au- thorized and appropriated, not including that $60 million you anti- cipate will remaii~ at the conclusion of this fiscal year? Mr. LILLY. We do not anticipate there will be any unobligated balance in the Apollo program in fiscal year 1967. Our history in the prior years has been that we have always obligated about 99.8 per- cent of our Apollo funds. Of course, you will always have a balance of a few hundred thousand in many different elements. However, this amounts to less than two- tenths of 1 percent. Mr. RUMSFELD. rfhat doesn't show up in the budget book? Mr. LILLY. That is correct. Dr. MUELLER. We have used every dollar that the committee has given us for Apollo in the last several years. We have adopted the philosophy that you gave us this money to carry out the program and we are using it as effectively and as efficiently as we can. Mr. RUMSFELD. If it doesn't come out, then you make a reprogram- ing request? Dr. MUELLER. We do shift funds within the reprograming au- thority provided to us by the Congress in order to support the areas where we have problems. Mr. WAGOONNER. Any further questions? If not, the committee is adjourned until 10 a.m. tomorrow morning. (Whereupon, at 11: 50 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned until 10 on Thursday, March 16, 1967.) 76-265 O-67--~pt. 2-17 PAGENO="0258" PAGENO="0259" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION THURSDAY, MARCH 16, 1967 HoUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, Wa$/?4ngton, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, in roOm 2318, Rayburn House Office Building, at 10 a.m., the Honorable Olin E. Teague (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. TEAGUE. The committee will come to order. We will go to the Apollo Applications program this morning. Please proceed Dr. Mueller. FURTHER STATEMENT OP DR. GEORGE E. MUElLER, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR MANNED SPACE PLIGHT, NASA; ACCOMPA- NIED BY WILLIAM E. LILLY, DIRECTOR, MANNED SPACE PLIGHT PROGRAM CONTROL, NASA; ROBERT P. FREITAG, DIRECTOR, MSF, FIELD CENTER DEVELOPMENT, NASA; CHARLES W. MATHEWS, DIRECTOR, SATURN APOLLO APPLICATIONS, NASA; AND JOHN H. DISHER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, SATURN APOLLO APPLICATIONS, NASA Dr. MUELLER. This morning I would like to provide an outline of the Apollo Applications program. As you know, the Apollo program will itself by the end of this year have developed two sets of space flight vehicles (MPR66-7783, fig. 1) the first of these is the Apollo Saturn I and by the end of 1967 all elements of the Apollo Saturn I vehicle including the first and second stage, the lunar module and the command and service module should be qualified for manned flight. By the end of 1967, we also expect to qualify for manned flight the Apollo Saturn V. Som~time in 1968 we can begin manned flights on that vehicle. Schedules for the development and qualification of these vehicles are shown on the slide on the right and this slide and its schedules have remained constant for the last several years (MC66- 5438A, fig. 2). This is essentially the same chart that I showed you in early 1964. You will note here that Apollo Applications uses the hardware that has been developed in the Apollo program to apply to missions other than the manned lunar landing and, in particular, we would expect during 1968 to begin the use of the uprated Saturn I for manned orbital missions in the area of astronomy and in the area of long-duration flight. 255 PAGENO="0260" 1968 NASA AUTIIORIZATION 1~IGUL~ 1 PAGENO="0261" 1968 NASA AUTHO1tIZATION 257 We would expect following the manned lunar landing to begin extended lunar exploration using this basic hardware but with modi- fications beginning in the 1970's. In addition to the Earth orbital applications, one of the objectives of the Apollo Applications program is to lay a foundation for other future programs so that we do not come to the end and not establish a foundation for further manned and unmanned space flight activities. Apollo Applications does represent a bridge or transition from the Apollo hardware developed for the manned lunar landing and its use for those future programs which may be developed as a result of or experience in space activities. There are two basic mission concepts that we use in the Apolio Applications program (MC 66-5173, fig. 3). As you know, we may be able to use some of the launch vehicles and some of the spacecraft that are in the basic Apollo program for missions other than the manned lunar landing. Whether or not these vehicles will become available depends upon our progress in the basic Apollo program. We believe that it is to the Nation's best interest to make most economical use of the hardware and equipment by providing alternate missions for the basic Apollo hardware. This will permit us to utilize these vehicles and these trained launch operational teams to carry out certain missions that apply the basic equipment to operations other than the lunar landing if this basic equipment becomes available from the basic Apollo program. APOLLO APPLICATIONS - MISSION CONCEPTS ALTERNATE MISSIONS USE OF BASIC LUNAR MISSION SPACE VEHICLES WHICH MAY BECOME AVAILABLE FROM THE APOLLO PROGRAM FOR APOLLO APPLICATIONS MISSIONS. FOLLOW-ON MISSIONS USE OF MODIFIED APOLLO SPACECRAFT WITH STANDARD SATURN LAUNCH VEHICLES FOR LONG DURATION MISSIONS IN EARTH AND LUNAR ORBIT AND ON THE LUNAR SURFACE. NASA MC 66-5, 1 73 REV. 1-9-67 FIGURE 3 PAGENO="0262" 258 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION The second class of missions that we have are follow-on missions and here we do expect to use the basic hardware of the Apollo space- craft and standard launch vehicles with certain modifications in order to permit them to work for long periods of time in Earth and lunar orbit and on the lunar surface. The major Apollo Applications objectives (MC 67-5412, fig. 4) for each of these classes of missions are, first of all, to determine the use- fulness of man in space. The Apollo developed equipment, our ex- perience is showing, is applicable, versatile enough to be applied to missions other than the Lunar landing itself and one of the most im- portant things to determine from our national point of view is how useful man can be in space, what it is you can best use him for and one of the primary objectives of our Apollo Applications program is to determine just how best to use man in space and whether or not it is worthwhile to have man engaged in these activities. A second major objective and one which has obtained almost uni- versal recognition from the scientists and other people who have looked at the possible use of man in space is the use of man to conduct astro- nomical observations. One of the major objectives of the Apollo Ap- plications Program is not only to determine the range of astronomical observations that can be carried out in the space vehicles adapted from the basic Apollo hardware but also to determine the usefulness and how best to use man in this set of observations. Now, the third major objective is to develop the capability for economical space flight through hardware reuse and long duration MAJOR APOLLO APPLICATIONS OBJECTIVES * USE APOLLO DEVELOPMENT TO * DETERMINE USEFULNESS OF MAN IN SPACE * CONDUCT ASTRONOMY OBSERVATIONS. * DEVELOP CAPABILITY FOR ECONOMICAL SPACE FLIGHT THROUGH HARDWARE REUSE AND LONG DURATION FLIGHT. * EXTEND LUNAR EXPLORATION. NASA HQ MC67-5412 1-9-67 FIGuRE 4 PAGENO="0263" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 259 flight. Our studies to date have shown that the cost of having men in space is inversely proportional to how long they can stay in space. The major increment in cost is involved in getting into orbit and com- ing back down again. The expendables required to keep the man in orbit are a relatively small fraction of the total weight requirement and thus for most economical manned flight, one finds that the longer one can stay on a single flight, the more cost effective the use of man becomes. In turn, of course, the ability to do that depends upon the develop- ment of the equipment for long duration flight. Our studies thus far have indicated that again the basic Apollo hardware is capable of ex- tensions with minor modifications. Another important thing that we are studying is the reuse of the Apollo hardware. The Apollo spacecraft is a relatively expensive part of the equipment and we are studying the development of a land landing capability which would facilitate the reuse of this relatively expensive element of the total space vehicle. Finally, the fourth objective is extended lunar exploration and I will spend some time later on that. We have initiated the development of a piece of experimental ap- paratus called an airlock. This airlock is being developed by the Mc- Donnell Corp. and parts of it actually are being built at the Marshall Space Flight Center. The airlock is under the supervision of the Manned Spacecraft Center, but the overall integration of the orbital workshop is under the direction of the Marshall Space Flight Center. This is the picture on the left. (MG 66-898~T, fig. 5.) Fiauiu~ 5 PAGENO="0264" 260 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION The basic concept here is one of making use of the hydrogen tank of the uprated Saturn I which is normally left in orbit to provide a pressurized volume in space, pressurized through the airlock, it provides us with some 10,000 cubic feet of space of pressurized volume and with the airlock we have the ability to both enter this pressurized volume, attach it to the command and service module in which the crew comes up and goes down again and also provides for docking other experimental modules as time passes. Included in the airlock itself is also a power supply, the equipment for making the internal part of the S-IV B hydrogen tank habitable, that includes the addition of floors, ceilings, walls and so forth. All this is carried up on one flight of the Saturn I. A second flight brings the crew up with certain supplies. Mr. GURNEY. May I ask a question? Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Gurney. Mr. GURNEY. Do you use the engine and fuel in the second stage to get it up there? Dr. MUELLER. That is correct. The second stage is filled with hydro- gen and oxygen. It is placed in orbit by burning. When it is emptied and in the right orbit, the hatch is opened into the hydrogen tank. First of all the tank is vented and the hydrogen is let out into the vacuum of space. Then the hatch is removed, the airlock is opened and the crew enters and begins to build these floors and walls and install the equipment in very much like building a ship in a bottle except it is a very large bottle. (ML 66-9611, fig. 6.) FIGURE 6 PAGENO="0265" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 261 Mr. GURNEY. What boosts that? Dr. MUELLER. There is another Saturn I-B that actually lifts the command and services module in the same orbit. Mr. GURNEY. Thank you. Dr. MUELLER. If you look on the right you can see some of the equipment that is being developed for experimental use inside the workshop (ML 67-5537, fig. 7). The interior of this S-TV B is a two-story arrangement (ML 66-9611, fig. 6). One floor is set up to be used as a living quarters for the astronauts and the second story is designed to be used for the maintenance area, laboratory area that is the second function of this workshop. On the right-hand side (ML 67-5537, fig. 7) yon can see the heat exchanger experiment where principally you are looking to ways of developing maintenance capabilities, the ability to service this kind of equipment in orbit. There is a high-pressure gas experiment. Some of the things we don't know about are the changes that occur when you try to expand gas very rapidly through a small nozzle in a zero g environment as contrasted with the one g environment condition on Earth. One of the interesting things that we can't really do here on Earth is to measure the rate of flame propagation in zero gravity. Mr. ROUDEBU5TI. Will the interior of this workshop be zero g? You are not going to simulate gravity in there? Dr. MUELLER. No, we will not. There will be essentially zero gravity inside. Mr. ROUDEBU5TI. Thank you. HEAT EXCHANGER SERVICE EXPERIMENT ZERO ~G ORBITAL OSCHAROE CSM WORKSHOP HEAT EXCHANGER DUCT LASHED TO FUEL SENSOR PROBE INITIAL IRLOCII ZERO GRAVITY STOWAGE FLAMMABILITY EXPERIMENT HATCH cr & EXTINGUISHER e R BOTTLES HIGH PRESSURE GAS 7' EXPULSION EXPERIMENT PENT ZERO G' TAGE EXPERIMENT ORK PACKAGE OP CON ST1ON 1' CHAMBER VIEWPORT HIGH PRESSURE GEMINI El S TANK FIGURE 7 PAGENO="0266" 262 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Dr. MUELLER. If we go forward, I would like to go through some of the experiments that are presently being planned for the orbital workshop. (ML 66-9785, fig. 8.) This is the list that is so far ap- proved and, interestingly enough, we have sufficient experiments now so that we are beginning to have to shift the operation of the experi- ments from one mission to another. We may carry them up on the first mission, but we have to shift the actual operation or carrying out of the experiments downstream because we are running out of astronaut time even though they will be up `~ month if all goes well on this first flight. In the area of engineering, we do have experiments on space suits and here we are particularly interested in learning how to design these suits using them so we can get time and motion studies in the zero g environment since that is an important element in the design of the restraint systems and how they actually work outside the spacecraft as well as inside. In the case of the workshop we can work in a rela- tively safe atmosphere because we can simulate being outside the spacecraft by increasing the suit pressure three and a half pounds per square inch above the ambient atmosphere. We can take pictures of what the astronauts are doing while using the suits and trying to do certain tasks in an area which is relatively safe and perfectly confined and it should improve our knowledge of extravehicular activities by intravehicular operations. Mr. FULTON. When you are talking about difficulties of zero gravity, APOLLO APPLICATIONS ORBITAL WORKSHOP EXPERIMENTS ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE M486 SUITS & LUNAR HARDWARE 0018 INTEGRATED MAINTENANCE M469 ST 124 REMOVAL AND DISASSEMBLY 0019 SUIT DONNING AND~8LEEP STATION M419 ZERO G FLAMMABILITY EVALUATION M486 ASTRONAUT EVA EQUIPMENT 0020 ALTERNATE RESTRAINTS EVALUATION M487 HABITABILITY/CREW QUARTERS 0021 EXPANDABLE AIRLOCK TECHNOLOGY M488 HIGH PRESSUKE GAS EXPULSION M489 HEAT EXCHANGER SERVICE M491 SURFACE ADSORBED MATERIALS M492 TUBE JOINING IN SPACE M493 ELECTRON BEAM WELDING MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY M018 VECTORCARDIOGRAM TOll METEOROID IMPACT AND EROSION MO5O METABOLIC ACTIVITY TO2O JET SHOES MO51 CARDIOVASCULAR FUNCTION T021 METEOROID VELOCITY ASSESSMENT T022 HEAT PIPE MO52 BONE AND MUSCLE CHANGES MO53 HUMAN VESTIBULAR FUNCTION MO54 NEUROLOGICAL STUDY (EEG) M055 TIME AND MOTION STUDY NASA HQ ML66-9785 REV. 2-7-67 FIGURE 8 PAGENO="0267" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 263 why don't you do something to change it then. Why don't you have the capsule have a slight spin and magnetism or even have a pressure system where a flow of some sort of an atmosphere goes by and holds them in some position? Dr. MUELLER. Mr. Fulton, those are various things that we do want to look at in the development of our ability to operate in space. We are looking toward the development of experimental equipment to do each one of these things. And we don't really know at this time just which is the best way to proceed, but this is one of the major results that we anticipate from carrying out the work in the orbital workshop. Mr. FULTON. You are having experiments along those lines going ahead just as you are with the zero gravity? Dr. MUELLER. Yes, sir. We are trying to find adequate substitutes for the gravity that we have here on Earth for comfortable living in space and effective working in space. You are quite correct, so we are going to do both. We are going to find out what the trade-off is be- tween working in a zero gravity environment and creating an artificial gravity environment and the problems that are associated with that. You recognize that one of the important products of being in space is that you are in an inertial environment. It makes it convenient to point telescopes and large antennas at particular points and if you do introduce artificial gravity by such things as spinning, then you find that you have to find some way of designing the instruments so you can continue to point in a particular direction. Mr. FULTON. You have all these new adhesives that you could stick wherever you want. Could you just use that? Dr. MUELLER. True. But you would then have to unpoint them for the operational aspects of a mission. Mr. FULTON. My feeling is if you are going to a place that is going to be one-sixth gravity, why don't you have them start in a thing that is one-sixth gravity and learn everything that way so when they come to the Moon that transition has been made and not make that transition when you come down on the Moon. When you have all this new environment you give them a new gravity so why don't you do it ahead? Dr. MUELLER. We have looked quite carefully at producing a sixth gravity in this orbital workshop. There are, however, problems as- sociated with that because the only way that we have yet thought of to get a sixth of a gravity is by a rotational scheme. The rotational scheme in turn introduces coriolis forces which create some difficulty in reproducing the environment of the Moon. Mr. FULTON. What are coriolis forces? Dr. MUELLER. Those are forces that result from moving linearly in a rotating system. Mr. FULTON. I find myself doing that on some legislation. (Laughter.) Dr. MUELLER. One of the things in an engineering sense that we are going to try to do is to take one of the inertial platforms out of the instrument unit and disassemble it. We are going to try to learn how to maintain equipment in space. We are looking at zero g flam- PAGENO="0268" 264 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION mability and astronaut EVA equipment. We are interested in habit- ability and crew quarters. On the right-hand screen there are a number of different approaches to providing beds, sleeping quarters, help for donning suits and so on. (ML 67-5547, fig. 8.) There are interesting problems that are associated with how one sleeps in space that have not been solved yet. As a matter of fact, in looking at the crew sleeping system that we have here, one has a feeling that we still have to do a fair amount of inventing of more comfortable sleeping quarters than we have today. One thing you don't need how- ever, is springs. Because at least in the zero g environment you are floating all the time. Going on to some of the other experiments in the medical area we are trying to develop a fairly comprehensive set of medical measure- inents, particularly for these longer duration flights in order to deter- mine just what does happen to the human body as a function of time in the weightless environment. In terms of our long-range manned spaceflight operations, it would appear desirable to be able to stay in the zero g environment. For most of the activities, on the other hand, we have to be sure that the man can operate effectively under these conditions and he doesn't degrade his performance. These medical experiments are aimed at determin- ing the changes and also determining how one can avoid changes that are not good for the men. FIGURE 8 PAGENO="0269" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 265 We are carrying several Department of Defense experiments includ- ing an integrated maintenance station, a suit donning and sleep sta- tion evaluation, some alternate restraints evaluation, and expandable airlock technology. Some of these are multiple experiments: one for example is a test of a molecular sieve for taking the carbon dioxide out of the at- mosphere and at the same time using it to circulate the air in the cabin. In the area of technology, one of the interesting things that we are looking at is the use of jet shoes. This is different from the back pack with jets on it that we have been studying in Gemini. We are look- ing at different ways of achieving mobility in space. Going forward to one of the next major experimental configurations that we have shown here is the Apollo Telescope Mount. (ML66- 9610, fig. 9.) It includes, as you can see, a lunar module ascent stage. The descent stage is replaced by a rack which carries, with it a solar cell array and in the center of that rack you will see a. tube which is some 82 inches in diameter and 130 inches long which contains the instru- ments for observing the sun during 1969 and 1970, the course of the solar maximum. These solar instruments weigh about 2,000 pounds. The tube is gimballed and it has axles by which it can turn by about five degrees in either plane. It also can be rotated around its own longitudinal axis in order to permit pointing to any particular area on the Sun an'd stay pointed there. FIGURE 9 PAGENO="0270" 266 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION The basic rack also contains a set of gyroscopes They provide you with the coarse pointing accuracy required for pointing the whole assembly toward the Sun and the ascent stage provides the cockpit for the astronauts. It also has a reaction control system aboard which permits you to carry out docking maneuvers, and so on. This con- figuration we see on the left-hand screen (ML66-9610, fig. 9) is one possible configuration, ~tnd this is the ~\ ay it ~s ould work in the event that we ~s anted to fly a telescope mount with a command and service module The man carries out some five functions in this Apollo Telescope Mount (MC66-9678, fig 10) The first is that of sensing and, in particular he does c~trry out the initial operation of pointing and the fine alignment and trimming of the system The second is that of computing The man here is responsible for trimming and stabilizing during the drift mode periods He is com puting the drift and correcting for it by his manual control of the pointing. He sets and controls the camera exposure sequences. The third thing th'tt he is responsible for is maintenance In this he monitors the experiment operation and he insures the proper func tioning of the ATM, taking such corrective actions ~s are necessary depending upon the problem In the fourth area, he is responsible for data acquisition He re covers the exposed film and magnetic tapes and makes sure that they ire operating correctly MAN IN APOLLO TELESCOPE MOUNT 1 SENSING * INITIAL ACQUISITION AND POINTING * FINE ALIGNMENT AND TRIM 2 COMPUTING * TRIM FOR STABILITY DURING "DRIFT MODE" OBSERVING PERIODS * SETS AND CONTROLS CAMERA EXPOSURE SEQUENCES' 3 MAINTENANCE * MONITORS EXPERIMENT OPERATION * INSURES PROPER FUNCTIONING OF ATM 4 DATA ACQUISITION * RECOVERS EXPOSED FILM AND MAGNETIC TAPES 5 SCIENTIST * DETERMINES SOLAR EVENTS OF INTEREST AND DIRECTS SYSTEM TO OBSERVE NASA NO ML66 9678 1 5 67 FIGimE 10 PAGENO="0271" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 267 Finally, he serves as a scientist, to determine which solar events are of interest and to direct the system to observe these events. There are a number of scientific experiments that have been adopted. Mr. GURNEY. How does that telescope compare in size or magnifica- tion to these telescopes we are now using? Dr. MUELLER. The largest optics in this particular instrument is a 12-inch mirror. Now, I would hasten to point out that this telescope tube has in it some 13 major instruments, so that it really is a com- plete observatory housed in this telescope tube and they are all pointed with the same tube at the Sun and they make some five different kinds of measurements that permit you to observe what is happening during the course of the solar events, the major flares, and so on, at different frequencies, and wavelengths of light that you just couldn't observe here on Earth. It will be the first comprehensive examination of the solar phenom- ena during a peak period of solar activity. There is no comparable system here on Earth. Mr. GURNEY. In other words this will give us an opportunity to increase our knowledge very considerably over what we gain from telescope observation. Dr. MUELLER. We expect this will result in a new breakthrough in our understanding of the solar system. It may lead to a better un- derstanding of how the Sun works which in turn will provide us with information as to how this tremendous source of energy operates. Then it may lead to a better understanding of energy here on Earth. The releasing of energy is the most important single thing that determines the course of all of mankind's progress. Mr. GURNEY. Many fields will benefit from this sort of astronomical observatory? Dr. MUELLER. I am sure the scientific community as a whole is ex- pecting a great deal to come from this and it is strongly supporting it. Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Fulton. Mr. FULTON. My question would be, looking at the corona, its spots and the Sun-what is the purpose of the telescope? Dr. MUELLER. Let me go through the instruments themselves. Mr. FULTON. Why don't you use the same type of instrument in space that is being used in Kits Peak at the high altitude observa- tory in Arizona where you have a long focal length of about 300 feet and up here you would have no weight so that you would have no trouble getting a very large screen that probably by TV pictures would be taken back to Earth rather than use a 12-inch glass? Dr. MUELLER. In particular, some of the optics have an effective length which is several times 150 inches but generally the kinds of experiments that we are doing here don't require a tremendously long focal length. Most of them are spectrographic measurements in areas of the spectrum which are not available on the Earth at all because of the atmosphere. Mr. FULTON. Is there a temperature range as well as light? Are you going through the various spectrums of light? Dr. MUELLER. Yes, we are looking through the whole spectrum from X-rays through visible light. PAGENO="0272" 268 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Mr. FULTON. Put it in the record. (The information requested foTlows:) This figure (fig. 11, SG66~-299) shows the solar emission spectra from cosmic rays thru radio waves. The absorption effect of the earth's atmosphere is also shown. The Apollo Telescope Mount will examine the solar emission spectra. from x-rays through visible light. Dr. MUELLER. All right. To further answer your question, Dr. Newkirk of the High Altitude Observatory is one of the experimenters and he will have and is developing a coronagraph for our use. The purpose is to monitor the form and brightness of the solar corona in bright light. Mr. Purcell of the Naval Research Laboratory has two experiments, one is the coronal spectroheliograph which makes high-spatial resolu- tion monochrometric solar images in the 160-650 angstrom range and a chromosphere spectrograph which goes from 800 to 3,000 angstroms and records the solar spectra in that region. Mr. FULTON. Just put a statement in the record. I will read it and I think some of the others will. (The information requested follows:) This figure (fig. 12, ML67-5~54) lists five basic experiments designed to obtain solar data during the period of maximum solar activity. The principal investi- gators, the scientific instruments, and the purpose of each experiment is shown. The com~ination of instruments involved in these five experiments will provide a wide spectral view of the phenomena that occur during the next solar activity cycle and should yield information of considerable value to our understanding of the basic processes of solar activity as shown in figure 13 (SGGG-245). FIGURE 11 PAGENO="0273" 269 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION ATM SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENTS EXPERIMENT PRINCIPAL ORGANIZATION INSTRUMENT PURPOSE NUMBERS INVEST IOATOR MONITOR THE BRIGHTNESS, FORM SSS2 HAO DR. 0. NEWKIRK CORONAGRAPH ANT POlARIZATION OF THE SOLAR CORONA IN WHITE LIOHT. MAKE HIOFI-SPATIAL RESOLUTION CORONAL MONOCHROMETRIC SOLAR IMAGES S PR CTROH E Lb GRA PH IN THE IHR-H5U ANGSTROM RANGE S053 NRL MR. J, D. PURCELL RECCSRS SOLAIS SPECTRA IN THE CHR GM OS PH ERIC 855-3505 ANGSTROM RANGE WITH S FE CTRO G RA PH HIGH SPECTRAL RESCILUTION STUDY SOLAR FLARE EMISSICNS SPECTROGRAPHIC SS54 AS&E DR. R. GIACCONI IN THE SOFT X-RAY WAVELENGTHS X-RAY TELESCOPE (2-US ANGUTROMS) SPECTROHELIOMETRIC MAKE HIGH SPATIAL RESOLUTION UV TELESCOPE SOLAR IMAGES IN THE 3UU-1400 ANGSTROM RANGE STUDY SOLAR SPECTRAL EMISSIONS S FE CT ROM ETRIC SU55 HCC DR. L, GOLDBERG WITH HIGH SPATIAL RESOLUTION UV TELESCOPE IN THE 1455-2255 ANGSTROM RANGE HYDROGEN-ALPHA MAKE HYDROGEN-ALPHA SPECTRO- HELIOGRAMS OF THE ENTIRE SOLAR S PR CTROHE LIOG RA PH DISC OBTAIN TIME-HISTORIES OF THE HI-RESOLSSTICN DYNAMICS OF THE SOLAR ATMOSPHERE SS5H GSPC MR. J. E. MILLIGAN X-RAY TELESCOPE IN X-RAYS IN THE 3-ISU ANGSTROM RANGE NASA HG. ML H7-5554 - 1-25-67 FIOXTRE 12 76-265 0-67--pt. 2-18 FIGuRE 13 PAGENO="0274" 270 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Dr MUELLER Very well We have here a set of instiuments which are at least as good as any of the instruments that have been developed Mr FELTON How much better resolution do you get than the Earth's best telescope ~ Dr MUELLER In terms of resolution, we will not have very much greater angular resolution In terms of the spectral resolution, itself, we are actually making measurements in `treas not available to earth bound telescopes so it is infinitely better than Earth telescopes Mr GURNEY Will you transmit it back to Earth via radio or will the astronauts bring it back ~ Dr MUELLER Most is stored on film Some comes back on radio It comes back when the astronauts come back In addition to the m~jor scientific instruments there are a number of supporting instru ments that make it possible to use these instruments ~nd provide loca tion which are shown on the right chart (ML6'T-5555, fig 14) They make up a total of 13 instruments The package ~hich you see on the left (ML67-5558, fig 15) is `t f'urly complex integration task It is complicated by the fact that these instruments themselves have to maint'un alignment to something like a second of `irc I guess a second of arc is an amount that is sub tended by about 1 mile on the Moon as measured from the Earth so that you are pointing quite accurately and the relative alignment of these instruments has to be held to something of that order of magnitude So the thermal problems associated with this, an instrument that points toward the Sun for 45 minutes, is a real challenge to our designers. In turn, we expect to learn a great deal from the design effort re- quired here in terms of knowing better how to build such precise instru- ments in future missions. - If you will look at the right, you will see a cross section through the PRINCIPAL ORGAN IZ.AT ION INVESTIGATOR INSTRUMENT FUR POS[ HAG DR. 0. NEWKIRK OCCULTING DISC CEN~ER INTERNAL OCCULTING DISK ALIGNMENT SYSTEM TO MINIMIZE SCATTERED LIGHT NRL MR. J. D. PURCELL EUV DISPLAY TELESCOPE SOLAR DISPLAY IN EUV POR MAIN TELESCOPE ORIENTATION AS&E DR. R. GIACCONI X-RAY IMAGE DISSECTOR X-RAY FLUX DETECTOR TO ORIENT TUBE X-RAY TELESCOPE GSPC MR. J. E. MILLIGAN PROPORTIONAL X-RAY FLUX DETECTOR TX) ORIENT COUNTERS X-RAY TELESCOPE MSPC N.A. HYDROGEN-ALPHA PRIMARY DISPLAY OP SOLAR DISC DISPLAY TELESCOPE FOR TARGET SELECTION BY ASTRONAUT FTGuBE 14 PAGENO="0275" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 271 Apollo Telescope Mount (MC67-6003, fig 16) Particularly you can `see the ascent stage over there on the left We will use that stage both for docking as we shall see in a moment and for maneuvering with the reaction control system and we use the forward section for working quarters of the astronaut and we have access through the floor where the ascent engines used to be through the telescope tube so we can remove film from inside and replace it without having to go outside of the cabin for almost all of the instruments. You can see the location of this telescope too, the diameter of the tube is 82 inches. You can see the solar panels deployed. You can see where the control gyroscopes are mounted. Those are the little spheres located on the rack. Mr. FULTON. Why isn't this an experiment that we could have other countries or other foreign associations, that are interested in space, join with us? Dr. MUELLER. As a matter of fact, the President has spoken to the German Chancellor last year with respect to joining in the develop ment of some of these experiments Mr Webb has had various dis cussions with the scientific groups in each of the European countries exploring with them the possibility of participating in these experi ments. `They require a fairly long development time. We have invited cooperation from foreign countries in their use There is one other point, although the instruments themselves rep resent considerable engineering development, the data that is gathered FIGuRE 15 PAGENO="0276" 272 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION LUNAR MODULE/APOLLO TELESCOPE MOUNT NASA HO MC67-6003 3-15-67 FIGURE 16 by these instruments will be made available to all the scientists in the world. It is in fact the analysis and understanding of this data that provides the real scientific return from the equipment and that will be made widely available. Mr. FULTON. I was wondering about the European nations who are building the new telescope 50 miles away from ours. Have they been contacted? There is no use in our paying the full expense if others are working in the same field and they can be joined. Dr. MTJELLER. You are quite correct. They were invited to examine the possibilities here. They are interested principally in a large optical telescope for stellar observations and this is a fairly specialized instrument for solar observations. Mr. ROUDEBUSH. Has there been a determination as to when this telescope will be built and who will be the contractor? Dr. MUELLER. This particular telescope system is being assembled by the Marshall Space Flight Center; in order to be in a position to carry out each of these experiments a major fraction of this work is being done in-house at MSC and at Marshall Space Flight Center. There is of course, a considerable amount of contractor work. The Ball Bros., I believe, are building about six of the instruments that are involved in the mount itself and other contractors are working on the integration; the Lockheed and the Martin companies are in basic competition for an integration contract with Marshall. IN 225' APPROX. PAGENO="0277" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 273 Mr. FtTLTON. Because of distortion factors and heat, have you con- sidered using a metal disk? Dr. MUELLER. A metal disk? Mr. FULTON. Mirror; yes. Dr. MUELLER. As a matter of fact, the X-ray mirror is a metal disc: Mr. FULTON. They are experimenting with those at the University of Arizona and they seem to be quite successful and active. I won- dered if you looked into that phase. Dr. MUELLER. The experimenters that we have are responsible for the development of the instruments themselves. They are aware of the development of the metal mirrors. There is a problem, however, with the grinding of them in terms of the techniques that are now available generally. Mr. GURNEY. The orbiting solar observatory, was that built in- house? Dr. MUELLER. That was built by Ball Bros. in Colorado. The Orbiting Astronomical Observatory is being built by Grumman. Some of the control systems are built by General Electric, for example. The system being assembled and integrated in-house but the various components and experiments are being built in industry. Mr. GURNEY. Isn't this a departure from our previous method of operation? Dr. MUELLER. It is. We have done this both ways in the past. For example, Goddard has built satellites in-house and has contracted for satellites. Marshall has in the past developed the initial parts of equipments and then turned them over to industry. The first stage of the Saturn V is an example of that. This is not a departure from past practice. It does, however, represent two things. One is that as the Apollo program is phasing out, people are becoming available in the manned spaceflight centers to do other work. In order to use their talents and develop their talents in this new area of technology, it has seemed to us important to have them do some of these things that are on the forefront of the technological developments of today otherwise they, in turn, will not be capable of directing other people. The second aspect is that we have had some limited funds in the past years and the only sources for this work were literally the people in our centers. Mr. GURNEY. It seems to me that is not in keeping with our national policy which is to do as much of this work as we can in private in- dustry, and I know that some private industry is very unhappy about this because they have expressed their feelings to me personally. Why couldn't we do this by private industry? Why do we have to do it in-house? Dr. MUELLER. I think there are two answers to that. At the present time, we need to maintain the capability and the talents that we have at Marshall and at the Manned Spacecraft Center. In order to provide the kind of direction, the kind of ability to solve prob- lems that are needed in these centers. We are doing the same thing of course elsewhere in industry where we have special talents that are required fpr the on-go1ng Apollo program. In the long run, there is a need for competence and understanding and skill in the Government organizations that monitor contractors PAGENO="0278" 274 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION and, in fact, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration represents one of several sources of considerable technical talent within the Government that the Government has available to it, and I think that in order to manage properly, it is essential that the Government have a competent group of technical people. This is the only way I know to keep technical people competent with an understanding of current technology, that is, to have them do a certain amount of actual technical work themselves. I don't think that one can otherwise, in the long term, manage to understand the real technical problems that are associated with these complex developments. Mr. GURNEY. I follow that argument but if you follow it to its logical conclusion, then you would have to say that it would be neces- sary for the Government and NASA to build Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter and Voyager and any one of these programs. The argument is exactly the same if you follow it through to its logical conclusion and we completely defeat the purpose that we have expressed to do as much as possible through private enterprise. Dr. MUELLER. Mr. Gurney, one can carry this argument to any of these extremes. One could just as well carry it to the other extreme where all the work was done by private enterprise and there were no governmental laboratories at all. That is, of course, a possibility. I think that the balance that we have achieved in NASA is a sound one where certain things are done in-house and the majority, some 90 percent or more of the work, is done by private industry. When we are talking about these two particular items, we are talk- ing about something on the order of $45 to $55 million worth of work. All of that money is being spent in industry and we are talking about perhaps half that much in terms of in-house effort. Mr GURNEY How many people will be employed in this p~rticu1ar effort of putting together the observatory? Dr. MUELLER. In terms of industrial contractors? Mr. GURNEY. I mean NASA people. Dr. MUELLER. We have something on the order of 400 or 500 people working on this. We have something like a thousand or more people in industry. Mr. GURNEY. I am not sure this is the correct place to inject this question, Mr. Chairman, but I think we ought to develop some evi- dence here at these hearings of NASA manpower in comparison with industrial manpower. For example, industrial manpower we know peaked here a year or so ago and now it has gone down very considerably in this space program. I am wondering where Apollo shows a corresponding increase? Is it proper to go into it? Mr. TEAGUE. At Huntsville we went into this. All the details are in the hearing. I think we covered it very thoroughly. Dr. MUELLER. Let me add just one thought, Mr. Chairman, if I may, and that is that the manned space flight organization h'is increased slightly. In the case of the Apollo program, there is a role that our manned spaceflight organization is playing that is a quite important role in PAGENO="0279" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 275 carrying out the actual Apollo program. That role is being respon- sible for the integration of all of these pieces, the stages, integrating them together into a launch vehicle, the spacecraft, integrating them together into a space vehicle and then the integration of the systems as a whole. This is a responsibility that the NASA center and headquarters have undertaken. It represents the overall system engineering and it repre- sents the kind of thing that persists through the whole development cycle so that in fact the workload is increasing on our centers while the workload on our contractors is going down, so we are just now at the point where we are putting all of these things together having to make them work as a total system. Mr. GURNEY. I realize that. My real question and the thing that troubles me is that I hope that the Government isn't trying to retain all of its people that are necessarily in the space program just to make work for them in a project like we are talking about here, doing the in-house work rather than in private industry. Dr. MUELLER. First of all, we have not changed our policy of doing as much as possible in private industry. There are, however, things that are of considerable importance to recognize in this kind of an operation. When you do an experiment development of the sort we are talking about here, it is a one-of-a-kind thing. There isn't any production involved in it. You need a certain cadre of competent people to do it, and one has to use the resources one has in order to accomplish this. I don't think that we are in a sense competing with industry in this case. We clearly would not have the capability with the funding levels we have available to, in fact, put out anything more in industry than we have done now. Mr. FULT0N. In order to relate the telescope planned in this program to practical use, would you say this might help us in the future on weather prediction, on radio receptivity, on determination of solar wind effects because we are finding the source~? Can you make a practical prediction for this particular experiment that might help justify it? Dr. MUELLER. All of these things and more will come from a basic understanding of the physics of the Sun. This is, of course the major source of energy in our solar system. Understanding it and learning how it operates will in turn tell us much about its effect on our own life here on Earth. Mr. FULTON. Will modification of the Voyager program help us learn basic facts? Dr. MUELLER. Yes, sir. By the end of 1968, if all goes well on the basic Apollo program, and if all goes well in the Apollo Applications program, we will have carried out the set of maneuvers that you see on the right-hand side (ML66-8975, fig. 17), we will have placed in orbit the orbital work- shop; we will have tested the mapping and survey camera which will eventually be used for mapping and surveying the Moon. We will have had some 28 days of exposure to weightlessness in our flight of the workshop. We will have gone back to the workshop and revisited PAGENO="0280" 276 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION it and have carried up to the workshop the Apollo Telescope Mount and have assembled in space the Apollo Telescope Mount and the workshop together with the command module and the crew and we will have `begun to stay there for 56 days so we will hate `built up our exposure. They will experiment with the Sun and carry out experiments in the workshop and they will test various techniques for the use of the Apollo telescope itself. In particular, you will note that one of the views in this chart (see ML66-8975, fig. 17), shows the Apollo Telescope Mount tethered to the workshop. We hope to be able to study this as a possible method of operation in order to isolate the Apollo Thlescope Mount from the workshop. We will also be carrying out operations with the Apollo Telescope Mount coupled or docked to the workshop, and if our control system works well enough, it will be possible without going into pressure suits to travel from the Apollo Telescope Mount to the workshop using the airlock and docking adaptor. We will have then really an embryonic space station available to us for carrying out additional observations of the Sun and additional experiments throughout 1969 by using additionally the follow-on com- mand and service modules to resupply and revisit. By the end of 1969 we would expect to have reached, by doubling the weightless exposure, the ability to stay in orbit for as much as a FIGURE 17 PAGENO="0281" 1068 NASA AUTHORIZATION 277 year. That is with the proviso, of course, that the workshop and its equipment is still operating. Mr. FULTON. I am amused by the difference in titles. I could never understand `the difference between a manned orbital workshop and a Manned Orbital Laboratory. In the Air Force you get a laboratory. In NASA you get a work- shop. If you could explain that, I would like to see that there is no overlapping of function and that you aren't both doing the same thing in competition. Dr. MUELLER. As a matter of fact, the workshop is available in a time scale that permits us to help by developing techniques and equip- ment that will be used by the manned orbiting lab in the Air Force program. Mr. FULTON. You are correlating the programs rather than duplicating? Dr. MUELLER. Yes; and careful coordination is being carried on as I mentioned, yesterday. The Department of Defense participates in it. All the agencies coordinate. We design the program to provide the maximum amount of information to the Department of Defense. Mr. FULTON. Secretary McNamara made the "big steal" of the dec- ade when he got the Manned Orbital Lab away from NASA. I don't want any comment on that. Dr. MUELLER. In the Apollo alternate missions (MC 67-5409, fig. 18), we will use the basic Apollo space vehicles which may become available from the manned. lunar landing program to acquire the maxi- mum yield of solar data during the solar maximum; we will place in orbit, operating modules for reuse, we will provide early capability APOLLO APPLICATIONS APOLLO ALTERNATE MISSIONS * USE OF BASIC APOLLO SPACE VEHICLES WHICH MAY BECOME AVAILABLE FROM THE MANNED LUNAR LANDING PROGRAM `TO: 1. ACQUIRE THE MAXIMUM YIELD OF SOLAR DATA DURING THE SOLAR MAXIMUM. 2. PLACE IN ORBIT OPERATING MODULES FOR RE-USE. 3. PROVIDE AN EARLY CAPABILITY FOR A LARGE ENVIRONMENTALLY CONTROLLED VOLUME TO EVALUATE HUMAN PERFORMANCE, ENGINEERING CONCEPTS AND TECHNOLOGY LEADING TO A SPACE STATION. 4. DEMONSTRATE UP TO THREE MONTH ORBITAL FLIGHT CAPABILITY. NASA HQ MC67-5409 2-21-67 FIGURE 18 PAGENO="0282" 278 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION for large environmentally controlled volume in which to evaluate human performance, engineering concepts and technology leading to a space station. We will demonstrate up to a 3-month orbital flight capability. As we go further, we will expect to continue several major areas.; one of these is long-duration flight (MO 67-5410, fig 19). As I said, I expect to build up by the end of 1968 a system that will permit us by proper reuse to acquire the experience that we need for determining whether man can stay in space for periods of a year or more and that in turn is an essential understanding if we are ever to carry out manned planetary explorations. We are laying the foundation that will pro- vide us with the knowledge that we need for determining whether manned planetary travel is feasible at the present time. The major benefits we expect (ML 66-9790, fig. 20) include the astronomical observations, the determination of man's effectiveness as an astronomical observer in space and the test of alternate operating modes for future large manned telescopes. The development of the capability for reuse of space hardware will reduce program costs and we will determine the effects of extended duration flights in space on men and systems. The determination of the effects of artificial gravity in space on men and systems is one of the long-term objectives and we plan to develop more complex manned extravehicular capabilities. Now, I would like to take just a moment, if I may, to show a film. This film represents the testimony of some six outstanding scientists, doctors, and engineers, in establishing the requirement that they see in the future for manned space operations. (Whereupon, a film was shown, and an accompanying text was pro-j vided by Dr. Mueller as follows:) Dr Charles H Townes Massachusetts Institute of Technology The NASA Science and Technology Advisory Committee, of which I am Chairman, is a committee of Scientists and Engineers formed to advise the National Aeronautics and Space Administration on Manned Space Flight. "We've been quite interested in the possible uses of the Apollo/Saturn hard- ware-4he scientific and engineering missions, in earth orbit, lunar orbit, and on the lunar surface. Its boosters and other important units will also be valu- able in exploration of the planets and interplanetary space. "It is important for the scientific community to be familiar with the program now getting underway for utilizing the Apollo/Saturn space vehicle, because capabilities of the Apollo/Saturn hardware are far enough beyond what has previously been available for space science before this that scientists can think in terms of quite new types of experiments, much more extensive experimenta- tion, and new modes of operation." Dr. Charles A. Berry, Manned Spacecraft Center: "It's now time that we expand our observations from determining whether a man can indeed function in this environment and now look at what we can learn that we can apply in general to medicine wherever it is practiced. What can we gain, or what do we need to know as medical scientists in using the space systems which can be provided for us which will allow adequate volume and time to expose the human being. "We can look at the cause of the changes which have been observed thus far in exposing man to a space flight environment "It's terribly important that we define what is the cause of these various changes in order `to protect against them. We can also work at adaptive mecha- nisms. We can apply the information obtained in this manner to man adapting to environments of other types here on the surface of the earth. We also ought to look at basic biochemical mechanisms. And this is a `time when we can help to determine what really happens to substances in the body, because we can look at them as they occur in normal human beings in a very unique environmental situation. PAGENO="0283" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 279 APOLLO APPLICATIONS LONG DURATION FLIGHT OBJECTIVES * MEASURE EFFECTS OF LONG DURATION FLIGHTS ON MEN AND SYSTEMS. * ACQUIRE OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE. * DEVELOP SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR NEXT GENERATION OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHT * PERFORM EXPERIMENTS NASA HQ MC67-5410 REV. 2-7-67 FIGURE 19 MAJOR BENEFITS FROM WORKSHOP AND ATM MISSIONS * OBTAIN SOLAR ASTRONOMICAL OBSERVATIONS DURING PERIOD OF SOLAR MAXIMUM ACTIVITY * DETERMINE MAN'S EFFECTIVENESS AS AN ASTRONOMICAL OBSERVER IN SPACE * TEST ALTERNATE OPERATING MODES FOR FUTURE LARGE MANNED ORBITAL TELESCOPE * DEVELOP CAPABILITY FOR REUSE OF SPACE HARDWARE WHICH WILL REDUCE PROGRAM COSTS * DETERMINE EFFECTS OF EXTENDED DURATION SPACE ENVIRONMENT ON MEN AND SYSTEMS * DETERMINE EFFECTS OF ARTIFICIAL GRAVITY ON MEN AND SYSTEMS * DEVELOP EFFECTIVE MANNED EXTRAVEHICULAR CAPABILITY NASA NO NL$$N711 1*517 FIGURE 20 PAGENO="0284" 280 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION "The vestibular system offers us a very interesting sense organ which can be studied in this particular environment and take advantage of the laboratory situation which exists nowhere in the universe. Because thin system was de- signed to function in gravity with one "G", in other words, with gravity as it exists on the earth's surface. We can now look at this system as it functions without gravity and thus learn a great deal of basic physiology. In addition, the information obtained in this manner is applicable to future systems where we might have to try and provide gravity so that man could work in this space situation for very long periods of time, in planetary missions or just orbiting the earth. "To do these various things we need a laboratory. We can no longer ride piggy-back on operational science missions, but we must have a laboratory with adequate volume so that we can conduct these experiments. "This means that it could perhaps be supplied by a system like Apollo Applica- tions. For such a system would allow both medical scientists and the astronauts to perform a number of experiments and to make observations which would be extremely helpful to us from the medical point of view here on the surface of the earth and as we plan our future exposures of man to unique types of environments. "This information is valuable then, not only as we try to protect man in unusual environments or extend his stay, but also to medicine wherever it's practiced here on the surface of the earth." Astronaut James A. Lovell, Manned Spacecraft Center: "To capitalize fully on the advantages of having a man in space, we must now increase the length of our flights, first to a month, then to several months, and, ultimately, to in- definite periods. Not only must we investigate the physiological factors, we must learn much more about how to live and work in space on a day-to-day basis. "Of course, in the small Gemini spacecraft, which had about as much room as a typical sports car front seat, we proved that man can operate effectively in space for up to two weeks. To achieve :this, we incorporated special pro- visions, for instance, a light-weight pressure suit which could be doffed or donned with reasonable facility. "And in the Apollo spacecraft, which has somewhat more room for flight crews, we again have a two-week mission capability. "But for missions of much longer duration, there are still many questions about how to live and work most efficiently in space. "We expect to find many answers in the early Apollo Applications missions. "To establish a base of operations in space, we will launch an uprated Saturn I second stage into earth orbit, and then convert it into quarters for living and working. "In the stage, we will investigate things such as. . . how much cubic footage do we need for routine functions of life, experiments for science, maintenance of equipment? "What is an optimum floor plan for crew quarters and work stations? "What is the best way to sleep in the zero gravity of space? "What forms of exercise are most effective in keeping a crew physiologically fit? "We will investigate methods of food preparation, types of food, care of personal hygiene, management of `human wastes, ways of "keeping house." "We can learn the best means `of moving from place to place under zero "G" and restraining ourselves at work stations. Here we will be able to build on our earlier experience during similar work in Gemini, but in a controlled environment. "The data from our studies will be used in planning and developing both the later flights in Apollo Applications and the flights for future programs. And it will be instrumental in making the most effective use of man during long-dura- tion missions in space." Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner, Southwest Center for Advanced Studies: "Now that we have moved such a long way in this first decade of the space age, we have the opportunity to intensify the work of determining and measuring the `benefits that can be provided to man here on the earth. It's time that we capitalized on `this opportunity. "As populations increase and as there is `a rising concern with the problems of livIng in a crowded world, we have greater need to make effective use of PAGENO="0285" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 281 the earth's resources. To do this we need to measure their totals, and the depletion and the contamination that man's activities produce. "A satellite is at a vantage point at which comprehensive mapping and ac- curate measurements over really broad areas are possible for the first time. "The earth's resources are in the four states of land, sea, the atmosphere and the magnetosphere. "On the land, we can inquire into how effectively observations from space can help us find ores, fuels, and mineral deposits. "I have here a picture taken from the Gemini of Central Australia, which was an important aid in finding an oil deposit (figure 1). "We can pursue the possibility of aiding agriculture and forestry with repeated measurements of changes in the states of forests, of range land, and cultivated areas. Agricultural specialists have found that the infrared camera is an ex- cellent analytical tool for determining the plant and the soil temperatures and assessing the energy budget of the earth surface. "We cap determine how ~vell observations from space can provide useful information about such things as land uses in human populations. I have here perhaps one of the most densely populated areas of the earth, the Nile Delta, Figure 2 which goes back to man's earliest history, in which one can study in detail the concentrations of these populations as taken from the Gemini. "With respect to the earth's water, much information of value related to hydrology can be obtained. The fresh water supply and the extent of pollution. We use this photograph on the cover of our annual report for the Southwest Center for Advanced Study (figure 3). "It was taken in infrared and it shows the waters of the Cascade range very clearly; as you can see here, the peaks, which are clearly outlined, the faults and the structure which would aid in hydrological study. "In particular, about 5/6 of our planet surface is covered by the sea. Complete coverage of the oceans from its surface, of course, is very difficult. The ocean- FIGURE 1 PAGENO="0286" . 282 ~ i 9 6 8 NASA AUTHORIZATION ographer finds that he can see a great deal from space, and here I have a photograph taken from near the coast of Africa looking over almost the entire Indian Ocean, from one of the Gemini studies (figure 4) . There are many opportunities to learn much more about the ~ eather from space "Sometimes the meteorologist would like to have greater detail which can be supplied from actual color film or the record of observations of other otherwise invisible portions of the electromagnetic spectrum. Here we have a photograph of the Indian sub continent which shows I believe quite clearly the influence of the convective action of the atmosphere as it approaches the continent itself, and you will see the clouds are held away from the continent by this action. Certainly an observation that could only be made in space. "At very high altitudes an orbit synchronized with the earth's rOtation, the view from this vantage point can encompass a much wider area and follow step by step, minute by minute, the life history of a developing storm. "I have here three pictures taken from the Advanced Technology satellite in quick succession, and you can see in each of these three pictures the development of a storm system of over almost half of the whole earth's surface. "One problem in our atmosphere, of course, is the effects of man's activity upon it As we become increasingly aware air pollution is a major and increasing problem in heavily populated and industrial areas. "Of course, this problem can extend far from the most populated areas and here is an interesting picture of two forest fires which are creating heavy pollution in the area of development in the Gulf of Mexico, near Tallahassee and Apalachicola. "In all such research, it will be important to measure carefully the costs and the benefit's to be obtained by alternative methods of obtaining data. In some cases, the needed information can be obtained with aircraft, ~r with sounding rockets, or simple unmanned spacecraft. In others, the presence of a man in space to do such things as selecting the targets calibrating and directing instruments will justify the additional cost. But space offers the opportunity to do many things that 3ust cannot be done in any other way I m reminded for example of the fact that on my first expedition to the Antartic with Admiral Byrd in 1928 we flew some six hours to discover the Rockefeller Mountains only a short distance from Little America One `I look forward with pleasure to the day when a Polar orbiting Apollo will be able to sweep and map the whole continent in a single orbit Dr Eugene Shoemaker U S Geological Survey `The Geological Survey is carrying out a major program of Geologic investigation of the moon The first step in this program is Geologic mapping of the moon from earth based tele scopes. You see here on this frame the one-to-one million Geologic maps which have been prepared for the lunar equatorial belt. The next step in the investigations will be the detailed Geologic investigation of Ranger impact sights for Ranger 7 8 and 9 from the very high resolution pictures obtained on the Ranger missions Next we will be studying in great detail the lunar equator from high resolution pictures obtained from the unmanned lunar orbiter The Apollo Applications program will offer us the opportunity to extend these studies over the entire sphere of the moon, and to study in even greater detail areas of special interest such as the Crater Aiphonses and the Crater Copernicus which may be the targets for Manned Lunar Landing Our first detailed information obtained directly from the Lunar surface will come from the unmanned spacecraft Surveyor. From the pictures obtained from the two cameras, it will be possible to prepare very detailed maps of a region extending out about 100 feet from the spacecraft, which is an area about the size of this model. "In the first manned lunar landing, it will be possible to extend these observations to distances of about a thousand feet, and in the Apollo Applications program we will have the opportunity to look at features several thousand feet across `Finally we are studying the methods by which this information is to be transmitted to the earth and the techniques for reducing this information pri- marily by photogrammetry and photometry. Our objective in studying the moon is to compare the Geology and History of the moon with the Geology and History of the earth. And by this comparison, we hope to solve some of the age-old `questions of Geology." PAGENO="0287" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 283 FIGURE 2 FIGURE 3 PAGENO="0288" 284 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 4 FIGURE 5 PAGENO="0289" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 285 FIGIJEE 6A 76-265 O-67-pt. 2-19 FIGURE 6B PAGENO="0290" 286 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Dr. James Arnold, University of California: "Here at the University of Cali- fornia at San Diego, scientists are using the techniques of modern chemistry and of structural analysis to try to answer the question of the origin of the solar system. "Now to do analyses we need samples. We have the crust of the earth but the crust of the earth has had such a colorful history that most of the traces of its origins have been lost. We have the meteorites and a very rich field has grown up here. We've used modern instruments such as mass spectrometers, low level counters, to learn a great deal from these objects. We've learned such things as the age of the solar system-4.6 billion years-most of what we know about the origin of the elements, and much more. But we don't know exactly where the meteorites come from. We do not have these samples in context. So we look elsewhere. "Now there are many controversies about the moon, but there is one thing about which I think we all agree, and that is that the surface of the moon is very old. The processes of erosion which take place on the earth do not take place there to the same extent. We should be able to find clues, fingerprints of the moon's origin. Now Apollo will bring us back samples of the moon and the importance of this is so great that the scientists concerned have assigned sample return the highest scientific priority on the Apollo missions. "The Apollo Applications program can bring us samples from the moon in context, in a known relation to the lunar environment. We can bring these samples back to our laboratories; we can study them with our instruments; we can make discoveries and apply those discoveries and further measurements on similar samples. We can, in fact, do generations of work on the samples from a single mission. Perhaps, we can even give firm answers to the question of the origin of the solar system itself." Dr. Leo Goldberg, Harvard/Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory: "Here in this laboratory, we assemble, test, and calibrate astronomical instruments used in observing the sun from rockets and satellites. "Observations from space are of fundamental importance to astronomy, which has long been retarded by the restrictions imposed by the earth's atmosphere and _____. FIGURE 6C PAGENO="0291" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 287 gravity. We have, in effect, been looking at the universe through a screen that is opaque to both ultraviolet and infrared radiation, as well as to x-ray, gamma rays, and many types of high speed particles. Moreover, the atmosphere causes the stars to dance and twinkle, against a background glare, of scattered sunlight by clay and of airglow by night. The removal of these restrictions promises to extend our observational reach by many many times. "Our own efforts, and those of other groups elsewhere, are devoted to the in- vestigation of the sun. And more specifically, towards getting an understanding of the origin of magnetic fields, of the source of the sun's spot cycle and solar activity, of the origin of the solar wind and solar flares, and the production of high energy particles and photons. "At present, we are pursuing these studies with relatively small telescopes and spectographs, such as this instrument, which we have designed to fly in the unmanned `OSO-Orbiting Solar Observatory-series of spacecraft, as illustrated by this model, and here the left-hand box is designed to represent our instrument. "While much valuable ground work is being laid by observations with these small instruments, the questions we are asking about the sun, can only be answered through the use of much larger telescopes. Much valuable experi- ence in manned operation of solar telescopes and also much valuable preliminary data `will be gained `during Apollo missions in low-earth orbit, with an installa- tion like this one, called the "Atom." "In the Atom concept here you see the Apollo spacecraft, with the astronauts in their places, controlling the pointing of a battery of solar telescopes toward the sun. Later on, the Apollo Applications program will `make it possible for us to put the large telescopes into operation in space. For example, telescopes up to 60 inches' in diameter, with which angles as small as a tenth of a second arc, can be resolved. Telescopes so large that they will undoubtedly have to be assembled in orbit by astronauts, who would then also play an important part in the operation of the telescopes. By making required major changes in the observational equipment, by performing instant analysis of output data, and then modifying subsequent observations, for example, by reacting to the outbreak of a solar flare, by performing maintenance and repair, and finally, by returning FIGuRE 7 PAGENO="0292" 288 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION photographic data to earth. Through such efforts, we may hope to get answers to many of the most fundamental questions about the universe-the nature and number of x-ray and radio sources, the origin of cosmic rays, and finally, the origin and evolutionary history of the stars and galaxies, themselves." Dr. MUELLER. Mr. Chairman, I thought that it would be worth- while to have these requirements stated by some of our leading scien- tists. I wonder if it would be your desire to place them in the record. Mr. TEAGUE. Yes, sir. We would like to have them in the record. Dr. MUELLER. Going on to the use of the Apollo hardware in the follow-on program, in particular in carrying out extended lunar ex- ploration, there are two major courses that we expect to follow, one is the development of a mapping and surveying system which is capable of providing high resolution multispectral pictures utilizing a wide electromagnetic spectral range to cover the lunar surface. The sys- tem to be used here is, as you see, in the left-hand view (ML 66-9782, fig. 21), the mapping and survey camera, which is now under develop- inent in the Apollo program. We expect to fly it in lunar orbit and leave it in lunar oi~bit for a period of 28 days and thus permit a com- plete mapping of the lunar surface in a single mission (ML 66-8965, fig. 22). Mr. FUQUA. Would this be a manned mission? Dr. MUELLER. Yes. The man is essential `to `maintain the equipment to keep it operating and to change films. We would hope also to obtain both stereo coverage and éolor as well as high resolution photo- graphs of the lunar surface. That is one of the types of missions. FIGURE 21 PAGENO="0293" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 289 Mr. FULTON. Before you go on, when the new treaty on space goes into effect and it will probably be ratified very soon, there will be a number of missions of the Department of Defense in space that are automatically banned and I, for one, would like to see a program looked into on transferring those missions to NASA where they come within the jurisdiction of NASA on aeronautics and space. We are planning a lot of military operations in space and therefore the De- partment of Defense will have no particular specific program for such operations and I certainly hope that NASA will look to its jurisdic- tion and pick up some of the programs which can just as well be done by NASA. Dr. MUELLER. I will call Mr. Webb's attention to your remarks, Mr. Fulton. Turning to the extended lunar surface exploration, we would expect to develop a capability to extend the stay time on the lunar surface to approximately 2 weeks in the course of our developments. In the time that we spend on the surface, there are several types of experi- ments that we would like to carry out (MT 66-8685, fig. 23). One is a drill that will drill as deep as 100 meters, 300 feet or so, and with that drill, then, we have the ability not only to collect samples but also to use a probe similar to the probes that are used in the develop- ment of oil wells and other geologic investigations to determine the composition of the subsurface of the Moon, and what its history was. We also expect to carry on extended surveys of the lunar surface and to emplace various scientific stations that will permit us over a FIGuRE 22 PAGENO="0294" 290 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION rather wide area to measure the deep characteristics of the moon itself, through seismic observations, and also to measure the environment on the surface through careful and extended observations (MT 66-10142, fig. 24) Mr. RUMSFELD. May I interrupt there? What you are describing, to some extent, is very similar to the types of activities that will be undertaken in the portion of the budget that is being funded under the Apollo program, the samples and checking the surface and this type of thing. Is this correct? Dr. MUELLER. Well, in the Apollo program itself, we are limited rather markedly in the payload that we can deliver to the lunar surface so really we are only collecting surface samples in the case of the Apollo missions. That is the only capability that we have. This represents not just small extensions, but significantly greater extensions. Mr. RUMSEELD. Isn't it difficult to know exactly what you want to do in this Apollo Application without taking a look at some of the samples from the first Apollo missions? Dr. MUELLER. I think that our present knowledge of the lunar sur- face is such that we know that it represents a "garden" surface, a sur- face that has been worked over by meteorites over a long period of time. We have been led to those conclusions from the photographs. That describes a clear need for some method of drilling. There is no ques- tion about the need for a drill. FIGURE 23 PAGENO="0295" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 291 Mr. RUMSFELD. My question was, Is there a possibility that after the first manned lunar landing that you would have to or desire to change your plans substantially? Dr. MUELLER. I think we have examined that question pretty care- fully as well as the question, Is it desirable really to continue this lunar exploration? After we look at the first samples, will we find that is all we are interested in? There is a uniform opinion of those people who have worked on the subject in the scientific community, and we did have a major study during the summer of 1965 at Woods Hole of this particular area; the consensus was that we ought to plan on ex- tending the capabilities of Apollo, and we ought to develop the capa- bility both for drilling and extensive observations on a single site, and the ability to move a mobile system so you can move some distance across the terrain. The geologists say that the thousand feet which is the maximum range that an astronaut can go from a .landing point in Apollo is not going to be sufficient to do anything other than pre- liminary observations. Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Gurney. Mr. GURNEY. If you go ahead with the part of the Apollo program, what are we going to use for boosters? Dr. MUELLER. These are Saturn V's, it takes two to provide enough payload in order to have a 2-week stay and in order to carry enough experimental equipment. Mr. GURNEY. I though you were skating on thin ice with the pay- load already. FIGURC 24 PAGENO="0296" 292 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Dr. MtTELLaR. We use `one of the Saturn V launches `to land a lunar module descent stage without `any `ascent propulsion on board and that provides us with several tons of capacity. Mr. FUQUA. Will it be possible to leave certain equipment on the Moon and set up some type of outpost or station there? Dr. MUELLER. One of the things thalt we are looking at is the possibility of going back to a site, for example, `where we have a drill emplacement. We haven't determined whether that is the `best way to utilize an expensive set of apparatus. The `scientists are divided, whether they want to go to a `single s:ite `and explore it in depth or go to different spots. That will have to wait `until we get some experience. As we go further downstream, we see two types of payloads which have been developed in concept `and on w'hich the principal experiments have been identified, one is a meteorology payload pack'age (ML `66-9876, fig. 25), and in this particular case, we are carrying out a set of experimental observations of the earth's atmosphere, but using equipment that we would hope eventually to understand well `enough to determine whether or not it should be flown in an unmanned mode or a manned mode. Particularly, one of the objectives is to find that kind of equipment and to develop that kind of equipment using a man, that could be used most economically for extended meteorological observations. That is one of the principal objectives of this total package. The other is an Earth resources `package (ML 66-9873, fig. 26). It is used for observing the Earth's surface and the manned mode is desired so that we can develop the range and the scale `of the instruments to be used for future missions. These are both initial METEOROLOGY PAYLOAD PACKAGE (APP-A) OBJECTIVES * FLIGHT TEST EXPERIMENTA'L METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION. * USE MAN'S ABILITY TO DIRECT SENSORS TO METEOROLOGICAL EVENTS OF MOMENT. * COMBINE NUMEROUS SENSORS FOR SIMULTANEOUS OBSERVATION AND CORRELATION OF DATA. * CONFIRM SPECTRAL SIGNATURES OF EARTH RESOURCES. * FLIGHT TEST SOME INSTRUMENTS WHICH MAY CONTRIBUTE TO THE DETECTION OF AIR POLLUTION. * IMPROVE KNOWLEDGE OF ATMOSPHERIC COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE. * TAKE ADVANTAGE OF INCREASED PAYLOAD CAPACITY AND VOLUME PROVIDED BY AAP MISSIONS. PRINCIPAL EXPERIMENTS * DAY- NIGHT CAMERA SYSTEM * VISIBLE RADIATION POLARIZATION MEASUREMENTS * DIELECTRIC TAPE CAMERA SYSTEM * STELLAR REFRACTION DENSITY MEASUREMENTS * MILLIMETER WAVE PROPAGATION S UHF SFERICS DETECTION * MULTI -SPECTRAL PHOTOGRAPHY S IR INTERFEROMETER SPECTROMETER * IR TEMPERATURE SOUNDING 5 15 MICRON GRATING SPECTROMETER S02 & H2O MICROWAVE RADIOMETER S MULTI-CHANNEL RADIOMETER * IR FILTER WEDGE SPECTROMETER S SELECTIVE CHOPPER RADIOMETER EXPECTED FLIGHT READINESS DATE: MID 1969 NASA HQ ML66-9876 11 - 15-66 FIGURE 25 PAGENO="0297" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 293 EARTH RESOURCES PAYLOAD PACKAGE (APP-B) OBJECTIVES S ESTABLISH FEASIBILITY OF OBTAINING USEFUL DATA FROM ACTIVE AND PASSIVE REMOTE SENSORS. * DEVELOP TECHNIQUES FOR EXTRAPOLATION AND CORRELATION OF DATA OBTAINED SIMULTANEOUSLY FROM SEVERAL REMOTE SENSORS. * VERIFY METHODS FOR TRANSMISSION AND ANALYSIS OF LARGE AMOUNTS OF DATA: * DETERMINE USEFULNESS OF MAN IN EARTH ORBITAL APPLICATIONS SPACECRAFT. * OBTAIN EVIDENCE ON THE NEED FOR OPERATIONAL EARTH RESOURCES SPACE MISSION. * UTILIZE PAYLOAD CAPACITY OF AAP MISSION. PRINCIPAL EXPERIMENTS * MULTIBAND CAMERA * RADAR ALTIMETER AND SCATTEROMETER * METRIC CAMERA * LASER ALTIMETER * PANORAMIC CAMERA S IR SPECTROMETER AND RADIOMETER * TRACKING TELESCOPE * PASSIVE MICROWAVE IMAGER AND RADIOMETER * WIDE-RANGE IMAGER S ABSORPTION SPECTROSCOPE * RADAR IMAGER S UV SPECTROMETER EXPECTED FLIGHT READINESS DATE: MID 1970 NASA HG ML66-9873 11-15-66 FIGURE 26 missions and we will establish the kind of equipment that is useful and the limitations and they will be flexible enough to permit adjust- ment so as to modify them while in flight and to get the maximum amount of information. These are the kind of experiments that are being planned in the Apollo Applications program. Funding for both of these programs is included in the budget. A further extension of the Apollo telescope mount has interesting possibilities (ML 66-9875, fig. 27). I do believe that the combination of the workshop and the Apollo telescope mount represent a major step forward in our capability `and our ability for man to operate in space, a major step forward that can be taken with a relatively small expenditure of funds and yet which will lay the foundation for future space operations. I personally am convin'ced that this program pro- vides an opportunity that is of incalculable value in `the long term to our progress in space flight. In particular, `the same `basic equipment that is used for the solar observations can be `used to mount a telescope, a telescope that might be some 40 inches in diameter, but also be associated with a visible light telescope and probably would be associated with some X-ray telescopes as well. This array could be used for carrying out stellar observations. One of the basic requirements for this kind of a system is the ability to take long exposures of film so that you can photograph faint stars. The combination of time of exposure plus the aperture provides you with the faintness of the ~t.ar that you can identify and in particular, PAGENO="0298" 294 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MANNED PHOTOGRAPHIC TELESCOPE * 48-INCH DIAMETER BY 10 FEET LONG REQUIREMENTS * ± 1 ARC SECOND POINTING * MANNED OPERATION TARGET RECOGNITION AND SELECTION COARSE GUIDANCE CHOICE OF PHOTOGRAPHIC AND SPECTROGRAPHIC MODES ALIGNMENT AND FOCUS SELECTION AND CHANGING OF FILM EXPOSURE AND PROCESSING FILM EXCHANGE OF FILM FLIGHT READINESS * 1971-1972 SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVES * UV PHOTOGRAPHY OF GALACTIC EMISSION AND REFLECTION NEBULAE AND OF BRIGHT GALAXIES AND QUASARS * SPL ROGRAPHY OF PLANETARY AND DIFFUSE EMISSION NEBULAE AND QUASARS INSTRUMENTATION * 38-INCH APERATURE f/5 ULTRAVIOLET TELESCOPE * 1000 POUNDS NASA HG ML66-9875 11 - 15-66 Fioui~ 27 then, we would want to place this thing in a high enough orbit so that first of all the earthshine is not a problem and, secondly, we can take long exposures without being occulted by the Earth. A synchronous orbit is what most of the studies suggest (ML 66-8977, fig. 28). We would use the basic ATM equipment and place a workshop with it in Earth orbit, assummg the first flights work well, and then we will establish, if you will, a manned orbital telescope using the same basic equipment that we are developing for solar observation in lower orbits. Mr RUMSFELD Have you rejected plans or the possibility of an un manned lunar observatory that would be put on the surface of the Moon? There was some talk of this. Dr MUELLER Unmanned lunar observatory ~ Mr RUMSI'ELD That would be on a fixed position on the Moon as opposed to an orbiting observatory. Dr. MUELLER. There is the possibility of a manned and unmanned observatory I don't know of a serious study on the lunar surface unmanned because of the difficulty of controlling and pointing it. The work done indicates that probably the decision will be to go to an orbiting telescope rather than one placed on the lunar surface, and all of the people are agreed that that ought to be attended by man Whether or n~t there is a full time man operating it or not is still a question that needs to be determined as a result of our carrying out the work with the Apollo telescope mount PAGENO="0299" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 295 Mr. RUMSFELD. I remember talking to some people from the Lind- heim Observatory in Illinois some years ago that they desired to un- dertake such an effort prior to the first manned lunar mission. Their thought was that it would be a simpler operation. They thought the information would be of greater interest before the first manned flight. Dr. MUELLER. The complexity of that is greater when you ~et down to designing it than it is in concept and there were some studies made several years ago in this area, but when you really figure out whalt you actually have to do in order to do it, it turns out to be a pretty complex mission. Mr. RUMSFELD. So there are no plans for it to be unmanned? Dr. MUELLER. That is right; on the lunar surface. Another area of great promise is the land landing capability in the Apollo Applications program (ML 67-5763, fig. 29). What we are talking about is the development of a capability to reuse the command module. We hope at the same time to be able to increase the crew complement hopefully to as many as six rather than three using the basic Appollo capsule. We would expect, therefore, to be able to reduce the water recovery forces and, of course, to increase our landing flexibility. Now, the development required in order to do this is first of all a development for a gliding parachute (ML 67-5516, fig. 30) which we FIGURE 28 PAGENO="0300" 296 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION APOLLO APPLICATIONS LAND LANDING * DESIGN OBJECTIVES * COMMAND MODULE REUSABILITY * INCREASED CREW COMPLEMENT *REDUCED WATER RECOVERY FORCES * INCREASED LANDING FLEXIBILITY * DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS * GLIDING CHUTES * MANEUVERABILITY CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS NASA HQ MC67-5763 2-21-67 FIGURE 29 call a parasail and the requisite controls and displays to cause this to be useful. I ought to add one other thing and that is the develop- ment of capability for retrorockets at touchdown. This is under study at the present time and does have a great deal of promise in reducing the cost of operations for the manned space flight program in the future. Now, where we stand in the course of procurement and where we have to go forward this year with the Appollo Applications program if we are to avoid a shutdown of the factory lines that are producing the equipment and a corresponding hiatus and dissipation, if you will, of the launch teams and the test teams and the whole fabric of the organization is shown in these two charts (ML 67'-5i906, fig. 31; ML ~7-59O7, fig. 32). In the case of the command module, we have under procurement in one fashion or another all of the systems. In the case of the sur- face module and the lunar module, the same thing holds true. In the case of the Saturn launch vehicles, liprated Saturn I, we have pro- gressed to where all the vehicles are in fabrication and assembly at the present time. In the case of the Saturn V, we have long-lead-time procurement on all the vehicles, 10 of them are in various stages of fabrication and assembly so we are well along in the actual produc- tion of the hardware that is to be used in the basic Apollo program. In order to avoid a hiatus in production and to continue at least some PAGENO="0301" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 297 FIGu1~ 30 SATURN LAUNCH VEHICLE PROCUREMENT STATUS AS OF FEB. 25, 1967 LAUNCH VEHICLE STAGE USED ASSEMBLY COMPLETED IN FABRI- CATION AND ASSEMBLY ORDERED BUT NOT YET IN FABRICATION LONG LEAD PROCURE MENT UP R AT ED SATURN I SATURN V TOTAL 3 3 3 S-lB S-IVB lU. S-iC S-Il S-IVB I.U. 7 7 4 5 3 4 3 2 2 5 5 7 5 5 12 S-lB 12 S-IV~ 12 IV. 15 S-iC 15 S-Il 6 16 S-IVB 15 IV. NASA HQ MC66-5906 2-27-67 2 FIGURE 31 PAGENO="0302" 298 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION level of production, it is necessary to reorder the equipment at the present time. The leadtimes are shown on the next chart on the left- hand side (ML 67-5917, fig. 33) and in some cases we are past the long- lead procurement point, in fact. We have, in fact, placed orders for portions of the Apollo and Saturn I vehicles. We are in the process of having to place orders for long-lead-time procurement on Apollo- Saturn V, and the command and service modules, in order to provide the opportunity, if you approve the President's budget, to proceed on the production of these vehicles. Now, in conclusion, I would like to say something about the Apollo Applications program and particularly to try to answer where the Apollo Applications program merits your support at this time (ML 67-5971, fig. 34). I believe there are many reasons, but some of them are as follows: It will maintain the orderly pace of our progress in the space a~e at a time when there may be opportunities to move ahead of the Soviets in space achievement. It will guard against the possibility of technological surprise by supporting the continued advancement of an industrial technology. I think that both of these points were made in a different way by the Vice President-last evening. He did stress the importance to the Nation of a vigorous space program. It will maintain the forward momentum that space technology has given our competitive position in the world marketplace. It will support the broad base of research and development vital to our security as a nation. It will avoid the waste, the dissipation of space capability assembled in painstaking fashion over a period of a decade. It will hold open the opportunity t.o return direct benefits to man on earth in the next phase of space activity, maintaining the momentum achieved thus far. APOLLO SPACECRAFT PROCUREMENT STATUS AS OF FEB. 25, 1961 LONG BLOCK 1~~~LY IN FABRI - ORDERED BUT LEAD SPACECRAFT DESIGN- USED "~" CATION AND NOT YET IN PROCURE- TOTAL _________ ATION - COMPLETED ASSEMBLY FABRICATION MENT ____________ COMMAND BLOCK I 3 3 - - - 6 BLOCK I MODULE BLOCK II - 2 1 3 3 15 BLOCK II GRAND TOTAL=21 SERVICE BLOCKI 3. 3 - - - 6 BLOCK I MODULE BLOCK II - 2 1 3 3 15 BLOCK II GRAND TOTAL=21 MODULE 3 4 8 - GRAND TOTAL=15 NASA HQ MC67-5907 2-27-67 FIou1u1~32 PAGENO="0303" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 299 It will take advantage of the opportunities for expansion of knowl- edge when space-age technology shows promise of breaking through into an era of real discovery. I think most of the scientists who have been involved in our program in the Apollo Applications program are really looking forward to the fact that they ought to make dis- coveries that will be such that some of them will win Nobel Prizes. It will provide the means to meet the challenge of future in space at relatively modest cost. Our peak year was in fiscal 1966 when NASA expenditures totaled 0.83 percent of the gross national product. In the current fiscal year we are down to 0.73 percent and in the budget for fiscal 1968, the total would be only 0.67 of 1 percent. Finally, it will provide the capability to expand our space activity if the international situation should change. The resulting stabilizing benefits would be insured because this proposed program would keep the space team together and in a position to respond to economic de- velopments in the national scene. I have presented the program which resulted from the study effort authorized by this committee in fiscal year 1966. This careful plan- fling was further supported by this committee in fiscal 1967 when funds were authorized to keep the options open for one more year, and we are now asking you to exercise these options. The Apollo Applications funds you provided last year defined the follow-on effort to the Apollo program that resulted in an effective program to capital- ize on the investment this country has made in space. This program has been reviewed and endorsed by the Bureau of the Budget, the FIGURE 33 PAGENO="0304" 300 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION REASONS TO SUPPORT MANNED SPACE FLIGHT PROGRAM * MAINTAIN ORDERLY PACE OF OUR PROGRESS * GUARD AGAINST TECHNOLOGICAL "SURPRISE" * MAINTAIN COMPETITIVE POSITION IN THE WORLD MARKET PLACE * SUPPORT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT VITAL TO SECURITY * AVOID DISSIPATION OF SPACE CAPABILITY * HOLD OPPORTUNITY TO RETURN DIRECT BENEFITS TO MAN * TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXPANSION OF KNOWLEDGE * PROVIDE THE MEANS TO MEET THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE AT MODEST COST * PROVIDE THE CAPABILITY TO EXPAND OUR SPACE ACTIVITY IF INTERNATIONAL SITUATION SHOULD CHANGE NASA HQ MC67-5971 3-7-67 FIGURE 34 President's Science Advisory Committee, and the President. They recommend that we press onward in the investigation of man's role in space, the interrelationship between man and machine in space ex- ploration, scientific experimentation and operational systems. They recommend the Nation not be deprived of the ultimate benefits to mankind this capability offers. In this presentation in support of our budget request for fiscal year 1968, we are asking that you approve the continuance of our efforts toward these national objectives. Mr. TEAGUE. Any questions? Mr. GURNEY. Dr. Mueller, how are you handling the procurement for these? You mentioned you place orders for Saturn I-B hard- ware. Dr. MUELLER. That is correct. Mr. GURNEY. How have you handled this in view of the fact that we haven't authorized them yet? Dr. MUELLER. The funds were authorized for those on long-lead- time procurement in the fiscal 1967 budget. Mr. TEAGUE. $41.9 million. Dr. MUELLER. $41.9 million and those are the funds we are using. Mr. TEAGUE. Any questions? The committee will be adjourned until Monday at 10 a.m. (Whereupon, at 12 noon, the subcommittee adjourned to reconvene at 10a.m., Monday, March20, 1967.) PAGENO="0305" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MONDAY, MARCH 20, 1967 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, Wa.shington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, in room 2318, Rayburn House Office Building, at 10 a.m., Hon. Olin E. Teague (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. TEAGUE. The subcommittee will come to order. We will begin with advanced missions this morning. STATEMENT OP DR. GEORGE E. MUELLER, ASSOCIATE ADMINIS- TRATOR FOR MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, NASA; ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM L LILLY, DIRECTOR, MANI~ED SPACE PLIGHT PRO- GRAM CONTROL, NASA; CHARLES MATHEWS, DIRECTOR OP TEE SATURN APOLLO APPLICATIONS, NASA; ROBERT P. PREITAG, DIRECTOR, MSP, FIELD CENTER DEVELOPMENT, NASA; AND ED- WARD 2. GRAY, ADVANaED MANNED 3~ISSIONS PROGRAM DIRECTOR, NASA Dr. MUELLER. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. With your permission, I will talk about the advanced missions pro- grams and then go through the budget books for both the Apollo Applications and Advanced Missions. Mr. TEAGUE. Do I understand it will take you until about 11:20 on Advanced Missions? Dr. MUELLER. I would hope that we would be finished by then. I will move rapidly. Turning to the first chart (MT66-1O,256, fig. 1) we have developed over the past year using the funds provided by the committee, several baseline programs. What we have tried to do is to define the steps that are required to continue manned space exploration and manned space utilization. In the left-hand chart, you see the normal sequence of a development cycle. The developmeftt phase that we are in at the present time or that we are just entering on involves man's capa- bthties and requirements for operating in space. We are now going through the phase of just figuring out how man can survive and how he can be supported in space. We would expect, as the next major step in the manned part of this program, to begin the development of equipment and procedures for long duration manned research, flight, and operations. As we go 301 7e-265 0-67-pt. 2--20 PAGENO="0306" 302 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION further into the future, we eventually expect to begin to develop and improve equipment and procedures for Manned Space Flight. Now, in terms of a capability, this provides the development of the capability of staying for long periods of time in orbit so that we can measure the effects of the environment on man and also so we can develop the equipment to support him effectively for long periods of time. We will want to develop the equipment for continuous opera~ tions in space, first resupplied and then continuously operating on its own supplies so that we eventually reach the capability for inter- planetary travel. This baseline kind of advanced program is one of many that we have looked at and the dates here aren't necessarily any that would be met and, of course, the progress in this kind of a program depends upon the funding made available. Nevertheless, this is a baseline program that could be done providing it was found desirtble to pro ceed in this direction and providing resources could be made available. Another way of looking at it is shown in this chart (MC66~-5358A, fig 2) which is one that we have used in the past It represents a probable kind of a program evolution for manned spaced activities be ginning with Gemini and going through Apollo, to Apollo Apphca tions plus the experiments program All of which leads to the con clusion that the next major module that will probably be required on the next major development will be a manned space station A manned space station can, if the design constraints are proper from our studies, be designed so that it could be useful for a number of different end objectives. Because it is a major investment, it is prob- ably desirable to have as flexible a design as possible and this is the area in which our advanced missions program is working From MSF EVOLUTIONARY BASELINE SPACE PROGRAM (EXAMPLE) CY AN ND 70 71 72 73 74 75 CAPABILITY ENDAYS YD S LUNAR 180 DAYS AY SURF 240 DAYS 14 DAYS SN LAMAR SURF YR. IRESSPPL(DJ - CONTNNUOIIS METED- - - OPERATION RI SPACE RESAPPLED) LANETARY FURlS DYE- NOADSUPPLY - - MISSIONS RAW EARTH MAW STIED EARTHORMEY LUNAR EXPLORATION L SPACE STATISM L -~ EARTH MASS EXPLORATION RECONIENISSANC ORNTAL I TEXAS - TRIPUU FE-AllOT EXPLORATION - MARS! SENDS OPLORATION - MARS EXPLORATION )RECSNNAIS - ~ SUPPORTING PROGRAMS SURVEYOR/bRBITER MARINER VOYAGER PIONEER - . ~ RAD TION EXPERIMENTS METEOROID 5XPERIMENTS . - - - .----. ~ NCE) DEVELOPMENT PHASES I MANS CAPANETTIES I DEVELOPRENTOF ESUIPMENT I DEAELOPAND PROVE OPERATIONAL FLIOHTS MANS SURVIVAL j *110 REO'M'NTS FOR J AND PROCEDURES FOR JESUIPNENT & PROCEDURES PLANETARY EXPLORATION AND SUPPORT 1 EETENORD DURATION 1 LONE-DURATION MANNER RESEARCH T MANNED RESEARCH LOATH ORIENTED APPLISATIONS AND OPERATIONS CAPABILTY FIGuRE 1 PAGENO="0307" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 303 there we could go to manned planetary reconnaissance and finally to a manned planetary landing. That is the kind of evolutionary pro- gram that we have been studying. Next we have the manned earth orbital advanced studies. (MT66- 7996, fig. 3.) They have as primary objectives the development of earth orbital program planning ~dternatives to support the major ob- jectives of identifying the important manned earth orbital missions. They also explore systems concepts for these kinds of missions to evalu- ate and define logical program alternatives; to evaluate the supporting ferry, logistics and rescue concepts; and to identify such B. & D. technology and development that might be required to support these mission objectives. At the present time, we ha~e a fair knowledge of the space environ- ment (MC66-5361, fig. 4). We do have a considerable amount of Manned Space Flight experience. We have developed the basic tech- nology for operation of spacecraft and we have a large booster capa- bility that is coming into being, so that at the present time we have a space flight capability that is good enough for us to begin to define what man's capabilities are. This, of course, is the objective of the Apollo Applications program. From that experience and using this equipment, we expect to be able to define what man's usefulness will be in the future and how one needs to support him in order to make him most useful. Mr. DADDARIO. You will recall, Dr. Mueller, that during the course of the preliminary hearings before the full committee I asked you a question involved in. the PSAC report which although supporting manned activity in the future was somewhat critical of the way in which NASA had prepared itself for future activities. As I under- stood it the question was to the way you have come to judgment on nonmanned as against manned missions and the facts they believed MSF PROGRAM EVOLUTION LIMITED EXPANDED EXTENDED LUNAR LUNAR LUNAR EXPLORATION EXPLORATI ON EXPLORATION CA PA B IL IT IES GEMINI APOLLO APPLICATIONS + EXPERIMENTS STAUON PLANETARY LAND MG EXPERIMENTS EXPERIMENTS APPLICATIONS PLANETARY RESEARCH ~ INE.O. ~A~SIgiLITY EXPLORATION FACILITY & TECHNOLOGY REFUEUNG EXPER IMENTS NASA MCA6-5358-A 4-18-66 1~'iGURE 2 PAGENO="0308" 304 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MANNED EARTH ORBITAL ADVANCED STUDIES PRIMARY OBJECTIVES: DEVELOP EARTH ORBITAL PROGRAM PLANNING ALTERNATIVES TO SUPPORT MAJOR OBJECTIVES * ~ENTIFY IMPORTANT MANNED EARTH ORBITAL MISSIONS AND THEE PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS * EXPLORE ATTRACTIVE SYSTEMS CONCEPTS FOR ~ENTIFIED MISS~NS * EVALUATE LOGICAL PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES * EVALUATE SUPPORTING FERRY/LOGISTICS/RESCUE CONCEPTS AND EXPERIMENT MODULES * ~ENTIFY R&D TECHNOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS NASA HQ MT66-7996 12-30-66 FIGURE 3 FIGURE 4 PAGENO="0309" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 305 supported the idea that this was not properly synchronized. I re- ferred you exactly to the point in the PSAC report. I wonder if you might enlarge on that a bit since we didn't have an opportunity to do so at that time. Dr. MUELLER. I would be pleased to. I believe, you are referring to the passage on planetary exploration. Mr. DADDARIO. Yes, because you just touched that. I thought at this stage of the game that question would again be appropriate.. Dr. MUELLER. Let me say that the PSAC report, in general, has supported the immediate plans of NASA. I am thinking of the manned orbiting telescope work and the long duration flight activities. Mr. DADDARIO. Yes; there is no question about that. I agree with the idea that we ought to be involved with a man in these missions. I was concerned because they showed an agreement with that principle but concern about the way you had programed your plans for the future with some criticism about the lack of synchronizing the manned and unmanned missions. I recall that the major reason you could not make a decision at this time was because you did not have available to you the information which you would some year or two later as you develop activities of this kind. To make such decisions at this time would be, as I understand it, premature and might lead you to misjudgment. Dr. MUELLER. Precisely. The basic organizational structure of NASA has been set up to provide for coordination of our planning activities. The PSAC report reflects the fact that we have all agreed that we ought to go forward with Voyager at this point in time in order to provide for early information about the environment of first the near planets and then the far planets. At the same time we are continuing in our planning studies to examine alternatives between continued use of the Voyager and the use of a manned vehicle, first in a flyby mode and then eventually lead- ing to a manned landing. We have carried on a fairly extensive study effort in the past year in this area and that study effort has been quite well coordinated. We have some five or six coordinating panels in NASA. Mr. E. Z. Gray, is our representative. Mr. Cortright is the OSSA representative, Mr. Eggers is the representative of the OART. We do coordinate our planning. In order to have meaning- ful alternatives one has to define the alternatives and then examine the tradeoffs between one set of missions and another set of missions so we have a meaningful basis for judgment between the alternative of a manned flyby and an expanded Voyager program. This will enable us to understand what it costs and what can be gained from each one of these approaches. We are still at that point in time when we have to define these two approaches clearly and then make the tradeoffs. We do expect and plan to make those tradeoffs as our knowledge improves both as to what man's capabilities are and what his usefulness is as our studies define clearly just how to go about doing these very complex missions. They are very complex whether they happen to be manned or un- manned. I think that all of the groups that have been examining the future of manned space flight have concluded one thing. They are sure that man will eventually want to carry out planetary explora- tions for a number of reasons. Each group may have a different rea- PAGENO="0310" 306 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION son, but they all conclude that manned planetary exploration is a de sirable and necessary thing that man will do in the course of time With that as a basis then one needs to define a program that optimizes one's getting there You could make a different asumption and then you would have a different set of results Since there is almost universal agreement among those people that have examined the course of development that man will eventually be needed to explore the planets, then the question is what is the most economical way of arriving at that objective The other thing is to define what is possible and what is desirable Mr FULTON When you are taJking about planetary exploration, I have always been interested in the asteroid belt, which as you know, lies between Mars and Jupiter One of these asteroids is going to approach Earth very closely Why don't we try to see what it is going to be doing in the next couple of years, why don't we have an effort of this type in the program and see what an asteroid is g Dr. MUELLER. Dr. Newell has had under consideration probes to comets as they pass Earth in order to get som closeup views and some idea of their trail The asteroids are somewhat beyond Mars and tend to be in orbits that don't interest our orbit directly One of the interesting possibilities as well as problems of a Mars flyby, for example, is in coming past Mars you also come out in the asteroid belt before you return. You might not be able to avoid a major asteroid The advantage is that it gives you an opportunity for close and detailed observation of a number of asteroids as one spends some time out there. Mr. FTJLTON. With 50,000 asteroids strewn in your path, it would certainly be worthwhile for you to learn about them ahead of time. Dr. MUELLER. Yes, sir. Mr. FULPON. Secondly, when the Manned Space Flight Subcom- mittee flew in from Arizona we saw that tremendous crater where some sort of an asteroid hit So when I hear that within the next couple of years, there is a one chance in a billion that a particular asteroid will actually hit the Earth or go into orbit around us, I believe we ought to be looking into it. I don't want to be in the position of my great aunt living in Erie who was 80 years in age and was always freightened to death because Niagara Falls was going back 37 feet a year This particular asteroid may be too far out to be of danger. However, it would give us a chance to see what these asteroids are, particularly if we are going to Mars We might con ceivably acquire another moon in the next couple of years or might possibly be in the path of the asteroid Dr MUELL1~1R That is a possibility Mr. FULTON. So we may have to go up and hitch a~ rocket to it. Dr. MuELu~R. But it is, of course, fortunately an extremely remote possibility. Mr. FULTON. In astronomy, one chance in a billion isn't too remote. Dr. MUELLER. Turning to one of the major applications of Earth orbital applications, we have carried out some studies of optical tele scopes (MC6~-5366, fig 5) in Earth orbit and have looked at some comparisons between various kinds of telescopes (MC66-5597, fig 6) For example, the 200-inch Mount Palomar telescope has a resolution PAGENO="0311" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 307 w~*:c~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4 ~n ~t U ~ ~ ~ `~ ~ ~ ~ tsr f~ :a ~ ~ : ~ ~ $~ t~i IL ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 9 1 ~\ * ~ t~ k ~ ic~p ) ~ti nr JE ~ ~ `t~ ~ ~ : I ~ ~ ~ ir; ~ ~ \ ~ ~$$ ~ V ~$op~? ~ ~Ø A jt~1~ 14 jUg ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~1i* t~L3P5oSa:* $0 V$V ~jj ~;c'~~ ~Vc k *ANETS ~ Ni :i~ ~O:A ~ ~ ~ ~ Ic kwAL sit ~ r~ S V REQUIRED ~ n ~ ` ~ ~ ~ ~ a:~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~si ~ 7~sm tIc S ~ ~ ~.` I ~ iti~ ~~`/ z~WL ~ ~ t ~ ~f ~`11ç~V ~A ~ t=~ ~ ~ ~iL*~ *y~rSVV± IV : ~! ~ct ~ ~ JLBSI~ ~ FIGuRE 5 FIGURE 6 PAGENO="0312" 308 1 9 6 8 NASA AUTHORIZATION on the Moon of about three-tenths of a mile. A 16-inch telescope in orbit has about the same resolution. This is also true of Mars where we have about a 50-mile resolution. If you look at the im- provements achievable in orbit, you see that the 16-inch in orbit is about the same for Moon and Martian observations as that on the ground, but you get successively better resolution as you go to larger diameters. Finally, at 120-inch diameter, you get something like a 0.05 miles resolution on the Moon and something like 7 miles on Mars. With the 120-inch in orbit and perhaps even with the 60-inch in orbit, it might be possibleto detect planets, and other stars. One of the basic things that one can do in orbit that one can't do on Earth is to extend the spectral range of operation and extend the regions of the electro- magnetic spectrum over which one can observe. That is a unique characteristic of being in orbit. There are increased requirements in technology to reach these. One is developing the capability of pointing quite accurately. By the time one gets to a 120-inch telescope one has to have a stability of plus or minus .025 arc-seconds. The approximate weight of the telescopes increases as one goes up in size and the present estimates for the 120- inch telescope is that it might weigh as much as 30,000 pounds. Another area that we have looked at in terms of near Earth orbital operations is the way one might resupply or carry out periodic trips to space stations in orbit (MT65-9715, fig. 7) . We have looked at a :~ 4 ` &r ~ t ~ ~ ~ `~ ~ ~ ~ _t ~h ~ r~ I ~MODULt K ~ ~: t~ ~ ~kWJ~P~ c ~ r ~ %1O~U c : ~ ~ cP4ttW~ `~ ~ rrffi~S~s*1 4*Mi~W 4%ifl" ,s fl4t I I ~ ~ &~W*U~NSt ~ni~IEç fr~ p ~ j$~r ~4~a)t~4~; J~ I ~~ii1L ~ ;%M~~fl~u? ~ ; :Mr!f;:14&;%r?tr,fiO ~ 1% iOLa?,1wa~T ~;Waj, ~s Jrt.tStJflM ~4 - / v1~I S t PRIWULS$$ ~ a ~ - ~ SYN~H$$*$~ $1 svjuuw~ tIM ~a tnttnon u stx ~r~t ~ ~ : ;:~:`~;%~1/tc~4\ Y~/1~. / flouitz 7 PAGENO="0313" 1968 NASA AuTHORIZATION 309 range that starts with the Apolio Command Module and goes on to finally reaching something like a winged body spacecraft with an en- gine as you can see, on the far right, which is capable of flying. You will also find that there are various ways of carrying cargo and we have been examining these various means to try to find the most efficient way of carrying the cargo to orbit. We have also been looking at various propulsion modules. These are the kind of studies that lead us to an understanding that permits us to make sound decisions in times to come. Turning to the trend of the transportation systems (MT66-8032, fig. 8) that we will be using, we have been looking at various general kinds of vehicle concepts including such things as improving the pres- ent systems and then those systems where we can begin to reuse part of the system, beginning with the reusable spacecraft and then consider- ing some form of reusable booster systems. In this case the first stage is proposed as being reuseable time after time. Finally we are working toward a concept of fully reusable vehicle systems so that we would have a fully reusable launch vehicle and spacecraft. Mr. DADDARIO. In the area of manned Earth orbital telescope ac- tivity, Dr. Mueller, will you briefly sum up those members of the astro- nomical community who have advised you in this and supported this? Some of them have made the point that by spending less money on TRANSPORTATION TRENDS . EARTH TO ORBIT AND RETURN (MANNED PROGRAM SUPPORT I TIME PERIOD CURRENT INTERMEDIATE FUTURE . GENERALIZED VEHICLE CONCEPTS £ ~ U 1~ ~ EJ L~ L~\ L~\ OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES . EXPERIMENTAL SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENTS . EXPLORATORY SPACE PROGRAMS INITIAL SPACE SYSTEMS LOGISTIC SUPPORT * UPROVED OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY * GROWTH IN SPACE FUNCTIONAL CAPABN.ITY *INCREASED LOGISTICS TRAFFIC *NICREASED SPACE SYSTEMS CAPABILITY *REDUCED OPERATIONAL AND SUPPORT SYSTEMS COST *RBPROVED OPERATIONAL CNARACTERISTICS.NOMMAL AND CONTINGENCY DESIRED VEHICLE CHARACTERISTICS * EXPENDABLE LAUNCH AND SPACECRAFT VEHICLES `WATER RECOVERY OF SPACECRAFT FLEXIBLE MAN.RATED LAUNCH VEHICLE CAPABILITIES .REUSABLE ENTRY SPACECRAFT . ORBITAL MANEUVERING PROPULSION .NONNIAL LAND~RECOVERY OF SPACECRAFT *FULEY.REU$ABLE VEHICLE SYSTEMS E . EXPENDABLE UNIT R . REUSABLE UNIT NMAHQ MT~6-IO32 I2-3O~66 FIGURE 8 PAGENO="0314" 310 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Earth activities we could accomplish a great deal which is included in this kind of astronomical activity at what they consider to be a much greater cost. Dr. MUELLER. Of course we have the space-sciences groups who have reviewed our programs and have approved them as well as recom- mended them There is the Harvard observatory group There is a group at the University of California's Lick Observatory, just to name a few who have specifically looked at m'tnned orbital telescopes Mr. DADDARIO. We are curtailed for time. Might you be able to provide that for the record? Dr. MUELLER. I would be pleased to do that. The other point which I would like to make now is that there isn't a conflict between the re- sources used for ground based telescopes and those used for space telescopes. (The information requested follows ) SPACE SCIENCE BOARD The proposal for a 120 inch optical telescope was made by the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Science in its recommendations for Space Re- search Directson,s for the Future made as a result of the 1965 studies at Wood shole, Massachusetts. fThe particular astronomers associated with this recom- mendation were: Lyman Spitzer, Chairman, Princeton University Observatory. A. D. Code, Washburn Observatory, University of Wisconsin. L. W. Fredrick, Leander McCormick Observatory, University of Virginia. F J Low Lunar and Planetary Laboratory University of Arizona (until recently National Radio Astronomy Observatory) N. U. Mayall (Coordinator, Astronomy Working Groups), Ki'tt Peak Na- tional Observatory. A. B. Meinel, Steward Observatory, University of Arizona. Guido Munch, Mt. Wilson and Palomar Observatories. H. J. Smith, McDonald Observatory, University of Texas. W. G~ Tifft, Alternate, Steward Observatory, University of Arizona. F. L. Whipple, Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory. NASA has conducted an advanced study to examine the major technological implications of such an instrument when orbited in conjunction with a manned orbital facility (c.f. A System Study of a Manned Orbital Telescope. NAS 1-3968 The Boeing Company) The detailed characteristics of such a large tele scope in orbit are not defined now however as a result of our studies such a telescope appears feasible towards the end of the 1970 s PRESIDENP S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE (PSAC) The Space Science and Space Technology Panels of the President's Science Advisory Committee in the PSAC report `The Space Program in the Post Apollo Period" indicate that they, have "studied the Space Science Board recommenda- tions concerning earth orbital astronomy as well as other proposals that a major effort be concentrated on a very large orbiting telescope (of perhaps 120-inch aperture): While we feel that ultimately-perhaps in the late 1970's-the very large orbiting telescope will be feasible and may command a high priority, we believe that it would be a serious mistake to embark on this single objective now to the exclusion of a more evolutionary approach For scientific as well as technical reasons we urge an immediate start on simpler instruments which can more dramatically exploit the new access to unknown regions of the spectrum- such as X ray and gamma ray telescopes and relatively inexpensive submilli meter instruments In addition a reflecting telescope for the ultraviolet visible and infrared of 40-to-60-inch aperture ~hould be placed in orbit ait the earliest practical date if diffraction limited resolution can be obtained with available technology. The argument for this evolutionary approach follows directly from the great scientific impact which we expect these new facilities to have. If we are corect in this expectation, it is essential that the program be planned in such a way that the most expensive and ambitious instruments profit in their conception and design from the discoveries made using smaller ones which are more quickly PAGENO="0315" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 311 deployed. The possibilities' of large optical interferometers, X-ray telescopes, low-frequency teh~scopes, and other instruments never used on a large scale be- fore are such that it is unwise to attempt to predict at this time the nature of the highest priority large instrument for the program in the late 1970's". The membership of these panels is as follows: Dr. Franklin A. Long, Chairman, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. Dr. Lewis M. Branscom'b, Oo-~Chairman, Joint Institute for Laboratory Astro- physics, Boulder, Cob. Dr. William R. Adey, University of California, Los Angeles, Calif. Dr. Hendrick W. Bode, Bell Telephone Laboratories, Whippany, N.J. Dr. Robert W. Buchheim, The RAND Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. Dr. Melvin Calvin, University of California, Berkeley, Calif. Dr. Loren D. `Carlson, University of California, Davis, Calif. Dr. Joseph W. Chamberlain, Kitt Peak National Observatory, Tucson, Ariz. Mr. Allen F. Donovan, Aerospace Corp., Los Angeles, Calif. Dr. Howard W. Emmons, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. Dr. George Field, University of California, Berkeley, Calif. Dr. Herbert Friedman, U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C. Dr. Thomas Gold, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. Dr. Lester Lees, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, Calif. Dr. Gordon J. F. MacDonald, Institute for Defense Analyses, Arlington, Va. Dr. Frank T. McClure, Applied Physics Laboratory, Silver Spring, Md. Dr. Bruce Murray, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, Calif. Dr. Edward M. Purcell, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. Dr. J. Barkley Rower, Mathematics Research Center, Madison, Wis. Dr. Jack P. Ruina, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass. Dr. Martin J. Schwarzchilcl, Princeton University Observatory, Princeton, N.J. Dr. Irwin Shapiro, Lincoln Laboratories, Lexington, Mass. Dr. Nathan W. Snyder, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Ga. Dr. `Charles H. Townes, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass. The `recommendation of PSAO is consistent with the planning for Apollo Applications. The ATM is the first step in the evolutionary approach suggested by PSAC. In the Advanced Manned Missions Study area concept data is `being obtained for a comprehensive manned Astronomy/Astrophysics experiment pro- gram. This activity is described in the statement of work "Orbital Astronomy Support Facility" attached. NASA AD HOC ADVISORY COMMITTEE (RAMSEY COMMITTTE) `The following are the members of an ad hoc committee appointed by Mr. Webb in the `spring of 1966 and chaired by Professor Norman Ramsey who have advised and supported NASA in our planning on a variety `of `topics, including large astronomical `facilities in space: Dr. Norman F. Ramsey, Chairman, Harvard University. Dr. George W. Beadle, University of Chicago. Dr. Leo Goldberg, Harvard University. Dr. Jessee L. `Green's'tein, California Insti'tute of Technology. Dr. Harry H. Hess, Princeton University. Dr. Howard W. Johnson, Massachusette Institute of Technology. Dr. Gordon J. F. MacDonald, University of California at Los Angeles. Dr. Horace W. Magoun, University of California at Los Angeles. Dr. Nicholas U. Mayall, Kitt Peak National Observatory. Dr. Cohn S. Pittendrigh, Princeton University. Dr. Martin S'chwarzchild, Princeton University. Dr. Charles Townes, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dr. James A. Van Allen, Universi'ty of Iowa. Dr. Homer E. Newell (NASA Rep.), Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications. Dr. John E. Naugle (NASA Rep.), Deputy Associate Administrator for Space `Science and Applications (Sciences). Dr. Henry J. Smith (NASA Rep.), Deputy Director, Physics and Astronomy Programs, Office of Space Science and Applications. Mr. Robert J. Gutheim (NASA Rep.), Program Planning Officer, Office of Space- Science and Applications. PAGENO="0316" 312 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR MANNED SPACE FLIGHT (STAC) STAC in a letter to Mr. Webb of November 22, 1966 concerning NASA's pro- gram and planning for the coming years states that "while Eceptoration of the ~S~olar system should be a general and continuing goal of NASA, it does not en- compass all important missions. There are also a number of scientific experi- ments to be done in space which do not involve examination of the solar system or any astronomical object. From a scientific point of view, astronomical obser- vations of objects outside our own solar system from the vantage point of space vehicles, and hence without interference of the earth's atmosphere, represent one of the most rewarding applications of space technology, and should be an important and continuing part of the space effort." Also, it continues: "Major parts of the manned space effort which we envisage as a minimum reasonable program are as follows: 1. * * * 2. * * * 3. Manned space stations will be needed for a variety of purposes. By a space station we mean an earth satellite maintained in orbit over a period as long as about one year, and furnishing the necessities of life for man continuously or from time to time over a comparable period with the possibility of his doing use- ful work in orbit. Such a station will be needed to test man's ability to operate in space for the time periods required for interplanetary travel. In athiltion, use of a space station, at least on an intermittent basis, seems worthwhile for an orbiting astronomical observatory, for some other varieties of scientific ex- periments, and for engineering testing." Members of the STAC who signed the above letter are: Luis W. Alvarez, University of California, Berkeley, Calif. Stanley Bennett, University of Chicago. Francis H. Clauser, University of California, Santa Cruz, Calif. Lee A DuBridge, California Institute of Technology. Leo Goldberg, Harvard University. Gordon J. F. MacDonald, Institute of Defense Analyses, Arlington, Va. William G. Shephere, University of Minnesota. William B. Shockley, Stanford University. William H. Sweet, Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, Mass. Charles H. Townes, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. John R. Whinnery, University of `California, Berkeley, Calif. George D. Zuidema, Johns Hopkins Hospital, Baltimore, Md. Dr. MUELLER. The funding for ground based telescopes has tra- ditionally been supplied by the National Science Foundation. The need for ground based telescopes is one that is being met. It is not an area in which we attempt to make a judgment. We rather rely upon the advice of our scientific colleagues in that field to make these judgments. Mr. DADDARIO. This question having been put to you and having been examined, I believe it would be helpful if we could have that for the record. Mr. TEAGu1~. Yes. Dr. MUELLER. Thank you. We will be pleased to provide you with a detailed example of the kind of study we are doing in ad- vanced missions. (Information requested is as follows:) NASA is currently studying orbital astronomical support facility concepts in order to identify those that will allow us `to take advantage of the opportunities for astronomical observations outside the earth's atmosphere for the advance- ment of scientific knowledge. In defining these concepts we are examining the requirements for a broad program of observations, the potential instruments in- volved, flight missions and the interactions among these requirements. A copy of the work statement follows: PAGENO="0317" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 313 STATEMENT OF WORK: ORBITAL ASTRONOMY FACILITY, APRIL 4, 1966 ADVANCEI) SYSTEMS OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENP OPEEATIONS, GEORGE C. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT cENTER, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINIS- TRATION, I! UNTSVILLE, ALABAMA I. ~Scope This work statement covers a 9-month study to derive an Earth Orbital Astron- omy Support Facility concept that will enhance performance of a comprehen- sive, manned Astronomy/Astrophysics experiment program. The systems dis- cussed in this work statement do not necessarily represent approved programs and this study will not necessarily lead to hardward projects; however, the results will provide technical information upon which management decisions can be based. II. Baokgro~nd Advanced mission and systems studies to date have established that the national manned space flight capability can significantly enhance a broad pro- gram of space research and experimentation. Specific analyses have delineated the scope and nature of such a manned experiment program and have identified the potential contribution to be gained by use of Earth orbital research labora- tories in variou.s scientific/technical areas. Experimentation leading to the enlightenment and resolution of key scientific questions in Astronomy and Astrophysics is of major significance in the Earth orbital program in view of the unique opportunities for observations conducted from the vantage point of space. Earth-based observations are limited by atmos- pheric absorption of much of the electromagnetic spectrum; all but a few narrow bands in the visible, JR and radio regions of the spectra emitted by cosmic bodies are blocked and even in these narrow "windows" through the atmosphere, resolu- tion capability of existing equipment is impaired by atmospheric turbulence. From a space-based observatory, the astronomer may observe uninhibited the emissions of interest with optical, UV, radio, x-ray, and Gamma-ray telescopes, and will also have the unique opportunity to make simultaneous, correlated observations with different sensors. Utilization of an Earth orbital research facility for continued and coordinated intestigations into the fundamental ques~ tions of Astronomy/Astrophysics promises to increase by an order of magnitude man's knowledge and understanding of the universe. The virtual absence of gravity in orbit permits less massive telescope structures and promises pointing accuracies of 0.01-0.02 seconds. It is visualized that the Earth orbital facility will eventually attain the flexibility and multi-use that a ground facility would provide. Many separate and independent experiments and instri~mentation related to Astronomy/Astrophysics have been proposed, particularly for the Apollo Appli- cations Program. Studies have identified special areas of interest in this scien- tific discipline and have provided preliminary concepts of the instrumentation necessary to Investigate each. Building on these efforts, this study will analyze the needs of a comprehensive manned Astronomy/Astrophysics experiment pro- gram and will delineate specific concepts of an Orbital Astronomy Support Facility that enhances the program's potential value by capitalizing on man's participation. III. Objectives The objectives of this study are: 1. To develop a logical and evolutionary plan for Earth-orbital facilities for Astronomy/Astrophysics observations and to derive the criteria and direction for the conceptual design of an Orbital Astronomy Support Facility. 2. To develop system concepts for a flexible Orbital Astronomy Support Facility (ies) which fully exploits man's presence and participation and which enhances equipment simplicity and flexibility. 3. To define the capability of each facility concept to satisfy the needs of a comprehensive, manned Astronomy/Astrophysics experiment program and the manner in which the program's objectives can be pursued. IV. Guidelines The following guidelines are provided. Where warranted, the Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) may revise the guidelines during the course of the study. Additional information and guidance will be provided at the con- tractor orientation meeting and during the course of the study as required. PAGENO="0318" 314 . 1 9 6 8 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1. The single purpose of the Orbital Astronomy Support Facility (ies) is to capitalize on the established manned space flight capability in advancing the objectives of a comprehensive Astronomy/Astrophysics experiment program in Earth orbit. } 2. NASA will provide the contractor with manned Astronomy/Astrophysics experiment program planning documentation, and, to the extent available, with equipments/instruments and instrument packages identified as being required by these objectives and experiments This material will guide and aid the con tractor in establishing a suitable reference frame within which the Orbital Astron omy Support Facility (ies) concepts and configurations can be derived 3 To the extent that it is practical and desirable the facility concepts will utilize the spacecraft currently envisioned for the Apollo Applications Program (AAP) and the Manned Orbital Research Laboratory for housing the equip- ments/instruments. If for best overall results the OASF should be housed in a spacecraft different from those currently envisioned, the facility housing will be such that it will be capable of operating with the AAP or MORL during the time periods specified in paragraph IV-6 4 The facility concepts particularly those for the earlier time periods should allow for modular addition of equipment and accessories thus further enhancing the facility s flexibility This equipment may consist of items that become available after initial operation of the facility or items that may become neces- sary due to the refinements of experiments based on feedback from the initial phases of manned experimentation Maimed assembly calibration or modifi cation with subsequent unmanned periods of operation manned and unmanned data return crew rotation and resupply requirements shall be considered where appropriate in this study 5. The facility will capitalize on man's appropriate participation as a research and operator in the experiments observations assembly maintenance calibra tion, and other activities. 6. For initial guidance purposes the spacecraft to be assumed to be available for the Orbital Astronomy Support Facility, or for operation with it are: a. For 1969-70: Basic Apollo and AAP spacecraft including LEM labora- tory; Saturn S-IVB spent stage. b For 1972-74 Extended life Apollo CSM with laboratory module in adapter Saturn spent stages c For 1976-78 Manned Orbital Research Laboratory with Saturn spent stages 7 The facility concepts may include units that require several manned launches and/or unmanned launches The facility concepts will be compatible with the Saturn TB and Saturn V launch vehicles 8 Orbital characteristics to be considered should include those of greatest interest to the scientific community and are limited only by the Saturn lB and V capabilities launched from Cape Kennedy and man s presence during all or portions of the experimentation/observations 9. Emergency escape is to be provided at all times for all personnel. 10 Results of current research projects data of existing equipment/instru ments and those under development will be used wherever possible. Possible use of existing ground based instrumentation and equipment that could be modified for space operations should be considered. In particular, for the 1969-70 time period, the optical telescope available is expected to be an adapted and modified 38-inch diameter (IEP type telescope. For 1972-74, the optical telescope is expected to be a minimum of 40-inches In dameter with technology moving towards 00-inches. For 1976-78, the minimum diameter is expected to be 60-inches with technology moving towards the 120-inches diameter telescope. 11. Use shall be made of ground tracking, instrumentation, and data acquisi- tion facilities currently planned or being developed. 12. The National Acaçlemy of Sciences' 1965 Woods Hole summer study shall be considered a major source of astronomical ideas and "directions for the future" in space astronomy research. 13. The contractor will consider and build upon the results of previous studies, particularly the analysis of the~ scientific goals of Astronomy/Astrophysics, and the assessment of equipment requirements and their adaptation to space-borne experimentation These studies include but are not limited~ to the Douglas MORL Study (NAS1-3612) the Boeing Manned Orbital Telescope Study (NAS1-3968) the IBM study of the ORL Experiment Program (NASw-1084 PAGENO="0319" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 315 and NASw-1215), the Kolisman study of adapting the GEP-38" telescope to lunar surface missions (NAS8-20132) and the North American Aviation study of radio astronomy experiments on the lunar surface (NAS8-20198). Portions of this documentation are required during the course of this study but are not required in preparation of the contract proposaL 14. Spacecraft and launch vehicle performance and schedules will be made available by NASA as well as data from other appropriate NASA studies and facility and equipment development funding guidelines. 15. Dimensionless parameters shall be used wherever practical and appropri- ate. The "International System of Units (SI)" shall be used in addition to the "English Gravitational System" in final presentations and reports, where appropriate. 16. The division of effort `of this study will be approximately as follows: ~ask A: 10 to 15%. Task B: 20 to 25%. Task C: 60 to 70%. V. Contractor's tasks The objectives of this study are to be achieved by proceeding sequentially from the requirements of a comprehensive Astronomy/Astrophysics' program to the development and systems analysis of manned astronomy support facility concepts. This study will consist of three distinct tasi~s: Task A: Astronoy/Astrophysics Ecoperiment Program Baseline and Associ- ated Equipment and Mission 1?equirements.-It is the purpose of Task A to provide an updated, comprehensive Astronomy/Astrophysics research program baseline with correlated scientific objectives and requirements. The general criteria, direction and guidance for developing the subsequent analysis will be based on the results of this task. 1. The contractor will review, refine, and fill-in, to the extent required by this study, the NASA provided time-phased research objectives, experiments and requirements of the manned Astronomy/Astrophysics experiment program. Thus, the contractor will establish an up-dated baseline' program and reference frame for the study. In this review and refinement the con:tractor will not limit his time frame to the 1969-78 time period and will pay particular atten- `tion to the interrelations'hips among objectives and among experiments. The program baseline will be submitted to NASA for review and approval. The Work Statement Addendum, which is a general discussion of an overall astron- omy program, is provided to help outline the astronomy program scope for contractor consideration. 2. The contractor will Identify and relate to the Astronomy/Astrophysics objectives the equipment requirements needed to conduct the research program. 3. Further, the contractor will review, analyze and define the types' of mis- sions, including orbital parameters and duration, which are required or desired for conducting the observations of the Astronomy/Astrophysics research program. Task B: Establishment of Equipment Meeting Astronomy Program Objec- tives.-Phe purpose of this task is to identify equipment capabilities and avail- abilities as a function of time that can meet the needs of the Astronomy/Astro- physics Research program. 1. The contractor will analyze the equipment requirements established in Task A and assess the commonality among the requirements of the various program objectives and time-ordered activities. 2. The contractor will review the basic instrumentation and equipment pack- ages provided by NASA and those developed by other NASA studies, specifically under the IBM Experiment Program `and Boeing MOP studies. Furthermore, the contractor will relate the instruments/instrument packages to the common requirements; he will assess the adequacy o'f these instruments/instrument packages and identify additional instruments that are required by the program. 3. The contractor will assess equipment designs, providing conceptual designs where they are not available and establish as a function of time, considering the three time periods indicated in IV-6, the equipment that best meets the re- quirements of the program objectives and specific experiments. The contractor will especially assess the advantages to be gained in equipment simplicity by man's participation in the erection, operation and servicing of the specific equip- ments/instruments. PAGENO="0320" 316 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 4. The contractor will delineate the requirements of the major equipments, including operating regimes, stabilization, fine guidance, isolation, work space, photographic and data recording and other ancillary equipment. 5. The contractor will establish development times and order of magnitude costs. The costing should be done only to the level possible on the basis of engi- neering estimates, not detailed cost accounting techniques. Task C: Development of an Orbital Astronomy Support Concept-It is the purpose of this task to establish specific orbital astronomy support facility con- cepts that best satisfy the Astronomy/Astrophysics program objectives in the given time periods (indicated in paragraph IV-6). The overview purpose of this task is to define a logical evolutionary plan of Earth orbital facilities and capabilities to satisfy Astronomy/Astrophysics program objectives. The impact on the astronomy equipment/instrumentation requirements will be assessed when they are made to operate within specific spacecraft and in conjunction with the spacecraft indicated in paragraph IV-6. It is also the purpose of Task C to consider and analyze the operational interfaces and relationships of the instru- mentation, related equipment and total operations in conjunction with specific spacecraft and launch vehicles. 1. The contractor will delineate, using the results established in Tasks A and B, specific facility concepts for the time periods indicated in IV-6. These con- cepts will be so structured that they satisfy the Astronomy/Astrophysics program objectives, the requirements imposed by the equipments, their operation and their integration including peripheral equipment, combined operation, crew/time al- location and work space requirements. Each concept will include the capability to be shut down in orbit and then reactivated at a later date by man. 2. The contractor will determine the effects on the spacecraft and launch sys- tems of the Astronomy/Astrophysics equipment and instrumentation. Specifi- cally, the contractor will consider the systems indicated in paragraph IV-6. 3. The contractor will recommend specific configurations of the Astron- omy/Astrophysics facility after analyzing and selecting the basic operations modes. The modes of operations could be, but is not restricted to: a. The facility(ies) being docked and permanently coupled to an AAP or MORL or spent stage spacecraft. b. The facllity(ies) coupled to the specific spacecraft for experiment set- up but decoupled operation. c. The facility(ies) and the specific spacecraft completely decoupled. 4. The contractor will perform and analyze the trade-offs in integrating the instrumentation with the facility. This will include attitude control and stabi- lization distribution considerations among the equipments, the facility(ies), and the spacecraft with which the facility may be operating; power source; altitude of operation; and thermal/visibility problems. 5. The contractor will perform conceptual designs of the facility concepts finally selected for the time periods as indicated in IV-6. The designs should give sufficient detail to show how they respond to the requirements of the Astron- omy/Astrophysics program and how and over what time period they help to accomplish the objectives. VI. E~vpected results This study will include, but will not necessarily be limited to, the following results: 1. An updated, comprehensive Astronomy/Astrophysics research program baseline with time-ordered Astronomy/Astrophysics objectives and experiments. 2. Determination of the relative effectiveness of each type of scientific equip- ment in contributing to the program objectives, presented within a meaningful and easily read format showing the relationship of Astronomy/Astrophysics pro- gram objectives and the required scientific equipment/instrumentation. 3. Definition for each major Astronomy/Astrophysics program objective and for each associated major scientific equipment the following: a. Technology Requirements: technology advancement, experimental veri- fication, prerequisite ground-based research and necessary flight testing. b. Mission Requirements: preferred orbital characteristics, duration and number of missions (consistent with the time frame of interest), crew par- ticipation and size, specialized crew training, logistic support. c. Operational Requirements: operational development, ground facility support, data management, launch support. PAGENO="0321" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 317 d. System and Subsystem Requirements: volume, weight, controlling dimensions; power, environment control; stabilization control and accuracy; special handling; reliability and accuracy. 4. Development of a time ordered sequence for each major scientific instru- ment shown to be required with consideration of technology advancement re- quirements, funding development periods and prerequisite accomplishments. 5. Identification and assessment of the applicability of adapting present-day ground equipment and instrumentation for use in an Orbital Astronomy Support Facility. 6. Specification of the appropriate combination of scientific equipment that best satisfy the Astronomy/Astrophysics program objectives into three facility concepts. 7. Recommend configurations of the OASF for the time periods indicated in JV-6 that can operate with specific spacecraft, and assess the capability of each configuration for conduct of the Astronomy/Astrophysics program. VII. Period of performance and reviews A. Period of Performance.-All work required herein shall be completed within nine (9) months from date of contract. B. Reviews.-1. The contractor shall visit MSFC, before beginning work, to discuss details of the work to be accomplished and the contractor's method of approach. 2. At the completion of approximately one-third of the contract period, the contractor shall give a presentation (at a location to be determined) on the work completed, and the work remaining, including the planned approach to be taken. Special emphasis should be placed on the work to be accomplished during the next reporting period. The purpose of this presentation is to inform MSFC personnel of the work being done by the contractor and to allow MSFC to com- ment on the approach being taken to insure that the desired results will be obtained. 3. At the completion of approximately two-thirds of the contract period, the contractor shall give a presentation (at a location to be determined) on the work accomplished, work remaining, and approach to be taken for the remainder of the study. 4. The contractor shall make final presentations at MSFC and NASA Head- quarters at the completion of the study on dates agreed upon by MSFO and the contractor. These briefings will outline all work accomplished during the con- tract period, giving the study results and conclusions, as well as recommendations for further study. VIII. Reports and `cisual aids A. Reports Required.-1. The contractor will prepare a study plan developing in further detail the sequence of investigation to be conducted during the study. Bach major step defined in this more detailed sequence will include objectives, expected results, approach to the solution, allocated man-hours, and data required from other sources. After approval of this plan by the COR, detailed analysis may begin. 2. Upon completion of the study, the contractor shall prepare and distribute, in accordance with a distribution list to be furnished by the COR, approximately 100 copies of the final report. This report shall consist of a minimum of two volumes: a "summary technical reports" limited to 20 pages and a "detailed technical report." The length of the detailed technical report should be propor- tional to the complexity of the study. The report should be comprehensive, i.e., include all significant data, but should also be concise. Include only significant and useful Information; e.g., working papers, detailed calculations, etc., should not be reproduced in the report. This does not preclude referencing significant supporting data. Illustrations should be reduced as much as possible without sacrificing clarity and should be integrated into the text. 3. Upon completion of the study, the contractor shall prepare and distribute, in accordance with a distribution list to be furnished by the COR, approximately 100 copies of a "research and technology implications report" limited to 20 pages. It shall include a brief summary of the study covering the objectives and results. This report shall reflect the contractor's concerted effort to delineate those areas of research and technology wherein further efforts would be desirable based on 76-2~5 O-~67---pt. 2--ui PAGENO="0322" 318 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION the results of the study. The recommendations should be listed in the following categories, where appropriate: a. Instrumentation b Biotechnology and Human Research c. Electronics and Control d. Materials and Structures 4. At the time of each presentation, the contractor shall deliver to MSFC 50 copies of a brochure containing reproductions of the slides or charts used in the briefing, supported by a short description on the facing page. B. Reports Approval Requirements.-1. The contractor shall submit a detailed outline of each volume of the final report to the COR for approval prior to a preparation of the report. 2. Before final publication, draft copies of each volume of the final report shall be submitted to the COR for review and approval. The number of draft copies required shall be determined by the COR. C. Printing Requirements.-1. The requirements outlined in paragraph 35 of Government Printing and Binding Regulations, Joint Committee on Printing, i~ongress of the United States April 1 1964 concerning contract printing are waived in accordance with the Committee s Authorization No 21985 2 Printing of reports resulting from this study shall be in accordance with the following general specifications: a. Method of Reproduction-offset; b. Finished Size-81/2" x 11"; c. Paper-60-litho cover stock; d. Pages will be printed on both sides, blank pages will be avoided when possible; e. Oversize pages will be avoided when possible, but if necessary will be folded to 81/2'? xli": f. Additional color shall be used only upon prior approval by the COR; g. Binding shall be the most economical method commensurate with the size of the publication and its intended use 3. The cost of printing the final reports shall be a line entry on the financial reports (NASA Form 533). The cost includes composition, platemaking, press- work and binding Composition includes typesetting or final copy preparation by any method used as a substitute for typesetting D. Visual Aids Required.-The contractor shall deliver to MSFC two sets and one set to NASA Headquarters (MTE) of 2" x 2" slides of all charts used in the final presentation and one set for the mid-term presentation. The slide mounts shall not be more than %2" thick. IX. Program management A. Technical.-1. This contract will be administered and monitored by Mar- shall Space Flight Center (MSFC) of the NASA The MSFC will monitor all technical activities of the contractor, provi&~éthnical direction and coordination and expedite the resolution of problem areas. The scope of the task requires that a number of NASA centers, contractors, and other organizations be involved in its implementation. The MSFC will be the focal point for this coordination activity. 2. The contractor shall assign a competent study program manager, free of other responsibilities, and staff to provide maximum continuity to the study effort. 3 The COR and other NASA representatives will visit the contractor s facility periodically to evaluate technical progress. The COR may also call periodic meetings to resolve problems when required. 4. During the performance of the study, the Contracting Officer or his author- ized representative may redirect the study as required for maximum benefit to NASA. 5. It will be necessary for the contractor to coordinate the exchange and integration of all pertinent information with other NASA elements, other Gov- ernment agencies, and contractors performing on studies or programs that are in progress or that may be initiated during the life of this contract. This in- tegration and and coordination activity will be as specified by the Contracting Officer or his authorized representative, and will include reports, both written and oral, presentations conferences, and special meetings. PAGENO="0323" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 319 B. Adnvinistrative.-Th.e contractor shall submit to the Contracting Officer and to the COR financial data on NASA Form 533 (Five (5) copies) monthly, on or before the 15th day of the month succeeding the period covered by the report. The line entries for subdivisions of work and elements of cost to be reported shall be determined by MSFC. Separate curves, showing programmed man-hours vs. actual manhours expended, and programmed dollars vs actual dollars expended, shall be submitted on or before the 15th day of the month succeeding the period covered by the report. These curves will be forwarded directly to the COR and prepared in accordance with his instructions. WORK STATEMENT ADDENDUM-ORBITAL ASTRONOMY/ASTROPHYsICS, APRIL 4, 1966 A BROAD REVIEW OF AREAS TO BE CONSIDERED Introduction Advanced mission and system studies to date have established that the national manned space flight capability can significantly enhance a broad program of space research and experimentation in various scientific/technical areas. Space astronomy/astrophysics is one of the areas being pursued. The Orbiting Solar Observatory was the first true spaceborne astronomical observatory. Information gathered by this observatory indicates that continued studies with more ad- vanced orbiting laboratories could contribute much more significant data and further enhance advancement in space sciences. For example, the ultraviolet solar spectrum has only been partially studied. Research in space would allow full utilization of the light gathering and resolving power of sensing instruments in virtually all spectral regions. By fully exploiting the capabilities of even the current instrumentation we would be able, for example, to separate into componets close binary systems, to obtain more accurate parallaxes and proper motions (much wanted for the sub-dwarf, white dwarf, and SS Cygni stars), and to obtain more planetary details. Space astronomy/astrophysics experimentation will bring a broad perspective to re- search in various aspects of the knowledge which is needed for the understanding of the universe. Astronomy/Astrophysics is concerned with the understanding of the nature and evolution of the universe. Among the outstanding problems of current inter- est we may mention the angular dimensions of the quasi-stellar radio sources or quasars the structure of the nuclei of galaxies, the resolution of galaxies into starts to refine the distance scale, the study of the faint end of the population of clusters of galaxies and stars the source and acceleration of cosmic rays, and the mechanisms of energy generation. Structured key questions in the area of Astronomy/Astrophysics have been generated in the study of ORL Experiment Program (NASw-1084 and NASw- 1215) by IBM. The number of important astronomical problems requiring the highest achiev- able resolution in space is very large. Indeed, every one of the outstanding astronomical problems of our time requires high resolution for further under- standing. Celestial objects The following section reviews some of the main categories of celestial objects, and to point out what yet needs to be observed to find the answers to the key questions and to extend our knowledge of the universe. The following identified objects should not be considered to be all Inclusive and should be used only as a guide. Solar system 1. All Planets: Of top priority Is high resolution direct photography and spectrophotometry of all objects in the solar system, including the Sun, its corona, the Earth and its suspected cometary tail, planetary aurora, comets and astronomy of other possible planetary systems. 2. Earth: It is of importance to determine more accurately the shape of the Earth's gravitational field, its "pear shape", plus higher harmonics, from accurate tracking of Orbiting Geophysical Observatories (OGO). An Earth orbiting satellite equipped with a precision gyroscope to measure relativistic geodetic effect and the precession resulting from Earth's rotation. A very accurate Earth orbiting satellite could be used for the determination of ephemeris time PAGENO="0324" 320 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION (or gravitational time) to be compared with atomic time at two different epochs. It is of cosmological interest to know whether the ratio of these two kinds of time varies from epoch to epoch. This requires tracking of the satellite to O".l or better. 8. Moon: It is desired to do high resolution mapping of the Moon in the IJV, visual, and IR in various wave bands. 4. Mars: All types of observations of Mars are needed to prepare for unmanned exploration as recommended by the National Academy of Sciences. The un- manned exploration would in turn prepare for manned exploration. Most es- pecially needed is a better knowledge of the Martian atmosphere for the design of spacecraft. Observations in the UV, visual, IR, radio wavelengths, together with the use of radar is required. 5. Venus: Needed are sub-millimeter measurement of the continuum radiation for the selection of suitable models of surface and atmosphere. 6. Jup'it~r and other large planets: Radio observations of the larger planets, especially on either side of the radio window, will provide information leading to an improved knowledge of their magnetic fields, Van Allen Belts, internal structure (core and upper layers). Measurements of total heat flux are needed. A determination of the abundance of D, He8, Li7 relative to H and He would aid in unraveling the physical processes on Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, and Neptune. 7. Sun: In addition to high resolution photography and spectrophotometry, radio observations of the solar corona and interplanetary plasma are needed. stars 1. Bright Stars: Observations of luminosity and spectral energy distribution over the complete range of wavelengths for a comparison with Planck and other theories is needed for an understanding of stellar structure and stellar evaluation. The Hertzsprung-Russell relation (spectral-luminosity function), should be ex- tended into the UV and IR (and perhaps X-ray region) for much wider range in stellar temperatures. High resolution spectrophotometry should be carried out for all wavelengths for better understanding of stellar atmosphere and ultimately the dynamic of stellar evolution and abundance analyses. This will lead into the nature of stellar chromospheres and coronas, Direct photography will result in the improvement of stellar paralaxes; if ever this can be done at great distances from the Sun, the larger base-line will produce even more improvement. 2. Faint Stars: Broad band filter photometry and low dispersion spectroscopy of fainter stars, especially those of large proper motion, will statistically augment the program outlined in the first paragraph; the sampling in this case will largely be in favor of the cool stars. But also to be included will be the more distant hot stars (blue and UV). Direct photography (including the use of filters) will ultimately result in a revised "Palomar-National Geographic Sky Survey." Ac- curate determination of astrometric coordinates of most stars clown to a selected magnitude would then result in a new general catalogue of star positions unaffected by atmospheric refraction, and includes accurate proper motions. 3. Binary Stars: Observations from beyond the atmosphere will especially in- clude those binary stars whose spectra are difficult to separate in the visible region. This will expand our knowledge of the masses of stars and other dynamic properties of binary systems. Search for close companions is of importance. 4. X-ray Stars: The existence of X-ray `stars (i.e., point sources) is yet to be proved. The only X-ray source identified with an optical source is the Crab Nebula; it appears to be an extended X-ray source. Improved large equipment (by collimation directed equipment, and by focusing with grazing-incidence optics) needs development. Perhaps the most accurate coordinates of X-ray sources can be obtained on the lunar surface from occultations by lunar moun- tains. This should bring about refinements of "neutron star" theory, and per- haps the theory of proto stars, and wherein non-thermal effects play a role. 5. Gamma-Ray Stars: This might be considered an extension of the X-ray observations noted in the preceding paragraph. To date no isolated sources, point or extended, have been identified. Large-area spark chambers, geiger counters, and other special devices have yet to be fully developed. Longer wave- lengths and cosmic rays must be eliminated by filters and anti-coincidence equipment. 6. Special Stars: Rqdio observations of stars at either side of the radio window for thermal and non-thermal effects are needed for flare stars, variable stars, and peculiar stars as well as a number of those noted above. Incipient planetary nebulae and old novae should be given attention. PAGENO="0325" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 321 Our GaZa~ry, its structure, interstellar matter 1. Survey of Galactic regions, its gaseous nebulae and clusters, with high- resolution diffraction-limited optics. Fainter objects and more detail. Detailed observations in all wavelengths are of great interest. JR studies of central re- gions, for extinction and distribution of hydrogen. Abundances of other ele- ments relative to H; e.g., C, N, 0. Also emission in UV, especially in Lyman alpha. How much emission is thermal and how much non-thermal. IR for total extinction, UV for size distribution. 2. Special attention to Galactic center, photos of filamentary structure, deter- mination of motions of gasses_turbulent and systematic. 3. Distribution of gas and dust. Magnetic fields (from polarization measures) associated with interstellar material, because of theoretical implications with regard to cosmic ray accelerations. Observations of Interstellar absorption lines in ultra spectra of distant stars. Primary source of excitation of emission nebulae thought to be Lyman alpha `and other lines in series. 4. $upernovae and their remnants, include X-ray observations, and UV ob- servations, and gamma ray observations if latter sensors can be pointed with sufficient accuracy. 5. A sky survey in X-radia:tion and gamma-radiation at many wavelengths is needed to determine sky background and discrete sources, and their diameters. Until now, the gamma radiation appears to be all due to background. Only about 10 X-ray sources are known, and only one of these (Crab Nebula) has identified with `an optical object and is not a point source. Only imaging has been done on Sun: first with a pin-hole device, later with grazing incidence optics. For objects fainter than the Sun, collimating systems may be required in order that very large collecting areas are possible. 6. Large orbiting radio antennas may be needed for exploring the Galactic center `and `arms of the Galaxy, in wavelengths on either side of the radio win- dow. The longer wavelengths (longer than optical) penetrate absorbing features more easily than shorter wavelengths. Galaccies and Intergalactic space 1. Direct high-resolution photographs and spectrophotometric observations of the nearer galaxies, together with polarization measures will give improved knowledge of the largest groupings of stars and gas clouds. This will include radio observations and X-ray source observations. Galactic nuclei deserve spe- cial attention since there Is evidence of ejection of large gaseous masses. With high resolution (e.g., 0'.'l, 0~01'.' or better) It will be possible to identify much smaller components of galaxies, including brighter stars, star clusters, gaseous nebulae, and filaments for many more nearby galaxies than the dozen or so now studied in detail from ground observations. Some of these special features should be easier to detect against a blacker sky-beyond the airglow of the atmosphere. 2. Distance criteria for nearer and more distant galaxies will improve the Hubble velocity-distance relation (or redshift versus magnitude). This in turn should lead to the selection of cosmological model (s) of the universe, and more rea:sonable explanations of the apparent expansion of the universe of galaxies. Is there a relation between a "neutron star" `as proposed by theory), and an "X-ray star" (also theoretical, and perhaps yet observable), and the QUASAR (observed as a "radio star" `and photographed as a bright star-like object)? Observations of these objects outside the Earth's atmosphere, together with the efforts of the theorists may shed light on this question. 3. Observations of the most distant objects, such as the galaxies themselves, and the QUASARS (quasi stellar radio sources) may indicate important dif- ferences between the universe as it is now, and as it was, say, 5 to 10 billion years ago. It is important to correlate energy received from. the galaxies in wavelengths observable outside the `atmosphere with energy received at the Earth's surface through the optical and radio windows. Will there be found good evidence of aging of galaxies the farther out one observes? (i.e., Are distant galaxies appreciably younger, or at least, different from nearer galaxies?) 4. Quasi stellar galaxies (QSG) emit excessive `amounts of light In the ultra- violet range and not radio detectable as sources. Although only `a few of them have been studied, they appear to be much more plentiful than quasars. Further discovery and study of these QSG's will provide much more information for studying the outer limits of the universe. PAGENO="0326" 322 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MAN IN SPACE An Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) will point telescope up to 3 meters in length ait the Sun with a precision of about 5 sec of arc In some experiments astronomers will need to achieve a resolution of 1 sec of arc, and eventually 0'.'l' O'.'O'.' or better. Not only must telescopes be pointed with that precision, but more significantly, considerably larger telescopes are required, as well as corre- sponding refinement of component specifications, alignment, etc. Two consequen- ces of this desired high resolution performance of space telescopes are of special importance to the question of man's potential role. First, the data collection rate of large telescopes may be greater than that of small telescopes. Second, those telescopes and their accessories must be specialized as to functions wavelength of operation etc so that versatility is achieved only by major subsystem inter change or adjustment All of these factors must be considered as part of the question of man s usefulness in performing astronomical observations from a satellite. It is clear that men can perform many useful functions in connection with the assembly and operation of large instruments in space. Perhaps other advantages of manned operation will appear as man gains experience in space work. In the operation of large telescopes, man has several potential functions. First, he can perform major configuration changes-for example, converting a spectrograph into a spectrohehograph altering the ~ avelength setting of a solar monochroma (or inter changing gratings of different rulings etc During individual obser vaitional projects, man provides the ability to perform rapid analysis of the out- put data in order to modify the subsequent observations. An example would be to monitor an active region and to start a series of high rate spectral or cine observations at the inception of a flare Automatic equipment to do the iob accurately and reliably probably cannot compete with human judgment, since the complex activities of time correlation, field search and event localization, and very sensitive threshold judgments must be made simultaneously, and both ac- curately and quickly sometimes under conditions of low signal-to-noise ratio. SPACE OBSERVATIONS AND SENSING As a matter of convemence ofttimes dictated by the types of detection equip- ment employed it might be well to divide the total electromagnetic spectrum into a number of wavelength intervals IThe names of these intervals as tabulated below, are generally accepted; the boundaries of these intervals, however, vary from one investigation to another If man s environmental and biological history had been quite different perhaps wavelength intervals of a completely different character would have resulted. 1. Gamma Rays Shorter than 1.0 A 2. X-rays 1.0 A to 100A 3. Ultra-Violet (UV) 100A to 3000A 4. Visible 3000A to 7000A or 0.3~i to 0.7k 5. Infrared (IR) 0.7 to 100 6. Microwave 100 to 10,000 or 0.01 cm to 1.0 cm 7 Radio 10 m to 100 km and greater 8 Radio Window 01 cm to 10 m All except the visible range of wavelengths correspond to five oi more octaves of frequencies The amount of light which we see through the Earth a atmos phere covers a little bit more than one octave of the electromagnetic spectrum. When we add the narrower slots in the optical window and the somewhat larger radio window, the coverage from the ground still does not cover some very im- portant regions of the total spectrum which NASA should cover in order to ob- tain a satisfactory knowledge of the universe. ~Phe series of spectrum wavelengths, then, gives us one of the important param- eters for making observations' in outer space, and beyond the turbulent and ab- sorbing layers of `the Earth's blanketing atmosphere. Another parameter is the intensity of this radiation and another is its variation with time for particular coordinates. Inasmuch as it is, perhaps, an impossible task to cover each and PAGENO="0327" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 323 every coordinate in the sky to the nearest 0'.' or 0'.'OOOl, the astronomer con- centrates on special astronautical objectives of particular interest. The pa- rameters of importance, then, are: 1. Celestial object: spherical coordinates, distance. 2. Intensity of radiation, polarization. 3. Wavelength. 4. Time, date. The amount of accurate data for each of these parameters, of course, varies with the type of sensing and recording. For example, a direct photograph of a portion of the sky normally covers only a very narrow range of wavelength and time; however, properly interpreted the Intensity date is very good for a very wide range of spherical coordinates. A spectrophotometric scanning device, on the other hand, gives excellent and detailed intensity data for many wavelengths; butt generally applies to a particular set of coordinates for a particular instant of time. The problem of the astronomer is to obtain all the data for all time (or a reasonable fraction of this), and to interpret these data according to pres- ently known physical laws, and to theorize how these laws can best be modified and extended. Dr. MUELLER. We assume that first of all the Voyager program is going to go forward and now we are looking at what comes after the initial Voyager flights. We looked at a specific mission in some de- tail and the objectives of this particular mission (MT66-1O,201, fig. 9) of manned Mars-Venus reconnaissance would be the return of a Mar- tian or a Venusian surface sample. Another objective would be reconnaissance and mapping of Mars and Venus. It would make OBJECTIVES OF MANNED MARS/VENUS RECONNAISANC E * RETURN OF MARTIAN SURFACE SAMPLE * RECONNAISSANCE AND MAPPING OF MARS AND VENUS * ASTRONOMICAL OBSERVATIONS OF THE PLANETS,SUN AND OTHER BODIES * MANNED PLANETARY SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT AND PROOF TESTING * MANNED PLANETARY OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE * UTILIZATION OF PRESENTLY EVOLVING TECHNOLOGY TO EMBARK ON MANNED PLANETARY EXPLORATION * ACQUIRE ENGINEERBIG DESIGN INPUT DATA FOR APPLICATION TO FUTURE SYSTEMS * ENHANCEMENT OF NATIONAL PRESTIGE NASA HQ MT66-1O,201 12-30-66 Fionim 9 PAGENO="0328" 324 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION astronomical observations of the planets, Sun, and other bodies while in transit. It would look at the development and proof testing of manned planetary systems. It would give us some experience on manned planetary operations. It would utilize our presently evolving tech- nolo~y to embark on early manned planetary exploration. It would acquire engineering design input data for application to future sys- tems, and it would provide enhancement of our national prestige. Mr. FULTON. On Mars and Venus it would give you two reference points in which to determine the effect of the Sun and Earth, so that you would then have some method of calculating other than just have one reference point when we are on the Earth? Dr. MUELLER. That is correct. Mr. FULTON. It would have an application to better life on Earth and possibly better man's existence? Dr. MUELLER. It would be our first opportunity to observe the total operation of the Sun. Mr. FULTON. It would be very interesting. Dr. MUELLER. Turning to the actual profile of a typical Mars mis- sion (MT66-10,212, fig. 10) we would launch as we approach the target planet a series of probes; one would be an Orbiter; another would be a Mars Surface Sample Return probe. There are also some Lander probes which would provide us with information about the atmQsphere and the surface on a continuing basis. All of this would be done in a matter of a few days while one was in the vicinity of the planet. FIGURE 10 PAGENO="0329" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 325 We would also be carrying out observations of the local environ- ment and conducting an extensive solar observation program and a planetary observation program from the various vantage points one attains from an orbit that is far removed from the Earth. Mr. FULTON. Why couldn't you put an instrumented capsule in* orbit that was a long elliptical orbit that would have two focal points, the Earth and Mars, and leave it there and man it from Earth? Couldn't you do something like that rather than just a one-shot program? Dr. MUELLER. That is possible. The major problem associated with that is that we are talking about a sizable telescope, at least 40 inches in diameter. It is a quite difficult task and we are reaching a level of complexity where man becomes an essential part of the system. The use of man becomes mandatory as the system complexity in- creases beyond a certain point, and for this kind of a mission it is clearly one that would have to be manned. Mr. FULTON. So you really need a manned Mars mission as well as an unmanned flight? Dr. MUELLER. That is right. Mr. FULTON. That is all. Dr. MUELLER. Now, the flight opportunities (MT 66-10,222, fig. 11) for such a flyby are relatively frequent in the 19~T0's, they run from TYPICAL MARS/VENUS RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHT OPPORTUNITIES LAUNCH DATE LEGS IN DAYS DURATION IN DAYS ~V INJECTION FEET PER SECOND REENTRY VELOCITY FEET PER SECOND MARS SEPT. `15 OCT. `11 NOV. `19 130/531 145/533 132/554 661 678 686 15,400 14,800 14,800 49,100 48,700 41,400 VENUS JUNE `15 JAN. `11 AUG. `18 APR. `80 111/250 111/25~1 116/249 109/250 361 374 365 359 12,000 11,800 11,800 12,000 . 44,600 44,800 43,300 45,000 VENUS/MARS DEC. `18 142/230/253 625 16,000 45,000 VENUS/MARS/VENUS FEB. `11 715 13,000 39,700 NASA HQ MT66-1O,222 12-30-66 FIGuRE 11 PAGENO="0330" 326 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION September of 1975 through November of 1979 for a Mars mission In the case of Venus, they run from June of 1975 to April of 1980 Those are the launch dates. They will come back a year or 2 years later de- pending upon the mission program. One of the most interesting missions is a Venus-Mars-Venus flyby in February 1977. That permits you in some 700 days to fly out past Venus, go around Mars, fly back past Venus and then return to the Earth. The time is very comparable to that of the other flight times; the reentry velocity is low as is our projection velocity and it is an interesting case of billiards in space. Mr. Gray informs me this is a unique event. It won't happen again in this century. Mr. FULTON. Wouldn't it be interesting to pick up a piece of this asteroid, Icarus, that is expected to come within 4 million miles of the earth and compare it to whatever landed in Arizona, I understand that its size is estimated at between several kilometers and several miles and that its orbit will be between one-fifth of an astronomical unit (putting it inside the orbit of Mercury) and two astronomical units (putting it outside the orbit of Mars). You may have an asteroid in being. If so we could have our own laboratory. Why don't we take over the tourist center in Arizona where there has been an impact from an outerspace object of some size Why doesn't the United States take that over as a national asset ~ Wouldn't that help ~ Dr. MUELLER. I don't feel that I know enough about the problem, Mr Fulton, to answer that Mr. FULTON. Go ahead with your report. Dr. MUELLER. Significant results (MT 66-10,203, fig. 12, MT 66- 10,202, fig. 13) that we would expect to obtain from manned Mars re- connaissance missions include returned surface samples, photography, measurements of the atmosphere and the solid body properties; we would expect also to carry out a number of en route experiments which, as we have looked at them in some detail would rather fully occupy the crew Then in addition we have certain technological developments that will markedly affect the future of our own technology since for the first time we have to have equipment that will last for 2 years and in re- turn there will be a certain amount of prestige associated with a first manned planetary flight. Mr. DADDARIO. I assume those samples would be brought back to the lunar receiving laboratory ~ Dr. MUELLER. That is correct. The samples would be returned to our lunar receiving laboratory where they would be processed. The interesting thing about such a reconnaissance program is that many of the major components can be modified from the existing Apollo Appli- cations hardware so that it would appear that we do have at least the major elements of technology available to us for carrying out such a program (MT 66-6708, fig. 14). There are certain areas where wehave to extend our technology and it would not be wise to embark on a pro- gram of this magrntude without in turn expecting to extend our tech- nology because that is one of the major benefits that comes to our society here on Earth. PAGENO="0331" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 327 SIGNIFICANT RESULTS FROM MANNED MARS RECONNAISSANCE SCIENTIFIC RETURNED SURFACE SAMPLE: * CHEMICAL COMPOSITION OF RETURNED SURFACE SAMPLE OF MARS. * EXISTING OR FOSSIL UFE FORM IN RETURNED SAMPLE. * PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF RETURNED SAMPLE. PHOTOGRAPHY: * MAPPING OF 85% OF MARTIAN SURFACE WITH RESOLUTION BETTER THAN ONE KM. * SEASONAL VARIATIONS IN SUFACE AND ATMOSPHERE. * MULTISPECTRAL IMAGING OF SURFACE AND ATMOSPHERE FOR COMPOSITITION, STRUCTURE,AND TEMPERATURE DISTRIBUTION. * PHYSICAL SHAPE OF PLANET MARS. ATMOSPHERE: * ALTITUDE PROFILES OF ATMOSPHERIC TEMPERATURE, PRESSURE,DENSITY, AND COMPOSITION. * LOCAL WEATHER VARIATION ON MARS SURFACE. NASA HQ M166-10,203 12-30-66 FIGURE 12 SIGNIFICANT RESULTS FROM MANNED MARS RECONNAISSANCE (CON `T) SOLID BODY PROPERTIES * INTERNAL ACTIVITY OF PLANET. * GRAVITATIONAL AND MAGNETIC FIELD OF PLANET. * PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF SURFACE. ENROUTE EXPERIMENTS * TELESCOPIC OBSERVATIONS OF MOONS OF MARS. * STEREOPHOTOGRAPHS OF SOLAR EVENTS. * Lit HISTORY OF SUN SPOTS AND FLARES. * VISUAL OBSERVATIONS OF SOLAR SYSTEM AND STELLAR OBJECTS. TECHNOLOGICAL * LONG TERM SPACE SYSTEMS CAPABLITES. * EXPLOITATION OF EXISTIOG HARDWARE. * ENGINEERNIG DESIGN DATA FOR FUTURE SYSTEMS. * VERFICATION OF ENGGIEERING DESIGN PHLOSOPHES FOR PLANETARY MISSIONS. * PLANETARY OPERATIONS EXPERIENCE. PRESTIGE * FIEST MANNED INTERPLANETARY FLIGHTS. NASA HQ MT66-10,2C0 12-30-66 FIGURE 13 PAGENO="0332" 328 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MARS/VENUS RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM FEATURES UTILIZATION AND MODIFICATION OF PRESENT SYSTEMS MAJOR COMPONENTS EARTH ENTRY MODULE MISSION MODULE SPACECRAFT PROPULSION EARTH ORBIT ESCAPE STAGE PROPELLANT TANKERS LAUNCH SYSTEM LAUNCH FACILITIES MISSION CONTROL CENTER COMMUNICATION AND CONTROL NET DEVELOPMENT BASE MOOFIED APOLLO COMMAND MODULE GROWTH FROM EARTH ORBITAL ACTIVITES APOLLO SERVICE MODULE AND LEM MODIFED SATURN S-Il OR SATURN S-IV B STAGES MODIFED S-Il SATURN V SATURN V APOLLO APOLLO+ DSIF TECHNOLOGY EXTENSIONS ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS ASTRIONICS (GUIOANCE,COMMUNICATIONS,ETC) ORBITAL OPERATIONS FIGURE 14 HYPERBOLIC ENTRY LONG-TERM RELIABLITY CONCEPTS LONG TERM SPACE STORABLE PROPELLANTS STERLIZATION TECHNIOUES NASA HQ MT66-6708 2-30-66 We have the development base and we have the major compo- nents reasonably well defined. Mr. DADDARIO. Your remarks indicate that you don't give one target superiority over another. You seem, to indicate that both the Mars and Venus programs offer you a choice without discriminating one as against the other. Your charts sometime refer just to Mars and you never have a Venus chart. You have Mars charts and Mars- Venus charts which seems to indicate that you do, in fact, tend to in- dicate at this time that your objectives will be more toward Mars than Venus, is that so? Dr. MUELLER. I think they are both equally interesting objectives. We have a limited amount of resources so that we have had to con- centrate on one. Mr. DADDARIO. At this point in time it is Mars. Dr. MUELLER. It is also true that we have a much greater knowledge about the Martian environmental characteristics than we do about Venus so therefore we can do better planning. Mr. DADDARIO. Did we make the choice of Mars over Venus because of certain observations that come back to us from our satellite activity and then find as we examine that information, we have some ques- tion about its accuracy? Have we then come to some other judgment that perhaps we have made the choice too soon to operate for Mars rather than Venus? Dr. MUELLER. I believe the scientific community has fluctuated be- tween Mars and Venus being the most desirable planet for study for the past 25 years. There seems to be some vacillation between the two. I think they are equally interesting. I think that the scientific community does tend to be divided. PAGENO="0333" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 329 My own expectation is that these Mars and Venus missions will provide us with two quite different understandings of the develop- ment and operation of our solar system. Mr. DADDARIO. Would it be fair to say even though it seems to in- dicate that we would be aiming more of our efforts toward Mars, that if the information on Venus spells itself out with more accuracy than is now available, we would not have any problem adjusting to take advantage of Venus as a target if it is proven to be a better one. Dr. MUELLER. That is correct. We are trying to design the ap- paratus and the missions themselves to be flexible enough to use either planet or for that matter other planets as targets. Mr. DADDARIO. Thank you. Dr. MUELLER. Now, turning to another example of advanced missions we show here (MA66-10245, fig. 15) the possible evolution of lunar exploration. The steps that are involved begin with Apollo, go through Apollo Applications. Here we have quite a few plans under development for carrying out extended lunar surface and lunar orbit operations. Then we go forward from that to a next major step which involves much greater mobility than we can accommodate in the Apollo Appli- cations program and the ability to stay and carry out extensive observations. Each one of these steps depends upon the knowledge that we gained from the preceding one, so that we are trying hard now to develop the various alternatives, but not to make firm decisions EVOLUTION OF LUNAR EXPLORATION * MAJOR FEATURE SURVEYS * DEEP DRLLPIG - ` PITRA~FEATURE *TERPRETATION * ASTRONOMISAL NIV(STIOATIOIIS * RESOURCE SURVEYS GEOLOGISAL AND GEOPHYSISAL AREA SURVEYS * COMPREHENSIVE EMPLACED STATION * ON-SITE ANALYTISAL BITERPRETATION CORE SAMPIJIG AND HOLE LOGGING ATMOSPHERIG ANALYSIS * ORBITAL SURVEYS `MANNED LUNAR OPERATIONS -* SAMPLE RETURN * LOCAL GEOLOGIGAL INTERPRETATION * SMALL EMPLACED STATION NASA NT MT664V45 FIGURE 15 PAGENO="0334" 330 1968 NA$A AUTHORIZATION as to the course that we are going to follow This is an evolutionary process We learn from each step as to wh'tt can and should be done in a scientific sense at the next step Some examples of the lunar surface exploration payload can be seen on this chart (MT 66-10246, fig. 16) and there are a number of extended lunar surface explorations. One thing in particular that is of interest to the scientific commurnty equipments that need to be developed and can be used to carry out is the ability to move around on the lunar surface. We have looked at several modules that can carry out extended traverses on the Moon and on this chart (MT 66-9608, fig. 17) you see one example of such a vehicle. A summary of the objectives of such a mobile lunar exploration is shown here (MT 66-10247, fig 18) The chsses of vehicles that ~ ill be useful for transportation beyond E irth orbit (MT 67-5865, fig 19) include the current Saturn V which is cap'tble of putting something like 100,000 pounds on a trajectory to the Moon. We would expect that the next major step would be the development of a nuclear upper stage which would roughly increase this from 50 to 100 percent depending upon the actual characteristics developed in such a propulsion system. If we look forward to the future, it is possible to envisage the fact that NERVA can grow and be capable of larger payloads in these missions. The Saturn V also is capable of growth. One way would be to strap on solids. Another way would be to improve the basic EXAMPLE AAP LUNAR SURFACE EXPLORATION PAYLOAD (LM SHELTER/TAXI MODE) 1 LUNAR SCENTFIC SURVEY MODULE 12 SURFACE ELECTR~AL SURVEY 2 GEOPHYSICAL STATION 13 EROSION/EXPOSURE PANELS 3 LUNAR SCENTF~ SURVEY MODULE MOUNTED DRILL 14 BORE-HOLE LOG 4 MULTIOAND PHOTOGRAPHY/RADIOMETRY 15 HAND TOOLS 5 LUNAR SURVEYIIG SYSTEM 16 SAMPLE CONTAIIERS 8 TOPOGRAPH~/GEOOET~ 11. PHYSI~AL PROPERTIES EQUP. 1 ACTIVE SEISM~ 18 DATA HANDUNG SUBSYSTEM 8. GRAVITY SURVEY 19. NAVIGATION SUBSYSTEM 9. MAGNETIC SURVEY 20. SYSTEMS UITEGRATION EOU~. 10 PORTABLE GEOCHEMISTRY 21 LABORATORY EXPERUENTS 11. GAS ANALYZER NASA HQ MT66-1O,246 12-30-66 FIGURE 16 PAGENO="0335" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 331 OBJECTIVES OF MOBILE LUNAR EXPLORATION PHASE PRIMARY - BROADEN AND INTEGRATE OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE MOON THROUGH LONG RANGE, LONG DURATION REGIONAL STUDIES. MOBILE MODE REQUIRED TO: 1. STUDY WIDELY SEPARATED SITES YET OBTAIN CORRELATIVE INTER-SITE INFORMATION. 2. PERFORM GEOPHYSICAL SURVEYS WITH WIDE STATION SPACING. 3. CONDUCT INTEGRATED SAMPLING WHICH CROSSES MAJORITY OF STRATIGRAPHIC UNITS. 4. PROVIDE CONTINUOUS"GROUND TRUTHN DATA FOR INTERPRETING ORBITAL SENSORS. SECONDARY COMPLETE EVALUATION OF MOON AS A SITE FOR OBSERVATORIES AND LABORATORIES. SELECT CANDIDATE SITES FOR FUTURE BASES. NASA HQ MT66-1O,247 12-30-66 FIGrnu~ 17 FIGURE 18 PAGENO="0336" 332 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Fiouas 19 engines of the vehicle and, finally, of course, one can go to a new advanced launch vehicle. I would say at this point in time it would look to us as though the combination of the Saturn V plus NERVA would satisfy our im- mediate needs for planetary exploration. Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman? Mr. TEAGUE~. Mr. Fulton. Mr. F1JLTON. As you remember some time ago the members of this manned spaceflight committee strongly opposed the concept and pro- posed the building of the NOVA rocket type booster. It would appear that this concept has been completely dropped and NASA is now mov- ing toward the NERVA concept and the high-energy fuel concept, liquid or the large solid concept; is that correct? Dr. MUELLER. We are advocating the NERVA engine in the 200,000- pound class and we believe that that is the next and needed step toward our launch vehicle capabilities. Mr. FULT0N. You have dropped the NOVA which is as big as the Capitol dome? Dr. MUELLER. Yes, sir. Mr. FULTON. Thank you. If I oouldjust say to our chairman, that is one bird that this subcommittee shot down. Dr. MUELLER. With your permission, I would like to turn to the fiscal year 1968 budget book for Apollo Applications and go through that beginning with volume V, pages RD2-3 and RD2-4. Turning to Apollo Applications (MP67-5725, fig. 20) for which we are requesting $454.7 million in fiscal 1968, this is now a program PAGENO="0337" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 333 MANNED SPACE FLIGHT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT APOLLO APPLICATIONS FY 1968 BUDGET ESTIMATES (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) FY66 FY61 FY68 SPACE VEHICLES EXPERIMENTS MISSION SUPPORT $ 8.5 40.3 2.4 $ 38.6 35.6 5.8 $ 263.1 140.1 50.3 TOTAL $ 51.2 $ 80.0 $ 454.7 NASA HQ MPR67-5725 2-2-67 FIGURE 20 line item, comparable to Apollo and Advanced Missions. Funding shown for fiscal years 1966 and 1967 was carried under Apollo and in the space sciences budget. Apollo Applications builds upon the strong base of flight experi- ence, ground facilities, and trained manpower developed in past and current programs. Each mission is designed to take full advantage of the Apollo Saturn system to make significant contributions to a wide range of objectives. Missions are planned to concurrently gain expe- rience, test theory, perform experiments, and collect data. By estab- lishing multiple objectives for each flight mission, a program limited to a minimum economical launch rate can achieve rapid progress and make great gains at low cost. Planning includes the decision to use, modify, and expand present Apollo systems, capabilities rather than move toward whole new developments, the strategy of reusing basic hardware for many missions by storing it in orbit and returning later with fresh crews and expendahies, and the approach of designing experiments that will gather important data while at the same time testing the experimental concepts themselves. The program of investigations and development to be carried for- ward in the Apollo Applications program will meet two basic oh- )ectives; to make unique contributions to practical applications, opera- tional capabilities, science, and technology; and, at the same time, to place the Nation in a position to assess, on the basis of valid scientific experimentation and actual experience, the value and feasibility of future space flight and the interrelated roles of manned and unmanned systems. In support of these objectives, the principal areas toward which the fiscal year 1968 effort will be directed are the development of an ex- ~6-265 0-67--pt. 2---22 PAGENO="0338" 334 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION tended flight capability, the conduct of manned astronomical and Earth observations from space, and the continued explor'ttion of the Moon. Specific program elements have been selected for initiation in fiscal year 1967 and 1968 that, in combination, provide the greatest contri- bution to the Nation's space objectives at the lowest cost. I go further and say in my judgment they represent an absolute minimum funding for the program in terms of meeting these ob jectives. Mr. FULTON. Can you divide those figures between Venus and Mars ~ Dr MUELLER As a matter of fact none of these are devoted to either Venus or Mars. They are devoted to developing the basic capa- bility for long-duration space flight and the utilization of those for astronomical observations and for extended lunar exploration. Mr. TE~GUE. I would hope on Apollo Applications you would spell out in much more detail for our hearings than what we have in our backup books, for the ordinary layman to know what the vehicles are you are using and what the experiments mean and that type of explanation. Dr. Mtn~r~u~ai. I will try. Mr. TEAGUE. Not now but for the record. Dr. MUELLER. Yes, sir. (The material referred to follows:) APOLLO APPLICATIONS The following is a description of the Apollo Applications planned missions, equipment experiments and funding requirements This description supple ments and further defines the material contained in the FY 1968 Budget back up books submitted to the Congress and reflects the status of program planning. FIRST APOLLO APPLICATIONS MI5sI0N-AAP--1 AND AAP-2 The end objective of the AAP-1 and AAP-2 flights is to establish in orbit the Orbital Workshop The Orbital Workshop is an important new concept for an embryonic space station. It is economical because it involves minimum new hardware development and is reusable, thus allowing basic exploration of space station requirements with a reasonable funding level. For the short term, the Orbital Workshop provides an early capability for a large controlled environment to evaluate human performance and secure engi neering data for future subsystem design for both manned and unmanned spacecraft. Ultimately in the workshop or any successor space station where man will be assembling apparatus, antennae structures etc as well as operating instruments cameras, electronic equipment and other devices he will need to know the most efficient and effective means of operating and living The first two Apollo Applications missions will provide for further economies in space flight by developing techniques for the resupply and reuse of hardware that is left in orbit. The Orbital Workshop concept will also provide for the early development of a long duration flight capability which is a key iequirement for most of the possible significant advances in manned space flight. The experimental payloads included in the AAP-1 and AAP-2 flights are designed to provide significant data on the capabilities of man and equipment, and on their potential ability as promptly and as economically as possible In addition there are included scientific and applications experiments MISSION MODE AND RELATED EQUIPMENT The initial AAP mission, which could be as early as 1968, consists of 2 launches, AAP-1 and AAP-2. The following equipment will be required for these launches: PAGENO="0339" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 335 For AAP-1, a manned flight, the launch vehicle will be the uprated Saturn I. Spacecraft equipment will include the Command and Service Modules and a Lunar Mapping and Survey System. For AAP-2, an unmanned flight, the launch vehicle will be the uprateci Saturn I. Spacecraft equipment will include the Airlock Module and Multiple Docking Adapter. AAP-1 will have a 3 man crew in the Apollo Command Module. The crew will perform several days of operations in low earth orbit for qualification of the Lunar Mapping and Survey System which is launched in an adapter of the Saturn space vehicle (Figure 1). The Lunar Mapping and Survey System will be used in later AAP operational missions for mapping and geological survey of the lunar surface from lunar orbit. After these tests, AAP-2 (Figure 2) will be launched unmanned into a higher, circular orbit about 300 statute miles altitude where the orbital lifetime will be greater than 1 year. The crew from AAP-1 will transfer the Command and Service Module and the Lunar Mapping and Survey System to the higher orbit and rendezvous with and dock to the Multiple Docking Adapter from the second launch (Figure 3). The spent S-IVB stage from AAP-2 will then be activated into an Orbital Workshop. Through use of the Airlock Module, the crew will transfer equipment into the workshop and erect the crew quarters (Figures 4 & 5). Orbital Workshop operations and experiments will be performed for a period of up to four weeks, when the crew will deorbit In the Command Module, leaving the Orbital Workshop, Multiple Docking Adapter and Airlock Module in orbit in a gravity gradient stabilized condition for later usage. OBJECTIVES FOR FIRST APOLLO APPLICATIONS MISSION In summary, the five objectives of the first Apollo Applications mission are (1) to test the Lunar Mapping and Survey System photographic equipment and spacecraft subsystems in earth Orbit for subseo~ient lunar mapping and survey missions; (2) to determine feaaihiUty of operating the Orbital Workshop as a habitable space structure for a period of up to four weeks; (3) to evaluate FIGURE 1 PAGENO="0340" 336 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 2 FIGURE 3 PAGENO="0341" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION space flight environmental effects on the crew of a mission duration up to four weeks; (4) to conduct approximately 4~ other experiments; and (5) to leave the Orbital Workshop and associated &iuipment docked in orbit for reactiva- tion and reuse during subsequent AAP missions. HABITABILITY To completely exploit the advantages of having a man in space, we m~ist in- crease the length of our flights, first to a month, then to several months, and, ultimately, to indefinite periods. Not only must we investigate the physiological factors, we must learn much more about how to live and work in space on a day-to-day basis. 337 FIGURE 4 PAGENO="0342" 338 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION In the confined quarters of the Gemini spacecraft, providing about as much room as the front seat of a small car, we proved that man can operate effectively in space for up to two weeks. To achieve this, special provisions were incor- porated such as a light-weight pressure suit which could be doffed or donned conveniently. In the somewhat larger flight crew quarters of the Apollo spacecraft, we also will have a two~week mission capability. But for missions of mkich longer dura- don, many questions must still be answered about how to live and work most effectively in space. The Apollo Applications missions are designed to find many of these answers. In order for man to operate successfully in the workshop where man will be assembling test apparatus, antennae, structures, etc., as well as operating FIGuRE 5 PAGENO="0343" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 339 instruments, cameras, electronic equipment and other devices we will study and develop efficient and effective means of living and operating in this orbital environment. In the Orbital Workshop, we will investigate questions such as how much cubic footage do we need for routine functions of life, experiments for science, mainte- nance of equipment. What is an optimum floor plan for crew quarters and work stations? What is the best way to sleep in the nero' gravity of space? What forms of exercise are most effective in keeping a crew physiologically fit? We will investigate methods of food preparation, types of food, provisions for personal hygiene, management of human wastes, ways of "keeping house." We can learn the best means of moving from place to place under zero gravity and restraining ourselves at work stations. Here we will be able to build on our earlier exp'eirence during similar work in Gemini, but in a controlled environ- ment. The data from our experiments will be used in planning and developing both the later flights in Apollo Applications and the flights for future programs. Our experiments will be instrumental in making the most effective use of man during long-duration missions in space. In effect, the Orbital Workshop may be considered an embryonic space station. It increases our useful habitable workspace volume by a factor some 30 times greater than provided by the Apollo Command Module Spacecraft. This Orbital Workshop can be exploited to make mapy contributions in the major fields of space science, earth-oriented app'lication~, and support for space operations. EXPERIMENTS Five types of experiments will be flown on flights of the first Apollo Applica- tions mission: Scientific, T~chno1ogical, Medical, Engineering. Some of the experiments support Department of Defense studies. SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENTS The scientific experiments are designed to take advantage of space operations to learn more about the universe, the space environment, and the phenomena that exist in the solar system that affect the environment of man on earth. Scientific experiments and their objectives are as follows: (1) ~9ynoptic Weather Photography-Obtain selective, high quality, color cloud photographs for studying the fine structure of the earth's weather system. (2) Nuclear Emulsion-Investigate the physical and chemical character- istics of cosmic radiation in near earth space. (3) X-Ray Astronomy-Study X-ray sources originating beyond our sys- tem to determine source position and strength. (4) Micrometeorite Uollection.-Collect and study composition and flux rate of small micrometeorites in near earth space. (5) Ultraviolet ~S'teller Astronomy.-Obtain ultraviolet spectrum photo- graphs of stars to determine their temperature and composition. (6) Ultraviolet Airgloiv Photography-Photograph and study the airglow band surrounding the earth to determine its characteristics and composition. (7) Mnltiba~d Terrain Plvotograpky.-Photograph the earth's surface in four different spectral regions to determine earth's characteristics and re- sources. (8) Ultraviolet/X-Ray Astronomy.-Ob'tain detailed information about the sun in the ultraviolet and X-ray emission regions. TECHNOLOGICAL EXPERIMENTS The technological experiments are designed `to learn more about the space operational environment to improve man's ability to operate effectively and per- form useful work in space. Technological experiments and their objectives are as follows: (1) Manual Navigation Sightings.-Evaluate the ability of a navigator to accurately measure the angle between celestial bodies with a hand held sextant. PAGENO="0344" 340 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION (2) Frog Otolith Function-To determine the adaptability of the otolith or balance system to weightlessness and acceleration due to rotation. (3) Meteoroid Impact and Erosion-Obtain data on the flux of micro- meteoroids and their effect on optical surfaces. (4) Jet Shoes.-Determine the feasibility of using reaction-jets mounted on shoes for astronaut maneuvering in space. (5) Meteoroid Velocity-Measure the impact velocity and penetration depth of meteoroids in soft aluminum. (6) Heat Pipe.-Study the feasibility of transferring heat from one place to another during weightless flight by means of a fluid circulating through pipes. MEDICAL EXPERIMENTS In addition to biomedical and physiological studies, the medical experiments will provide information and knowledge necessary to improve living conditions for man in space and enable him `to live and work comfortably in space for long periods of time. Medical experiments and their objectives are as follows: (1) Vectorcardiogram.-Measure the electrical activity of the astronauts' hearts to determine any effects due to weightless flight. (2) Metabolic Activity.-Measure changes in man's metabolic effectiveness during space flight. (3) Cardiovascular Function Assessment.-Determine weakening of man's blood circulation system due to weightless flight. (4) Bone and Muscle Changes-Assess alteration in man's bone and muscle systems during orbital flight. (5) HumanS Vestibular System-Investigate the effects of weightlessness on man's balance system. (6) Time and Motion Studies.-Make time and motion studies of astro- nauts performing tasks in orbit. (7) Habitability/Crew Quarters.-To evaluate the habitability of large crew quarters as compared to the more restricted quarters of previous spacecraft. ENGINEERING EXPERIMENTS Engineering experiments and their objectives are as follows: (1) Mapping and Survey System.-Conduct comprehensive photographic study of the lunar surface from lunar orbit. (2) Space Suit Evaluation.-E~aluate several different types of space suits in terms of mobility, comfort, etc. (3) ST-124 Stable Platform Removal.-Remove components of the Guid- ance and Navigation system from the Instrument Unit during orbital flight to obtain experience in space maintenance. (4) Zero Gravity Flammability.-To determine the propagation of flames along the surface of combustible materials and the relative effectiveness of several extinguishing agents. (5) Astronaut EVA Equipment.-To evaluate the effectiveness of various tethers, restraints, and hand hold devices. (6) High Pressure Gas Expulsion-To determine the liquification charac- teristics of high pressure gas during prolonged blow-down in zero gravity. (7) Heat Exchanger Service.-Formulate acceptable heat exchanger servicing procedures for use in extended missions of the future. (8) Tube Joining Assemblies-Develop and demonstrate tube joining maintenance operations during space flight. (9) Electron Beam Welding-Develop and demonstrate plate welding maintenance operations in space flight. DEPARTMENT OP DEFENSE EXPERIMENTS Experiments conducted for the Department of Defense and their objectives are as follows: (1) Carbon Dioxide Reduction-Determine the operational capabilities of a solid electrolyte carbon dioxide reduction system, in a zero gravity space environment. PAGENO="0345" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 341 (2) Integrated Maintenance-Evaluate factors of equipment maintain- ability in-orbit including tools, crew restraints, illumination levels, and the timelines and procedures for performing specific maintenace tasks. (3) Suit Donning and Sleep Station Evaluation.-Evaluate the time re- quired and techniques for pressure-suit donning starting from the restrained sleeping position. (4) Alternate Restraints Evaluation-Evaluate various crew restraint devices for use in both operating and maintaining equipment. (5) Expandable Airlock Technology.-Demoristrate the feasibility of ex- pandable structures in an~ earth orbital environment and evaluate the func- tional characteristics of an airlock design based on this technology. (6) Expandable Reentry Structures.-Demonstrate the ability of an astronaut to deploy and lock or rigidize an expandable reentry capsule structure. Typical Experiments SCIENTIFIC The X-ray Astronomy experiment is a typical scientific experiment. The purpose of the X-ray Astronomy experiment will be to continue the study of X-ray sources outside our solar system. These sources cannot be studied from the earth's surface because of the influence of the atmosphere on absorbing the X-rays. Specific objectives will be to deteirmine the positions of the known X-ray sources very accurately to within less than a tenth of a degree; to measure the X-ray spectrum of the stronger sources; and to observe discrete objects of astronomical interest such as strong radio emission centers, the galactic center and nearby galaxies for evidence of X-ray emission. These scientific data will be gathered by using a high sensitivity, high resolu- tion detection system. The system will shed light upon the nature of these source's and provide experimental observation's for comparison with theoretical predictions. TECHNOLOGICAL The Jet Shoes experiment is a typical technological experiment. The po- tential importance of extravehicular activity (EVA) in space operations such as repair, rescue, multiple rendezvous, refueling, etc., makes It desirable that the astronaut be provided with a natural, simple, and reliable means of mobility. The Jet Shoes concept shows promise of providing the desired type of mobility hi a manner closely related to walking. The Jet Shoes concept involves placing jets on the soles of the astronaut's shoes. These jets are activated on demand by using the toes to depress a `switch, and the more or less instinctive movement of the feet and legs is used to direct the jets and produce locomotion in the desired direction. Because the jets are directed and controlled by the feet, both hands are free for any tasks that are required. Utilization of the large enclosed volume of the S-IVB Workshop is ideal for a safe yet practical evaluation of the Jet Shoes concept. The experiment involves having an astronaut perform a series of maneuvers within the confines of the Workshop to demonstrate the feasibility of the concept and to gain experience and confidence in the use of the jet shoes. The maneuvers will first be performed without a space suit in a shirt sleeve environment, and later, in a pressurized space suit for a realistic evaluation of the concept under the identical conditions of true "space walking". MEDICAL A typical Medical Experiment is the Metabolic Activity experiment. The purpose of the Metabolic Activity experiment is to determine man's metabolic effectiveness in doing mechanical work under exposure to the space environment; and comparing this effectiveness with identical physical activities under the influence of earth's gravity. A great deal is known about the relationships between the rate of doing work utilizing muscular effort. However, this wealth of information pertains to measurements done on the earth's surface and under the influence of the force of gravity. To obtain this comparison of work in space and on earth, it is planned to measure man's metabolic rate as related to his work output in space. This can PAGENO="0346" 342 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION best be done `by measuring his metabolic rate for various work outputs using a calibrated device similar to a bicycle exerciser to provide reproducible levels of work. I1~IPORTANCE or AAP-1 AND AAP-2 For the long term the AAP 1 and AAP 2 flights will piovide a test bed for the systems and subsystems required for future unmanned and manned space station's and for long duration manned planetary exploration flights. The AAP 1 and AAP 2 flights are designed to take full advantage of the Apollo/Saturn system to make significant contributions to a wide range of objectives. The major benefits to be derived from the AAP 1 and AAP 2 flights are (1) to develop capability for reuse of space hardware which will reduce program costs; (2) to determine effects of extended duration space environment on men and system's; (3) to conduct a large number of important experiments; and gain operational experience with manned space systems to put this nation in a position to define and evaluate further manned and unmanned exploration and operational space systems; and (4) to develop effective manned extra- vehicular capability. If the AAP-1 and AAP-2 flights are not accomplished, there would be an indefinite hiatus in achieving the benefits mentioned above. The timing of the AAP-1 and AAP-2 flights will have a most important effect on the future of our space program. Use of the Apollo developed hardware for the AAP-1 and AAP-2 flights, as now scheduled, will give the United States the means to operate effectively and economically in space for long periods of time at an early date and in an orderly fashion. Our Advanced Manned Mission planning involving future earth orbital manned space station operations and manned planetary flights `relies heavily on tests, experiments and operational data to be gained from these Apollo Applications flights. Cancellation or postponement of the AAP-1 and AA'P-2 flights will disrupt the orderly pace of our progress in space and would dis'sipate a capability assembled in painstaking fashion over the period of a decade RESOURCES The fiscal year 1967 and 1968 increments of funding required for the AAP 1 and AAP-2 flights are:tabulated as follow's: Apollo Applications program-Resources summary [In millions of dollars] Fiscal year 1967 Fiscal year 1968 Apollo Applications: AAP-i 2.6 iO.0 AAP-2 Subtotal Basic Apollo hardware: 1 AAP-i i9.6 i9.9 - 22.2 - - -~ 29.9 58.5 14.3 AAP-2 Subtotal Total 24.1 6.7 82.6 - 21.0 104.8 50. 9 1 Apollo procured equipment for alternate use by AAP. SECOND APOLLO APPLICATIONS MISSI0N-AAP-3 AND AAP-4 In the short term the AAP-3 and AAP-4 flights will provide three major benefits (1) solar astronomical observations will be obtained during the period of maximum solar activity (2) man s effectiveness as an astronomical observer in space will be determined and (3) alternate operating modes for future large orbital telescopes will be tested. PAGENO="0347" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 343 In the long term, the AAP-3 and AAP-4 flights will provide a significant Initial capability that can be enhanced over the years to conduct comprehensive and detailed studies of the sun. There are many reasons to conduct these studies, but the two principal ones are emphasized below. First, variations of the sun are the major cause of environmental changes to the earth. Further knowledge of how these environmental changes occur could permit man to control them for his own benefit or learn to better adapt and make use of them. Secondly, the sun is a valuable astrophysical laboratory which may be viewed by scientists of many disciplines and is considered a virtually untapped reservoir of new and different facets for exploration in extending the knowledge of the respective scientific fields. The effect of the sun on the environment of our planet is especially important since the sun's energy ultimately impacts on every living organism, including all plant and animal life. Evolutionary effects may certainly be said to be tied up with this environment. The effects of the sun's environment on agriculture are obvious. The field of meteorology is intimately concerned with the study of solar physics as a means of predicting and possibly even controlling the earth's weather. Communications are also involved because of the sun's effect on the earth's ionosphere with subsequent disturbing `black- outs" of world wide radio nets. MISSION MODE AND RELATED EQUIPMENT Apollo Applications flights 3 and 4 comprise the second mission. The equip- ment for the flights will consist of the following: For AAP-3, the launch vehicle will be the uprated Saturn I. Spacecraft equip- inent will consist of the Command Service Module. For AAP-4, the launch vehicle will be the uprated Saturn I. Spacecraft equipment will consist of the Nose Cone, the Lunar Module Ascent Stage, and the Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM). The Command and Service Module and crew from AAP-3 will be placed in a low altitude parking orbit and AAP-4 will be launched unmanned into a higher parking orbit (figure 6). The Command and Service Module will transfer to Fxounn 6 PAGENO="0348" 344 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION the higher orbit and rendezvous and dock with the Lunar Module/ATM. The Command and Servicb Module will then transfer the Command Service Module! Lunar Module/ATM combination to the orbit of the Orbital Workshop stored from AAP-1 and AAP-2 and rendezvous and dock, form&ng an embryonic space station (Figures 7 and 8). The crew will reactivate the Orbital Workshop, ii~sta1l and perform additional e~periments, including solar astronomy observa- tions through use of the Apollo Telescope Mount. The Command and Service Module from the AAP-3 flight will carry sufficient expendables to reactivate and resupply the entire orbd±al cluster for a period of up to eight weeks. Upon completion of this mission, the crew will return in the Command and Service Module, leaving the remainder of the early space station in a gravity gradient stabilized condition for later usage (Figure 8). FIGURE 7 PAGENO="0349" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 345 In summary, the objectives for the second AAP mission are (1) to obtain sci~ entific data on the characteristics of the sun through observations of the entire electromagnetic spectrum made with the ATM instruments; (2) obtain engi- neering data for selected modes of operation of the Lunar Module/ATM to sup~ port development of an advanced manned astronomical observatory; (3) to deter- mine effects of long-duration space flight on crew and space vehicle subsystems up to eight weeks; (4) to leave the Lunar Module/ATM and Orbital Workshop docked in orbit for reactivation and reuSe during subsequent Apollo Applica- tions missions; and (5) to conduct approximately five other experiments. The primary objective of the AAP-3 and AAP-4 flights is to place the Apollo Telescope Mount into operation supported by the Orbital Workshop. The Apollo Telescope Mount, a significant part of the Apollo Application,s program, is essentially a manned solar laboratory being designed and developed to study the sun, its evaluation, struciture and 1~ehavLor. It represents the first use of manned scientific telescopes in ~pace. It provides the capability of car- rying large scientific instrumentation to study the sun, having increased spatial and spectral resolution over and above that of similar instrumentation being flown in space today. Observations from space are of fundamental importance to astronomy, which has long been retarded by the restrictions imposed by the earth'$ atmosphere. We have, in effect, been looking at the universe through a screen that is par- tially opaque to ultraviolet, x-rays, gamma ray:s, and many types of high speed particles. The removal of these restrictions promises to significantly extend our observational reach. APOLLO TELESCOPE MOUNT The Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) provides a new capability for a variety of solar and stellar scientific experiments to be performed above the earth's atmosphere (Figure 7). The ATM provides a stabilized platform which can be carried on Apollo Applications missions to accommodate experiment instruments having a requirement for finely controlled pointing. FIGURE 8 OBJECTIVES OF SECOND APOLLO APPLICATIONS MISSION PAGENO="0350" 346 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION The ATM includes scientific instruments and supporting sub-systems mounted in a structural rack attached to the ascent stage of an Apollo Lunar Module. It can be operated in several possible modes to obtain the maximum amount of solar data within the limits of available astronaut time and the possible clegrad- ing effects of motion and contamination disturbances. The ATM is controlled by the astronauts to orient telescopes to selected solar activity regions or specific stellar targets, using a television monitor to locate targets of scientific value. The ATM enables experiments to be conducted using the data gathering features of recoverable photographic film as well as of photo- metric techniques. Communications from scientists on the ground to the astro- naut-observer will aid in the selection of targets and the data to be recorded. The ATM pointing control system can hold alignment with selected targets for long term pho'tographic exposures. The initial launch of the ATM is planned to conduct solar observations from low earth orbits, beginning as early as 1969, to obtain data during the next period of maximum solar activity (1968 through 1970). Five basic experiments to obtain solar data during the period of maximum solar activity have been selected for development for the initial ATM launches (Figure 9). Supporting instruments are also being developed to make the scientific experiment instrumemits more effective (Figure 10). The combination of instruments involved in the overall ATM experiment platform will provide a wide spectral vie~v of the phemiomena that occur during the next solar activity cycle and should yield information of considerable value to our understanding of the basic processes of solar activity. The forthcoming period of maximum solar activity is expected to range from 1968 through 1970. This period is probably the most interesting period of the eleven-year solar cycle, however, there is still much to be learned about the sun's behavior during the remaining portion of the cycle. Scientific returns from the ATM experiments package mission during the 1970 portion of solar maximum, and on into the period of degrading activity would be extremely beneficial to the scientific community. ATM SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENTS EXPERIMENT PRINCIPAl I I NUMBERS ORGANI/ATIGN INVESTIGATOR INSTRUMENT 4_~ PURPOSI MONITOR THE BRIGHTNESS, FORM SOS2 HAL) DR. 0. NEWKIRK COHCTNAORAPH ANI) POI.AITIZATION OF THE SOLAR CCSRONA IN WHITE LIGHT. CORONAL MAKE 111011-SPATIAL IIESOLUTION SPECTROHELIOGRAPI-1 MONOCHHOMETRIC SOLAR IMAGES IN Till: 160-USIS ANGSTROM RANGE SOS3 NRL, MR. J. T. PURCELL CHROMCISPBIERIC HLCLIIIG SOLAR SPECTRA IN THE SPECTROGRAPH 000-3000 ANGSTROM RANGE WITH FIIGLI SPECTRAL RESCILUTION SPE R - STUDY SOLAR FLARE EMISSIONS STS4 AS&E OR. B. GIACCONI X-RAY TELESCOPE IN THE SOFT N-HAY WAVELENGTHS SPECTROHELIGMETRIC MAKE HIGH SPATIAL RESOLLITION LIV TELESCOPE SOLAR IMACSES IN THE 300-1400 ANGSTROM RANGE S `E B -ME B STIITY SLILAR SPECTIIAL EMISSIONS TOSS HCL) DR. L, GOLDBEI1O I CT C - TIC WITH LIIGLI SPAS IAL RESOLUTION UV T L - CO IN THE I4SO-22S0 ANGSTRCIM RANGE HYDROGEN-ALPhA MAKE HYDROGEN--ALPHA SPECTRO- SPLCTROHEI ICIORAPH HELIOGRAMS C-F THE ENTIIIE SOLAI1 DISC - - - - OBTAIN TIME-il ISTOR 110 OF THE SWH OSFC MR J F MILl ICAN LIIRCSOLIITICN DYNAMICS C-F THE SCILAR ATMOSPHERE - - X-RAY TELESCOPE IN 0-RAYS IN THE 3-100 AN050RT)M HA N OF NASA HO. MI 6?-SSS4 I--OS-H) FIGURE 9 PAGENO="0351" 196 ~ NASA AUTHORIZATION PRINCIPAL ORGAN IZAT ION INVESTIGATOR INSTRUMENT HAG DR. G. NEWKIRK OCCULT INC DISC ALIGNMENT SYSTEM NRL MR. J . D. PURCELL EUV DISPLAY TELESCOPE AS&E DR. R. GIACCONI X-RAY IMAGE DISSECTOR TUBE GSFC MR. J. E. MIILIGAN PROPORTIONAL CO U NT ER S MSFC N.A. HYDROGLN~ALPHA DISPLAY TELESCOPE 347 FIGURE 10 EXPERIMENTS APOLLO TELESCOPE MOUNT EXPERIMENTS The primary focus of experiments for the AAP-3/AAP-4 missi~ii centers around the Apollo Telescope Mount. The five major experiments planned for ATM are described below: U) White Light Coronagraph.-To monitor the brightness, form and polarization of the solar corona from about 1.5 to 6 solar radii from the center of the sun. ~2) Ultraviolet Coronal Spectrographs.-To obtain high resolution pic- tures of short-time variations in the solar atmosphere such as flares. (3) X-Ray Spectrographic Tele*scopc.-To study solar flare emissions in the soft X-ray wavelengths of 2-10 angstroms. (4) Ultraviolet Spectrorneters.-Po acconiplisli vacuum ultraviolet solar astronomy from above the earth's atmosphere utilizing the participation of the astronaut in the observing sequence. (5) Dual i-ray Telesoopes.-To map the X-ray emission from the solar corona in various wavelength bands and to measure the total flux and crude spectral shape of the solar X-ray emission in two bands. OTHER SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING EXPERIMENTS Other scientific and engineering experiments to be performed include reactiva- tion and reuse of experimental equipment in the Orbital Workshop. In addition, among the other experiments that would be conducted are: (1) Star Horizon Automatic T-racking.---To validate the definition of a horizon based on scattered visual light, and the measurement techniques for on-board horizon position during flight and to provide a worldwide check of the horizon model. (2) Zero G Single Human Cells-To study the influence of zero gravity on living human cells and tissue cultures and try to determine whether or not the absence of gravity has a significant effect on isolated human cells. (3) Galactic X-ray IEfapping.-Survey a large portion of the sky for X-ray sources of very low flux and gather spectral data of limited resolu- tion of the sources. PAGENO="0352" 348 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION (4) Potato Rospiration.-To determine whether sprouting potatoes will change their rhythmic biological processes when subjected to a zero gravity environment. IMPORTANCE OF AAP-3 AND AAP-4 In the long term, a well-planned and adequately supported program of astro- nomy using orbital telescopes can contribute significantly to the resolution of important scientific problems. By extending the range of accessible wavelength.s and the levels of faintness, it can clarify the problem of stellar evolution and the origin of the universe. By permitting an increase in the sharpness of Images attained, it can permit an attack on the existence of remote planetary systems, some of which may harbor life. And by increasing the power and spectral bandwith over that obtainable on the ground, it can push even further the studies, of remote objects initiated with ground-based instruments. It is worth noting that many of the general philosophical questions for which such a program has great implications have great interest for the general public. The sun is the ultimate source of all energy on the earth, and natural con- version of this energy has provided us with such resources as oil, coal, and wood. It has been estima:ted that in the last 100 years, the world has used an amount of energy approximately equivalent to the quantity consumed in the previous 1800 years. In the last century, the increase in energy used has been tenfold and the rise in increased consumption is continuing. A major and largely untapped source of energy is that obtained directly from te sun in the form of solar energy. Approximately 32,000 times as much energy as the human race is currently using reaches the earth's surface each year. Were we able to efficiently harness a sizeable portion of this energy, our energy source problem could be solved. Therefore, a better understanding of the sun, its activities, and its influence upon the earth is basic to practical applications. The ATM, with its' improved capabilities and techniques, will provide major contributions toward a better understanding of these questions. Initial steps are being taken by NASA to develop an optimized space astronomy program. Studies have been made in this regard and others are currently in process. NASA is working with the National Academy of Sciences and with some `of the leading astronomers to develop the best approach to a spaceborne general astronomical observatory. Additionally, ATM will establish the basic technological advances, enabling us to achieve a large space-borne astronomical observatory. It is expected that it would be man-tended in that man would maintain it, focus and repair instru- ments, replace parts as required and change and return film. The ATM and OAO are current development steps being conducted in parallel, leading toward this objective. In gathering data regarding solar phenomena, the ATM incorporates man into the data gathering loop and also provides for the use of photographic film for obtaining high resolution data at a high data rate. The OAO, being an automated spacecraft carrying instrumentation to study stellar astronomy, pro- vides experience in long term operation of astronomical scientific instrumenta- tion in a space environment. The combination of these two programs provides `the logical development know-how to obtain the currently viewed optimum astronomy program. The Apollo Telescope Mount experiment has been endorsed by the President's Science Advisory Committee. The Committee has stated in its February, 1967 report that astronomy is an appropriate choice as a primary objective in our National Space Program. In addition, the Committee envisions an evolutionary development of earth orbiting astronomical facilities designed to take advantage of the unique opportunities which are offered by observations from space. The ATM will provide the basis for future work in stellar astronomical observations as well as expanded capability for solar astronomy studies. To not accomplish the AAP-3 and AAP-4 flights within the concepts described herein will seriously curtail long duration astronomical observations in space by man. Without AAP-3 and AAP-4, the maximum time available for manned experiments of this type would be limited by the present Apollo capability which is 14 days maximum. The continuous gathering of solar data by such equipment as the ATM and the ultimate large space laboratories of the future, will provide man on earth with fundamental information on which to `base practical applications which will benefit his own welfare. PAGENO="0353" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 349 RESOURCES The fiscal year 1967 and 1908 Increments of funding required for the AAP-3 and AAP-4 flights are tabulated as follows: Apollo Applications program-Resources summary (In millions of dollarsi Fiscal year 1967 Fiscal year 1968 Apollo Applications: AAP-3 AAP-4 Subtotal Basic Apollo hardware:' AAP-3 AAP-4 Subtotal - Total 6.0 12.2 13.1 34.8 18.2 47.9 55.4 38~3 24.2 22.2 93.7 -~ 111.9 94.3 1 Apollo procured equipment for alternate use by AAP. APOLLO APPLICATIONS MISSIONS FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1969 The first two Apollo Applications missions will demonstrate the ability to employ a concept of revisitation and reuse of major equipment stored in orbit. This capability-will then be extended to approach continuous operations in the late 1969 time period. In this way new experimental packages can be ferried to the workshop to carry out more detailed observations of the earth and sun. Emphasis will be placed on weather observations, with man evaluating new scientific instruments and techniques to better comprehend the factors affecting the earth's weather as an aid to improved predictions and leading eventually to possible control of storm systems and general climatic conditions. A significant aspect in the utilization of the revtsitation and reuse concept is the ability to sustain men in this orbiting observation post. Can man perform effectively and usefully in the space environment for periods up to a year? The ferry and `resupply concept as planned for the 1969 period will allow crews to be sustained and to operate in the embryonic space station for such periods of time. If man is ultimately to journey to his neighbor planets this ability must be demonstrated. Preliminary investigations are also necessary to design and improve instru- ments and devices required for orbital observations of the earth's resources. These investigations in 1969 will provide better information on overall resources existing on the surface of the earth and will lead to more complete earth resource's surveys beginning in the 1970's. MISSION MODES AND RELATED EQUIPMENT As now planned we would revisit and reuse the embryonic space station, placed in orbit `by Apollo Applications flights~ 1 through 4, through additional flights, beginning in calendar year 1969. These flights will be of increasing duration and open-ended for up to 90 day's for each mission. We would thus build up to nearly a continuous manned operation of the Orbital Workshop and Apollo Telescope Mount. - With appropriate overlapping of succeeding Apollo Applications flights using the uprated Saturn I and Apollo Command and Service Modules, we can inter- change crews and can build up operational and biomedical data approching one year's duration on a given crew member. By overlapping 3-man crews, we can also provide u.p to 6 crew members for short periods of time working in the Orbital Workshop or with the ATM. The equipment planned for the missions starting in calendar year 1969 will support four launches approximately 90 days apart, each consisting of an up~ -rated Saturn I launch vehicle, and Command and Service Module spacecraft with resupply provisions. 76-265 0-67-pt. Z-23 PAGENO="0354" 350 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION In the event that the orbital configuration of the Orbital Workshop, Apollo Telescope Mount and associated equipment are in some way inoperative or not usable we have planned for a second Orbital Workshop and Apollo Telescope Mount to be available as back-up for flights in the calendar year 196~ time period. Our funding request for FY 68 includes the increment of obligational authority required to support this back-up hardware. EXPERIMENTS During the course of these missions, we will perform various scientific, tech- nological, engineering, medical and applications experiments. The scientific experiments will include areas of astronomy, space physics and bioscience for flight in low earth orbit. The technological and engineering experiments will deal primarily with eval- uation of advanced technology associated with future planned space stations or planetary missions. The medical experiments include apparatus to test and record human response during long duration flight to various stresses. Among auch `stresses are physi- cal exercise, variable gravity, and the performance of complex other human tas:ks. The applications experiments are planned to develop techniques foi measuring the effectiveness of man's participation in orbital meteorology. A large portion of the meteorology experiments is contained in a package of experiments known as Applications A (APP-A) (Figure 11). METEOROLOGY PAYLOAD PACKAGE (APP-A) OBJECTIVES * FLIGHT TEST EXPERIMENTAL METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION. * USE MAN S ABILITY TO DIRECT SENSORS TO METEOROLOGICAL EVENTS OF MOMENT * COMBINE NUMEROUS SENSORS FOR SIMULTANEOUS OBSERVATION AND CORRELATION OF DATA. * CONFIRM SPECTRAL SIGNATURES OF EARTH RESOURCES * FLIGHT TEST SOME INSTRUMENTS WHICH MAY CONTRIBUTE TO THE DETECTION OF AIR POLLUTION * IMPROVE KNOWLEDGE OF ATMOSPHERIC COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE * TAKE ADVANTAGE OF INCREASED PAYLOAD CAPACITY AND VOLUME PROVIDED BY AAP MISSIONS. EXPECTED FLIGHT READINESS DATE: MID 1969 NASA HQ ML66-9876 11-15-66 FIGURE 11 APPLICATIONS A (AAP-A) The Applications A experiments are planned to develop techniques for and to measure the effectiveness of man s participation in orbital meteorology Meteor ological investigations will afford the opportunity to evaluate a number of instru ments establish their flight worthiness and to examine man s capability to control or modify the experiments. This experiments package affords an excellent opportunity to ifl% estigate space concepts for orbital flight before they are applied to long life unmanned meteor ological satellites for continuous worldwide weather forecasting. In this respect, PRINCIPAL EXPERIMENTS * DAY- NIGHT CAMERA SYSTEM * DIELECTRIC TAPE CAMERA SYSTEM * MILLIMETER WAVE PROPAGATION * MULTI -SPECTRAL PHOTOGRAPHY * IR TEMPERATURE SOUNDING *O2 & H2O MICROWAVE RADIOMETER * IR FILTER WEDGE SPECTROMETER * VISIBLE RADIATION POLARIZATION MEASUREMENTS * STELLAR REFRACTION DENSITY MEASUREMENTS * UHF SFERICS DETECTION * IR INTERFEROMETER SPECTROMETER * 15 MICRON GRATING SPECTROMETER * MULTI-CHANNEL RADIOMETER * SELECTIVE CHOPPER RADIOMETER PAGENO="0355" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 351 the use of manned missions will materially assist in accelerating the development of key experiments and techniques for a worldwide o~bservation system. Significant improvements in weather predictions depend upon data which bet- ter define initial state weather conditions on a global scale. All the data which are necessary for determining this initial state condition are not attainable through conventional weather forecasting networks because of the relative spac- ing of weather reporting stations. These early investigations will lead to more advanced systems which will re- sult in more accurate prediction of violent weather conditions; improve length and accuracy of weather forecasts; and provide greater understanding of the air pollution problem, leading to the development of air pollution countermeasures. REsouRcEs The initial FY 1968 plan that went forward to the Bureau of the Budget is shown on the Figure hA. Column 2 reflects the revised amounts that were re- quested in the President's Budget to Congress. Column 3 reflects the difference between Columns 1 and 2. Column 4 Is a statement of the impact of each of the funding reductions from Column 1. (The information presented in Figure hA is the same as the material provided on page 362 to answer Mr. Daddario's ques- tion "I would like to request for the record that Dr. Mueller provide us with those programs eliminated after having gone to the Bureau of the Budget.") The fiscal year 1967 and 1968 increments of funding required for the Apollo Applications missions are tabulated as follows: [In millions of dollars] Fiscal year 1967 Fiscal year 1968 Fiscal year 1967 Fiscal year 1968 Basic hardware Mods for long duration Science ATM 24.0 13.5 (20.1) 11.7 8.4 (2.1) 167.4 66.8 (86.7) 36.9 13.5 17.0 5.0 1.7 12.6 (35.2) Experiments Land landing and 6-man capability Synchronous orbit capa- bility Medical Habitability MissIon support Total 1.0 1. 1 .8 14.2 5.3 80.0 11.7 18.5 5.0 18.3 30.0 50.3 454.7 APP-A APP-B Extended lunar Other earth orbital Definition Technology PY 1968 0000111 PLAN (Millions of Dollars) APOLLO APPLICATIONS INITIAL REVISED ~ IMPACT SPACE VEHICLES 309.9 263.7 - 46.2 Reduce rate of buildup of long - - duration and re-use capability. Defer development of extended lunar capability one year. ExPERIMENTS 235.0 140.7 -94.3 Reduce effort related to definition of experiment payloads (stellar astronomy, medical, meteorological, earth resources) for CaleRdar Year 1970 and beyond. Defer development of synchronous flight. Defer develop- ment of extended lunar exploration, experiment payloads one year. MISSION SUPPORT 81.8 50.3 - 31.5 Reduced requirements based en reduced - - experiments. Delay nods to Mission Control Center at Houston relating to real time experiment readout. APOLLO APPLICATIONS TOTAL 626.7 454.7 -172.0 APOLLO ~5 ~Q~S -100.0 SPACE STATION 100.0 -0- -100.0 ATFACU4ENF IV Fiaunn hA PAGENO="0356" 352 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION APoLLo APPLICATIONS MISSIONS IN THE 1970's In the early 1970's, Apollo Applications missions can be expected to fall into three broad and, to some extent, overlapping groups: (1) In `some cases, they will be a continuation and extension of those activities that previous experience has shown t'o be valuable. (2) A second class will still be-aimed at the questions-"What can man do an'd what is worth doing in `space?" (3) A third group may `be more specifically oriented to the development and flight testing of components, subsystems, techniques, and operation's leading to an expanded capability in manned space flight. Taken aitogther, these missions will tell us when we are ready to take the n'ex't major `step in space, and whether it should be aimed at the planets, the moon, the earth, or some combination of these. When such a step has been decided, Apollo Applications missions may play a further role as a test `bed' for such `subsystems as power, life support, communications, guidance and naviga- tion, or even for whole spacecraft modules. OBJECTIVES EXTENDED FLIGHT CAPABILITY In the area `of extended space flight capa'bility, we will be looking for pragmatic data to answer such questions as: (1) What must be provided beyond subsistence to make space livable for prolonged periods? (2) How can `space flight `be made simpler and less expensive? (3) How can we repair an'd maintain spacecraft in flight for extended periods? (4) How can we `best insure astronaut safety? (5) How can we streamline our operating procedures? (6) How can `return to earth `be simplified? (7) How can we get greater mobility in extravehicular operations to per- mit safe and easy construction `of large assemblies in space? (8) What crew size should be planned for planetary missions of one to two year duration? (9) What living and recreation facilities are needed? (10) Is artificial gravity worth the price, or is it an absolute need? (11) How big should a space station be, and what facilities should it provide? (`12) What `is the best way `to use man in support of the mission objectives? LUNAR EXPLORATION In the area of `lunar exploration, we will be accumulating data to help answer questions such `as: (1) Wha't is the `surface structure of the moon? (2) Isthereacore? (3) Are there active volcanoes? (4) How wa's the moon formed? (5) Wha't does it tell us about the earth? (6) Wha't does `it tell us about `the solar system? (7) Are there traces of living organisms? (8) What does it take `to support a man on the moon and allow him to do effective exploration? (9) What kind of lunar vehicle is needed? (10) Can he make use of materials found on the moon? (11) Is `there anything worth exploiting `on the moon? (12) What exploration is `best done by `men? By robot? (13) Is the moon a good `base f'or an astronomical observatory? (14) What can we learn from photography and other remote sensing from lun'ar orbit? (15) Are `the polar areas essentially the same as the equatorial? PAGENO="0357" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 353 ASTRONOMY In the area of astronomy, we will be attacking such questions as: (1) What can be learned about the fundamental nature of the sun, using observations at wavelengths that are obscured by the earth's atmosphere? (2) What can we learn about other planets, using the greater detail ob- servable from space? (3) What is the nature of the celestial sources of x-ray radiation that have been observed by rocket born sensors? (4) Are there other sources of high energy radiation (e.g. gamma rays)? (5) What can `be learned from low frequency radio waves that do not penetrate the ionosphere? (6) It is practical and worthwhile to operate a large astronomical ob- servatory in space? (7) How can man's presence best contribute to astronomy in space? As an observer? As a mechanic? (8) Do the benefits of astronomy from synchronous orbit outweigh the additional cost? EARTH OBSERVATION In the area of earth observations from space, we will look for answers to such questions as: (1) Can more accurate weather predic'tion be made using more detailed observations from space? (2) How well can the remote measurement of wind velocity, moisture content, temperature, pressure, etc., be made? (3) What altitude is best for different kinds of observations? (4) How does solar activity interact with the earth's atmosphere to effect weather? Crops? Communications? Magnetic activity? (5) Can the observation of rainfall and snow cover lead to better water management? (6) C;an the observation of crops and forests from space help in im- proving the production and distribution of food? (7) Can observations from space help to control the pollution of air and water? (8) How much detail is needed for useful observations? (9) What wavelengths or groups of wavelengths yield the most valuable data? (10) How frequently should observations be made? (11) What is man's proper role in observations of the earth from space? WEIGHTLESS ENVIRONMENT FOR EXPERIMENTATION In addition to the above major areas of activity, Apollo Applications will provide a facility In which scientists can conduct experiments which exploit the welghtlessnes and other attributes of the space environment. These will attach such questions as: (1) How are the growth and activity of plants and animals affected by weightlessness? (2) How are the daily life rhythms of plants and animals affected by removing them from their normal environment and 24 hr. daily cycle? (3) What is the behavior of fluids and gasses in a weightless condition? (4) How is the sense of balance affected by weightlessness? (5) How do animals adjust to gravity after a prolonged period of weight- lessness? (6) How are the functions of the bodily organs affected by weightlessness? (7) Will observations of biological specimens under weightlessness pro- vide better understanding of their normal function? (8) Are there beneficial effects of weightlessness that could be exploited? MISSION PLANNING Mission assignments for Apollo Applications in the 1970's are of necessity tentative and still under study. Early AAP missions are contingent on events in the Apollo program. Many problems that might arise in the Apollo peogram would not impact AAP. For example, a problem associated with the Saturn PAGENO="0358" 354 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION V/Apollo flight may not impact Saturn I/Apollo hardware used by AAP for early missions As a matter of fact the AAP planning and scheduling is consistent with and would not be changed by moderate difficulties or moderate success in the basic Apollo program In the event that Apollo hardware is not available for AAP usage the AAP payloads for the early missions will be stored for later usage on follow on missions The alternative schedules for AAP will be determined after analysis of the situation at that time The storage and maintenance of the AAP hard ware will involve increased cost However the AAP payloads will be available for modifications and improvements while In storage thus permitting the experiments in the payload package to be kept abreast of the state of the art Thus the experiments will be maintained in a configuration to obtain the quality and quantity of data consistent with the latest scientific and engineering techniques Definition is underway for a large module which could be placed in orbit by a Saturn V vehicle and provide the capability of one year s manned operations in earth orbit Early concepts of this one year module include an Advanced Orbital Workshop or prototype Manned Space Station Sufficient experiments and equipment would be provided for a one-year duration, with periodic resupply missions (both crew and expendables) being provided by additional flights of the uprated Saturn I with Command and Service Modules. The configuration of systems involved with this one year module represents an initial validation of the types to be used in manned planetary missions. Another Saturn V Apollo Applications mission is a mission in lunar orbit to perform mapping and survey operations which Will provide ac~urate mapping and high resolution stereo photography in the polar areas of the moon which will not have been covered previously Subsequent Saturn V flights are planned for extended lunar surface e"~ploration Our planning for these lunar surface missions requires 2 Saturn V flights per year beginning in 1970 Present plan ning also includes additional lunar mapping and survey operations from. lunar orbit at a rate of 1 per year. One of the results expected from this extended lunar exploration will be information relating to the origin and evolution of the moon with possible sig nificance to the understanding of the origin and evolution of the earth. Operations utilizing the Saturn V launch vehicle in the 1970's also include extended manned operations and stellar astronomy from synchronous earth orbit. A manned earth orbital telescope in synchronous orbit offers large poten- tial returns in terms of determining the dimension and origins of the universe Such an instrument utilizing up to 120 inch optics should increase our capability for resolving celestial objects by a factor of 20, extend range by four magnitudes of brightness and allow observations into the infrared and ultraviolet ranges Such a telescope should be able to detect planets the size of Jupiter in orbit about the closest star Alpha Centauti Such a discovery would be an initial indication of solar systems similar to ours and therefore the possible presence of life forms existing beyond our solar system. APPLICATIONS EXPERIMENTS The experiments planned for Apollo Applications missions in the. 1970's are now being defined A funding increment is Included in the FY 1968 budget to support this definition activity The categories of experiments are (1) Corn munication and Navigation experiments; (2) Meteorological, experiments; and (3) Natural Resources experiments. COMMUNICATION AND NAVIGATION EXPEIiIMENTS The objectives of the Communication and Navigation experiments will include: (1) Control and coordination of all air traffic while flying over the ocean. (2) The development of position fixing data to provide for all weather global navigation by sea and by air. (3) The development of improved air-sea emergency, search and rescue aids. (4) The development of techniques to broadcast voice and television directly to home receivers, on a global basis. (5) The development of improvements in spacecraft to ground communi- cations and space vehicle tracking aids. PAGENO="0359" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 355 METEOROLOGICAL EXPERIMENTS Meteorological experiments in the 1970's will be extensions of the experiments carried out in the 1969 missions. There are two basic purposes for the continued research and development in meteorology. One is the basic scientific pursuit to explore and understand th.e nature and behavior of the atmosphere. The second results from the impact of the weather on daily operations, private and public, and upon the economy of nations. NATURAL RESOURCES EXPERIMENTS The Natural Resources experiments cover specific applications to agricul- ture/forestry, geology/hydrology, oceanography/marine technology and geography. The following principal fields associated with agriculture/forestry will be explored in order to determine if useful data is obtainable from space for identi- fication and management of available resources. (1) a better understanding of the emission and reflectance properties of biological and physical materials through spectrophotometric analysis in the laboratory, on the ground, and from low altitudes. (2) Identifying the single or combined wavelengths in the electromagnetic spectrum that will yield unique and consistent imagery as it is acquired from progressively higher altitudes. (3) Specifying the minimum accuracy standards and quality requirements of data for the various agriculture and forestry application areas. (4) Identification and analyses of economic benefits of the application of space technology to agriculture and forestry. The objective of applying space technology to the field of geology/hydrology will be to improve the utilization of the earth's land, mineral, and water resources through the use of repetitive global surveys. The principal fields of interest to be analyzed in formulating the manned earth-orbital experiment program are: (1) Oeology: Field mapping, economic geology, petrology and mineralogy, geomorphology and tectonophysics. (2) Hydrology: Basins, streams and rivers, percolation and runoff, rain- fall and, evapo-transpiration. The objective of applying space technology to oceanographic purposes will be to improve utilization of the world's oceans through the use of repetitive global surveys. Repetitive surveys will include the following: (1) PhysIcal phenomena of the sea which vary markedly with time. (2) Physical phenomena of the sea which are relatively invariant with time. (3) Economic geography of the sea. (4) Irr~proved displays of global oceanographic information suitable for direct utilization by technical, commercial, and scientific communities. The application of space technology to the field of geography will be used for repetitive global surveys. These surveys will provide the following: (1) Compete multisesisor coverage of the earth's surfaee~ thus' eliminating reliance on incomplete coverage of major portions of the earth. (2) Current information of natural and cultural phenomena, thus elimi- nating reliance on old, incorrect and outmoded data. (3) Seasonal coverage of the earth's surface which will enable analysis of the extent and rate of seasonal changes in the earth's geography. (4) Comparative coverage which will be acquired from time to time to understand the extent and frequency of long term changes in the earth's geography. LAND LANDING CL~PABILITY The Apollo Applications land landing capability, as planned, will present a major step in the advancement of a technology which will reduce the possibill. ties of crew injury and equipment damage during landings. It will previde flexibility in `the accomplishment of Apollo Applications and future manned space flight missions. In addition, the land landing capability will facilitate reuse of Command Modules returned from space, with attendant cost savings. The system will be available for first flight tests In 1971. Follow-on Apollo Applications mission planning involves full use 0f the land landing system on all flights. PAGENO="0360" 356 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION The land landing s~ystem technical objectives cover the capabilities of a descent system to provide a greater glide range. Maneuvering controls to provide the crew with the ability to make a controlled touch down is another technical objec- tive (Figure 12). The system will provide decreased impact velocities while re- taining the original water landing capability. Many of the Apollo Applications program missions are of long duration and are open-ended. The capability to effect a land landing as well as a water landing thus increases missioa abort flexibility. The lower impact velocities will lessen the chances of crew injury and provide greater assurance of crew safety. To meet the technical objectives of the Apollo Applications landing system several gliding parachutes have been identified and tests performed on small scale modein. They are the cloverleaf, the parawing, and the sailwing (Figure 13). Sufficient development effort on the cloverleaf configuration has verified its capability when used in conjunction with retro rockets for impact attenuation. Modifications to the Command Module are minimum and consist of structural configurations for storage and deployment of the parachutes and the mounting of the retro rockets. The parawing and the sailwing have greater glide ranges and maneuverability control and if selected for the Apollo Applications program, could obviate the necessity for retro rockets. The reduced landing accelerations will minimize current crew seat require- ments, resulting in more usable volume in the Command Module. Existing couches can be removed and replaced with storable light-weight net couches. This will provide a capability for carrying up to 6 astronauts for short duration resupply ferry flights (Figure 14). The net couches further provide more crew volume for experimentation and other mission required operations. Studies are currently being conducted for refurbishment and reuse of Apollo Command Modules.. Soft landing recovery and reuse provides potential savings in refurbishment costs over that of water recovered spacecraft because of the noncorrosive land environments. APOLLO APPLICATIONS LAND LANDING * DESIGN OBJECTIVES * COMMAND MODULE REUSABILITY * INCREASED CREW COMPLEMENT * REDUCED WATER RECOVERY FORCES * INCREASED LAN DING FLEXIBILITY * DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS * GLIDING CHUTES * MANEUVERABILITY CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS NASA HQ MC67-5763 2-21-67 Fiounu 12 PAGENO="0361" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 357 FIGURE 13 FIGURE 14 PAGENO="0362" 358 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION TIMING OF FoLLow-oN PROCUREMENT Another consideration regarding the Apollo Applications program is the pro- curement cycle for Apollo/Saturn hardware. Figures 15 and 16 summarize the status of Saturn launch vehicle and Apollo spacecraft procurement as of Febru- ary 1967. Note that all of the uprated Saturn I launch vehicles have been pro- cured and that the last of these are now in fabrication and assembly. Of the 15 Saturn V launch vehicles provided by the Apollo program all have been or dered except the last five However long lead procurement has been authorized for these vehicles and they will soon be in the Apollo pipeline Of the 21 Corn mand and Service Modules all have been ordered except the last three and long lead procurement for these has been initiated All of the 15 Lunar Modules have been ordered and they are in various stages of activity in the Apollo pipe line. Figure 17 shows the lead time relationship between the launch vehicles for the basic Apollo program and the follow-on Apollo Applications program. The vari- ous elements of the launch vehicles have slightly different lead times but planning is such that all launch vehicle entities arrive at Kennedy Space Center at the proper time for integration and launch. The lead time problems currently faced-maintaining continuity of the capa- bility developed for Apollo-are evident. Similar situations exist for the space- craft and other Apollo equipment. This effort will permit accomplishment of significant results w ith the first follow on Apollo Application Saturn V vehicles and it will provid. a means of maintaining our national capability. It will also allow a 4 per year rate in the future to meet the follow.-on mission goals. The President's Science Advisory Oommittee in its report published in February 1967 recommended an average 4 per year rate for the saturn V which can be provided if the required funding is available. SATURN LAUNCH VEHICLE PROCUREMENT STATUS AS OF FEB. 25, 1961 IN FABRI - ORDERED BUT LONG LAUNCH STAGE USED ASSEMBLY CATION AND NOT YET IN LEAD TOTAL VEHICLE COMPLETED ASSEMBLY FABRICATION PROCURE UPRATED S-lB 3 7 2 12 S-lB SATURN I S-IVB 3 7 2 12 S-IVB lU. 3 4 5 12 lU. SATURNV SiC - 5 5 - 15S1C S-Il - 3 7 - 15S-Il S-IVB 1 4 5 - 6 16S-IVB IU - 3 5 2 5 151U NASA HQ MC66-5906 2-27 -67 FIGURE 15 PAGENO="0363" 1 9 0 8 NASA AUTHORIZATION 359 APOLLO SPACECRAFT PROCUREMENT STATUS AS OF FEB. 25, 1961 BLOCK E BLY IN FABRI - ORDERED BUT SPACECRAFT DESIGN- USED ASS M CATION AND NOT YET IN PROCURE- TOTAL _________ ATION _ COMPLETED ASSEMBLY FABRICATION MENT _ COMMAND BLOCK I 3 3 - - 6 BLOCK I MODULE BLOCK II - 2 1 3 3 15 BLOCK II GRAND TOTAL=21 SERVICE BLOCK I 3 3 6 BLOCK I MODULE BLOCK II 2 1 3 3 15 BLOCK II GRAND TOTAL21 MODULE 3 4 8 GRAND TOTALI5 NASA HQ MC67-5907 2-27-67 FIGURE 16 ~, *~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ( ~ ~E' ~ ~ UPRATEDSAtLJRNI\ 4~ ~ ~t ~ ~; ~ ;~` t~ ft p ~ c LA#Ap~1t ~j% ~ ~b*.fl 1*k~ ~ ~; ~ 14 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~i. ~- Ce' ~ $$~b 4L T~~\t~t ~ ~ `, ~~1:!a;t ;t$~ ~ k h ~ ~ ~ ~ :A M ~ ~ j ~ R ~ ;AtiJ,;Nt~;: ~ ~ ~:*yP . ~< t;~ ~ I 2 ~ , > ~ ~ : : ; ~ ~ ~ `~:Ii~ ~1%r j ; ~1)t~34 ~ ~ `jS~L. ~ Lt Mt~s1~ ~ 4~ ~ `~t33~ *4 ~n\~ ~P:rf!; ~ :` ~ ~: ~ ~ *~~jriP ~ ¼ ~ , ~rntu~ ~ ~~Aek~ g FIGURE 17 PAGENO="0364" 360 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION SUMMARY OF APOLLO APPLICATIONS BENEFITS Manned and unmanned space activities present many exciting prospects for great benefits, not only for this nation, but for the entire world. Such possibilities could include meteorological stations to track and study the nature and behavior of the atmosphere and the effects of solar activity on weather. It has been estimated by the National Academy of Sciences that through better weather forecasting alone, farmers, fuel producers, public utili- ties, construction industries, and water managers can save about $2.5 billion annually. Research stations to map and study the earth's resources which could provide a better way of life for millions of people is another possibility. Astronomical observatories to conduct solar and stellar observations outside the filtering effects of the earth's atmosphere is a third possibility. A fourth is assembly, mainte- nance and operation of communication stations potentially capable of signifi- cantly increasing reliable world-wid~ communications and television coverage. Navigation and traffic control stations to achieve increased efficiency of trans- portation, particularly the operation of ships and aircrafts, is a fifth possibility. Furthering space technology by developing and using man's ability to assemble, test, repair and maintain large space structures is a sixth possibility. In addi- tion, the presence of man in space with his abilities to reason, to analyze, to make decisions, and to improvise can contribute much to the scope and range of space activity. For example, Apollo Applications experiments performed by man on a wide variety of sensing devices can test the feasibility and utility of ad- vanced types of meteorological observations and garth resource surveys from space. These experiments and tests will provide the data for decisions on future space systems-manned or unmanned-to derive additional practical benefits f rem space observaitions. To develop `the caj$abillties to éarry out such missions, we must learn much more about man's capabilities and limitations in space flight. We must deter- mine, for example, how long man can operate effectively in space withowi return- ing to earth. We must learn the most effective means of accomplishing extra- vehicular activities such as those which would be required for the assembly of large structures in space and we must develop the most efficient and economIcal means of control and communications. The means to study these requirements and to do it economically are provided by the Apollo-developed hardware. The Apollo Applications program is designed to make use of this capability. Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Chairman? Mr. T]~aUE. Mr. Daddario. Mr. DADDARIO. When you discussed the Apollo Applications last year you expressed the importance of receiving funds necessary to maintain the Apollo Applications hardware capability. You stated that this year would be essential to then follow through on the pro- gram. Were you talking about the same amounts that you are now proposing to us this year? Dr. MuEuaiR. No, sir. The amounts that we talked of last year as holding open an option were associated with a minimum fiscal year 1968 budget of some $626 million I believe as compared with the $454.7 million we have here. Mr. DADDARIO. That is the reason I asked the question. I think that if anything in our authorization budget is going to be attacked, it will be this. You have already then taken into consideration knowl- edge now available to you which was not available last year. In the recommendations you then made to us you have been able to come up with a budget that recommends that is some $200 million less for this year than you thought it would have been at this time last year? Dr. MUELLER. That is correct. PAGENO="0365" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 361 Mr. DADDARIO. Can you go into that? What did you do? How were you able to lower this amount of money and what effect does it have upon the program? Is is going to be a stronger program or have you already lowered your sights? What is the whole background of that? Dr. Mui~ur~a. We have done several things. We have introduced a new program concept at an early date and that involved the de- velopment of the concept of the spent stage and the use of the Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) using the Lunar Module attached to the spent stage or the S-IVB orbital workshop. This orbital workshop ATM concept permitted us to provide a single development of a set of com- plex instruments that we could reuse and it is that basic concept of reusing the hardware which has made it possible to save this $200 million. In addition to that, however, we had to cut back on our basic development of experiments, cutback to the absolute minimum that Dr. Newell and Dr. Adams feel will sustain a meaningful scientific effort in years to come. What we have done, therefore, is to do two things, basically. One is to invent a new approach to carrying out space activities in the Manned Space Flight program and implement that with the workshop and the Apollo Telescope Mount. The second thing we have done is to reduce the funding in the experiment area to a minimum consistent with maintaining a viable utilization of this workshop and the Apollo Telescope Mount in Earth orbit. Mr. DADDARIO. How did you do with the Bureau of the Budget with this proposal? Did you come out with what you asked for or did they reduce it? Dr. MUELLER. We proposed $626 million for fiscal year 1968 for the Apollo Applications program. In addition to that, we proposed an- other $100 million for the beginnings of a dev~k~pment of a space station. The Bureau of the Budget said under the circumstances, they could not support that level of funding. They asked us to eliminate the funding for the space station and to reduce the Apollo Applica- tions program funding to an absolute minimum. Mr. DADDARIO. When you went to the Bureau of Budget, you figured for this program some $600 million and you had an additional request for some $100 million to get going in space on your space station. Dr. MUELLER. That is correct. Mr. DADDARIO. The space station can be considered a separate pro- *gram? Dr. MUELLER. That is correct, separate from Apollo Application. Mr. DADDARIO. One you can pick up at a later time? Dr. MUELLER. That is correct. Mr. DADDARIO. And that is what you intend to do? Dr. Mu1~LER. Yes. Mr. DADDARIO. Then this figure represents, if not a drastic cut, certainly a very large cut from your original request? Dr. MUELLER. Yes. PAGENO="0366" 362 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Mr. DADDARIO. Do you believe, however, that it will still allow you to do the job that you need to do? Dr. MUELLER. It is my belief that we will be able to do the job that we need to do. But you have to recognize that a program of this sort does not have built into it the ability to solve problems It is, if you will, a high risk program, not a risk in terms of lives or safety, but a risk in terms of can we in fact meet these objectives that we have set out for ourselves Mr DADDARIO Are you saying that you will maintain this same objective within the $454 million rather than have stretched it out over the next few years? Dr. MUELLER. We have not maintained the same objectives. We have, however, held onto the primary objectives that we had before, that is long duration flight and the use of the orbital telescope for solar observations in the beginning of the development of the manned or bital telescope program Those two major objectives we have held onto. We have had to shear off many desirable, in fact, essential experiments in terms of future developments. We have held onto those that appeared to have the most promise for immediate payoff in the area of applications experiments. Mr. DADDARIO. I would like to request for the record that Dr. Muel- ler provide us with those programs eliminated after having gone to the Bureau of the Budget (The following is submitted for the record:) The attached table (attachment I~) is in reply to Mr. Daddario and Mr. Fuqua who posed the above questions for the record Column I of Attachment IV shows the initial fiscal year 1968 plan that went forward to the Bureau of the Budget Column 2 reflects the revised amounts that were requested in the President s Budget to Congress. Column 3 requests the difference between columns 1 and 2. Column 4 is a statement of the impact of each of the funding reductions from column 1. ATTACHMENT IV Fiscal year 1968 budget plan [Millions of dollars] Initial Revised Decrease Impact Apollo applications: Space vehicles Experiments Mission support Total Apollo Space station 309.9 235. 0 ~ 81.8 263.7 ~ 140.7 50. 3 46.2 94. 3 31.5 . Reduce program assurance for long dura- tion. Delay extended lunar capability i year Reduces definitIon of experiment payloads (stellar astronomy, medical, meteorologi- cal, earth resources) for calendar year 1970 and beyond. Delay synchronous flight of cluster. Delay extended lunar exploration, experi- ment payloads 1 year. Reduced requirements based on reduced experiments. Delayed mods to Mission Control Center at Houston relating t~ real time experi- ment readout. 626. 7 454.7 172. 0 2,706.5 100. 0 2,606.5 0 100. 0 100. 0 PAGENO="0367" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 363 Then I would like to ask one last question. The Apollo Applications program is now presented to the committee in the amount of $454 million. If, in fact, it is low, would it then be worth, let us say, a $300,000 expenditure in order to accomplish Apollo Applications activities that you would like to have? Do you reach the point somewhere where it is better not to go ahead and is the $454 million pretty much the low water mark in that regard? Dr. MIXELLER. There is nothing that I know of that one can do to reduce the costs on the space vehicles without eliminating a space vehicle in the future. You either have to give up the Saturn I or the Saturn V since you couldn't eliminate the spacecraft and still fly. All of those are involved in the number under "space vehicles" as we will see in a moment. In the experiment area, we have cut back very drastically experiment developments, and I believe that we are already at a point where the scientific community feels that we are in- adequately supporting the development of future experiments. Mr. Ti~&uui~. Then, George, are we going to be sending vehicles half loaded with experiments? Dr. MUELLER. No, we are not going to be sending vehicles half loaded in the years immediately ahead. The basic thing that we have had to cut out is the early development of extended lunar capabilities for example. That phase had to be deferred by a year. We had to cut out the development of new kinds of Earth sensing experiments beyond the first packages. When I say we have a high- risk program, what I am really saying in this regard is that if our judgments are wrong and if we haven't made exactly the right set of decisions at this point in time in an area in which, after all, we aren't that sure that we are going to be right about, then we may not be able to stay up for 2 months. We may have to come back down after only 1 month or even 2 weeks. We don't have the alternatives that would permit us to go back. There is a considerable risk that the very desirable things that we are setting out to achieve using the Apollo Applications program, we may not be able to achieve because of the restriction on funding. Mr. TEAGIIE. It is the wise thing to do to have each one of our vehicles have the maximum number of experiments on when they fly? Dr. MUELLER. I agree. Mr. TEAGUE. Would you include for the record the request Mr. Daddario made of the items that were cutout? Dr. MUELLER. Yes, sir. Mr. FULTON. Along the lines that we have been speaking about, I would like to have estimates put in the record of the monetary result of a 1- or a 2-year postponement on the Apollo Applications program and also the effect on the program in view of the present installations which we already have. I would like the cost put in and I would like an estimate on what would happen on the same factors if we put the Apollo Applications program temporarily in mothballs for an indefinite time and then tried sometime in the future to pick it up again, so that that would be an indefinite suspension. One other point that I want to finish with. On the asteroid Icarus that is coming within 4 million miles of the Earth's surface by June 1968, this asteroid is a part of the asteroid belt between Mars and Jupiter and could give us an insight into what asteroids are and help PAGENO="0368" 364 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION understand this unknown danger for astronauts who are going to operate in this asteroid belt of some 50,000 asteroids. So the question is: When this asteroid comes within 4 million miles, why don't we look at it? It is going to be several kilometers in diam- eter, so that we might be able to acquire a sample. We might try to put it in orbit. Mr. FUQUA. What level of funding would be the optimum amount to have the maximum amount of experiments on each payload that we could take advantage of? I agree with the chairman that we should not send half-loaded ve- hicles into orbit if at all possible. Where are we along in the program? What would be the level of funding that we could have for the opti- mum amount of experiments on each one? Dr. MUELLER. Let me hasten to assure you and the chairman that we are not sending half loaded vehicles into orbit in the calendar year 1968 and 1969 time period. The optimum funding level for the experi- ments to provide some alternatives and some future experiment devel- opment would involve almost all of the $200 million reduction that I mentioned.' Most of the $200 million that was cut out would appear in the AAP experiments line item and that is where the principal costs were taken out. What we have essentially done is to do what Mr. Fulton has sug- gested, and that is defer as well as we could, everything that could possibly be deferred and still leave us with a, viable program. Mr. FULTON. How much did you ask for originally? Dr. MUELLER. Roughly two and a half times the funds we have here in the experiments line item. Mr. FULTON. That is all. Mr. FUQUA. I think it would be helpful when you answer the ques- tion that Mr. Daddario asked about the breakdown, if you could break them down into the three line items, space vehicles, experiments, and mission support. (Information requested is as follows:) ATTACHMENT IV Fiscal year 1968 biulçjet plan [Millions of dollars] Initial Revised Decrease Impact Apollo applications: Space vehicles Experiments Mission support Total Apollo Space station 309.9 235. 0 81.8 263.7 140. 7 50. 3 46.2 94. 3 31. 5 Reduce program assurance for long dura- tion. Delay extended lunar capability 1 year. Reduces definition of experiment payloads (stellar astronomy, medical, meteorologi- cal, earth resources) for calendar year 1970 and beyond. Delay synchronous flight of cluster. Delay extended lunar exploration, experi- ment payloads 1 year. Reduced requirements based on reduced experiments. Delayed mods to Mission Control Center at Houston relating to real time experi- ment readout. 626.7 454.7 172. 0 2,706.5 100. 0 2,606.5 0 100.0 100. 0 PAGENO="0369" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 365 Dr. Mui~I1LER. Yes, sir. Mr. FUQUA. I think this would be very helpful. Mr. RUMSFE.LD. I thought you said two and a half times. Dr. Mt~.LLER. Mr. Fuqua asked me what the experimenters asked for. Mr. RUMSFELD. I see. Is it possible to give us a breakdown; and I don't find it here in backup books on the cost. per launch with the fact of experiments and mission support that go with each of the launches anticipated. Dr. MUElLER. Yes. But that can be done for the basic launch ve- hicle, Mr. Rumsfeld. Each package has a different set of experiments. It is different in each case. We can provide that information. (`Information requested is as follows:) Answer: We are engaged at NASA, not merely in landing an expedition on the moon, but in developing the whole range of technology to give the nation a rounded manned space flight capability. Thi~s development of itself has tre- mendous benefit for our whole country. It helps to demonstrate our advanced position in science and technology `before all the nations of the world. It has, an enormous impact on our educational system, challenging and ~timu- lating our youth to new standards of excellence. It creates basic new industries for our economy. It is producing immediate benefits of direct use to people here on earth. Whenever a laboratory develops a new scientific concept or a piece of hardware for space purpose~, the probability is high that the development will turn out to be useful somewhere in earth-bound life. Over the next 20 years, you will see an amazing parade of new products, improvements on old ones, and price cuts on expensive ones. In many cases, the origins of these new and revolutionary products will lie in research carried out as part of the national space effort. Just as the necessities of World War II led to such lasting innovations as the jet plane and aerosol spray, the exploration of space has already started a bone- ficient fallout of commercial products and proce~ses that promises profound effects on our economy and lives here on earth. The list is a long one: lightweight plastics, developed for use in rockets, are being used in the construction of railway tank cars that weigh only half as much as their steel counterparts; new metals, developed by space researchers, are now being used in oil refineries where their resistance to corrosion is required; seal- ants,, developed for the seams of spacecraft, are being used in caulking bathroom tiles and for sealing window~s of automobiles; an alkali silicate paint that resists weather, solvents, and radiation, has been marketed commercially. In addition to developing new products, space research has led to the discovery of new uses for old ideas and products. An example of this is the fuel cell, which was developed in the la~t century but found no marketable application until space researchers began to use it for supplying electrical power onboard the Gemini and Apollo spacecraft. Oommercially, the fuel cell is now being used to power experimental golf narts, tractors, spot welders, fork-lift trucks, and smog- free, electric automobiles of superior efficiency. In the field of medicine, we have already seen many benefits as a result of our space program. For example, the tiny bio-sensors used to monitor the astronauts' physical condition during flight are now being used in many hospitals to permit one nurse, seated at a central console, to monitor the condition of many patients at the same time. Another medical device stemming from our space research is a tiny radio trans- mitter which is s~yallowed by the astronaut and suspended in the stomach without surgery. This enables doctors to monitor his physical condition, especially thermal stresse~, gaseous conditions, and tensions. This device, which is only the size of a large vitamin capsule, also has extensive "earthly" application in the practice of medicine. The future holds promise of many more benefits to medicine through space re- search. In the past we have used studies of patients during periods of long bed- rest as an analogy to determine the effects of prolonged weightlessness in space. 76-265 O-67--pt. 2~--24 PAGENO="0370" 366 1 9 6 8 NASA AUTHORIZATION Now, there is promise that the reverse analogy will prove useful, and that our studies of weightlessness may provide information of help to the practice of medicine here on earth in cases where patients are required to spend long periods of time in bed. Perhaps one of the greatest benefits that will come to mankind through oui space research is a better understanding of what the healthy human being is and what he is capable of doing. The ordinary physician looks at many sick people in a normal earth environment; our space medicine people, in their work with the astronauts, are able to monitor healthy people in the "abnormal" environment of space. By changing the environment, we are able to get a different view of the mechanism that is the human body, and we are able to gain a better under- standing of just what a healthy human being is, and how he can be kept heaithy. The space program is thus in the forefront of a scientific and technological revolution that is changing radically our whole way of living here on earth. Any prediction of what will happen in the next 20 years is bound to be ultra- conservative. The Apollo Applications program proposed for initiation in the FY 19G8 budget will meet two basic objectives. The program of investigations and development to be carried forward will make unique contributions to practical applications, operational capabilities, science and technology. At the same time, it will place the nation in a position to assess, on the basis of valid scientific experimentation and actual experience, the value and feasibility of future space flights and the interrelated roles of manned and unmanned systems. (Mr Rumsfeld's request is further amplified in reply to a question by Chairman Teague on~p. 334.) Mr Rimrs~'isr~n I can see it would be unwise to go ahead with the original number of vehicles if you were going to cut the mission sup port and experiments to `i point where it wasn't worthwhile to buy the vehicles How many inseparable activities are involved here ~ How many ye hides are there, for example ~ Dr. MUELLER. Actually, there are four launches of the uprated Saturn I which produce two missions. In other words, we need `tbout 80,000 pounds of payload capability or a little more per mission in order first to set the workshop up and, second, to get the orbiting observatory up. We use a single launch in 1969 to resupply the work- shop plus the telescope. Now, it is turning out, as our studies pro- ceed, that if we can make these flights contiguous, it simplifies tre mendously the problems keeping this cluster operating Mr RUMSFELD You basically have two separable missions Dr. MUELLER. That is right. I think that it ought to he recognized that there is in fact a mini- mum rate at which ~ e can launch these vehicles and still maintain `t reasonable degree of competence in our launch crews and flight crews and in the ground support system. One of the constraints, actually, on the scheduling we have here is how few launches can we make a year and still have a viable operational team One of the problems is that we are already at what in my view is below the rate of launching that provides for maximum safety, for maximum effici~ ency and for maximum effectiveness We really are talking about an average rate of four launches of a vehicle a year. That would be one every three months except in the case of the Saturn I, which will be dual launches so there is one dual launch every 6 months and the trained crews don't maintain their proficiency. There is a forgetting cycle thit goes with this, too I am personally concerned as to whether or not we have an idequate launch rate to maintain `t viable teim PAGENO="0371" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 367 Mr. RuMs]1~LD. How many missions, if there are two missions ba- sically involved in the $454 million, how many were in the $626 million request which the Bureau of the Budget disapproved? Dr. MUELLER. Actually the same number of missions was provided at the $626 million level. There were, however, different missions in 1969 than we have in 1968. There are two missions in calendar year 1968 that we are talking about. In calendar year 1969 at the $626 million level, there were additional apparatus carried up to the vehicle that we are not now carrying. We will reuse the old equip- ment in 1969. That provides a great savings providing the old equip- ment is equipment that you really want to use. Mr. RUMSEELD. The figure, $454 million is five and a half times the $80 million for fiscal year 1967, yet when you compare the total expenditures for Apollo and Apollo Applications they are level. To combine them it is $2.99 billion in fiscal year 1966; $2.99 billion in fiscal year 1967; and $3 billion in fiscal year 1968. Is this just a coincidence? Dr. MUELLER. In a sense it is a coincidence and in another sense, I am sure that the Bureau of the Budget in carefully looking at our activities has said to itself: Is there a level at which one can operate. I think though that it is not a coincidence in that sense. In fact, the Bureau of the Budget has allowed us an increase in the amount required in the fiscal year 1968 manned space flight R. & D. program because they felt `that we do absolutely have to have this relatively slight increase. If my recollection is correct, we have actually gone up about $45 million in R. & D. in fiscal year 1968. Mr. RUMSEELD. Combining the two? Dr. MUELLER. In total the Bureau held back $60 million from NASA in fiscal year 1967, as part of the President's anti-inflation effort. Mr. RUMSFELD. With the $60 million of prior years? Dr. MUELLER. Yes. The $60 million was made available to us to cover fiscal year 1968 requirements. Literally the reason the Bureau of the Budget let us go up is that they couldn't find any way of bring- ing us down and still have a viable program. Mr. RUMSFELD. If you take your NASA request of $626 million and reduce it to this figure you are recommending $454 million, we are increasing to a level of $263 million in vehicles but we have cut back in the other areas which in fiscal year 1969 would have given us the capability of possibly making greater use of that original investment from an experimental standpoint? Dr. MUELLER. That is exactly right. Mr. RUMSFELD. I would like to talk about the space station for a minute. What were the specific goals that you set forth in the request to the Bureau of the Budget? What were the things that NASA hoped to gain? And to reverse that, what are `we losing `by not requesting, authorizing, and appropriating the $100 million for the beginning work on the space station? SPACE STATION NEEDS AND REQUIREMENTS The following statements `summarize the potential objectives and requirements of the space station. 1. The prime justification for a manned space station rests in the potential it provides for undertaking with a single space vehicle broad~based research and PAGENO="0372" 368 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION development programs in science and technology adressed to all of the space objectives of the United States as stressed in the National Space and Aeronautics Act of 1958. 2. In Earth Resources, a manned space station, with a discipline oriented staff onboard, can capitalize on the global synoptic overview to survey simultaneously many earth resources in hitherto inaccessible and undeveloped regions, and thus contribute greatly to the development of systems designed to alleviate growing world problems of production of food and consumable resources. Basic require- ments are a low-altitude orbit at an inclination of from 590 to 70°. 3. In Meteorology, a manned space station with scientist/observers abroad could provide the potential for an unequaled opportunity for the observation and description of meteorological phenomena on global, regional, and local scales; for the conduct of experiments with new sensors that would hasten the develop- ment of the full-scale observational satellite system; and for exploring the capability and effectiveness of sustaining or modifying an unmanned observa- tional satellites system. Much of the initial research and developmental effort can be conducted from an altitude of 200 mIles at an orbital Inclination of from 50° to 70°; however, in later phases of the program, observational opportunities in other orbits may be required to employ these potentials. 4. In Biology and Aerospace Medicine, a manned space station with trained observers and scientists affords an u.nexcelled opportunity to study the effect of long-term weightlessness on the physiology and human performance of man. It would provide a unique laboratory for studying basic life processes in a free gravity field which scientists believe will furnish insight into the basic laws governing life processes on earth. These programs can be conducted In a low orbit of any inclination. An onboard centrifuge capable of up to lg is required for studying men and animals. A capability of simulating the reentry g profile is also desired. 5. In Astronomy, a manned space station affords the opportunity to make immediate contributions to our knowledge of the universe through the use of intermediate size telescopes sensing radiation throughout the electromagnetic spectrum. The experience gained from the use of these instruments, together with the capability to develop further techniques and procedures onboard a manned space station in low orbit, will lead to the ultimate very large instruments which are probably best located in synchronous or higher orbit. 6. For Orbital Operations and Advanced Technology, a manned space station would provide the needed laboratory for developing the enormous variety of skills, techniques, procedures, training, subsystems, and equipment required for efficient utilization of man and systems in space. 7. A manned space station affords an opportunity to make immediate con- tribution to qualifying man and systems for long-duration missions such as the exploration of the near planets'. 8. As a guide to minimum requirements, it is suggested that programs of space systems research, development, and applications of tremendous significance to the national interest can be undertaken with a manned space space station capable of operation up to 5 years, either intermittently or continuously manned, in a low orbit (200 miles) of moderate inclination (50°), operated with a small station staff (8 to 12), and supplied by space systems derived from the existing manned space vehicle inventory. THE NEED FOR A SPACE STATION Table 1 identifies the fields of interest associated with the basic objectives of the Space Act. The disciplines of science and technology that have been found to be especially amenable to space exploitation are also shown. Specific programs in these disciplines have formed the nucleus of the unmanned and manned space programs of NASA since 1958. The activities shown in the last column include the objectives set forth for the present study and are indicative of activities for which the presence of man can be expected to contribute signifi- cantly or which cannot be undertaken at all without man's active participation. It is noted that if a manned space station could be operated to support activity in the disciplines of Biology, Astronomy, Orbital Operations, Long-Term Flight, Advanced Systems, Meteorology, and Earth Resources, a singular space facility PAGENO="0373" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 369 capable of supporting programs addressed to all of the objectives cited in the Space Act would exist. The usefulness of space The fundamental ways by which operations in space differ from those con- ducted on or near the ground are the guideposts to the manner in which space- based operations can be utilized for scientific and technological programs aimed at harnessing space for human welfare. Four highly useful and exploitable features of extended operations in space are these: (1) Comprehensive overview-Areas of the earth which are countrywide, continent-wide, or hemispheric in scope can be viewed for purposes of observa- tion or communication. (Earth Resources, Meteorojogy) (2) Absence of atmosphere.-Absence of atmosphere permits astronomical and astrophysical observations with a clarity and breadth not possible from earth. (Astronomy) (3) Weightlessness.-The weightlessness in space permits new insights into matter, energy, and lLfe processes through experiments and measurements not possible in earth's gravity field. It allows erection and assemblage of large structures without constraint of defiections due to weight. (Biology, Orbital Operations and Logistics., R and P in Advanced Technology, Long-Term Flight, Meteorology) TABLE I.-$pace act objectives Space Act of 1958 obJectives, sec. 102(o) Field of interest Activity or discipline Activity for man in space 1. Extension of human knowledge. 2. Increased efficiency of spacecraft. 3. Development of capabi- lities of spacecraft. 4. Utilization of space 6. Information exchange - -- ~ 8. Cooperation with Gov- ernment agencies. Science Technology ~Applications - -- I }~nt:rnationai Economics Physics, chemistry, biology, astronomy, medicine, planetary exploration, Launch vehicles, ground support, orbital operations, long-term flight systems. Communications, meteor- ology, cartography, re- sources, Earth sciences. ri~fleeijifl~Pro~raxns~ interns- Department of Defense, Department of Commerce, Department of the Interior, Department of Agriculture, etc. Biology, astronomy, long-term flight, aerospace medicine. Orbital operations, R. and D. In advance technology. Meteorology, Earth resources. All. Do. (4) Long flight duration.-Flight lifetime limited principally by ingenuity in providing reliable operation equipment. (Long-Term Flight) These features of the space environment exploited, singly or in combination, using the unique capabilities of man a;s an onboard investigator in a spacecraft of adequate payload capacity, offer such potential benefit in so many fields of interest as to compel an examination of the requirements for a manned space station. The Role of a Manned Space Station The most important advantage of man in space is found in his capability to observe and act upon unforseen phenomena and events. Research is inherently oriented to the discovery of the unknown and unanticipated and requires the ac- tive participation of a staff possessing the necessary judgment, experience, and skills. Thus, man's role in an orbiting space station is similar to his role in a research laboratory on earth. The active participation of a laboratory staff permits experiments and tasks to be undertaken that would otherwise be impossible or are so complex that the probability of successful completion with an automatic system is low. For ex- ample, man's potential ability to erect and assembl~ large equipment in orbit and maintain it for long periods of time affords a flexibility and reliability that PAGENO="0374" 370 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION is beyond reasonable attainment for an unmanned system. The ability to con- duct experiments and correlate inputs from ground based specialists with re sults from many observations and sensor measurements affords an opportunity for an onboard scientific specialist to adapt experimental procedures to real time and possibly to edit and ~eiect the most appropriate data for transmission to the ground. Clearly, a manned space station should not be planned to perform functions or execute programs that can be done better or more economically on the ground or by unmanned satellites On the other hand it would be proper to under take special tasks on a manned space station that would be excessively demand- ing in cost time and manpower if undertaken by unmanned space experiments Furthermore, unmanned satellites are constrained to perform those functions for `which the technology either exists or can be developed with reasonable certainty and for which the tasks can be defined in complete detail and are not so complex or intricate that the probability of successful completion is unat- tractive Nevertheless a manned space station utilized as a research laboratory can furnish the needed insight into the kind of meaningful measurements and observations that are required before unmanned satellites can be employed to provide large amounts of data on a routine basis. SPACE STATION REQUIREMENTS The detailed program requirements are summarized herein in such a manner as to indicate the general scope of a space station system which would effectively accommodate the initial activities of all the programs and the greater portion of all the long term activities Performance Requirements Orientation, stabilization, and gravity are the most significant program re- quirements related to space station performnace. The requirements for each of these factors are sumarized in table II. TABLE II -space station program requirements Program Instrument orientation Instrument stabilization accuracy, degree Gravity Astronomy Earth resources Meteorology Biology Long-term flight Research and develop- ment. Orbital operations Inertial Earth do Independent do~ -- - Inertial and earth Independent 0.001 0.05 0.05 Independent do 0.1 Independent No instrument rotation. Do. Do. 10-5 and centrifuge. Nominal zero and centrifuge. Nominal zero. Do. Orientation and stabilization Programs involving the nse of optical and/or photographic inptrumentation equipment dictate the orientation and stabilization accuracy requirements For astronomy inertial orientation is required and obviously the need is to look in the direction of space Meteorology and earth resources programs obviously need to look at the earth and require continuous geocentric orientation These require ments then are conflicting in both direction and stabilization modes, and on a single space station require that the astronomy programs be conducted sequen tially with the earth observation programs when the astronomy instrumentation is operated attached to the station. During many portions of the astronomy program it is de~ired to operate the instrumentation remote from the station and under these circumstances the programs could be conducted simultaneously The stabilization accuracies required for the optical and photographic instru- mentation most likely cannot be satisfied by the space station primary stabiliza tion and control system. It is anticipated that the station system will achieve at least 05 stabilization and may achieve 01 stabilization Separate stable platforms and/or gimbal mounts will be required for most of the program instrumentation. Those programs which are basically independent of station orientation or stabilization accuracy do require nominal zero gravity and this PAGENO="0375" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 371 dictates the need for a high-quality space Station stabilization system to minimize periodic and transient motions and angular rates. Gravity In discussions between the requirements committee and the design teams, it became evident that the most difficult problem to resolve is the matter of artificial gravity. If artificial gravity is made a firm requirement its implementation can have a very large impact on space station design. Zero gravity is a mandatory requirement for major portions of the experiment programs. There is however, apprehension in some quarters that personnel will not `be able to carry out certain tasks satisfactorily in a zero-g environment. On the other hand, provision of artificial gravity by rotating the station complicates the experiment and station design tremendously and introduc~s other apprehensions about the capability of people to carry out tasks in a rotating station. The following comments on these problems are therefore offered. Rotation of the space station cabin presents a serious problem in the execution of most experiments in all the areas studied. In astronomy, the need for accurate pointing oct telescopes without disturbance from the station obviously calls for a support system that is as motionless as can be obtained. Photography and accura'te pointing of ~ensors needed in meteorology and earth resources can be accomplished simpler `and more reliably fro'm a stationary platform than from a rotating one. Most orbital operations could be accomplished only with difficulty from a rotating station and all advanced technology experiments not direOted toward the study of the effect of gravity are generally best accomplished in a nonroct'ating situation. `Similarly, in long-term flight, moSt of the program is best suited to nonro'tation and that portion of the program which requires a centrifuge is directed toward the effects of gravity (primarily biomedical effects). Plant biology is constrained to a gravity level less than 10~ gravity units. Even though the experiments and their apparatus are most suited to zero gravity, there still remains the question whether man can, in zero gravity, accomplish the experimental program conveniently. This problem is m'ore than a question of man's health. It relates to his awkwardness in doing tasks that are quite simple in a normal earth environment but are complicated by the lack of a gravity force to keep things in proper place. Experience in the Gemini pro- gram tends to be a little discouraging in this respect. It must be realized, however, that we are still in the early stages of developing competence in operations at zero gravity and, furthermore, the Gemini cabin is so small that it provides a relatively cramped space for two people. With the development of suitable aids and provision of more commodious cabins, the defficulties in working in a zero-gravity field could certainly be alleviated. An argument has been advanced by some groups concerned with `the operational feasibility of a space station that artificial gravity should be provided in any event for crew convenience. The validity of this argument can probably be determined from experiments in space addr~ssed to `this issue. In any event, whether this con- venience is furnished or not, the space station crew must learn to operate in a zero-gravity environment in order to c'arry out most of the crew `tasks associated with the research and development programs. If the artificial gravity were obtained by rotation of the space station cabin with the rotating radius very large ~o that the angular velocity would be very low then the experimental program might be less severely affected. A radius of rotation of thousands of feet would be needed to get the greatest advantage of this approach and, of course, the practicality of providing it remains to be established. More conventional schemes for rotating the cabin usually have a radius of rotation of the `order of 50 to 100 fee't. They offer the capability of living con- tinuoi~sly in an artificial gravity field, but Coriol'is effects and gravity gradients are expected to be problems for personnel in this type of environment. Naturally, the programs that cannot tolerate station rotation would have to be carried ou't in a nonrotating part of the station or In a nonro'tating module separated from the station unless rotation of the station were stopped for the duration of such experiments. Jllissiom requirements Orbit attitude and inclination and mission duration are the key factors con- sidered as space station mission requirements. Table III shows a summary of the altitude and inclination requirements. PAGENO="0376" 372 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION TABLE 111.-Space station mission requirements Program Initial activity Long-range activity Altitude, nautical miles Inclination, degree Altitude, nautical miles Inclination, degree Astronomy Earth resources Meteorology Biology Long-term flight Research and Development Orbital operations 200-260 125-200 200 (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) 50-70 50-70 (1) (1) (1) (1) 20,000 125-200 20,000 750-1500 (1) (1) (1) (1) <60 (2) 0 (2) (1) (1) (1) (1) llndependent. 2 Near polar. Programs other than astronomy, earth resources, and meteorology are in- dependent of either orbit altitude or inclination and any convenient orbit will satisfy their needs. Biomedical experiments within the long-term flight pro- gram require a minimum flight duration of 2 years in zero gravity. rThis require- inent represents the maximum duration experiment identified; however, it is highly desirable to operate the space station in orbit for about 5 years. During the 5 years it is not ncessarily required that the space station be continuously manned should unforeseen circumstances warrant a period of inactivity. There Is no requirement for altitudes much above about 200 nautical miles to accomplish the initial activity within most of the astronomy, earth resources, or meteorology programs. An answer to the question of what altitude must be a compromise between minimum orbit-keeping propulsive disturbance, desired optical resolution, desired range of view of the earth's surface, the radiation hazards, and light scattering effects in the astronomy program. An altitude of about 200 nautical miles is a reasonable compromise altitude for each program. The earth observation and meteorology programs are most dependent on orbit inclination. Within the earth resources program there are significant reasons for having an overview of all the populated regions of the earth. An inclination of about 70° would provide such coverage. it is recognized, however, that such a high inclination for the first permanent-type space station is undesirable for many reasons and may even be impractical for early achievemenL Therefore, a lower limit of 50° InclInation has been established because an orbit nearer that inclination is realized to be more practical. TABLE IV.-Spacc statioia staff requirements Basic skills Specialist skills Program area :~ .~ ~ fi I ~ a ~a fi ~ a ~ D ~ .~ ~ ~ I ~ I ~ I ~ u I ~ 4) I ~ :~ ~ ~ ~ z ~O I ~ I o - ~ .~ ~ Li ~ Astronomy X X Earth resources X X Meteorology X X Biology Long-term flight Research and development X ---- Orbital operations I X X ---- X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ~-- X X X ---- X PAGENO="0377" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 373 Moreover, the gamma-ray and X-ray portions of the astronomy program prob- ably require the lower inclination. Any inclination less than 500, however, would seriously compromise effective accomplishment of the earth resources program. The continental United States must be utilized to provide the calibra- tIon sources necessary to the program and, furthermore, it is highly desirable that the immediate information gained be most useful to the United States. Within the meteorology program, it is, of course, desirable to see all of the earth's atmosphere. Much the same reasoning as was applied to the earth resources program must be applied to the meteorology program, however, and therefore an inclination range of 500 to 700 is indicated. There is a general consensus, fortunately, that considerable and meaningful portions of the meteor- ology program can be accomplished in that inclination range. Lesser inclina- tions would materially depreciate the value of the program. The long-range activity envisioned within the astronomy and meteorology pro- grams requires synchronous altitude orbits. However, it does not seem wise at this stage of development in manned space flight to consider long durations for man at synchronous altitudes. The benefits of low-altitude manned space flight should be realized before planning long-term synchronous orbits. Additionally, it is reasonable to expect that more sophisticated unmanned satellites will accrue from the space station activity and these satellites may satisfy a portion of the needs of meteorology at the very high altitudes~ The needs for observations in the range of 750 to 1500 miles at sun-synchronous near-polar orbits may also be best served by unmanned satellites. The long-range activity within the earth resources program requires near-polar orbit for total earth observation. This requirement may ultimately be more closely related to the collection of opera- tional data than to research and development activity and may be best satisfied by unmanned satellites once the research activity has been conducted aboard the low-altitude moderate-inclination space .station. It can be concluded therefore that an orbit altitude of 200 nautical miles and 50° to 70° inclination will satisfy most of the initial activities in each program area and will also satisfy a significant portion of all the long-term activities. The long-range astronomy and meteorolgy programs require much higher orbit altitude. IS~pace station staff skill requirements The space station staff primary skills required to accomplish all of the pro- grams are summarized in figure 9. Those six skills for which there is the great- est demand are indicated to be basic skills and may be required on a continuous basis. It is recognized that these are also the basic skj~ls required to operate the space station. The remaining skills mostly represent scientific specialties which are not necessarily required on a continuous basis and may be phased or shared in accordance with program scheduling and demand. Dr. MUELLER. We have carried out during the course of the last year a rather comprehensive study of both the benefits to be derived from a space station and the characteristics that a space station might have. I am sure that we can put a summary of that in the record if you would like. The principal things that the space station was going to provide for us and will not be provided as an early a time is a capabil- ity for extended stay time in orbit about the Earth, it would have de- veloped the ability to carry out extensive observations on the Earth itself, in terms of at an earlier time having a thorough Earth resources evaluation capability, it would have provided us with the ability to carry out manned meteorological observations for extended periods of time, and it would have permitted us to provide a base for astro- nomical observations. Now, essentially, the elimination of this has delayed by at least 1 year the availability of this capability. Mr~ RUMSFELD. Is there anything besides dollars that is causing a problem as far as the $100 million turndown on the beginning work of the space station? Is there any conflict, discussion, negotiation, or PAGENO="0378" 374 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION difficulty with the Department of Defense as to this particular `tctivity ~ Dr MUELLER No, ~ e never had a problem in this area That is an area where we are working with the Department of Defense to try to find a joint program. I would like to say one further word and that is in all honesty, we are, of course, trying to make the workshop do some of the things that we have planned on doing with the space station. Mr TEAGUE Will the gentleman yield ~ Mr RUMSFELD Yes Mr TEAGUE Is it not true, Dr Mueller, that many of the expert ments on this `tre for the benefit of defense, for their Manned Orbiting Laboratory that comes around in 1971? Dr MUELLER That is correct Mr TEAGUE There are some definite agreements th'it the Defense Department wants in this program. Mr. RUMSFELD. I know that. What program? The $100 million for the beginning of the sp'tce st'ttion2 Mr TE &GUE Yes Mr. RUMSFELD. They want NASA to do this? Mr. TEAGUE. Yes. Dr MUELLER They are `tsking us to do experiments in our work shop in support of their Manned Orbiting Lab Mr. RUMSFELD. I am confused by the chairman's answer. Are you saying that the Department of Defense went before the Bureau of the Budget and urged that they not cut out that money? Dr. MUELLER. No, they asked NASA to do these experiments before they fly their Manned Orbiting Laboratory. Mr RUMSFELD Which ones9 The ones they are going to do or the ones they are not going to be able to do because of the cut9 Mr. DADDARIO. Would the space station-if that had been authorized this year and if that had been supported-would it include Defense Dep'Lrtment experiments2 Dr. MUELLER. Yes, it would have, because we have a good working relation with the Department of Defense in developing experiments and I do anticipate that we will be working with the Department of Defense in this area of the space station's development. Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Rumsfeld? Mr. RUMSFELD. I am through for themoment. Mr. FULTON. The question on the $454.7 million in the fiscal 1968 figure, is that a tight figure? Is there any backup at all? If so, how much, in that figure? Dr. MUEL.UER. Is there any backup? I don't know quite how to answer that, Mr Fulton Mr. FULTON. Put it in the record. Dr. MUELLER. I don't know how to answer it. Mr. FULTON. Have you made the figure on the basis that 100 per. cent of the experiments will be correct and performed the first time? In Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo, we had a backup on everything. In this figure on Apollo Applications, is there backup and if so, how much9 A statement in the record will be fine, thank you, sir PAGENO="0379" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 375 The 454.7 million dollars request is a tight figure. We proposed 626 mil- lion dollars to the Bureau of the Budget for Apollo Applications in FY 1968. The Bureau of the Budget stated they could not suppport that level of funding and requested NASA to reduce the Apollo Applications funding to an absolute minimum. The 454.7 million dollars figure is the NASA response to the BuBud request. This request contains no contingency funding. There are no back-up experiments planned with this level of funding. In terms of reliability and safety, however, these are back-up reflected in redundant systems on board the space vehicles similar to Apollo. Dr. Muiwu~u. Thank you. Mr. DADDARIO. As we proceed along this line of the discussion, I am looking ahead to some of the problems we have and I wonder where is it that the NERVA II proposal came up? Why was it not included in your original proposals? Was it because you just have not put your thoughts together or was it because you came upon it at a later date and it was not something you really wanted? Dr. MUELLER. The President, as you know, has had to be very care- ful in the process of putting together the budget because of the real pressures that are involved in the Vietnam and other areas of the Government on the total resources of the Nation. The President included the NERVA II in the contingency portion of the budget message. Therefore funding for it was accounted for in his budget. It is my understanding that it was included this way to provide further time for consideration. We had recommended the NERVA II very strongly in our initial presentation to the Bureau of the Budget and very consistently rec- ommended it throughout the budget process. Mr. DADDARIO. When you recommended NERVA II to the Bureau of the Budget, it was eliminated? Dr. MUELLER. No. It was treated within the total President's budget as a case requiring special consideration. Mr. DADDARIO. At that time? Dr. MUELLER. That is correct. Mr. DADDARIO. Was it in this same amount? Dr. MUELLER. That is correct. Mr. DADDARIO. Then at that stage of the game, taking everything into consideration, the Bureau of the Budget obviously felt and ap- parently it was supported by your arguments as well, that the Apollo Applications was a more important program at that time and place in consideration of the economics involved than was the NERVA II? Dr. MUELLER. I believe the discussion centered around the fact that the Apollo Applications is really a continuation of an ongoing program and the NERVA II development is an extension of the present tech- nology program leading to flight hardware in the 1975-77 time period. In one sense NERVA II is dependent upon a continuing space pro- gram. If you don't have a program aimed at continued flight of large payloads, there isn't really a need or requirement for the NERVA II development at as early a date. Mr. DADDARIO. It seems curious to me taking the whole space pro- gram into consideration, would it not be better to use that additional part of the money which is some $90 million for a space station? What suddenly caused the high priority or a higher priority for NERVA II versus the space station which seems to have some security implications involved? PAGENO="0380" 376 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Dr. MUELLER. Well, I can't answer that question. I can only offer my own opinion in this area, and that is that if we are to have a viable long-term space program, then we do need, as a nation, to continue examining alternative methods of propulsion. One of the most-in fact, we have not really been pursuing new areas of technology in the past several years as vigorously as desirable because of the constraints of our budget. I think it is most important from our long-running posture to have more new developments, new technology under development in the years ahead and NERVA has such a long leadtime that there is always a tendency to put it off. It has been put off for 2 successive years and one cannot put these things off indefinitely. One must proceed or else the basic technology will not be used in a timely fashion. Mr. DADDARIO. I would agree with that and I would agree whole- heartedly with the importance of having nuclear power developments in our program and I wish we would have had it sooner than later. But the fact remains that there does come a time when you make a choice. The choices in the Apollo Applications pained all of us in this com- mittee because we had felt last year that there should have been greater support. This is really an observation. I wonder if this is the same logic which has inclined you to establishing priorities in the past? It seems to me, and I may be wrong about that, that at this stage NERVA has jumped over something which a year ago you felt was more im- portant, that is just an observation, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman? Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Fulton. Mr. FULTON. There is no doubt that maneuverability in space is dependent upon the ability to have space fuels which are first easily boosted, secondly, a.re space storable, and thirdly, available for ex- tended times in space. If there is anything in space that requires defense, then of course a high-energy fuel, either chemical, liquid, or a nuclear fuel, is vital to any operations, so if we are talking security, there is just as much security for a high-energy fuel as an element as there is for a space station and to me it means more. In conclusion, unless we are going to go into a series of programs that are expensive, bulky, and have minimum payloads because of the necessity of putting second and third stages of liquid fuel into orbit, we are going to have to advance on a long leacitime to first reduce expense, and secondly, to increase geometrically the payload because of the less weight and the probable less cubic content for the nuclear fuels. Likewise, when we move into the nuclear fuels, we get away from the tremendous amount of insulation load that we have between hydrogen and oxygen combinations. For example, hydrogen boils at 123° below zero and the same tem- perature in space is going to run 200° to 220° below zero, so we have to have the insulation there anyhow and we couldn't afford to hang a coffeepot on the safety valve in space if the hydrogen is boiling. PAGENO="0381" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 377 I have for many years been urging that we get high energy, space- storable fuels that are operable in space and secondly have been push- ing for the nuclear fuel development and may I say on that that the nuclear fuel development under NERVA II is simply an extension of the program of NASA and Atomic Energy in this field. That brings up the question, what do we do, break up the scientific teams and post- pone it for 2 to 5 years or do we `take advantage of the know-how which may be less expensive by continuing these programs? Finally, and this is where I disagreed with NASA, I do believe we need the emphasis on the large, first-stage boosters of `solid fuels so if I have any criticism of the fuel program, it has been that we aren't pushing that field as well as the nuclear. That is all. Dr. MUELLER. I do agree, Mr. Fulton and Mr. Daddario, on the need for and desirability of an increased emphasis on new developments. I do believe, `though, when one has a very severe budget restriction in ordering them, I can't help but feel that the priority `that was attached by the Bureau of the Budget to the President was a reasonable one. Fundamentally, if we are going to have any future Manned Space Flight program, we must implement the Apollo Applications of the program this year. N'ow I said "any," `bu't I mean "any" in the context of really utilizing the resources we have already placed in this very large program. Clearly there are alternatives available .that delay the Manned `Space Flight program and shift its emphasis, but it would really lose the capabilities and team that we have developed. We must go forward `with the Apollo Applications program this year in terms of new `developments. I do believe the NERVA is an attractive new development. I do believe `the space `station `is some- `thing that we `inevitably are going to nee'd to develop if we are going to continue in the future in Manned Space Flight. Continuing with `the budget, the spent, orbiting sec,ond stage of an Tiprated Saturn I will be converted into a habitable, 10,000 cubic foot orbital workshop. Provided with an airlock, the workshop will provide in 1968 an economical long duration manned shelter for many experimeiftal activities and will be revisited and reused during the course of the program. `The `support systems of the basic Apollo command and service mod- ules will be modified for long duration operations. The lunar m'odule will `be modified to serve as a base f'or manned lunar investigations of up `to 2 weeks. Now that is just in the very early phases of the operation. The ApollD developed lunar mapping and survey system will be used to complete the cartography `of the Moon. The `Command Module will be modified to carry up to six men for short duration ferry and resupply missions and will be provided a land landing capability, thereby reducing costs and increasing op- crating flexibility. Specialized payloads will be developed i~r operation in various orbits and on the Moon, including multispectra Earth a~id weather sensors, biological and biomedical experiments, mobile lunar vehicles, and communications systems. PAGENO="0382" 378 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION A manned solar telescope system, forerunner of long-lived orbital `tstronomical f'tcilities, will be flown during the peak of solar `tctivity Space vehicles: Volume V, RD 2-4 fiscal year 1968 funding require- ments for sp'~ce vehicles total $263 7 million, of which $1674 million is for the first three lines (MP67-5709, fig 21) This request pro vides for continued rncrement'tl funding of the follow on TJprated S'tturn I procurements initiated in fiscal years 1966 and 1967 and for the iniltial funding for the follow on Saturn V vehicles and Command `md Service Modules (CSM) The first follow on TJprated Saturn I will be delivered in late 1968 The delivery of the first follow on CSM is pl'mnned hte in 1969 The first follov~ on Stturn V will be delivered in mid-1970. Mr. FUQUA. Before we leave this page on delivery by various in- stallations, you h'tve $228 2 million for the manned sp'Lcecraft, the largest item in the procurement of space vehicles. What is the justification for this l'mrge amount ~ I can recognize that m'tny expenditures will be necessary at the Marsh'mll Center Dr MUELLER It is roughly half and half Mr FUQ1JA You have $199 6 million `mt the Marshall Center ~ Dr MUELLER Mr Lilly, ~ ould you like to answer that ~ Mr. LILLY. Mr. F'uqua is reading the distribution of program amounts by centers. You don't have that break on your chart. The amount identified for the Manned Spacecraft Center AAP effort is $928 2 million, $199 6 million for Marshall, $3 3 million is for Ken nedy; and $23.6 million is for NASA Headquarters. Dr. MUELLER. Then I understand. Included in those items dis- tributed by centers is the experiment development and the majority MANNED SPACE FUGHT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT APOLLO APPLICATIONS FY 1968 BUDGET ESTIMATES (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) FY66 FY67 FY68 SPACE VEHICLES $85 $386 $263 1 CSM PROCUREMENT 0 0 43 3 UPRATED SATURN I PROCUREMENT 1.0 . 24.0 18.5 SATURN V PROCUREMENT 0 0 45 6 * SPACECRAFT MODIFICATION 1 5 14 6 91 3 LAUNCH VEHICLE MODIFICATION -0- -0- 5.0 NASA HQ MP67-5709 1-15-67 FIGURE 21 PAGENO="0383" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 379 of experiments development funding it, the majority of experimental development funding is identified to the Manned Spacecraft Center. The $228.2 million for the Manned Spacecraft Center includes both space vehicle and experiments and definition and development fund- ing. Mr. FUQUA. Would the space vehicle development be at the Mar- shall Center? Dr. MUELLER. Partly at Marshall and partly at Manned Spacecraft Center. Practically equal. Mr. T1~euE. Are they funded out of Houston? Dr. MUELLER. All spacecraft are funded out of Houston-all launch vehicles are funded out of Marshall. The experiments carried out at Houston are different. Mr. FUQUA. The work will not be carried out per se at Houston? Dr. MUELLER. No, sir. The remaining requirements under space vehicles totaling $96.3 million, support the continuation of the design and development ef- forts, begun in fiscal years 1966 and 1967, which are required to furnish modified Apollo spacecraft systems for the planned missions. Apollo spacecraft systems, including the electrical power, life support, and environmental control systems, are currently being subjected to exten- sive tests to determine their ability to operate in the environments and for the durations proposed for the Apollo Applications missions. To minimize the cost of this phase of the program, the plan is to in- corporate only those changes required by the planned missions. Limited development of a Lunar Module (LM) shelter/taxi to ex- tend lunar surface exploration time beyond that planned for the Apollo program will commence in fiscal year 1968. The LM shelter, carrying scientific exploration equipment such as a lunar mobility vehicle and drill, is intended to be landed unmanned on the lunar sur- face where it will remain quiescent. The manned LM taxi combina- tion and its equipment will be used as a base for lunar exploration for periods of up to 2 weeks. That is the next major step forward. This is the area which we delayed for a year because of the reduction in the level of funding to $454.7 million. Fiscal year 1968 funding also includes the initiation of development of a land landing capability for the Command Module which will allow elimination of water landing as the primary recovery mode, thereby providing greater operating flexibility, allowing refurbish- ment and reuse of command modules, and reducing recovery and new procurement costs. The changes to the spacecraft that permit in- corporation of the land landingcapability will also allow the interior of the Command Module to be rearranged to accommodate up to three additional astronauts for short duration ferry and resupply missions. Experiments and mission support: Volume V, RD 2-6 and RD 2-8. My next chart (MP67-5708, fig. 22) shows the remainder of the fund- ing being requested for Apollo Applications-$140.7 million for Ex- periments and $50.3 million for Mission Support. PAGENO="0384" 380 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MANNED SPACE FLIGHT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT APOLLO APPLICATIONS FY 1968 BUDGET ESTIMATES (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) FY66 FY67 FY68 EXPERIMENTS $40.3 $35.6 $140.7 DEFINITION 34.4 12.0 33.7 * DEVELOPMENT 5.9 23.6 107.0 MISSION SUPPORT $2.4 $5.8 $ 50.3 PAYLOAD INTEGRATION .1 4.4 40.0 OPERATIONS 2.3 1.4 10.3 NJASA HQ MP67-5708 1-15-67 FIGURE 22 Mr. Chairman, in addition to this, we will provide you with some backup information, the details and the experiments and the break- down of cost. Experiments: Of the experiment funding, $33~7' million is for defini- tion and $107 million is for development. Apollo Applications ex- periments cover a wide range of objectives in the fields of space medicine, science, applications, technology, and engineering. The def- inition and development of experiment payloads to meet these ob- jectives will include activity by elements of NASA, other Government agencies, and the scientific and industrial communities. Effort in fiscal year 1966 and 1967 was primarily confined to definition of experiments and experiment hardware for use in the early Apollo Applications missions. Included in these efforts were studies which led to the Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) and the spent-stage S-IVB Orbital Workshop, now under development. The fiscal year 1968 effort will continue the development of the orbital workshop and the Apollo Telescope Mount and will define and develop other experiment payloads for follow-on Apollo Applications missions. The Orbital Workshop permits astronauts to work and perform experiments in the empty hydrogen tank of a spent second stage of the TJprated Saturn I. A 65-inch diameter airlock and docking adapter provides the connection between the Apollo spacecraft and PAGENO="0385" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 381 the spent stage. A hatch in' the airlock permits the astronauts to go into space without depressurization of the workshop or the spacecraft. In orbital flight, the Command and Service Module docks with the airlock and the crew activates systems to pressurize the workshop for habitation. The experiment equipment for use in the workshop is stored elsewhere and carried into the workshop for operation. An extensive list of experiments is planned for operation within the Orbital Workshop. Some are directed at evaluating the habit- ability of the workshop for long duration flight, the work capability, and mobility of astronauts in zero-g, and the effect of long duration zero-g on man. Others are directed at engineering and technology experiments which utilize the large enclosed volume of the workshop. The Apollo Telescope Mount provide a new capability for a variety of solar and stellar scientific experiments to be performed above the Earth's atmosphere, where the Sun and stars can be clearly observed without being obscured by the Earth's atmosphere. Film can be re- turned from a space astronomy mission, and for the first time the role of the astronaut in astronomical observations can be evaluated. The ATM provides a stabilized platform which will be carried on Apollo Applications missions to accommodate instruments requiring finely controlled pointing. The ATM will be mounted in a structural rack attached to a Lunar Module ascent stage. * Five experiments using 13 separate instruments to obtain solar data during the period of maximum solar activity have been selected for development for the initial ATM mission. These experiments are: Intensity of solar flares; ultraviolet spectrometer; X-ray telescope; solar atmosphere photography; and white light coronagraph. Applications experiments are planned to develop techniques for, and to measure the effectiveness of, man's participation in such fields as orbital meteorology, communications, and remote sensing of Earth resources. Low-altitude orbits at medium and high inclrna- tions have been studies for meteorology and natural resources missions during 1969 and 1970. An initial synchronous orbit mission is planned to test man and spacecraft operation in that operational mode. Also planned is a test of operational techniques for communicating between the low-altitude manned spacecraft, synchronous spacecraft, and ground control stations. Later synchronous orbit missions are under study for continued operational use, as well as for experiments in astronomy, space physics, meteorology, and advanced communications techniques. The extended lunar exploration missions planned for Apollo Appli- cations include both orbital mapping missions and extended lunar sur- face exploration. The objective is to extend knowledge of the Moon beyond that achieved in the earlier Ranger, Surveyor, Lunar Orbiter missions, and Apollo missions, and to provide the basis for the deci- sions on the establishment of semipermanent or extensive research facilities or manned stations on the Moon. The lunar orbital missions are planned to acquire high-quality map- ping and survey photography from polar or near-polar lunar orbits. This will allow the detailed study of the geologic features of the total lunar surface. Lunar surface missions are planned to provide up to 2 weeks staytime at selected lunar sites for extensive geological, geo- 76-2e5 0-67-pt. 2~--2.5 PAGENO="0386" 382 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION physical, and biological exploration Experiments planned for these missions include small vehicles to perform traverses at moderate dis tances from the landed spacecraft, drills for subsurface sampling and vertical profile measurements, and deployed instrumentation for ac quiring geophysical data to be transmitted back to Earth by radio frequency link for up to a year after departure of the astronauts One extended lunar surface mission per year is planned, beginning in 1971. Medical experiments during 1968 and 1969 will concentrate on the biomedical effects of long duration fl~ght on man A biomedical lab oratory is planned for flight in 1970 This laboratory will consist of an Apollo spacecraft module equipped with biomedical and behavioral apparatus to test and record human responses during long duration space flights, to various stresses such as physical exercise, variable gravity, and the performance of complex tasks Bioscience and biotechnology laboratories are planned to extend earlier investigations on various life forms ranging from simple cells to primates. In these laboratories, greater stresses can be applied to specimens than are normally planned for human subjects, and the results will benefit both the bioscience community and manned space flight technology Mr DADDARIO Included in these medical experiments, you have not included any animal experiments? Dr MUELLER The bioscience experiments that I referred to are on animals and they run up to primates and one of the downrange or downstream experimental sets of apparatus is an experiment on pri mates, using man for the carrying out of experiments Mr DADDARIO You are talking about primates in orbit for what period of time? Dr. MUELLER. Well, at this point in time, the experiment is in a definition phase and that has not been determined. Mr DADDARIO But it is definite that we will be using animals in this timeperiod? Dr. MUELLER. Yes. But that time period is out in 1970, so it is several years away. Mr. DADDARIO. Thank you. Dr. MUELLER. The technology and engineering experiments planned for Apollo Applications missions are focused generally toward the development of equipment and techniques which are fundamental to the accomplishment of the next generation of space flight missions During 1968 and 1969, emphasis will be placed on conducting re- lated experiments in and with the Orbital Workshop. Resupply and crew transfer flights are planned to extend mission duration, rotate crews, and to test orbital rescue operations Orbital assembly of complex structures and in-flight maintenance of vehicles and experi- ment apparatus are also planned. The fiscal year 1968 effort will continue the development of the Apollo Telescope Mount and the Orbital Workshop and will define and develop other experiment payloads for follow-on Apollo Appli- cations missions. These experiments have already been discussed in considerable detail. PAGENO="0387" 1988 NASA AUTHORIZATION 383 Mission support: RD2-8 payload integration, for which $40 mil- lion of the $50.3 million requested for mission support is earmarked, includes the system analysis and development effort required to as- semble experiments into mission compatible payloads and the effort required to physically install and qualify them for fligiit readiness. This activity includes definition, design and development, modifica- tion, and installation. The definition phase of payload integration was initiated during fiscal year 1966 and will be essentially completed by the end of fiscal year 1967. Design and development includes con- trol documentation, interface qualification and acceptance test speci- fications, and testing plans. Modification and installation provide for changes to space vehicles and experiment carriers to accommodate experiments and physical in- stallations of experiments into applicable carriers. The fiscal year 1968 effort will provide for the analyses of payloads to determine de- tailed payload integration requirements and the implementation of design and development activities for the initial Apollo Applications flights. Operations will require $10.3 million and include efforts at the Ken- nedy Space Center and the Manned Spacecraft Center that are directly concerned with launch, flight, crew, and recovery activity. Basic support is provided in the Apollo program for those missions cur- rently scheduled as alternate Apollo Applications flights. Fiscal year 1968 funding will also provide for intitiation of opera- tions support for missions including the augmentation of the Mission Control Center located at the Manned Spacecraft Center required to support the increased data demands resulting from the enlarged ex- periment and operational activity associated with the Apollo Applica- tions program. That is a summary of Apollo Applications. Could I now turn to advanced missions to briefly go through that material, volume V, RD3-1. The advanced missions program, for which (MC 67-5540, fig. 23) we are requesting $8 million in fiscal year 1968, allows us to investigate Advanced Manned Space Flight concepts. The studies examine logi- cal extensions of the NASA space capability through analysis of the growth potential of present hardware systems; assesses requirements for future systems; furnish guidance for research and technology activities; provide technical information and cost data upon which future program decisions can be based; and permit initiation of the definition, preliminary design, and specification of probably future missions. By conducting these advanced studies, we build a solid base for planing and selecting future Manned Space Flight missions. Specific areas of investigation include manned Earth orbital, lunar, and planetary missions and launch vehicles. Fiscal year 1966 and 1967 studies provided support for the evolving Apollo Applications pro- gram, including the definition of experiments and other mission pay- loads and analysis of the cost effectiveness of alternate flight equipment aproaches. The fiscal year 1966 and 1967 studies also examined the feasibility of a long-duration space station module. In addition to considering various Earth orbital applications, the space station PAGENO="0388" 384 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION NASA MANNED SPACE FLIGHT FY 1968 BUDGET ESTIMATE (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) FY 1966 FY 1961 FY 1968 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT $3,199.5 $3024.0 $3,069.2 APOLLO 2,941.0 2916.2 2,606.5 APOLLO APPLICATIONS 51.2 80.0 454.1 ADVANCED MISSIONS 10.0 6.2 8.0 GEMINI 191.3 21.6 -0- CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES 11.5 43.8 21.9 ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS 296.9 315.4 323.5 TOTAL $3513.9 $3,383.2 $3,420.6 NASA HQ MP67-5440 1- 15-67 FIGURE 23 study includes analysis to identify features common to manned plan- etary flight requirements. In the area of Earth orbital studies, we have been analyzing a 1-year Earth orbital workshop which could evolve into a continuous- operation space station. Alternate approaches for an eventual 1-year workshop included module configurations utilizing the third-stage structure of the Saturn V; a Saturn V launched module containing all expendables for a 1-year duration; and a system based on a flexible subsystem module. We are also defining rescue concepts and space station resupply and logistic systems; and continuing work on the selection and definition of candidate equipments. The potential economic benefits that can be derived from space station operations are also being assessed. Based on the results of the conceptual studies, preliminary defini- tion of a 1-year workshop module will be initiated, together with the preliminary definition of a modular spacecraft to allow us to carry out Earth resources experiments and astronomical observations. The fiscal year 1968 studies will concentrate on the definition of a versatile space station designed for Earth applications, astronomy, and bio- medical research, as well as interplanetary exploration. We are also conducting planetary mission studies, examining vari- ous mission modes and systems concepts for manned Mars and Venus PAGENO="0389" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 385 reconnaissance, sample retrieval from the Martian surface and, ulti- mately, Mars landing space vehicle hardware for sample retrieval or reconnaissance missions, and have provided us with spacecraft con- cepts for manned Mars landing missions in the future. The fiscal year 1968 study program will focus on continued defini- tion of technology requirements and concepts for a Mars sample re- trieval mission. This type of manned mission offers the unique advantage of bringing samples of the Martian surface and atmosphere back to Earth for scientific analysis. The manned spacecraft, which would also allow for scientific research and observations on the way to and returning from the planet, would be used to aim, launch, and retrieve an. unmanned sample return probe. During fiscal year 1968, the study effort will include preliminary definition of the mission spacecraft, and the associated propulsion stages, in addition to the onboard experiments that could be conducted by the crewmembers during the mission. The studies will define the total system for Mars sample retrieval in enough depth to permit definitive planning of the funding requirements, the technological development program required to support this mission, and the total program support required within NASA. Fiscal year 1968 lunar mission studies will provide for updating the current plan for lunar exploration so that the accompanying con- ceptual designs cant be developed. This integrated exploration plan will review the basis for a continuing series of manned and unmanned missions. Finally, launch vehicles studies to support Earth orbital planetary and lunar missions will be continued during fiscal year 1968. These studies will stress preliminary definition of improved Saturn vehicles, analysis of reusable reentry vehicles, and determination of the facili- ties and support requirements. To summarize, I have reviewed the major activities of the Manned Space Flight program. As you recall, I began by citing our general objectives in Manned Space Flight. These are the broad objectives that have motivated our efforts in specific programs. We have worked for the establishment of man's capabilities; for development of a na- tional competence for Manned Space Flight as represented by an industrial base, trained personnel, ground facilities, launch vehicles, spacecraft, and operational experience, for the exploration of space, and for U.S. leadership in space. Now we propose we move forward and use this national capability. Mr. RUMSPELD. Before we wind the whole thing up, I have a couple of questions on this advanced missions section, Dr. Mueller. How much did you request for this category of advanced missions at the Bureau of the Budget? Dr. MUELLER. $26 million in our fiscal year 1968 preview budget. Mr. RUMs~ILD. $26 million? Dr. MuEr~LEa. Yes. Mr. RUMSJ3ELD. Now $8 million is a lot of money, but when you start enumerating all those things that you hope to try to undertake under advanced missions, $8 million isn't going to go very far. Pos- sibly you could explain the relationship between advanced missions and the category of Apollo Applications. Isn't this a study category PAGENO="0390" 386 1 9 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION and a planning category that feeds into Apollo Applications in. some cases and in some cases in other categories ~ Dr MUELLER That is correct In fact, the major part of the money that we spent in the last year was in the area of supporting Apollo Applications work.' Mr RUMSFZLD How many studies were undertaken with the $62 million in fiscal year 1967 ~ ~Eiow many different areas were explored and how many do you anticipate with this $8 million? Dr MUELLER The average cost of a study, Mr Rumsfeld, that is, the money spent outside of NASA, which does not include the people inside NASA that are also working on advance studies is around $200,000 Therefore, there were a number of actual studies carried out There were some 37 studies in 1966, and we are planning some 18 in 1967 Mr DADDARIO Would you like those listed for the record ~ Mr RUMsr1~u I think it would be useful Dr. MUELLER. I would be pleased to. ADVANCED MANNED MIssIoNs STUDIES FOR FISCAL Yn&RS 1966 1967, AND 1968 The FY (36-67-68 studies in the Advanced Manned Missions program are a progressive set of phased studies directed at providing in depth technical and fiscal data required for major program decisions that are anticipated in connection with the FY69 and 70 budget submissions FISCAL YEAR 1966 The 37 FY 66 studies were aimed at defining later flights in the Apollo Appli cations program the requirements for an earth orbiting space station a pre liminary Investigation of manned planetary missions, and studies of launch vehicle improvements. Seventeen studies primarily cover activities in earth orbit and the definition of experiments in earth orbit These include studies on satellite recovery re furbisbable spacecraft artificial gravity extravehicular activity orbital astron omy support facilities, subsystem definition spent stage utilization space sta tions `and observatories, emergency and rescue concepts, and economic benefits. In the lunar area six studies cover experiment activities on the lunar surface and advanced concepts for delivery to the lunar surface Seven manned planetary studies cover electric propulsion mission modes and the use of Saturn/Apollo systems and their modifications. Seven vehicle studies cover possible Saturn upgratings and facility require ments large solid rocket motors and advanced logistics systems FISCAL YEAR 1967 fThe FY 67 program totals 18 studies an the four areas of earth orbital mis sions lunar exploration planetary reconnaissance and vehicle systems Six studies in the earth orbit area include the preliminary definition of a long duration space station, definition and integration of space station experiment modules for conducting experiments in astronomy biosciences and earth re sources and for studies of earth orbit emergencies reentry and rescue systems Two lunar mission studies continue the effort in defining the objectives for continued lunar missions and includes studies on integrating lunar orbit missions with work stations on the lunar surface In the planetary area six studies of reconnaissance flights to Mars and Venus cover alternative mission modes mission integration contingency planning spacecraft and several modules and probes for landing orbiting experiments and sample return Four studies in the vehicle area encompass facilities and operational con cepts for future programs facilities and equipment for improved launch con trol logistic systems for earth orbital missions and orbital launch vehicles PAGENO="0391" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 387 systems and operations for planetary missions. The studies of launch vehicles are directed toward a single set of vehicles that will accommodate requirements for the earth orbital, lunar, and planetary missions. FISCAL YJ8AR 1968 Based on the results of the FY 66 and some of the FY 67 studIes, planned FY 68 studies will continue the earlier studies emphasizing selected areas such as identifying common systems in the various spacecraft modules and with a view to reducing the number of distinct modules required for earth orbital, lunar, and planetary missions. A better definition of the long duration earth orbital space station will con- tinue to Investigate the* implications of artificial gravity requirements as well as to determine the feasibility of adaptation to planetary modules. Sirnilarily, the designs of the experiment modules will be investigated for their applicability for planetary missions. Planetary studies will continue to Identify design requirements for the recon- naissance flights to assure maximum carry over to later manned planetary landings. Studies in the lunar area include the preliminary definition and predesign of a direct flight lunar logistic vehicle identified in a F! 66 study. Additional studies will continue the investigation of lunar experiments for both fixed stations and long distance lunar traverses. The vehicle studies will continue to determine in more detail the characteristics of the most desirable systems to support the areas of earth orbital, lunar, and planetary missions. Mr. RUMSFELD. This category of advanced missions was cut down to less than a third- of what you requested. Was there any other category that was cut down to less'than a third? Dr. Mu~LI~R. Weil, the space station was cut- Mr. RUMSFELD. One hundred percent? Dr. MUEr~u~a. Yes; 100 percent and to some extent these tie together. We are delaying `the work that could be done on a space program for at least a year. The advanced mission studies lay the foundation for the future course of our activities. When we cut those back, we essentially cut back our ability to determine the course of action that would be most economical and most effective in the future. Mr. RtJMSFELD. That is what my view is. It seems to me that it is rather foolish to pare down advanced missions to less than a third of what NASA thought would be reasonable when this does, in fact, lay the groundwork for making intelligent decisions as we proceed through the future months and years. Let me put it this way. Whydid NASA accept this? Dr. M1JELLEa. Well, again, it goes back to the need to balance the total program. I think that what this represents is a decision on the part of the President and the Bureau of the Budget to go forward with an aggressive space program, but by no means to go forward with the most aggressive space program that we could undertake. It represents a conscious decision to- Mr. RUMSFELD. Isn't it true that these studies help you decide what should be undertaken? Dr. MUELLER. Yes, sir. Mr. RUM5FELD. By revising that to less than a third, aren't you cutting off your options for `the coming months and years? Aren't you reducing the input that is going to be available to make intelligent decisions next year and the year after? PAGENO="0392" 388 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Dr. MUELLER. That is precisely the difficulty that one encounters. I do believe, though, that the funds here will support the program well enough, I think we will get the definition of those essential ele- ments that will permit us to make the correct decision concerning the program that we have adopted. It does not provide us with the basic knowledge and facts we would need for an aggressive space station program. It does not provide us with the basic background and basic facts we would need to make a reasonable decision on a lunar base. It does not provide us with the background nor the studies that are needed in order to form a basis for a manned planetary exploration. Mr. RUMSFELD. It doesn't provide you with the money you need to make intelligent decisions across the board as to where the space pro- gram should go in the coming years? Dr. MUELLER. Essentially it provides us with the money we need to make intelligent decisions on the programs we have already decided on. Mr. RUMSFELD. It strikes me that that is a rather poor place to be saving money. I will be happy to look at the list that will be sub- mitted for the record of the studies undertaken in 1967 and those an- ticipated in 1968. Mr. DADDARIO. There isn't much you can do about it if you go to the Bureau of the Budget and they cut it out. You have to decide on what they give you. I disagree with it. Mr. RUMSFELD. I don't mean to leave the implication that I am criticizing Dr. Mueller. Mr. DADDARIO. I know you are not. I agree with you. The argu- ments indicate that they put up a good fight for additional funds. Dr. MUELLER. I must say that I agree with Mr. Rumsfeld and Mr. Daddario and on the other hand, being faced with a limitation on funds, I do believe this is the best balance that we can achieve. Mr. DADDARIO. You are an executive agency, Dr. Mueller. I don't know how you can take any other position. Dr. MUELLER. In this presentation in support of our budget request for fiscal 1968, we are asking that you approve the continuation of our efforts toward these national objectives. Mr. DADDARIO. Any questions, gentlemen? Dr. Mueller, I want to thank you for your statement today and your completely candid positions in answering our questions. We recog- nize, of course, the difficulties you have. These are things it is our responsibility to add or subtract from. We are looking forward to a continuation of these hearings which will begin tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock at the same time. This meeting is now adjourned until then. (Whereupon, at 12 noon, the subcommittee was adjourned to re- convene at 10 a.m., Tuesday, March 21. 1967.) PAGENO="0393" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION TUESDAY, MARCH 21, 1967 HOUSE or REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANNED SPACE; FLIGHT, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, in room 2318, Ray- burn House Office Building, at 10 a.m., the Honorable Olin E. Teague (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. TEAGUE. Thecommittee will come to order. We will begin this morning on the construction of facilities and administrative operations. Mr. Gurney, do you have any questions on what we covered yesterday? Mr. GURNEY. No. Mr. TEAGUE. Proceed, Dr. Mueller. STATEMENT OP DR. GEORGE E. MUELLER~ ASSOCIATE ADMINIS- TRAT'OR FOR MANNED SPACE PLIGHT, NASA; ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM E. LILLY, DIRECTOR, MANNED `SPACE PLIGHT PRO- GRAM CONTROL, NASA Dr. MUELLER. Turning to facilities, at this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to cover the status of our facilities, reviewing progress of the past year and our plans for the future. Over the last 6 years an orderly buildup of these facilities has re- sulted in an investment totaling approximately $2.5 billion. The basic plant is now available to support a manned lunar landing, with suffi- cient built-in capability to accommodate follow-on programs at mini- mal cost. Most test and launch facilities, particularly those located at the Kennedy Space Center, Mississippi Test Facility and Manned Spacecraft Center are now operational. This year the total request for facilities in support of manned space flight activities consists of nine projects totaling $27.9 million. Dur- ing my discussion, I will review this year's request for each MSF Cen- ter and location, beginning with Kennedy Space Center. The Kennedy Space Center is the site of major launch facilities for both manned and unmanned space flight. As of ,June 30, 1966, the investment at this location aggregated $808,549,000. By far the largest item is launch complex 39 (fig. 1, MC67-5745), where all three stages of the Saturn V launch vehicle will be assembled and mated with the Apollo spacecraft, undergo both individual and integrated checkout, 389 PAGENO="0394" 390 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION and then proceed to one of the two pads (fig. 2, MC67-5742) for launch into space. The vehicle assembly building, which is 525 feet high, has a volume of 129.5 million cubic feet (fig. 3, MC67-5746). The struc- ture will be fully outfitted and operational in three of the four high bays. In addition, two crawler transporters, three launch umbilical towers, one mobile service structure, and three fully instrumented firing rooms will make up the operational complex. Mr. FULT0N. Before you leave the vertical assembly building, I was down there about 3 or 4 weeks ago and it seems to me that you ought to have some arrangement for visitors. They took us clear up in an elevator and we looked over a rail which had no screen and we only had the rail to hold you. I think we ought to have a glass enclosure so you could take visitors where they can see the building. My sug- gestion is that there should be better visitor facilities. Dr. MUELLER. Thank you, Mr. Fulton; we will look into that. Mr. FULTON. They did a good job in showing us around. I mean for the general public. It ought to be set u~ particularly for visitors. Dr. MUELLER. It isn't really set up for visitors at the upper levels at this point in time. We didn't plan to use it for the regular visitor tour. It would be most impressive but it adds to the cost and increases our problem of handling the people. Mr. FULTON. I think there should be something for visitors and it should be separated from the workmen. FIGURE 1 PAGENO="0395" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 391 Dr. Mui~i1u~. Incidentally, the VAB is going to he the largest vol- ume building in the world for a relatively short; period of time. Boeing Co. in `Seattle is building a larger building than this one for the production of their 747. Mr. FULTON. I understand the Boeing building in Seattle is the kind of building that the Government would build if it were rich. [Laughter.] Dr. Mm~i~u~. Last year saw the completion of construction and outfitting of high bay No. 3 and firing room No. 2 and the basic con- struction of launch area B (fig. 4, MC67-5743). During the coming year plans call for the second high bay launch umbilical tower No. 2, and pad B to become operational. This coming year will also see the completion of a visitors information center, a critically needed addition to the KSC headquarters building and an addition to the flight crew training building to house urgently needed additional simulators. Two additional launch complexes at the Kennedy Space Center which play a major role in the Apollo/Saturn program are launch complexes 34 and 37 (fig. 5, MC67-5747). Both are now operational. Launch complex 34 already has undergone a major modification to launch the first uprated Saturn I flights, and will be used for the first manned Apollo/Saturn flight. Launch complex 37 also has under- gone a modification for the uprated Saturn I vehicle. These com- plexes will continue to be modified in order to meet the needs of future programs. FIGuRE 2 PAGENO="0396" 392 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGu1~E 3 PAD 39B KSC FIGURE 4 PAGENO="0397" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 393 The launch complexes cannot function without supporting facili- ties for communications, data processing, testing of* components, maintenance of facilities and hardware, and accommodations for engineers and administrative personnel. One of these is the central instrumentation facility (fig. 6, M067-5749). Its major instrumen- tation elements act as processing stations for Kennedy Space Center wide telemetry, flight TV, prototype tracking data; facilities for computing and data reduction; and systems for data storage, presen- tation, and distribution. Another key support facility is the operations and checkout build- ing (fig. 7, MC67-5748). This facility is used for assembly and checkout of all manned spacecraft and provides for crew training and preflight operations. The KSC headquarters building presently provides administrative space for about 1,890 personnel, with an addition currently under- way which will house an additional 988 personnel. Maintenance facilities, shops, and warehouses as well as numerous laboratories and checkout facilities round out the support required for launch opera- tions which will adequately support both current and presently con- templated future operations (fig. 8, MC67-5750). The request for fiscal year 1968 includes a requirement for funds to complete outfitting of launch complex 39 and to provide for modi- fications required by changes in hardware. Also included is a request for funds to rehabilitate major elements of complexes 34 and 37 and, PAGENO="0398" 394 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION CENTRAL INSTRUMENTATION FACILITY - KSC FIGURE 7 PAGENO="0399" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 395 finally, a small extension of the Merritt Island industrial area high temperature hot water distribution which will provide increased re- liability to the environmental control systems in key facilities located in this area. The responsibility for the development of spacecraft for manned space flight programs aud..the conduct of manned flight operations, including astronaut training, is concentrated at the Manned Space- craft Center, Houston, Tex. (fig. ~), M06'T-5727). Since construction was started in 1962, the facilities investment has grown to $294,709,000 as of June 80, 1966. The center is the site of the largest man-rated space environment chamber with solar simulation in this country (fig. 10, MC67-5756). This chamber can simulate an altitude of about 80 miles, and subject Apollo or larger spacecraft to the complete spectrum of environmental conditions which can be expected during a lunar mission. A large anechoic chamber is ideal for testing Apollo spacecraft communica- tions (fig. 11, MC67-5754). These and other scientific laboratories provide a basic developmental capability contributing to both present and future missions. The Mission Control Center at Houston became completely opera- tional in 1965 (fig. 12, MC67-5771). This sophisticated facility makes available immediate tracking and telem.entry data as received from the ground network. It houses a large computer complex which can provide preplanned alternative courses of action for use in the FIGuRE 8 PAGENO="0400" 396 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 9 FIGURE 10 PAGENO="0401" 397 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION ANECHOIC CHAMBER MSC FIGURE 11 76-265 O---6T---pt. 2---26 FIGURE 12 PAGENO="0402" 398 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION event any one of a vast number of contingency situations develop during a mission. The control center has the means for sending in- structions and data to the spacecraft crew, and exercises operational control over all mission ground operational support facilities. Another important grouping of facilities at MSC is the mission simulation and astronaut training complex. It includes a flight ac- celeration facility which features what is probably the world's largest centrifuge with a man-rated, environmentally controlled gondola at the end of a 50-foot arm (fig. 13, MC67-5757). Other buildings are for mission simulation and training, and flight operations. The lunar receiving laboratory (fig. 14, MC67-5753) is now under construction. Its primary purpose is the initial receipt, processing, and safeguarding the integrity and biological containment of lunar material returned to Earth by Apollo missions; and biologically isolat- ing the returned spacecraft, astronauts, and associated support per- sonnel. The receiving laboratory will provide the means to certify the safe release of all materiel and personnel and to perform highly time dependent experiments such as radiation counting and gas analysis. Most MSC facilities were completed during 1965. Additional ma- jor milestones occurring during 1966 were the activation of the en- vironmental testing laboratory for spacecraft 008, the activation of the flight acceleration facility, and completion of the electronic systems compatibility facility. Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman. Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Fulton. Mr. FULTON. I understand scientists have been appointed to exam- ine this material. Will we be building through the country subsidiary lunar sample receiving stations or is this the only one? Dr. MUELLER. This is the only receiving station. The samples will be handled there initially, then, allocated to the various experimenters who have been selected for carrying out the analysis of these samples. Mr. FULTON. That would also run to the laboratory and equipment? Dr. MUELLER. In general the selection process except for some lim- ited, specialized pieces of equipment was based upon availability of people and facilities to carry out the analysis at the laboratories. Mr. FULTON. At the Kennedy Center there are rooms with con- soles and electronic equipment as well as various types of viewer equip- ment. When are you going to finish these? I understand there are to be three in operation. Is there one more? Dr. MUELLER. Actually at the computer support complexes for the three high bays-I assume this is what we are talking about-are being put in operation. We do not at this time plan to complete the fourth bay. Mr. FULTON. So that is not in this particular budget? Dr. MUELLER. It is not in this particular budget. Mr. FULTON. That is all. Dr. MUELLER. Most MSC facilities were completed during 1965. Additional major milestones occurring during 1966 were the activa- tion of the environmental testing laboratory for spacecraft 008, the activation of the flight acceleration facility, and completion of the electronic systems compatibility facility. Other completions were PAGENO="0403" FIGuRE 13 LUNAR RECEIVING LABORATORY MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER FIGuRE 14 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 399 PAGENO="0404" 400 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION the atmospheric reentry materials and structures evaluation facility, the lunar mission and space exploration facility; and a cafeteria, project' engineering facility, and addition to the central heating and cooling plant. The major portion of the phase I contract for construction of the lunar receiving laboratory was completed. This work comprises the foundations, structural steel, and building shell as well as the under- ground radiation laboratory structure and site utilities. Work to be completed this year includes phase II construction of the lunar receiv- ing laboratory contract, comprising interior architectural work and installation of mechanical and electrical systems and laboratory equip- ment. Also to be completed are the technical services facility, space- craft control technology laboratory, ultrahigh vacuum space chamber facility, and modifications to the environmental testing laboratory providing an extension to the solar simulation system and increased vacuum pumping capacity. Our request for fiscal year 1968 at MSC calls for improvements to the environmental testing laboratory which will enhance safety and operational effectiveness. The requirement results from technological developments, new requirements, and experience gained from actual flights. Our request also includes a project which will increase sewage treatment plant operating efficiency, and an access road from a major off-site thoroughfare to the western boundary of the Manned Space- craft Center. The Marshall Space Flight Center at Huntsville, Ala., is responsi- ble for the management of all activities leading to the design, develop- ment, production, test, and delivery of large launch vehicles and re- lated systems. This includes the direction of the several contractors associated with development, fabrication, and test of all major flight vehicles, engines, and components at locations on the west coast, the Midwest, Louisiana, and Mississippi. As of June 30, 1966, the capital investment in this facility amounted to $376,519,000. This figure represents the facilities acquired from the Army as well as those constructed by NASA over a period of years for space vehicle and propulsion systems development. Test facilities for present and future programs range from stands for testing components up to the giant Saturn first stage vehicle. The comprehensive complex of scientific equipment and facilities constitutes one of the most complete aerospace research and develop- ment centers in the country. Marshall's technical equipment and facilities rai~ge from a substan- tial investment in relatively standard bench equipment, such as oscil- loscopes, recorders, m&croscopes, and measuring equipment through unique laboratory equipment such as environmental chambers, vibra- tion and shock testers, and particle accelerators, to complete rocket vehicle testing stands. Large high bay areas with associated cranes, support shops, clean rooms and process development laboratories have the capability to accommodate any large hardware items such as complete payloads or rocket stages. This could include manufac- ture of prototypes or flight items. The R. & D. facility requirements for many of the potential aerospace projects could be largely satisfied by existing capability at Huntsville with relatively minor facility expenditures. PAGENO="0405" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 401 The testing structures (fig. 15, MC67-5732) at Marshall consist of static firing rocket test stands for flight readiness as well as develop- ment testing; dynamic test stands to determine compatibility of com- plete vehicles with their vibration environment; cold flow stands for development of vehicle fluid flow systems; ground support equipment testing apparatus; acoustic and structural testing positions. An example of flexibility in facility application is the construction of a zero gravity drop test tower in an existing dynamic test tower (fig. 16, MC67-5733) which was built for the Saturn program. These modifications do not compromise the ability of the dynamic stands to do vibration testing on future vehicle payloads combinations such as Voyager. Experience in the Saturn program has proved the importance of `development and testing of the launch tower systems and their inter~ lace with the vehicle. Marshall's high bay spaces with massive access doors, environmental control, and sensitively controlled high capacity cranes can be used in any aerospace program requiring stations for work on large hard- ware items (fig. 17, MC67-5730). Mr. GURNEY. Mr. Ohairman. * Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Gurney. Mr. GURNEY. Why are we building this off-site access road? Why are the governmental authorities building this road? Mr. LILLY. Is this at Houston? 1ST STAGE SATURN V rsi FIGuRE 15 PAGENO="0406" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 402 FIGuRE 16 PROPULSION & VEHICLE ENGINEERING LAB FIGuRE 17 PAGENO="0407" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 403 Mr. GURNEY. Yes. Mr: Liu4y. The road that has been proposed there has been a corn- brnation of the county, the State, and Humble Oil to build a parallel road in back of the site. The Humble Oil Co. has paid for the road to our site. We are picking it lip from there inward to connect to our own internal roads at MSC. Mr. GURNEY. I don't know that I quite understand that now. It says this road will connect Avenue B which is your road to the Bay Area Building, which is apparently a main highway down there. Isn't it on the land owned by lJncle Sam? Is it at the Manned Space- craft Center? I have been reading from C.F. 7-8. Mr. LILLY. There is a portion of it that is off-site, Mr. Gurney. It is the access from our gate on the site out to the road. Mr. GURNEY. Why is t.his not done by the local governmental authorities? Mr. LILLY. I think this is the normal procedure, that all access roads and thoroughfares are handled by the Federal Government if it is required by us. This is not any different from what we have done at any of the other locations. Mr. GURNEY. In other words, we are following precisely the same procedure here that we have in all the others. Mr. LILLY. That is correct. In fact, the Humble Oil Co. and county and State went even a little further in terms of donating some land for us to do that. Mr. GURNEY. Thank you. Dr. MUELLER. Returning to MSFC facilities, the adjoining com- plex of supporting facilities and equipment completes the capability required for Saturn vehicles and development of advanced manu- facturing methods and processes (fig. 18, MC67-5731). During 1966 we completed construction which provides additions, improvements, and extensions, such as modernization of instrumenta- tion and control systems, additions to components test facilities, and expansion of high pressure gas and propellant systems. In addition, basic construction of the transportation hangar in the Saturn support. test area, and the acceleration, test, and calibration facility was com- pleted. The instrument unit checkout station and the Saturn V sys- tem development facility were activated. Work yet to be completed includes utilities extensions for roads and telephones. For our fiscal yea.r 1968 program we are requesting a water pollution control project which will treat chemical wastes generated by MSFC testing and manufacturing operations. Also requested is a project to provide for a centralized fire detection and reporting system at the center. The first or booster stages of the uprated Saturn I and the Saturn V are being produced by the Ohrysler Corp. and The Boeing Co. respec- tively at the Michoud Assembly Facility near New Orleans (fig. 19, M067-5734). This Government-owned plant, as of June 30, 1966, represented a capital investment of $134,450,000. This 43-acre manufacturing building was constructed during World War II. Since NASA acquired the plant we have added a vertical assembly and checkout capability, together with storage and engineer- PAGENO="0408" 404 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 18 ing space to provide a facility that is well suited to the assembly of large space hardware. During 1966 we completed construction and placed in operation the contractor services building, the vehicle component supply building, and an extension to the marine dock. Also completed were improve- ments to the storm drainage system, and repair of damage to the roof and other structures sustained during Hurricane Betsy. Additions to the computer facility at Slidell, La., were also completed. To be com- pleted this year are the expansion and modification of the chemical waste disposal system, and utility modifications to sewer, steamplant, and water distribution systems. For fiscal year 1968 we are requesting approval of a project for re- habilitation and improvements to the facility utility systems, equip- ment and roads. Also requested is a project `to extend Saturn Boule- vard to the State road system; thus connecting the Michoud complex with limited access highways now under construction by the city of New Orleans and the State of Louisiana. Mr. FULTON. We had some question about the airstrip and what they were going to do with it. What happened to that finally? PAGENO="0409" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 405 FIGURE 19 Dr. MuELLER. It is not now in use accept as a storage area. Mr. TEAGUE. Isn't it used to transporting launch vehicles to the barges? Dr. MUELLER. Mr. Lilly? Mr. LILLY. Several years ago there was a proposal to modify and upgrade the old airstrip. This proposed project was turned down. We have used `that airstrip as a part of our road running from the plant out to the shipping dock. Mr. FULTON. My next question is along the lines that the chairman has asked. Is it necessary to deliver material and transport structures? Mr. LILLY. Is it necessary for that? Mr. FULTON. Is it necessary to do that? Mr. LILLY. It is necessary to use it as a road to transport the stages out to the barges which carry them to and from Marshall, Miss., and the Cape. Mr. FULTON. You don't need it for transporting equipment of any kind for examination or inspection as we envision at Michoud. Mr. LILLY. So far, Mr. Fulton, the commercial airports have been satisfactory for our use in air transport. Mr. FULTON. Has the fact that this committee turned it down caused you any trouble? Mr. LILLY. It has not caused any delays, sir. PAGENO="0410" 406 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Mr. FULTON. That is all. Dr. MUELLER. Final acceptance testing of the Saturn V first and second stages takes place at the Mississippi Test Facility. The capital investment in this complex reached $215,994,000 as of June 30, 1966. This figure represents a testing complex consisting of one Saturn V dual position test stand (fig. 20, MC67-5738), and two single posi- tion second-stage test stands (fig. 21, MC6'r-5735). Test support fa- cilities include the test control center, data acquisition center, pro- pellant facilities, water supply system, fuel transfer and storage fa- cilities, and supporting laboratory facilities. Last year, the first Saturn secona-stage test stand was completed and test firings are now underway. The first position of the Saturn first- stage test stand became operational during this past December. Ac- complishments during 1966 also include completion of a warehouse addition, security control facilities, mobile equipment operations building, and a components service facility. The Saturn second-stage storage and checkout facility was also completed and became opera- tional. Essentially, all work has been completed at the center except for minor roads and the bridge over U.S. Interstate Highway No. 10. There are no fiscal year 1968 funds requested for the Mississippi Test Facility. Engine and vehicle fabrication facilities are operated by contract under the managerial cognizance of the Marshall Space Flight Center. FIGURE 20 PAGENO="0411" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 407 FIGURE 21 The total capital investment for these facilities as of June 80, 1966, exceeds $117,2~T'T,00O. The engines which are used in all space vehicles, the H-i, F-i, and J-2, are developed, fabricated, assembled, and tested by Rocketdyne Division of North American Aviation, Inc., at Government-owned facilities. The developmental testing takes place at Santa Susana (fig. 22, MCG7-5'T41). The 11-1 engine is fabricated, assembled, and tested at Neosho, Mo. The F-i and J-2 engines are fabricated and as- sembled at Canoga Park, Calif. (fig. 23, MA64-9446). The accept~. ance testing for the F-i engine is conducted in facilities constructed at the Edwards Air Force Base and the testing of the J-2 takes place in facilities jrovided at Santa Susana, Calif. In each instance, we have capitalized on basic resources provided by the Department of Defense with augmentation by NASA. Two Saturn launch vehicles stages, the S-IVB and the S-TI are fabricated and assembled on the west coast. The S-IVB stage is manufactured by the Douglas Aircraft Co. (fig. 24, MC67-5759) in company-owned facilities at Huntington Beach, Calif. Acceptance testing of the completed stages takes place at Sacra- mento, Calif. (fig. 25, MC67-5160), where NASA has an operational test complex. The fabrication and assembly of the S-TI stage is performed in the NASA constructed facility at Seal Beach (fig. 26, MC67-5761) oper- PAGENO="0412" 408 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 22 FIGURE 23 PAGENO="0413" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 409 FIutrRE 24 SACRAMENTO FIGURE 25 PAGENO="0414" 410 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION ated by the Space and Information Systems I)ivision of the North American Aviation, Inc The final acceptance testing and refurbish ment of the S-TI stage takes place at the NASA Mississippi Test Facility. Activation of the first factory checkout station at Seal Beach, Calif., was completed in April 1966 to accept the arrival of the S-TI-i Saturn V second stage Activation of the second facility checkout station at Seal Beach is underway and will be completed by mid 1967 There are no fiscal year 1968 requests for various locations Spacecraft manufacturing and testing are accomplished under the managerial cognizance of the Manned Spacecraft Center The Apollo command and service modules are manufactured by the North Amen can Aviation Co in the NASA industrial plant at Downey, Calif This plant was acquired from the Air Force in 1964 We have added a number of facilities valued at $15,765,000 which are now complete and operational The Lunar Module is manufactured by the Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp at their Bethpigc~, N Y, plant (fig 27, MC6G- 5719) Some of the more important Grumman facilities are the elec tronic systems development laboratory, the fuel systems laboratory, the navigation and guidance laboratory, and the flight control systems laboratory. FIGuRE 26 PAGENO="0415" FIGURE 27 Development testing of the Apollo spacecraft propulsion systems is conducted at the NASA-operated White Sands Test Facility in New Mexico (fig. 28, MC67-5728) on land acquired from the Army by use permit. NASA has invested a total of $26,934,000 in this facility which has three major areas. 0 Mr. GURNEY. Where are you in the budget estimates so we can follow along? Dr. MUELLER. Actually what I have been doing, Mr. Gurney, is reviewing what had been accomplished in the last year. I wasn't fol- lowing the budget book. In this particular case, there are no new requirements in this area so there is no entry in the budget book for it. Mr. GURNEY. When I can turn to it, let me know. Dr. MUELLER. I will do so. Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman? Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Fulton. Mr. FULTON. What planning is being done for isolation of men and materials returning from the lunar mission? What are you doing in that field? Are you going to land the first men returning from the Moon at the White Sands Test Facility in New Mexico? Dr. MUELLER. Our present plans provide for landing in the ocean, either in the Atlantic or Pacific, depeilding upon the time of year. Mr. FULTON. You have no plans for any facilities at the point of landing? Dr. MUELLER. No, sir; we will continue to use the I)epartment of Defense recovery support forces for this operation. 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 411 PAGENO="0416" 412 1968 NASA AUTHORIZAPION Mr. FULTON. Why are you still landing on water rather than land Dr. MUELLER. Mr. Fulton, we are requesting funds as part of our fiscal year 1968 Apollo Applications program to begin development of a land-landing capability for the spacecraft. Mr. FULTON.: That is really what I am asking. Dr. MUELLER. We literally need to design and develop a system to carry this out and in the course of that design and development effort, we will be able to define the requirements for the landing sites. None have been selected at this point in time. Mr. FULTON. Is there any design engineering money in this 1968 budget? Dr. MUELLER. The fiscal year 1968 Apollo Applications request in- cludes funds for initiating the development of a land-landing capa- bility for the Command and Service Module. I believe that is some- thing like $18 million for fiscal year 1968. Mr. FULTON. Would you put that in facilities? Dr. MUELLER. I was referring to R. & D. money, Mr. Fulton. There are no funds for facilities at all. Mr. FULTON. I am talking about facilities. That is all. Mr. GURNEY. Mr. Chairman, I have one question. Is our own staff member checking out the requested new construction? Mr. TEAGUE. Ed, as we made our trips around this year to the facili- ties and the centers and the countries, one staff member was assigned WHITE SANDS TEST FACILITY NEW MEXICO FIGuRJ~ 28 PAGENO="0417" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 413 to spend his time while we were there going over facilities and there has been much work done. Mr. FULTON. Is your flagpole sufficient at your Houston Manned Spacecraft Center, because some of us objected to the original one. Also, I might add that the cafeteria was a little large, although now that it is built, it is a very nice cafeteria. That is all. Dr. MUELLER. Let me return to White Sands, covering the Apollo Propulsion Systems Development Facility, the Lunar Module Test Facilities, and the Little Joe II Launch Facilities. The Lunar Module Test Facilities are used for developmental test- ing of the ascent, descent, and reaction control propulsion systems. The test area has three structurally identical, single position, static firing stands. The complex for flight qualification of spacecraft modules and sys- tems prior to manned flight has now been deactivated. There `are no fiscal year 1968 C. of F. funds requested for various locations. To summarize, the basic plant is now available to support the Apollo missions. The facilities which represent a major national investment by Government and industry are capable of significant contributions to the Apollo Applications and future programs. I believe that the United States has brought in `being a firm foundation upon which the Nation can begin to realize substantial benefits from space activity and to reach toward the planets. The fiscal year 1968 Manned Space Flight C. of F. request totaling $27.9 million, will be used primarily for the activity required to com- plete outfitting of Launch Complex 39 at the Kennedy Space Center in support of the Apollo program. The funding required for the Manned Space Flight centers also provides for modifications and improvements for safety `and `operational effectiveness and for mod- ernization of utilities. I would like to turn to a brief summary of Administrative Opera- tions `and then turn the questions and answers for both A.O. and C. of F. over to Mr. Lilly. Mr. TEAGTJTE. George, there are a few questions I would like for you to answer. Dr. MUELLER. Yes. I plan to stay as long as you like. I thought I might finish Administrative Operations before we go on to questions. Mr. TEAGUE. Go ahead. Dr. MUELLER. If we turn `to Administrative Operations, I believe the committee has had an opportunity to look at what we have been doing at the centers during the recent hearings at KSC, MSFC, and MSC, so I w~n~t `try to go through it completely but will instead try to bring together an overview of what we are doing. In the case of Administrative Operations for the three Manned Space Flight centers the fiscal year 1967 funding level is $315.4 million (fig. 29, MC67-5433). In fiscal 1968 the requirements are $323.5 million. The increase can be traced primarily to personnel compensa- tion and benefits and support services. Ai~out 60 percent of the funds in Administrative Operation's are spent for the civil service personnel. About 25 percent `are spent on 76-2e5 0-67--pt. 2-27 PAGENO="0418" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 29 various services, both for operating facilities and for technical services. If I can turn to our civil service manpower resources at the three Manned Space Flight Centers, our civil service tot'tl this year (fig 30, MC66-l0,188) is 14,384 Of these 2,720 are at the John F Kennedy Space Center, 4,634 at the Manned Spacecraft Center, and 7,030 at the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center. Mr. FULTON. Are these permanent positions? Dr. MUELLER. These are permanent civil service positions. Mr. TEAGUE. As time goes on, do you see a shift in personnel or will they remain at about `this level? Dr. MUELLER. I expect that they will tend to decrease, but not markedly. One ~f the things that we anticipate is that we will be able, to some extent, to absorb the fluctuating wOrkload by varying the number of people in `the various categories. In addition, of course, the number of people that we will have will depend upon the committee's action and the action of the Congress with respect to the Apollo Applications program, the Voyager pro gram and eventually such follow on programs as the NERVA Mr. FULTON. Would you comment whether the abolishment of cer- tain positions has caused any delay in the Apollo program? Dr. MUELLER. The 1,013 is for the agency as a whole, Mr. Fulton. We have taken a reduction on the order of 420 of this agency total in the Manned Space Flight program. I cannot say that this curtail- ment has affected the Apollo program, although it has caused con 414 PAGENO="0419" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 415 CIVIL SERVICE MANPOWER RESOURCES FOR THE MANNED SPACE FLIGHT PROGRAM TOTAL 14,384 [~~CE OF MA~1 FLIGHT 11 PROGRAM DIRECTION AND CONTROL EAcEcEN~L~E~I ~GE C. MARSHj NAA I(~ M( 66 0, 00 FIGuRE 30 siderable problems, in the process of accommodating them, at both the mission control center at Houston and at our Kennedy Space Center. Mr. FULTON. This retrenchment has not affected the safety factors of the Apollo program nor the technical factors so that we are not as technically adequate as we might be? Dr. MUELLER. We have made no compromises in either technical performance or in any event in the safety of either the astronauts or the ground crew because of any retrenchment either in dollars or per- sonnel in the Manned Space Flight organization. Mr. FULTON. These personnel have not been taken out of inspection or control areas, have they? Dr. MUELLER. Not unless they were no longer required. Mr. FULTON. That is all. Dr. MUELLER. Looking at the distribution of skills (fig. 31, MC 66-40,152) we have a relatively large percentage of scientists and en- gineers, some 46 percent of our organization being in that category. We do have a number of professional administrators, so that almost 60 percent of our organization are professionals of one sort or an- other. Turning to the Manned Space Flight civil service manpower (fig. 32, MC67-6010), we had at the end of fiscal year 1966 some 14,597 people authorized to the Manned Space Flight program. By the end of fiscal year 1967, we expect to be down to 14,384 people at our three PAGENO="0420" 416 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 31 MANNED SPACE FLIGHT CIVIL SERVICE MANPOWER Year End Year End Year End FY 1966 FY 1967 FY 1968 TOTAL 14597 14384 14384 Fiourn~ 32 PAGENO="0421" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 417 centers, and we expect to hold constant during fiscal year 1968 at this level. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take one example of some of the work we have done in Administrative Operations. Actually, it was at least in part in response to some questioning by Mr. Rumsfe~d with respect to our procedures and processes for automatic data processing. If I may read just a few passages from the summary and then enter into the record this document on our "Computer Systems Survey Manned Space Flight, NASA October 1966" I would appreciate it. In the summary the document states: Computers are an integral part of the Manned Space Flight (MSF) program and support the missions and functions of each center. General support com- puters are used by the MSF centers in their day-to-day activities of engineering development and management operations. Other computers are linked together as elements of systems used to train flight personnel, check out launch and space vehicles, and control missions. The number and varieties of computer models used in the MSF program are illustrated in figure 1-1. (Cf. page 1.) This figure is too complex to project on the screen, but you will see it in the report. With respect to our management techniques, which is one of the various aspects of this survey, we have developed, in the course of our building up of our Manned Space Flight centers, a carefully imple- mented set of management techniques which have been applied by our own Manned Space Flight office in Washington and our centers to manage the computer resources. Let me quote from the document: Automatic Data Processing (APP) planning documents which project in- tended ADP usage, are developed by each Center and transmitted to OMSF on a yearly basis with quarterly revisions. Program Operating Plans (POP) and quarterly submissions of revisions of the annual ADP budget are also intensively reviewed In OMSF. Procedures for the acquisition of computer hardware have been developed that involve both the Centers and NASA Headquarters. Following NASA Headquar- ters authorization, the Center initiates a procurement based on a firm specifica- tion of the required system (cf. page 4). We have a broad participation by computer manufacturers in the Manned Space Flight program as a result of this process. In the centralized data processing facilities, a system of workload control procedures is utilized to provide the basis for controlling computer resources. Control is accomplished through user budgets. For operational systems, com- puter requirements are validated through program-management procedures. A significant amount of computer resources utilized in MSF Is developed, oper- ated, and maintained by contractor personnel. Procedures and management tools for monitoring contractor performance have been developed and are being applied. The OMSF and its three Field Centers actively promote computer-resource sharing arrangements through the MSF Resources Sharing Panel and through written agreements with the General Services Administration (GSA). Com- puter programs and machine time worth $7,000,000 were shared in MSF during calendar year 1965. Resource sharing has been further encouraged in 1966 by management action, such as the establishment of programming standards, stand- ard data formats, and a computer program library at MSC (cf. page 4). (The following is submitted for the record.) PAGENO="0422" PAGENO="0423" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 419 COMPUTER SYSTEMS SURVEY October 1966 Office of Manned Space Flight NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADNINISTEATION PAGENO="0424" 420 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FOREWORD In early 1966, Dr. George E. Mueller, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, directed his staff to undertake a comprehensive survey of the management and utilization of manned space flight computational resources. The results of the survey were to be used as the basis for increased management visibility of computer operations with an aim toward ascertaining that all possible means were being exercised to assure that manned space flight computers were doing the best job at the lowest possible cost. The purpose of this document, then, is to describe and explain how the manned space flight organi- zation manages and utilizes its computer resources. On February 28, 1966, Lt. Gen. Bogart net in Washington with those people from each of the Manned Space Flight Centers and Headquarters having significant responsibilities in computer management to discuss the project and describe the dimensions of the task. At this meeting, Lt. Gen. Bogart designated the Manned Space Flight Automatic Data Processing Resources Sharing Panel to be the key intercenter coordi- nating group for the project. Shortly thereafter, at a meeting in New Orleans, it was determined that the task could most expeditiously be accomplished in-house and that the starting point would be the collection of a data base in the areas of computational capability, organization and staffing, and management techniques. Key personnel were designated at each Center to spearhead the study effort and, in conjunction with several key NABA Headquarters people, formed a Joint Action Group to prosecute the collection and analysis of information. After the data had been collected, a full-time working team, designated by the Joint Action Group, met in Washington at intervals during the months of September and October 1966 to analyze the data and prepare the survey report. The Manned Space Flight Automatic Data Processing Resources Sharing Panel, with technical assistance from several consultants, reviewed the work of this group and endorsed the presentation. In summary, this report describes and explains the manned space flight computer capabilities, organizations, staffing, and management techniques used to control these resources. The report also describes the role of the computer in manned space flight and identifies the individuals responsible for the various operating elements. Funding levels and cost trends are shown. Several management developments, such as Automatic Data Processing Workload Control and the Manned Space PAGENO="0425" 1968 NASA AUTHOEIZATION 421 Flight Automatic Data Processing Resources Sharing Panel, which were instituted in manned space flight to support urgent program require- ments, are also discussed. The exploitation of.the computer as an integral part of the manned space flight effort, as well as the high cost of attaining effective computer capability, makes it essential that management continue its intimate concern with these resources. PAGENO="0426" 422 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION OFFICE OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHT COMPUTER SYSTEMS StTRVEY OCTOBER 1966 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Dr. George E. Mueller, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight Lt. General Frank A. Bogart, Deputy Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight (Management) Mr. Paul E. Cotton, Director, Manned Space Flight Management Operations Mr. Charles F. Bingman, Director, Manned Space Flight Management Programs Computer Study Joint Action Group Mr. James Costantlno, Office of Manned Space Flight (Study Director) Mr. Charles L. Bradshaw, George C. Marshall Space Flight Center Mr. Eugene H. Brock, Manned Spacecraft Center Dr. Rudolf H. Bruns, John F. Kennedy Space Center Mr. William E. Miller, Office of Manned Space Flight Mr. Ronald V. Murad, Office of Manned Space Flight Computer Study Working Group Mr. Fred E. Webster, Manned Spacecraft Center (Chairman) Mr. Sylvester A. De Mars, John F. Kennedy Space Center Mr. Harry Hayman, Office of Manned Space Flight Mr. Charles A. King, George C. Marshall Space Flight Center Mr. Burt H. Liebowitz, Bellcomm, Inc. Mr. Edward T. Mallory, George C. Marshall Space Flight Center Mr. Edward P. O'Rourke, Office of Manned Space Flight Mr. Arell E. Weaver, Office of Manned Space Flight Consultants Dr. Helmut Hoelzer, George C. Marshall Space Flight Center Mr. Isaac D. Nehama, ~ellcomm, Inc. Dr. Anthony Oettinger, Harvard University Dr. William Wattenburg, University of California PAGENO="0427" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 423 CONTENTS Section Page FOREWORD 420 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . 422 TABLES . 427 428 FIGURES . . . . 429 430 1.0 suw~~ 1.1/ COMPUTERS AT TEE MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER . . . . 431 1.2 COMPUTERS AT THE GEORGE C. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER 432 1.3 COMPUTERS AT JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER . . . . 432 1. L~ MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES 433 1.5 MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES 434 1.6 CONVERSION TO NEW GENERATION EQUIPMENT 435 1.7 COMPUTER COSTS 435 2.0 USE OF COMPUTERS IN ThE~ MANNED SPACE 1~LIGHT PROGRAM 438 2.1 GEORGE C. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER 438 2.1.1 Huntsville, Alabama 438 2.1.2 Slidell, Louisiana 439 2.1.3 Launch Information Exchange Facility, Huntsville Operations Support Center 440 2 * 2 MANNED SPA~ECRAFT CENTER 440 2.2.1 Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, Texas 440 2.2.2 Mission Control Center/Real-Time Computer Complex, Houston, Texas . . . . 440 2.2.3 White Sands Test Facility, New Mexico . 441 PAGENO="0428" 424 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Section 2.3 JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, CAPE KENNEDY, FLORIDA 441 3.0 COMPUTER CAPABILITY 444 *1~~~ 3.1 MISSION CONTROL 444 3.2 TEST AND CHECKOUT 445 3.2.1 Marshall Space Flight Center 445 3.2.2 Manned Spacecraft Center . 447 3.2.3 Kennedy Space Center 447 3.3 TRAINING 448 3.3.1 Simulator Training Systems 448 3.3.2 Simulation Checkout and Training System 448 3.3.3 Breadboard Terminel Landing System 449 3.14 REAL-TIME DATA PROCESSING 449 3.14.1 Central Instrumentation Facility 449 3.14.2 Launch Information Exchange Facility . . . 449 3.5 SERVICE CENTER DATA PROCESSING 450 3.6 GENERAL-PURPOSE DATA PROCESSING 450 3.6.1 Centralized Data Processing Equipment 450 3.6..2 Computers in the Aero-Astrodynamics Laboratory 451 3.6.3 Computers in the Astrionics Laboratory 452 3.6.14 Computers in the Propulsion and Vehicle Engineering Laboratory 452 3.6.5 Computers in the Quality and Reliability Assurance Laboratory . . . . 452 3.6.6 Centralized Data Processing Equipment at the Manned Spacecraft Center 452 3.6.7 Computers in the White Sands Test Facility 453 3.6.8 Computers at Kennedy Space Center . . . . 454 PAGENO="0429" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 425 Section 3.7 SPECIAL-PURPOSE DATA PROCESSING 454 3.7.1 RE1~IEVER Data Acquisition System . . . . 454 3.7.2 Automatic Testing Laboratory Acquisition System 454 3.7.3 Slow Speed Acquisition System 454 3.7.1~ Special Information Processing Techniques 454 3.7.5 Electronic Systems Compatibility Facility 456 3.7.6 Manned Spacecraft Center Centrifuge Facility 455 3.7.7 Manned Spacecraft Centez~ Technical Services Division 455 3.7.8 Kennedy Space Center Information Systems Directorate 455 ~. 0 ~E8PONSIBILITIES, 9RGANIZATION, A~) STAFFING 462 1~.l ORGANIZATION 462 1~.l.l George C. Marshall Space Flight Center 46$ Ll.2 Manned Spacecraft Center 463 I~.l.3 John F. Kennedy Space Center `~64 ~ Intercenter Relations 464 I~.2 STAFFING 465 L~.3 RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS 468 5.0 ~~AGEMENT TECENIQUES 479 5.1 MANAGEMENT,REPORTING 479 5.2 COMPUTER RESOURCE ACQUISITION 481 5.3 COMPUTER RESOURCE CONTROL 482 5.3.1 Workload Control in the Computation Facilities 462 5.3.2 Workload Control in Operation Systems 464 PAGENO="0430" 426 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Section 5 1~ CONTRACT I4ONflOR1NG 484 5.L~.l Scope of Contract TypEs 485 5.L~.2 Management Tools . . . 486 5.~.3 Special Considerations for Mission Contracts 488 5 ~ Future Ef4'orts in CQntr~ct Manageirent of Computer Systems 489 5 5 cO~PtJTER,~ESOuRCE 2~ARING 489 5 5 1 PolIcy 489 5.5.2 Sharing Org~nizations . ~. . 490 5.5.3 Sharing Accomplisthrients *. 491 5 5 L~ Future Efforts 492 6 0 ~ ~DINC SUMMARY 497 7 0 CO!~USIONC3 509 APP~DIX A. ~. C0~ØTER..INVEN'1ORY 512 G~O,~SABY OF ,A~BREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 535 PAGENO="0431" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 427 TABLES 2-I SUMMARY OF TESTS AT KENNEDY SPACE CENTER DURING F! 1967 442 3-I C~MPUTERS USED IN CKECKOUT PRIOR TO ON-PAD PRELAUNCH ACTIVITIES 456 I~~I CONTRACTOR SUPPORT 466 1~~II MANNED SPACE FLIGHT FULL-TIME CIVIL SERVICE IN ADP 467 1+~III MANNED SPACE FLIGHT FULL-TIME CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL INADP.. . 468 5-I SU~4ARY OF OMSF ADP RESOURCE SHARING IN TEENS OF TOTAL VALUE 493 6-I MANNED SPACE FLIGHT AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT, CATEGORY A (a) Fiscal year 1966 (thousands of dollars) 498 (b) Fiscal year 1967 (thousands of dollars) 499 (c) Fiscal year 1968 budget (thousands of dollars) 500 6-Il MANNED SPACE FLIGHT AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING ZQUIPIvIENT, ,eATEGORY B (a) Fiscal year 1966 (thousands of dollars) 501 (b) Fiscal year 1967 (thousands of dollars) 502 (c) Fiscal year 1968 budget (thousands of dollars) 503 6-Ill f MANNED SPACE FLIGHT AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT, CATEGORIES A AND B (a) Fiscal year 1966 (thousands of dollars) 504 PAGENO="0432" 428 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION (b) Fiscal year 1967 (thousands of dollars) 505 ~-~) Fiscal year 1968 budget (thc~s~nds of dollars) 506 A'I INVENTORY OF COMFrJTERS, MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER (Category A) 513 516 A-Il INYENTORY OF COMPUTERS, MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER (category A) 616 518 A-Ill INVENTORY OF COMPUTERS, KENNEDY SPACE CENTER (,Category ~) 519 A-IV INVENTORY Q? COMPUTERS, MARSHALL SPACE F1~GHT CENTER (.~ategory B) 520 - 52~ A-V INV~NTORY OF COMPUTERS, MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER (Category B) 529 631 A-VI INVENTORY OF COMPUTERS, KENNEDY SPACE CENTER (Category B) 532 - 534 PAGENO="0433" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 429 FIGURES 1-1 (1 Computers installed at Manned Space Flight Centers to October 1966 436 1-2 Computer equipment costs at Manned Space Flight Centers by appropriations, in millions of dollars 437 3-1 Principal Manned Space Flight computers used in launch and mission operations 457 3-2 Mission Control Center/Real-Time Computer Complex phaseover schedule 468 3-3 Principal Manned Space Flight computer systems used in training 469 3_1# Quick-look reduction data to engineering units . . . . 460 3-5 Kennedy Space Center/Marshall Space Flight Center Launch Operations Support Center communications link 461 14-1 National Aeronautics and Space Administration automatic data processing organization 472 14-2 George C. Marshall Space Flight Center automatic data processing organization 473 14-3 Manned Spacecraft Center automatic data processing organization 474 14_14 John F. Kennedy Space Center automatic data processing organization 475 14-5 Manned Spacecraft Center computer responsibilities 476~ 14-6 Marshall Space Flight Center computer responsibilities 477 14-7 Kennedy Space Center computer responsibilities . . . . 478 76-265 0 - 67 - pt. 2 - 28 PAGENO="0434" 430 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 5-~ U Coz~puter acquisition plan cycle . 494 5-2 Pr~curement cycle (source selectiox~ through the ..~3ource Evaluation Board (SEB)) 495 ~-3 Cu~tomer periodic report 496 6-~ Corr.puter Equipment Costs, percentage by program office 507 6-2 Manned Space Flight computer equipment coat by center and funding method in millions of acllars 508 PAGENO="0435" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 431 1.0 SUMTYLARY Computers are an integral part of the Manned Space Flight (MSF) program and support the missions and functions of each Center. General support computers are used by the MSF Centers in their day-to-day activities of engineering development and management operations. Other computers are linked together as elements of systems used to train flight personnel, check out launch and space vehicles, and control missions. The number and varieties of computer models used in the MSF program are illustrated in figure 1-1. 1.1 COMPUTERS AT TIlE MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER The Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) manages the development of manned spacecraft, trains flight crews, and controls space flight operations. Spacecraft design and development work requires a large, general- purpose computational facility capable of solving engineering and scientific problems. This includes the Data Reduction Complex (DRC), where large volumes of telemetry (TM) data from previous missions are processed for analysis by engineering personnel. This facility also provides a capability for administrative and business data processing, including finance, payroll, logistics, and management-control applica- tions. Crew training is a key function at MSC. This function is primarily accomplished by computer-based simulation. Other simulations include the simulation of subsystems for developing checkout procedures and the simulation of space environments for checking the entire spacecraft. A major portion of the computer capability at MSC is centered in the Real-Time Computer Complex (RTCC), which supports the Mission Control Center (MCC). Its primary function is to process and display, in real time, spacecraft data from approximately 20 remote sites for use by the mission director and his staff. The RTCC also has the capability to generate and transmit spacecraft commands during a mission. PAGENO="0436" 432 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1.2 COMPUTERS AT THE GEORGE C. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER The George C. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) designs, manu- factures, and tests the vehicle stages used in the various manned, unmanned, and satellite missions. The George C. Marshall Space Flight Center has a large, central data processing facility in the Computation Laboratory, which supports other Center divisions. However, most of the computers at MSFC are used to support design, checkout, and static firings of Saturn vehicle stages or systems associated with the Saturn V (S-V) instrument unit. These digital computers are integrated into larger systems that include analog devices and other special equipment used to control operations, such as stage firings or the gathering., cycling, and sequencing for feedback of data and commands. For example, in the MSFC Huntsville Operational Support Center (HOSC) during the powered-flight phase of a mission, a computer monitors vehicle parameters transmitted in real time from the launch site and drives displays for the use of MSFC engineers in providing technical backup during launch and flight operatioxls. The Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF) and the Mississippi Test Facility (MTF) are also supported by MSFC through a computational center at Slidell, Louisiana. This facility is used primarily by the Apollo stage contractors, that is, Chrysler Corp., the Boeing Co., and Mason-Rust. Computer capability is provided for scientific and general engineering applications, as well as for administrative and business applications. 1.3 COMPUTERS AT JO}11'I F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER The John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) is responsible for develop- ing and managing the Merritt Island Launch Area (MILA); providing tech- nical and administrative support for National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) elements located both in the area of MILA and on the Eastern Test Range (ETR); and planning and supervising the integra- tion, test, checkout, and launch operations at these facilities. A major computer installation is the Central Instrumentation Facility (CIF). This facility can accept data from launch sites, process and retrieve it on request and display it on demand, providing a "quick look" Th station for space-vehicle engineers. A unique feature of this real-time computer installation is its ability, when not sup- porting a mission, to perform batch-processing of administrative and scientific data. PAGENO="0437" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 433 The checkout computer capability of KSC consists of a large number of computer systems which are an integral part of space-vehicle pre- launch and launch operation activities. Also, to support real-time data requirements during launch, computers are used in the Apollo Launch Data System (ALDS) to pre-process ¶[M data from KSC and ETR sites prior to transmission to MCC at Houston. ~ MA]~AGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES Although operational computer control is vested in the directors of the respective Centers, the Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF), Washington, D.C., maintains both organizational and functional control through the chain of supervision to each\Center Director. Overall program control is assured through the OMSF review and evaluation process and through the issuance of policy directives. The NASA Deputy Administrator, Dr. Robert C. Seamans, is the final authority on NASA computer resources. In this capacity, he draws on the Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition (OTDA) for staff assistance and on the Office of Programming for budget-policy execution. Within overall NASA policy, MSF has delegated the day-to-day operational control of computer resources to computational elements within each Center. Each Center Director has final authority on delegated computer matters. Each director has further delegated this authority to operating heads in keeping with the differences that exist in the mission and organizational structure of each Center. At MSFC, the Computation Laboratory plans, establishes, and con- ducts a program for application of high-speed computers and automation devices to the scientific and general engineering aspects of launch- vehicle research, development, test, and fabrication, as well as to the areas of pianagement and project direction. At KSC, the Data Systems I~Lvision maintains cognizance of the in- strumentation systems used to obtain test data for manned and unmanned flight and fulfills all requirements for general-purpose scientific and data reduction computing, special-purpose checkout computing, con- current real-time ~ and display computing, and quick-look data- reduction applications. This assignment includes the planning and execution of test-data handling and management-information data proc- essing for business applications. At MSC, computation functions are controlled by two organizational elements. The Flight Operations Directorate is responsible for the computers used in the direct control of manned space vehicles; the PAGENO="0438" 434 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Engineering Development Directorate is responsible for general-purpose scientific and engineering (category A) computers, special-purpose (category B) computers, and the operation of these computers. (An in- ventory of MSF computers is included in the appendix.) 1.5 MANAGEME~NT TECHHIQUES' Management techniques have been developed and applied by OMSF and its Centers to manage its computer resources. Automatic Data Processing (ADP) planning documents, which ~ro~ject intended ADP usage, are'developed byeach Center and `transmitted'to OMSF on a yearly basis with quarterly revisions. Program Operating Plans (Pop) and quarterly submissions of revisions of the annual ADP budget are also intensively reviewed in OMSF. Procedures for the acquisition of computer hardware have been de- veloped that involve both the Centers and NASA Headquarters. Following NASA Headquarters authorization, the Center initiates a procurement based on a firm specification of the required system. Figure 1-1 demonstrates the broad participation, by computer manufacturers in the MSF program. In the centralized data processing facilities, a system of workload control procedures is utilized to provide the basis for controlling computer resources. Control is accomplished through user budgets. For operational systems, computer requirements are validated through program-management procedures. A significant amount of computer resources utilized in MSF isde- veloped, operated, and maintained by contractor personnel. Procedures and management tools for monitoring contractor performance have been developed and are being applied The OMSF and its three Field Centers actively promote computer- resource sharing arrangements through the MSF Resources Sharing Panel and through written agreements with the General Services Administration (GSA). Computer programs and, machine time worth $7,000,000 were shared in MSF during calendar year .1965. Resource sharing has been further encouraged in 1966 by management action, such as the establishment of programming standards, standard data formats, and a computer program library at MSC. PAGENO="0439" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 435 i.6 CONVERSION TO NE~ GENERATION EQUIPMENT During fiscal year (FY) 1967 and early 1968, the three MSF Centers will be engaged in making major equipment changes, primarily from second- to third-generation computers. At KSC, the GE 635 system in- stalled in the CIF will be expanded to provide for simultaneous testing of multiple vehicles. The expansion will permit centralization of all computing that formerly required separate machines. At MSFC in Huntsville and at Slidell, all of the existing general- purpose computers are being replaced by a central multiprogranimed- multiprocessor system at each location. Involved in the change are 39 computers that, will be replaced by centrally located UNIVAC 1108 II computers being phased in by late 1968. The third-generation general-purpose scientific and engineering computers at MSC will be installed in early 1967. The MCC is in the process of converting to IBM 360/75 computers, with the target for completion being early calendar year 1967. 1.7 COMHJTER COSTS The total computer-equipment costs in MSF are illustrated in figure 1-2. Total equipment costs for Fl 1967 are $7,800,000 less than those for Fl 1966, and Fl 1968 costs are $6,500,000 less than those for Fl 1967. These reductions are a direct result of installing third-generation equipment, as well as of the centralization of com- putational capability wherever possible. PAGENO="0440" z C12 ci ::::::::::::: 16 0 :~:::~:.: 12 I 1~ Ii ~ 49 TOTAL SYSTEMS INSTALLED-282 (APPROXIMATE VALUE $220,000,000) 46 31 27 22 8 CDC SDS RCA RAYTHEON UNIVAC IBM HONEYWELL OTHER GE BECKMAN Figure 1-1. - Computers installed at Manned Space Flight Centers to October 1966. PAGENO="0441" $43.9 3.8 C of E $36.1 10.8 AO 10.2 $29.6 AO 11.4 AO 29.3 25.9 R&D R&D 18.2 0 R&D FY 1966 FY 1967 FY 1968 Figure 1-2.- Computer equipment costs at Manned Space Flight Centers by appropriations, in millions of dollars. PAGENO="0442" 438 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 2.0 USE OF COMPUTERS THE MANNED SPACE FLIGHT PROGRAM The utilization of computers, both technical and administrative, extends into every phase of manned ~pace flight operations Computers are used to design, develop, test, and launch complex flight systems, and are, therefore, an integral part of manned pro3ects To meet the needs for computational capabiltty, the MSF program has tended to use available commercial computer hardware wherever possible and to modify that hardware, as necessary, for special purposes. This has allowed MSF to remain abreast of the rapidly changing computer technology at a reasonable cost and to remain in a position to share hardware and soft- ware experience with many users. Further, the use of commercial sys- tems has fostered multiprogrem utilization, also with inherent advan- tages of flexibility and economy. In the following sections, the use of computers in the MSF program will be discussed on a center-by-center basis. 2 1 GEORGE C MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER 2 1 1 Huntsville, Alabama The George C Marshall Space Flight Center at Huntsville, Alabama, has a heavy computation need for data reduction and general scientific and administrative data processing This need primarily stems from the computation required for research and development relating to launch vehicles and data processing necessary for the efficient administrative management of a large center Facilities for simulation, while smaller in comparison to other computer functions at MSFC, play an important role in the development of vehicle simulation techniques required in the development of large launch vehicles In the data-reduction area, telemetry is received from static tests, launch vehicles, and satellites for preflight, real-time, and postflight analysis A large amount of processing is required in decoinmutating data, and in calibrating, smoothing, and formatting measurements. For this purpose, an analog-to-digital converter system converts analog signals to sampled digital input form A receiving and recording sta- tion receives and records telemetry and video signals via radio and microwave links from satellites, launch vehicles, and captive tests. PAGENO="0443" 1968 NASA AUTHOIUZATION 439 General scientific and engineering applications include problem studies such as aerodynamic analysis, flight mechanics, flight perform- ance, vibration and acoustical studies, and general support of accept- ance checkout. Typical administrative applications performed include am on-line inventory control system with an automated procurement cycle, and financial management applications, such as payroll, disbursements, and budgets. Personnel management applications include official file records, leave status, and transportation and travel. Analog and hybrid computers are used to perform simulation studies in the areas of reusable boosters, engine start-up and cutoff, fuel flow, sloshing, heat transfer, flight simulation, lunar traverses, and other computations using physical and mathematical models. In addition to computation work carried on in-house, contractual backup support with computation resources is exchanged, as needed, with two industrial firms in the Huntsville area, Northrop Corporation and Brown Engineering Company, Inc., and with the Army Missile Command lo- cated at Redstone Arsenal. Backup support to MSFC is also provided by the University of Alabama in Huntsville. 2.1.2 Slidell, Louisiana The mission of the computation center at Slidell, Louisiana, is to provide centralized computation support to stage contractors at the M.AF and MTF. Slidell also furnishes backup support in the administra- tive and scientific area for MSPC, Huntsville, and MSC, Houston, during overload conditions at those facilities. Scientific computation at Slidell primarily supports structural design and evaluation and checkout of the various Saturn vehicle com- ponents during the manufacturing cycle at MAF. This computer equipment is operated on a three-shift, 6-day week basis. Computer eq~iipment at Slidell also supports administrative functions of the contractors' op- erations and includes applications such as financial accounting, Pro- gram Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT), work-order control, configuration control, reliability, personnel, and procurement. In late 1967, Chrysler will begin data reduction at Slidell of launches at Cape Kennedy. Simultaneously, Boeing and North American Aviation, Inc., will also commence data reduction at Slidell of test firings at MTF. PAGENO="0444" 440 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 2.1.3 Launch Information Exchange Facility, Huntsville Operations Support Center The Launch Information Exchange Facility (LIE?), HOSC, is a multi- purpose data display, monitoring, and control facility that links KSC and MSFC and is operated during prelaunch operations, launch, and post- launch evaluation to assist MSFC in providing technical support to KSC. The system was designed with visual output devices in place of con- ventional printer output. 2.2 M~4NNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 2.2.1 Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, Texas A significant number of computers are required to support the MSC activity with general scientific computing capability. Scientific and engineering needs are based upon requirements to develop models, evalu- ate engineering design, plan missions, predict failures, and so forth. The specific computing equipment used to support these applications is discussed in a later section. In the administrative and management area, there is a class of computers capable of processing and retrieving volumes of data in support of MSC administration, finance, logistics, and procurement activities. 2.2.2 Mission Control Center/Real-Time Computer Complex, Houston, Texas The computer complex supporting the MCC is identified as the RTCC. Operational mission support required that the computing system auto- matically accept input data from ground-based tracking stations and from spacecraft and launch-vehicle TM systems. In addition, the system must accept display requests from flight controllers and manual input data from computer controllers. The RTCC processes the input data to provide support displays for flight dynamics and vehicle systems anal- ysis; it also performs network support and vehicle command functions. The RTCC also has the capability to evaluate the mission flight plan in real time and to redesign the mission profile, as necessary, during the mission. For Apollo missions, the RTCC will be the prime source of naviga- tional data during the translunar phase of flight. The RTCC has pro- vided backup guidance information to the spacecraft, including updates of targeting parameters in the spacecraft computer and backup computa- tions for both nominal and abort maneuvers. The RTCC computers also PAGENO="0445" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 441 support the flight-crew activities and experiments conducted during manned missions, and provide network support, such as command genera- tion, data flow checkout, TM summary-mesSage broadcasts, and acquisition- data transmissions to tracking stations. For flight controller and astronaut training in sinulated missions, the RTCC duplicates the oper- ational computing support, previously discussed, using simulated input data. In addition, the RTCC performs flight dynamics and vehicle sys- tems analysis. 2.2.3 White Sands Test Facility, New Mexico The Data Reduction Facility (DRF) at the White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) provides quick-Look data processing and management logistics support for the White Sands Apollo Propulsion System Development Facil- ities (PSDF). The computer at this facility is compatible with the DRC equipment at MSC and also provides the exchange of utility and appli- cations programs and backup capability in the event of computer break- down at MSC. The DRF fulfills requirements for data reduction services to Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., the ZIA Co., North American Avi- ation, Inc., and The NASA Propulsion Engineering Office. The facility at White Sands is used to support the Apollo spacecraft and Lunar Mod- ule (LM) propulsion system testing and evaluation. The MSC Computation and Analysis Division (CA.AD) has technical responsibility for the com- puter at WSTF. 2.3 JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, CAPE KENNEDY, FLORIDA The KSC has a heavy and varied computation workload in the areas of general engineering and scientific, operational, administrative, and checkout data processing. The computer resources of KSC are not only used in support of the manned space programs, but also support NASA un- manned space projects, such as Project Centaur. Except for the normal administrative and general scientific computing workload at KSC, the total computing requirement is a function of the number of launch vehi- cles and spacecraft under test in the systems checkout areas, the number of space vehicles under test at the Launch Complex (LC) areas, and the number and duration of space vehicles actually launched. Since the early days of the space effort, computing capabilities at KSC have had to expand to accommodate the increasing number and complexity of space launches from MILA and ETh. Table 2-I provides a summary of estimated tests for FY 1967 for which computer support will be required. PAGENO="0446" 442 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION DURING FY Administrative and management data processing constitutes a portion of the total KSC computer workload The major portion of this data processing is being done on an IlivI 7010 and an I~4 7olo/l1~4o system located in the CIF This is the normal data processing load for the management of a large NASA Center, as well as support provided to con- tractors and to other NASA Centers for project-related activity The scientific application of computers at KSC provides capability for prelaunch testing and launch support of NASA space vehicles The prelaunch requirements include computation of acquisition angles for tracking systems, safety curves, coordinate transformation, doppler frequencies, wind shear, and acoustical levels Real-tine computing capability is provided at KSC to support launch simulations and actual launches. Real-time requirements include the processing of meteorologi- cal, impaQt prediction, vehicle 1~, gtiidance, communications, and dis- play data A quick-look data-reduction capability is maintained to allow immediate evaluation of launch data. The need for this TABLE 2-I. - SUMMARY OF TESTS AT KENNEDY SPACE CENTER Program ` Launches Simulated tests Lab tests Total Gemini Centaur Saturn/Apollo (unmanned) Saturn/Apollo (manned) Lunar Orbiter Atlas Agena 3 6 ~ 2 3 3 1~ 18 16 2 9 ~ 8 36 3 70 -- -- 15 60 23 7)~ 12 7 Totals 21 53 117 191 8Estimated. PAGENO="0447" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 443 capability becomes most important when malfunctions occur during the launch phase. Special-purpose computer resources are utilized to perform systems test and checkout functions on spacecraft and launch vehicles from the time of arrival at KSC until actual launch. These special-purpose com- puters are part of an integrated checkout and display system. The pri- mary mission of the checkout computers is to control, record, and process checkout data in a real-time test environment. PAGENO="0448" 444 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 3.0 COMPUTER CAPABIMTY The computer sciences are newly emerging, and consequently, the terms, symbols, measures, and power ratings are either tentative or nonexistent. To compensate for this handicap, the questionnaire used during the collection phase of the `computer-systems survey was designed to accumulate a great deal of descriptive information for each computer system and is compiled in a catalog of computer capability (MSF Computer Systems Study, Volumes II to Iv). A narrative description of the con- tents of the catalQg is presented in this section. An inventory of MSF computers is included in the appendix. The large number of computers instailed and the wide variety of their use in the MSF program have led. to a classification of computer hardware that recognizes modality. Today, the large proportion of MSF computers operates in a single mode; however, recent advances in com- puter technology make possible muJ.ti-modal operations at sizeable savings in cost and manpower. The description of computer capability is arranged in consonance with the modes of computer operation. 3.1 MISSION CONTROL The scope of activity and the role of computers in the launch and mission phases of manned flight are illustrated in figure 3-1. The function of mission control and of the computers that support the mis- sions is included in this broad outline. Computers installed in the RTCC of the MCC at Houston are inte- grated into a larger overall system which is not basically computational in nature. The RTCC consists of a variety of electronic data process- ing equipment, some of which is general-purpose equipment by nature of its manufacture, while other equipment has been manufactured for and is used for this special purpose, such as the System Selector Unit, Plotting Display Control Unit, Systems Status Display, Tine Standard Unity, Computer Monitor and Control Console, Control Area Junction Unit, Standby Digital Driver Unit, and Computer Controller Multiplexor `Unit. All of the equipment, both general purpose and special purpose, is integrated into the Ground Operations Support System (GOSS). The func- tion is to acquire data from the spacecraft, transmit the data to a central control point, and convert the data to engineering units which can be displayed for flight controller use in making decisions con- cerning Gemini and Apollo mission control. The RTCC does not perform an independent data processing function, PAGENO="0449" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 445 An equipment phaseover sc1~edule depicts the installation and re- moval schedule for all general purpose computers through early FY 1970 (fig. 3-2). The installation and removal dates are based on capabili- ties required to support the Gemini and Apollo Spacecraft Program flight schedules as they are presently known. The phaseover schedule is subject to change, based on the extent of the required changes. Every effort is made to have the RTCC hardware directly complement the required needs, and the configuration index portion of the sup- porting contract is structured to motivate the contractor to eliminate hardware whenever possible if the removals do not jeopardize mission obj ectives. 3.2 TEST AJ~1D CHECKOUT The role of the test and checkout computers is to insure that the integrated space vehicle and its subsystems meet the standards required for conducting a space mission. The test and checkout functions are performed at manufacturers' installations, special facilities such as MAF or MTF, and at each of the MSF Centers. The major checkout func- tions are outlined in the following sections. In the case of the launch vehicle, the major checkout functions are broken down by vehicle stage due to the number and types of stages. A summary of test and checkout information is shown in tabLe 3-I. 3.2.1 Marshall Space Flight Center The major checkout systems at MSFC are used for test and checkout of the S-lB and S-IC stages, and the Instrument Unit. MSFC alsp uti- lizes facilities at MAF, MTF, and Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc., Sacramento, California, to test the S-Il and S-IVB stages. Saturn lB sta~.- An RCA 110 computer is used at the MSFC static- test stand for S-lB checkout. The equipment translates computer commands into signals that monitor and check vehicle systems during static-test firing. The computer also acquires data during the tests, processes the data, and uses it as inputs to Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) monitor displays for evaluation by test personnel. A system performing similar functions, but utilizing a Packard- Bell (now Raytheon) PB 250 computer, is used by Chrysler at MAP to test the S-lB during fabrication. A DEE 3 (SDS 910) is used with the PB 250 computer. The DEE 3 scans the discrete event lines to detect and record any status change for later evaluation by test personnel. 76-265 0 - 67 - pt. 2 - 29 PAGENO="0450" 446 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Saturn IC stage.- The Mississippi Test Facility and MSFC each have an RCA 11QA and DEE 6 (SDS 930) system for static firing of the S-IC. Similar systems for manufacturing checkout are located at MAF and the Quality Laboratory at MSFC. MSFC also uses a DEE 3 system for engine checkout at MSFC. In these systems, the RCA llOA is used to control and monitor test and checkout procedures.~ During the tests, the computer compiles and recoi~ds an events trail composed of command times and system responses for later evaluation. These data are displayed by computer driven CRT displays or recorded in a printed record. Saturn II and flT.B stages.- The S-IVB and the S-Il stages use the CDC 924A computer as the controlling element during static tests. The DEE function is performed by a ~DC 8090 computer. These computers perform ftnctions similar to those performed by the S-lB and S-IC checkout computers. Computer systems for the S-IVB stage are located at the Douglas Huntington' Beach facility for manufacturing checkout, at Sacramento for static testing, and at a separate facility at Sacramento for post-static-firing tests. The S-Il checkout uses the systems located at Seal Beach (North American Aviation) for manufacturing tests, and at MTF for static firing. Instrument Unit.- The Instrument Unit (ni) contains the guidance, navigation, and control equipment used during flight by the launch and injection stages. It also contains the TM and communications equipment used to gather and transmit data and to receive information during flight. The complexity of the IU stage checkout task requires two breadboard facilities in addition to an International Business Machines (IBM) facility at Huntsville. The IBM facility contains two RCA llOA computers (one for the S-lB vehicle and one for the S-V vehicle) and two DEE 3 systems. In addition, a DDP 221k computer is used to drive a Sanders Display System associated with the RCA llOA'computers. Addi- tional off-line support in the form of a GE 235 computer supplies input data tapes containing parameters needed by the onboard Launch Vehicle Digital Computer (Li/DC) and Launch Vehicle Digital Adapter (LVDA). The RCA 11QA computer generates test sequences that activate the Electronic Support Equipment (ESE) that interfaces with and sup- plies test stimuli to the stage subsystems under test. The response of the tested system is then received, processed, and displayed for test personnel Instrument Unit, Saturn lB breadboard - The breadboard facilities provide a simulation of a complete multi~itage vehicle This PAGENO="0451" 1068 NASA AUTHORIZATION 447 simulation is used to debug the launch-vehicle checkout facilities. There is one breadboard for the S-fl vehicle and one for the S-V vehi- cle. The S-fl breadboard contains two RCA llOA computers, one used to generate test sequences and control the ESE, the other to receive and process the telemetr~r. Also included is an RCA 110 used to generate inputs that simulate the functions of the spacecraft Acceptance Checkout Equipment (ACE) computer interface as it exists at KSC. There is also a DEE 6 computer as part of the system. To facilitate software checkout of the system, there are two additional RCA llOA computers used off- line to assemble and to debug programs. Instrument Unite Saturn V breadboa~.- The S-V IU breadboard facil- ity consists of two RCA llOA, two DEE 6, and two DDP 22I~ computers. The system functions in the same manner as the S-lB IU breadboard described above. 3.2.2 Manned Spacecraft Center At MSC, the principal checkout functions are concerned ~ith the verification and development of the spacecraft and its subsystems. These functions utilize three ACE stations. The first of these is an experimental ACE station. It is used in systems design of future check- out techniques and in the certification and checking out of current com- puter programs. It is similar to the ACE stations at KSC, but does not have the full range of electronic support equipment and only has a par- tial control room. The other two ACE stations are used for environ- mental chamber checkout of the Conmrnnd and Service Module (CSM) and for the LM. The spacecraft is placed in the chamber and subjected to con- ditions as found inspace. Various tests such as leak tests, pressure tests, equipment checks, and so forth, are conducted using the computers in the same manner as KSC. 3.2.3 Kennedy Space Center Computers are used at KSC to control checkout of the functional systems associated ~1th the launch vehicles and their associated space- craft prior to mission launch. At the Saturn Launch Complexes (Pads 3~, 37, and 39), MSFC desigx~ed systems containing two linked RCA llOA com- puters perform the real-time analysis of test parameters from the vehicle~stageS. The results are used as inputs to a display driven by a DDP 22~ computer (located at the S-V complex) or to memory tube dis- plays (located at S-lB complexes) for evaluation by the test engineers in the blockhouse. These computers permit test personnel to monitor PAGENO="0452" 448 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION stage systems and to control automatic checkout from vehicle erection through prelaunch activities and countdown to time of launch. In addi- tion to these computers, a DEE 3 (SDs 910 computer) monitors the vehicle discretes during checkout. This information is displayed to test per- sonnel in the Launch Computer Complex (LCC). The ACE-Spacecraft was developed by MSC to permit efficient check- out of complex spacecraft subsystems. There are two separate ACE sta- tions at KSC, one for CSM checkout, the other for LM checkout. Each system contains two CDC l6OG computers, one used for command generation and the Other used for processing the resulting telemetry. The Command System consists of test consoles, the command computer, and transmitting equipment. Using this system, test personnel manually initiate a wide variety of tests from controls on their consoles. The test commands are interpreted by the computer which sends the appropriate instructions to activate the equipment, as required, to perform the indicated tests. 3.3 TRAINING 3.3.1 Simulator Training Systems All simulator computing is an integral part of a simulator and training system. The trainers are used for training flight crews and ground operations personnel in support of the Gemini and Apollo missions (fig. 3-3). The computer system equipment, DDP 02~~ and DDP ~ is used to provide a real.~time solution for all mathematical and logic equations needed to realistically simulate vehicle dynamics and spacecraft-system performance. The computer system is interfaced with the trainer in such a way as to accept inputs from the simulated~ command module, instructor operator station console, and other simulated subsystems, and outputs in real-time all data required for actuation of the SCM and lOS displays, instruments, and visual drives. There are two Gemini mission simula- tors, one located at MSC and one at KSC, and there are two Apollo mis- sion simulators at the same locations. When the Apollo trainers are modified to an Apollo Block II configuration, it is planned to add one DDP 22~ to each trainer computer system. There are two LM Mission Simulators, one will be located at MSC and one at KSC. Another DDP 22!~ will be added to the present ones when these trainers are modified to the I~4 Block II configuration. 3.3.2 Simulation Checkout and Training System The Simulation Checkout and Training System (SCATS) is used for the training of flight controllers in preparation for Gemini missions and the checkout of data systems at MCC, Houston. PAGENO="0453" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 449 3.3.3 Breadboard Terminal Land~Lng System The Breadboard Terminal Landing System (BTLS) uses an SDS 920 com- puter. The computer is installed in a mobile van and is part of the system being developed for experimentation and for development of tech- niques for the safe landing of spacecraft after reentry from orbit. 3 .~ REAL-TD4E DATA PROCESSING 3.~.l Central Instrumentation Facility In the Central Instrumentation Facility at KSC, the GE 63~ computer system interfaces with the telemetry ground station (Data Core) and the CIF display system as is illustrated in figure 3_1~. The real-time func- tions consist of data inputs, storage, computation, retrieval, and out- put. The system accepts data from the ground station at a transfer rate of 1~32,O0O bits per second and is capable of servicing 12 simultaneous display requests within a period of 1 second. This computer, a multi- processor multi-programmed system, performs general-purpose scientific computing and data reduction concurrent with its real-time data reduc- tion and display functions. 3.l~.2 Launch Information Exchange Facility The LIEF/HOSC is a multipurpose data display, monitoring, and con- trol facility which links MSFC with KSC. The system was built by over- laying a programmable control system on an existing integrated data reduction system and providing the data reduction system with visual output devices in place of conventional output devices. The visual out- put devices are mounted in or terminate in modular display consoles and a variety of television monitors. The consoles are equipped with dis- crete lights, meters, stripcharts, television monitors and a teletype input/output (I/O) connected to the Collector Distributor. Located at Huntsville, the system has full access to the KSC data system and can address any 1~QQ 10-bit words from the KSC Data Core at will. The system currently handles prelaunch activities, flight opera- tions support, and postflight data analysis. System coordination is accomplished through a very flexible telephone/intercommunications sys- tem. The LIEF/HOSC is operated during launch and postflight evaluation. Much of the equipment is used between flights to facilitate routine data handling and experimental systems development. The supporting data corn- munications are extensively used between firings for computer sharing and exchange. PAGENO="0454" 450 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 3.7 SERVICE CENTER DATA PROCESSING At Slidell, Louisiana, MSPC has established a centralized computer facility to meet the needs of the MSFC contractors at MAF and the MTF (fig. 3_7). The computer center has resident NASA management and is operated by a computer specialist contractor. Programming is a user responsibility and programming languages are standardized. Six Honeywell computers are available for business-type applica- tions. Scientific applications use the IBM 7O91~ II or IBM 70140/7091L computers and their peripherals. A GE 205 computer is used for weather forecasting and sound propagation prediction in conjunction with stage testing. The special purpose computers perform two functions: the digi- tizing of Saturn TM data (pulse amplitude modulation, pulse code modu- lation, and frequency modulation) and computational support involving the u~e of hybrid systems. The former application uses am SDS 930 and the latter a Raytheon 720 computer. The Raytheon 720 is combined with several EA1 23lR analog computers to provide a capability for loading structural and control problems encountered during a mission. 3.6 GENERAI.-PtJRPOSE DATA PROCESSING 3.6.1 Centralized Data Processing Equipment The centralized data processing equipment installed in the Computa- tion Laboratory at MSPC is used in the following areas: data reduction, scientific and engineering data processing, and business-type applica- tions. Data reduction activities. - The computers used in data reduction usually ~.iork in conjunction with analog-to-digital (A/D) equipment, either controlling equipment (Raytheon 1i1~0, Raytheon 520, SDS 92) or monitoring (SDS 92, DDP 116). They cover applications in lunar orbit simulation and modeling or may be used in hybrid (analog and digital) simulations. Their principal use, however, is in that of conversion and processing of TM data, reformatting of data, and engineering unit conver- sion. The data sources are wind tunnels, flights, or test stands. Scientific. application equipment. - Presently, most of the applica- tions in the Computation Laboratory in this~ area are processed on two IBM 709I~ II computers. These are supported by six IBM l~~0l C3 pe- ripheral computers used for printing, utility assembly, card handling., PAGENO="0455" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 451 and tape preparation. The applications themselves are perhaps the most varied at MSFC, covering language study and research for trajectory, orbit and automatic checkout use, thermodynamic and engine performance studies, flight experiment sequencing, vehicle stage modeling and simu- lation, orbit and trajectory calculations, and mission simulation. The projected increased workload and need for additional computa- tional capacity will be provided by the recently completed procurement for five UNIVAC machines (three at MSFC, two at Slidell). These ma- chines, through the use of remote terminals and time sharing, will optimize the utilization of Computation Laboratory capabilities and experience. Business-type applications . - Three machines currently are used for these applications an IBM 771~O and two IBM 7010' machines. One IBM 7010 and the IBM 77l~0 utilize 31 remote input terminals to support the on-line inventory system to provide com~1ete electronic processing of all supply transactions from receLpt of request to shipment of mate- rial. The other 7010 performs processing needed for PERT, charting the pop, contracts and change order, and control and engineering support applications. Business applications consist of payroll, labor distri- bution and costing, personnel records, and data management. 3.6.2 Computers in the Aero-AstrOdyflamics Laboratory Computers are installed in the Aero-Astrodyflamics Laboratory for data reduction and engineering and scientific calculations. They con- sist of the following machines: CDC 3200.- This equipment supports aeroballistics research, lunar landing research, planetary orbit calculations, and heat studies. GE 20~.- This equipment supports a requirement for reduction of wind-tunnel data and general engineering calculations associated with wind-tunnel use. GE 20~5. - This computer performs meteorology computations in support of thi~eather station by calculating atmosphere profiles and reducing weather data. ______ These machines support light dynamic, thermodynamic, and aeroballistiC studies. PAGENO="0456" 452 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 3.6.3 Computers im the Astrionics Laboratory Computers are installed in the Astrionics Laboratory to support requirements that exist in launch activity and checkout research and advanced studies in guidance and vehicle performance. The data proc- essing is at an extremely high technical level. These requirements are met ~y a GE 235 and an IBM 1130. 3.6 ~ Computers in the Propulsion and Vehicle Engineering Laboratory The data processing equipment installed in the Propulsion and Vehi- cle Engineering Laboratory is used for calculations involving weight control and general-purpose scientific calculations. IBM 1620.- The IBM 1620 computers are used by S-lB and S-V weight- control studies and structural analysis. SDS 930.- The SDS 930 computers support S-I and S-V advanced vehicle programs. 3.6.5 Computers in the Quality and Reliability Assurance Laboratory Computers are installed in the Quality and Reliability Assurance Laboratory for two functions: a study of checkout procedures for vehi- cles and training of personnel in checkout of computer systems. There are two computers currently being used, a GE 235 which will be expanded to a real-time system by interfacing with other computers and an RC~ 110 which is being used by NASA and contractor personnel. Both computers are used in developing checkout programs needed for various components of the S-IC stage. 3.6.6 Centralized Data Processing Equipment at the Manned Spacecraft Center The centralized data processing equipment installed at MSC is used in three areas: scientific application, TM data processing, and busi- ness application. All of the equipment is general purpose. Scientific and engineering applications. - Scientific and engineer- ing needs are~based upon requirements to develop mathematical models, evaluate engineering designs, plan missions, and predict failure times. The computing equipment used to support these applications includes PAGENO="0457" 1 ~ 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION 453 t~o IBM 7091~ computers, a direct coupled system IBM 70lfl~/709!~, a UNIVAC 1108, and a CDC :3600. Equipment supporting data reduction applications.- This category of applications involves a combination of both scientific/engineering and information retrieval/management techniques. The computers cur- rently used to support this area include: CDC 3600/3800: This computer is used to reduce decommutated TM data from the CDC 3200. The 3800 is am upgraded 3600. CDC 3200 telemetry processor: One CDC 3200 computer is used to perform the decornmutatiofl of TM data after the hardware has performed the necessary signal conditioning and synchronization of data. This provides more flexibility at a lower cost than the previous technique of using programmable decommutation equipment. CDC 3200 input/output computer: This computer is used for periph- eral support to the 3600. It shares the tapes and input-output equip- ment attached to the CDC 3600, thus eliminating the manual handling of magnetic tapes. Business applications. - This category deals primarily with compu- tation involving data storage, retrieval, and report generation. Increasing emphasis is being placed on computers to store large quan- tities of information and to retrieve specific elements of data rapidly in a form that will permit effective management analysis. The element of information retrieval combined v~ith the use of the computer for finances, logistics, and procurement has resulted in a significant in- crease in the MSC computing workload. The computers are: IBM 7010, management applications; IBM 70~O, used for Apollo configuration, accounting, preferred parts listings, cost models, and so forth. For management applications, a UNIVAC 1106 currently being brought on-line is scheduled to replace the IBM 7010 in November 1966. 3.6.7 Computers in the White Sands Test Facility The WSTF computer equipment (CDC 3200) performs digital computation and quick-look data reduction. The secondary function of this equipment is to perform high-volume logistics support data processing for test plan preparation and failure analysis. The total workload imposed upon the DRF system is composed of several unique combinations of equipment and software for the processing of pulse-code-modulation data. The general-purpose CDC 3200 computer performs the functions of formatting and process control. The same computer is used for data processing and, with additional storage capability, is capable of performing data proc- essing concurrent with data conversion. PAGENO="0458" 454 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 3.6.8 Computers at Kennedy Space Center The KSC administrative and management computer resources consist of an IBM 7010/l1~40, an IBM 7010, and a GE ~l5. In addition to these sys- tems, limited quantities of business-type work are processed on the GE 635 computer. This equipment is all centrally located in the CIF. The GE 635 system is being expanded to accommodate the real-time opera- tional requliements. In doing so, computer capability will be avail- able to absorb the administrative and management workload on the expanded system. As programs are converted to the GE 635 and full computer capability is realized, older equipment will be released. 3.7 SPECIAL-PURPOSE DATA PROCESSING 3.7.1 ~ETRIE1TER Data Acquisition System The system, a DM1 620, is used on the recovery vessel, RETRIEVER, for spacecraft flotation tests in the Gulf of Mexico. 3.7.2 Automatic Testing Laboratory Acquisition System This system, with a DM1 620 computer, supports spacecraft qualif i- cation testing. The system can accommodate eight stations which are performing different tests simultaneously, and each test engineer can input 25 channels of information. 3.7.3 Slow Speed Acquisition System The system, with a PDS 1020 computer, is used for environmental simulation testing of spacecraft materials. 3'7.1~ Special Information Processing Techniques This system was developed for producing automatic on-line display format generation. This system, with a PDP 5 computer, is used by flight operations personnel to prepare static background information which will be used in real time for mission support in the MCC. PAGENO="0459" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 455 3 7 5 Electronic Systems Compatibility Facility The Electronic Systems Compatibility Facility (ESCF) is equipped with a IJNIVAC 6'~2B/l00~/l2l8 to provide compatibility verification of certain critical electronic systems which are required for the Apollo flights 3.7.6 Manned Spacecraft Center Centrifuge Facility In support of the MSC Centrifuge Facility, the Crew Systems Divi- sion operates a computer complex adjacent to the centrifuge. The con- trol computer operates the facility and acquires data in real time Each-~ system of the centrifuge, such as arm velocity, gimbal and gondola position, temperature, and vacuum pressure, is controlled by the com- puter 3.7.7 Manned Spacecraft Center Technical Services Division The Technical Services Division at MSC utilizesa Honeywell 610 as a category B computer. This computer is used to control and monitor the central heating and air-conditioning plant located at MSC Pres- ently, this system controls the air flow into 19 buildings at MSC An expansion ~ill be necessary for control of air flow when additional buildings are constructed 3.7.8 Kennedy Space Center Information Systems Directorate At KSC, category B ADP equipment ~ithin the Information Systems Directorate (INS) is used by the Telemetry Branch Two SDS 930 com- puter systems, that are an integral part of the ALDS TM subsystem, per- form the function of selecting, buffering, and formatting real-time TM data for subsequent transmission to the MCC in Houston for flight con- trol display purposes PAGENO="0460" 456 1968 NASA ATJTHORIZATION TABLE 3-I. - COMPUTERS USED IN CHECKOUT PRIOR TO ON-PAD PRELAUNCH ACTIVITIES Space flight unit Contractor Computers Factory checkout (a) Static firing KSC CSM North American Aviation, Inc. bC~ l6OG (c) bC~ l6O~ LM Grumman Aircraft xngineering Corp. bC~ l6oG IU International Business Machines Corp. SCA llOA (e) dRCA llOA S-IVB Douglas Aircraft Corp. . bCDC 92~A bCDC 8090 bC~ 921+A bC~ 8090 dRCA 11OA ~SDS 930 5DDP 22~~ 1SDS 920 S-Il North American Aviation, Inc. bC~ 921~A bC~ 8090 bC~ 921~A bCDC 8090 S-IC Boeing Corp. dRCA llOA ~SDS 930 ~CA 11OA aAfter static firing (or equivalent tests), a post-factory checkout takes place. This involves the sane computers and computer programs (with possible minor modifications as a result of static firing tests). bC~, Control Data Corp. cThe last routinely scheduled rocket motor firing test takes place at factory checkout. dRCA, Radio Corp. of America. eDoes not contain rocket motors; static firing tests are not applicable. ~SDS, Scientific Data Systems. %op, Computer Control Corp. PAGENO="0461" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 457 0 "-4 4.) (`5 a) p4 0 0 0 "-4 `a `a "-4 .0 I P ~ \ PAGENO="0462" COMPUTER ! 1BM709411A ~ IBM 709411 B ~ IBM 709411 C ~ IBM 709411 D 81c !. IBM 709411 E 6 IBM146OB L IBM 360/20 ~.. IBM 360/30 A ~ IBM 360/30 B 10 IBM36O/30C " IBM 360/40 ~. IBM 360/50 A `~ IBM 360/50 B !~ IBM 360/50 C `~ IBM 360/75 A ~±. IBM 360175 B ~ IBM 360/75 C 18 1BM360/75D " IBM 360/75 E 20 C) 0 Figure 3-2.- Mission Control Center/Real-Time computer Complex phaseover schedule. PAGENO="0463" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 459 _______ ______ ~ I fr~~i~ ~ z I I I ci:~ L~i'~ ~±i o PJ~1 I. -~ I-n ~2~g U -~ ~ ~ -~ 2~8~28 PAGENO="0464" C) 0 N Figure 3-u. - Quick-look reduction data to engineering units. PAGENO="0465" 0 CAPE KENNEDY REDSTONE ARSENAL ADX - AUTOMATIC DATA EXCHANGE TCO - TELEPHONE CENTRAL OFFICE MILA - MERRITT iSLAND LAUNCH AREA RSA - REDSTONE ARSENAL KSC MSFC KSC BANANA RIVER REPEATER STATION COMPLEX 39 MSFC AIR FORCE/KSC INTERFACE oo 0 I-I N Figure 3-5.- Kennedy Space Center/Marshall Space Flight Center Launch Operations Support Center communications link. PAGENO="0466" 462 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION ~.O RESPONSIBILITIES, ORGANIZATION, AND STAFFING Just as it has been necessary to assign different portions of the total space effort to specific Centers for accomplishment, it has also been necessary to assign different computational responsibilities to elements within the Centers to insure the highest efficiency of both the space mission and the support functions performed by the computers. Standardization has been realized in many facets of computational sup- port, and the Centers are working toward more standardization where and when practical. There are still, and probably always will be, unique requirements and non-standard operations that can and must be accom- plished uniquely. Although the Centers tend toward standardization in organization and operations, standardization has not become a goal. Rather, mission efficiency has been adopted as a goal, with effective computer support at the least practical cost. Because of differences in missions, them, differences also exist in computer organizations, in operations among Centers, and sometimes even within a Center. The remainder of this section will describe, step-by-step, the organizations that have been developed, the staffing for the computer elements, and the responsibilities that have been assigned to assure goal accomplishment. ~.l ORGANIZATION Within NASA policy, the OMSF has assigned operational control of computer resources to the lowest possible organizational level which is required to meet program objectives and to be consistent with economic utilization Since MSF has practically no computational requirements at NASA Headquarters, the direct control of MSF computer resources rests with the three NSF Center Directors Figures 1~~l to 1~-1~ provide an indi- cation of the organizations utilizing and controlling computer resources at each Center and up through the NASA chain of command Although not indicated on the attachments, obviously every element and individual in NASA is, in essence, an ultimate user of computer resources The degree of utilization varies from the receipt of am automated payroll check through computer control over manned orbital flights. PAGENO="0467" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 463 14 1 1 George C Marshall Space Flight Center At MSFC, all general-purpose computers and a portion of the special- purpose equipment are located in the Computation Laboratory under the direction of Dr. Helmut Hoelzer. In addition to the equipment located in the Computation Laboratory, special-purpose equipment is located in the various Research and Development Laboratories, where it is utilized in mission-oriented applications. In these instances, Dr. Hoelzer. main- tains computer-oriented responsibility, while the various user labora- tories maintain mission-oriented responsibility. At the Slidell Computation Center, general-purpose and special- purpose equipment is under the direction of Mr. Robert Reeves. Organi- zationally, the Slidell Computation Center reports to MAP. The purpose of Slid~1l is to provide centralized computation support to the NSPC prime contractors at MAP and. MTF on a time-sharing basis and to MSPC and MSC in scientific areas during peak workload periods at those Centers The contractors also use this equipment for administrative/management applications. As in the Research and Development Laboratories, Dr * Hoelzer maintains computer-oriented responsibility for the Slidell Center This is accomplished both through the activities of the Slidell Computer Board, which meets periodically to assess the Slidell Operation, as well as directly from Dr. Hoelzer to Mr. Reeves. 14 1 2 Manned Spacecraft Center At MSC, all general-purpose application computers are located with- in the Computation and Analysis Division (CAAD) under the direction of Mr Eugene H Brock The CAAD carries out functions related to admin- istrative and scientific applications and data reduction Both general-purpose and special-purpose computers are included in the RTCC of the Mission Control Center This function is administered by the Flight Support Division under the direction of Mr H E Clements This equipment is integrated into a real-time system used for Gemini and Apollo mission control The balance of the special-purpose equipment is located in several divisions. The Information Systems Division under the direction of Mr. P. H. Vavra maintains computer-oriented responsibility, while the various users maintain mission-oriented responsibility over this equip- ment The MSC Computation and Analysis Division has technical responsi- bility for the computer equipment at WSTP and maintains approval author- Ity for all equipment. acquisitions outside the MCC. PAGENO="0468" 464 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION )-~.l.3. John F. Kennedy Space Center At KSC, the general-purpose and special-purpose equipment, other than for checkout applications, is located in the Data Systens Division under the direction of Dr. Rudolf H. Brims. Special-purpose checkout equipment is located in Launch Operations. Each of the user groups operates checkout equipment in conjunction with the flight hardware supplier for the particular operation. )4.l.1~ Intercenter Relations The Office of Manned Space Flight and its three Centers work to- gether on computational matters through the MSF Resources Sharing Panel which meets periodically on an informal basis. This group works in computer-related management problems such as standardization of pro- grams between two or more Centers (e.g., the Launch Data Processing by KSC and subsequent data transmission to MSC and MSFC and exchange qf programs among Centers to eliminate duplication of prOgramming efforts). In addition to participation in the MSF Resources Sharing Panel, each of the Centers is represented on the NASA Intercenter Committee on ADP. This group serves in an advisory capacity to Dr. Robert Seamans, NASA Deputy Administrator, in insuring compliance within NASA to other government-agency policies and regulations, in establishing intercenter and agency-wide policy, and in solving specific computer-management related problems. Additional responsibilities in the area of computer resource sharing have recently been placed on MSFC and MSC. In establishing a government-wide Computer Resources Sharing Sy~tem, GSA has, through mutual agreement, appointed MSFC as the Alabama, Mississippi, and Slidell Regional Exchange Center and MSC as the South Texas Regional Exchange Center. In this capacity, these centers act as the catalyst to further the sharing of government-wide computer resources within their areas and to coordinate requirements for computer resources from other areas. To bring into focus the two trends of innovations in space flight technology and innovations in computer technology, there has been a critical need to devote effort to research and development in the com- puter sciences and to the performance of, complex mathematical investi- gation into fundamental aspects of problems encountered during manned and unmanned space fli~ht research. The MSF Centers have been instru- mental in extending these frontiers of computer knowledge. Technical ex- perts in each of the computational elements investigate computer solutions PAGENO="0469" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 465 of problems encountered during space flight research. In addition, these people are available as consultants in selected areas of mathe- matics and physics. Dissemination of information takes the form of pub- lished papers and program sharing through the NASA Office of Technology Utilization, 1+.2 STAFFING In the MSF organization, programming and computer operation at the Centers is carried out primarily by contractor support personnel on a task-order basis. The use of contract support personnel is the result of several related circumstances. First, in order to maintain a dynamic staff at all times through the peaks and valleys of work requirements, it would have been necessary to recruit, train, and maintain a large staff and reservoir of programmers and operators on the civil service roles. By contracting on a non-personnel-services type contract, -. the Centers are able to have a readily available staff of personnel ~ with these skills (see table 1k-I). This action is not unlike the end item when contracting for space technology hardware. The civil service personnel are contract monitors over these skills. This arrangement accounts for the seemingly disproportionately high number of management- type assignments among the civil service personnel. This situation is especially noticeable in an organization such as MCC at the Manned Spacecraft Center (as sho~n in table 1~~ii), where no civil service per- sonnel are used as operators, programmers, analysts, and so forth. PAGENO="0470" TABLE 4-I. - CONTRACTOR SUPPORT Contractor Scope of work Location Type contract Effective Number and type personnel ITT/Federal Electric Co. Programming and operating computers KBC-Cape Kennedy CPAF June 1964 7 - Management 74 - Professional 31 - Operators 3 - Clerical Computer Applications, Inc. (subcontractor to Ling-Temco-Vought) Prograrmiing and operating computers KSC-Cape Kennedy CPAF January 1964 * 10 - Management 113 - Professional 124 - Operators 7 - Clerical Lockheed Klectronics Programming, operating, and maintaining computers MSC-Houston ~ CPAF - November 1965 37 - Management 193 - Professional 134 - Operators 164 - Clerical International Business Machines, Inc. Engineering programming, maintenance, and operations to support Gemini and Apollo missions MSC-Houston ~ . CPAF/CPIF September 1965 . * ~4 - Management 392.- Professional 89 - Operators 94 - Clerical ZIA Co. MSC-White Sands Computer Sciences Corporation . Programming operating and maintaining computers MSFC Huntsville , CPAF July 1966 39 Management 247 - Professional 128 - Operators 64 - Clerical LW Range Systems Operation of the Slidell Computer Office MSFC-Slidefl CPAF January 1966 12 - Management: 21 - Professional 135 - Operators 45 - Clerical CD `.3 0 PAGENO="0471" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 467 The following table categorizes the skill distribution of the full- time civil service personnel in the MSF organization. TABLE !~-II.~ MAN~ED SPACE FLIGHT FULL-TIME CIV~1 SERVICE IN ADP Assignment MSC MSFC ~ Huntsville Slidell Tota] KSC MCC CAAD Management Computation professionals (analysts, programmers, systems engineers) Operators Clerical, administrative (GS-9 and below) . 12 32 0 3 -i-- 77 0 0 7 - 12 97 0 61 - 1~0 106 2 1~3 6 0 0 2 l1~7 235 2 116 - All of the ADP contracts utilizing contractor personnel are for mission support services except at Slidell, where a management-type con- tract is used due to the "open shop" nature of the batch-type processing accomplished. The contractors' organizations at the Centers *in the sup- port situation parallel the civil service structure. The integrity of the contractors' supervisory chain is maintained, and task assignments result from definitive work orders issued under the terms of the con- tract. PAGENO="0472" 468 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION The following table illustrates the numbers and corresponding categories of contractor personnel: TABLE 4-ill. - MA~BED SPACE FLIGHT FULL-TIME CONTRACTOR PERSONT~EL IN ADP Assignment KSC MCC CAADI MSFC Slidell Total Management Computation professionals Operators Clerical, admin- istrative (GS-9 and below) 18 177 259 12 54 392 89 94 37 193 134 164 39 247 128 64 12 21 135 45 160 1030 745 379 In addition to the civil service and support contractor personnel assigned on a full-time basis to computer operation and management, others are involved with computer use in situations in which a com- puter supports professional activity on a part-time basis (for example, design engineering, test, checkout, and so forth). A recent sample indicates that 126 civil service and 718 contractor engineers are so occupied. 4.3 RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS In linear-type charts (figs. 4-5, 4-6, and 4-7), some of the ma- jor computer actions that are taken in each of the Centers have been assigned action codes ("develop," "concur," "approve"). These charts indicate the computer-related responsibility levels at each of the Centers Overlaying this, however, is the prime responsibility of the user that of determining that there is need for computation support. Basically, there are two methods for obtaining computational sup- port. The first is the authority to obtain and operate a computer com- plex in support of a definite and continuing mission. The second is to PAGENO="0473" 196 S NASA AUTHORIZATION 469 obtain day-to-day computer support from a computer organization that has been established for the computation needs of a Center in general. The most obvious example of the first method is the RTCC at Mission Control Center at MSC. In this instance, a need was estab- lished at the Gemini, Apollo, and Mission Operations Program Office level within MSF. Once the need was established, all levels through the NASA Adninistrator were in the chain of approval. After approval, operational responsibility was assigned through the chain of supervision to MSC, to a directorate, and thence to the Flight Support Division. In circumstances such as this, the responsibility is clearly established and applications are monitored by the organizational structure. Not so obvious, but certainly as vital, are the hundreds of thou- sands of run requests, printouts, computations, and tabulations that are the day-to-day applications placed by the scientific, engineering, and management personnel of each Center. These responsibilities are not* so clearly defined, and thus not so easily traced through a chain of supervision or to a clearly required function. The management ~ech- niques, such as the resource control systems, job order assignments, and budget allocation, are discussed in the "Management Techniques" section of this report. They supplement and make possible the appli- cation of responsibility for these many and varied applications. From a responsibility point of view, it was most important that each system be carefully designed to insure a firm chain of audit from the expend- iture of any and all computation resources to a responsible individual in each and every case. In addition to the two basic methods of obtaining computer support discussed above, there is a need to use a computer as a supplement to another piece or pieces of equipment. In thOse instances, the user organization deems it necessary to have computer equipment (special purpose) as an integral.part of a mission-related system. The user must first obtain cognizant mission-authority approval. Then, as an example, the Computation Laboratory at MS.FC enters the picture to determine which hardware and software best satisfy the user require- ments, follows through with the user in the procuremçnt process, and maintains computer-related responsibility throughout the installa- tion and operational phases. This same pattern exists for the launch vehicle (MSFC cognizance) and spacscraft (MSc cognizance) checkout e9uipment located at KSC, even though the users perform actual operation of the equipment. A very important responsibility at each of the Centers is the establishment of computational objectives as related to the scope of the computer operations. These objectives involve short- and long- range planning, organization, and staffing of all elements associated PAGENO="0474" 470 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION with computers or computer operations, centralized or decentralized concept of computer operations, degree of support to outside operations (including contractors), and civil service and contractor support per- sonnel requirements. There are, variations in the responsibIlity assignments. for the. establishment of computational objectives among the three Centers.. In each case, the user or customer of the computer operation forms the preliminary basis by establishing his long- and short-range computation- al requirements. At MSFC, the Computation Laboratory establishes the computational objectives for approval by the Research and Development Operations Director and the Center Director. At KSC, this responsi- bility starts with the Data Systems Division, with ultimate approval by the Center Director. As a graphical presentation, the following chart depicts the responsibility chain for the establishment of computational objectives at MSC. [~TER DIRECTOR [ENGINEERING AND DEVELOPMENT1 FLIGHT OPERATIONS1 I DIRECTORATE 1 [~ DIRECTORATE J LCOMPUTATION AIW1 1 ANALYSIS DIVISION INFORMATION I I FLIGHT SUPPORT APPROVAL OF SYSTEM DIVISION DIVISION J EQUIPMENT I GENERAL PURPOSE I I SPECIAL PURPOSE] I MISSION CONTEOL i COMPUTATION AND ANALYSIS DIVISION FOR CONTINUOUS `MONITORING AND ADVICE PAGENO="0475" 471 The Office of Manned Space Flight exercises control over the Cen- ters primarily through a review and validation process As stated earlier, the NASA policy of assigning responsibility at as low a level as possible z~esults in each Center essentially being in control of its own computer resources The OMSF reviews and evaluates computer re- quirements on a center-by-center basis and coordinates with appropriate program offices (Apollo, Gemini, and so on) to insure the consistency of requirements Additionally, OMSF consolidates budget and funding requirements for the three Centers for transmittal to the Office of Programming and monitors operations at each Center for compliance with NASA and other agency policies The NASA Office of Progranñliing is responsible for consolidating all budgetary requirene~ts which have been approved by tne Associate AdtniniS- trator and submitting the NASA requirements to the Bureau of the Budget for further approval. The Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition (OTDA) is responsible for the development of NASA-wide policies, plans, and procedures approved by the Associate Administrator The OTDA serves as the single focal point between NASA and other government agencies for computer matters, reviewing, evaluating, and coordinating on a NASA-wide basis the computer requirements, acquisitions, utilizations, and operations of computer resources The NASA Intercenter Committee on ADP is responsible for advising NASA management on the establishment of procedures, reviews, and con- trols necessary to insure compliance with other government policies and regulations on the selection, acquisition, and management of NASA computers Further, the committee aids in the establishment of Inter- center and agency-wide policy and operational procedures for NASA conput~s. The NASA Deputy Administrator, Dr Robert C Seamans, Jr , is the final authority for computer resources in NASA In this position, he provides final approval of NASA policy and plans for acquisition, utili- zation, and disposition of computer equipment and services based on the ob~jectives of the agency and the government He has assigned the Assistant Administrator for Administration as the NASA Headquarters ADP Prog1*a~n Officer to assist with the management information systems involved in this task. 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION PAGENO="0476" 472 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 0 U] ~ 4.) ON COal O `r4 U] 4.)U] 0~ 00 *~ *H .t~+) 0 PAGENO="0477" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 473 GEORGE C. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER ___________________________________________________ F-i. ~ ii ~I~ [;~ F _____________ I _____ 1 ~ x Special Purpose Equipment # General & Special Purpose Equipment & Total Center Responsibility * Slidell Facility ~rct~F ~ i~~;~i- -I :~;:] ~F#~CEF ~ I x~~} 3.~::~ix #1 ~.4~~4_H xI!4~!} :`~!jx ~ F~I:} ~ ~ [~: ~;~i [~J ~J I~!.~F ~ *____ ~ I LEGEND: Figure ~4-2.- George C. Marshall Space F~light Center automatic data processing organization. PAGENO="0478" [GINEEReG~DEvELoPMENj ~ FLuG~~oHs 1M~E~O:ERR~*~TIONS ~ I~f!I 1r~f~1 r~l ____ LIH ~1:H I H__ x~j. ~~j* ~~Ix Lj~t~] f~- {!!:~. j~ x Special Purpose Equipment # Mission Control Equipment & Center Responsibility * General Purpose Equipment & Center Responsibility o Special Purpose Equipment & Center Responsbility [I!U~] LEGEND: I ~ L I 11 II I ~:NiT~j~ 1 i~th~i r~i oo 0 N F [K~ ~] L21 Figure 14_3.- Manned Spacecraft Center automatic data processing organization. PAGENO="0479" z C12 0 N NOTE: Special Purpose Checkout Equipment Responsibility Shared With Flight Hardware Suppliers (MSFC, MSC, GSFC). Figure 4.-L- John F. Kennedy Space Center automatic data processing organization. General & Special Purpose Equipment & Center Responsibility (Dr. Bruns~ PAGENO="0480" 476 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION CODE: * DEVELOP x CONCUR # APPROVE C & A GENERAL DETERMINATION OF DIV f PURPOSE SPECIAL PURPOSE HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS APPROVES L MISSION AND IMPLEMENTATION ALL LEVELS INVOLVED CONTROL * PURPOSE - - -r- 7 T GENERAL DETERMINATION OF SOFTWARE * SPECIAL REQU I REMENTS AND PURPOSE MISSION IMPLEMENTATION SEVERAL DIVISIONS CONTROL EVALUATION AND APPROVAL OR DISAPPROVAL OF COMPUTER APPLICATIONS SEVE RAL DIVIS IONS GENERAL PURPOSE SPECIAL PURPOSE MISSION CONTROL DESIGN OF COMPUTER HARDWARE SYSTEMS 7 # GENERAL PURPOSE SPECIAL PURPOSE MISSION CONTROL PROCUREMENT OF COMPUTER HARDWARE SERVICES # * X * X ~ * ~ ~ GENERAL PURPOSE SPECIAL PURPOSE MISSION CONTROL INSTALLATION OF COMPUTER HARDWARE SERVICES * GENERAL PURPOSE SPECIAL PURPOSE MISSION CONTROL DETERMINATION OF COMPUTER UTILIZATION REPORTS DESCRIBING EFFECTIVENESS AND COST OF HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE SYSTEMS # - * - (CO # ST) * - X ~ ~ x * ~ GENERAL PURPOSE SPECIAL PURPOSE MISSION CONTROL PREPARATION OF COMPUTER UTILIZATION REPORTS * (COST) # # * ~ ~ GENERAL PURPOSE SPECIAL PURPOSE MISSION CONTROL ANALYSIS AND ACTION RELATED TO COMPUTER UTILIZATION REPORTS # * (CO ST) x x ~ * ~ GENERAL PURPOSE SPECIAL PURPOSE' MISSION CONTROL Figure ~ Manned Spacecraft Center computer responsibilities. PAGENO="0481" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION CODE: * DEVELOP #APPROVE /~~4%~/ /~./~I#./'/ (BOTH GENERAL AND SPECIAL PURPOSE EQUI PMENT) tc,, /6Vc~? I / DETERMI NAIl ON OF HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS AND IMPLEMENTATION # * X * DETERMINATION OF SOFTWARE REQU I REMENTS AND IMPLEMENTATION # * X it * EVALUATION AND APPROVAL OR DISAPPROVAL OF COMPUTER APPLICATIONS it * it DESIGN OF COMPUTER HARDWARE SYSTEMS # PROCUREMENT OF COMPUTER HARDWARE SERVICES # * x * INSTALLATION OF COMPUTER HARDWARE SERVICES it . DETERMINATION OF COMPUTER UTILIZATION REPORTS DESCRIBING EFFECTIVENESS AND COST OF HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE SYSTEMS , . . PREPARATION OF COMPUTER UTILIZATION REPORTS it x * ANALYSIS AND ACTION RELATED TO COMPUTER UTILIZATION REPORTS it x Figure I~_6._ Marshall Space Flight Center computer responsibilities. 477 76-265 0 - 67 - pt. 2 - 31 PAGENO="0482" 478 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION CODE: * DEVELOP x CONCUR # APPROVE DETERMINATION OF HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS AND IMPLEMENTATION # CHECKOUT DETERMINATION OF SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS AND IMPLEMENTATION X * # # ` GENERAL PURPOSE SPECIAL PURPOSE CHECKOUT EVALUATION AND APPROVAL OR DISAPPROVAL OF COMPUTER APPLICATIONS S # # (OTHER x CENTERS GENERAL PURPOSE SPECIAL PURPOSE CHECKOUT S DESIGN OF COMPUTER HARDWARE SYSTEMS # X X X X OTHER CENTERS GENERAL PURPOSE SPECIAL PURPOSE CHECKOUT S PROCUREMENT OF COMPUTER HARDWARE SERVICES X 1 X X X GENERAL PURPOSE PURPOSE S. ~ INSTALLATION OF COMPUTER HARDWARE SERVICES S OTHER CENTERS ~ S OTHER CENTERS # ~ * CHECKOUT GENERAL PURPOSE SPEC AL PURPOSE ChECKOUT DETERMINATION OF COMPUTER UTILIZATION REPORTS DESCRIBING EFFECTIVENESS AND COST OF HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE SYSTEMS it it S GENERAL SPECIAL PURPOSE CHECKOUT S PREPARATION OF COMPUTER UTILIZATION REPORTS GENERAL PURPOSE SPECIAL PURPOSE S ANALYSIS AND ACTION RELATED TO COMPUTER UTILIZATION REPORTS OTHER CENTERS) - I I ~OTHER CENTERS) CHECKOUT PURPOSE CHECKOUT - Figure 1~~7 Kennedy Space Center computer responsibilities PAGENO="0483" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 479 5.0 MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES 5.1 MANAGEMENT REPORTING The Office of Manned Space Flight and its Centers have applied classical management techniques and, where necessary, developed new ones for the management of computer resources. These techniques include methods for the acquisition, control, utilization, and sharing of com- puter resources. In order to administer the computer resources and meet overall objectives, management review and reporting systems have been established at all levels of management throughout NASA Headquarters and its field installations. "Management Procedures for Automatic Data Processing Equipment," NHB 2L~lO.l, issued by OTDA, establishes the policies and procedures for use throughout NASA for the management of computer resources. This doc- ument defines the responsibilities of the Deputy Administrator, the Associate Administrator for Tracking and Data Acquisition, the Head- quarters Institutional Directors, and the directors of the field instal- lations. It also promulgates requirements for the Annual ADP Planning Document and the ADP Equipment Acquisition Plan, as well as establish- ing guidelines for the selection, acquisition, and utilization of category-A equipment. The three major reporting systems currently in existence for con- trolling computer resources are the ADP Annual Planning Document, Bureau of the Budget (BOB) Circular A-55 Reports, and the Program Op- erating Plans (pop). The most comprehensive of the computer reporting.systems is the Annual ADP Planning Document. This document covers all known equipment actions for the current and budget years, identifies all costs associ- ated with the equipment, and includes complete justification for its use and need. It provides the actual utilization for the past year and estimates for the current and budget years. It shows funding require- ments foi~ all 3 years and includes a section for long-range plans. The BOB Circular A-55 submission is an annual report required by BOB. This report is also updated with quarterly summaries. This doc- ument, which is prepared at the Centers, shows the status of each com- puter for the past, current, budget, and budget-plus-one years. This status shows cost range, whether the computer is purchased or leased, and the actual or estimated (for future years) average number of hours in service. In addition, it supplies planning data in the areas of PAGENO="0484" 480 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION personnel and cost on a 3-year basis and reflects the type of applica- tions currently being performed by the Center computers. The POP is an internal quarterly funding report which is submitted by all field Centers to NASA Headquarters. A separate plan is submitted for each appropriation. In the case of the Research and Development and Construction of Facilities appropriations, the costs are shown by program and project. For the Administrative Operations appropriation, the costs are reflected by BOB object and sub-object classification. The sub-object class is further shredded-out to cover the area of com- puters. It contains the purchase, lease, and maintenance costs, of equipment and shows contractor costs for operations and programming of NASA-owned machines. The plan contains past-year actual dollar totals and current- and budget-year estimates. The current-year estimate shows 6-month projected cumulative obligations with quarterly cumulative totals and totals for the fiscal year. There are other planning docu- ments which are part of the computer reporting system, such as the individual acquisition plans and special reports and studies which are prepared for top' management, the BOB, and Congress. These reports also provide information related to the overall planning of computer systems in Manned Space Flight. Computer management reports forwarded to OMSF from a Center Director's office are sent through channels to the MSF Technical Sup- port Branch for evaluation, The only exception to this procedure is for individual reports and acquisition requests for real-time and check- out computers, which are evaluated by the Mission Operations group and the Operations Support Systems and Checkout Branches, respectively. The reports or plans are reviewed for such items as need, technical feasi- bility, funding requirements, facilities requirements, and utilization. Where overall reports contain data on project requirements, they are coordinated with appropriate project offices. Funding requirements are coordinated with the MSF Resource Control Office. The completed evaluation, including the detailed analysis, is forwarded to either the Director of Management Operations, Mission Operations, or the Apollo Program Office, as appropriate, for recom- mendation to the Associate Administrator for MSF, either to be approved at that management level or to obtain concurrence where reports or plans must be approved at a higher management level. Each field Center, as well as NASA Headquarters, conducts overall reviews of the entire computer system operation. These reviews gener- ally take the form of detailed reports or briefings. For example, at MSFC and MSC, the Center Directors annually receive a presentation on all aspects of the computer systems. The Office of Manned Space Flight conducts periodic reviews both at the Centers and at N&SA Headquarters. PAGENO="0485" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 481 These reviews may be in conjunction with POP reviews or studies of individual areas of the computer picture. In addition to established management reviews both at NASA Headquarters and field Centers, reviews, both formal and informal, are conducted as specific requirements or situations nay dictate. ~.2 COMPUTER RESOURCE ACQUISITION The basic computer acquisition procedures for NASA are derived from BOB Circular Nos. A-5)4 and 60-6 and from NASA Document NHB 2~lO.l and are defined in more detail in individual Center policies and pro- cedures. In essence, these procedures require that the selection of equip- ment to meet a given need be based primarily on the capability of the equipment to fulfill system specifications and on the most economical method of acquisition, installation, and operation. The computer acquisition procedure is divided into t~o major steps. As depicted in figure 5-1, the user at a Center must have his require- ments validated and get approval from Center and NASA Headquarters management prior to initiation of the acquisition process for a com- puter. As sho~m in figure 5_21, after approval, the Center establishes a Source Evaluation Board (SEB) and enters the acquisition cycle. Early in the acquisition process, the requesting installation prepares a computer acquisition plan. This document is submitted through channels to the Associate Administrator for approval. Prior concurrence of the Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight and the Associate Administrator for Tracking and Data Acquisition is required for all computers covered by these procedures before the acquisition plan is approved and the procurement process initiated. The acquisition plan includes an evaluation to show clearly that computer requirements cannot ~tholly or partially be met by: (1) The use of existing computer resources, available either within NASA, from other government agencies, or from contractors (2) The use of computers that may be excess to the needs of other elements of NASA or other government agencies and ~hich are available or will become available by the planned installation date (3) The augmentation of an existing P.DP facility PAGENO="0486" 482 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION The acquisition plan also contains a written justification for the equipment, citing the specific requirements that will be satisfied This justification gives an estimate of utilization, special input/out- put (I/o) requirements, backup needs, operational constraints, and so forth Specifications for the equipment are included which describe the equipment proposed for acquisition ~in detail. The plan must also include estimated dates for readiness review, software checkout, training, and program conversion. The computer acquisition procedures are designed to give management the ability to carefully assess and review computer acquisitions. Fol- lowing this assessment, review, and approval, the Center then proceeds to enter the procurement cycle. First, qualified computer manufacturers are invited to submit proposals on the specifications developed for the computer to be acquired. Criteria are developed, defined, and weighted by the SEB and are used as the basis of the SEB s statement of facts to the selection official Depending on the dollar amount of the acqui- sition, the procedure for selection as depicted in figure 5-2 is follow- ed A more detailed explanation of the SEB may be found in NASA Document NPC ~ Source Evaluation Board Manual. 5 3 Cc~~1PUTER RESOURCE CONTROL The expenditure of computer resources is controlled in MSF by methods of workload control for all computing efforts and contract mon- itoring for contracted efforts involving computer resources 5 3 1 Workload Control in the Computation Facilities The objective of the established workload control system in the MSF computational facilities is to furnish the means for planning, reviewing, and analyzing work requests and, as a result, controlling the work effort and expenditure of resources in the MSF computation facilities. The MSF computational facilities involved in this fonnal system are the general-purpose computer support organizations at KSC, MSC, and MSFC. ~ A prime benefit of workload control is to reduce to the minimum degree the possibility of expending computer resources on marginal tasks. In essence, discipline in the use of computer services is achieved by assigning each user element a dollar budget against which computer usage PAGENO="0487" is charged. If the user exceeds this budget during the fiscal year, he must justify the need for additional funds from Center management. The computer workload control system: (1) Assigns to each user the responsibility of achieving efficient computation (2) Provides the Centers with a data structure for their annual ADP budget preparation (3) Assists management in evaluating requests for additional com- putational capacity (~) Provides NASA Headquarters information for ADP budget reviews and evaluations Each computational facility in MSF utilizes essentially the same procedure for workload control, although details may differ slightly. The procedure is described in the following paragraphs using the MSFC system as an example. The computation facility develops a workload projection and budget allocation with each user prior to the fiscal year. Center management then sets a total allocation for the computer facility based on the workload projections. Each user must submit a written request for all support. This request form provides the basis for record keeping, including dollar accounting. The user's management reviews the work request against the assignment for that organization and the avail- ability of computing funds and approves or disapproves the request, as appropriate. The computation facility also reviews the approved request and, if technically feasible, performs the work. The user receives periodic reports showing allocation, current expenditures, and remaining balance (for an example, see figure 5-3). Center management also receives periodic expenditures reports per user division. If necessary, the customer requests additional budget allocations from Center manage- ment. The MSFC and KSC systems differ in one respect from the }4SC system. In MSFC and KSC, the computation support dollars show up in the com- putation facility's budget. The facility, in turn, allocates the dollars to the customer as needed. At MSC, the computation dollars are gathered in a carrier account, which is charged for the Computation and Analysis Division's reimbursable costs and credited by charges against the customer for support rendered. The charges are based on operating cost data developed by the Center's Resource Management Office. 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 483 PAGENO="0488" 484 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION The MSFC, KSC, and MSC workload control systems were implemented as of July l96+. The MSFC Customer Dollar Allocation was operational July 1965. The MSC Carrier Account was effective July 1966. Further action will be taken to improve workload control by expand- ing its coverage, and disseminating information to other interested par- ties. One area that will have to be studied closely is the effect of third-generation time-sharing computers on budget allocation methods and cost determination. 5.3.2 Workload Control in Operation Systems The task of controlling the expenditure of computer resources in operational systems, such as real-time systems for the support of a mission, checkout, and training, is somewhat different than resource control in the computational facilities. Each such system has a signif- icant role to play in overall mission accomplishment and puts extensive demands on t.he computer within the system. In some instances, computer requirements cannot be completely defined at the inception of. a program and must be increased during the course of system development. Basi- cally, this increase results from one of two causes: (1) the require- ments for the system become better defined as time progresses; (2) the users of the system may impose requirements with a factor of redundancy to assure accomplishment of that element of the entire mission profile. In the case of the former, there is little to say; the requirements must be met if the mission is to be successful. The latter is a prob- lem that is handled in various ways in MSF. Procedures for require- ments control are set by the organizational element responsible for the development of the overall system. New requirements are evaluated to determine their necessity, their impact on existing contracts, their effect on interfaces with other systems, and so forth. The methods for evaluating such requirements must, by necessity, vary from project to project. In the Apollo spacecraft program, for example, systems are under the control of the Apollo Configuration Management System de- scribed in detail in N&SA Document NPC 500-1, "The Apollo Configuration Management Manual." Configuration management procedures have thus been developed to control changes to all elements in a system, including those that utilize computers. 5. )4 CONTRACT MONITORING A significant amount of the oonputer resources utilized in MSF is either developed, operated, or maintained by contractor personnel. The use of contractors in this manner is in keeping with NASA policy to PAGENO="0489" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 485 utilize wherever possible the resources of private industry, and enables MSF to obtain what might otherwise be the unobtainable services of high- ly skilled personnel. Contract monitoring from both a technical and management point of view, therefore, constitutes a considerable activity in MSF. Organizations, procedures, guidelines, and techniques for this activity have been developed by the Office of Manned Space Flight, Cen- ter Directors, and individual Center divisions. 5.)4.l Scope of Contract Types The scope of contracted efforts in MSF is broad, running from support keypunching services for Center conputation facilities to con- tracts for the delivery of complex computer based systens. Depending on the nature of the effort, the contract nay be of any type, such as incentive, fixed fee, award fee, and so forth. Support contractors may be located on NASA premises or off site. Responsibilities for a particular effort nay be divided between several NASA organizations. Contracts nay call for the delivei~y of hardware or software (computer programs) or both. Each contract in this broad spectrum of requirements requires a tailored approach to achieve effective control. For the purposes of management control, contracts awarded in MSF can be considered generally as one of two broad types: support services contracts or mission sup- port. contracts. Support services contracts are those in which a NASA organization obtains the services of a contractor on a level-of-effort basis, Individual tasks are assigned on a task-order basis to con- tractor personnel working closely with NASA personnel. This type of contract is used when a NASA Center determines it will need a certain amount of manpower support but cannot completely identify the required end items in advance. A specific example is the contract between MSFC and the Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) in which CSC provides programming and computer operating services to the MSFC computational facility. . A mission support contract is one in which NASA contracts for a particular end item to be used in support of a mission. Requirements for the end items are included as part of the contract; there is usu- ally a separate contractor-managed group set up to perform the task. For~ial NASA monitoring by way of reviews, written reports, and accept- ance. tests characterizes these efforts with minimum day-to-day contact between the NASA users and contractor personnel. The unique technical considerations of the contract make it mandatory in many instances that the techniques used to monitor these efforts be tailored to the individual system. An example of a mission contract is the contract PAGENO="0490" 486 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION for the Real-Time Computer Complex at Houbton In this contract, IBM provides computers and computer programs that are used in the Houston Mission Control Center to assist flight controllers during a manned space flight. 5.)4.2 Management Tools An extensive set of management tools has been developed by OIvISF and its centers to' aid in contract monitoring. The following are typical examples: Work statements, task orders - Each contract contains a work statement which serves as the basis for contractor support and for evaluation of such support. For mission contracts, the work statement defines the end products to be produced, management requIrements, required contractor tasks, and schedules. The exact content and detail of the work statements vary in OMSF according to application, partic- ularly for software contracts. For support contracts, work statements) define the general task and management requirements. Detailed descrip- tions of required end items and delivery dates are incorporated into individual task orders during the period of the support contract These task orders serve as "little work statements," so to speak, to monitor the contractor's performance Incentive contracts - It is NSF policy to lend incentive to con- tracts to the greatest degree practical This policy has also been applied to' contracts that utilize computer resources. Typically, these contracts encourage improved `contra~tor performance by paying fees according to the quality of the product, performance, total cost, and delivery date. Both support and mission áontracts either have been or are being made into incentive contracts in NSF wherever possible At MSC, for example, the support contract for the computational facility has been made into an incentive `contract (Contract NAS 9,.538L~), as has the mission contract for the RTCC (Contract NAS 9-995). Com- puter resource contracts have also been made into incentive contracts at MSFC and KSC The RTCC contract is an interesting and particularly significant one in that it contains incentives for the production of large-scale computer programs, the first time this has been done in NASA and, quite possibly, in government Management guidelines - The Office of Manned Space Flight and its Centers have issued an extensive set of guidelines to be used in the management of contracts A typical example is the MSFC Support Contract Management Manual which provides guidance for the management of all support contracts at the MSFC This manual covers such items as PAGENO="0491" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 487 surveillance of services, travel and security regulations, incentive award fee evaluation, acceptance of products, manpower control, and so forth. Monitoring organizations.- Total contract monitoring is usually accomplished by several organizations. In general, technical monitoring is done by the organization which utilizes the contractor's services and end products. This monitoring is accomplished by design reviews, evaluation of test results, inspections, and so forth. The purpose of the monitoring is to insure that the technical work of the support rendered meets the requirement stipulated. Each Center has contractual offices to monitor contracts in a legal and fiscal sense. These organizations work closely with the technical monitoring groups to insure total adherence to contractual requirements by the individual contractors. For incentive contracts, performance evaluation boards are established to determine the incentive fee due the contractor. The board may consist of personnel from organizations other than those directly responsible for monitoring a particular con- tract. For example, in the RTCC contract, the Incentive Evaluatio~a Boara consists of the Center Director; the Center Deputy Director; the Director of Flight Operations; the Chief, Flight Support Division; and the Chief, Procurement and Contracts Division. This board, in turn, is supported by an Incentive Evaluation Con~mittee which is composed of those technical and contractual personnel most closely associated with the contractor's effort. In certain mission contracts, change control boards have been established. These boards evaluate proposed changes to determine if they should be incorporated in the system. The boards are cognizant of the activities of all contractors who may be affected by the proposed changes. The board members are technically oriented personnel. If an action of a board requires a change in scope, the change will be negotiated by the contractor and the responsible con- tracting officer. Workload control. - Support contractors are included in the com- puter workload control systems in effect in the computational facili- ties. This system provides visibility of contractor expenditures for use in contract monitoring and controls a contractor to keep resources for computer expenditures to a minimum. Computer resources as management aids. - A major advantage of contracts that utilize computers is that the computers themselves may PAGENO="0492" 488 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION be used as a management aid. This is done throughout MSF, as illus- trated by the following typical examples: (1) Computers are used to help in lease versus purchase deter- minations. (2) Computers are used to compute and store up.-to-date budget and allocation records in the workload control systems. (3) Computers are used for the generation of PERT reports and schedule predictions. Q4) Computers are used to keep track of the specifications and documents that describe complex computer-based systems. (5) Computer simulations are used to aid management in making decisions regarding alternate strategies. 5.14.3 Special Considerations for Mission Contracts Several factors of a technical nature tend to make the management control of mission contracts more complex and more individualized than management control of support contracts. In many of these contracts, the end items (computer hardware, computer programs) are parts of large systems which contain complex interfaces. The development of each end item must be controlled so that the items will work together when the system is assembled. Since a change to an end item may affect a number of other items, different groups and levels of management in a Center may be affected. ~rther, the equipment and computer programs developed may be extremely complex and require the efforts of several MSF elements in the monitoring task. For example, the RTCC effort requires the production of a program with more than 1,000,000 instructions. The requirements for this program are developed in one branch (which is assisted by a support contractor), technical monitoring is done by another branch, and contractual monitoring done in yet another branch. In many of these mission contracts, software development is a major consideration. The traditional methods of management available for hardware development have to be modified or abandoned for software and new techniques developed. Most of the resulti~ig management techniques have been tailored to individual software requirements. Despite these considerations, some progress has been made in simplifying and stand- ardizing management techniques for mission contracts. One significant development is the initial effort in the Apollo ~pacecraft program to bring certain computer-based systems into the PAGENO="0493" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 489 Apollo configuration management system. This procedure provides control of the technical requirements, which define a large system. The Apollo Configuration Management Manual has been amended to provide for the specification and control of these computer programs, and the new procedures are currently being phased into on-going projects. Also, the Apollo Program Office has sponsored a study of management procedures for computer programming efforts (Bellcomm Report No. TR 66-320-2, "Pro- cedures for the Management Control of Computer Programming in Apollo"). ~ Future Efforts in Contract Management of Computer Systems There is a continuing effort in OMSF and its Centers to improve the level of contract management of computer systems. Several areas are presently under study, such as: (i) How to collect, code, and disseminate the experience gained: in software management so it can be applied to future efforts (2) How to more effectively use computers to manage other computers (3) How to effectively incentivize selected software contracts (l~) How to develop standard milestones to provide all levels of management with increased visibility when monitoring computer contracts (5) How to more effectively identify computer costs in contracts that cover both computer and non-computer elements. 5.5 CONPUTER RESCURCE SHARING 5.5.1 Policy Computer resources (computer time, programs, program outputs, personnel, program descriptions) are shared extensively in MSF, both in formal programs and on an informal basis. Sharing is encouraged by stated NASA and government policy (NASA Document NHB 2L~lO.l, "Manage- ment Procedures for Automatic Data Proce s sing Equipment") and controlled through Center participation in special panels developed for this pur- pose. In addition to inter-MSP sharing, resources are shared with other NASA Centers, government agencies, and private organizations. PAGENO="0494" 490 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 5.5.2 Sharing Organizations Several organizations within MSF have been established for resources sharing: (1) The MSF Resource Sharing Panel is comprised of the Directors of the MSF Computational Laboratories; Bellcornm, Inc.; and NASA Head- quarters representatives and was established in late 1963 to pronote the sharing of computer resources in MSF and to exchange ideas on the management of large computer complexes. The current membership of the panel includes C. L. Bradshaw, Deputy' Director, Computation Laboratory, MSFC; E. H. Brock, Chief, Computation and Analysis Division, MSC; R. II. Brims, Chief, Data Systems Division, KSC; J. Costantino, Chief, Technical Support Branch, OMSF; B. G. Griffin, Chief, Computation Branch, KSC; H. Hoelzer, Director, Computation Laboratory, MSFC; I. D. Nehama, Director, Analysis and Computer Sciences Division, Bellcomm, Inc.; E. P. O'Rourke, Technical Support Branch, OMSF; and R. L. Reeves, Chief, Computer Operations Office, Slidell. The panel meets periodically to discuss and recommend policy standards that will aid sharing. In addition to its regular meetings, the panel has sponsored and directed a study by Bellcomm to develop specific standards and procedures for re- source sharing in the Manned Space Flight Centers. Bellcomm is provid- ing continuing support in this area; and MSF Centers, by direction of the Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, are implementing the standards developed by the panel. (2) Project COSMIC,has been established by NASA Headquarters Tech- nology Utilization Division and MSFC, utilizing the services of the University of Georgia on a contract basis, to disseminate information at minimum cost to all interested parties concerning the availability of computer programs developed by all NASA Centers and contractors. (The central library for this project is maintained at MSC a~ described in item (1~).)\ (3) Both MSC and MSFC have been designated as ADP Sharing Exchanges for their respective geographic areas by the General Services Adminis- tration (GSA). The computational elements at these Centers coordinate ADP sharing for all government agencies, in the designated areas and provide current information on available ADP resources. (1k) A central librarian for the sharing of computer programs has been established at MSC. PAGENO="0495" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 491 5.5.3 Sharing Accomplishments It is estimated that $7,321,200 in computer resources were shared in 1965 (see table 5-I). The most significant saving resulted from the use of available computer programs, or parts thereof, in lieu of pro- ducing a new program. Several factors indicate that the level of shar- ing will increase in 1966 and that this trend will continue. For example, the MSC and MSFC computational facilities will be using the same general type computers starting in F~( 1967. This will aid greatly the exchange of machine time and computer programs between the two Cen- ters. As a result of both individual initiative on the part of the Cen- ters and efforts of a Resources Sharing Panel/Bellcomm study, a number of significant innovations have been made to aid further sharing. These are reported in a NASA Document, "Procedures for Computer Program and Telemetry Resource Sharing," October 1966, and include: (1) The establishment of a program sharing library at MSC - Ab- stracts, describing computer programs available for sharing in MSF, are produced by the responsible programmers and transmitted to a central librarian. The central librarian disseminates the abstracts to MBF personnel. An interested potential user contacts a local librarian at the programmer's Center to get a copy of the program and its descriptive documentation. The effect of this system is to provide a wider dissem- ination of information concerning available programs in MSF. (2) The establishment of a standard form for a computer program abstract This form is used in the program library as described above; it is also used as the abstract for program documentation and as a header to all program card decks and tapes. (3) The establishment of guidelines for computer program documen- tation in the MSF computational facilities The use of standard doc- umentation techniques will facilItate one Center's using programs developed at another Center. (1~) The establishment of standard computer languages in the com- putational facilities FORTRAN IV is standard for scientific and en- gineering applications; COBOL is standard for business applications. All programmers in the MSP computation facilities must use one of these languages unless technical considerations require otherwise. The use of common language will ease the problem of one Center's running a pro- gram written at another Center. This procedure will aid sharing of com- puter programs between Centers and the use by one Center of available machine time at another Center. PAGENO="0496" 492 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION (5) The establishment of a staxidard fô~ the formatting of telem- etry calibration data - This standard will reduce the amount of pro- gramming required to handle telemetry processing requests made by engineers and scientists in MSF. (6) The development of a standard set of routines for driving out- put plotter devices - A standard program reduces program maintenance requirements at the Centers and reduces the total programming effort required to handle printout requests made by NSF engineers and scien- tists. ~ Future Efforts The development of methods and standards to facilitate resource sharing is continuing. Several areas are currently under investigation, including: (1) The further development of a unified documentation procedure for use in the NSF computation facilities to replace the present doc- umentation guidelines (2) The establishment of a telemetry data tape standard (3) The identification and development of standard programs to fulfill common needs at each Center (for example, payroll and accounting programs may be standardized to minimize updating and maintenance costs) (!~) The establishment of standardized programming practices to make programs produced at one Center more usable at another Center. PAGENO="0497" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 493 TABLE 5-I. - SUMMARY OF OMSF ADP RESOURCE SHARING IN TERMS OF TOTAL VALUE [January 1, 1965 - December 31, 1965] KSC MAF MSC MSFC Programs requested by other NASA Centers, dollar savings 0 0 0 0 (20) $L~O,9OO (33) $666,500 Programs requested by non-NASA government agencies, dollar savings 0 0 0 0 (~) 12,000 (6) 52,500 Programs requested by government contractors, dollar savings 0 0 0 0 (25) 255,300 (151) 5)49,000 No-man days shared on other support, dollar savings (1)45) $6,900 (320) $15,300 (138) 6,600 (417) 19,900 Computer hours shared, dollar savings (6,500) 810,000 (1,290) 467,100 (7,5)47) 2,473,900 (11,2)47) 1,455,300 $816,900 $482,400 $3,188,700 $2,743,200 Total resource sharing value $7,231,200 Total program sharing value $1,976,200 76265 0 - 67 - pt. 2 - 32 PAGENO="0498" 494 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION CENTER DIRECTOR Reviews and concurs in the computer acquisiton plan NASA HEADQUARTERS [~views and approves acquisition plan, as appropriate ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR/NSF CENTER DIRECTOR Es is :~ r More From 0 0 E5~=nS=~ Less than $1 000 000 [T6J Figure 5-1.- Computer acquisition plan àycle. COMPUTER USER Determines the existence of applications or requirements for computers, requests Center computation element to review application or requirements CENTER COMPUTATION ELEMENT Evaluates applications and requirements, initiates the acquisition approval procedure PAGENO="0499" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 495 PROCURING OFFICE Receives approved pro- curement plan from NASA Headquarters SEB NEGOTIATOR Establishes evalua- Prepares and issues tion criteria Requests for Proposal I I DIRECTOR SOURCES SEB Concurs Prepares and submits Receives and evaluates proposals proposals NASA Headquarters Receives SEB presen- tation and selects source Figure 5-2. - Procurement cycle (source selection through the Source Evaluation Board (SEB)). PAGENO="0500" CUSTOMER - EXECUTIVE STAFF DATE - FY66 THRU JUN65 COMPUTATION LABORATORY EXPENDITURES BY CUSTOMER ACTUAL TARGET VARIANCE EXPENDED - CURRENT MONTH $ 9,466.31 $ 7,833.33 $ 1,632.98 ~ ACTUAL MONTHLY EXPENDED - YEAR TO DATE $ 93,062.87 $ 93,999.96 $ 937.09 ~ACTUAL CUMULATIVE PROJECTED - TOTAL YEAR $ 93,062.87 $ 94,000.00 $ 937.13 --TARGET TREND CHART -liii 90 ##~ ###~._P~ *#~#~ ## ~ 80 P70 60 50 ~ #00# ø~ ## *###A~)l'~ .,#:::__i.#~ 00 JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN 1965 MONTH 1966 GO 0 N 0 Figure 5-3.- Customer periodic report. PAGENO="0501" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 497 6.0 FUNDING SUMMARY During FY 1967 and early 1968, the three MSF Centers will be en- gaged in making major equipment changes. At Kennedy Space Center, the GE 635 system installed in the Central Instrumentation Facility will be expanded to provide for simultaneous testing of multiple vehicles. The expansion will permit centralization of all data processing and will accommodate the business-type applications that formerly required separate machines. At Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville and at Slictell, all of the existing general-purpose computers are being replaced by a cen- tral multiprogrammed-multiprocessor system at each location. Involved in the change are 39 computers and 1~8. remotes that will be replaced by the UNIVAC 1108 II computers being phased in by late 1968. The general-purpose scientific and engineering computers at Manned Spacecraft Center are being installed in early 1967.' The RTCC Mission Control Center, where computer capabilities are required for mission monitoring, inflight mission planning, and simulation, is in the process of converting to IBM 360 computers for use in the Apollo Spacecraft Program. Attached are summary statistical schedules (tables 6-I to 6-Ill) by fiscal years 1966, 1967, and 1968 for both category A (general-purpose computers) and category B (special-purpose computers). These schedules reflect costs b~ç appropriation and by purpose of funding (purchase, lease, and maintenance). The total equipment costs for FY 1966, 1967, and 1968 are $U3,900,000, $36,100,000, and $29,600,000, respectively. Figures 6-i. and 6-2 depict equipment costs for the past, current, and budget years. Figure 6-1 illustrates OMSF equipment costs in relation to the other Program Offices. Figure 6-2 shows the costs.of each Center by funding method. (Refer to figure 1-2 for a breakdo~m of the equip- ment costs by appropriation.) One trend that can be seen from reviewing the total equipment costs is the continuing reduction in fiscal years 1967 and 1968. Fiscal year 1967 total equipment costs are $7,800,000 less than those for FY 1966, and FY 1968 costs are $6, 500,000 less than those fr FY 1967. These reductions in costs are the result of the installation of third- generation equipment and the centralization of the computational capa- bility. PAGENO="0502" 6-I - w~m~ SPACE FLIGHT AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING EQUIEM~NT, CATEGORY A (a) Fiscal year 1966 (thousands of dollars) Centers Purchase Lease Maintenance Total Research and Development Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Total, R & D -- $13 1,320 $1,333 $792 11,335 6,380 $18,507 $31+7 -- 21 ~ $1,139 ll,3L~8 7,721 $20,208 Administrative Operations Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Total, A0 -- $370 -- $370 $9L~7 14,9714 3,869 $9,790 $288 311# ~ $9147 5,632 14,183 $10,762 Construction of Facilities Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Total, *C of F $3,759 -- -- $3,759 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- $3,759 - - -- $3,759 Summary All Appropriations Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Total $3,759 383 1,320 $5,1#62 $1,739 16,309 10,2149 $28,297 $31#7 288 335 ~ $5,81+5 16,980 U 9014 ~14729 C12 0 0 PAGENO="0503" Centers Purchase Lease Maintenance Total Research and Development: Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Total, R & D - -- -- -- -- $450 12,973 6 638 $~~o6i $300 -- 53 $353 $750 12,973 6 691 $20 Administrative Operations: Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Total, AO -- -- -- -- $1,151 4,397 3~672 $9,220 -- $487 299 $786 $1,151 4,884 3,971 $10,006 Summary All Appropriations: Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Total -- -- -- -- $1,601 17,370 10 310 $281 $300 487 352 $1,139 $1,901 17,857 10 662 ~ TABLE 6-I. - MAI~1NED SPACE FLIGHT AUTOMATIC DATh F~OCESSING EQUII~4ENT, CATEGORY A - Continued - (b) Fiscal year 1967 (thousands of dollars) 00 0 PAGENO="0504" TA.BLE 6-i. - MANNED SPACE PLIGHT AU~LOMATIC DATh PROCESSING EQTJIHVIENT, CATEGORY A - Concluded (c) Fiscal year 1968 budget (thousands of dollars) z 0 N Centers Purchase Lease Maintenance Total Research and Development: Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Total, R & D $2,O1~8 -- -- $2,OhB $361~ 9,352 3,57)~ $13,290 $L~L~1 -- 63 $~I~ $2,853 9,352 3,637 $15,8L~2 Administrative Operations: Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Total, AO -- -- -- -- -- $5,1~37 5,063 $10, 500 -_ $)#6o 329 $789 $5,897 5,392 $1l,2~ Summary All Appropriations: Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Total $2,O1~8 -- --~ $2,0)-~8 $36I~ lL~,789 8,637 ~23,79O $~i~l ~~6o 392 $1,293 - $2,853 15,2L~9 9,029 $27,131 PAGENO="0505" TABLE 6-Il. - MANNED SPACE FLIGHT AUIOMATIC DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT, CATEGORY B (a) Fiscal year 1966 (thousands of dollars) Centers Purchase Lease Maintenance Total Research and Development: Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Total, R & D -- $6,802 -- $6,802 -- $1,788 283 $2,071 -- $179 18 ~1~F -- $8,769 301 $9,070 Administrative Operations: Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Total, AO -- -- -- -- - - -- $5 $5 -- -- $82 $82 -- -- $87 $87 Summary All Appropriations: Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Total -- $6,802 -- $6,802 -- $1,788 288 $2,076 -- $179 100 ~ -- $8,769 388 ~9,157 PAGENO="0506" TABLE 6-li - MANNED SPACE ~1IGHT AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT, CATEGORY B - Continued (b) Fiscal year 1967 (thousands of.dollars) Centers Purchase Lease Maintenance Total Research and Development Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Total, R & D -- $2,150 -- $2,150 -- $2,825 302 ~~,127 -~ $232 18 - $5,207 320 Administrative Operations Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Total, AO -- -- -- -- -- -- $60 $60 -- -- j9~ $~ - -- -- $157 $157 Summary All Appropriations Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft center Marshall Space Flight Center Total -- $2,150 -- $2,I -- $2,825 362 $3,187 -- $232 fl5 ~T~7 $5,207 t~77 $~~8Ij PAGENO="0507" TABLE 6-il. - MAEI1EL) SPACE PLIGHT AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT, CATEGORY B - Concluded (c) Fiscal year 1968 budget (thousands of dollars) 00 z 00 0 N Centers Purchase Lease Maintenance Total Research and Development: Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Total, R & D -- $300 -- ~ - - $1,588 2714. ~I,862 -- $132 12 ~ -- $2,020 286 ~ Administrative Operations: Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Total, AO -- -- -- -- -- -- $60 $~o -- -- 4~ ~ -- -- $lla ~ITiT Summary All Appropriations: Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Plight Center Total -- $300 -- $300 -- $1,588 3314. $I~ -- $132 93 ~ $2,020 ~i27 $2,1~7 PAGENO="0508" TABLE 6-ill. - MANNED SPACE FLIGHT ATJTC)MATIC DAIa PROCESSING EQUIPMENT, CATEGORIES A AND B (a) Fiscal year 1966 (thousands of dollars) Centers Purchase Lease Maintenance Total Research and Development: Kennedy Space Center Manned Spaceoraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Total, R & D -- $6,815 1,320 $5,135 $792 13,123 6,663 $20,578 $31~7 179 39 $5~ $1,139 20,117 8 022 Administrative Operations: Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center ~4arshaU Space Flight Center Total, A0 -- $370 -- ~_$~_~7~ $ql4q 14.,9714 3 87l~ $288 396 $~ ~(LL7 5,632 1~,270 ConstructIon of Facilities: Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Total, C of F $3,7~9 -- -- $~759 - -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -_ $10,814.9 $~759 -- ~ $3,759 Summary All Appropriations: Kennedy Sp&ce Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Total $3,759 7,185 l,320 $l2,~6)4 $1,739 18,097 10,537 ~37~ $3)47 )467 )435 $l,~)49 $5,8)45 25,7)49 12 292 PAGENO="0509" TABLE 6-Ill. - MANNED SPACE FLIGHT AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING E(~UIPMENT, CATEGORIES A AND B - Continued (b) Fiscal year 1967 (thousands of dollars) Co C, 00 0 N 0 Centers Purchase Lease Maintenance Total Research and Development: Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Total, R & D -- ~2,l50 -- $2,150 $1.~50 15,798 6,91~~o $23,158 $300 232 71 $603 $750 18,180 7,011 ~25,9L~l Administrative Operations: Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Total, AO -- -- -- -- $1,151 11,397 3,732 $9-;-~58 -- $J~87 396 $883 $1,151 11,8811 ~4,l28 $10,163 Suimnary All Appropriations: Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Total -- $2,150 -- $2,l50 $1,601 20,195 10 672 ~~h68 $300 719 1167 $l,k86 $1,901 23,0611 11,139 $36,lOL1 C cJ~ PAGENO="0510" TABLE 6-I11 MANNED) SPACE FLIGHT AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING E~JIPME~NT, CATEGORIES A AND B - Concluded (c) Fiscal year 1968 budget (thousands of dollars) Centers Purchase Lease Maintenance Total Research and Development Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Total, R & D $2,0148 300 -- $2,3248 $3614 10,9240 3,8248 $15,152 $14141 132 75 $6248 $2,853 11,372 3,923 $18,1148 Administrative Operations: Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Total, AO -- -- -- -- -- $5,1#37 5,123 ~I -- $2460 ~#10 $870 -- $5,897 5,533 $ll,l~30 Summary All Appropriations Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Total $2,0248 300 -- $2,3148 $3614 16,377 8,971 $25,712 $14141 592 148~ i~151B $2,853 17,269 9 1456 ~2~57B cc `-3 0 N PAGENO="0511" C) 00 0 FY 1966 FY 1967 Figure 6-i.- Computer Equipment Costs, percentage by program office. C FY 1968 PAGENO="0512" KSC (.3)~~ $43.9 MSFC (.4)- ______________ MSC (.5); MSFC (1.3) KSC (3.8) MSC (7.2) KSC (1.8) ~MAlNT.(L2) PURCHASE (12.3) KSC(.3)~ $36.1 MSFC (.5)- _____________ MSC (.7V MSC(2.1) KSC (1.6) MSFC (10.7) ~LEASE (30.4) MSC (20.2) 1.5 2.1 32.5 MSFC (10.5) MSC (18.1) L2 12.3 30.4 C 00 ?~ MAINT. (1.5) I PURCHASE (2.4) LEASE (25. 7) MAINT.(1.5) PURCHASE (2.1) KSC(.4)~ $29.6 MFSC (.5)- ______________ MSC (.6); KSC (2.1) MSC(.3) KSC (.3)' MSFC (9.0) LEASE (32.5) 1.5 2.4 25.7 MAI NT. PURCHASE LEASE MSC (16.4) FY 1966 FY 1967 FY 1968 Figure 6-2.- Manned Space Flight computer equipment cost by center and funding method in millions ot dollars. PAGENO="0513" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 509 7.0 CONCLUSIONS This survey was conducted to provide information on Manned Space Flight computer systems in terms of their use, capabilities, and the techniques used to manage these systems. It has become clear that the computer systems being used in the NSF programs are an essential part of the overall NASA mission, and the sustained growth ofcomputers in NSF reflects the continual blending of this tool into on-going research and development programs. Not only has automatic data processing shown a growth in magnitude in NSF, but by its very nature, the diversity of its applications has also increased. Although, in many government agen. cies, emphasis still seems to be placed on the business and management applications, only 5 percent of the digital computers in Manned Space Flight are used for that purpose; the remaining 95 percent are used in scientific and technical research and development activities, including real-time mission control. The task of managing the computer systems in the NSF organization, then, has by necessity been tailored to the preponderance of the research and development computational activities. The large number of computers in use in the Manned Space Flight program and the, wide range of their applications have led to a classifi- cation of computer hardware that recognizes the functional area in which the equipment operates. As a result, computers in this survey report have been described in terms of mission control, test and checkout, training, and data processing, including real-time, general and special purpose, and service center operation. The capability of NSF computers has been carefully structured to match the missions and workload of the organization. Special efforts, as in the Mission Control Center, have been made to take optimum advantage of advanced techniques in planning the procedures and resources needed for the most advanced system design. Thus, the NSF organization has, by necessity, operated on the frontiers of computer technology to achieve an orderly and coordinated program of computer capability. An inventory of computers has been included in this survey (appen- dix A). This inventory identifies each system, whether it is purchased or leased, the average monthly hours it is in service, and its location in the NSF organization.. The inventory has been expanded over previously published inventories to include those special-purpose computers which, in the past, did not meet reporting criteria, since they ware integral' parts of total systems whose usage was dependent on total-system utili- zation. Although the computers have been categorized as being in cat- egory A (general purpose) or category B (special purpose), this 76-265 0 - 67 - pt. 2 - 33 PAGENO="0514" 510 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION classification has many shortcomings stemming from the fact that com- puters do not fit neatly into such narrow classifications, and there are many cases where a single computer installation functions within both categories in meeting varying program demands. Further, the utili- zation figures are not necessarily a meaningful comparison between computers, since they are.not an adequate description of the utility of the computers~ in their diverse applications. However, in the absence of a universally accepted computer classification system, which would not only reflect the different purposes for which computers are used but also the operating requirements surrounding their uses, the present A and B categorizations have been used as a reasonable basis for making appropriate distinctions in applying policies. The Manned Space Flight organization for managing its computer re- sources has been structured to carry out overall programs of which the computers are an integral part. Because of the differing missions at each of the MSF Centers, the computer organizations which have been de- veloped are also different. However, in a].].. cases, the thread of sim- ilarity which runs through each of the Center's organizations is that the director of the Center is the final authority for computer policies at that Center. All computer acquisitions must be approved at his level prior to submission to NASA Headquarters for final approval. Programming and computer operation at each center is carried out primarily by contractor support personnel on a task-order basis. The contractor method of supporting computers in MSF has provided a highly trained staff through the peaks and valleys of work requirements. The total number of contractor personnel used by the 14SF Centers in computer support of all programs is approximately 2200. While the capability of MSF computers is expanding to meet increased program requirements, with equipment changes to third-generation hardware, the FY 1967 and FY 1968 costs show a significant decrease. This reduc- tion can be attributed to both the third-generation hardware, which has a greater computation per dollar ratio, as well as to the centralization of computational capability. Both of these trends are continuing. The natural growth that has been characteristic of the computer industry has resulted in a whole new generation of computer equipment that has necessitated frequent re-appraisals of existing management tech- niques and the development of new procedures, such as the ADP Resources Sharing Panel, which have immeasurably improved our ability to carry out manned programs. There is a continuing awareness in the NSF program that the com- puter is inextricably entwined with the achievement of manned space- flight goals. The application of computers must be viewed in terms of PAGENO="0515" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 511 their relationship to the total mission-oriented structure of the agency. The basic policies and procedures by which the MSF organization manages its computer resources are a prudent course ~hich will be continued on a high-priority basis with such modifications and refinements as may be suggested by future experience. PAGENO="0516" 512 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION APPENDIX A COMPUTER INVENTORY NASA has adopted a two-part categorization of eomptit~rs. Cate- gory A computers are general purpose in character and make up the large centralized computer service facilities at the Centers. Major management effort is directed to this category with emphasis on utili- zation and cost. Acquisitions are individually approved by the Deputy Administrator and operations are subject to detailed management report- ing. Category B computers are special purpose in character. These computers are dedicated to a single use and are usually part of a larger system with special interface requirements included in the installation. Special purpose computers are normally purchased and acquisition is accomplished through normal program management channels. Management reporting is confined to an annual inventory. The inven- tories for category A and category B computers for Marshall Space Flight Center, the Manned Spacecraft Center, and Kennedy Space Center are given in tables A-I to A-VT. PAGENO="0517" TABLE A-I. - INVENTORY OF COMPUTERS, MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER [Category A equipment] (12 0 N . location Computer t~5 Owner- ship (a) Production, hr/month Test, hr/month Date . installed Planned release . Application Bldg. 4200 CDC 3200 L 42 87 9/65 12/67 Scientific data processing IBM 1620 L 125 12 10/62 10/66 Meteorological data processing SDS 930 P 41 49 9/65 -- Scientific data processing SDS 930 P 45 70 9/65 -- Scientific data processing Bldg. 4202 SDS 930 L 45 75 9/65 2/68 Scientific data processing Bldg. 4351 IJEIVAC 422 p 60 -- 9/65 -- Training Bldg. 4481 IBM 1620 L 250 -- 11/65 10/66 Scientific data processing IBM 1620 L 200 -- 7/65 2/68 Software development Bldg. 4485 IBM 1401 L 137 11 8/62 9/67 IBM 7010 support Bldg. 4487 GE 235 L 82 22 1/65 4/68 Scientific data processing Bldg. 4487 GE 235 IBM 1130 P L 200 B/Ab -- N/A 12/64 1/66 -- 2/68 Scientific data processing Scientific data processing Bldg. 4491 IBM 1401 L 307 10 5/61 3/68 Business applications IBM 7010 L 320 94 9/65 9/67 Business applications IBM 7010 L 320 94 1/66 3/68 Business applications IBM 7740 L 160 17 7/64 3/68 Business applications 8Leased is indicated by an L; purchased by a P. b Not available. PAGENO="0518" TABLE A-I.- INVENTORY OF COMPIJTENS, MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER - Continued [Category A equipeent] . location Computer type Owner- ~ Production, hr/month Test, hr/month Date installed Planned release . Application Bldg. 4610 IBM 1620 L 112 39 9/62 11/66 Saturn weight control IBM 1620 L 58 23 12/62 10/66 Scientific data processing SDS 930 46 37 9/65 12/67 Scientific data processing Bldg. 4663 B 5500 L 250 136 7/65 9167 Data processing IBM 1401 L 120 70 8161 9/67 Support to 7094 II IBM 1401 L 120 70 i/64 9/67 Support to 7094 II IBM 1401 L 120 70 2/65 9/67 Support to 7094 Ii IBM 1~O1 L 450 - 10/63 7/67 Data processing printing IBM 1401 L 450 -- 11/61 7/67 Data processing printing IBM 1401 L 45~o - 4/62 7/67 Data processing printing IBM 7094 II P 300 200 1/60 - Scientific data processing IBM 7094 II P 300 200 1/60 -- Scientific data processing Bldg. 4708 GE 235 L 65 135 12/64 3/68 Scientific data processing Bldg. 4728 BECOI4P L 100 - 1963 4/68. Scientific data processing Bldg. 4732 GE 205 P 112 -- 12/64 - Scientific data processing with wind tunnel 3016 Uni- Drive RCA 110 P N/At~ N/A 6/62 -- Training in programing and maintenance a~d is indicated by an L; purchased by a P. bNot available. PAGENO="0519" TABLE A-I. - INVENTORY OF COMPUTERS, MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER - Concluded [Category A equipment) OQ 0 b-I N Center location Computer type Owner- ship (a) Production, hr/month Test, hr/month Date installed Planned release Application MSFC - MAP GE 235 L 1b14 38 7/65 9/68 Scientific data processing MSFC - MAP IBM l1~1~O L 355 0 6/65 9/68 Data processing MSPC - Slidell HON 200 L 51~7 6 10/6~4 9/68 Data processing HON 200 L 535 2 12/611 7/67 Data processing * HON 800 L 290 90 12/62 5/67 Data processing HON 800 L 119 1611 9/611 11/68 Data processing HON 1800 L 228 60 1/65 7/67 Data processing HON 1800 L 230 63 14/65 9/68 Data processing IBM 11101 L 1102 214 8/62 7/67 Support IBM 70911 * IBM 70110 L 171 230 3/65 ~ 9/68 ~ Data processing - scientific DCS 70914 II IBM 70914 II P 177 193 11/62 -- Data processing - scientific DCC 70110 IBM 70914 II L 315 95 1/614 7/67 Data processing - scientific 8Leesed is indicated by an L; purchased by a P. PAGENO="0520" C;' TABLE A-Il.- ThVENIORY OF COMFJTERS, MARRED SPACECRAFT CENTER [Category A equipment] Center location Computer type Owner- ship M Production, hr/month Test, hr/month Date installed Planned release Application MSC - Bldg. 12 CDC 3200 P 281 171s 12/GA -- Th conversion CDC 3200 ~ P 197 318 12/GA -- DCS with CDC 3800 data process- ing UNIVAC 1108 P 285 135 2/66 -- Scientific data processing . CDC 3800 P 275 198 2/GA -- Data processing DCS with CDC 3200 IBM 360/30 L 225 201 10/65 5/67 Data processing support to DCS IBM 701~0 L 275 132 8/63 10/66 Scientific data processing IBM 701~1L L 3GA 176 2/GA 5/67 Data processing DCS 70l4~/709LL IBM 7091~ II L 3GA 176 2/GA 5/67 Data processing DCS 70~4~/7091~ UNIVAC 1106 P 250 133 2/65 -- Business data processing MSC - Bldg. 16 CDC 3600 L 270 195 6/65 3/69 Scientific data processing MSC - Bldg. 30 IBM ll~0l L 235 195 9/63 12/66 Data processing support to 70914 ~ IBM 70914 I P 1401 1614 7/65 -- Scientific data processing MAC - TRW, Nassau IBM 360/30 L 237 173 11/65 Indef. Data processing support to 70914 I IBM 70914 I P 398 [ 167 10/61 --. Scientific data processing aLeased is indicated by an L; purchased by a P. PAGENO="0521" . location Computer type Owner ~ Production hr/month Test hr/month Date installed Planned release . Application Ellington IBM 360/30 L 180 150 11/66 11/66 Business data processing IBM 7010 L 287 185 6/65 U/66 Business data processing Sands CDC 3200 P 320 95 1/65 -- Data processing and iN reduc- tion 30 IBM 360/30 L 385 -- 9/65 12/66 Peripheral support of RB~C com- puters (printer, tape/print, etc.) IBM 360/75 L -- 511 5/66 2/70 RWC program development IBM 360/75 L -- 376 6/66 2/70 RECC program development IBM 360/75 L -- 1138 6/66 2/70 RItC program development IBM 70911 II L -- 5611 7/611 11/66 Mission control and program development IBM 70914 II L -- 576 1/63 12/66 Real-time mission control IBM 70911 II L -- 515 5/63 1/67 Real-time mission control IBM 70911 II L -- 559 9/63 7/65 Mission simulation for flight operations training IBM 70914 II L -- 1112 1/611 1/67 Real-time mission control and program development TABLE A-Il.- INVENTORY OF COMFJTERS, MANNET) SPACECRAFT CENTER - Continued [Category A equipmentl CR 0 N aLeased is indicated by an L; purchased by a P. Cl' PAGENO="0522" TABLE A-IT.- INVENIDRY OF COMEUTERS, MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER - Concluded ~Category A equipment] Center location Computer type Owner- ship (a) Production, hr/month Test, hr/month Date instafled Planned release Application MSC - Bldg. 30 MSC - Beta Bldg. IBM l~6O IBM 360/30 IBM 360/50 L L L -- -- -- 295 563 583 9/66 12/65 1/66 8/66 10/66 8/66 Peripheral support to REUC com- puters Peripheral support of RIOC com- puters (printer, tape/print, etc.) RTCC program development C;, 0 aLeased is indicated by an L; purchased by a P. PAGENO="0523" TABLE A-Ill. - INVENTORY OF COMPUTERS, KENNEDY SPACE CENTER [Category A equipaent] `.3 0 `-4 N Center location Computer type °`~`~ r~2 Production, hr/month Test, hr/month Date installed Planned release . Application KSC CI? . GE 635 P 247 191 11/65 -- Data processing and TM data reduction - on-line GE 235 L 120 20 8/63 6/67 Scientific data processing and 54 data reduction - on-line GE 415 L 605 31 ~/64 . 6/67 Data processing - support card to tape/tape to card/tape to print UNIVAC 1004 P 180 9 6/65 -- Data processing - printing and LIEF support - on-line UNIVAC 1004 P 180 9 6/65 -- Data processing - printing and LIE? support - on-line UNIVAC 1004 P 480 -- 5/65 -- Data processing - printing IBM 7010 L 538 39 4/66 6/67 Data processing and real-tine supply system DCS i440 IBM 1440 L 538 ~9 ~/6~ 6/67 DCS 7010, Data processing and real-time supply system IBM 7010 L 500 110 2/66 6/68 Business data processing ~Leased is indicated by an L; purchased by a P. PAGENO="0524" TABLE A-IV.- INVENTORY OF CC*4PUTERS, MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER [Category B equIpmentl CD a) 00 I Center location Computer type Owner- 5(a~ Production, - hr/month Test, hr/month Date installed Planned release tb P a n Bldg. 1~1~36 No. 1 RCA flO P b N/A N/A 12/63 -- Simulation in Saturn lB breadboard No. 503 RCA 11OA P l~5o -- 3/65 -- Saturn lB breadboard No. 501~ RCA 110A P 1~5o -- 3/65 -- Saturn lB breadboard No. 1 SDS 910 P 285 -- 12/6k -- (DEE 3B) Saturn lB breadboard (PTCS simulation) No. 2 SDS 930 P l~50 -- 8/61~ -- (DEN 6) Saturn lB breadboard SEE 810 P 350 -- 12/65 -- Used with Saturn IN breadboard Bldg. ~1l87 DEC PDP 5 P 2~0 -- 5/61~ -- Checkout inertial components DEC PDP 5 P 2~0 -- 5/6k -- Checkout inertial components DEC PDP 5 P 2~0 -- 5/6I~ -- Checkout inertial components DDP 224 P N/A N/A 2/66 -- Saturn V display program debug RAY 250 P N/A N/A 7/60 -- Function generator in hybrid system RAY 250 P N/A N/A 12/62 -- Function generator in hybrid system aLeased is indicated by an L; purchased by a P. available. PAGENO="0525" TABLE A-~1.- INVENTORY OF CGHPUTERS, MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER - Continued [Category B equipment] Co C) 00 I Center location Computer type Production hr/month Test, hr/month Date installed Planned release . Application MSFC - Bldg. 44&t RAY 250 P N/Ab N/A 1/63 -- Function generator in hybrid system No. 501 RCA 110A P 450 -- 9/65 -- Saturn IS and V breadboard support program debug No. 522 RCA IIOA P 450 -- 2/66 -- Saturn lB and V breadboard support program debug SEL 8i0 P N/A N/A 7/65 -- Used with GE 235 as display driver MSFC - Bldg. 4566 GE 235 L 250 -- 11/64 1/68 On- and off-line acoustic data processing MSFC - Bldg. 4570 No. 3 BEC 420 P 215 -- 3/65 -- Used with engine test stands No. 4 BEC 420 P 215 -- 3/65 -- Used with engine test stands No. 5 BEC 420 P 215 -- 2/66 -- Used with engine test stands No. 6 BEC 420 P 215 -- 2/66 -- Used with engine test stands No. 5 RCA 110 P 170 -- 11/63 -- Saturn IS and S-riB static- firing checkout 5Leased is indicated by an L; purchased by a P. available. PAGENO="0526" TABLE A-Ill. - INVENTORY OF COMPUTERS, MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER - Continued I Category B equipment] I Center location Computer type Owner- ~ Production, hr/month Test, hr/month Date installed Planned release . Apilication MSFC - Bldg. I~57O No. 3 SDS 910 P 120 -- 5/65 -- (DEE 3) Saturn lB and 5-11Th static-firing checkout MSFC - Bldg. 1~583 No. 2137 505 920 P 170 -- 5/65 -- S-Ill and S-IC component checkout No. 2l~l SOS 920 P 170 -- 5/65 -- S-Ill and S-IC component checkout MSFC - Bldg. 1~6l9 Yo. 1 GE 235 P 200 -- 7/61~ . -- On-line with stress test stands No. 9 GE 235 P 200 -- 5/EA -- On-line with stress stands MSFC - Bldg. 1~626 GE 205 P 125 12 l2/6I~ -- Meteorology MSFC - Bldg. ~646 No~ 211~5 SOS 920 P . 170' -- . 5/65 -- S-IC and S-IVB component checkout MSFC - Bldg. I~663 ASI 2100 P 170 -- 7/65 -- Used in hybrid system DDP 116 P N/Ab N/A 5/66 -- Used in hybrid system DDP 221~ P N/A N/A 10/65 -- Processes IN for input to B5500 (part of LIEF system) RAY ~0 P 160 -- 7/65 -- Used in hybrid system (TRICE) RAY 520 P N/A N/A l~/66 -- Used in hybrid system (TRICE) 8Leased is indicated by an L; purchased by a P. available. PAGENO="0527" TABLE A-IL - INVENTORY OF CC*4PUTEBS, MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER - Continued [Category B equipment) Center location Computer type 0i~ 5I(1~ Production, hr/month Test, hr/month Date installed Planned release . Application MSFC - Bldg. 1~663 555 92 P 130 -- 2/66 -- Part of L?4 reduction system MSFC - Bldg. I~671~ No. 15 PDP 1 P 215 -- 2/61k -- Used with engine test stands No.16 PDP 1 * P 215 -- 2/6k -- Used with engine test stands No. l~7 PDP 1 P 215 -- 7/61~ -- Used with engine test stands No. 1~6 PDP 1 P 215 -- 7/61k -- Used with engine test stands No. I~ RCA 110 P 100 -- 11/65 -- Simulation of S-IC, also software development No. 512 RCA llOA P 190 -- 7/65 -- S-IC static-firing checkout No.9 SDS 910 P b N/A N/A 1~/65 -- (DEE 3) S-IC static-firing checkout MSFC - Bldg. 1~708 DDP ?21~ P 650 -- 2/66 -- Saturn V breadboard display processor No. 502 RCA llOA P 215 -- 1/65 -- S-IC checkout aleased is indicated by an L; purchased by a P. b Not available. PAGENO="0528" TABLE A-IV.- INVENTORY OF C(I4PUJTEBS, MARSHAlL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER - Continued Category B equipment I Center location Computer type Owner- . ~ . Production hr/month Test, hr/month Date installed Planned release . Ap~lication MSFC - Bldg. 1~7O8 No. 007 RCA llOA P 650 -- 6/65 -- Saturn V breadboard * No. 013 RCA llOA P 650 -- 7/65 -- Saturn V breadboard No. 1122 SDS 910 P 220 -- 9/63 -- (DEE 3) part of vehicle checkout station No. 1 SDS 910 P 330 . -- ll/61~ -- (DEE 3A) part of S-IC checkout station No. 003 SDS 930 P 1~~o -- 1~/65 -- (DEE 6c) Saturn V breadboard No.006 SDS 930 P b N/A N/A 1/66 -- (DEE 6D) Saturn V breadboard No. 3118 SDS 930 P 215 -- 1/65 -- Used for stage checkout No. 1001 SEL 810 P N/A N/A 11/65 -- Used idth GETS to simulate IN No. lOOk SEL 810 P N/A N/A 12/65 -- m processor MSFC - 3016 Diii- versity Drive No. 1179 SDS 910 P N/A N/A l961~ -- Trainer for ATOLL language training aLeased is indicated by an L; purchased by a P. b Not available. PAGENO="0529" TABLE A-IV. - INVENTORY OF CCMPUTERS, MARSHAlL SPACE FlIGHT CENTER - Continued [Category B equipment] 0 Center location Computer type Owner- . ?a~ . Production, hr/month Test, hr/month Date installed Planned release . Application NAA - Downey CDC 921~A P N/Ab N/A 8/63 -- Program development facility * * CDC 921~A P N/A N/A 10/63 -- Program development facility CDC 8090 P N/A N/A 5/65 -- Program development facility NAA - Seal Beach CDC 921~A P N/A N/A 7/65 -- S-Il checkout station no. 8 CDC 921~A P N/A N/A 7/66 -- S-Il checkout station no. 9 CDC 8090 P N/A N/A 10/65 -- S-u checkout station no. 8 cix~ 8090 p N/A N/A 1~/66 -- S-Il checkout station no. 9 MSFC - MAF RCA llOA P N/A N/A i~/65 -- S-IC checkout RCA llOA P N/A N/A 7/65 -- S-IC checkout RAY 250 (7 each) P N/A N/A l961~ -- Factory checkout of S-lB station no. 1 and station no. 2 SDS 910 P N/A N/A l96!~ -- S-IN checkout (DEE 3) SDS 910 P N/A N/A l96'~ -- S-IN checkout (DEE 3) SDS 910 P N/A N/A l0/61~ -- S-IC checkout (DEE 3) SOS 910 P N/A N/A io/61~ -- S-IC checkout (DEE 3) MSFC - Mississippi Test Facility GE 205 P 199 -- l2/61~ -- Scientific data processing aleased is indicated by an L; purchased by a P. b Not available. PAGENO="0530" TABLE A-IN.- INVENTORY OF CC~APUTEPS, MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER - Continued aLeased is indicated by an L; purchased by a P. bNot available. (Category B equipment] C) I Center location Computer type Owner- shi (a~ . Production, hr/month Test, hr/month Date installed Planned release A licat*o 1 n MSFC - Mississippi Test Facility No. 1 BEC li.2O P b N/A B/A 11/65 -- Test monitoring and control checkout No.2 BEC ~2O * P N/A N/A 11/65 -- ~ Test monitoring and control checkout No.) NEC 1i20 P N/A N/A 11/65 -- Test monitoring and control checkout No. ~ BEC ~2O P N/A N/A 11/65 -- Test monitoring and control checkout CDC 92l~A P N/A N/A 9/65 -- S-Il static test no. A2 CDC 921~A P N/A N/A 2/65 -- S-Il static test no. Al CDC 8090 P N/A N/A 8/65 -- S-il static test no. A2 (DEE) CDC 8090 P N/A N/A 1/65 -- S-Il static test no. A]. (DEE) No. 516 RCA 110A P N/A N/A 8/65 -- S-IC static-firing checkout No. 10 SDS 910 P N/A N/A 5/65 -- (DEE 3) S-IC static-firing checkout SDS 930 P N/A N/A 8/66 -- On-line processing of 54 PAGENO="0531" TABLE A-tV.- INVENTORY OP CC~4PUTEDE, MARSHALL SPACE FLICEff CENTER - Continued (Category B equi~tent] CD 0O `-3 0 `-4 C~n Center location Computer type (a~ Production, hr/month Test, hr/month Date installed Planned release ~plication . MSFC - Mississippi Test Facility SDS 930 P b N/A N/A 8/66 -- On-line processing of TE MSFC - Slidell No. 203 RAY 520 No. 90 BBS 930 L P 660 155 -- -- 3/66 2/65 3/69 -- Part of hybrid system (EAt 231R) Part of TE processing system Miscellaneous S-V Dynamic Test Stand SEL 8~o P N/A N/A 2/66 -- Used on-line with dynamic test stand Douglas Aircraft Company Huntington Beach CDC 92l~A P N/A N/A 7/614 -- EDSIL CDC 9214A P N/A N/A 7/614 -- S-IVB checkout station no. 1 CDC 921#A C]X~ 8090 P p N/A N/A N/A N/A 7/65 7/65 -- -- S-IVB checkout station no. 2 EDSIL (DEE) * CDC 8090 P N/A N/A 8/65 -- S-IVB checkout station no. 1 (DEE) CDC 8090 P N/A N/A io/65 -- S-IVB checkout station no. 2 (DEE) No.517 RCA 110A P N/A N/A . 8/65 -- IU 500 PS checkout aLeased is indicated by an L; purchased by a P. bNot available. PAGENO="0532" TABLE A-IV.- INVENTORY OF CCMPUTERS, MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER - Concluded (Category B equipment] Center location Computer type Owner- ~ (a~ . Production, hr/month Test, hr/month Date installed Planned release ca ion Huntington Beach 5DB 930 P N/Ab N/A 1965 -- IU 500 FS checkout (DEE 6) Sacramento CDC 921~A P N/A N/A 10/65 -- Vertical checkout laboratory CDC 92~A P N/A N/A 9/65 -- Beta 1 static test stand CDC 921~A P N/A N/A 9/65 -- Beta 3 static test stand CDC 8090 P N/A N/A 8/65 -- Vertical checkout laboratory- (DEE) CDC 8090 P N/A N/A 7/65 -- B~ta 1 static test stand (DEN) CDC 8090 P N/A N/A 9/65 -- Beta 3 static test stand (DEE) IBM - Huntsville DDP 22~ . P N/A N/A 7/66 -- Display processor - S-V IU checkout GE 235 P 200 -- 7/65 -- G&C simulation No. 505 RCA UOA P 31~5 -- 5/65 -- S-lB 10 checkout No. 506 RCA 1IOA P 3I~5 -- 8/65 -- S-V EU checkout No. 2 SDS 910 P 280 -- 2/65 -- (DEE 3A) S-rB IU checkout No. 3 SDS 910 P 280 -- 2/65 -- (DEE 3A) S-V IU checkout EEL 8io p N/A N/A 7/65 -- Used with GE 235 as display driver C) 00 I aLeased is indicated by an L; b Not available. purchased by a P. PAGENO="0533" TABLE A-V.- INVENTORY OF C~JTERS, MANNED SPACECRAFT CEN~R [Category B equipment I Center location Computer type Owner- ~ Production, hr/month Test, hr/month Date installed Planned release . Application NBC - Bldg. 1~ Two CDC 1600 P 250 -- 2/63 -- Computer program development for ACE (spacecraft checkout) Two CDC l6OA P 250 -- 9/62 -- Computer program development for ACE (spacecraft checkout) MSC - Bldg. 5 DDP 02~~ Two DDP 02I~ L P 200 1~40 176 N~ 30 6/65 u/61~ 11/66 b2,,67 emini mission simulator (astronaut training) Stations for Gemini mission simu- lator (astronaut training) Two DDP 02~~ P 1,00 100 u/65 -- Support of Apollo mission simulator Three DDP 22 P l21~ 370 12/65 -- light crew trainer (Apollo mission simulator) SDS 930 L 150 -- 2/65 6/67 cal-time flight simulation for program development MSC - Bldg. 12 - UNIVAC 1,18 L -- 210 3/66 6/67 Coimnunications processor to switch remote terminals NBC - Bldg. 15 PDP 5 P 176 10 ll/6L~ -- cal-time flight systems accept- ance testing SM 8~o P 176 -- 3/66 -- Transducer checkout of Apollo spacecraft NBC - Bldg. 16 DDP 21~ P 175 1~7 12/65 -- cal-time system simulation guidance and control system C) 00 z 5Leased is indicated by an L; purchased by a P. bRelease to Air Force on completion of Gemini Program. PAGENO="0534" TABI~ A-V.- INVENTCRY OF CC*4HJTERS, MAN1ED SPACECRAFT C~T~ - Continued (Category B equipment] * Center location Computer type Owner- h ~ . Production, hr/month Test, hr/month Date installed Planned release . as ion NBC - Bldg. 16 Raytheon 250 P 160 -- l2/6L~ -- Control of ThICE Raytheon 250 P 160 -- 12/65 -- Digital differential analyzer Raytheon l~0 P 160 -- 5/6k . -- Simulation guidance equipment and ThICE control function NBC - Bldg. 2l~ SDS 910 ~ P 650 ~O 4/61~ -- Real-time system control - main- tenance equipment for base facilities NBC - Bldg. 29 ~ Two DDP 2l~ P 60 60 14/65 -- ~ Real-time control of suit and spacecraft systems acceleration tests NBC Bldg 30 1i41 620 P 120 3/66 - Development of data acquisition systems UNIVAC 1218 P 110 35 3/65 -- Development of flight operations displays for RTCC UNIVAC 1218 P 34G 300 8/614 - Quick look processing of l!4 for command history UNIVAC 14914 P 220 205 14/66 Communications processor RTCC UNIVAC 14914 P 220* 205 6/66 -- Communications processor - RTCC UNIVAC 14914 P 220 205 6/66 - Communications processor RTCC UNIVAC 1418 L 180 140 10/65 12/66 Flight controllers simulation in NCC I- aLeased is indicated by an L; purchased by a P. PAGENO="0535" T(~BIE A-V.- INV~4TCBY OF COMEUTRRS, MAulED SPACECRAFT CENTER - Concluded [Category B equipment] Center location Computer type Production, hr/month Test, hr/month Date installed Planned release . Application MSC - Bldg. 32 Four CDC i6oa (identical systems) P -- 600 2 on 1/65 2 on 12/65 -- -- Spacecraft checkout (CSM and Ill) and test program development MSC -~ Bldg. 33 PDS 1020 P -- 250 5/65 -- Vacuum chamber monitoring NSC - Bldg. ~~4O UNIVAC 1218 P 180 190 2/65 -- Certify S-band communications and remote site equipment * UNIVAC 6l~2B P 180 ~ 190 3/66 -- Certify S-band communications and remote site equipment UNIVAC l001~ P 180 190 1ij66 -- Certify S-band communications and remote site equipment NAA - Downey Bldg. 290 Six CDC i6oo (identical systems) P -- 600 2 on 6/61~ 2 on 8/6)t 2 on 11/6)4 -- -- -- Eight more systems are at MILA and four more at MSC for space- craft checkout (CSM and LU) GAEC - Plant No. 5 Six CRC 1600 (identical systems) P -- 600 2 on 5/65 2 on 8/65 2 on 6/6)4 -- -- -- Eight more systems are at MILk and four more at USC for space- craft checkout (cSM and iu) Pleasantville, New York Two DDP 02I~ P 100 u/6~ -- Support CSM and LU simulators Fort Hood, Texas SDS 920 L 100 - 3/65 12/71 Terminal landing calculation for space flights Recovery Vessel - RETRIEVER ]I.~I 620 P -- 170 11/65 -- Processing of spacecraft telem- etry data CR 00 r12 0 5Leased is indicated by an L; purchased by a P. PAGENO="0536" TABLE A-V1.- INVENTORY OF CC~1HJTERS, KENNEDY SPACE CENTER [Category B equipment) 00 0 Center location* Computer type ~P Production, hr/month Test, hr/month Date installed Planned release A ~.. ~* PP ica ion KSC - LC-34 0009 RCA 11OA P 420 90 6/65 . -- tJprated Saturn I checkout 0010 RCA I1OA P 420 90 6/65 -- Uprated Saturn I checkout KSC - LC.-37 0019 RCA 1].OA P 420 90 2/66 -- Uprated Saturn I checkout 0020 RCA UOA P 420 90 1/66 -- Uprated Saturn I checkout KSC - LC-39, LCC-l 0015 RCA UOA P 420 90 11/66 -- Saturn V checkout KSC - LC-39, LCC-2 0021 RCA 110A P 420 90 10/66 -- Saturn V checkout KSC - LC-39, IiJT-l 0018 ~CA UOA P 420 90 12/65 -- Saturn V checkout KSC - LC-39, UJT-2 KSC - LC-39, VAB 0017 RCA 11OA 0014 RCA 110A P P 420 420 90 90 10/66 4/66 -- . -- Saturn V checkout Saturn V checkout support KSC - LC-39, LCC-1 DDP 224 P 420 60 4/66 -- Saturn V checkout display processor KSC - LC-39, LCC-2 DDP 224 P 420 60 10/66 -- Saturn V checkout display processor 9leased is indicated by an L; purchased by a P. PAGENO="0537" TABLE A-VI.- INVENTORY OF COMPUTERS, KENNEDY SPACE CENTER - Continued [Category B equipment] C) 00 (12 0 Center location Computer type Owner- . ~ . Production, hr/month Test, hr/month Date instafled Planned release . Application KSC - LC-39, VAB DDP 22I~ P ~~2O 60 10/66 -- Saturn V checkout support KSC - MSOB CDC 1600 P 230 228 3/65 -- CSM and 124 checkout CDC 1600 p 230 228 3/65 -- CSM and 124 checkout CDC 160G P 230 228 8/65 -- CSM and 124 checkout CDC 1600 P 230 228 8/65 -- CSM and 124 checkout CDC l6OG P 230 228 6/66 -- CSM and 1.24 checkout CDC 1600 p 230 228 6/66 -- CSI4 and 114 checkout CDC 1600 p 230 228 8/66 -- CSM and 124 checkout CDC 1600 P 230 228 8/66 -- CSM and 114 checkout KSC - CIP SDS 930 p 160 120 8/65 -- LY4 processing, part of ALDS SDS 930 p 160 120 8/65 -- N6 processing, part of ALDS KSC - Bldg. AK SDS 930 p 70 50 12/65 -- TE processing KSC - LC-3!i SDS 930 ~ P 520 21~ 7/65 -- DEE 6E uprated Saturn I checkout KSC - LC-37 SDS 930 p 520 2l~ 2/66 -- DEE 6E uprated Saturn I checkout KSC - IAJT-l SDS 930 p 520 2i~ 3/66 -- DEE 6C Saturn V checkout aLeased is indicated by an L; purchased by a P. PAGENO="0538" Center location Computer type ~°~" r'r Production, hr/month Test, hr/month Date nstall d Planned rd as . Appl]cat on KSC LUT 2 SDS 930 P 520 24 9/66 DEE 6C Saturn V checkout NBC - LUT-3 SDS 930 P 520 24 1/67 -- DEE 6C Saturn V checkout KSC - Bldg. 409 DDP 224 DDP 224 DDP 224 * P P P 124 124 124 370 370 370 5/66 5/66 5/66 -- -- Apollo flight crew trainer Apollo fl ght rew tra n Apollo flight crew trainer NBC - Bldg. 40 ~ DDP 024 DDP 024 P P 440 440 30 30 12/64 12/64 -- -- Gemini flight crew trainer Gemini flight crew trainer KSC IC 34 (serv ice structure) SDS 910 P 1450 5/65 Onboard instrumentation checkout SC LC 34 SDS 910 P 90 24 11/65 Part f pr p ilant tank ng puter sistem DEE 3 SC - VAB : SDS 910' P -- -- -- -- Data processing and checkout com- puter support SC - LC-37 SDS 910 P 90 24 11/65 -- Part of propellant tanking com- puter system DEE 3 SC - LC-39, Pad A 5DB 910 P 90 24 11/65 -- Part of propellant tanking com- puter system DEE 3 SC - 1.6-39,: Pad B SDS 910 P -- -- 11/66 -- Part of propellant tanking coifi- puter_system_DEE_3 TABLE A-VI. - INVENTORY OF COMPUTERS, KENNEDY SPACE CENTER - Concluded [Cat g ry B equ pmentl 0 aLeased is indicated by an L; purchased by a P. PAGENO="0539" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 535 GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AN]) ACRONYMS ACE Acceptance Checkout Equipment A/D Analog to Digital ADP Automatic Data Processing ADX Automatic Data Exchange AGS Automatic Ground Station ALDS Apollo Launch Data System Apollo Mission Simulator APCU Apollo Process Control Unit ASTR Astrionics Laboratory B Burroughs Corporation BOB Bureau of the Budget BTLS Breadboard Terminal Landing System CAAD Computational and Analysis Division CCATS Communications Command and Telemetry System ~DC Control Data Corporation CIF Central Instrumentation Facility COBOL Common Business Oriented Language COMP Computation Laboratory CRT Cathode Ray Tube CSC Computer Sciences Corporation CSM Command and Service Module DAF Data Acquisition Facility DCS Direct Coupled System DDP Digital Data Processor (originally manufactured by Computer Control Corporation acquired by Honeywell, Inc.) DEC Digital Equipment Company DEE Digital Event Evaluator DNI Decision Machine Inc. (subsidiary of Decision Control Corp.) DRC Data Reduction Complex DRF Data Reduction Facility EA.I Electronic Associates, Inc. EAM Electronic Accounting Machine ESCF Electronic Systems Compatibility Facility ESE Electronic Support Equipment ES~ Electronic Systems Test Program ETR Eastern Test Range Yt4/~7A Frequency Modulation (signal on an ~ carrier) F! Fiscal Year PAGENO="0540" 536 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION GA.EC Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. G&C Guidance and~Control GE General Electric Company GETS Ground Equipment Test Set GOSS Ground Operations Support System GSA General Services Administration GSSC Ground Support Simulation Computer H Honeywell, Inc. HON Honeywell, Inc~, HOSC Huntsville Operations Support Center International Business Machines Corporation INS KSC Information Systems Directorate I/O Input/Output IU Instrument Unit KSC John F. Kennedy Space Center L Leased LC Launch Complex LCC Launci Computer Complex LIEF Launch Information Exchange Facility 1Z4 Lunar Module 1145 Lunar Module Mission Simulator LUT Launch Umbilical Tower L/V Launch Vehicle LVDA Launch Vehicle Digital Adapter LVDC Launch Vehicle Digital Computer LVO Launch Vehicle Operations MA.F Michoud Assembly Facility MCC Mission Control Center - Houston MILk Meritt Island Launch Area MOC Mission Operations Computer NPAD Mission Planning and Analysis Division MSC Manned Spacecraft Center MSF Manned Space Flight MSFC George C. Marshall Space Flight Cenier MSOB Manned Spacecraft Operations Building MTF Mississippi Test Facility NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration PAGENO="0541" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 537 OART NASA, Office of Advanced Research and Technology ~V1SF NASA, Office of Manned Space Flight OSSA Office of Space Sciences and Applications OTDA Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition P Purchased PB Raytheon (formerly Packard-BeU) PDM Pulse Duration Modulation PDP Digital Equipment Corporation PERT Program Evaluation and Review Technique POP Program Operating Plan PSDF Propulsion System Development Facility P&VE Propulsion and Vehicle Engineering RCA.- Radio Corporation of America R&D Research and Development ER Radio Frequency R~P Request for Proposal Redstone Arsenal EEDP Remote Site Data Processor RTCC Real-Time Computer Complex SCATS Simulation Checkout and Training System SDS Scientific Data Systems SEE Source Evaluation Board SLCC Saturn Lawich Computer Complex SOC Simulation Operations Computer S-V Saturn V TCO Telephone Central Office ~I~4 Telemetry PRICE Telemetry System TX~ Thompson Eamo Wooldridge U~IIVAC UNIVAC Division of Sperry Rand Corporation VAB Vehicle Assembly Building WSTF White Sands Pest Facility PAGENO="0542" 538 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION The total computer equipment costs in Manned Space Flight have been going down. They are, in fiscal year 1967, $7,800,000 less than the fiscal year 1966 costs and the fiscal year 1968 costs are $6,500,000 less than those for fiscal year 1967. Mr. FULTON. On the general purpose of computers rather than spe- cifically built components, what is your policy-do you favor the Gov- ernment owning the particular computer or do you favor leasing, everything else being equal? Dr. MUELLER. We have some careful guidelines prepared by the Bureau of the Budget and by the General Accounting Office which provide criteria for making a selection depending upon which is the least expensive total cost for the Government and we are applying those procedures to each of our purchases. Mr. FULTON. Did you ask each individual computer whether it should be bought or leased and did it reply to you: "Buy me or lease me?" Dr. MUELLER. We ask another computer to arrive at the answer to this rather complex question. Mr. FULTON. That is all. Dr. MUELLER. We want to avoid a conflict of computer interest. Mr. FLJLTON. That is all. Dr. MUELLER. That is all I had, Mr. Chairman. Mr. TEAGUE. I am sorry Mr. Rumsfeld wasn't in here. It was his question. George, while Don is out, I wish you would discuss support services at the different centers. Every time you change your procedure, all of us get swamped with letters and calls from contractors all over the country. They all come to see us. Would you comment on how you make a determination for contracting the in-house support service functions? Are they uniform in each center? Dr. MUELLER. Most of the changes that we have been instituting have been in the direction of bringing uniformity of applications of our support services contractors between the centers. Of course, their missions are different so you can't get absolute uniformity, but, as you recall about 2 years ago, we established a new support contractor structure and those structures were deliberately different at Marshall, MSC and KSC because we were trying to learn how best to utilize support contractors in the operation of these facilities. We have been learning from this process. In general, we have adopted the use of a contract involving a determination of an award fee, and insofar as we could do so, objective fee criteria. We are using an incentive fee structure for our support contractors and this has worked quite well. We are in the process of consolidating certain of the contracts in order to provide for both better management on our part and also to reduce the administrative overhead which it would appear, because of the way the contract structure has developed, could be done by consolidating certain contracts. Mr. TEAGUE. Take Cape Kennedy. What do you go to? Eight to four down there? Dr. MUELLER. From seven to four. Mr. TEAGUE. Seven to four. Dr. MUELLER. Yes. PAGENO="0543" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 539 Mr. TI~auE. Each one of those contractors have been working for a number of years down there? Dr~ Mu~LER. Yes. Mr. T~ouE. You know which ones do a good job and which one does a poor job? Dr. Mu1~u~R. Yes. Mr. TEAGUE. You ask for a proposal. Some spent $50,000 on i~ pro- posal and some spent $100,000. The rumors come to us that the com- panies put all their good people on the proposal. They know unless they have a good proposal they don't get the job. So a poor company spends $100,000 on its proposal, and, sends it in. The good company spends only $50,000 on its proposal. How does a staff of yours come out with a decision on which company gets the job? Dr. MUELLER. There is, Mr. Chairman, a very carefully developed set of procedures which are established by NASA regulations for the letting of contracts which we have implemented. Based on these procedures we establish Source Evaluation Boards comprised of qualified individuals who evaluate those proposals. We are required. to compete for these contracts and we comply with the existing,,,regulations. Mr. `TEAGUE. Do you have any evidence that you have achieved greater efficiency and saved money by your enforced consolidation? In one part of Government we encourage small business and small companies and NASA appears to be emphasizing fewer business firms and bigger companies. Dr. MUELLER. We do have some experience at the Marshall Space Flight Center' where we did accomplish some consolidation with con- siderable savings. Mr. TEAGUE. You went to what? From 80-some odd companies down to what? Mr. LILLY. We had 77 support contracts, Mr. Teague, at~Marshall. In January 1965, the value of the 77 contracts was estimated at $76 million. We Consolidated these contracts to 11, The actual cost for the first year of operation, including the award fee,. was $60,298,000. We also reduced the contractor personnel by approximately 882 Based on substantially, the same contractor workload, though I couldn't prove it exactly,. the savings would appear to have been about $15,- 000,000. , , Of course, we have not yet completed the, consolid~tion at KSC. Since KSC is still growing, I couldn't give any firm figures of the estimated savings there. Mr. TEAGUE. You consider the $15 million a true figure resulting from your consolidation at Marshall? Mr. LILLY. I consider the, consolidation a contributing factor. I think 77 was too large a number of support contra~tsto really man- age efficiently. ` `:, " ` ` Mr TEAGUE At Kennedy, you are consolidating your fire deptLrt ment and police department Yet, so far as I know, in no place in our whole country has any city combined' their police and fire de- partment activities; Dr MUELLER Both services are curre,ntly provided at KSC by one contractor, TWA. ,, PAGENO="0544" 540 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Mr. TEAGUE. Is that correct at present? Mr. LILLY. Let me ask Chuck Bingman, who is in our Manage- ment Operations office, to comment on this arrangement. Mr. BINGMAN. They are combining the fire and safety contract and the security guard contract at the Manned Spacecraft Center in }iouston. The two services are now performed together by TWA at the Kennedy S_pace Center. Mr. FULTON. For example at Marshall Spaceflight Center, were their reductions in the operating personnel or management? Mr. LILLY. The personnel that I referred to at MSFC were the support contractor personnel and were a combination. I don't have a breakdown here on how many were management and how many were operating. Mr. FULTON. The question would certainly arise as to whether you could have accomplished the same purpose by simply putting pres- sures on for economy and cutting out certain overlapping and cer- tain things that needed to be done, so that you achieve this efficiency. Because I can't see that the simple fact of having one contractor or two or a certain type of contract would have that big an effect on operations. It just doesn't seem logical to me. Could you explain that? Dr. MUELLER. One place where savings would become immedi- ately apparent is in the area of reducing the number of people sup- porting those who do the actual work. Mr. FULTON. George, that wouldn't involve $15 million. Dr. MtTELLER. That factor could account *for a relatively large fraction of the saving inasmuch as the paperwork involved in the commercial enterprises in terms of keeping the tax forms filled out and all the other things that are needed is an appreciable fraction of the cost of labor. Mr. FULTON. You are saying that small business operations inher- ently are not efficient and that since large ones are more efficient, NASA should deal with them? Dr. MUELLER. No, sir; I didn't mean to imply that. We have a very active small business program in each of our centers. Each of these consolidations is very carefully worked out with the local Small Business Administration and with their representatives. Mr. FULTON. With the chairman's permission, I would like a state- ment put in the record of the factors that caused the saving; if you would do that. That is all. While it is extremely difficult to develop a precise measure of the individual factors which resulted in a reduced cost after consolidation ot the service con- tracts at MSFC from 77 to 11, we believe the following factors contributed significantly to the first year's savings of over $15 million: 1. More efficient work assignment and greater flexibility in the use of the work force,; 2. Elimination of duplication and overlaps; 8. The reduction of interface probleths. For example, there were seven contractors providing various kinds of engi- neering and fabrication support. After the consolidation, a single contractor was able to provide the total support with fewer people by having complete flexibility in the use of the machine operators and technicians and by more efficient work assignment. PAGENO="0545" 1968 NASA AUPHORIZAPION 541 Mr. GURNEY. Dr. Mueller, getting back to the chairman's question about the high cost of preparing proposals for furnishing services. As I understand it now, you are required by law to periodically re- contract for these services, is that correct, every 3 years? Dr. MURLLER. Actually, we are required by law to compete on con- tracts. Mr. COTTON. We generally set different periods for the renewal of our contracts so that they don't all phase out at the same time. Dr. MUELLER. What is the limit? Mr. CorroN. Including renewal provisions, these contracts generally run for 5 years. We are contracting from year to year for planned periods running from 3 to 5 years without formal recompetition, as long as performance is good. Mr. GURNEY. You are legally bound to negotiate a contract for no longer than 5 years, is that correct? Dr. MTJELLER. The legal requirement is to have maximum practi- cable competition in all our procurements. Mr. GURNEY. Then regardless of whether you have a good operation or not, you have to negotiate for a new contract? Dr. MUELLER. Our Agency policy is to recompete at the end of the total planned period of contract performance. Mr. GURNEY. Do you have any suggestions to improve this? Ob- viously if you had a good and efficient operation, it would be a useless exercise to seek new contracts. Now I am aware that one reason why you do this is to prevent a contractor from being locked in forever. Do you have any other suggestions as to how this could be done? What is your own idea? Dr. MUELLER. In this area as well as in other areas, I think that there is a very real problem in maintaining a competitive industrial situation. You can, in fact, create a situation where there is no fur- ther cOmpetition. Mr. GURNEY. I wasn't suggesting that there shouldn't be any fur- ther competition. Suppose you had no limitation at all as far as a contract is concerned, that the law said nothing about it and suppose you negotiated a contract for 1 or ~ years and you were continuously looking at it. If you wanted to, you could at the end of 6 months or a year, throw it open because you didn't think the contractor was doing a good job. On the other hand, if he was, you could continue this almost in- definitely. Would that make any sense? Dr. MUELLER. As a matter of fact, our contracts are written in such a fashion that that is in fact possible. Each of our contracts provides, at the convenience of the Government, for rebidding. NASA policy provides limits for various types of contract and program situations. The principle is this: if the contractor who is doing the work is good, then he ought to win the next competition. Mr. GURNEY. Then you run into what the chairman says. A lot of people have to go through expensive exercises as well as tying up your own people. 76-265 O-67-pt. 2-a5 PAGENO="0546" 542 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Dr. MUELLER. We have tried to improve the situation through our phased procurement procedure in our R. & D. activities. This ap- proach was designed to reduce the cost to industry of preparing proposals. I don't think that has worked to actually accomplish this. Apin, the competition is very large. The desire for getting new business is very great and it is difficult to actually limit the amount of money that the company will put into proposals. Mr. GURNEY. Do you have any ideas on how the present method can be improved upon? Dr. MUELLER. No, sir; I do not. Mr. TEAGUE. I have seen some of those proposals and they stack up about 1 or 2 feet in height. How do you relate performance to proposal? Dr. MUELLER. It takes 3 or 4 weeks for 70 people to go through one set of proposals. Mr. TEAGUE. You have that many people down there doing this function? Dr. MUELLER. Yes, so it takes a great deal of time on the part of the Government to carry out a real evaluation of these proposals. It takes a great deal of time on the part of the companies involved to prepare the proposal. Mr. TEAGUE. What are you going to say to a company you have given a superior rating to when he doesn't get the renewal contract and you award the new contract to another company that didn't re- ceive a superior rating? How will you explain it? There is no law that tells you what to do. It gets down to somebody saying: "This company gets the job." Dr. MUELLER. Each of the source evaluation boards takes into ac- count past performance in their evaluation of the suitability and rank- ing of the contractor. I am sure that the people that lose one of these competitions feel very bad. Mr. TEAGUE. All companies do. Dr. MUELLER. I found that I felt bad every time I lost one when I was in industry. On the other hand, I have observed the operation of the letting of contracts in Europe, for example, where quite often the work is contracted by the Government and is divided among a set of companies in order to build basic capability and maintain that capability. My own observation is that Our system works about as well as any system. It is far from ideal and that is simply because there is no absolute measure of competence. There is no absolute measure of performance in the future. You can always say what the performance was in the past, but there are a few key people that have actually caused the past per- formance to be good and if you transfer 20 people out of any organi- zation, the right 20 people, you will find that its performance will decrease. That doesn't say that the performance level won't get good again, but the performance pattern will change. Mr. TEAGUE. You have really had a very satisfactory performance particularly at Cape Kennedy. Couldn't you save a heck of a lot of PAGENO="0547" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 543 money and wear and tear if you put all the names of qualified com- panies and choose them by lottery? Dr. MUELLER. Mr. Teague, if the Congress would like to authorize that procedure, I am sure we will comply. Mr. TEAGUE. I have a suspicion you will come out as well because I think you have got seven good companies down there. Dr. MUELLER. I certainly agree because the work has been very good in this support contract area. Mr. TEAGUE. Those proposals must consist of 10,000 pages. Dr. MUELLER. `les. Mr. TEAGUE. What does the contract negotiator know when he gets through with a proposal that he didn't know when he started? Mr. FUQUA. This has intrigued me for some time. I think you will find in many cases that the firms' capability to write proposals probably far exceeds their ability to perform the task that you set out for them. Is not this true? Dr. MUELLER. It is often difficult to have the proposal writers actu- ally working on the project that they write for. One thing that we try to do, is to be sure that the same people who are working on the pro- posal will be the same people actually working on the project itself. Mr. FUQUA. Some universities are being accused of "grantsman- ship" in getting grants. Some people have a better ability to express themselves on paper and maybe these companies find themselves get- ting into "proposalships." Like the chairman I think you would be bettter off to choose from among qualified contractors by lottery. It would save 70 people a lot of time and paper~vork. Mr. TEAGUE. Any questions? Mr. Rumsfeld, you were out when we were going into your favorite subject, automatic data processing. Do you want to go back toit and ask some questions? Mr. RUMSFELD. I would rather review what I understand will be put in the record and spend some time on it. If I have any questions I can get in touch with NASA. Mr. TEAGUE. All right. Mr. RUMSFELD. On this c1uestion of contractors, how precise a sys- tem do you have for recording the past performance of contractors in the area of technical performance? I can understand how you can evaluate a number of things about a contractor, but as far as the real hard area of technical performance, do you actually have a system for this? Dr. MUELLER. In the case of the support contractors, yes. Webreak it down so that there are essentially supervisors in particular areas of work who monitor what is being done and hold periodic meetings with the contractor management. Mr. RUMSFELD. Is this recorded? Dr. MUELLER. It is recorded. There is a scorecard of performance which is given to the contractor about once a month so that he knows how he is doing against the various items in this evaluation and so, in turn, that he can improve. The objective, of course, is to get the support contractor to do as good work as it is possible by providing him an award as an incentive. The problem you have with a supervisor evaluating the performance PAGENO="0548" 544 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION in a given area is that he always compares the work that another individual does with what he thinks he could do, and we generally tend to have a rather high opinion of what we think we can do. Mr. RUMSFELD. Is this also true of your R. & D. contract? Dr. MUELLER. With our R. & D. contractors we do not have that precise an evaluation system. There, performance is assessed on the basis of the performance evaluation system. We are a member of the program that DOD has set up for evaluating past performance. In R. & P. it is a more objective thing. The R. & P. hardware con- tractors are essentially operating independently and the Government is measuring the end product rather than monitoring what they are doing on a day-to-day basis. There is a danger in trying to do too much monitoring with respect to the evaluation. We do have a fair handle in the technical performance area from our incentive contract structure because that was carefully written out to identify key items that had to be done. You can pretty well evaluate at the end of the contract by just looking at performance on key points. Mr. RUMSEELD. With respect to the R. & P. contract; is that re- corded? Dr. MUELLER. Yes. Mr. RUMSFELD. In each case, it is made available to these boards? Dr. MUELLER. Yes. Mr. RUMSFELD. When they review the collection of recorded infor- mation, do you find a substantial disparity among companies working in similar areas with regard to their ratings? Dr. MUELLER. Generally there are not wide variations in the scores of the evaluation groups on the companies. You will find, however, typical variations of maybe 25 percent of the total points from the best to the worst-maybe a little more. But that is not surprising bceause you are dealing with a number of competent people who are trying to get the same work. It is about like grading students, in a sense. You have the same problem. If you have a highly select group of college students, how are you going to differentiate between the man who is making the highest grade and the man who is going to flunk the course? You have to determine the difference between an A and B when this difference may not be very large in terms of scores on tests. Mr. IRUMSFELD. When you are grading students or contractors, de- pending on how you set the standard, you can have a greater or smaller disparity, depending upon the scale you use and how you adjust it. Dr. MUELLER. Precisely. Mr. RUMSFELD. Have you drawn a cutoff line? Dr. MUELLER. Yes. Mr. RUMSFELD. Have you moved that line from time to time, as the program matures? Are you requiring a higher standard? Dr. MUELLER. Well, we tried not to move the line but rather to pro- vide an incentive for the contractor to do better. You see, if you move the line, you tell the man when he enters into the contract, that this is where the line is. Mr. RUMSPELD. I mean that if they fall below the line in perform- ance, they are not going to get more contract work. PAGENO="0549" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 545 Dr. MUELLER. If they fall below it in performance on an existing contract, then we get a new contractor, immediatly. That is what we do. Mr. RUMSPELD. But do you move that line? I take it you haven't. Dr. MUELLER. No, we have not. The minimum performance that we expect is say 75 percent. I believe that is an average number for performance in all of the categories. Mr. RUMSPELD. What happens specifically when some contractor falls below it and they get no more contract work? Do the employees from that company go to work for the other companies? Dr. MUELLER. Actually, we have not had an example of a company that has fallen below the minimum for 2 months consecutively. That is simply because there is a very large incentive for them to stay above. The fees for below minimum performance are very low, and conse- quently there is a large incentive for them to try to stay up around 95 percent. We haven't been so unfortunate, as I recall, to have a case where the contractor stayed down around the minimum region. There was one company that was there for 1 month. The company changed its management and improved spectacularly. Mr. RUMSFELD. Thank you. Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Roudebush. Mr. ROUDEBUSH. The thought occurred to me as to what system do we have of encouraging individual contractors for making suggestions on saving money for the Government? In other words, let us assume a hypothetical case, say TWA will come to you at Kennedy and say, "Look, Dr. Mueller, we can save $50,000 by combining some services." What do we do? Cut their contract by $50,000 or do we give them some sort of inducement? Dr. MUELLER. We cut their contract by $50,000. There is essentially a cost-saving sharing which increases their profit. Mr. ROUDEBUSH. They would make money by making such a sug- gestion? Dr. MUELLER. Yes. Mr. ROtTDEBUSH. When you combined these 77 support contracts, Mr. Lilly, to a much lesser number with a saving of $15 million, why wasn't someone aggressive enough to make some suggestions? Ob- viously there was overlapping and duplication of services. Why didn't someone make a suggestion? Mr. LILLY. When we reduced the number of support contractors at Marshall from 77 to 11, we converted to the incentive contract struc- ture. The physical processes of monitoring these award contracts represents a considerable burden on the Government structure. It was not feasible. We didn't have enough people with the right training to be able to monitor and manage 77 support contractors. Mr. ROUDEBUSH. Did anybody suggest a combination of services when the reduction of a number of contractors was accomplished? Did anybody turn in any suggestions saying we can do this? Do you follow my line of questions? Mr. LILLY. Yes. Mr. ROtJDEBUSH. Were any suggestions received which recom- mended a combination of services? Dr. MUELLER. I can recall one instance of a contractor at MSC that did suggest a combination of services because he thought it would re- PAGENO="0550" 546 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION duce the cost. I believe we accepted the suggestion. Unfortunately in the ensuing competition, he lost the bid. Mr. ROUDEBUSH. That answers my line of questions. Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Gurney? Mr. GURNEY. Dr. Mueller, I would like to renew my annual request for a complete breakdown of the public relations of NASA. There is nothing in this budget book anywhere which shows how much is being spent for public relations and how it is being spent. I asked for this last year and NASA was extremely unresponsive. It didn't furnish any information in detail, I think this committee ought to be in- formed especially as to how much is being spent and where. I remem- ber one year NASA requested funds for Columbia University in an attempt to learn how to do public relations or how to improve it. We got that stricken out of the budget. I know two newspaper editors from my home district who have said: "Can't you get NASA to stop flooding us with all this enormous paper they send, out," which these two people said "they constantly dump in the wastebasket." I am interested in how much NASA is spending on public relations and a breakdown of how it is being spent. In fact, I think it might be well if you furnished us with your inhouse public relations budget as it may be accepted by the Administrator and in turn put into your budget when you send it over to the Director of the Budget so that we actually know what this public relations money is. Mr. TEAGUE. Shouldn't that properly go to Mr. Webb? Mr. GURNEY. Yes, I think probably it should. I don't care who furnishes it as long as we get it. Mr. TEAGUE. We will send the request to Mr. Webb. (The following is submitted for the record.) National Aeronautics and Space Administration agency-wide public affairs budget estimate~s, fiscal year 1968-Summary [Dollars in thousands] Headquarters Field Total Personnel: Professional Secretarial and clerical Salaries and benefits Travel Information/educational publications preparation, printing, and distribution News photographic services Information/educational motion pictures production, process- ing, distribution, and depository operation Radio and television production, distribution, and service~.... Educational programs Spacemobile program Exhibits design, construction, display maintenance, trans- portation, and warehousing Community relations and local activities Supplies, materials, and equipment Total 73 44 128 72 201 116 $1,596 114 440 150 930 510 205 1,260 1,843 17 $2,337.8 201.7 492.5 510.6 1,362.3 221.4 100.0 674.4 195.0 219.7 $3, 933.8 315.7 932.8 660.6 2,292.3 731.4 305.0 1,260.0 2,517.4 195.0 236.7 7,065 6,315.4 13,380.4 Dr. MUELLER. We don't happen to have that part of the NASA budget under our jurisdiction and control. Mr. GURNEY. I understand that. I was using this opportunity be- cause it has to be brought out somewhere in committee. PAGENO="0551" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 547 Mr. TEAGUE. How do you guard against a very large company chargmg off all kinds of costs in the proposal preparation, as against a small company who can't charge off anything in a proposal? Dr. MUELLER. In our support contracts and also in our large con- tracts, but in our support contracts particularly, we normally have a separate cost center which gathers all the costs associated in that cen- ter. They are special kinds of things. We don't want to carry the overhead rate of the company as a whole. There are standard account- ing practices, and unless the company is willing to spend its profits on this operation, they won't permit them to divert costs to another operation. You can't have a loose division in Government contracting unless it is a fixed price contract and most companies aren't willing to put their profits into this kind of an operation. Mr. TEAGUE. I have one or two more questions on facilities. Last year this committee authorized $96 million for construction of fa- cilities. NASA had requested something over $101 million. Then the Appropriations Committee reduced this to $83 million. What was the impact of these reductions and were there serious delays as far as this program was concerned? Dr. MUELLER. I will turn that over to Mr. Lilly. Mr. LILLY. The total amount requested for the Agency's fiscal year 1967 construction of facilities program was $101.5 million; $95.9 mil- lion was authorized by the Congress. The Appropriations Committee reduced this amount to $83 million. As you know, in your Authoriza- tion Committee you made certain specific cuts in the fiscal year 1967 Manned Space Flight construction of facilities request. You made two in which you reduced the Lunar Receiving Lab from $9.1 million down to $8.1 million and denied the project at Marshall for the en- largement of the Hazardous Operations Lab. Those were the two specific cuts. The other cuts from the Appropriations Committee are not specified against any particular project. It is up to the Agency as to how it now rebalances or utilizes the appropriated funds, whether it comes back for a supplemental amount or comes back with the request in the following year. In terms of the fiscal year 1967 construction of facilities history, Manned Space Flight was authorized by your com- mittee approximately $53.8 million for facilities, and ended up with $43.8 million. Now, our criteria in trying to determine which ones would have the least adverse effect on our operations led us essentially to defer facilities which were primarily in the administrative area. We have been able to accomplish each of the facilities that you au- thorized, except for four at this point. Those four are the warehouse at KSC; the engineering building at MSC; and two other projects: one for rehabilitating and keeping up to date the test facilities at Mississippi and the same type of project for the S-IVB facilities in Sacramento, Calif. We have not found a way to fund these pro)ects. We have not given up on the requirement. We still think they are required. It is costing us more money to operate without the ware- house at KSC. It is a gradual kind of thing and I still have hopes of getting additional warehouse space. We have taken certain actions to alleviate part of our problem. By converting space in the Vehicle Assembly Building, we have found PAGENO="0552" 548 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION ways to pick up about 20,000 square feet. It is not efficient but it allows us to continue to operate. We also picked up some more space from the Air Force on the Cape Kennedy side which we had to pa~ for. However it is still not an efficient arrangement. The prior resi- dential structures used for storage on which there was considerable discussion' last year are continuing to cost us more money. There is more security surveillance involved. Some of the studies that we have done show that the operation and maintenance is costing us about $3.50 a square foot under these circumstances whereas the cost is less than a third of that amount in our regular warehouses. Now, in terms of technical facilities at the Mississippi Test Facility and at the S- IV B SACTO location, we may well be back to the Congress for those facilities as a special reprograming action this year if we are not able to live without them. At Mississippi, one of the things we are waiting for is the first test firing of the S-IC flight stage. We know we have to change the cooling holes and so forth in the deflector plate for the S-IC test stand. I will have to wait and see if we have to come back for a large amount. In the case of the S-IV B as you know, we had the S-IV B accident out at Sacramento. We are evaluating that problem to determine whether or not we will replace the dam- aged stand or if there is a different way of meeting our requirements. I wouldn't be surprised if we didn't have to use the emergency au- thority provided to us by the Congress to go ahead and repair the S-TV B at SACTO. That will mean that we will have to take R&D funds, which are already tight in order to carry out the repairs. I can't say specifically that the items that we have deleted so far have delayed us. Since we wouldn't have had the facilities completed yet anyway, I can't really tell. However, I feel that these items are a requirement and should be done. When the Lunar Receiving Lab was reduced from $9.1 to $8.1 mil- lion we had to take certain specific actions. In restudy, we did reduce the total area of the proposed facility, which was around 87,000 square feet. We were able to reduce this down to about 83,000 square feet, but our major planned saving so far is that whereas we had originally proposed having what is called a dual vacuum system, we have now removed one leg of that vacuum system so that we have a single vacuum system in the Lunar Receiving Lab. As far as we can tell right now, the major disadvantage of the change will be some delay in being able to process the lunar samples and get them out to the universities. That will be the major result. When you are running widely spaced trips to the lunar surface it won't have such an adverse effect on the handling capabilities, but if you have two, say, within a 3 or 4 month interval, you could be ac- cumulating a backlog in the Lab without getting the samples out quickly. The major drawback would be the delays in the handling of the samples. However, the change does not degrade the quality of the facilities in terms of the quarantine function. Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Gurney. Mr. GURNEY. I have a question here on communication costs. I notice you have provision for an increase of about a third of a million dollars. Why should your communications go up? PAGENO="0553" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 549 Mr. LILLY. Is this communications that went up in Administrative Operations? Mr. GURNEY. Yes. Mr. LILLY. Was the figure you read for the agency as a whole? Mr. GURNEY. I don't know if this is all for the Manned Space Flight area. Dr. MUELLER. These budget books were put together, they present Administrative Operations for the agency as a whole, they are not all broken out separately for Manned Space Flight. A lot of those figures in the budget statements are for the agency as a whole. Mr. LILLY. I don't have the number in front of me at the moment, but I can give you reasons that cause Manned Space Flight communi- cations to increase. Mr. GURNEY. All right. Mr. LILLY. During fiscal year 1968 there is an increase in man-years of work. For example, K~C is increasing its man-years during this time. They are not yet up to the 2,720 strength shown for the end of fiscal year 1967. They are now about 139 below that end year level, and are still in a build up situation. By the end of fiscal year 1967, KSC will have 2,720 permanent civil service personnel. Therefore we will have for all of fiscal year 1968 the manpower that you had only for part of fiscal year 1967. As a result, your total manpower increases. Ihat situation is also true at Houston, and it increases your personnel costs as well as other related categories, such as communications. In addition the previously authorized buildings that are being completed and are coming into operation at our Manned Space Flight centers must be accommodated. In fiscal year 1967, we will increase the square footage occupied at our centers by 535,000 square feet. In fiscal year 1968, buildings coming into operation will increase this figure by an- other 400,000 or so square feet. That factor adds to the operational costs, janitorial, communications, etcetera. Specifically, in terms of communications, my recollection is that there has also been some change in the Federal Telecommunications what is called the System (FTS) rate. I have the numbers here on the communications costs at our centers. At the Manned Spacecraft Center the fiscal year 1967, requirements are $2,337,000, and will go up to $2,343,000 in fiscal year 1968. The basic increase here is in several areas, but mainly in terms of the local telephone and exchange service where you need more people and more instruments. At the Marshall Space Flight Center, where the number of people has declined, requirements go down to an estimated $1,695,000 in fiscal year 1968. We get our largest reduction in the local telephone and exchange services. The leased lines and the long distance calls have not really changed. Mr. GURNEY. How do you monitor the long-distance calls to make sure that people aren't wasting the Government's money? Do you have any effective way of doing it? Mr. LILLY. I would have to answer that I don't believe that the agency has any definite way to determine whether or not an official call that an engineer, for instance, would make really was necessary, other than to continually keep in front of these people the cost of this PAGENO="0554" 550 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION service. We assess, at our centers and headquarters, what the com- munication costs should be. We monitor the number of instruments that are installed at the centers, in other words, to prevent having two or three instruments for one man and things of this nature. We also have a procedure that requires long-distance commercial calls to be certified by a supervisor to assure that these were official calls. We follow up to see that all long-distance commercial calls are made in the cheapest manner and any deviation from that procedure comes back to the supervisor, who has to check into the reasons for the devia- tion. Mr. TEAGUE. Any questions? Dr. Mueller, I think I should tell you that I had a little experience in World War II that caused me to ask a number of questions on con- tracts. I had a battalion of a thousand men. Ed Gurney will well understand that. I soon learned that the decorations I was recom- mending were not being approved. The battalion personnel officer who would write up the citation for a decoration originally had been a contractor. I searched around and located a journalism major to write up the citation for the decorations. The situation completely changed. I knew we were doing as much fighting as anyone. Very quickly, all the recommended decorations came back approved. If I were a contractor, I would hire a capable proposal writer. Any other questions? Dr. Mueller, we have scheduled the markup of the bill for the 4th and 5th of April and we hope that you and Mr. Lilly will be available at that time either up here or at your office so we can get in touch with you. Dr. MUELLER. Thank you. Mr. TEAGUE. Any further questions? If not, we will be adjourned. (Whereupon, at ii :40 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.) PAGENO="0555" ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FOR THE PUBLIC RECORD IN EXECUTIVE SESSION BY MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOM- MITTEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, APRIL 4, 1967 Question No. 1: Mr. GURNEY. You say the experimental program is mainly funded through a university who in turn engages contractors. What univer- sities are these and what are they doing? The answer to this question is partially contained in the answer to Mr. Teague's question "I would hope on Apollo Applications you would put out in much more detail for our hearings than what we have in our backup books for the ordinary layman to know what the vehicles are you are using and what the experiments mean and that type of ex- planation," on pp. 334-335 of the March 20, 1967 fiscal year 1968 au- thorization hearings and the answer to Mr. Daddario's question on pp. 310-312 in the March 20 hearings: "In the area of manned earth orbital telescope activity, Dr. Mueller, will you briefly name some of those members of the astronomical community who have advised you in this and supported this?" Question No. 2: Mr. DADDARIO. As I understand from Mr. Wilson, we will not get copies of this (the Apollo Applications amplifying statement) until it is put in galley proofs, because that is a costly procedure; I make this request that this all be provided to us prior to this going into galleys so that it can be put into fixed form and so we need no supplement to complicate the matter for us. Answer. The answer is identical to the question posed by Mr. Teague, during the March 20 hearings (see pp. 834-335), Mr. Teague: "I would hope on Apollo Applications you would put out in much more detail for our hearings than what we have in our backup books for the ordinary layman to know what the vehicles are you are using and what the experiments mean and that type of explanation." Question No. 3: Question by Mr. RUMSFELD: What I am trying to do is get some feeling for the types of total sums for different categories that NASA is going to be spending that are not going to show up in a beefed-up space program such as the ac- cident, such as wage increases, such as the effect of strikes. Some of these things I would think would be helpful to me in understanding the absolute level of funding, if I can use that word as opposed to the budget figure which will either stay the same or show a slight increase from last year or slight decrease. There is a gap between that and what we are really getting because of these various things such as the accident, wage increases, strikes, 551 PAGENO="0556" 552 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION and possibly these things that you are funding through NASA that DOD and Congress used to fund. I would be interested in having a list of these things with an estimated dollar amount so that we can get some feel. Tiger, does that make sense to you? Mr. TEAGUE. Yes, sir, it does. * * * * * * * Mr. FULTON. Could we have an estimate put in the record on that? Dr. MUELLER. Yes, sir. Mr. FULTON. If you will put that in the record for us, it would be the best thing. Why don't you make a complete survey and put it in the record. Is that all right, Mr. Chairman? Mr. TEAGUE. Yes. Answer. Known or potential increased funding requirements, ex- cluding those that will result from the 204 accident, that were not in- cluded in our fiscal year 1967 or fiscal year 1968 budget requests are shown below. The unbudgeted requirements in fiscal year 1968 could reach $150 million if the cost of doing business continues to increase at near 8 percent per year and if it is decided that we must replace the S-IT structural stage. A more optimistic outlook would place the increase between $75 and $100 million. Known or potential increased funding requirements [Dollars in millions] Total Fiscal year Fiscal year 1987 1968 Total $291.0 $141.8 $149.2 16.5 - 2.5 14.0 - 14.0 2.5 2.5 14.0 33.6 5.6 5.0 .6 28.0 33.0 .6 28.0 5.0 1.2 12.0 5.0 1.2 12.0 7.7 .5 7.2 1.7 6.0 .5 1.2 6.0 S-IVB explosion Stage replacement Stand repair S-Il stage losses Structural stage replacement Stand repair Service module 017 tank rapture LC 39 LOX line failure. Increased Eastern test range reimbursements Civil service pay raises Engineers and scientists General civil service raise Potential increase in contractor wages and other costs of doing business 215.0 1150 100.0 PAGENO="0557" ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD; REPLIES SUBMITTED BY DR. GEORGE E. MUELLER, ASSOCI- ATE ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, NASA APOLLO PROGRAM Question 1. What are the major launch schedule c1ia~nges since 1961 in the Apollo program for Saturn I and Saturn VY (Without cio~n- sideration of current rescheduling for the Apollo 204 accident.) Answer 1. The first firm Manned Space Flight schedule was estab- lished in November 1962, based on the Lunar orbital rendezvous deci- sion of July 1962. The first major rescheduling action occurred in the fall of 1963, when both uprated Saturn I and Saturn V launches were delayed approximately 6 months to accommodate the "all up" concept, to com- pensate for elimination of six Saturn I flights, and in consideration of existing funding constraints. The second major rescheduling action took place in January 1965 after a prolonged assessment of program milestones. Early develop- ment flights were slipped due to the impact of ground test problems and the operational flight program was stretched out because of fund- ing considerations. Question 2. What rescheduling has been made for either Satwi~m I or Saturn V unmanned flights based on the Apollo 204 accident? Answer 2. To date no rescheduling of the only planned Saturn I unmanned flight (LM-1) has been made due to the AS-204 accident. However, a review of LM systems is being conducted based on the AS- 204 accident and this review may result in the rescheduling of LM-i launch. Areas that will be reviewed are materials, environmental con- trol system wiring, minor schedule adjustments to the two unmanned Saturn V launches et cetera. We are now examining the need to make (AS-501 and 502) to flight test proposed modifications in the space- craft. Question 3. What is the net effect of the $60 million deferral of funds on fiscal year 1967-68 program plans? Answer 3. Of the $60 million which was withheld from NASA by the President last year, only about $8.8 million was allocated from the Apollo program. This is being absorbed in the ALSEP program. The net effect of this deferral of funds is to reduce our carry-forward funding at the enc~ of fiscal year 1967. Question 4. What effect on fund requirements has been determined to date, on rescheduling unmanned Saturn I and Saturn V flights? When do most wrtcreases based on rescheduling because of the Apollo 204 accident began to affect the total program? Answer 4. The fiscal year 1967 and fiscal year 1968 resource plan- ning will be analyzed to determine the full impact of the accident on 553 PAGENO="0558" 554 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION both the Apollo unmanned and manned flights This analysis will be completed subsequent to the final report of the AS-204 Accident Review Board Question ô What is the estimated co$f of investiqatson of the Apollo 9204 accident in dollars and man hours ~ Answer 5. There are about 1,500 people now engaged in one aspect or another of investigating the accident who will have worked about 2 months, 3,000 man-months, or 250 man-years. At $17,000 per man- year, the cost is estimated to be `thout $4 million (Better estimates will be av'ulable when the Board has completed its report) Question 6 Does NASA expect to alter its manufacturing tech niques in fabricating the tank walls of the S-Il stage ~ If so, when ~ Answer 6 We do not anticipate any further changes in the manu facturing techniques for the S-IT stage tank ~ ails As a result of the liquid hydrogen tank cracking that was experienced in mid 1966, a number of small changes were made in the manufacturing of the tank wall panels, and in the handling and assembly procedures of these panels to form the actual tank. These changes included such items as welding techniques, tooling, and handling fixtures and han dhng procedures Since the implementation of these improved and refined fabricating methods the L112 tank cracking problem is now considered to be undei control The manufacture and assembly of the S-TI stage has presented new development problems. These problems have been due mainly to the very large structural components involved as well as the use of the 2014 aluminum alloy material for the pressurized portion of the stage. Although this material was successfully used for the S-TV and S-IVB stages, it had never before been used in the large size sections required for the S-TI. The use of the 2014 material was dic- tated in order to achieve the optimum thrust to weight ratio required for the entire Saturn V launch vehicle Regarding the tank wall insulation, we are evaluating a spray on foam to replace the present bonded honeycomb material If tests presently underw'ty are successful, this foam material will be applied to the liquid hydrogen tank walls of S-II-8 in late 1967 This stage should be delivered to KSC in August 1968 Question 7 What are the most feasible current alternatives to the life support systeni currently designed for the Apollo Conimand Module? Answer 7 The Environmental Control System is being reexamined with emphasis on materi'ils failure modes, choice of fluids and mainte nance and servicing Particular attention is being devoted to improving fire resistance by careful selection of materials used and the types of plumbing con nections with the aim of minimizing the potential of leakage or joint failure as well as improving the maintenance and servicing of the system Tradeoff studies are being conducted to determine the feasibility of eliminating the present coolant fluid from the crew compartment PAGENO="0559" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 555 A second approach is replacement of the glycol in the cabin by water while leaving the mixture of water and glycol in the service module. A third approach involves the examination of the flammability characteristics of other mixtures of water and glycol. Finally, the design of the environmental control system is being reviewed with a view to improving its maintainability and service- ability. With regard to spacecraft atmosphere we are continuing tradeoff studies on spacecraft atmosphere for each operational phase of the Apollo program. These studies include one versus two gas tradeoffs, evaluation of the prelaunch atmosphere and a fire resistant oxygen system. Question 8. What have been the major contributions of the Apollo engine development program in the past 4 7/ears? Answer 8: F-i Engine: 1. Successfully developed the largest thrust engine fired to date in the free world (i,522,000 pounds thrust) enabling United States to launch significant payloads. 2. Completed flight rating test qualifying the engine for flight test. 3. Completed tests qualifying the engine for manned flight and continued intensive reliability analysis and test. 4. Successfully solved the high frequency combustion oscil- lation problem which has long-range benefits for other pro- grams as well as the Apollo program; 5. Successfully completed three S-IC acceptance sta~e fir- ings where all five engines are fired for ~he full duration of 150 seconds. 6. Advanced state of the art: (a) achievement of combus- tion stability of a large rocket engine, and (b) development of the turbopump machinery to pump the large volume of lox and RP-1 required. J-2 Engine: 1. Successfully completed flight rating tests qualifying the engine for flight. 2. Successfully completed tests qualifying the engine for manned flight and continued reliability testing. 3. Successfully flight tested this engine. 4. Solved the problem of testing at sea level, conditions that exist at altitude. 5. Solved the fuel pump stall problem by prechilling the pump and chamber and to limit the temperature conditions of each under which a start will be effected. This will have long-range benefits for other programs. 6. Largest hydrogen fueled engine in the free world with long-range benefits for future programs due to high perform- ance demonstrated during static and flight tests. 7. Exceeded specific impulse and thrust to allow greater payload (2,200 pounds in Saturn TB, 4,700 pounds in Saturn V). PAGENO="0560" 556 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 8. Demonstrated restart capability on AS-203. H-i Engine: i. Uprated from i88,000 to 200,000 to 205,000 pounds thrust. 2. Developed a method of furnace brazing critical parts, a much better and more economical system of production. 3. Improved turbopump and injector performance (spe- cific impulse increased from 255 to 263 seconds). 4. Successfully completed Saturn I flight program and demonstrated one engine out capability. 5. Successfully completed three uprated Saturn I flights. 6. Successfully completed man rating of the H-i engine at 205,000 pounds thrust level. RL iO-A3: i. This engine was the first turbopumped hydrogen-oxy- gen engine to be developed. 2. Successfully completed flight rating tests qualifying for flight. 3. Successfully completed six Saturn, I flights and demon- strated the first flight use of a hydrogen-fueled rocket stage. 4. Successfully powered Centaur flights, including engine restart in space. Question 9. What work will be accomplished within the engine de- velopment program in fiscal year 1968? Has part of the costs of this effort been transferred to other parts of the budget? If so, where and how much? Answer 9. Engine development project funding for fiscal year i968 provides propellants and test support to continue performance and reliability verification, J-2 engine restart capability assurance and related efforts. All effort by the prime contractor after engine quali- fication is carried in the appropriate launch vehicle account (Saturn lB for H-i and Saturn V for J-2 and F-i). H-i funding for sup- porting activities involved $4.i million for fiscal year i967. Saturn V funding for fiscal year i967 includes $38.9 million for supporting work. In fiscal year i968, funding for engines within the vehicle projects covers production and test of engines plus supporting activities such as the following: i. Flight support of the launch program. 2. Improved engine reliability. 3. Flight worthiness verification. This is a series of tests to verify that the engine reliability has in no way deteriorated as a result of shipping and handling, environmental conditions, and elapsed time from manufacture to flight. 4. Investigation and reduction in material rejection costs. 5. Continue elimination of possible failure modes to increase reliability. 6. Effective cost savings in refurbishment programs. Question 10. What is the composition of the Advanced Missions program, by study area, and cost, for fiscal year 1968? How does this differ from fiscal year 1967? Answer 10. Requested fiscal year i968 funding for Advanced Mis- sions, by study area, and comparable data for fiscal year 1967 is shown below: PAGENO="0561" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 557 [Dollars in thousands] Study area Fiscal year 1967 Fiscal year 1968 Earth orbital Lunar Planetary Launch vehicles and general program Total $3, 100 45(~ 1, 500 1,150 6,200 $3, 800 1,400 1,200 1,600 8,000 Question 11. What has contributed most significantly to delay in delivery of the lunar module? When will this delay adversely affect the flight schedules? To what extent have program costs been in- creased by the delayed deliveries? Answer 11. Schedule delays which began in early manufacturing have continued through subsystem installations and integrated check- out. We experienced some development problems in such systems as the ascent engine, descent engine, abort guidance and rendezvous radar. Tooling, manufacturing problems, and late delivery of sub- system hardware by vendors have had their effect. No single factor can be pointed to as a predominant contributor to the delay, but rather it has been a combination of factors which are normal to first of a kind flight hardware at this stage of development. It is possible that we will experience some impact in our lunar Iflodule development program as a result of the AS-204 accident. We have deferred detailed consideration of the lunar module until a basic understanding of the AS-204 accident could be developed. We will reevaluate the lunar module cost and schedule in the context of changes required in the command module and expect to complete this review in the next 6 weeks. Question 12. Since only block II command modules will be used for manned flight, what is the disposition of block I commend mod- ules? How does this affect program schedule and costs? Answer 12. The program plan provided for six block I command module flight articles. Two unmanned command modules (009 and 011) were flown as AS-201 and AS-202, respectively. An additional two unmanned command modules (017 and 020) are programed for flight on AS-501 and AS-502, respectively. Command module 012 was destroyed in the AS-204 accident at KSC. Command module 014 was shipped to KSC to support the AS-204 Accident Review Board and was disassembled. Since the block II configuration spacecraft will be used for manned Apollo flights, the disposition of block I command modules will not directly affect the program schedule or costs. The flight schedule will depend on the availability of the block II spacecraft. Question 13. What are the cost and manpower requirements in A pollo quality assurance and reliability in the fiscal year 1968 budget plan? How does this compare with fiscal year 1967? Has the Apollo 204 accident caused a shift of emphasis or modified operations of the Apollo quality assurance and reliability program? Answer 13. Quality assurance and reliability has been an active and integral part of the Apollo program. Throughout the Manned Space 7G-2~5 O-67---~pt. 2-~36 PAGENO="0562" 558 1 9 6 8 NASA AUTHORIZATION Flight org~tnization `i prirn'trv function perfoimed is the management of contrictoi efFoit [Tnder this criterion `~pproxim'~te1y 15,000 mtn years of government and center support contractor effort are involved in quality assurance and reliability related activities. For example, the review of program changes by the various levels as outlined in the Apollo management presentation to the committee involves quality ~ssurtnce `tnd reiribility `ictivity Other examples are to be found in the w orkirig groups `md test progr'tms conducted `tt the centers In fisc'tI yen 1967 effort of Apollo personnel specific'illy classified `is qu'ihty assut `ince `ind reli'tbility is divided between Government pei sonnel, who `ire performing 2,200 man years, `ind contr'ictor personnel who are performing 8,200 man ye'trs The fisc'il ye'ir 1968 budget plan, which was formulated before the AS-204 `iccident, provided foi `ilevel of effort corresponding to the pl'inned decline in overill engineering, minufictu ing, and test effort We are now in the process of conducting a thorough review of our current R & Q A progrim The results `ire expected to be available in April 1967 Question 14 What effect will recent loss of a S-IVB stage have on the flight vehicle deliven,~' schedule ~ Answer 14 Actions `ire underway with Douglas Aircraft Co to ieallocate existing flight stages S-IVB-503 will be replaced by S-IVB-504 for launch vehicle AS-503. Subsequently each flight stage will be `idv'tnced to replice the preceding stage Question 14(a) Will it affect the unmanned Apollo flight wliedule ~ Answer 14 (`i) No S-IVB pl'tnned deliveries ~ ere `ihead of sched ule at the time of the loss S-IVB deliveries will support KSC need dates. Question 14(b) At what point in time would it affect the manned 4pollo flight schedule when it is resumed~ Answer 14(b) We expect S-IVB deliveries will support the manned flight Apollo schedule Question 15 To what extent is NASA hardware avd technology avadable and utilized bmj the Department of Defense space effort ~ Answer 15 Much NASA hardware `md technology have already been made avail'ible to the Department of Defense with respect to the Gemini program (question 17) In addition, elements of the U S Air Force `ire working for, or closely with, the NASA organization in prosecuting the Apollo program at both heidquarters and our field centers For inst'ince, a lirge number of Air Force officers are em ployed in the Mission Control Center, Houston, contributing, as well `is gaining, experience in the operating area We have carried, and plan to c'irry, DOD experiments on NASA space flights It is NASA's policy that all technology gained is available to any one requiring it The policies i egardrng hardware which governed disposition of Gemini equipment will prevail in the Apollo program `is well Question 16(a) Is experimental space available in the Apollo pi ogram~ Answer 16 (i) Yes P'mylo'td sp'mce has been made `ivulable and is being used in `ill uprated Saturn I Apollo Earth orbital flights These consist of medicil, scientific, and technological experiments Addi tional space can be made `ivailable on certain flights However, the PAGENO="0563" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 559 feasibility of flying experiments on Apollo operational flights depends on other factors such as weight, crew participation, and propellant usage. Proposed additional experiments will be judged against the operational constraints. The experiment complement for Apollo lunar missions consists of the Apollo lunar surface experiments package and the lunar geologic experiment tools and equipment. Other in-flight experiments could be carried but none have been recommended or approved. If recom- mended they would again be judged against operational constraints. Question 16(b). To what extent is experimental space utilized when available b~ the Department o/Defense? Answer 16(b). There are three DOD experiments currently as- signed to Apollo program earth orbital flights. These are: (1) P008 radiation in spacecraft (AS-207); (2) P009 simple navigation (AS- 207); (3) D017 carbon dioxide reduction (AS-209). It should be noted that the flight designations are the current flight mission assign- ments. They are now being reevaluated. Additional DOD experi- ments in support of DOD's Manned Orbital Laboratory (MOL) are being included by the Apollo Applications program in the S-IVB workshop missions. Question 17. What has been the disposition of equipment available from the Gemini program? To what extent has this equipment been made available to the Department of Defense? Answer 17. Gemini hardware is finding its way into many programs and activities. One of these is the Air Force Manned Orbiting Labo- ratory which is making use of significant amounts of both flight and ground equipment. As an example, certain of the crew trainers and simulators with modifications were applicable as part task trainers to the Manned Orbiting Laboratory program of the Air Force and have been transferred to them. Two Gemini spacecraft have been transferred to the Air Force and a third will be transferred soon. One of these has since been flown by the Air Force in a test in which a crew access hatch had been installed in the heat shield. This access hatch is utilized as part of the Manned Orbiting Laboratory to and from the spacecraft. The Gemini fuel cells have found application in the NASA biosatellite program and have also been transferred to the Navy's Marine Engineering Labo- ratory for their experimental use. The Federal Aviation Agency is putting flight computers to such diverse usage as components of a collision avoidance experiment. The Apollo and Apollo Applications program will use significant amounts of Gemini equipment in direct support of their activities. Finally, the Gemini spacecraft are being exhibited both here and abroad and will be displayed at the Canadian International Exposi- tion in 1967. The specific disposition of Gemini spacecraft is as follows: Gemini 1: Not recovered. Gemini 2: MOL program. Gemini 3: MOL program. `Gemini 3A: MOL program. Gemini 4: Smithsonian Institution. Gemini 5: On display at MSC. Gemini 6: In storage at St. Louis. Gemini 7: Expo-67. PAGENO="0564" 560 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Gemini 8: In storage at St. Louis. Gemini 9: In storage at MSC. Gemini 10: In Australia on tour. Gemini 11: In storage at St. Louis. Gemini 12: In storage at St. Louis. Question 18(a). To what extent will other Government agencies furnish experim1ental payloads for Apolloi~ Answer 18(a). In addition to Department of Defense experiments mentioned above, Dr. Eugene Shoemaker of the U.S. Geologic Survey is the principal investigator for the lunar geologic experiment. Ex- cept for limited photographic analysis by the Department o.f Interior no other agency is involved in Apollo in-flight experiments at this time. Many agencies including Commerce, Interior, and Agriculture are expected to participate in the Apollo Applications experiment program. Question 18(b). What mechanisms are available so that promising experiments can be incorporated in Apollo flights by other Govern- ment agencies and private sources.~ Answer 18(b). NASA has periodically issued a general publication titled "Opportunities for Participation in Space Flight Investiga- tions" (NHB-8030.1) in which we outlined the entire scientific experi- ment participation program and procedures for manned as well as unmanned flights. This has been supplemented by the Apollo Experi- ments Guide, dated June 15, 1965. Presentations have been made at many technical society meetings to alert the scientific community to the opportunity for participation. In addition, special notices are issued from time to time to all interested parties when relatively short notice events become available for experimental participation. By this means, all Government agencies, universities, and private individ- uals showing interest are notified of the opportunity to propose scientific experiments for Apollo through a NASA program office to the Manned Space Flight Experiments Board. After a feasibility study all submitted scientific experiments are considered by the board and, when selected, are assigned to the appropriate program office for implementation. In the case of experiments requested by private sources they are submitted through the Office of Grants and Research Contracts (recently renamed Office of University Affairs) for distri- bution to the appropriate NASA. program office. Question 19. Based on current planning, what is the flight-by-flight mission assignments for the Saturn I and Saturn V in Apollo (and Apollo Applications)? Answer 19. The basic logic of our flight program incorporates seven major phases for the Apollo/Saturn flight schedule. This plan employs both the uprated Saturn I launch vehicle and the Saturn V. The first Apollo/Saturn I program phase included unmanned launch vehicle and Command-Service Module flights and was com- pleted with the successful AS-202 mission in August 1966. Remain- ing phases include unmanned Lunar Module development, manned Command-Service Module long duration operations, and manned missions involving orbital operation of the Command-Service Module with the Lunar Module. The first Saturn V phase consists of unmanned launch vehicle and spacecraft development flights. The second phase will be manned PAGENO="0565" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 561 lunar mission simulation flights. The Apollo flight program will culminate in the Apollo/Saturn V missions achieving manned lunar landing and return. The five major Apollo milestones are: 1966: First Apollo uprated Saturn I unmanned flight. 1967: First Apollo uprated Saturn I manned flight. 1967: First Apollo Saturn V unmanned flight. 1968: First Apollo Saturn V manned flight. 1969: Apollo Operations. The exact number of flights in each phase depends on the degree of success achieved on each mission. Question 20. What has been the disposition of the $41.9 million provided in fiscal year 1967 for long-leadtime procurement for the Apollo Applications program? Have other funds been used to sup- plement this effort in fiscal year 1967? If so, what was the use of these funds? Answer 20. The disposition of the $41.9 million provided in fiscal year 1967 is as follows: Long-lead procurement of follow-on Uprated Saturn I $24.0 Design and development of spacecraft systems modifications 14.6 Experiment definition 3.3 Total 41.9 No other funds have been used to supplement this effort in fiscal year 1967. The development of experiments for AAP is covered by other line items. Question 21. Early flights in the Apollo Applications program. are based on a success schedule in the Apollo program1. What are the schedule alternatives available in Apollo Applications flights and what are the cost effects of these' alternatives? Answer 21. Many problems that might arise in the Apollo program would not impact AAP. For example, a problem associated with the Saturn V/Apollo flights may not impact Saturn I/Apollo hard- ware used by AAP for early missions. As a matter of fact, the AAP planning and scheduling is `consistent with and would not be changed by moderate difficulties or moderate success in the basic Apollo program. In the event that Apollo hardware is not available for AAP usage, the AAP payloads for the early missions will be stored for later usage on follow-on missions. The alternative schedules for ,AAP will be determined after analysis of the situation at that time. The storage and maintenance of the AAP hardware will involve increased cost. However, the AAP payloads will be available for modifications and improvements while in storage, thus permitting the experiments in the payload package to be kept abreast of the state of the art. Thus the experiments will be maintained in a configuration to obtain the* quality and quantity of data consistent with the latest scientific and engineering techniques. Question 22. What effect does the availability of tracking ships and aircraft have on the Apollo and early Apollo Applications programs? Answer 22. The availability of tracking ships and aircraft is ade- quate to support the current Apollo and Apollo Applications schedule. PAGENO="0566" APOLLO APPLICATIONS (Set No. 1) Q uest2on 1. Because the delay in the Apollo program! will cause, un- doubtedly, a similar delay in the first flight of the Apollo Applica- tions program, why does NASA still need, in fiscal year 1968, all of the funds it has requested for hardware modifications, experiments, and mission support in the Apollo Applications program? Answer 1. A delay in the Apollo program will not necessarily impact the AAP program which has been deliberately structured so as to be able to absorb some possible Apollo problems. The Apollo program has not yet determined the extent to which their delay will affect the 1968 Earth orbit flights. It is likely that several AAP flights will be possible in calendar year 1968. Fiscal year 1968 funds are needed for AAP experiments, hardware modifications, and mission support to be available for calendar year 1968 flights that are not required for Apollo lunar mission simulations. As was pointed out in the answer to question No. 21 (Apollo pro- gram), certain problems may arise in the Apollo program that might not necessarily affect AAP. For example, a problem associated with the Saturn V/Apollo flights may not impact Saturn I/Apollo hard- ware used by AAP for early missions. Question 2. In fiscal year 1968 how much money is programed for actual spacecraft and launch vehicle modification of equipment still in the mainstream Apollo program as opposed to design and develop- ment efforts relating to "how to modify" such hardware? Answer 2. The fiscal year 1968 funds programed for modification of equipment still in the Apollo mainstream are associated with space- craft only and are as follows: CSM: $1,900,000. LM: $5,700,000. The CSM modifications are related to t.he orbital workshop mission and the LM modifications are related to the Apollo telescope mount mission. No modifications are planned for the mainstream Apollo launch vehicles. The definition efforts relating to "how to modify" such hardware are included in the fiscal year 1966 and fiscal year 1967 study activities. Question 3. 7'he PSA C report on "the Space Program in the Post- A polio Period" recommends (p. 25) tha.t the orbital workshop should proceed because of the opportunity for 28 to 56 day flights in 1968. In view of the Apollo fire, does NASA still expect an AAP flight in 1968? (a) If a flight does not occur in 1968, should NASA still pro- ceed with the orbital workshop? 562 PAGENO="0567" 1968 NASL~ AUTHORIZATION 563 Answer 3. Yes. NASA has a reasonable expectation that it will be able to release uprated Saturn I launch vehicles and spacecraft for AAP Earth orbit flights in 1968. (a) The orbital workshop is an important step in developing the capabilities for long duration space flight; it should be prose- cuted even if delayed somewhat. Question 4. The PSAC report infers that NASA shouM use the Titan 111/MOE for flights up to 60 days' duration and develop a more permanent ground-built space station for longer flights. Please com- ment on this proposal discussing also what studies NASA has made concerning use of the Titan 111/MOE and the relative launch vehiele and development costs involved.~ Answer 4. During the past year NASA has considered carefully whether the Titan hIM launch vehicle or the Titan IIIM-MOL system should be used in the post-Apollo nonmilitary manned space flight program in lieu of the uprated Saturn I-Apollo system. The key questions have been: 1. Possible use of the Titan hIM instead of the uprated Saturn I to launch the Apollo system. (a) Would it be technically feasible? (b) Would it he less expensive? (c) What would be its advantages and disadvantages? 2. Possible use of the Titan IIIM-MOL system in place of the uprated Saturn I-Apollo system: (a) Could essentially the same objectives be accomplished? (b) Would it be less expensive? (c) What would be the advantages and disadvantages? Several specific possible programs and alternatives were studied in some depth by NASA, with the collaboration of the Department of Defense in providing data and cost estimates with respect to the Titan hIM and MOL systems. Ground rules for performance and cost comparisons were worked out jointly by NASA and DOD. In the studies, NASA used without modification or independent valida- tion the technical data and cost estimates on the Titan hIM and the MOL systems provided.by DOD. These studies have led to the following main conclusions with respect to the questions listed above: 1. With respect to the possible use of the Titan hIM instead of the uprated Saturn I to launch the Apollo system: (a) The use of the Titan hIM to launch the Apollo sys- tem appears to be technically feasible, but its feasibility would have to be confirmed by further ground and flie~ht testing. Use of the seven-segment Titan hIM from ETR would provide capabilities approaching but not equal to those of the uprated Saturn I-Apollo system. The low orbit pay- load performance penalty would be about 10 percent per launch. At least 31/2 years would be required for systems integration, facility modifications at ETR, and flight qualifi- cation of the Titan hIM-Apollo configuration. (b) Funding requirements for the first several years for programs using the Titan hIM would be substantially higher than for corresponding alternative programs using the Saturn TB-Apollo system because of the nonrecurring PAGENO="0568" 564 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION costs of about $250 million for systems integration, facility modifications at ETR, additional checkout equipment, con- trol center modifications, and two unmanned launches to qualify the new Titan hIM-Apollo system. The Titan hIM-Apollo system would have lower recurring costs than the uprated Saturn I-Apollo system by about $15 million per launch, and after about 11 launches the savings would amor- tize the initial nonrecurring costs. Compared to a corre- sponding program using the uprated Saturn I-Apollo sys- tem, and assuming four launches per year in both cases, it is estimated that the crossover point at which a lower total program cost would result from introduction and use of the I itan hIM-Apollo system would not occur until ~T years after a decision to proceed with it. (o) tTse of the Titan hIM-Apollo system would have several disadvantages as compared to the uprated Saturn I- Apollo system. These include: (1) the payload penalty of about 10 percent; (2) the problems of integrating the Apollo system with Titan hIM; (3) the program discontinuities involved in shifting to the Titan hIM-Apollo after 12 up- rated Saturn I-Apollo launches; (4) the delay of about 2 years in the time at which a post-Apollo nonmilitary low earth orbital manner program could get underway; and (5) the fact that the Titan hIM cannot be used to place S-IVB stages in orbit for use and reuse with the airlock in the approach to the development of long duration flight capa- bilities which now appears to have significant advantages. The only advantage in using the Titan hIM to launch the Apollo system appears to be the lower ultimate total program cost if the total number of launches is large enough so that the potential long-term savings can be realized. In view of the experimental nature of the nonmilitary post-Apollo Manned Space Flight program now under consideration, and the possibility of a decision sometime in the next several years that a new system should be developed to meet the require- ments as seen at that time, it does not appear prudent to make a decision at this time based on the assumption of high-vol- ume or long-term use of either the Saturn TB-Apollo or Titan hIM-Apollo system. 2. With respect to the use of the Titan IIIM-MOL system in place of the uprated Saturn I-Apollo system: (a) An unmodified Titan IIIM-MOL system could meet some NASA post-Apollo objectives but would not be capable of achieving the longer duration flight and related experi- ment objectives which are a primary post-Apollo goal. An extensively modified Titan IIIM-MOL system suggested by the DOD (designated the uprated MOL system) might ac- complish some of the long-duration flight objectives now en- visaged, and this configuration has been used for comparison with the uprated Saturn I-Apollo system. Development of the uprated MOL system is estimated to require almost 4 years from the time a decision is made. With a vigorous PAGENO="0569" 1968 NASA AUTHOBIZAPION 565 program entailing a launch rate of six per year, a milestone of 1 year in orbit might be achieved about 1 year later than with continued use of the uprated Saturn I-Apollo system. DOD has no plans at this time to proceed with such a develop- ment for DOD purposes. (b) The uprated MOL system would necessitate DOD and NASA nonrecurring costs for development and facilities modifications estimated at about $480 million. Recurring costs would be higher for each 1-year mission than with the uprated Saturn I-Apollo system since a larger number of launches (six versus four) would be required. Achievement of the same number of man-days in orbit would require an even greater number of launches with the Titan IIIM-MOL system. (c) Use of the uprated MOL system in lieu of the uprated Saturn I-Apollo system has several disadvantages, including: (1) the two-man-per-launch limitation on ferrying operations as compared to three with the possible increase to six men per launch with the Apollo; the 2-to-3-year delay and hiatus in low Earth orbital application of the technology being proven in the Apollo program; and (3) the lack of direct compati- bility with Saturn V-launched systems which means that (a) the advantages of common use of S-IVB stages, includ- ing the spent stake "workshop," would be lost, and (b) there would be no economical capability to test in low earth orbit the same systems to be used with the Saturn V in high and synchronous orbits or out to the Moon or beyond. Use of the uprated MOL system would have the advantages of (1) compatibility with the DOD Titan IIIM-MOL sys- tem, and (2) a capability for polar orbit from WTR launch facilities being built for the basic MOL. In view of the above, it has been concluded in summary that: 1. A decision at this time to discontinue use of the uprated Saturn I-Apollo system and to introduce in its place either the Titan hIM launch vehicle or the Titan IIIM-uprated MOb sys- tem for use in the nonmilitary post-Apollo Manned Space Flight program would not be technically desirable or clearly cost ef- fective. 2. Use of the uprated Saturn I-Apollo system will take advan- tage of and maintain continuity with the Apollo program and avoid the prospect of a hiatus which might jeopardize the U.S. position in space. 3. Assuming success in the experimental program now planned, a capability for long-duration flight of 1 year or more could be available sooner and at less cost by proceeding in fiscal year 1968 and subsequent years with the uprated Saturn I-Apollo system. 4. If the experiments to be undertaken by NASA with the up- rated Saturn I-Apollo system and by DOD with the MOL system indicate a requirement for a nonmilitary program involving a large number of missions within the capabilities of the MOL sys- tem, the use of the Titan IIIM-MOL or a modification thereof should receive careful consideration. PAGENO="0570" /~\ffG~\ ij~ ~1P[~ Ii/~Y~ft. P/,~(~ ~ (~uy~r~ ~ i~\S~ f~Vi'~IE; ~ 1i~? -~ ~ t~a~:~s i~/\i~ ~ .~ ~ i1~1A~ /\\V~ !~1~' Question 6. What is the estimated total cost of the solar telescope. and how much is being funded in fiscal year 1968~~* Answer 6. The total cost of the ATM experiments package is esti- mated at $19.5 million. Of this amount, $7 million is planned for fiscal year 1968. The ATM experiments package contains five experi- ments. Two of the five experiments are specifically for telescopes with a total of $7.9 million, of which $2.7 million is planned for fiscal year 1968. * It is assumed that solar telescope refers to the Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) experi- ments package. 566 1968 NASA AUTHOEIZATION Question 5. If the solar telescope cannot be launched during the height of the solar activity in the 1968-69 time period, would it still be worthwhile to launch the solar telescope after that periody* Answer 5 The forthcoming period of maximum solar activity is expected to range from 1968 through 1970. This period is probably the most interesting period of the 11-year solar cycle, however, there is still much to be learned about the Sun's behavior during the re maining portion of the cycle Scientific returns from the ATM ex periments package mission (ML67-5558) during the 1970 portion of sol'tr maximum, and on into the period of degrading activity would be extremely beneficial to the scientific community 2 PAGENO="0571" 1968 NASA ATJPHORIZATION 567 Question 7. How many solar telescopes does NASA plan to build, and has a contractor been selected?* Answer 7. The ATM experiments package carries five scientific experiments containing nine separate telescopes. The total cost of the five ATM experiments is estimated at $19.5 million. Of this amount, $7 million is planned for fiscal 1968. Two of the five experi- ments are specifically for telescopes with a total of $7.9 million, of which $2.7 million is planned for fiscal year 1968. The principal in- vestigators are contractually responsible for the development of their instruments. In some instances, they subcontract major portions or all of the instrument development and fabrication to an industrial organization. In the case of the ATM experiments package, three of the investigators (Harvard College Observatory, High Altitude Observatory, and the Naval Research Laboratory) have given major portions of their instrument development effort to the Ball Brothers Corp.; one investigator (American Science and Engineering) is doing their own development work in-house; and one (GSFO) is Iiavmg their instrument developed by MSFC. These solar telescopes com- plement those instruments which have been flown and planned for flights on balloons, rockets, and the orbiting solar observatories. Question 8. In `view of the comments concerning ATM in the PSAC report, what efforts are going on within NASA to develop an "op- timised" space astronomy program? Answer 8. Initial steps are being taken by NASA to develop an optimized space astronomy program. Studies have been made in this regard and others are currently in process. NASA is working with the National Academy of Sciences and with some of the leading astronomers to develop the best approach to a space-borne astro- nomical observatory. 0 Included in such an observatory could be a large astronomical tele- scope and a number of smaller ones including solar, planetary, X-ray and radio types. It might be automated with remote operation by astronomers on the ground. It is expected that it would be man- tended in that man would maintain it, focus and repair instruments, replace parts as required and change and return film. The ATM and OAO are current development steps being conducted in parallel, leading toward this objective. In gathering data regard- ing solar phenomena the ATM incorporates man into the data gather- ing loop and also provides for the use of photographic film for obtain- ing high resolution data at a high data rate. The OAO, being an automated spacecraft carrying instrumentation to study stellar as- tronomy, provides experience in long-term operation of astronomical scientific instrumentation in a space environment. The combination of these two programs provides the logical development knOw-how to obtain the currently viewed optimum astronomy program. Question 9. When does NASA plan to use operationally the lunar mapping and survey system? Answer 9. NASA plans two missions in 1968-one an Earth orbital test mission, and the other a lunar contingency mission, if required * It is assumed that solar telescope refers to the Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) experi- ments paekage. PAGENO="0572" 568 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION for operational support of the Apollo program. For AAP lunar orbital missions, contingent on the success of the manned lunar land- ing mission, we will be ready to fly one mission a year beginning in 1969. Question 10. Assuming that the mapping and survey system will not be used until after the manned lunar landing, why does the system have to be funded in fiscal year 1968 and flown on the first Apollo Applications flight? Answer 10. Both Apollo and Apollo Applications lunar surface missions require surveys and mapping of candidate landing sites. Operational requirements may not be fully satisfied by unmanned Surveyors and Lunar Orbiters. The Apollo Applications require- ments may be more rigorous than Apollo because extended duration exploration sites can be at high latitudes or near rugged geological features. A larger area must be studied in detail to suppport large area surface traverses, and safe landing areas must be found in close juxtaposition to interesting, therefore potentially dangerous, surface features. Funding in fiscal year 1968 is needed to provide for au Earth test mission in mid-calendar year 1968 to prepare for subsequent lunar missions in the 1968-71 time frame. Question 11. In Dr. Mueller's prepared statement, the LMSS is re- ferred to as "Apollo-developed." Please explain what you mean by "Apollo-developed," and when was it developed? Answer 11. The LMSS has been under definition since 1964 with feasibility studies started in 1963. The system is funded by Apollo since it is being developed to meet Apollo contingency requirements for site certification and landmark location. Apollo Applications re- quirements are also covered, and the capability to meet general scien- tific objectives is now being incorporated. Question li3. Was the LMSS reviewed by the President's Science Advisory Committee in connection with its report, "The Space Pro- gram in the Post-Apollo Period"? Question 1~(a). Do you consider it significant that LMSS is not mentioned in the report? Answer 12. The LMSS was not formally reviewed by PSAC, but several members of PSAC and their staff have been kept informed of its development. Question 13. Will NASA use the lunar mapping and survey system in conjunction with earth resources surveys? If so, have the Depart- ments o/ Interior and Agriculture been consulted regarding the design, development, and use of LMSS? Answer 13. No, there are no present plans to use the LMSS for earth resources survey. The system is designed and configured for lunar missions. The earth test mission in 1968 will be a lunar simu- lation mission. Question 14. Will the L. M. c6 S.S. provide both photographie and infrared coverage? Answer 14. We are planning to use primarily fine grain, panchro- matic emulsions imaging in the 4000-7000 Angstrom range, but infra- red emulsions, sensitive out to approximately 1 micron can also be used. Color emulsions can also be used with the L.M. & S.S. PAGENO="0573" 1968 NASA AUTHOItIZATION 569 Question 15. How many Li!. d~ S.S. will be built and has a con- tractor been selected? What is the estimated total cost of the L.M. c& Answer 15. Five systems are being developed, and contractors have been selected by the DOD, which is NASA's agent for this effort. The estimated total cost of procuring, integrating, operating, and reducing that data from L.M. & S.S. for five missions is approximately $16 million. Question 15(a). What portion of the $454.7 million requested for AAP in fiscal year 1968 is devoted to L.M. ct~ S.S.P Answer 15(a). The LMSS development will require $17.9 million in fiscal year 1968, to be included in the Apollo budget. The AAP request includes approximately $2 million for L.M. & S.S. mods to increase its scientific capability. Question 16. Is the Department of Defense developing or funding any portion of the mapping and survey system? If so, what is its interest in the system? Answer 16. DOD, pursuant to a NASA-DOD agreement, is devel- oping the L.M. & S.S. flight hardware to meet NASA lunar mission requirements, under NASA funds transferred for this purpose. DOD is not funding any portion of the L.M. & S.S. development. PAGENO="0574" APoLLo APPLICATIONS (Set No. 2) Question 1. Of the $51,247,000 budgeted for AAP in fiscal year 1966, how much has been committed and how much has been costed as of February 28, 1967? Answer 1. As of February 28, 1967, the latest date for which data is available $45,147,000 of the $51,247,000 had been committed. Actual obligations were $41,787,000. Question 2. 0/the $80 million budgeted for AAP in fiscal year 1967, how much has been committed and how much has been obli- gated as of February 28,1967? Answer 2 As of February 28, 1967, $44,323,000 of the $80 million had been committed. Obligations totaled $35,382,000. Question 3. The back-up books (p. RD 2-2) refer to the long dura- tion flight capability of AAP as a key requirement for most of the signifleant advances in Manned Space Flight Does this indicate that NASA will wait until it has demonstrated the ability of man to survive in space for at least 1 year before recommending the approval of new space goals such as a manned Mars flyby or landing? Answer 3. Full assurance that the crew would not only survive, but would function effectively throughout the mission, is, of course, a prerequisite to embarking on a manned planetary mission and will require extensive test oper'itions and demonstrations in orbital flight as well as a comprehensive ground test program. A goal such as a manned planetary mission could be established on the basis of con sidered iudgment `tgainst well defined risks, taking into account the state of knowledge at the time, with demonstration and confirmation of key capabilities at their proper time in the development program. In the planned AAP E'trth orbital series, we expect to have results during 1968-70 from flights of progressively longer duration, rang- ing initially from 1 month up to 1 year. These results will provide either increased assurance of the feasibility of manned planetary flight or early indications of problems to be solved NASA is recom mending that the United States go ahead with a vigorous program of long duration manned flight in the Apollo Applications program so that the United States will have the basic data for major decisions beyond the post Apollo space program as early and completely `is possible. Question 4. Will shielding agaiiwt radiation hazards and micro- meteoroid penetration have to be added in orbit to the walls of the S-IVB stage in order to make it safe for astronauts? Answer 4. It is possible that shielding may have to be added to the S-IVB stage to lower the probability of micrometeoroid penetration. rhe probability of penetr'ttion during plinned occupancy is quite low, 570 PAGENO="0575" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 571 and the danger to the astronauts from such a penetration has not been fully evaluated yet because the habitability quarters design is not com- plete. If it is considered advisable to use a micrometeoroid shield, it will be installed prior to launch. Studies based on available data show that the trapped radiation environment at the altitude of the orbital workship mission will not present a radiation hazard to astronauts within the workshop. Solar flares do not significantly raise the damaging radiation level at this altitude. The Command Module, with its inherent radiation shield- ing capability, will function as a radiation "storm shelter" for the orbital workshop crew in event of a massive solar flare. Question 5. What are the relative merits regarding building the orbital workshop in space versus making the necessity modifications to the S-IVB stage on the ground and then launching into spacef Answer 5. Some of the modifications required to make the S-IVB stage habitable cannot be made prior to launch if the stage is to be used also for propulsion. On the other hand, complete assembly of the habitability structures and equipment in orbit would require an inordinate amount of astronaut time. A balance has been established between these extremes. A basic structure will be installed prior to launch that will not interfere with the propulsion characteristics of the stage. Experimental equipment and partitions will be packaged externally for launch and will be brought into the S-IVB hydrogen tank and assembled in orbit. Question 6. Will systeme or subsysteme being developed for the MOE program find application in NASA's AAP program? Answer 6. This question should be answered in terms of mutual benefits of the MOL/AAP programs. The NASA and the DOD now have agreements in operation that provide an interchange of per- sonnel and technical data. The majority of the MOL systems are basically the Apollo and Gemini systems or extensions of those sys- tems to obtain an orbital capability of 30 days. Any developmental improvements of those systems by the MOL program will certainly be evaluated for utilization in the AAP. One area, as an example, is the electrical power system. DOD is sponsoring the improvement of the Apollo fuel cell by incorporating ceria coated/cobalt activated elec- trodes to obtain a longer life. Though the MOL operational char- acteristics will differ, AAP is seriously considering the application of this technology development in the use of the improved fuel cell for AAP missions. In the experiments area, the DOD is sponsoring several experiments for flight in the AAP orbital workshop. This will give the MOL preliminary flight evaluations prior to finalizatior~ in the MOL flights. These experiments deal with in-space maintenance and repair tools; crew activities such as suit donning and sleep station evaluation; ex- pandable airlock technology; and recoverable expandable structures. Question 7. Will a Lunar Module ascent stage be diverted from the Apollo program to provide for mating to the ATM? If so, how long before the launch of the ATM miu~t such a module be diverted? Answer 7. Yes. If the Apollo program goes well. Present plans identify the need for the assignment of an ascent stage which will be delivered approximately 1 year prior to the ATM launch date. LM/ PAGENO="0576" 572 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION ATM design definition to date indicates that the LM ascent stage should be assigned to AAP approximately 9 months prior to launch in order to make the necessary modifications and to conduct tests. Question 8. What is the orbital lifetime for the CSM on AAP-1? Question 8(a). I/for some reason the AAP-~ orbital workshop cannot be launched as expected, can the L.M. ~ 5.5. be left in orbit for later use? Question 8(b). Why isn't the launch of the unmanned orbital work-shop the first mission in the Apollo Applications program since it can remain in orbit and is not dependent upon an immediate 8econd launch? Answer 8. The orbital lifetime of the CSM on AAP Mission 1 at a nominal altitude of 120 miles is governed by the electrical power ca- pabilities of the CSM. Depending upon the exact power profile to be used during the mapping and survey system test, the total lifetime may run from 8 to 12 days. Answer 8(a). The L.M. & S.S. cannot be resumed in its present con- figuration. Answer 8(b). The orbital workshop is established by a series of venting and passivation actions accomplished partly by automatic se- quencing and partly by the crew on the* spent S-IVB stage. These take place during the first few days after launch and while the assem- bled vehicle is under the control of the CSM. For this reason it is important that the CSM be in orbit and ready to rendezvous at the time of the orbital workshop launch. We also plan to have several days of low Earth orbit qualification with the L.M. & S.S. prior to initiation of the orbital workshop mission. Question 9. The established production capability for the Apollo program is six uprated Saturns and six Saturn V's per year. In the Apollo Applications prO gram, it is expected to launch four Saturn lB's and four Saturn V's per year. What effect will this reduction have upon your organixation? Question 9(a). Since such items as facility overhead remain rela- tively constant, what effect will this reduction have on the cost per ve- hicle? Question 9(b). What is the current cost of an uprated Saturn and a SaturnV? Question 9(c). What is the estimated cost per vehicle for those being funded in fiscal year 1968? Answer 9. There will be no substantive effect on the total organiza- tion, only a possible shifting of some personnel away from the hard- ware production area to the experiments area. Answer 9(a). The Apollo schedul:e requires a maximum delivery rate of four uprated Saturn I's and six Saturn V's per year although a production capability of six of each vehicle has been established. The average cost of the initial Saturn V's procured for AAP will increase significantly in the transition to a four a year rate. The affect on up- rated Saturn I unit costs is minimized by the continuation of essen- tially the same production rate as Apollo and the recognition of cost savings introduced in this more mature project. PAGENO="0577" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 573 Answer 9(b). The current recurring production cost for an uprated Saturn I and a Saturn V delivered to Cape Kennedy is $42 million and $163 million respectively. Answer 9(c). The estimated cost per vehicle for those funded in fiscal year 1968 for Apollo Applications is $39 million for the uprated Saturn I and $193 million for the Saturn V. The unit cost is greater for the Saturn V than in Apollo since the follow-on production rate is lower than Apollo. Question 10. How many uprated Saturn I and Saturn V flights does NASA currently envision for the Apollo Applications program? Answer 10. The total scope of the Apollo Applications program is not measured in a specific number of flights but in a planned rate of mission capability over the next several years. The total number of missions in the program will depend upon progress and successful achievement of sequential objectives, upon problems encountered, and upon the resources available. Question ii. Is it expected that follow-on orders for Saturn/Apollo hardware will be fixed price contracts or will NASA continue to use incentive contracts? Question 11(a). What was the nature of Saturn/Apollo hardware contracts awarded with fiscal year 1967 funds? Answer 11. It is expected that NASA will continue initially to use incentive contracts for follow-on orders for Saturn/Apollo hardware in order to continue to motivate the contractors to increase their effi- ciency and reduce costs, while producing the best possible items. It must be noted that as yet many of the Apollo and Saturn engines, stages, and modules have not been flown a sufficient number of times to establish the production configuration. Changes are still antici- pated and drawings and specifications are constantly undergoing re- vision. As experience is gained in the production and performance of these items, and when cost data permits an accurate forecast of costs, full consideration will then be given to firm fixed price (FFP) contracts for later follow-on orders. Answer 11(a). The major AAP hardware contracts presently uti- lizing fiscal year 1967 funds are: (1) S-lB stage.-Contractor, Chrysler Corp.: Cost plus fixed fee (CPFF) type contract for long leadtime materials, compo- nents, and parts, including engineering support, necessary to maintain a follow-on capability at the rate of four uJ?rated Saturn I's per year. The next procurement phase which will specify the fabrication, assembly, and delivery of stages will utilize incentive contracts. (2) S-IVB stage.-Contractor, Douglas Aircraft Corp.: CPFF type contract for long leadtime materials, components, and parts, including engineering support, necessary to maintain a follow-on capability at the rate of four uprated Saturn I's per year. The next procurement phase which will specify the fabrication, as- sembly, and delivery of stages will utilize incentive contracts. (3) H-i engine.-Contractor, North American Aviation, Rocketdyne Division: Fixed price incentive (FPI) type contract for production and delivery of 60 H-i engines. 76-265 O-67---pt. Z---37 PAGENO="0578" 574 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION (4) Apollo telescope mount-pointing control system (ATM- POS.-Contractor, The Bendix Corp., Navigation and Control Division: Cost pius fixed fee contract with option to later convert to cost plus incentive fee (CPIF). For three units plus test support equipment and critical subassemblies. (5) Airlock.-Contractor, McDonnell Co.: Firm fixed price (FFP) type of contract for design, development, fabrication, test, checkout, and delivery of one airlock module for flight. Question 1~2. Discuss the relationship of t/~e Department of the Interior's EROS (Earth Resources Observation Satellite) program to NASA's AAP program. What functions will NASA perform in regard to the EROS program? Answer 12. The Department of the Interior's EROS program is understood to be in the conceptual stage aimed toward the eventual establishment of an operational space system for Earth resources obser- vation. The NASA effort in Earth resources observation is directed toward establishing the feasibility of such observations and developing the most cost effective systems for multiple use applications, in this effort it is expected to carry out both manned md automated experi ments. In the Apollo Applications program, NASA is planning several payloads that will both test the instrumentation for Earth resources observations and define the most effective use of man in such an effort-as an observer, equipment operator, data collector and discriminator, or maintenance and repair engineer. The data from both manned and automated systems will be made available to all potential user agencies to guide their definition of requirements and capabilities for operational systems. Specifically with regard to EROS, NASA. has responded to the Department of the Interior's request to analyze the feasibility of the concept and to provide the necessary R & D. background for such an approach to Earth resources observations. Question 13. How does NASA plan to handle the tremendous amount of photographs and other data that will be obtained in the Apollo Applications program? Will a new data-handling mechanism have to be created or are present facilities, personnel, and systems suf- fici cut? Answer 13. During the high data Gemini 7/6 mission the existing NASA data collection, handling, and reduction facilities were ade- quately employed and provided the major portion of the support. In the determination of facilities, personnel and systems requirements for AAP, consideration is being given to frequency, timelines (how quickly is reduced data needed) and quantity of data It is anticipated that the data rates for AAP will be not too much greater than those currently employed in the unmanned programs which are being ade- quately hindled with present capabilities The Space Science Data Center at GFSC is receiving data at the rate of 100,000 tapes per year; 300,000 tapes have already been stored there. This storage facility will be expanded to accommodate the additional quantity of data generated in AAP. In summary, a large portion of the data-handling mechanism neces- sary to support AAP requirements is in being. In certain areas where PAGENO="0579" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 575 additional facilities, personnel and systems are required, they are being identified and implementation started. The initial AAP experiments will be supported by existing capability. Question 14. If the AAP program uncovered information concern- ing another country that is or may be of military significance, how does NASA propose to handle such information? Answer 14. The scientific results of the NASA flight programs are openly available to all nations, either directly or through the publica- tion of research results. Any Government agency including the De- fense Department has complete access to such data from our flight experiments. The Apollo Applications program experiments now planned and foreseen will produce information of great value to the scientific and engineering community on the role that man can best play in space systems, on solar and stellar astronomy, and on many techniques and approaches for the utilization of space systems for furthering the welfare of this Nation and of mankind. Such informa- tion, while of potential significance to the defense capabilities of the United States, is intended to provide tests of crews and instrumenta- tion in Earth orbit and at the Moon. Question 15. The Department of Defense is using a mixture of oxygen and helz'um in the MOE program whereas NASA indicates that it will use a mixture of oxygen and nitrogen in the AAP program. Would you discuss the reason for the oxygen-nitrogen selection? Question 15(a). Will it be used operationally on the first AAP flight or will NASA rely on a pure oxygen environment? Answer 15. The Apollo Applications program presently plans to use a 5 pound per square inch absolute, two-gas atmosphere of 69-per- cent oxygen, 31-percent nitrogen in the airlock module and S-IVB spent stage workshop for planned mission durations in excess of 30 days. The 5 PSIA pressure level selected for this mission was dictated by present Apollo pressure vessel capability and system compatibility considerations. The primary consideration in utilization of the two-gas system for long-duration missions is a desire to avoid physiological uncertainties and the possibility of atelectasis or collapse of the alveoli of lungs from ready absorption of oxygen and concomitant lack of inert gas. Nitrogen is not metabolized by the tissues of the body and the addi- tion of a small percentage of the gas appears to prevent the clinical effects attributed to the absorption of oxygen. The oxygen-nitrogen atmospheric composition was selected as being physiologically equivalent to the Earth environment in most essential aspects. The orbital workshop concept permits Apollo astronauts to work and perform experiments and enables us to investigate the feasibility of using a launch vehicle spent stage in orbit as a large habitable space structure. It provides an early capability for a large, controlled en- vironment to evaluate human performance in long-term zero gravity. Man's evolution on Earth in an atmosphere consisting primarily of oxygen and nitrogen provides us with a massive amount of baseline data for comparison with biomedical observations to be made in the AAP Workshop. The baseline data on man's behavior in atmospheres PAGENO="0580" 576 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION containing primarily oxygen and helium is significantly less. While there is no question of harmful effects of an oxygen-helium atmos- phere, the interpretation of biomedical data obtained in space with this atmosphere is more complicated. Answer 15(a). A two-stage (oxygen-nitrogen) atmosphere will be used on the first AAP orbital workshop mission. Question 16. If it becomes necessary to repro gram additional funds into the Apollo program as a result of the accident, will the funds be taken from AAPP If so, what part of the AAP program will be cut backY Answer 16. No determination has been made that funds will be re- quired from AAP to cover Apollo costs resulting from the accident until the report of the review board has been received and analyzed. Should AAP funds be required for this purpose later, the decision on which parts of the AAP program to cut would be made at that time on the basis of minimizing impact to work already underway while maintaining the best possible balance for future effort. PAGENO="0581" APolLo APPLICATIONS (Set No. 3) Question 1. According to figures previously presented by NASA, four AOSO satellites would have cost about $167.4 million, or about $42 m,illion each. The PSAC report states (p. 74) concerning ATM "the expected value of scientific return may be no greater than would have been obtained with one of the original 9-month AOSO flights." (a) What information will ATM provide that could not hceve been pro'cided by AOSO? (b) Why was AOSO canceled? (c) At the time of the PSAC review, what was the estimated cost of each ATM, exclusive of launch cost? (d) What is the current estimated cost for ATM? (e) How many ATMs will be built? (f) What is the estimated launch cost per ATM, including the cost of the launch vehicle? (g) If there has been an increase in cost since the PSAC re- view, what was the reason for the increase? (h) Why, in terms of scientific return, is the ATM worth the increased cost over what AOSO would have provided? Answer 1. (a) The scientific objectives of the ATM experiment are not identical to those of the AOSO. The instrumentation was tailored, in each case, to the unique capabilities of the respective missions. The ATM, using film as the basic means of data acquisition, will provide wide bandwidth, high-resolution studies to be made of rapidly fluctuating solar phenomena. As an example, the rise time of solar flares, measured in seconds can be photographed by the ATM. AOSO would have provided long-term studies of the sun, but with a low data rate capability. Launches for both ATM and AOSO were planned during the next period of maximum solar activity because data from both types of space telescopes are essential to understand solar activity and solar flares. (b) The AOSO was canceled because of budgetary considera- tions. In particular, the AOSO imposed heavy constraints upon the fiscal year 1966 and fiscal year 1967 budgets since development funding requirements for the program peaked during this time period. (c) At that time (September 1966), the estimated cost of the first ATM, exclusive of launch, was $36 million. (d) The current estimated cost of the first ATM is $38.4 million. 577 PAGENO="0582" 578 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION (e) The fiscal year 1968 budget request includes funds for con- tinued development of the first ATM and the initiation of development of a second. Both will be configured for solar astronomy missions. A third ATM, for a stellar astronomy mis- sion, is planned, however, no funds are contained in the fiscal year 1968 budget for initiating this development. (f) The estimated launch cost for the first ATM, including the cost of the Uprated Saturn I launch vehicle and Lunar Module, is approximately $130 million. However, this launch will provide other benefits besides the solar obtained with the ATM. The mission will provide data on man and his capabilities in space, on a family of other technological and scientific experi- ments, and on the utility of the ATM concept as well as direct solar data during a scientifically important period. Further- more, the ATM is planned to be reuseable. (9) Estimates have increased by $2 5 million since the PSAC review All of this is in development efforts of the ATM itself and consists of additional work related to the solar cell array and the pointing control system. (h) The ATM and AOSO programs are complementary from a scientific standpoint. The ATM, by using film as its basic means of data acquisition, will return hi-resolution, wide band- width data of rapidly varying phenomena. Launching ATM during the next period of maximum solar activity will increase the probability of. photographing a greater number of solar events, thereby improving its cost effectiveness. AOSO was to have flown during the same time period, but for a longer dura- tion, and would have telemetered data of slowly varying phe- nomena, thus complementing ATM. Question ~2. The PSAC report makes three criticisms of ATM on pages 73 and 74 of the report (items listed as (a), (b), and (c)). Please answer these criticisms if they are valid and explain how the problem has been corrected. If invalid, tell why they are invalid? Please also respond to PSAC's cr?~taczsm1 concerning the workload of the astronauts (p. 74). Answer 2. (a) From an ATM operational viewpoint it makes no difference whether the astronaut is 10 or 100 feet away from the instruments just as long as he is above the obscuring atmosphere and in the same orbital viewing position as the instruments. From an astro- naut safety and comfort point of view, it is far better to have him operate within the cluster. This arrangement not only gives the astronaut more maneuverability and flexibility, but also from a safety consideration keeps him within physical reach of his return vehicle. At the time that the PSAC committee was briefed on the ATM there was concern regarding manned motion or activity within the cluster and the effect this would have upon the accuracy of pointing and stabilizing the instrument platform. A vernier gimbal system has since been added to the ATM con trol system which will eliminate any impact of manned activity or motion upon the instrument pointing accuracy PAGENO="0583" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 579 (b) It should be noted that ground observations and commands and electromechanical acquisition and pointing systems do not provide the most suitable arrangement to acquire solar activities in a timely manner. Accordingly, such interesting solar events as flare buildup patterns (rise time), are not obtained due to the time required for instrument pointing and acquisition by those other means. (c) The concept of repair and maintenance of the scientific instrumentation is being investigated in the development pro- gram. It is considered, however, that this concept can be pursued to only a limited degree without overburdening our capabilities in both extra-vehicular activity (EVA) and instrument com- plexity. *This feature is one of desire but not necessarily re- quired in obtaining success in our early manned observatory missions. (d) Operational time-lines are currently being investigated to determine the best and most feasible operational arrangement for acquiring data and optimumly using the astronauts capabilities. One example of such an arrangement could be the operation of the ATM instrumentation during four orbit shifts, approximately three times a day. Each orbit would consist of approximately 50 minutes; 10 for orientation and 40 for data acquisition. With three astronauts to conduct this effort no undue hardship appears to be imposed. Approximately 300 hours of experiment opera- tion time could be achieved in such a manner. Question 3. Please distinguish between AAP studies and Advanced Mission studies-where is the dividing line? For example, during Dr. Mueller's AAP discussion on March 16, 1967, he referred to one chart which was entitled "Extended Lunar Erploration." The ques- tion is where does extended lunar exploration leave off, and where does advanced lunar mission studies begin? (a) is it fair to say that unlike when everything other than the Apollo program was automatically considered Advanced Missions, today there is no real difference between AAP studies and Advanced Mission studies; and that for all practical purposes, Advanced Missions should be a line item under AAP and refer to all studies and concepts other than those programs which are being actively pursued in the fiscal year for which the funds are requested? Answer 3. The Apollo Applications program (AAP) is distin- guished from Advanced Manned Missions by the approval status of the projects being considered. AAP engineering and planning is limited to that family of missions which utilize modified Apollo sys- tems and which have been approved for detailed planning by the Deputy Administrator. Advanced Manned Missions studies include overall systems engineering, planning and definition of manned mis- sion studies and projects, until these projects are approved for inclu- sion in the NASA program. However, Advanced Manned Missions studies do include consideration of major alternatives or additions to approved projects. PAGENO="0584" 580 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Advanced Lunar Mission studies cover those potential approach to the extension of lunar exploration beyond the capabilities of both Apollo and AAP. In reply to the suggestion that Advanced Mission studies be a line item under AAP, we would not consider that good management. The AAP effort should be directed toward specific missions without divert- ing responsibilities. Advanced Manned Missions efforts provide the base on which to plan and select other future missions, which may involve new systems. Such advanced studies, in the past, provided the definition of the Apollo and the Apollo Applications programs. Studies of space stations, lunar exploration beyond AAP, and plan- etary missions are more appropriately identified and managed as Ad- vanced Manned Missions rather than as a part of AAP. PAGENO="0585" ADVANCED MIssioNs Question 1. 0/the $10 million budgeted for Advanced Missions in fiscal year 1966, how much has been obligated and how nwch has been expended as of March 1, 1967 (or the latest date for which figures are available)? Answer 1. Latest information available from a canvass of NASA Centers shows $8 million of the fiscal year 1966 funds have been obli- gated. The remaining $2 million has been committed on study con- tracts now under negotiation. Of the obligations, `about half has been costed. Question 2. 0/the $6.2 million budgeted for Advanced Missions in fiscal year 1967, how much has been obligated and how much has been expended as of March 1, 1967 (or the latest date for which figures are available)? Answer 2. The consolidated fiscal year, 1966-68 Advanced Mis- sion Study program is a progressive set of phased studies directed to provide the in-depth technical and fiscal data required for major pro- gram decisions. in keeping with the phasing of this study program, fiscal year 1967 funds have not yet been obligated. However, they are earmarked for specific studies which we are proceeding to imple- ment by the end of this year. The fiscal year 1966 program is cur- rently phased for obligation `as a followup to the fiscal year 1967 pro- gram and we are planning full commitment during fiscal year 1968. Question 3. Why was the Advanced Missions budget reduced by NASA in November 1966 $1.8 million below the $8 million authorised by the committee for fiscal ~jear 1967? Would not the same level of funding ($6.2 million) be adequate for fiscal year 1968? Answer 3. The reduction of $1.8 million resulted from the Presi- dent's directive to the Agency to reduce expenditures as part of his anti-inflation measures. A total of $60 million in obligational author- ity was withdrawn from NASA. The Advanced Manned Missions study program investment pro- vides a progressive set of phased studies directed at providing the in- depth technical and fiscal data required for future major program decisions that are anticipated in connection with fiscal year 1969-70 budget submissions. The soundness of the Agency's proposals will de- pend upon the quality, scope and timeliness of the fiscal year 1966-67- 68 study program results. The fiscal year 1968 study program takes cognizance of the $1.8 mil- lion reduction in fiscal year 1967 and, in our judgment at this time, represents the minimum budget necessary for the 1966-67-68 study program to properly support major management decisions. Question 4. What studies have been conducted by NASA relative to using solid strap-on rockets on the up'rated Saturn, and what does NASA foresee as possible missions for such vehicles? 581 PAGENO="0586" 582 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Answer 4. In fiscal year 1964, NASA initiated feasibility studies of improvements to the uprated Saturn I (Saturn-1B) which included consideration of strap-on solid rocket motors (SRM's) for increased performance. The same contractors were funded in fiscal year 1965 for studies of promising configurations in greater depth. These fol- low-on fiscal year 1965 studies were the "Saturn-lB Improvement Studies" with Chrysler (contract NAS 8-20260) and Douglas (con- tract NASA 8-20259). These contractual efforts included considera- tion of Minuteman and 120-inch (five and seven segment) strap-on SRM's. For a 100-nautical-mile circular orbit the resulting strap-on SRM configuration ranged in payload capability from approximately 50,000 pounds with four strap on Minuteman to approximately 110,000 pounds with four strap-on 120-inch SRM's (seven segments). Missions for which the uprated Saturn I (Saturn-1B) with strap- on solid rocket motors might be used include earth orbit'tl manned and unmtnned experiments, orbitil injection of small, short duration space stations, and logistics support of l'Lrge, long duration spice stitions Other possibilities included high energy, unmanned missions, usually with an upper third stage such as Centaur. Question 5 What studies have been conducted by NASA relative to manned weather satellites and what is the outlook for such satellites at this time? Answer 5. Investigations related to meteorology and weather satel- lites conducted in connection with our space station studies have been concerned with manned support of meteorological experiments These studies did not address themselves to the creation of operational weath er satellites in the sense of TIROS, Nimbus, nd so forth, but rather toward manned facilities to conduct experiments and develop opera- tional systems. The studies examined the spectrum of meteorological iesearch objectives, instruments required for experiments in support of these objectives, flight mission requirements, and accommodation of the instruments aboard the conceptual station configurations Question 6 How are the fiscal year 1967 funds budgeted as between the four classes of Advanced Mission studies? Answer 6: Fiscai year 1967 Study area: (tltousand8) Earth Orbital $3, 100 Lunar 450 Planetary 1,500 Launch vehicle and general program 1, 150 Total 6200 PAGENO="0587" CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES GENERAL QUESTIONS Question. The Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight has made five field trips to NASA field centers and contractors in the last 2 months. Based on these trips, it is obvious that the current NASA request does not include many con- struction requirements originally considered necessary by the field centers. It is recognized that budgetary considerations often preclude acceptance of many field requests. However, it would be illuminating to be apprised of such field projects. What was the total reduction by the manned space flight area and by field center, of field requests by NASA headquarters? What were some of the major projects eliminated by NASA headquarters and by any Bureau of the Budget action? Answer. The total reduction in the proposed fiscal year 68 C. of F. program for each Manned Space Flight Center occurred at two levels, first at the OMSF level and then at the NASA headquarters level. The following table summarized these reductions. The figures are in millions. [In millions of dollars] NASA head- quarters sub- mission Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Michoud Assembly Facility Mississippi Test Facility Various locations __________ ___________ Total 82.8 38.3 28.8 The major projects eliminated included such facilities as: Engineering Laboratory Addition - Kennedy Space Center. Engineering Building Manned Spacecraft Center. Spacecraft Recovery Environmental Test Facility Manned Spacecraft Center. Upgrading and Modifications to Test Stand Facility . Mississippi Test Facility. Optical Experiment Facility . Various. The BOB review resulted in the reduction of one OMSF project. This was the Automatic Checkout System Experimental Facility, Manned Spacecraft Center. Question. In the past, NASA officials have e~rpressed concern over the lack of fiea~ibility in the Fiscal Year 1967 budget level and the difficulties built into budget constraints which do not precide a margin of funds to adjust to nnf ore- seen technical problems. How serious has this problem been with regard to NASA construction projects; how is NASA meeting this problem; and what is the outlook for Fiscal Year 1968? Answer. The lack of flexibility in the budget levels for construction has caused NASA to reduce the size of its construction program through the elimination of projects which improve our technical capacity, which Improve our ability to adequately house personnel on our centers as well as the elimination of those projects which improve and rehabilitate our physical plant. NASA has made do with the budget levels provided and anticipates making the same adjust- ments during Fiscal Year 1968. Center Center submission OMSF submission 53.1 .15.1 1.0 1. 1 2.0 10.3 26.7 4.4 .9 2.2 0 4.1 22.6 3.3 .9 2.0 0 0 583 PAGENO="0588" 584 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Que8tiOn~. Last year, the Congress authorized a total of $95,919,000 for con- struction and facility planning and design activities, instead of the $101,500,000 requested by NASA. This amount was further reduced to $83,000,000 by appro- priation action. What was the specific impact of these reductions? What serious delays in flight or test prograims can be attributed to these actions? Answer. Reduction of the NASA authorization request from $101,500,000 to $95,919,000 resulted in deletion of the Marshall Space Flight Center Hazardous Operations Laboratory Addition, and a reduction of $1 million in the author- ized cost of the Manned Spacecraft Center Lunar Receiving Laboratory. Sub- sequent appropriation action reduced the NASA Construction of Facilities total from $95,919,000 to $83.000,000. As a result of this reduction four MSF projects have been deferred. These projects are: Extension to Central Supply, Kennedy Space Center $600, 000 Engineering Building, Manned Spacecraft Center 2,600,000 Facs to Support S-IC & S-Il Test Prog Mississippi Test Facility_ 1, 700, 000 Fac for S-IVB Stage Program, Various Locations 1, 100,000 The deferral of institutional projects such as warehouse and engineering building additions will have a decided impact upon operational effectiveness and costs. This will result from continued overcrowding of personnel, equipment and supplies, and the use of dispersed substandard facilities. The deferral of technical facilities will particularly impact field center ability to react rapidly to the solution of complex problems, and in some cases equipment will be opera:ted above capacity so that overhaul or replacement cycles will be reduced significantly. Question. Based on present missions, including those proposed `In the FY 1968 request, what is the latest NASA estimate to complete all new construction requirements in support of manned space flight activities, and what is the esti- mate of such requirements by field center? What is the current value of the NASA physical plant of the NASA manned space flight centers? Include a break- out of new construction or other 00fF requirements, by Center, specifically needed for Apollo Application activities assuming currently requested programs arc approved. Answer. It is expected that the Apollo Applications Construction of Facilities requirements will be limited `to modifications of exis'ting facilities. These modi- fications are now in the process of definition. Essentially `the funds have been provided for the completion of all major technical facilities required to support current programs approved through FY 1968. Approximately $25 million will be needed on `a yearly basis for the next several years, to meet requirements as yet unidentified for `the rehabilitation, repair, modification and upgrading of technical facilities. In addition requirements for support facilities `such as ware- houses, office space, and shops will continue to `be identified as appropriate to meet `deficiencies which have resulted `from reduced appropriations. The follow- ing is an estimate of distribution: Miflion Kennedy Space Center $15-20 Manned Spacecraft Center 5 Marshall Space Flight Center, including various locations 5 The current value as of June 30, 1966, of the NASA physical plant by MSF centers is as follows: Kennedy Space Center $808,549, 000 Manned Spacecraft Center 294,709,000 Marshall Space Flight Center 376,519, 000 Michoud Assembly Facility 134,450, 000 Mississippi Test Facility 215, 994, 000 Question. Last year, NASA estimated that about $2 million of FY 1967 facility planning and design moneys would be used in support of manned space flight activities. Is this estimate still valid? If not, what factors caused the changes? What portion of the $3 million requested for FY 1968 facility planning and design is to be used in manned space flight areas? An'swer. Current plans call for Manned Space Flight to utilize about $813,000 of Fiscal Year 1967 Facility Planning and Design Funds. Last year~s estimate that about $2.0 million would be required, was based upon a projected FY 1968 C. of F. Program of about $40.0 million, in lieu of the present $27.9 million. In PAGENO="0589" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 585 addition to a smaller program, significant elements of FY 1968 projects, such as Launch Complex 39 contract settlements, do not require design. Consequent- ly, FY 1967 FP&D requirements have been reduced from $2.0 million to the present estimate of $813,000. However, the requirements for planning and design funds by OART and OSSA have increased correspondingly. It is esti- mated that about $1.25 million of the $3 million requested for FY 1968 will be utilized for facility planning and design in support of Manned Space Flight requirements. Question. Have there been any work stoppages or strikes at any of the Manned Space Flight Centers during Fiscal Year 1967 and, if so, where and what dura- tion? What has been the impact, if any, of such labor problems? Answer. Information concerning work stoppages and strikes is maintained by calendar year. During Calendar Year 1966 a total of 36,276 man days were lost due to work stoppages. In 1965, 72,288 man-days of work were lost. This, reflects a significant improvement in the labor relations area. The following tabulation shows location and duration of work stoppages: Lost man-days-Calendar Year 1966 KSC 20,139 MSC 4,283 MSFC 450 MAF 0 MTF 11,053 WSTF 351 Various locations 0 Total 36,276 The improvement of 1966 over 1965 is due primarily to a program of preventive labor relations initiated by NASA. This program provides for detailed anticipa- tory planning on the part of NASA to avoid or work out labor problems before they reach the critical stage. The success of the program may be determined by an analysis of lost man days at the Kennedy Space Center. While this loca- tion had the highest number of lost man days during 1965 and 1966, it is signifi- cant to note that no work stoppages have occurred at this Center since Septem- ber 8, 1966. During Calendar Year 1966 there has been no impact on launch or test schedules resulting from work stoppages. Question. What types of maintenance services arc currently contracted out by the Manned Space Flight Centers? What is the value of such contracts by center for Fiscal Year 1967, and what is the estimate for Fiscal Year 1968? Answer. The following is a listing of the types of maintenance services cur- rently contracted for by the Manned Space Flight Centers: Engineering in Support of Maintenance Activities Maintenance and Repair of Buildings, Structures, and Equipment Maintenance of Roads and Grounds Custodial Services Maintenance of Utility Systems Fire Protection The estimated contractual value for Fiscal Year 1967 and Fiscal Year 1968 is as follows: Center FIscal year 1967 Fiscal year 1968 Kennedy Space Center Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center Michoud Assembly Facility Mississippi Test Facility White Sands Test Facility $13, 908,000 9,484,000 3, 179,000 4, 512,000 4, 100,000 2,304,000 $17, 586,000 10, 125,000 3,300,000 4,213,000 4, 300,000 2,385,000 Question. During last year's hearings NASA estimated that it would spend about $3,147,000 of Administratire Operations funds for minor construction and modification during FY 1966 and about $3.5 million for similar work during FY PAGENO="0590" 586 1 968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1967. What wa~ the final figure for FY 1966, the latest eBtimate for FY 1967 and the current e8tirnate for FY 1968? Answer. During Fiscal Year 1966 Manned Space Flight Centers expended $3,372,600 for minor construction and modifications. During Fiscal Year 1967, current plans call for a reduction to $2,480,000, while Fiscal Year 1968 is expected to be $2,258,200. Question. Have all the NASA manned space flight centers fully developed their master plans and are they being kept currant? What inspections were conducted by NASA Headquarters construction management personnel of the field centers during FY 1967? Answer. The facility master plans for each of the NASA MSF Centers are kept current through a continuous process of reviewing, analyzing, upgrading and updating so that reliable documents are in effect when required. It is NASA policy to have the facility master plans officially updated by September 1 of each year. The timing is such that the updated documents are available at the time of the CofF budget preparation. During FY 1967 construction management personnel periodically visited all MSF Centers and participated in design reviews., reviews of construction progress and adherence to approved, projects, review of project funding requirements and to assure compliance with NASA construction and safety standards Also in cluded was the review of master plans Field trips were made to provide ap- propriate guidance on master planning, and to assure that the plans are being properly implemented. Question Last year there was considerable discussion on the Lunar Receiving Laboratory at the Manned Spacecraft Center. What progress has bean made on this facility and will the original deadline date for its completion be affected by the recent accident at Cape Kennedy? Did the reduction in last year's re- quest by the appropriation action result in any cutback in the construction for this facility; and if so, did such cutbacks reduce the capability of the facillty to perform its function and in what way? Answer. As of March 13, 1967 the overall construction of the Lunar Receiv- ing Laboratory was approximately 65 percent complete and all elements of work are on schedule The following work has been completed foundations sub structhre erection of structural steel precast concrete wall panels and alunu num window walls; roofing; underfloor utilities, and concrete floor slabs; utility tunnel and piping and site utilities The mechanical and electrical systems and interior partitioning are currently being installed. The vacuum systems and radiation counting equipment are in the fabrication phase. The recent accident at Cape Kennedy will not impact the construction com- pletion date of August 1967. However, the deadline date for operational readi- ness will be adjusted based on any. changes. which might be made to the Apollo Program as a result of the accident. As a res~ilt of the $1.0 million reduction for the Lunar Receiving Laboratory which was imposed, it was necessary to delete one branch of the dual vacuum system, and reduce the square foot area of the facility from 86,800 to 83,000 square feet. The vacuum system is required for processing lunar samples with minimum terrestrial contamination nhiie insuring against the release of biologi cal organisms in the samples to the surrounding environment. In limiting the facility to a single vacuum system the operational flexibility to process samples was reduced. Althdugh the quarantine period will not be affected the total sample processing time will be extended, thereby delaying release of samples to the scientific community. Question. Last year, the committee ea,pressed concern over the large amount of authorization not funded for facility planning and design.. In fact, the surplus authorization through FY 1967 amounted to about $11.6 million. What disposition is to be made of this surplus authorization? How much of it will be automatically resoinded under the three-year eccpiration rule by the en.~ of Fl? 1967? Answer For the Agency approximately $9 million of the unfunded author! zation for facility planning and design will automatically be rescinded at the end of FY 1967 under the three-year expiration rule. Question. Of the total construction of facilities funds appropriated to date, how much has been obligated and ea~pevded to date? What are the obligations and ecependitures to date on facility planning and design funds provided by PAGENO="0591" 1968 NASA AU~ORIZAPION 587 Congress? What are the obligations and e~rpe'nditures to date on the FY 1967 funds provided for Manned space Flight construction of facilities and facility planning and design? Answer. Of the total construction of facilities funds allocated to date (FY 1961 thru FY 1967) to Manned Space Flight, the following amountu have been obligated and expended as of January 31, 1967. Million MSF Program $1, 596.5 Obligations 1,544.3 Expenditures 1,423.6 The status of obligations and expenditures for facilities planning and design funds provided by Congress thru FY 1967 as applied to Manned Space Flight Projects as of January 31, 1967, is as follows: Million MSF program $27.9 Obligations 26.3 Expenditures 25.0 The status of obligations and expenditures as of January 31, 1967 for FY 1967 funds provided for Manned Space Flight construction of facilities and facilities planning and design is as follows: (In millions of dollars] Construc- tion of facilities Facility planning and design Funds available Obligations Expenditures $43.8 22.7 2.0 $0.6 0 0 Question. Now that the major new construction program for the manned space flight centers is nearing completion, what measures has NASA taken to establish, maintain, and supervise an effective facilities ma4ntenance program? In view of continuing rising costs for labor and materials, what steps have been taken by NA&4. to hold the line on maintenance costs without jeopardizing the effectiveness of the NASA mission and operation? Answer. The establishment, maintenance and supervision of an effective main- tenance program at each NASA Center and location was recognized as a major requirement early in the construction program. Within the Manned Space Flight Facilities Office, a maintenance group was established which has been augmented concurrent with the growth of the program. The basic purpose of this group has been to provide guidance and assistance to the Centers.. It provides management with a review and evaluation group which strives continu- ously to Improve center maintenance programs. At each MSF Center or location, the maintenance structure includes a civil service management organization. Since five of the six MSF locations utilize contractual services to perform maintenance, this civil service entity provides guidance to control and evaluate the contractors' efforts. At the Marshall Space Flight Center, maintenance is performed primarily by civil service craftsmen with some augmentation by a support services contractor. Each location has implemented effective procedures for budget planning, execution and work scheduling. Central work control offices have been estab- lished at each installation to Insure: effective utilization of resources, cen- tralized control of work, improved coordination between the accompaniment of maintenance work and interference with normal operations and better cost control systems. Maintenance work order flow procedures which recognize the need for approval processes are now a part of each Center's program. Pve- ver~tive Maintenance programs are In effect as are maintenance stores and spare parts control methods. An equipment management program to determine the capability of each piece of equipment and to Insure its effective utilization has been Implemented at certain Installations and Is being Initiated at the other sites. PAGENO="0592" 588 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Each of the foregoing techniques undergoes periodic reevaluation and review by both the Centers and the Manned Space Flight Facilities Office. These re- views are augmented by periodic reports which provide performance data and serve as a basis for a continuous total analysis of the maintenance program. In view of continuing rising costs for labor and materials, definite steps have been taken to insure more effective utilization of maintenance resources while holding the line on maintenance costs. Significant improvements in maintenance management techniques have been accomplished resulting in improved efficiency and a reduction in costs. Examples of areas where cost reductions have taken place are as follows: a. Utility Conservation-Savings have been effected by the institution of comprehensive conservation programs, and by scheduling activities to avoid high peak electrical demand periods, thereby reducing electrical utility costs. b. Reduced Frequency of Custodial and Grounds Maintenance Tasks- Re- duced costs have been effected by reducing the frequency of cleaning cycles, and reducing the intensive care areas for grounds maintenance. These reductions have not been made without due consideration to the possibility of increased deterioration of the facilities. Essentially, those services that were reasonable but were not essential to safety, health or necessary to the long-term preservation of condition were the only services reduced in frequency. c. Supply Support-Annual purchase contracts for the purchase of stand- ard maintenance supplies and materials have been negotiated at each location covering several thousand items. This technique reduces the cost of pre~ paring numerous purchase orders throughout the year at obvious savings in clerical and processing costs. It has been found that a potential annual con- tract has led to spirited bidding by suppliers with resulting savings to the Government. Also the schedule of deliveries, agreed to by vendors, has permitted a reduction in storage requirements. d. Instrumentation Pooling Program-As a part of the equipment man- agement program, instrumentation pools are being initiated at several MSF installations. Savings are being derived due to improved utilization of existing instruments, and consolidation of Center-wide requirements for common-usage instruments resulting in "quantity procurements" at sig- nificant discounts. e. "Off Season" Award of Service Contracts-Analysis of market condi- tions has led to the award of "one-term" repair projects, such as building repainting, repaving and reroofing, during the "off season". The cycle of these activities has been rescheduled now to take advantage of lower rates and competitive market conditions prevalent during these slow periods of construction and maintenance activities. f. Reduction in Emergency Crews-Careful monitoring of the need for emergency crews during evenings or weekends has disclosed that significant reductions could be made in the size of crews required to provide this serv- ice. Emergency back-up is now provided by individuals who are designated to remain "on-call" in the event of an emergency during off-hours. This decision has led to significant reduction in costs but still provides for effective response in the event of an emergency. g. More Effective Use of APP Equipment-As the maintenance work load began to stabilize at each MSF Installation, positive steps were taken to reduce clerical scheduling and posting through the wider use of available ADP capability. As soon as sufficient information was accumulated, deter- minations could be made as to the most effective operation of facilities, better scheduling of preventive maintenance and more effective utilization of maintenance resources. h. Increased Use of Automatic Monitoring Systems-As a part of the design of utility systems, cost studies are made to determine the "cost trade-offs" of operator monitoring of equipment operation versus automatic monitoring systems. The installation of the monitoring systems has led to significant operator cost savings as well as increased efficiency of the utility plant equipment. For example, at one MSF Center, the installation of a heating and cooling plant monitoring system has led to a force of roving operators numbering 54, where an unmonitored system would require 108 operators. The cost of acquisition and installation of the automatic monitoring system has been amortized in less than four years. At some of PAGENO="0593" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 589 the older MSF installations, where such devices were not originally provided in the utility systems, analysis of cost studies has led to the installation of these devices with attendant cost savings. Question. What is the estimate, by field center, for the FY 1968 cost of main- taining the NASA manned space flight field centers? What is the breakout by HdD and AO funds? How many personnel, by center, are involved in the main- tenance function? Answer. The estimate for maintaining the NASA Manned Space Flight Center Facilities `during FY 19438 is: Kennedy Space Center $25, 661,000 Manned Spacecraft Center 12,495, 000 Marshall Space Flight Center 11,532, 000 Michoud Assembly Facility 8, 746, 000 Mississippi Test Facility 5, 320, 000 White Sands Pest Facility 2,500,000 `Total 66,254, 000 The breakout by R&D and AO funds is: R&D Funding $21,524, 000 AO Funding 44,730,000 The number of Civil Service and contractor personnel involved in maintenance functions is as follow's: Kennedy Space Center 1, 647 Manned Spacecraft `Center 857 Marshall Space Flight Center 641 Michoud Assemibly Facility 261 Mississippi Test Facility 342 White Sands `Test Facility 91 KENNEDY SPACE CENPER Project: Launch Complen 39 Question. The FY 1967 NASA estimate of final runout costs on this launoh complece was given at $475 million. How much of the $16~66 million request is for new construction as contrasted to modifications and alterations? Does this; amount when added to the $473 million of prior year funds approceimate the FY 1967 runout cost estimate? Is it anticipitated that any further funds will be requested for new construction in the Launch Uompler 39 area? Does NASA have any estimate for annual repair, rehabilitation and modernization costs? Answer. Of the $16.6 million contained in this request, the following items are considered as new construction: Launch Umbilical Power Refurbishment Area $482, 000 Gaseous Helium Storage 4378, 000 Photo Support System 900,000 Instrumentation 830,000 Total 2,890,000 Ouri~ently we do not anticipate a requirement for major new construction in the Launch `Complex 39 to meet the currently planned operational capability. It is estimated that approximately $10 million of CofF funds will `be required on a yearly `basis fo'r rehabilitation and `modernization of the complex. Question. What is the specific basis that NASA used in estimating the funds required for contract settlement? How muck has been paid in contract settle- ments to date on the work at Launch (Yomplece 39? Is some of the money required for settlement of new claims as contrasted to settlement of appeals from con- tractors on unilateral settlements by NASA? If so, what portions are esti- mated for each category? Is the estimate in the FY 1968 request considered adequate to cover all present and potential claims under the contracts for work on Launoh Complece 39? Furnish a few typical evamples of cases where there were differences in interpretation of specifications, and project delays. Answer. In estimating the funds required for the settlement of claims, a factor was applied against the contractors request as set forth in his original 76-265 O-67--~pt. 2~----38 PAGENO="0594" 590 1 9 6 8 NASA AUTHORIZATION filing. This factor which gives a realistic appraisal of the final settlement, is based on experience with similar major construction projects of both NASA and DOD. It took into account claims which were filed and later denied, claims filed and subsequently withdrawn, together with those on which settlements were negotiated and paid. As of March 1, 1967, $2.434 million had been paid for the settlement of claims connected with work on LO 39. It is estimated that an additional $10.6 million will be required for the payment of claims during Fiscal Year 1968, $7.2 million of which is required for claims which are presently on file and $3.4 million for anticipated filings. Of the latter, approximately $2.7 million will be required for the settlement of appeals from contractors on unilateral settlements by NASA and $0.7 million for the settlement of new claims on work that is piesently in process The funds requested should satisfy our requirements through FY 1968. Since contractors are not limited as to the time in which they may file a claim there is a possibility that some claims might be filed and settled after FY 1968. The following examples of claims that have been filed where there were differences in interpretation of specifications and/or project delays Provision of Hurricane Protection During Construction of VAB~__ $1,000, 000 Correction of Deflection in Horizontal Rolling Door Guide Rail- VAB 59,138 I)efinition of Electrical Interface Between Crane and Construction Contracts-VAB 186,000 i~ate Delivery of Amended Contract Drawings and Speclficatlons___ 20,000 Delays in Defining Discrepancies in tontiact Drawings 10 000 Delays in Resolving Problems on Heat Sensing Devices-Jib and Bridge Cranes-VAB 11, 070 Question Will the Launch Umbilical 7 owers be refurbished after each launch? Is it anticipated that all three towers will use Launch Umbilical Tower Park Position No. 3 for refurbishment? Answer. The Launch Umbilical Towers. will be refurbished after each launch. All three towers will use Launch Umbilical Tower Park Position No. 3 in con- nection with refurbishment operations. Question. What type of storage is KSU presently using for helium? If rail- road cars are being used, is KSCI paying deniurrage for such storage and what are the estimated annual costs of such demurrage? Does NASA anticipate that thepermanent storage requested will pay for itself over a period of time? If so, what is the time period estimate? Answer. KSC currently has permanent facilities capable of storing 2,720,000 standard cubic feet of helium This storage capability is being augmented through the use of railroad tank cars. We are presently paying $25.00 per day rer car for demurrage or about $130,000 per year. The actual expenses from December 10, 1965 through December 31, 1966 was $138,425. These additional permanent storage facilities will pay for themselves in approximately 5 years Question Funds are being requested to remove pockets of clay below the surface of c'rawlerways and to replace them with suitable fill material. Did not KSU or the contractor take core samples of the area before the crawlerways were Initially built? If so, why were such clay pockets permitted to remain? Why was not this work considered before the surfacing operations in FY 1966 and 1967? Will the funds requested complete, in NASA's opinion, all of the necessary subsurface work? Answer Deep core borings were made at 1 000 foot Intervals on the crawler way to Pad A Intermediate shallower borings were taken at 250 foot intervals and at 100 foot intervals in areas where the borings indicated poor subsoil conditions might exist. The unsuitable material discovered as a result of the boring data was removed and back filled The pocket in question Is quite local ized is not In an area where the borings Indicated questionable subsoil condi tions existed and was discovered when the crawlers underwent fully loaded tests in May 1966 As a result the work included in this request could not be con sidered before the surfacing operations took place The funds requested are expected to complete all necesenry subsurface work. Question During last year s hearings NASA estimated that the final runout costs on the Marion Power Shovel contract (for the crawler-transporters) would, aemount to $139 million (including a $4 million overrun from the ot iqinal contract PAGENO="0595" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 591 price) and that the overall costs for the transporters would amount to about $15.1 million. Are these estimates still valid? Answer. The overall estimated cost of $15.1 million for the transporters is still valid. Project: Alteration and Rehabilitation of Launch Complea' Non. 34 and 37 Question. What is the age of the launch towers and associated equipment and were they specifically designed for the Saturn I and uprated Saturn I vehicles? If not, what shortcomings ewist relative to adequate handling of currently planned launches? Answer. The launch towers and associated equipment for Launch Complex 34 were completed in 1961. LC 37 was completed in 1963. Both stands were de- signed for the Saturn S-i vehicle. Since then both complexes have been modi- fied to provide an upratecl Saturn I capability. Both complexes are capable of supporting the presently planned launches; however, certain structural and ether repairs and modifications must be undertaken to retain this capability. Question. Does the proposed repair and rehabilitation work conform to the e~vperience of the Air Force both at Patrick and Vandenburg bases? Are the estimates for repair and rehabilitation in consonance with cost factors used by the Air Force on their older launch complewes? Answer. The non-recurring maintenance costs experienced by the Air Force as well as NASA on similar structures were considered in the development of the cost estimate for the subject project. Question. What has been the impact of the Apollo accident on repair require- ments and what is the current estimate of the amount of damage caused? Answer. The alterations and rehabilitation which are included in this project request did not stem from the Apollo accident. The latter Is currently under in- vestigation by a Board of Investigation. The estimated cost of modifications resulting from the accident will not be known until the Board has completed its work and filed its report. Question. Specifically, what are the reasons that environiinental control systems must be replaced and where are such systems now located? Answer. The environmental control systems, which are located on the service structure and umbilical tower at both complexes, have been in continuous opera- tion for over five years and have reached the point where major repairs and the replacement of some key elements is, or will be necessary. While normal mainte- nance has been provided, a program of major repair and rehabilitation has not been accomplished previously on these systems. Such a program wherein major elements such as compressors, valves, and controls are rebuilt or replaced, Is normal for equipment of this type and must be accompflshed at approximately five year intervals. An engineering Investigation of the condition of the en- vironmental control systems has established that major repairs will be neces- sary during FY 1968. Question. Why is it necessary to replace or install structural members? Was this caused by inadequate design on the umbilical tower and the launch structure? Answer. The replacement of structural members is not the result of inadequate design. The need to replace or install new members stems from the effects of past launches on the structures and the corrosion which has resulted from the salt laden atmosphere at Cape Kennedy. Some new members will be added to provide for additional loads imposed by platform mounted ground support equipment. Question. If the obsolete drum type elevators need to be replaced, is it because they are inadequate or simply worn out? If inadequate, why did the original design provide for such slow elevators and is not such lack of speed a potential danger hazard in the event of an emergency at the capsule level of the tower? How many elevators are involved at each compleai and on what time basis does NASA Intend to replace such elevators? Answer. The existing obsolete drum type elevators are at or nearing a point where they will be beyond economical repair. A phased replacement program is therefore necessary. The speed of these elevators was considered adequate for the support of unmanned launches. Higher speeds will be incorporated in the replacement items. These elevators will compliment the high speed elevators that provide the astronauts Ingress and egress at the capsule level. There are three slow speed elevators on Launch Complex 34 and two on Launch Complex 37. One elevator will be replaced on each Complex during FY 1968. The re- mainder are scheduled for replacement starting in FY 1969. PAGENO="0596" 592 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Project: Utility Installation Question: it is understood that the interconnecting (or looping) of the three hot water syStems is required in the event of a break in the main line serving any one area. How critical would such a break be in the carrying out of a launch mission? if uninterrupted service is of highest priority, why was such an interconnection not included in the original design and program for the utilities for the area? Answer. A break in the main line serving any one area could result in the loss of the environmental control in one of the launch critical facilities and could cause a cancellation of a planned test or launch. The original design provided an economical and efficient high temperature hot water system. Cross connec- tions were not included as the possibility of a major break in a supply main was considered to be remote. Subsequent studies have been completed which dictate the need for redundancy on certain system.s to reduce the possibilities of single point failures. This requirement for cross connections is considered to fall within this category. Question. Are there any other utilities systems (e.g., electrical, communica- tion) that may require interconnection at some time in the future to insure continuous service? If so, identify such needs and provide related cost estimates. Answer. Currently there are no known requirements for further intercon- nections of existing utility systems. MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER Pro ject: Modifications to the Environmental Testing Laboratory Question. Will this request complete all major modifications based on known technological needs? Did M&1 request additional funds over and above the $1.9 million? Answer. The request for Modifications to the Environmental Testing Labora- tory will complete all major modifications based on known technological needs. However, due to the complex and sophisticated nature of this facility it will be necessary to accomplish future modifications to incorporate technological ad- vances and retain the operating efficiency. The MSC budget request was for $2,695,000 as compared to $1,900,000. Question. How does the $410,000 for the conversion of the single manlock to a double manlock compare with the initial cost of the ea'isting single manlock? Answer. The existing manlock, with its supporting systems, was included as an integral part of the Ohamber A structure. The contractor priced this work on the basis of the overall project and his bid information does not provide a basis on which the several elements of the manlock can be isolated and priced. A com- parison of costs between the original work and the planned conversion would therefore not be realistic. However, the proposed modifications to provide a double manlock are in essence a duplicate of the existing installation and to this degree the costs should be comparable. Question. About $1.5 million is requested for the rehabilitation of the solar simulation system and it is stated that by FY 1968 this system will have been operated for about 1,500 hours which is the limit of its life ea~peotancy. Is it to be understood that at the 1,500 level there will be a recurring need for com- plete rehabilitation of this system? If so, is it ecopected that it will involve an- other $1.5 million and when is it anticipated that the necrt rehabilitation cycle will take place? Answer. Although rehabilitation of the solar simulation system will provide certain improvements, it is expected that a major rehabilitation will be required after every 1,500 hours of. operation. The rehabilitation costs are expected to remain in the area of $1.5 million unless significant improvements to the carbon arc system are developed. It is anticipated that the next rehabilitation cycle will take place in 2 to 3 years after completion of the proposed work. Project: Center ~Support Facilities Question. It is stated that the local authority, the Clear Creek Basin Authority, has ruled that all sewage treatment plants in the area must be operated at the highest level of efficiency. What specific deficiencies now' eceist that do not meet the effluent requirements of the local authority? What are the current operating sffluent levels of other sources feeding into Clear Lake? What are the relative PAGENO="0597" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 593 turbidity levels and BOD contents of the effluents feeding into' the lake as corn- pared to that of the Manned Spacecraft Center sewage treatment plant? When was the latest requirement placed on the users of the lake as a point of dis- charge? Are all other parties now complying? Answer. MSC is meeting the current requirements imposed by the Health Department of Harris County. The current operating effluent levels of other sources feeding into Clear Lake meet, or are below, the 20 ppm BOD and 20 ppm of suspended solids as established by the Harris County Health Department. There are no turbidity requirements. Periodic inspections by the County Health Department are made to enforce compliance. The Clear Creek Basin Authority was established In 1965 with charter of preventing the eventual contamination of Clear Lake through further improvements in sewage disposal methods. The modifications which are included, in this request are needed to improve the operating efficiency of the sewage treatment plant. These improvements will also assist in the control of water pollution in the Clear Creek-Clear Lake area in accordance with the long range program of the Clear Creek Basin Authority. Question. It is stated that the present highway system creates delays during rush hours of up to 30 minutes. What percentage .of the traffic during tb4s period is actually delayed as long as 30 minutes? Why should the traffic volume during rush hours (presumably when the work day is starting or finishing) crceed the number of NASA and contractor employees located in the Manned Spacecraft Center? How often has the average daily traffic volume eeceeded 21,000 vehicles per day? Answer. State-NASA Road 1, which serves as the principal access to the Manned Spacecraft Center, is a major fear-lane highway which interconnects the Gulf Freeway with the State Highway 146 which leads `to LaPorte, Texas City and Galveston. As such, this route carries the traffic entering or leaving MSC, as well as that generated by the local communities and residential areas, and the cross country traffic which leaves the Gulf Freeway to enter the LaPorte Highway. It is this condition which adds to the delay of employees entering or leaving MSO. The average daily traffic volume which was stated in this project request, and the 1970 projectIons, were developed by the Bureau of Public Roads. It is estimated that up to 50% of the traffic entering or leaving MSO encounters delays of up to 30 minutes. MABSHALL SPACE FUGHT CENTER Project: Water Pollution Control Question. The construction of new holding basins and the enlargement of e~risting basins implies that the creation of wastes from manufacturing and testing activities is going to increase. Is this true, particularly in light of the activation of the Mississippi Test Facility and the qualifIcation of the various engines through numerous past tests? Why should there be any substantial amount of industrial wastes generated "in the manufacturing comple~v"? Isn't the manufacturing phase almost finished in the Marshall Space Flight Center? If not, what activities are being ca'rried out? Answer. The construction of new holding basins and the enlargement of exist- ing basins is not associated with an increase in manufacturing and test activities at MSFC. These improvements are needed to provide a means whereby wastes which are generated by the present Center research, development and test activities can be held during periods of low stream flow, can be properly diluted or processed, and disposed of at times when conditions are favorable to the preservation of fish and wildlife. A substantial amount of industrial wastes are generated in the "manufacturing complex as a result of the research which is conducted on improved fabrication and manufacturing techniques as well as the development of prototypes of new parts and equipments. While the principal manufacturing efforts at MSFO has been reduced, research and development is being continued in consonance with the Center mission. Question. It is stated that untreated wastes from the Center is a matter of concern to the Tennessee Valley Authority and the U.S. Public Health Service and that these agencies concur with the need for corrective action? Have either of these agencies at any time requested that the Center take corrective action? If so, when and in what way was such action to be taken? Answer. Both the Tennessee Valley Authority and the U.S. Public Health Service have requested the Department of Army to take corrective action on PAGENO="0598" 594 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION wastes generated within the Redstone Arsenal reservation. The Army, has in turn, made the Marshall Space Flight Center responsible for taking corrective action on wastes generated in, the NASA portion of the reservation. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare requested that they be furnished information on a plan of action which would control pollution in accordance with established criteria including: the start and completion date of the necessary engineering reports; an indication of the time and conditions of the authorization of the respective agency; the fiscal year in which the agency proposed to finance facilities a time schedule for the commencing and completion of construction; and, the date operation of the facility is scheduled to com- mence. MSFC was requested to give serious consideration to providing hold- ing facilities of sufficient capacity to provide protection from the adverse effects of accidental spills in test or component development areas. Project: Fire Surveillance System Question How critical is the absence of a central fire detecting system' Have there been any instances where a fire was undetected for some time and would have caused intensive damage had it not been detected accidentally? How much damage would have resulted if the fire cited as occurring in the basement of the F-L Engine Test Stand had not been noticed? Answer. The absence of a central fire detection system is critical to the quick suppression and control of fires. It is a generally recognized fact that fires which are detected during the initial stages can be extinguished with a minimum of damage whereas fires which are undetected up to the point where they have gained substantial headway frequently result in a complete loss of the structure and Its contents. In one instance a burning motor on an air conditioning system serving the film vault in one of the major MSFO warehouses was detected by sheer accident. Had this fire, which was started through an electrical short circuit, not been dis- covered a major facility and the supplies stored therein could have been lost. Had the fire In the basement of the F-i Engine Test Stand not been noticed and been brought under control it could have resulted in damage to the S-IC test stand as well as the F-i stand since both are interconnected through an under- ground tunnel leading to the Test Control Center The Government s investment in these facilities exceeds $35 million, all or part of which could have been lost. Question. What other NASA centers employ a centraii~sed fire detection and reporting system? Are such systems used in other Government installations? (Name a few representative installations). Does industry employ such systems and, if so, whioh companies as an e~rample? Answer. Other NASA centers employing a centralized fire detection and re- porting system include the following: Mississippi Test Facility Michoud Assembly Facility Manned Spacecraft Center Kennedy Space Center (Three separate centralized systems due to the large area to be covered) White Sands Test Facility Goddard Space Flight Center Ames Research Center Langley Research Center (Partial) Lewis Research Center (Partial) Such systems are used in Government installations includmg the following Arnold Engineering Development Center Tullahoma Tenn Warner Robbins SAC Base Macon Ga Fort Gordon Army Base Augusta Ga Fort Jackson Army Base Columbia S C Dobbins Air Force Base, Marietta, Ga. Turner Air Force Base, SAC, Albany, Ga. Fort Benning Army Base, Columbus, Ga. Charleston Air Force Base, Charleston, S.C. Fort Sill Army Base Oklahoma Fort Bliss Army Base Texas Oarswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Tex. Milan Arsenal, Tennessee Large industrial corporations also employ fire detection and reporting systems such as the Ford Motor Company and the General Shoe Corporation. PAGENO="0599" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 595 MICHOUD ASSEMBLY FACILITY Project Eat enmon of Saturn Boulevard to State Road System Question It is stated that vehicular traffic to and from Mi,choud averages 12 600 vehicles per day with peak surges ecceeding 2,000 vehicles per hour Has any attempt been made to stagger starting and closing hours at the Facility? What is the average delay during peak hours of traffic? Answer. A staggering of the starting and closing hours at Michoud has been in effect for an extended period Currently the work force arrives in five stag gered groups between 7:00 am and 8:18 am. The outgoing traffic is similarly staggered from 3 30 pm to 4 48 pm A recent survey showed the average peak period delay to be 30 minutes per vehicle. Question. What is the estimated traffic volwme when the Chrysler and Boeing production rate is reduced from sic vehicles per year to a macimum of four per year? Might not much of the current traffic congestion be eliminated by virtuc of lower employment levels in the near future? Answer. If Chrysler and Boeing production is reduced, our analysis indicates the traffic volume will average approximately 11,400 vehicles per day with peak surges exceeding 2,800 vehicles per hour. This traffic has to enter or leave the facility into the high speed network being constructed by the city and the. State to accommodate the increasing traffic In the Michoud vicinity Therefore the safety hazards and the congestion will still exist even if the employment levels were to be reduced in the future. PAGENO="0600" PAGENO="0601" ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS Question 1. The general understanding in the committee is that funds provided under the category, Administrative Operations, completely cover all costs of personnel, operation and maintenance. Past inspections indicate that certain operation and maintenance activities are actually funded from Research and Development appropriations. It is understood that the Mississippi Test Facility and the Michoud Assembly Facility are examples of NASA facilities where this type of funding is taking place. (a) What is the overall NASA policy with regard to this type of funding? Answer. Consistent with the recommendation of the first Hoover Commission, and the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950, the NASA budget is presented on a performance basis, which emphasizes the work to be done rather than the objects or services to be purchased. The various requitements for funds are grouped together on the basis of the purposes for which the funds are required. Within this concept, funds for institutional requirements are presented under the "Administrative Operations" appropriation. Basically, these requirements are due to the presence of the in-house Government establishment (personnel, facilities, equipment) which is required to provide a generic NASA capability to plan, direct, and supervise the activities of other organizations through which the substantive program is executed. On the other hand, funds for the technical or substantive program require- ments are grouped under the "Research and Development" appropriations. Prac- tically all of these funds are for support of activities of other agencies (industrial contractors, universities, other Government agencies) who are engaged more or less directly In specific research and development work. Since the content of the two appropriations is determined by purpose, one can find the same kinds of items financed in both appropriations. In such cases, it is NASA policy (based on the performance budget concept) to identify fund requirements with the various NASA missions to the maximum extent reason- able and practicable. Items needed `to respond to the requirements of research and development programs and projects belong under "Research and Develop- ment"; and items required for institutional and general support purposes should be financed under the "Administrative Operations" account. There is one major case which is an apparent exception to this rule. The salaries and related benefits and travel expenses of all NASA employees are budgeted and funded under "Administrative Operations," whether the employees can be identified at any given time as engaged in direct project work or not. The reason for this is, that these personnel are employed for the purpose of carrying out the generic functions of the agency-and not for the sole purpose of executing a specific research and development project. The salaries and expenses of contractor employees, however, are part of the costs of the contracts. They are, therefore, financed under the "Administrative Operations" or "Research and Development" appropriation depending upon the purposes of the contracts. Question 1(b). Is the authority to fund administrative types of activities with Research and Development funds retained at the Headquarters level or is it delegated to the field? Answer. Policy, guidelines and criteria for determination of fund sources foi Manned Space Flight activities are established by NASA Headquarters. Question 1(c). What sort of management controls are exercised over this area by Headquarters personnel? How often are inspections held? Answer. Formal management control of fund source use is accomplished through the Manned Space Flight periodic review of Center funding require- ments. These reviews are conducted as required but no less than twice a year. Question 1(d). Does the fis~cal year 1968 budget request identify all research and development funds intended to be used to support administrative activities? 597 PAGENO="0602" 598 1 9 6 8 NASA AUTHORIZATION Answer. The fiscal year 1968 budget includes specific amounts of research and development funds in support of administrative activities, but they are not identified in the budget document. The fiscal years 1967 and 1968 estimates for this requirement are approximately $47 million each year. The Marshall Space Flight Center provides for contractor operation of the Mississippi Test Facility and the Michoud As:sembly Facility. The operations of these two fa- cilities are funded from research and development funds because the activities are in complete support of contractor operated production and test facilities. Question 2. NA$A pians to e~rpend $7.5 million more for Administration Op- erations in fiscal year 1967 than was appropriated. (a) From what sources will this additional amount be obtained? (b) On what basis was this source chosen rather than others? Answer. For fiscal year 1967, NASA was authorized to expend $655.9 million for Administrative Operations. The funds appropriated for this purpose were $640 million. In the preparation of the initial fiscal year 1967 Operating Plan, NASA reduced its Administratii~e Operations requirement to the authorized level but was unable to reduce further in the light of then anticipated and approved increases in personnel complement for the year. The Administrative Operations require- ments were determined as part of a concurrent review of Research and Develop- ment and Construction of Facilities requirements whbre appropriations were also less than the levels authorized. It was concluded that the shifting of $15.9 million from the available R&D appropriation to the AO appropriation would be necessary to the interests of the best overall NASA programing. Accordingly, the following R&D programs were reduced, as shown, from the authorized levels to provide the source of funds to be transferred. Millions Gemini -$4. 70 Launch Vehicle Procurement -& 65 Space Vehicle Systems -1. 10 Electric Systems -1. 90 Basic Research -.50 Space Power and Electric Propulsion -2 75 Chemical Propulsion -1.30 Petal -~ -15 00 The reduction in Gemini funding was made possible by the early successful com- pletion of the Gemini Program with no impact on the attainment of the program objectives. The reductions in the other program areas requii~ed a stretch-out in the accomplishment of supporting research and technology objectives but did not involve cancellations of any specific projects. Subsequent to the reductions outlined above, NASA was directed to freeze its end-of-year employment strength at the actual levels that existed on ~uly 31, 1966, to reduce its planned use of overtime by 25% below the FY 1966 level, and to achieve a total reduction in planned expenditures for FY 1967 of $30 million Consideration of the impact of the personnel ceiling and overtime limitations and the economy objectives lead to a reduction in the Administrative Operations Operating Plan from the authorized level of $655 9 million to a revised program of $6479 million (including $400 thousand transferred to GSA for rental of general purpose space). The $8 millionS reduced from the Administrative Operations program was reverted to the R&D appropriation from which it had been transferred, and was placed in reserve by the Bureau of the Budget along with $52 million of additional R&D funds that were removed from the R&D program as part of the total anti-inflationary cut-back required in obligation authority to achieve the overall $30 million expenditure reduction in FY 1967 Question 3 During prior fiscal years the manned space flight area u as marked by transfers of substantial numbers of personnel between the field centers to accommodate the requirements of new or ecepanding pro qrams It is noted that the fiscal year 1968 request provides for each of the three manned space flight centers to be staffed at ea~actly the same level as in Fiscal Year 1967 How is suck action possible at a time when launch operations and mission control activities are continuing to ecepand and manufacturing and testing activities should be levelling off and dechningi PAGENO="0603" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 599 Answer. The manpower planning levels for end fiscal year 1967 for the Manned Space Flight Centers were established early in the fiscal year. This plan pro- vided for a build-up of 131 spaces at Kennedy Space Center in fiscal year 1967 to accommodate the expanding launch operations and related activities, with off- setting reductions at both the Marshall Space Flight Center and the Manned Spacecraft Center. The reductions at these two centers considered the decline in manufacturing activities of the MSFC and the phase-out of the Gemini Pro- gram at MSC. This staff realignment is planned for completion by the end of fiscal year 1967. Fiscal year 1968 levels as now planned do provide adjustment of personnel within centers to accommodate shifts In program emphasis. Question 4. The fiscal yeair 1968 budget request shows a requirement for $65,172,000 to finance Administrative Operations at the NASA Headquarters level. Last year, NASA estimated that about $13 nsillion of the $58.6 million Headquarters budget foe- fiscal year 1967 would be ewpended on manned space flight activities. What is the current estimate, by category, of the fiscal year 1967 ansI the fiscal year 1968 administrative budget attributable to manned space flight operations? Answer. Total NASA (fiscal years) MSF portion (fiscal years) 1967 1968 1967 1968 Personnel Travel ADP Facilities support Technical services Administrative support Total, fund requirements $37, 179 2,921 1,264 1,453 13,733 7,211 $38,377 2,939 1,149 1,622 13,941 7,144 $7, 024 940 250 300 3,110 1,600 $7, 161 940 210 300 3,110 1,600 63,761 65,172 13,224 13,321 Question 5. In his statement before the committee, Dr. Seasnans pointed out that, as a result of Ecceoutive Department restrictions, NASA reduced its re- quested end-of-fiscal year 1967 personnel strength from 34,399 to 33,126 perma- nent positions. Obviously, the 613 positions which were not filled were intended to carry out specific programs and efforts. a. In view of the inability of NASA to obtain its requested strength, what programs was NASA forced to defer or reduce? b. What specific impact did this personnel restriction have on the manned space area? Answer. a. NASA applied the directed reduction of 613 permanent positions on a basis which would cause the least possible Impact on the program. The largest portion of the reductIon, 259, was assigned to the Electronic Research Center. This action restricted ERC to 741 rather than 1,000, as previously planned. The effect of this action is to stretch out the buildup phase of the center's development to longer than originally planned. The balance of the reduction was widely spread among the remaining instal- lations, so that no specific program area would be significantly Impacted. b. The Manned Space Flight centers were reduced by a total of 262 posItions planned fiscal year 1967 year and strength. The specific reductions were 50 at KSC, 84 at MSO, and 128 at MSFC. Generally, all areas were "squeezed" with a disproportionate share in support areas. Early success in the Gemini program which provided earlier than planned use of that staff minimized program im- pact in fiscal year 1967. Question 6. Due-ing snuck of fiscal years 1966 and 1967, much uncertainty pre- vailed regarding NASA manned space flight activities following the lunar landing mission. (a) To what ecctent did this uncertainty affect NASA's ability to retain or recruit critical talent? (b) Were there any specific instances where such uncertainty seriously im- peded NASA in their personnel management? Answer. (a) (b). The degree of uncertainty over manned space flight activi- ties `beyond Apollo was probably not `sufficient in fiscal year 66 and 67 to affect PAGENO="0604" 600 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION our recruiting and personnel retention very much, since Apollo was reaching its peak levels of activity. Fiscal year 68 will be a much more critical year in this respect, particularly for the scientists and engineers already In the program, as they wait to see how the Apollo Applications program will take shape. NASA has experienced an increasing attrition rate and strong industry com- petition in recruiting particularly among young professionals in scientific and engineering disciplines. The recent increase in salary for these people should help substantially in our ability to retain these critically needed young profes- sionals. Question 7. If the proposed Voyager and Apollo Application.s programs are approved, large numbers of personnel will be required, some of which will be made available from the Apollo Lunar Landing program. However, there is a distinct possibility that these new programs will require numerous personnel at a time when the lunar landing mission effort is at its peak. (a) Can NASA provide an estimate of the relative strengths at the Manned Space Centers attributable to Apollo, Apollo Applications, and Voyager for fiscal years 1969 and 1970? (b) In view of the heavy involvement of the other two sectors of NASA in the Voyager and, to a lesser eo,tent, the Apollo Applications program, is it probable' that the total NASA strength may actually increase sharply over that currently approved? Answer. (a) A number of shifts in the program assignment of our manpower which are now occurring will continue into fiscal years 1969 and 1970, and will be dependent upon the scopes of programs approved and the fund appropriated. The Apollo Applications program management structure has been established in the Manned Space Flight organization. The peak effort in the Apollo program will be reached in fiscal year 1967 and the assignment of the engineering skills to Apollo Applications has begun. As the phasing of the Apollo program permits, we will transfer other personnel into AAP activities. Generally, the later phasing will be in the launch and mission control activities. In the meantime, we are using such things as dual assignments to make some of our key engineering skills available to both Apollo and AAP and to assure a maximum of carry over of technical knowledge and experience on both programs. (b) It is not expected that total employment for NASA will increase sharply above the level in the fiscal year 1968 budget in the next few years because of the Voyager and Apollo Applications programs. However, it should be noted that as these programs develop, shifts in personnel strength between installa- tions may become necessary. The nature and extent of such shifts, if any, cannot be stated at this time. Even though no increase in total agency employment is anticipated for the Voyager and Apollo Applications programs, some increase is anticipated in subsequent years because of the planned growth of the Electronics Research Center. Specific increases will be developed as part of the budget process and in accordance with the ERC master plan previously published. Question 8. In the past, NASA officials have ecopressed concern over the lack of fieaibility in the Fiscal Year 1967 budget level and the difficulties built into budget constraints which do not provide a margin of funds to meet unforeseen problems, workloads and contingencies. How serious has this problem been with respect to manned space flight activities and how is NASA meeting this problem now and intend to meet it in Fiscal Year 1968? Answer. There is extremely limited flexibility within the AO appropriation. Sixty~two percent of the appropriation `is related to pay of personnel and bene- fits. Unbudgeted increases such as salary increases without a corresponding increase in appropriation must therefore be generally accommodated by a trans- fer of funds from another appropriation since the funds in the AO appropriation for other than pay are related to many fixed cost expenses such as communica- tion, electricity, gas, and other utilities and `services. Question 9. NASA is requesting a total of $40,792,000 for automatic data processing under the Administrative Operations category for Fiscal Year 1968. 9(a). Of this agency-wide total, Marshall Space Flight Center is listed for over $10 million. What functions are performed which require this center to receive over 25% of the total? Answer. The automatic data processing functions performed at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) are similar to those performed at the other MSF Centers. Total estimated cost, regardless of appropriation, is $11,591,000. Corn- PAGENO="0605" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 601 parable costs at the Manned Spacecraft Center and the Kennedy Space Center are $36,367,000 and $10,334,000, respectively. Question 9(b). How is the automatic data processing workload controlled at the three Manned Space Flight Centers? Answer. The objective of the AD? workload control system is to furnish the means for planning, reviewing and approving ADP work requests and, as a result, controlling the work effort and expenditure of ADP resources. Each MSF Center utilizes essentially the same procedures for ADP workload control. The computation facility develops a workload projection and budget allocation in coordination with each user prior to the beginning of the fiscal year. Center management then sets a total allocation for the computer facility based on validated workload projections. Each user provides a work authorization to his management for computer work. The users' management reviews the work request against its assigned budget, the computation facility reviews the request for technical feasibility and performance. Periodic reports are pro- vided showing allocations, expenditures, and balances to users. Question 9(c). What reviews are conducted at the headquarters level of requests from field centers for additional data processing facilities and capabilitie~? Answer. The program offices, including the Office of Manned Space Flight, are responsible for managing the acquisition and utilization of AD? resources at their centers in accordance with the policy and procedures promulgated in NHB 2410.1, "Management Procedures for Automatic Data Processing Equip- ment". Approval of overall ADP plans, as well as specific approval of general purpose of ADP equipment is the responsibility of the NASA Deputy Admin- istrator, Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition. The program offices review ADP requirements on a center-by-center basis to insure that requirements are consistent with institutional and program objectives by conducting reviews of all center ADP acquisition plans and operating practices~ Requests from field centers for acquisition of ADP equipment, with supporting documentation, are reviewed by the program offices and those requests which are validated are transmitted to the Deputy Administrator via the Associate Administrator for Tracking and Data Acquisition. Question 9(d). Does NASA currently have a standard operation procedure for managing and supervising the automatic data processing areas? Furnish for the record, a brief description of such procedures. Answer. In July 1965, NASA published NHB 2410.1, "Management Procedures for Automatic Data Processing Equipment." The provisions of this document are applicable to NASA Headquarters, NASA fields installations, and NASA- owned contractor-operated facilities. The document prescribes the policies and procedures to be used throughout NASA in management of automatic data processing, including the assignment of responsibilities, the formulation of ADP plans, acquteition procedures, and guidelines for selection and utilization of general purpose ADP equipment. The document also assigns AD? responsi- bilities to the NASA Deputy Administrator, the Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition, the program offices and to the field centers. The NASA Deputy Administrator has been designated as the final approval authority of all policy and plans for acquisition, utilization and disposition of AD? equipment and services. The Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition serves as the ADP staff to the Deputy Administrator to develop AD? plans and procedures as well as review, evaluate and coordinate on a NASA-wide basis the utilization of AD? resources. Each program office validates AD? requirements and funding re- quests submitted by their centers who, in turn, are responsible for the local management and operation of the NASA computational capability. Question 9(e). What progress is being made at the Manned Space Flight Centers to share automatic data processing equipment, personnel and programs? Answer. Since its establishment in 1963, the MSF Resources Sharing Panel (RSP) has acted as the principal organization in the Manned Space Flight organization to coordinate sharing of ADP equipment, personnel and programs. Comprised of the directors of the computation laboratories at the centers, the MSF Resources Sharing Panel guides sharing activity by establishing standards and procedures, as well as sharing knowledge in specific computational tech- niques. In the recent past, the RSP has established a program sharing library, a standard for formatting telemetry calibration data, and a standard set of routines for driving output plotter devices. In the last year, MSF has shared 124 computer programs having an original development cost of approximately PAGENO="0606" 602 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION $2 million. In addition, the MSF Centers shared 5,930 man-hours and 5,540 hours of computer tline. It is expected that the level of sharing will increase this year and that this trend will continue. The sharing of machine time and program exchange among the centers is being facilitated by the standardization of languages and installation of the same general type computers starting in fiscal year 1967. Question 9(f). How does NASA administer and manage the computer and data processing service provided to contractors in the Louisiana-Mississippi area from the $lidell Computer Center? Answer. At Slidell, La., the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) has es- tablished a centralized computer facility to meet the needs of MSFC s contrac tors at the Michoud Assembly Facility and the Mississippi Test Facility. The computer center has a small group of NASA personnel who administer the center The equipment Is operated by a support contractor specializing in ADP opera tions. Programing is a user responsibility. The users are also responsible for estimates of computer usage. Question 9(g). Why is the Manned spacecraft Center replacing its general purpose equipment writh "third generation" computers and what will be the im- pact of this action on current automatic data processing operations? Answer. The principal objective of the ADP equipment replacement program at the Manned Spacecraft Center is to achieve a reduction in computer hard- ware cost that wilt result from the more efficient design of the third generation equipment. It is anticipated that this savings will approximate 30 percent of the lease cost of the second generation equipment being replaced. At a result of the change, work now requiring round-the-clock operation can be accomplished in less than two shifts, and eliminate the need for using outside ADP sources for workload overflow. Further, the less efficient decentralized operation of numer- ous small individual computers' is being replaced, in the main, by a centralized computer complex. Question 9(h). During last year's hearings, Congressman. Rumsfeld requested a summary of computer operations which would help explain how the computer area was managed. Is such a study available? Answer. Yes. A comprehensive Computer Systems Survey report was pub- lished in October 1966 and describes the complete `ipectrum of Manned Space Flight computational activities, including the way in which MSF manages Its computer resources Question 9(i) What is the total estimated cost relating to automatic data processing equipment, by center, regardless of funding appropriation for Fiscal Year 1968? Answer. Manned space flight ADP total estimated costs fiscal year 1968 [In thousands of dollars] Purchase Lease Mainte- nance Support Total Manned Spacecraft Center Marshall Space Flight Center (Huntsville) Marshall Space Flight Center (Slidell) Kennedy Space Center Total 300 26 2, 048 15,277 4 833 4,472 1,556 592 402 75 441 20, i98 6 330 3, 711 6,289 36,367 ii 591 8,258 10,334 2,374 26, 138 1,510 36,528 66,550 Question 10(a) since the number of permanent pontson'i at each of the three centers remains at exactly the same level as in fiscal year 1967 what is the reason for an increase in two centers and a decrease in the other? Answer. The fiscal year 1967 budget provided for a personnel increase for the Kennedy Space Center. These new positions will be filled on a phased basis during fiscal year 1967; therefore, there will be a greater number of man-years realized in fiscal year 1908 even though the end of year ceiling is the same for both fiscal years. The same explanation applies for the Manned Spacecraft Center increase for personnel costs in fiscal year 1968 except the vacancies to be filled during fiscal year 1967 are a carry over from a fiscal year 1966 authorization. PAGENO="0607" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 603 The decrease in personnel costs for the Marshall Space Flight Center in fiscal year 19(38 results from a gradual phase down In personnel during fiscal year 1967. Although the end strength for each fiscal year is the same, the average level of employment will be lower in fiscal year 1968. Question 10(b). The fiscal year 1968 request shows personnel costs slightly inoreased for Kennedy Space Center and the Manned Spacecraft Center with a slight decrease for Mars hali Space Flight Center. On a NASA-wide basis, support personnel make up 32 percent of the total per- manent personnel complement. This percentage varies from 41 percent at Ken- nedy Space Center to 25 percent at the Manned Spacecraft Center and 21 per- cent at the Marshall Space Flight Center. What is the reason for this variation? Answer. Support personnel represents the minimum complement necessary to support the role and mission of the center. In most instances, the number of support personnel is not directly proportionate to the number of direct personnel; therefore, the larger the direct force, the lower the percentage of support person- nel. This would explain the Marshall Space Flight Center having a lower per- centage of support personnel than the Manned Spacecraft Center. Kennedy Space Center is unique in that the support personnel of this center provides support services to KSC direct personnel, personnel of other NASA centers, and stage and spacecraft contractor personnel involved in launch oper- ations. Question 10(c). The fiscal year 1968 request shows personnel costs slightly increased for Kennedy Space Center and the Manned Spacecraft Center with a slight decrease for Marshall Space Flight Center. How many persons were made available from the phase-out of the Gemini pro- gram and how were they utilized? Answer. The peak manpower on the Gemini program from the Manned Space Flight Centers was slightly over 1,050 in fiscal year 1966. This will be essen- tially phased out by the end of fiscal year 1967 and completely phased out in fiscal year 1968. This Gemini manpower was used principally to build up Apollo and Apollo Applications, with some assignments to meet requirements in other programs. As an example, the final close-out of the Gemini program released 141 profes- sional people who had been employed full time in the Gemini program office organization at MSC. Of the 141 released, 43 went directly to the Apollo pro- gram and 41 went to the Apollo Applications program. Then people located at the McDonnell Corporation in St. Louis were detailed to assist in the supervision of the Air Force Manned Orbiting Laboratory program contract for Gemini space- craft. The balance of the Gemini work force were given assignments in mission operations, flight safety, engineering, or test activities. Question 10(d). The fiscal year 1968 request shows personnel costs slightly increased for Kennedy Space Center and the Manned Spacecraft Center with a slight decrease for Marshall Space Flight Center. To what ecotent has NASA employed retired military personnel in manned space flight activities; what types of positions are they holding; and what effect has their employment had on the career opportunities of regular civil service per- sonnel? Answer. About 2.2 percent of NASA's 34,000 civil service employees are retired military officers or enlisted men. The total in Manned Space Flight is 337 or about 2.3 percent of our total complement. We have found that there are many retired military people whose experience in military research and development programs is excellent background for our own programs. Most of the 219 retired officers we employ are being used in professional aerospace technology positions or in a professional administrative capacity. The 118 retired enlisted personnel are being used primarily in technician or technical support jobs. We believe that the relatively small percentage of retired personnel in the program has not constrained promotion or career development opportunities for the regular civil service work force, particularly in the light of the substantial growth situation of the last few years. Question ii. It is noted that while there is a slight reduction from the Fiscal Year 1967 level, there is still $3,596,000 requested for reimbursement of military manpower detailed to NASA. What is the ratio of support for such personnel as far as compensation is concerned, particularly in view of the obvious training benefits to the military services from such duty with NASA? Wili not many PAGENO="0608" 604 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION of these military personnel be lost as the Manned Orbiting Laboratory gains momentum? Answer. It is NASA's policy to provide full reimbursement to DOD for mili- tary personnel serving on detail. However, there has been one significant ex- ception to this policy with respect to the assignment of a number of Air Force Officers to the Manned Spacecraft Center. In this case the training benefits to the Air Force were considered sufficiently great to warrant a special agree- ment between NASA anti DOD to share the cost of these officers on a 50/50 basis. The number of military detailees is expected to stabilize at about the end of FY 1968 number. Since there is a continual turnover in such personnel, because of tours of duty ending and new personnel being assigned, the effect of the momentum of the Manned Orbiting Laboratory is not expected to be too large. Question 12. On a NA$A-wide basis, over 40% of NASA personnel are scien- tists or engineers. What is the percentage by manned space flight center of such critical personnel? Answer. The percentage of scientists and engineers of the total permanent employment for the Manned Space Flight centers is as follows: Kennedy Space Center: Percent Fiscal year 1967 48. 0 Fiscal year 1968 50. 2 Manned Spacecraft Center: Fiscal year 1967 56. 6 Fiscal year 1968 57.2 Marshall Space Center: Fiscal year 1967 39. 1 Fiscal year 1968 39. 6 Question 13. Overtime and holiday pay is listed as more than $10 million. What amounts will be programed for each of the Manned Space Flight Centers? Will there be any substantial amounts of such pay for activities other than those directly involved in launch and mission operations? If so, what are they and why are they necessary? Answer. Overtime and holiday pay in fiscal year 1968 is programed for the Manned Space Flight Centers as follows: [In thousands] Kennedy Space Center $2, 212 Manned Spacecraft Center 2,621 Marshall Space Flight Center 1, 988 The Manned Space Flight overtime is programed in recognition of mission operations, and is based on the following considerations: The bulk of MSF over- time is related to mission planning and control, spacecraft .and launch vehicle checkout, launch facility preparation, and related launch support. Technical activities such as minor spacecraft or launch vehicle modifications, and trajec- tory modifications must be accomplished within a limited time period prior to flight. Pre-misslon and post-mission activities such as simulations, astronaut and tracking crew training and post launch evaluation and report preparation are schedule critical and cannot be deferred. The overtime requirements in this category are primarily tied to support of the Apollo test, launch, and flight schedule. Since continuity must be maintained in conducting these activities to achieve full integration of the test, checkout, or launch operations, it is not always possible to limit the shift-work to an eight- hour basis or to bring in a fresh crew. For example, acceptance tes'ting, launch and flight operations support may require the technical crews who are doing the job to work beyond an eight-hour day and to provide support on a week-end. The work must be accomplished in a continuous sequence to meet the nature of the launch and `test operations. In addition, there will continue to be special situations and emergency problems that are not related to operations which will require some small amount of over- time at all the Centers. Question 14. NASA is requesting $2.3 million for personnel training. How is this training supervised to insure that such training is directly related to NASA pro gra~ns and not to the acquisition of an advanced degree by an employee? Answer. The responsibility and authority for providing training under the pre- visions of the Government Employees Training Act has been delegated to each NASA center with specific reference to the agency policy that such `training must PAGENO="0609" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 605 contribute to an employee's ability to perform his official duties. This policy dil- rective also specifically reiterates the requirement that agency sponsored training will not be approved.for the primary purpose of assisting the employee in obtain- ing an academic degree. We stress, however, that if a degree is incidental to such training, it is highly proper and should be encouraged. In exercising this respon- sibility, supervisors and managers are actively involved at all levels of cónsidera- tion and approval of training. Question 15. It is understood that, whereas `travel at the Marshall Space Flight Center will increase because of its involvement in the proposed Voyager and Apollo Applications programs, the total travel requirement will not increase due to cuts in other travel areas. What are these areas in which decreases will take place? NASA is requesting over $1 million for overseas travel. What portion of this is for travel of manned space flight personnel and what is the reason for such travel? Answer. The total fiscal year 1968 travel requirement for Marshall Space Flight Oenter remains at the fiscal year 1967 level. However, there are o~- setting adjustments among the major categories within the total travel program. Specifically, the travel for direction and coordination of program activity will increase, but is offset by a reduction in administrative travel due to the planned purchase of an administrative aircraft during fiscal year 1968. Purchase of an administrative aircraft will reduce the number of charter flights required. Forty percent of the NASA request for overseas travel to launch and tracking sites is for travel of manned space flight personnel. This travel is used to provide the additional operational personnel needed at overeas tracking stations during space flights. Question 16. What is the average OS grade of NASA professional and scien- tific personnel and of those `termed "professional administrative personnel"? How does this compare with the average grade level of other Government agencies? Answer. Average grade of NASA professional scientific and engineering per- sonnel is 12.58 in FY 1967 and 12.59 estimated for FY 1968. The averages for professional adm:inist'rative personnel are 11.49 in FY 1967 and 11.40 estimated in FY 1968. The average grades available in the President's Budget for other Government agencies are for total GS strength only. Since there is no sub- division by `major occupational grouping, the requested comparison cannot be made by NASA. Question 17. By centers, list those facilities (with square footage) which will become operational either during Fiscal Year 1967 or 1.968 which will cause an increase in the provision of utilities, communications, custodial services, repair and maintenance services and supplies and equipment. Answer. 565,797 additional square feet of facilities will become operational at the Manned Space Flight Centers during FY 1967. In FY 1968 an additional 449,734 square feet of area are scheduled to become operational. These facilities are being provided through Construction of Facilities Projects and Minor Con~ struction. Itemized lists of facilities with respect to fiscal year and center follows: FISCAL YEAR 1967 Area Kennedy Space Center: (square feet) Propellant Systems Components Lab 50, 715 USAF facilities on Cape Kennedy being acquired 70, 000 Total 120, 715 Launch complex 39 (pad B) Manned Spacecraft Center: Atmosphere reentry materials and structures 14,300 Technical services building 57, 800 CafeterIa-building 11 15,400 Center support-mission support warehouse 48,000 Printing and reproduction building 227 6,000 Maintenance shop building 329_ 8,000 Health physics laboratory extension building 263 960 Total 150,460 ~T6.-265 0-07-pt. 2--39 PAGENO="0610" 606 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION White Sands Test Facility: GSA maintenance building 2,304 Lumber storage building 1, 152 Chemical storage building 554 Total 4,010 Marshall Space Flight Center: Test engineering building (extension) 19,500 Gas storage and distribution system 5,540 Load test annex (extension) 54, 558 Addition to Materials Laboratory 22,534 Non-destructive Test Laboratory 8,780 Total 110,912 Michoud Assembly iracility: Contractor services building 75, 000 Slidell computer facility addition 39,400 Total 114,400 Mississippi Test Facility: Components service facility 60, 700 Cryogenic calibration facility 4,600 Total 65,300 S-IC (B-2) Static Pest Stand (one each.) S-Il (A-i) Static Test Stand (one each). Manned space flight for fiscal year 1967 total 565, 797 FISCAL YEAR 1908 Kennedy Space Center: Flight crew training building addition 32,180 Visitor information center 20,000 Dispensary addition 9, W0 KSC headquarters addition 120,000 Central telephone office 2,000 Launch Complex 39 157,004 Vertical Assembly Building Bay 2 143,727 Launch Control Center-Firing room No. 3 13, 277 Total 340,334 Manned Spacecraft Center: Lunar Receiving Laboratory 83,000 Flight crew training facility 22,200 Center support facilities . 4, 200 Total 109,400 Manned space flight for fiscal year 1968 total 449, 734 Question 18(a). What reductions in fiscal year 1968 are ecpeoted as a result of decrease in rental of real property as a result of availability of new construe- tion. Answer. MSF is presently leasing 101,547 square feet at $308,744/year. No reductions in rental are expected in fiscal year 1968 as a result of new construction. Question 18(b). What reductions in fiscal yecr 1968 are e~vpected as a result of: (a) decrease in rental of real property as a result of the availability of new construction; and (b) decrease in the rental of ADP equipment because of pur- chases of such equipment? PAGENO="0611" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 607 Answer. No major purchases of ADP equipment are programed for fiscal year 1967 or fiscal year 1968. The major purchases of ADP equipment were affected in fiscal years 1965 and 1966. In last year's testimony, Manned Space Flight reported a savings in lease cost of $3.7 million to have resulted from these pur- chases. In late fiscal year 1966, additional purchases were made, reducing lease costs by $600,000 per year. Thus, the total decrease in rental costs in fiscal year 1968 is approximately $4.3 million. Question 19. What is the esti'mated square foot cost during fIscal year 1967 at each of the three manned space flight centers for: (a) maintenance and repair; and (b) custodial services? Answer. The estimated cost per square foot of maintenance and repair and custodial services during fiscal year 1967 at the Manned Space Flight Centers is: [Dollars per square foot~ Maintenance and repair of buildings Custodial services KSC MSC MS~'C $0.44 .85 .22 $0.66 .37 .40 Question 20. NASA is requesting a $1 million increase in maintenance, repair and rehabilitation funds to cover the NASA use of Ellington Air Force Base because of a transfer of the airbase to the Teilas National Guard. What will be the new cost-sharing formula? When will NASA be able to vacate this spaoe? Answer. There will -be about 28 tenants at Ellington who will share base operations and maintenance costs in proportion to their specific utilization of base facilities. Previously, NASA reimbursed the Air Force for only those costs which were peculiar to NASA. The additional $1 million requested will pay for NASA's share of the base operations. NASA intends to be a permanent user of the flight facilities at Ellington, because of the continuing requirement for astronaut flight activities. The tem- porary office-laboratory facilities at Ellington will be vacated as permanent office-laboratories facilities become available at the Manned Spacecraft Center. Question 21. What types of management controls are being e~rercised by NASA over printing and reproduction aetivities? What factors are employed in deciding whether such operations will be carried out on an in-house or con- tractor basis at the same center? Answer. We are constantly striving for ways to effect economies in the print- ing and reproduction activities of our field centers and contractors. OMSF representatives, assisted by NASA's printing officer, recently conducted a study of printing and reproduction activities at the three Manned Space Flight field centers. Improvements in the form of better NASA printing standards and more effective utilization of equipment and personnel are in the process of being implemented. In addition, Center printing and reproduction officers are reviewing these func- tions at major contractor plants to insure that their activities are operated economically. The printing work which cannot be performed in-house because of special characteristics or size is acquired through contracts with commercial printing firms. Overflow work which cannot be accomplished in-house within the required time schedule is also obtained through this source. Question 22. It is noted that NASA is requesting funds for maintenance, repair and other administrative functions under both the Facilities Service category and the Administrative Support category. What distinction is made between these two categories on the funding of identical types of functions? Answer. The Administrative Support includes the general services which support overall installation operations. This includes administrative com- munications, printing and reproduction, administrative supplies, materials and equipment, administrative transportation (motor pool, administrative aircraft, services and operation, and movements by common carrier), and other related administrative services, such as medical services. The Facilities Services includes the rental of lands and buildings, the procure- ment of electricity, water, gas and other utilities, and maintenance of buildings PAGENO="0612" 608 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION and grounds, and minor construction; maintenance and repair of equipment; custodial services (security, janitorial, fire protection, laundry, cleaning, and other), and procurement of supplies and equipment related laboratory, shop, hardware, building materials, etc. Also covered is the requirement for major service contractual effort at the Merritt Island Launch Area and reimbursement to the Air Force for services provided the Kennedy Space Center (Range Operations). The support included in each of these categories is not duplicated in the other. As shown above, the Administrative category covers those items of general sup- port and not related to the physical plant, whereas, the Facility category covers those items of support related to the physical plant. However, included in the Facilities Services are the "Range Operations" re- quirements for major service contractual effort at the Merritt Island Laun.ch Area and reimbursement to the Air Force for services provided the Kennedy Space Center. The contractor effort covers facilities engineering and planning, maintenance, repair and operation of facilities and utilities, maintenance of roads and grounds, supply operations, fire protection, industrial health services, security, computer operations, publication and graphics support, photography and library services. Reimbursements to the Air Force, except for utilities, include maintenance and repair of buildings and equipment, security, extermi- nating, printing, medical services, photography and supply support at the Cape Kennedy Air Force Station complex. For convenience in understanding the "Range Operations", these requirements are consolidated under Facilities Serv- ices, and not distributed to Administrative Support and other functions. Question 23. What results have been achieved by the manned space ftight centers on the effecting of economies in supply operations, as directed by the President's letter of September 16, 1966? Specifically, what actions have been taken to make better use of the General Services Administration and the De- fense Supply Agency as sources of supply as well as the maintenance of supply inventories at minimum levels? Answer. The Office of Manned Space Flight and the Manned Space Flight Centers are making every effort to fulfill the objectives of the President's pro- gram to reduce costs in the supply area. We have established as goals for our centers a six-months level of supplies on hand and the identification of 90% of our common supply items with federal stock numbers. Before establishment of the goals, center inventories ranged as high as a 12 month level at one Center. The percentage of total center replenishments from GSA/DSA increased from 42% to 54% when comparing the first quarter with the last quarter of CY 1966. The goals which we have established will assist us in keeping our investment in inventories at the minimum levels necessary to accomplish our mission and enable us to effect economies by purchasing more of our supplies and materials directly from the GSA and DSA. Our centers are also taking actions to redistribute and dispose of the supplies and materials which they no longer need to meet their requirements. In addi- tion, they are pursuing active programs to make better distribution and use of available furniture, fixtures, office machines, typewriters, etc. Question 24. One the the reasons given for the increase in utilities under the categary "Range Operations" at the Kennedy Space Center is the trasu~fer of "additional" facilities from the Air Force to NASA. What are these facilities and why are they being transferred at this late date? Answer. All or a portion of the following facilities, amounting to approxi- mately 70,000 square feet, have fren or are in the process of being transferred from the Air Force to NASA: Launch Complex 15 Blockhouses and Surrounding Fenced-In Areas Launch Complex 19 Only, no Launch Facilities Blockhouse of Launch Complex 29 Hangar "C" Hangar "H" Hangar "L" Hangar "0" Cafeteria Building #1 These facilities are being acquired to provide the necessary space for person- ~neI, equipment and material in support of the Apollo build-up. As there is in- sufficient area available within the Merritt Island facilities to house these activi- ties, the above listed Air Force facilities will be utilized to alleviate these defi- ciencies. PAGENO="0613" SUMMARY OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHT SUBCOMMITTEE (MSF) FIELD TRIPS IN CONNECTION WITH FISCAL YEAR 1968 AUTHORIZATION HEARINGS The Manned Space Flight Subcommittee fiscal year 1968 authoriza- tion hearings in Washington, D.C., which commenced on March 14, 1967, were preceded by MSF' Subcommittee field trips to and hearings at NASA Manned Space Flight Centers and Apollo-involved major contractors. The schedule of these trips was as follows: January 20, 1967: Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., Beth- page, Long Island. Feb. 9-11, 1967: Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Ala. Chrysler Corp. and the Boeing Co., Michoud Assembly Facility, New Orleans, La. Mississippi Test Facility, Bay St. Louis, Miss. Feb. 16-18, 1967: North American Aviation Co., Los Angeles, Calif. Douglas Aircraft Corp., Huntington Beach, Calif. Jet. Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, `Calif. February 24-25, 1967: Kennedy Space Center, Fla. March 2-3, 1967: Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, Tex. The appendixes (A thru H) that follow this opening summary com- prise the verbatim record of these field hearings. In the succeeding paragraphs, selected highlights of interest are abstracted from the. record of these hearings. More comprehensive coverage of this material is to' be found in the appendix noted with each highlight. A1'oLLo APPLICATIONS Detailed presentations by the Marshall Space Flight Center, the Manned Spacecraft Center, and the Kennedy Space `Center as well as Chrysler, Boeing, Grumman, North American, and Douglas are. presented. Understanding of the value of the Apollo Applications program and a readiness to move on with the effort was noted. It is of concern to each firm that challenging work be provided to allow them to maintain the capability they have developed This is especially true in engineering and is becoming increasingly critical in manufac turing and testing. It is important to them that the trained manpower nc~t be lost as mainline Apollo effort fails off and the Nation's resources in thisarea are not allowed to erode. HOME TELEVISION BROADCAST SATELLITES (From appendix F; Dr.von Brann, MSFC) In due time there will be full-time television broadcast satellites. If we put up a 50-kilowatt synchronous orbit satellite, we can go 609 PAGENO="0614" 610 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION directly into home antennae on the ground. All the people would have to do is put up about a 2-foot dish, pointing at one point in the sky, and they could receive the T.V. signals directly. This would be television broadcast by satellite. The present relays, by contrast, work through a large ground station with a big dish on the ground, which in turn rebroadcasts the television programs locally. David Sarnoff of RCA once said that with such an advanced television broad- cast system, we could eradicate illiteracy from the face of the globe within 10 years. NEED FOR A SPACE STATION (From appendicc F; Dr. `von Braun, MSFC) "If we want to utilize fully man's capability in space, we shall need a space station. We shall need a capability for man to stay in orbit for long periods of time so that he can work and rest and sleep and eat under conditions as similar as possible to what he is used to here on earth. You saw today our humble beginnings in this area in our Orbital Workshop, and we feel that this is really a bargain-basement deal to come to grips with the habitation problems in outer space. We don't propose to have all our future space stations built into empty tanks of rockets, but we feel since these Saturn-TB's are going up there anyway, this is the cheapest and easiest way to learn. Tech- niques on how to build space stations can very well be based on this learning too. Long stay-time in space involves not only building a space station, but also the provision of a logistics supply system. We can have a space station that is good for several years, but nobody would like to stay there for the life of the station. So we have to rotate crews; we have to fly new supplies up there; we have to bring data back to the ground; we have to update equipment; we have to support this entire system with logistic supply systems. It was actually this interrelationship between the logistic supply system and the conduct of science at the far end of this logistic supply system that motivated Robert Gilruth and Max Faget of the Houston Center and Ernst Stuhlinger and myself from the Marshall Center to take a trip to Antarctica a few weeks ago. "We had long felt that there was a great deal of similarity between some aspects of the space program and the Antarctica program. Of course, we knew they don't wear space suits in Antarctica, and you can't wear a parka on the Moon. Also, they don't fly in rockets to the South Pole, but in turboprops. But other than that, we found our belief fully confirmed that many operational aspects of work in Antarctica and future work in space are similar enough to make fullest use of the tremendous body of practical experience accumulated down there over the years. When they have sudden emergencies on the ice, their logistics system must respond just as quickly as ours will have to respond in space. And, the scientists in those remote polar stations are just as vulnerable and just as dependent on the working of this long logistic supply system as an astronaut scientist would be in a space station. We just wanted to know how this interface be- tween science and operational support looks and how it really works. We learned a great deal." PAGENO="0615" 1908 NASA AUTHORIZATION 611 RENOVATION AND REUSE OF THE APOLLO COMMAND MODULE (From appendix D; North Anw~1can Aviation) Renovation and reuse of the Apollo Command Module is discussed. It is brought out that studies have shown that this concept is practi- cal, technically feasible and its accomplishment would not interfere with ongoing lunar program commitments. The contractor has lim- ited himself to examining the accomplishment of a second flight in Earth orbit only as opposed to using a vehicle for a second lunar mis- sion. Under this Renovated Command Module (RCM) program, existing facilities and GSE would be fully applicable with only very insignificant modifications. Under this concept, the Command Mod- ule is recovered in the normal fashion; i.e. by recovery ships. Some preliminary postflight operations would be performed, and the vehicle would then be returned to the contractors plant where inspection and tests would be accomplished. Certain subsystems would be removed, if necessary, and these would be returned to the subcontractors for refurbishment and/or replacement of individual elements. The ve- hicle would be reassembled, using. the same primary structure, and after checkout would be shipped, with a new service module, a new launch escape system, and a new adapter, back to the Cape for a sec- ond flight. Cost studies show that over $9 million could be saved by this refurbishment and flying again as opposed to production of a new vehicle. The flight experience on which this concept is based consists of two unmanned spacecraft flights of Apollo i.e., spacecraft 009 and 011. Another study effort described is that pertaining to advanced land- ing systems for Apollo Command Modules. With these systems- which would include steerable gliding chutes and~ landing retro- rockets-great mission flexibility and choice of landing areas would be realized. Landings could be made on land rather than on ocean areas, reducing recovery force requirements greatly. Reusability of the Command Module could be greatly enhanced. Lastly, it would be possible to carry three more men in the Command Module. If six men can be carried to a space station, instead of three, then the cost of transporting each man is cut in half. Reuse of the Command Module coupled with the ability to carry twice as many men will result in major economics, FUTURE IMPROVED SATURN PROGRAMS (From appendix C; Chry8lerCôrp.) Means of filling the "payload gap" between Saturn I-B i~iid Saturn V rockets are discussed. Strap-on solid rockets of five- and seven- segment construction can be used to raise the near earth orbi~ payload capability of Saturn I-B from 40,000 pounds to 78,000 and 106,000 poun.ds, respectively. Also escape capability is raised from 1,650 pounds to 1,800 and 28,500 pounds, respectively. It was noted that the solid rockets strap-ons would be man-rated in connection with the DOD MOL program and that therefore, this effort would be within the current state-of-the-art. PAGENO="0616" 612 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FUTURE UsEs OF THE LUNAR MODULE (LM) (From appendix A; Grumnman Aircraft) Use of the Lunar Module hardware for post-Apollo programs is discussed. One of the promising Voyager Mars landing capsule con- figurations under study uses significant portions of Lunar Module hardware and technology, including the LM descent engine. The resultant decrease in development costs could represent considerable dollar savings to the Government for a Mars lander type of vehicle. The LM has over 2,300 cubic feet of available volume and can carry over 20,000 pounds of payload. Study has been made of many manned and unmanned LM configurations and modifications which use its large volume, payload and propulsion capability to satisfy the goals of lunar exploration, Earth and ]unar orbital missions. The LM derivatives can perform missions that provide the basis for further long-duration space stations, lunar bases, manned plane- tary vehicles, and lunar roving vehicles. The studies have shown the LM can perform all of the Earth orbital missions that have been proposed. The advantages gained in using LM hardware for these missions stems from the continued use of the experienced LM engineering, manufacturing, and test teams together with the existing clean room type assembly areas, special test facilities and the three operational ACE stations located at the contractor's plant. Another advantage stems from the use of existing astronaut crews who will be thoroughly trained in the operation of Apollo/LM vehicles. For over 3 years a wide variety of LM derivation have been studied to fulfill the following missions: Extended Earth orbit with resupply: To 45 days. To 105 days. Extended lunar orbit: To 28 days. On the lunar surface: To 14 days. Lunar roving vehicle: To 14 days. Space rescue. Military. Scientific (astronomy etc.). Applications (communications, Earth resourses, etc.). A short list of a few of the vehicles studied are: Apollo telescope mount LM: To obtain solar astronomy data unobtainable from any other method. Earth resources LM: Survey Earth resources on a large scale, particularly in remote areas. Separate module for sensors could be used for other missions. . . Augmented lunar module: Increased payload capability with astronauts for mission up to 14 days on the Moon. LM truck A modified LM descent stage capsule of landing over 10,000 pounds payload on the Moon. 3-Man LM: Used for space rescue, place more men on the Moon or in space. Used as a space shuttle. PAGENO="0617" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 613 VOYAGER PROGRAM (From appendix F; Dr. von Braun, MSFC) "Pending approval of the Voyager program by the Congress, we expect that the Marshall Center will play a major role in its develop- ment. Voyager is an unmanned spacecraft designed to go to Mars, explore the planet from orbit through photographic and remote sensor techniques, and send a lander to measure the Martian atmosphere and surface. The present plan is to fly four Voyagers, the first in 1973; the second in 1975; the third in 1977; and the fourth in 1979. Each mission would be launched by a Saturn V, and each flight will carry two independent planetary vehicles. Each of the planetary vehicles would consist of the spacecraft that goes in orbit around Mars and a lander that will soft land, unmanned, on the Martian surface. THE EFFECTS OF SPACE FLIGHT ON MAN (From appendix H; Dr. C. A. Berry, MSC) Prior to Mercury and Gemini people in the biomedical community had some grave concerns about whether man could perform in a space flight environment. Not only that, but they had concern about whether he could even survive in it. There were predictions made about the environments, and about what was going to happen to man, and these are discussed. For example, meteorite density and its effects were of concern, but this has not been a particular problem, as far as man has been con- cerned, thus far. It has not been a problem to maintain pressure within the spacecraft and there has not been a loss by any spacecraft pressure except when done deliberately for EVA operations, nor has there been any in- advertent loss of any suit pressure. There has not been encountered any significant radiation levels as yet, realizing that spacecraft haven't actually flown into the Van Allen Belt areas, with the exception of one flight where the area was just brushed by. Isolation was predicted as a real problem. No confirmation of this has been seen. Physical confinement or restraint has been uncom- fortable, but no serious effects have resulted. The acceleration or gravity loads have been no problem. One prob- lem that was not predicted to be a problem was the workload observed during extravehicular activity. Dy~barism or the bends was pre- dicted, but this was prevented by denitrogenating the flight crew prior to launch by the use of 100 percent oxygen environment. N.o skil infection and skin breakdown was observed. There was some dryness and dandruff on some of the long-duration flights. There was some minor interference with sleep, and some sleep cycles have been altered. There was some minor fatigue. No reduction in visual acuity was observed in a space-flight environment. There were two effects that were not predicted, some eye irritation and some nasal stuffiness and hoarseness. These are thought to be related to the use of a 100 percent oxygen environment. Disorientation and motion sickness were major predictions and this was not experienced within the spacecraft or in the extravehicular PAGENO="0618" 614 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION situation. High or low blood pressure was not seen with the exception of some postthght which is discussed in some detail in the appendix proper. Some high heart rates were encountered, but abnormal rhythms of the heart were not observed. No actual fainting in the postflight situation was encountered. Some changes in blood volume were detected. Some weight loss occurred, and some minimal calcium loss. None of the mental aberration that had been predicted was en- countered. No infectious diseases developed in flight. On balance the results showed up considerably different than originally predicted. It has been shown that the space-flight environment has been better for man than the biomedical community had thought it might be, and man, in turn, has shown better response. COST AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SPACE PROGIIAM (Fro~m appendix E; Dougia~ Aircraft Co.) Twenty years from now, assuming that the number of dollars ap- propriated for space applications remains constant, those dollars will buy only half the product-by weight-that we get today. Inflation is one reason for this, but the second reason is increased sophistication of the product. Thus, the dollar cost per pound of space hardware will increase. At first glance, you might think this means that the space budget has to double in the next 20 years t.o maintain our present pace. But that is not the case. When you examine the progress to be made in 20 years, it turns out that the product this indust.ry can provide 20 years downstream will be about 50 times more effective than what it produces today. This will come about because of increases in payload effectiveness, and in- creases in transportation effectiveness. Some of this will be showu in our presentation today. With the gross national product increasing, if you again assume a constant level of space appropriations, then in 20 years we will be spending only about half the percentage of gross national product that we are now spending for space. Thus, if we spend our space appro- priations wisely, and new programs are timed to start in the proper sequence for cost effectiveness, then the years ahead will give us a much improved yield on our investment. At present, the space program produces dividends mainly in the area of scientific experimentation, and the value of this is already increasingly apparent. This new technology already contributes to everyone's personal well-being, and to the general economy. But as the space program approaches the 20-year mark, we should reach t.he point where true commercial utilization of space will start t.o pre- dominate, as opposed to simple Government utilization for experi- mental purposes. PAGENO="0619" APPENDIX A HEARINGS OF THE SUBCOMM1rVEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, GRUM- MAN AIRCRAFT ENGINEERING CORP., BETHPAGE, L.I., JANUARY 20, 1967 Appearances: L. J. Evans, J. G. Gavin, G. F. Titterton, C. W. Rathke, Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp.; Representative 0. Teague, Chairman, Representative R. Giaimo, Representative J. Wag- gonner, Jr., Representative L. Wolff, Representative E. Cabell, House of Representatives; J. Wilson (staff), P. Gerardi (staff), J. Felton (staff), R. Freitag (NASA headquarters), R. Callaghan (NASA headquarters, J. Cramer (NASA headquarters). Mr. EVANS. Gentlemen, we have Joe Gavin, our program director, here with us this morning. He will essentially lead the briefing. George Titterton, you have all met, senior vice president of the cor- poration. I have George now supervising the LM project from my area, to assure that project full corporate support. We have our program manager, Bill Rathke. I am confident he can answer any questions you may have. I make one observation that troubles us, and I am sure you have heard it before. As we look downstream, we have built up a capa- bility that you have had a chance to observe here this morning. Gentlemen, there are some 7,000 people on the project. We are talk- ing roughly on just round figures, 40 percent of the. current workload at Grumman. We can look 2 years ahead and say to ourselves fairly confidently that over 3,000 people, that have been trained over ap- proximately 4 years now on current funding that we look at, will not be employed in the space area. Just to make a point; and I am sure you have been hearing .that from a lot of. other places. Let me comment very briefly about the other bird-orbiting astronomical observatory-because this ties in with the projection of the corporation. Dr. Tripp is our program director on that project. The first bird flew late last spring-April 8, 1966-and was not a successful flight because of a power failure. It orbited for 2 days ~thd finally was deliberately put into a lumble mode. Now, the power failure reflected itself in the battery-the battery cells were overheating. There has been a very detailed study made both by Grumman and by Goddard and by a joint committee, who, in turn, reported to the associate administrator. We, in turn, have reviewed it carefully and have reached agreement with NASA as to the modifications required. The second flight has been delayed to assure we don't run into problems as we did last time. Arcing of the star trackers Was another problem which is being corrected. Fortunately, several things were proved about the spacecraft opera- tion before the failure became catastrophic. 615 PAGENO="0620" 616 1968 NASA AUThORIZATION We were very pleased with the stabilization that the vehicle achieved in the initial stabilization phase. I might point out that the specifi- cation for fine pointing may be characterized as follows: if you are sitting in Bethpage, roughly 40 miles from New York City, you could hold a target the size of a baseball in New York City. In technical terms, this is one-tenth of a second of arc. Now, this vehicle achieved initial stabilization. It latched onto stars. It stabilized itself, held it for some time, and then the clock would reset itself due to the star tracking arcing. Chairman TEAGUE. You say the next is due to fly next year? Mr. EVANS. Yes; in the beginning of 1968. Now, the experiments are coming along very well. The first one flew with the Wisconsin experiment looking out one end and three additional experiments looking out the opposite end. The Smithsonian experiment will fly next time with the Wisconsin experiment package; There is still a great need in the scientific area for this telescopic capability. One of the projects on the AAP, as you know, is how do we get a manned telescope out and stabilize it. I can say this to you, the know-how we have acquired, in OAO pointing toward the SAP, is very useful. This is the cross-pollination I think you achieve if you are fortunate enough to run a major unmanned and a major manned program at the same time. I don't know what it is worth in dollars and cents. I can tell you from the management confidence level, it is worth a great deal. Chairman TEAGUE. Any questions, Bob? Representative GIAIMO. Not yet. Mr. EVANS. Why don't I let Joe launch right in then? He has a presentation to make and I am sure we will be able to answer all of your questions. Chairman TFJAGUE. Gentlemen, if you `won't comment straight out, I will ask the question: What difference does it make as to whether you get a certain amount of money next year and relieve the pres- sure, so to speak, instead of this concentration? Mr. EVANS. Joe, why don't you plunge right into answering this question? Mr. GAVIN. The question has been asked, what happens if the press of the schedule is relieved and the program is allowed to stretch out? This has been studied a number of times in the past. I think that some of the things that come to mind immediately are that, first of all, we have done quite a bit of stretching out within the framework of the present dates. Periodically we have reviewed those. things which either we are doing or which our subcontractors are doing, with the intent of pushing them as far downstream as will fit the program. So in this respect, a certain amount of elasticity has already been used up. This has been done in order to keep the cost rate from peaking any more than it has. The second thing that comes to mind is that if a stretchout in dates occurs, there are certain fixed costs which seem to continue on for this additional time. The studies which I am sure that NASA has made or we have made or our subcontractors have made, all seem to show this up as a factor, which tends to make stretching of this sched- ule cost more in total. ` PAGENO="0621" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 617 Now, I think there is some argument as to whether the penalty is 10 cents on the dollar or whether it is 15. I think this is a very dif- ficult thing to determine, but it appears that the fixed portion of the cost adds up when the schedule is extended. There are some savings, of course. In other words, there could be some immediate savings in overtime pay, this sort of thing. Now, unfortunately, these studies tend to look at it in an ideal sense, where you can talk in terms of manpower applied and schedules that you meet and so forth. I think there is another thought that should be considered, and that is, the time which elapses between the substantial completion of the vehicle and the time that it is launched, is already quite considerable, and I believe that if there is a significant stretchout in the speed with which things happen, there is going to be a demand for additional intermediate testing to see whether, in fact, the vehicle is still in sound condition. This is a difficult thing to evaluate, but by comparison with any of our aircraft experience, the longer a vehicle sits without a subsystem being ex- ercised, the more doubt begins to grow as to whether that subsystem is indeed ready at the time you put the switch on. So as I look at this from the astronaut's point of view, I would say that I want the vehicle checked out just before I go. From that point you would backtrack to the factor sequence, and I think that in a stretchout, it could be expected some additional testing would make sense from the operational point of view. This then represents additional work. I think that it has been made clear in previous studies that either speeding up or stretching out tends to increase the cost. It is my own feeling, that the valley is somewhat flatter than perhaps has been said in the past. That isn't a very definitive answer, but these sire the things that come to min.d, Mr. Teague, when you ask me my opinion as to what would happen if you string things out. Chairman TEAGUE. The operation that we have just seen, you are running 7 days a week and 24 hours a day? Mr. EVANS. Yes. Chairman TEAGUE. Is that because TM is a pacing item or because that is the best way to run the program? Mr. GAVIN. The around-the-clock operation has to do with the first delivery vehicles and the reason for that is that we are running behind, as I will comment on later. We are trying to make sure that we do not impact the rest of the program, because there is such a train of events in progress that we just cannot afford to become a limiting element. Mr. EVANS. During a checkout, it is probably desirable anyway. If you were to run an 8-hour shift only, startup discontinuity, would take additional time. Each shift, when it starts up, would just have to look back to find out what had happened. Chairman TEAGUE. What we are doing today will be printed as a hearing, if you want to revise or put any additional material in. Mr. GAVIN. I think, Mr. Teague, I would like to consider that question carefully before answering it. Chairman TEAGUE. Bob, do you ha.ve a question? PAGENO="0622" 618 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Represen~ative GIAIMo. Do I understand that you are estimating cost for fiscal 1967 of $350 million and now they are going to be $400 million? Mr. GAVIN. Fiscal 1967? Chairman TEAGUE. Excuse me, Joe, we have asked the staff to give us an approximate figure. I am sure they wo&t exactiy jibe, but they should be very similar to ours and close to ours. Mr. GAVIN. I was going to pick up the question later, but since it's been asked, let me answer it. At some point in the past, and I would have, to check on this, I believe the $350 million figure was forecast. However, when your staff visited last August, we were projecting at that time $382 million for fiscal 1967. Representative GIAIM0. That's without any thought of a stretchout? Mr. GAVIN. Yes, that's just actual cost increases. Representative GIAIM0. Without changing the schedule? Mr. GAVIN. Yes. Shortly thereafter we reviewed with MSC, on a work package basis, the work for the fiscal year, and we revised our projection downward to $373 million, and at this point we are strug- gling to attain that number. The more trouble we have with the vehicles you saw out there this morning, the more difficulty, the more unlikely the probability becomes with regard to that number. I think that we should certainly hit it within 3, 4, 5 percent. I think this is possible. We are in the position where a great ;deal of work is behind us and where the character of the work remaining is not as diversified or as problematical compared with some of the things we have con- tended with in the past. Representative GIAIM0. Then that leads me to my main purpose of asking the question. Going back to Mr. Teague's question with regard to stretchout and how it would affect you and how it would affect cost-if your costs seem to be increasing anyway, without a stretchout, why would the stretchout increase cost to the Government rather than decrease them for this year? Realizing that there is a certain ~problem with built-in expenses, `and `so forth, there is also the savings from a stretchout. I don't quite clearly understand that. Mr. GAVIN. I failed to make that clear. It is true that the cost for a given time period can be reduced, but I was referring to a growth in total cost. I was looking at the cost to complete the job. In other words, it is possible to decrease the cost rate in any particular time period, but you then have to complete the job, and the point that I was making had to do wit'h the effect of a stretchout on the com- pletion. Representative WOLI~T. The overall cost? Mr. GAVIN. That's correct. Representative GIAIM0. And do you have any way of estimating what that would be? Mr. GAVIN. Well, I think that would depend. Representative `GIAIMo. It would depend on how long a stretch- out is. Mr. GAVIN. It would depend on the stretchout, but I am sure for any proposed set of conditions, that could be estimated. PAGENO="0623" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 619 Mr. TITTERTON. May I respond to Congressman Teague's question? There is another factor bearing on stretchout which becomes impor- tant if any followon program such as AAP is intended. If you were t:o look at your handout, figure 1 lists recommended reorder dates. This shows that our subcontractors-and this refers to all the major systems, which would be approximately some 80 to 90 percent of the total outside cost-the end of their line is in the very near future. They are only talking 3 to 4 months from now, and all of these people, if they are going to have any continuity, must have a reorder. Now, if you go to the figure before that, it shows you (fig. 2-3) fiscal 1966 and 1967 expenditures, major subcontractors, it shows you here- Chairman TEAGUE. What do you mean by reorder? Mr. TITTERTON. Well, they would have delivered all requirements for the present 15 LM's. If there are to be any followup LM's or equivalents, they will be breaking down their lines and have to start over fresh until they got an order at that time. Representative WA000NNER. Actually, isn't this predominant in all your thinking about stretchout? Isn't this the real reason for addi- tional cost-the breakdown of continuity? Mr. TITTERTON. Yes. This is the point that Joe was making, but I would like to make another point, that your major cost will have been expended as of 3 or 4 months from now. If you look at page 46 of the statement it shows you the rate of expenditures of the subcon- tractors. You will find that presently they are running about $15 RECOMMENDED RE-ORDER DATES TMC!RCS CLUSTERS * LAST RE-ORDER DATE TO MAINTAIN SUBCONT RCA/COMMUNICATIONS FACTORY LINE HAM-STD/ECS <>LAST RE-ORDER DATE TO MAINTAIN GRUMMAN AEROJET/ASC PROP TANKS FACTORY LINE ARMAICAUTION & WARNING ARMA!SIGNAL CONDITIONERS RCA/RADAR BELL/ASC ENGINE AiRESEARCHISC HELIUM TRW SYS/AGS ALLISON/DESC PROP TANKS TRW SYS/DESC ENG GRUMMAN MACHINED PARTS r~i~ `66 FIGURE 1 PAGENO="0624" 620 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FISCAL 1f,~ & `67 EXPENDITURES: MAJOR SUBCONTRACTORS 180 ACTUAL - ---FORECAST - JULY 1966 160 ---- FORECAST - DEC 1966 140 120 $ MILLIONS 100 PER QTR 80 60 _ - 40 1----' 1 2 3 4 1 2 34 FY'66 FY `67 FIGuRE 2-3 million a month. By the fourth quarter of this fiscal year, by May and June, they are down to $3 million per month. What you are looking at there is a quarterly expenditure. In other words, in the fourth quarter of fiscal 1967, which is only 3 to 4 months from now, you are running at a rate of $10 million a quarter. In other words, the expenditures, if you stopped them today, you would save a few assembly operations. If you stopped them a few months from now, you would have all your hardware. Mr. EVANS. Let's take a for instance, an inertial platform, and you order 15 of them, and you have reached the point that the production ]ine has stopped and 15 units flown out, you don't fly for a year-you have a very serious problem of maintaining the repair capability of the repair facility, how many men you will need, the overhead ap- plied to it and many other problems, you see. Now, as far as going back to production, having a year's break, and you come in and order 15 more of them, the whole facility will have to be reborn onto the project. In the meantime, the talent has to be re- trained. You will have some of it available, but a good deal of it has generally shifted, if not to another project, even to another organiza- tion. Chairman TEAGUE. Yes; I understand that. Do you have any ques- tions? Representative WOLFF. What about changes? Have any changes caused you to increase the cost in the vehicle itself? Mr. GAVIN. Well, I think yes. I will have to explain in some level of degree, because when people say "changes," this covers a lot of ground. For example, in the LM, as in other parts of. the Apollo program, there is an extensive effort to control the configuration of the vehicle PAGENO="0625" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 621 down to a very fine level of detail. So, consequently, anything which changes is a change and, therefore, of the total number of changes, there are a great many rather minor changes. Some of them even as small as correcting the paperwork. But on the other hand, there are from time to time, significant functional or engineering changes, which do produce a change in the vehicle, which do cause additional effort on our part and which do result in changes in how it works. I would say that in the past year, something on the order of-certainly over a year-something on the order of $15 to $17 million worth of significant changes were made. Does that answer your question, Mr. Wolff? Representative WOLFF. Yes. Representative GIAIM0. One other question, the $372 million, plus or minus, that you mentioned for fiscal 1967, that gives us how many LM's? Mr. GAVIN. How many LM's? Representative GIAIM0. Units? Mr. GAVIN. We will have delivered LM-3 by the end of the fiscal year, LM-~-5 by the end of the calendar year. Representative GIAIM0. Well, by the end of the 1967 fiscal year, one will be delivered? Mr. GAVIN. No. Representative GIAIM0. Two? Mr. GAVIN. Through LM-3. Representative GIAIM0. Through LM-3? Mr. GAVIN. In other words, we would have the ground-test vehicle, such as the ITA-8, plus LM's 1,2, and 3. Mr. RATHKE. Also the status of the following vehicles will be ad- vanced. Mr. TITTERTON. Yes; LM-4 and 5 will be in the final test area at that point. Mr. GAVIN. Perhaps I should explain that right today you can go to one of our plants and find pieces and parts of LM-7, subassembhes, this sort of thing, and LM-6 is starting and LM-5 is further along than that. Representative GIAIM0. Well, I am just trying to get a picture in my mind, as to what costs remain in the future. Your contract calls for approximately 15 altogether, does it? Mr. GAVIN. Fifteen is correct. Representative GIAIM0. So what costs remain for the balance of the 15 in general, if you can give me that? Mr. GAVIN. Well, there is a chart in the handout. Representative GIATM0. I know some of them are probably in the preliminary stages and some costs of the future ones are in the 1967 budget. Mr. GAVIN. That's correct, and in your handout, there is a curve which shows by quarter what the trend is for the total cost; and if you look forward to that, it looks as though the next fiscal year is going to be something on the order of $150 million. I think that gives you your comparison. Representative GIAIM0. But then roughly for fiscal 1967, we would have completed two, I understand, in final testing at this time? Mr. GAVIN. Yes. ~Te-265 O-67~--~pt. 2-~----4O PAGENO="0626" 622 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Representative GIAIM0. And what else? Mr. RATHKE. Four more identifiable. Representative GIAnro. Four more identifiable ? Mr. RATHKE. Yes. Mr. GAVIN. And parts. Mr. RATHKE. And parts for everything. Mr. GAVIN. You see, there will be pieces, assemblies, at roughly ~1/2 month intervals. Representative GIAIM0. Well, the only thing I am trying to get at is that there is an awful lot of money yet left to be expended for the completion of this entire project. Mr. GAVIN. I think that you should also bear in mind that the operation at Cape Kennedy is at this point just approaching full scale, and that this will continue on through the launch period for the program, and we have tended in this discussion to concentrate on what is happening in the production end of the business, without say- ing very much about that. Representative WAGGONNER. I think that charts on this handout (fig. 2-3, p. 62O~ br the total expenditures and for the subcontractors, really reflect what is happening there and what is going to happen better than anything else because they show that at the end of the first quarter, we had peaked as far as actual expenditures are concerned, and it is a downhill proposition. Mr. EVANS. Yes, the project is over the peak and it is going down- hill. Representative WAGGONNER. The. one thing that interests me in this chart is that during the first quarter of fiscal 1967, the actual expendi- tures were just a wee bit below forecast. Mr. EVANS. That is exactly what we have been reviewing in great depth in the last 2 weeks. I am confident of it, but we are going to follow through and check to see that that is what has happened. Incidentally, the relationships are great with these people and we have been working pretty much to midnight to make sure that there are good cost projections on this project, and still make the schedule. We are, at the moment, at the critical stage. This is it right now, and I think you will hear more as to that from Gavin. Representative WAGGONNER. Not only is that true with the total expenditure, it is true for the first and second quarters with the sub- contractors, too. Mr. GAVIN. That's correct. Mr. EVANS. Yes, sir. Mr. GAVIN. Shall I go back, Mr. Teague, and see if we can't get back to the schedule? Chairman TEAGUE. Any other questions from anybody else? Representative WoLFF. In the event that there would be any addi- tional vehicles that would be ordered, what would be the outside date before you would have the start of the cost all over again? Mr. GAVIN. Well, this is indicated back oir figure 1 of the handout, and it falls into two categories. It involves the startup time reflected on our subcontractors, the equipment manufacturers. As you would suspect, they reach this point before we do, because of the fact that there is a leadtime of the equipmeiit with respect to the construction PAGENO="0627" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 623 of the vehicle. The date that looks like the key date to Grumman is August of this coming year. ~Representative WA000NNER. Joe, isn't it true that at any time you have this kind of an interruption, the costs really do become excessive? Mr. GAVIN. Well, that's right. Any time that you have an inter- ruption in the sequence of operations, you are faced with either tying up people or facilities unproductively, and this then represents a direct cost for keeping them, or if you dismantle them, you then face the restart problem. Representative WOLFF. Mr. Chairman, the reason I asked that question is because of the fact that during the hearings when I ques- tioned General Schriver about the duplication which existed at the TM project, there was some question as to whether or not, some of the old experiments could be carried out on existing vehicles, and I believe that this was a point made, that a goodly percentage of them could be car- ried. Therefore, if it was a question of duplication, a question of cost is something which might be considered. `Chairman TEAGUE. Yes, sir. Thank you for inviting us to your district and good to be here. Representative WOLFF. Thank you, sir. Chairman TEAGUE. One other question: I have forgotten what you people told us about your post~Apollo program. I would hope that these subcommittee hearings may force this post-Apollo problem to a head, where if there are some decisions made before the middle of the year, that you would know whether there are going to be other orders. Can you tell us of any other proposals for use of the TM on down the road in the space program? Mr. EVANS. Looking ahead, in general, we are actively looking at things like Voyager. We are probably the only company that has the soft-lander capability for Mars. We have had roughly 60 men working on this for about a year now. One of the promising Voyager Mars lander capsule configura- tions under study uses a significant amount of Lunar Module hard- ware and technology, including the TM descent engine. The result- ing decrease in development costs would represent a considerable dol- lar saving to the U.S. Government for a Mars lander type of vehicle. We have studied many manned and unmanned TM configurations and modifications which use its large volume, payload and propulsion capability to satisfy the goals of lunar exploration, earth and lunar orbital missions. The TM derivatives can perform missions that pro- vide the basis for future long duration space stations, lunar bases, manned planetary vehicles and lunar roving vehicles. We have examined over 100 scientific and applications experiments which included the use of several types of telescopes and a wide va- riety of sensors. The TM, as you know, has over 2,300 cubic feet of available volume and can carry over 20,000 pounds of payload. Quite frankly, we had been looking, as T think any progressive company does, along the very lines that Congressman Wolff has just brought up. These studies have positively concluded that the TM can perform all of the earth orbital missions, both scientific and military, that have PAGENO="0628" 624 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION. been proposed. The obvious advantage to be gained from using TM hardware for these missions stems from the continued use of the ex- perienced IM engineering, manufacturing, and test teams together with the existing clean-room type assembly areas, special test facil- ities, and the three operational ACE stations now located at Beth- page. Another advantage stems from the use of existing astronaut crews who are now being thoroughly trained in the operation of Apollo/ LM vehicles. These men, many of whom have had extensive Air Force flight training, as well as NASA instruction, will not require any fur- ther training to accomplish these proposed missions. For over 3 years, a wide variety of LM derivatives have been studied to fulfill the following mission: Extended Earth Orbit-to 45 days With resupply-to 105 days Extended Lunar Orbit-to 28 days On the Lunar Surface-to 14 days Lunar Roving Vehicle-to 14 days Lunar Scientific Stations Space Rescue Military Scientific (Astronomy, etc.) Applications (Communications, Earth Resources, etc.) A short list of a few of the vehicles studied are: Apollo Telescope Mount LM: To obtain solar astronomy data unobtainable from any other method. Earth Resources LM: Survey earth resources on a large scale-particularly in remote areas. Separate module for sensors could be used for other missions. Augmented Lunar Module: Increased payload capability with astronauts for mission up to 14 days on the moon. LM Truck: A modified LM descent stage capable of landing over 10,000 pounds payload on the moon. 3-Man LM: Used for space rescue, place more men on the moon or in space. Used as a space shuttle. Now, that to me derives a lot of technology from LM, but is quite obviously not an LM vehicle. I don't know whether that answers your question. Representative Wor~~. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportu- nity of sitting in. Chairman TEAGUE. Come back later. Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Teague, in view of the fact that we took the tqur first, I am going to shortcut some of the initial remarks I had planned that are purely descriptive and go on rather more quickly into where we stand (figs. 4-8). I do think it is worth commenting, however, that the principal functions of the LM vehicle stand at a much higher confidence level than perhaps they did at the beginning of the design, or even at the time of your last visit. For example, the NASA's greatly successful Gemini program seems to have conclusively disposed of questions con- cerning rendezvous and docking. With respect to the question of the lunar landing, we think that the NASA programs involving Ranger, Orbiter, and Surveyor, have dispelled a great many of the questions which people were asking back when we really got started. I think these represent real support to the manned space operation from the unmanned side of the house. PAGENO="0629" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 625 GRUMMAN AIRCRAFT ENGINEERING CORPORATION REPORT FOR THE SUBCOMMI1TEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT 20 Jan 1967 FIGTJRE 4 AGENDA * INTRODUCTION * FORMAL PRESENTATION - REVIEW CY66 - CURRENT STATUS - PROGRAMSUMMARY * INFORMALDISCUSSION *TOUR * LUNC~i * DEPART FIGuRE 5 PAGENO="0630" 626 OUTLINE OF FORMAL PRESENTATION 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION * INTRODUCTION * GENERAL FAMILIARIZATION * REVIEW CY66 - MAJOR MILESTONES - SIGNIFICANTENGINEERINGACI-IIEVEMENTS - SIGNIFICANT MANAGEMENT ACTI VITIES * CURRENT STATUS - SUBSYSTEM STATUS - OPERATING PLAN - PLANNED MAJOR MILESTONES CY 67 * MANPOWER * COSTS * CONCLUSION FIGuRE 6 I I FIGuRE 7 PAGENO="0631" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 627 It is rather interesting to note that none of these results have de- manded a significant change in the LM vehicle. In talking about the status that we have at present, I would like to first take up the signifi- cant accomplishments during the past year, calendar 1966. Now, in your handout, we have presented several slides that involve accomplishments at Bethpa~e, White Sands, the Manned Spacecraft Center and Kennedy Space ~enter, and I think that I will not go into each one of these in detail. I think you can read these easier than I can speak of them. I would like to highlight several of these. At Bethpage (figs. 9-10) the buildup and testing of the spacecraft elec- trjcal subsystem was accomplished first on a mockup, the electronic system integration rig, and then on the LTA-1 house spacecraft. Now, this activity represented a very necessary background to the design, the manufacture and checkout of the spacecraft, the sort of thing that is now in progress, which you saw this morning. It has con- firmed the basis for circuit design, for working out the problems of PIGUR1~ 8 PAGENO="0632" 628 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1966 BEFHPAGE MILESTONES CONTRACT DATE ACTUAL * IES BETHPAGE TESTING COMPLETED 12/22 * TM-2A/R A/S REFURBISHED FOR LTA-5D PROP. TESTS SHIPPED TO WSTF 11/30 12/15 * LTA-1 COMPLETED FEAT ON FIRST TRY --- 11/30 * INTERIM COMPONENT QUAL TESTING (90% COMPLETE) `11/15 11/15 * IES FIRST MANNED SIMULATION TESTING COMPLETED --- 11/8 * M-5SHIPPEDTOMSCFOR DISPLAY --- 11/7 * LTA-5D SHIPPED TOWSTF 10/1 10/21 * LMS-1 SHIPPED TO MSC 11/1 10/14 * LTA-3 COMPLETED IN-HOUSE VIBRATION TESTING --- 10/4 * TM-6 A/S RR TEST MODEL SHI PPED TO MSC 9/1 9/6 * LTA-1OR REFURBISHED FOR FLIGHT - SHIPPED TO KSC 9/15 9/15 FiGURE 9 1966 BEIHPAGE MILESTONES (Contd) CONTRACT NAME DATE ACTUAL * M-3 (FVV) REFURBISHED FOR FACI LITY VERIFICATION SHIPPED TOKSC 7/30 8/12 * LTA-3D TRANSFER TO TEST 8/19 8/25 * TM-8 LAND INC RADAR TEST MODEL SHI PPED TO MSC 7/1 8/10 * LTA-3A TRANSFER TO TEST 7/15 7/24 * LTA-1 HOUSE S/C NO. 1 COMPLETION OF SUBSYSTEM INSTL & READY FOR INTEGRATED TESTING. 5/27 6/15 * ES I OCP's COMPLETED - 31; 4 IN WORK, 4 NOT STARTED * TM-i ASCENT STAGE RENDEZVOUS RADAR TEST MODEL SHIPPED TO MSC 4/1 5/6 * TM-4 ASCENT/DESCENT STAGE INTERFACE COMPLETED --- 4/27 * TM-2A START THERMAL VACUUM TESTING 12/30/65 3/3/66 * TM-2D COMPLETED FIRST THERMAL VACUUM RUNS --- 2/2 * INCENTIVE CONTRACT SIGNED , --- 1/14 FIGURE 10 the ground support equipment and developing the techniques for running these operational checkout procedures. In late November we succeeded in carrying out the final engineering acceptance test sequence on the LTA-1, the house spacecraft, on the first try. Another thing which looms large in our mind from the past year, has to do with the LTA-3, a structural test vehicle. This is the next PAGENO="0633" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 629 slide that you see (fig. 11). This is a picture of the LTA-3 as it was hung on a spring mount in our testing laboratory while we ran a vibratory survey to determine the response of the structure of the spacecraft to the rocket engine, and also the reaction control thrusters. This was of particular importance, because it defined more clearly the type of environment which much of our equipment is subjected to during the course of the actual mission. I will speak a little bit more about this vehicle when we come to the things which have been going on at Houston. I FIGuRE 11 PAGENO="0634" 630 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION The n~xt slide (fig. 12) shows the first thermal vacuum test article, TM-2, which is shown here being lowered into Grumman's thermal vacuum chamber, to determine the heat transfer characteristics of t.he vehicle. This is a very important vehicle because it provided the de- sign information that was necessary to proceed with the lightweight thermal skin insulation and other features which determine the heat balance in the vehicle. Chairman TEAGUE. What temperatures are involved there, approxi- mately? Mr. GAVIN. Well, we have to look at this vehicle from the stand- point of the lunar surface in full sunlight, to t.he lunar surface in full shadow, which is a range of plus or minus 3000 F., approximately. When it is hot, we are trying to keep the heat out; and when it iS cold, we are trying to keep the heat in. We are trying to do this in a suffi- ciently efficient fashion that we do not put too large a demand on the environmental control system in t.he vehicle. It is a little bit like having a well-insulated house, I suppose. In any event, these lists which you can pursue in more detail by yourself, tell you what we did at Bethpage during the past year, and I suppose that we should point out a couple of things that we didn't do. We did not succeed in delivering LM-1 and LTA-8 by the end of the year, which was something that we were striving mightily to do. But also, I want to point out the list of things, which were happenmg at Beth- page does not include the fact that we have had astronauts here almost FIGURE 12 PAGENO="0635" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 631 every week, certainly at least every other week during the past year, who have participated in our design discussions, who have reviewed the program on the vehicle, and who have spent time in evaluating the cockpit portion of the vehicle, the adequacy of everything from, say, circuit breakers to provisions for stowing the back pack and how they can reach the various controls. With regard to the activity at White Sands (fig. 13), I would like to highlight several other things which have been accomplished there. After a difficult starting-up period, we have been able to accomplish a vastly improved operation, whether it is measured in terms of test schedule or on the basis of runs per unit time. The first slide (fig. 14) in the sequence shows an ascent stage test vehicle, PA-i being lowered into the vacuum can at White Sands. The tests run on this vehicle represent the demonstration of the adequacy of the propulsion system, including the propellant feed system. Also, this series of tests provides us with a demonstration of the supporting ground service equipment. These tests have included mission simula- tion firings, and off nominal condition firings. We have also evalu- ated the reaction control system, and in particular, the supercritical helium pressurizing system in this case, for the descent stage. Representative WA000NNER. How much altitude can you simulate with this? Mr. GAVIN. This brings us up to something like 150,000 feet, which is adequate from the standpoint of developing the full expansion in the rocket engine nozzle. This next shot of the facility shows the can with the cover on (fig. 15). Down at the bottom is the business end of the steam ejector, which provides the pumping to keep the can at the low pressure when the engine is running. From our point of view, this is an indispens- able operation because it is the only way that we are able to test the WSTF MILESTONES ACCOMPLI SHED: 1966 COMPLETED: * PRE-PRODUCTION DESCENT PROPULSION SYSTEM 4/27/66 TEST SERIES (PD-i) * PRODUCTION DESCENT PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST 11/22/66 SERIES IN SUPPORT OF LM-1 (PD-2) * PRE-PRODUCTION ASCENT PROPULSION SYSTEM 9/23/66 TEST SERIES (HA-3) * PRODUCTION ASCENT PROPULSION SYSTEM 12/28/66 ALTiTUDE TEST SERIES (PA-i), INCLUDING: - COLD FLOW - REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM - FIRE-IN-HOLE - MISSION DUTYCYCLE FIGURE 13 PAGENO="0636" propulsiOn aspects of the vehicle on the ground in anything approach- ing the conditi0~ that would be encount~ed in space. It is the prac- tical solution of what we can do on the ground to get ready for space flight. This shows up, of course, in the propulsion system itself, but it also shows up in those things which are a~ected by the propulsion system. We have actually taken instrumented readings of the reac- tion of the structure, for example, to the ener~Y output of the engine. I think that perhaps I am jumping ahead a little bit, but I will men- tion that we have one ve~ ~~teresting series of tests where we fired the ascent stage adjacent to the descent stage to simulate the condition at lunar launch. This has been 50~ething that we have been analyzing and ~unniilg model tests on for a good portion of the program~ and has given us an indication of the pressures that exist along the base heat shield of the ascent stage. This is an area where we are still carrying out some work to resolve the interaction of the engine 5tarting pressures and the base heat shield. This is the sort of thing, that as far as I can see, just couldn't be ~~complished without this kind of a facility to do it in. Repre5entat~ WA000 ~n. Is this the only facility of this sort that we have, or does this facility exist in a number of other places other than White Sand5~ Mr. GAvIN. i believe at AEDO there is a facility which might pos- Mr. FR~ITA0. There is a similar facility at Tullahoma, and there sibly do this. are similar tests going on at Tullaboma for this program' BepreSentat~ WAGG0~~ Who is conducting those tests ~ 1968 N~SP~ AUT~0~~TI°~ PAGENO="0637" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 633 Mr. FREITAG. The Air Force is conducting them for us. Representative WA060NNER. Is there any correlation between the two to give one the advantage of any advance the other might have? Mr. FREITAG. I would say that the data itself is not too related. The techniques and testing techniques are, and they are correlated, yes. Mr. GAVIN. Well, I guess that we should make the point, that in the course of the engine development, both engines have been run at AEDC in order to make sure that correlation was established, because of the fact that AEDC did have a background in testing many other engines. We have had short sequences at Tullahoma for that pur- pose. FIGURE 15 PAGENO="0638" 634 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Now, we have another list of things which have been done in the past year, which has to do with the Manned Spacecraft Center at Houston (fig. 16). One of the key items which I would like to high. light is t.he same LTA-3 structural test article I mentioned earlier (fig. 17). Once we had run the series of tests here at Bethpage, the vehicle was shipped to Houston. There a simulated external thermal skin was applied, and the whole vehicle was mounted in a spacecraft adapter. That is that conical device with the patches on it; then the whole assembly was shaken and vibrated. You see, in the tests here at Bethpage, we were pursuing the effect of the engine on the spacecraft., the engine firing portion of the mis- sion, and at Houston, we were pursuing the question of the environ- ment during launch `and boost when the LM is inside the stack. Now, the next picture (fig. 18) shows the upper end of the facility; and here I guess I am speaking more for MCS than for Grumman, because it is their facility. This is a huge set of loudspeakers which p~~r acoustical energy down the funnel. Inside the funnel has been mounted the spacecraft adapter, the LM within it; and then on top of that, the command and service module portions, so that we had the spacecraft stack inside this funnel. Then acoustical energy was poured down it to simulate the launch boost conditions. From this we were able to read from the instruments on the LM the reaction of the LM vehicle to that environment. This was of very great signifi- cance to us because it allowed us to obtain a better indication of the environment to which we would have to subject the equipment in the I~M; and in many cases we were able to reduce some of the earlier overconservative assumptions which we had made. This was a ma- jor step ahead in bringing to completion the development of some of the LM equipment. There are several other items of note that went on at houston. The next picture (fig. 19) shows a mock-up of the ascent stage which was provided to MSC to support radar range testing of the rendez- vous antenna. MSC MILESTONES COMPLETED: 1966 * TEST PREPARATION AREA: COMPLETED MECHAN I CAL FACILITY MOD 10/15/66 * RENDEZVOUS RADAR TESTING, TM-i 10/13/66 * VIBRATION TESTING, LTA-3 11/17/66 FIGURE 16 PAGENO="0639" FIGURE 17 The next slide (fig. 20) shows the antenna involved. This pic- ture was taken on another vehicle out in the final assembly area. The next slide (fig. 21) shows a very crude representation of a piece of the descent stage. That's one landing gear sticking up in the air. This was used also to examine, on the radar range, the landing radar, which is mounted on the descent stage. We have also delivered to MSC the first of the LM mission simm- lators, which is now approaching operational status. This is the Link simulator. It provides MSC with a LM companion for the Apollo mission simulator that is also there. 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 635 PAGENO="0640" 636 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION With respect to what has been going on at Cape Kennedy, we have provided you with yet another list (fig. 22). The first slide shows the LTA-1OR vehicle being picked up here (fig. 23) at Grum- man by the Guppy, which is an operation which always amazes those of us who once were concerned with aircraft programs. All of the vehicles have been delivered in this fashion, and it has proved very useful. The next slide (fig. 24) shows LTA-1OR in the assembly area at Cape Kennedy. The base is a representative descent stage. The ascent stage is merely a mass simulation. FIGURE 18 PAGENO="0641" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 637 Now, the purpose of this vehicle is to ride the first Saturn V booster, so that we can measure the environment produced by that booster. Consequently the descent stage is instrumented to show what the stresses and the vibrations are. There is a similar test vehicle lined up for the second Saturn launch. Both of these vehicles represent an interesting program economy in view of the fact that they were used for other tests before they were assigned to this particular pur- pose. Both of these are structural test articles. One of them was used in conjunction with the testing of the spacecraft adapter at Tulsa and the other one was used in connection with the evaluation at M~FC, Huntsville, of the structural dynamic characteristics of the whole stack. Representative WA000NNER. These structural test items are made to conform with presently adjusted overall weights, when you launch them, when you use them as structural test items? Mr. GAVIN. Yes, sir. Representative WAGGONNER. Is this the proper point or later, or put it in anywhere, but are you going to give us some idea of what the weight picture has been from the outset? Mr. GAVIN. Yes. As a matter of fact, that's exactly the next thing I was going to come to. I'd like to highlight just a couple of engineer- ing accomplishments during the past year, the ones that stand out to us (fig. 25). The first of these is the fact that we have been success- ful in bringing the weight under control. This has been `a long, FIGURE 19 76-2~65 0-67-pt. 2-41 PAGENO="0642" 638 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION troublesome problem, and this chart (fig. 26) which will take a little bit of study, shows what has happened. We are plotting weight against time. The term "SWIP" means super weight improvement program. We didn't invent it for this pro- gram. We inherited it from one of the other programs. What this means is that we put a highly talented team in to review all of the designs which have occurred, and we literally scraped the ounces out. We have campaigned all the structure, all the equipment., and all the requirements. FIGURE ~2O PAGENO="0643" KSC MILESTONES COMPLETED: 1966 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 639 * KSC BECANE AN OPERATIONAL SITE. * 547 GSE END ITEMS RECEIVED ON SITE;474 VALIDATED * LTA1OR: LAUNCH COMPLEX 39 ACTIVATION: 15 DEC 66 *LM-1 - OPERATIONS & CHECKOUT BUILDING V'STAB &CONT LAB V SPARE PARTS & TOOL ROOM y'MODIFICATION SHOP V BATTERY MAINT LAB v'ACE SIC STATION, 3 V'ACE S/C STATION, 4 VCALI BRATI ON LA B - SPACECRAFT SPARES BUILDING - PYROTECHNIC INSTL FACILITY * COMPLETED SIMULATION STACKING OPS WITH SLA ORD ACCOMPLI SHED 12/15/66 8130166 8/30/66 10/26/66 6/10/66 8/12/66 12/30/66 6/29/66 9/16/66 FIGURE 21 FIGURE 22 PAGENO="0644" 640 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION In short, there is some weight margin in the vehicle as it stands today. One of the problems that faces us at this point is that we have to fend off the people who would like to use up some of the weight margin. Between MSC and ourselves, we think that we can make it through the remaining months. We have shown this chart for LM-4, because not all the vehicles have this weight saving in them. We picked up these weight savings in LTA-3 from a structural point of view, so that we would have a representative test article. We picked up the LM-2 descent stage, and the LM-3 ascent stage. From that point on, the vehicles are all of the same lightweight configuration. Representative WA000NNER. If that chart means or what it appears to me it means, you didn't have any choice back in 1965 except to create that superweight improvement program, did you? Mr. GAVIN. Yes. In retrospect, it was a very trying period, and it was obvious that something effective just had to be done. There was no choice, so we took the bull by the horn's and did it. I would point out that this particular undertaking, while it has been success- ful, has been very expensive in terms of effort and time; and I also would like to point out that we have been able to save weight without compromising our operation capabilities, or for that matter, the quali- fication tests which both the vehicle and the equipment have been re- quired to pass. Representative WA000NNER. Time as related to weight in the first column, it doesn't show what that target weight is and what the cur- rent weight is. Do you have those rough figures? FIGURE 23 PAGENO="0645" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 641 Mr. GAVIN. Yes. Mr. RATHKE. Control weight is 32,518 pounds at separation, cur- rent reported weight is~ 30,953 pounds, or 1,565 pounds difference. Mr. GAvIN. Thank you, Bill. I might point out a very interesting sidelight to this whole thing. The surface of the vehicle contains a surprising number of square feet. When we started out on this weight- saving campaign, it became obvious that, if we were not extremely careful with respect to the thermal shielding, we would use up weight hand over fist. One of the major contributing factors to weight savings FIGURE 24 PAGENO="0646" 642 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION S I GN I F I CANT 1966 EN G I N EER I NG A C H I EVEMENT S * WEIGHT UNDER CONTROL * DESCENT ENGINE MET REQUIREMENTS * GSE PRODUCTION ON SCHEDULE * EQUIPTQUALIFICATION 90% COMPLETE FIGuRE 2~5 LM-4 WEIGHT (AT LUNAR ORBIT SEPARATION) WI NO FULL SWIP CONSUMABLES\ ~ CONTROLWT ~ ~-~--~-~ I REPORTEDWT TARGET WT SWIP ~ PROGRAM~ STUDY& I ________ DWG DESIGN ~ RELEASE SHIP LFA B & ~L. I NSTR& I ASSY I CHECKOUT liii 1111111 TI II I I I H 11111 ii 1965 1966 1967 FIGURE 26 PAGENO="0647" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 643 has been the development of a lightweight thermal shielding and outer skin. Re~presentative WA000NNER. I commented when we were over at the facility over there, that this was surprisingly thin. Mr. GAVaN. That's right. Representative WAGeONNER. And delicate. Mr. GAVIN. That's right. One of the things which is connected with this, of course, is the fact that this is a true spacecraft. We are still the only manned spacecraft which does not have to reenter the earth's atmosphere, and this gives us a fair degree of freedom in what we do with the outside of the vehicle, which the others don't enjoy. I also point out that a good portion of the spacecraft is designed for less than 1 g, and this, of course, is because of the lunar environment. I would like to speak a little bit about the ascent and descent engines. After a very extensive development testing program, we have evolved configurations suitable for qualification testing. However, at this time both engines are in a two-phased qualification test program. The first phase provides release for early flight use and the second completes the full operational qualifications. On the ascent engine (fig. 27) the principal effort during the past year has been focused on obtaining superlative chamber durability and on manufacturing welding procedures. I might point out that the ascent engine is a part of the vehicle which is not redundant. We obviously must have the highest confidence that it is suitable for the mission. This has led to being very careful about being satisfied with chamber durability. This has involved a great deal of injector develop- ment; and I must give credit to the Bell Aerospace' Corp. for the job they have done in working out the compatibility between the injector and the chamber. I `think that the one remaining problem, which was alluded to briefly earlier, is the work remaining in settling the question of the Startup pressures produced by the engine with respect to the base heat shield. ASCENT ENGINE * SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE AVAILABLE FOR EARLY MISSIONS * PROBLEM OF START TRANS I ENT UNDER INVESTIGATION: * WILL BE CONFIRMED IN QUAL B TESTS &TESTS AT WHITE SANDS * ASCENT ENGINES DELIVERED FOR LTA-8 & LM-1 LM-l ENGINE RETURNED FOR MODIFICATION & WILL BE DELIVERED IN MID FEB WITH LM-2 ENGINE FIGURE 27 PAGENO="0648" 644 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION This is under active work right now, and it appears there are a couple of solutions. Our problem is to pick the one which we are content to live with. With respect to the descent engine (fig. 28) the principal effort has involved obtaining consistent and acceptable performance and accept- able throat erosion. Again I have to give credit to TRW for develop- ing a configuration which takes into `account the complexities of the throttling requirement, for acceptable operation over a wide range of operating conditions. This has finally been done, and we seem to be, at this point, through the worst. Another area which I would like to comment on, which is partly engineering and includes management and manufacturing, has to do with the ground support equipment. Here I want to point out that just about a year ago, we were in rather difficult straits. Today we are on schedule with a supporting program, and it i~ difficult to imagine today what a struggle it was to get that way. But fundamentally, we have come a long way in this area, and we don't have too much further to go. This a list of the end items which have been made (fig. 29). This is just the top of the iceberg really. Underneath all this lies the fact that we have to install this equipment usually at a field site, although we have still this activity at Bethpage, and then we have to check it out and make sure it works before we can use it to support the vehicle. So really, you have to look at GSE as being first a problem of finding out what the vehicle really needs to support it, which is difficult to do until the vehicle is pretty well designed, and then quickly you have to produce it so that it is ready when the vehicle is ready; but theii before you use it, you have to get it installed and checked out to make sure that it doesn't cause more trouble than the vehicle does. Fortunately, this is largely behind us. DESCENT ENGINE * SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE AVAILABLE FOR EARLY MISSIONS - PHASE A QUAL * PROBLEM OF REPEATABI LIlY (RE: PERFORMANCE) & EROSION HAS BEEN DIAGNOSED. TEST RESULTS INDICATEADEQUATE CORRECTION IN CRITICAL MJSSION SEGMENTS OF DUTY CYCLE * PHASE B QUAL WILL CONFIRM THIS IN A SERIES OF FORMAL TESTS * DESCENT ENGINES DELIVERED FOR LTA-5, LTA-8, LM-l, & LM-2 FIGURE 28 PAGENO="0649" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 645 Another area which I would like to comment on has to do with equipment qualification testing. This slide (fig. 30) shows the test- ing which was accomplished in 1966. The milestone of November 15 was very important to us. We were able to complete 90 percent of the qualification requirements on that date. I think it is interesting that of the tests run, a rather minor percentage produced significant design GSE STATUS * DELIVER IES TI-IRU 10 JAN 1967 END ITEMS CABLES MAKE 1,119 4,444 BUY 937 . 1,459 GFE 302 - TOTAL 2,358 5,903 DELINQUENT 0 0 AHEAD OF SCHED 102 173 * FUTURE DELIVERIES MAKE 102 710 BUY. 72 0 GFE 11 - TOTAL 185 710 FIGURE 29 QUALIFICATION TESTS * TOTAL REQUIRED IN 1966: 217 * SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED: 208 * REQUIRED PENALTY RUNS: . 5 * SIGNIFICANT DESIGN CHANGES RESULTING FROM TESTS: 15 FIGu1~F 30 PAGENO="0650" 646 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION changes. I can't go past this item without pointing out that it has required a great deal of cooperation on the part of MSC tolive through these tests with us, to understand these pieces of equipment as the development tests progressed, so that, as time went by, we could adjust the qualification testing to prove that which was necessary. I think I should explain that a little bit more and point out that as a piece of equipment is tested and understood, what was originally set up as its qualification requirements evolves and, because a qualification test is a formal demonstration of the acceptability of the equipment, this then leads to approvals of these procedures. It has taken quite a bit of cooperation to cause all this to happen in a timely fashion. Representative WAGGONNER. What do you mean by "required pen- alty runs"? Mr. GAVIN. When you have a test which doesnt quite seem to meet the requirements, rather than go back and rerun the whole test, it frequently makes sense to make the adjustment necessary and rerun only, that portion of the test involved. Generally, the results have been quite encouraging. The flight hardware looks very good, and it seems to bear out the design ap- proach. There are a small number of important things which have not yet fully completed qualification. There are also some which are scheduled for the 15th of February, and this is another date of im- portance to us. We expect the qualification program will support the LM flight schedule. I'd like to speak a little bit at this point about some of the significant management activities in the past year (fig. 31). Looking back, many of the things we take for granted or understand today, were specu- lative a year ago. Going from the concept to a well-defined design took time and effort and a number of difficult choices. The exacting requirements on all elements have caused a continued struggle be- SIGNIFICANT MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES * GSE DESIGN & MANUFACTURING STRENGTHENED * STRENGTHENED SUBCONTRACTOR MANAGEMENT CONTROL * ADOPTED WORK PACKAGE CONCEPT * INSTALLED 3RD ACE STATION * INCREASED COLD FLOW TESTING CAPABILITY FIGtTRE 31 PAGENO="0651" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 647 tween confidence in design, schedule, and cost. We assign the priority in just that order. `When the chips are down, whatever is necessary to make it work well is the choice. I think this is an attitude which the astronaut appreciates. I think that no matter what else occurs, we have to be responsible for the successful operation of the vehicle. This past year has seen a continuous rearrangement, as test results became available, of test programs, test articles, and test require- ments, all aimed at improving the schedule and the cost without im- pairing the operational quality. The very tight funding situation has made this rather difficult, with a minimum of the trade-off free- dom which you would ideally consider to be the consequence of in- centive fee contracting. I might say that the effort to reduce costs has been virtually con- tinuous. There are a couple of things which are listed on this slide which stand out looking back at the past year. I have already shown in some detail ti-ie GSE story. This involved a strengthening of our planning, designing, manufacturing, and procurement activities and, as I mentioned earlier, it required a great deal of effort to proceed from a position which was holding the program back, to one which supported the program. The tide was turned in midsummer. We were effectively on schedule in mid-October, and we have been supporting the schedule from that time forward. The second vital program action taken by about midyear to help counter the mounting cost and schedule problems, involved a massive strengthening of our subcontract management group. What we did was to apply more full-time talent, with clearly understood authority, to the management of our subcontractors and interfaces with them. The result has been better insight into and control of the operations in supporting LM. This slide (fig. 32) indicates the manner in which the subcontract project manager-he is the man in charge of a specific contract-acts for the program manager in bringing the various Grumman groups to bear on a particular subcontract. A third management action which we think was significant, was the introduction of work packages. The next slide (fig. 33) summarizes as briefly as possible what a work package is, and the fact that we have it in use within our house and at our critical subcontractors. I think the key point here is the fact that, by associating the output with the manpower estimated to do the job, we obtained a more direct indication of progress, and this allows better control of what is going on and we have found it effective and useful. We find, of course, that the effec- tiveness varies, depending upon the nature of the operation, but we think it does one other thing, and that is that it enhances the sense of responsibility of the work package manager, the person who is the organizational leader in charge of a group of people who have a respon- sibility for getting the task accomplished. We think it is a sfep forward. The fourth management action that I would like to refer to is clearly to the credit of MSC. This was the decision taken late in the summer to reassign priority, to divert and install at Grumman a third ACE sta- PAGENO="0652" 648 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION SUBCONTRACT ORGANIZATION WORK PACKAGE * DEFINES TASKS & SCHEDULED OUTPUT IN TERMS OF ORGANIZATIONAL UNIT PERFORMING THEM * PROVIDES BUDGETARY CONTROLS VISIBLE TO PROGRAM MANAGEMENT & UNDERSTANDABLE & USABLE BY PERSONS RESPONSIBLE * APPLIED IN-HOUSE & AT MAJOR SUBCONTRACTORS FIGIJRE 83 tion. This was done in anticipation of the overlapping of vehicles under electrical test, as indeed has developed. On the assembly floor this morning, you noted that we had three vehicles in the vertical assembly fixtures. All three of them were in various stases of electrical tests. This is being accomplished and can be accomplished because of the fact that this decision was taken, to divert the third ACE station to Grumman. QC MFG GSE FIGURE 32 PAGENO="0653" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 649 The fifth management action that I might list here, mostly because it represents a case of rapid revision and an addition to some of our major testing facilities, is the cold flow facility. A decision was made to introduce, just before shipment, an additional sequence of pressure checking of~ the fluid systems. This hadn't been previously planned, but we have adjusted to this. The changes to the facilities have been made and the LM requirements will be met. Representative WA000NNZR. Before we leave this area of manage~ ment activity, you said that you had been successful in supervision over subcontractors by putting more full-time personnel to work with these subcontractors. Are you, in effect, saying that administrative costs have risen in the program as a result of that? Mr. GAVIN. I think that's correct to say, that we have added a net of some 20 people to this operation, but I think the return has far out- weighed the cost of the 20 people. Representative WAGGONNER. Percentagewise, what do you estimate at the outset of this program your top sheet administrative percentage cost to be, as related to the overall cost of the program, and what has it, in fact, turned out to be? Mr. GAVIN. According to the way we structured our accounting prior to the change in operations administrative costs in terms of direct labor accounted for less than 4 percent of the total. At the time that we strengthened our program control and subcontractor management, we effectively added less than 20 people which represented a change of approximately 0.2 percent in the total administrative manpower. I would like to spend just a brief time speaking about the status of the various LM subsystems. The next slide (fig. 34) is a very LM SUBSYSTEMS STATUS 16Aug66 20Jan67 STRUCT ECS CREW EPS COMM PROP LG. G&N RCS INST S&C A/D GSE I I I I I I GOOD SHAPE : FIouR1~ 34 PAGENO="0654" 650 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION highly simplified bar chart showing how we think the various sub- systems stand. Perhaps I ~would better say this represents my opinion of how the subsystems stand, because I believe that almost anybody would vary it slightly, according to his own notions. The coding indicates.the position as evaluated last August and the present. There has been progress in almost every case, and I should point out that some of the improvement indicated represents the net result of both setback and recovery. Not all of this progress has necessarily been steady and constant. I don't intend to go through every one of these, but I think I should highlight a couple. In the case of the structure, which is the first bar, I noted earlier the fact that we were still working with the inter- action of the ascent stage base heat shield and the engine starting pressures, I also have indicated a slight retrogression because the thermal shielding has proved to be a more difficult job than was originally visualized. In the case of the environmental control .sys- tern, its evaluation is based on the fact that we still have not completed qualification of all of the components. We also have not conclusively proved that we are free of problems with the water boiler and we are living with a very tight hardware availability. It will be several months before the situation makes a major improvement, but we expect to be able to live with it and do not expect the vehicles to be held up. The guidance and navigation category includes the rendezvous radar and the landing radar. This evaluation reflects the concern which has existed for sometime as to the rate of development of the landing radar. I think recently we have seen some improvement in this, and believe that we are over the hump. Representative WA000NNER. At one point you had some erroneous altitude information from this radar. Has that been corrected? Mr. RATHKE. If that relates to the reflection off the heat shield, yes. Mr. GAVIN. There have been basically two problems with the land- ing radar that concern us; one was the matter of reflections off the vehicle itself. We have explored this and it turns out that we can provide a sort of a fence that prevents the radar from seeing the bell of the descent engine, which is a vibrating body as far as the radar is concerned. The other had to do with. the direction in which the antenna of the landing radar was pointing. After evaluating the various trajectories which form the likely envelope of operation, we have readjusted the direction in which it points, and we are now satisfied that this will work quite well. Representative WAGGONNER. The information made available from previous flights and photographs have been sufficient then for you to conclude that you are not going to get any erroneous altitude informa- tioii from this landing radar, as a result of reflection, for example, from the surface of the moon itself? Mr. GAVIN. The testing we have done doesn't lead us to be con- cerned about the reflections from the lunar surface. We have been struggling with reflections from the vehicle itself. Mr. RATHKE. NASA has acquired data that indicate that the re- flectivity of the lunar surface is somewhat better than we had jointly PAGENO="0655" 1968 NASA AtTHOEIZATION 651 presumed in the design of the radar. Our landing radar is a more sophisticated cousin of that used on Surveyor, so we have acquired some confidence, because of the fact that the Surveyor has been suc- cessful. The testing that has resolved our more pressing problems on the radar has been the various ground tests run with portions of the vehicles, tests run with the radar being vibrated, and so forth. Representative WA000NNER. Maybe Mr. Evans is the person who mentioned it earlier, but someone mentioned earlier that you had, above all others, a soft landing capability that nobody had; and it seems that I recall at one point in the soft landing program, in our `early efforts to solve the soft landing package on the moon, there was some speculation on the part of some-and I don't know what they finally concluded-but there was some difficulty with the soft landing, because maybe the radar was giving erroneous information as to the penetration point into the surface before the reflection back, and that measurement signal was giving erroneous information. Mr. RATHKE. i: think that I have heard of such thoughts. It is my impression that these have been largely put aside in view of the success of Surveyor. Mr. GAvIN. I think that one of the significant improvements shown here is in the case of the reaction control system. Now, this is sort of interesting, because the thruster involved is a common usage item be- tween North American and ourselves. The basic thruster was devel- oped for North American and we are using it in identical form. The accomplishment here is largely one of getting past a series of development and qualification tests which have given us a better un- derstanding of the operating limit of the engine under varying tem- peratures. In the case of the electrical power system, we still have to complete the qualification of the batteries. We have had a considerable amount of difficulty with both relays and circuit breakers, and we are work- ing our way out of these difficulties at present. In the case of the communications category, the S-Band steerable antenna is the longest lead item and getting past the qualification on that will represent a significant improvement in our evaluation of this category. I have mentioned already the situation with regard to the engines. I think that the significant point there is the improvement in our con- fidence with regard to the ~lescent engine. A lot of testing and results have been obtained since the August evaluation. Well, I could go on into this in much more detail, but I think I have hit the highlights. I would like to say before passing from this, however, that what doesn't show on this chart is the fact that our sub- contractors in general have done very well in meeting their weight requirements and also their performance requirements. I think this is showing up in the performance of the vehicle and the confidence level attached to its operation. Representative WA000NNER. What it does show that in the 5 months since August, in every area except the structure itself, you have made some real progress. Mr. GAVIN. That's correct. PAGENO="0656" 652 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Representative WAGGONNER. And you related the problem of the structure to the thermal shield, which you apparently have solved? Mr. GAVIN. We are in the middle of solving that right now. I will now speak about the current status of the program, and I am going to cover some of the ground you have seen this morning. Chairman TEAGtTE. Before you go on, any of this you have just been talking about apply to the MOL problem, the subsystems? Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Teague, my interest- Chairman TEAGUE. And if so, is the information you have available to people working on the MOL program? Mr. GAVIN. To the best of our knowledge, some of the LM technol- ogy has found its way into the MOL program. A recent survey of some of the LM major subcontractors indicated that 75 percent of them have made use of LM technology in one way or another in su - port of the MOL. It. is interesting to note that one-fourth of the L subcontractors surveyed had actually been awarded MOL contracts of one sort or another. Mr. FREITAG. I might comment briefly and say that several of these subsystems are used directly. For example, the reaction control engines are being used, and common tests are being planned on that. There are other systems which even we are not too familiar with, but the transfer of technology is quite great, and as you saw last year at Douglas, this was being done. Representative WA000NNER. But Bob, is that as a result of willing- ness on the part of the parties, or is that as a result on the part of the Air Force being inquisitive? Mr. FREITAG. You mean the transfer of technology? Representative WA000NNER. Yes. Mr. FREITAG. No; it is pure and simple. The equipment is there. It does the job; and what's the use of developing it a second time? They just use it directly. If I recall last year, Douglas stated that something like 60 percent of the components of their equipment are direct transfers. The tanks and the fuel cells are direct transfers, and you have another 20 percent of just reshaping of the equipment. Mr. GAVIN. I think Tom Kelly mentioned when you were out in the final assembly area, that both LM-1 and LTA-8 were in or approach- ing the final engineering acceptance test. This is a hurdle which we should have accomplished by this time and, therefore, we are behind on these. LM-1, once it gets past final engineering acceptance test, goes through a final fluid pressure check prior to shipment. LTA-8 does not require final fluid pressure checking, but the installation of its instrumented skins represents a hurdle that is unique to that vehicle. I mention this because you couldn't have picked a more critical time to be here with regard to those two vehicles. There is no question but what the whole operation here is focused on getting these two vehicles through their test sequences and delivered. We have progressed reasonably well in the manufacturing areas, but as I have just pointed out, we haven't done as well as we should in completing the operational checkout procedures. I have a slide which gives you a rough scorecard on the number of these procedures required per vehicle and where we stand as of yester- PAGENO="0657" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 653 day (fig. 35). I think a little explanation is in order on what an operational checkout procedure is. We call them OCP's. These can vary from a pressure or circuit check, which can be accomplished in perhaps 3 to 5 hours, to a complex sequence of circuit checks which can run hundreds of hours. What is done here is not just a casual checking of a system, or combination of systems. This is a formal checkout procedure, where the test director works from a small tele~ phone booth, which has in it, in exquisite detail, what is to be done, what is to be measured and what the criteria are for proceeding. To boil it down to its simplest form, it is a-well, you hear talk these days of programed learning. This is programed testing. The first instruction could be "turn switch A to on." The second one would read "read meter B." The third one would be "If the reading on meter B lies between two limits, proceed to the next step." And the reason that this has to be done in this fashion is that some of the systems that we are dealing with have many alternate modes of operation. And without doing it formally, there is the danger of not really checking out the system and still thinking you had. This is a painstaking process, and once it is accomplished, it lends con- siderable confidence to the fact that the system which has passed that test is indeed satisfactory. It turns out that the time taken on these tests is distributed between running the test and troubleshooting to find out why the test doesn't run smoothly. At this point, naturally, we are trying to cut down the amount of time devoted to troubleshooting, in order to improve the efficiency of the testing. With this background, I would like, to go on to the next slide (fig. 36) which is a statement of where the operating plan stands for the early vehicles. The diamonds represent the contract ship dates, and from this you can see that LTA-8 and LM-1 are indeed behind. OPERATIONAL CHECKOUT TEST STATUS VEHICLE TOTALTESTS TEST COMPL LTA-8 43 ~3O LM-l 62 40 LM-2 77 26 LM-3 76 3 LM-4 68 0 FIGuRE 85 7.6-265 O-&7~-pt. 2---~42 PAGENO="0658" 654 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION OPERATING PLAN LTA-8 LM-I LM-2 LM-3 LM-4 .1.. \ . ASCENT DESCENT * CONTRACT. SHIP DATE T~ ON' D iF MrAM i J `A' s _ÔrN 966 1967 FIGURE 36 LM-2 is less behind. The responsibility that faces us at this point is that we just must get LM-1 and LTA-8 out as soon as possible. I then have to go on to say that because I have emphasized LM-1 and LTA-8 so far in these comments-and this is important, because solving their problems is a prerequisite for later vehicles-I should point out that LM-2 is in many respects a vehicle more vital to the entire Apollo program, because it must meet a launch date, to provide the first manned flight testing of the combined spacecraft. What we have done to help ourselves with respect to the earlier vehicles is equally applicable to LM-2. At this point, we are con- vinced that LM-2 can gain from this experience, and we are expecting to support the Apollo launch schedule with LM-2. I think that it is obvious from the chart that at least these next 6 weeks are going to be very critical ones to us. The next several (figs. 37-44) lists in your handouts summarize the milestones which we see coming for fiscal 1967. I don't intend to go through them in detail. I would point out that the key events are these vehicle deliveries. This slide shows the assignment of the early vehicles (fig. 40). The corresponding delivery dates that go with these vehicles were described on the previous slide (fig. 36). It looks like LM-1 can be accomplished in late February, LM-2 in early April, LM-3 in May, LM-4 the first of August, and LM-5 by the first of November; so that gives you an indication of the rate at which these things face us; ~tnd I think it is also clear from this that the hump is with us right at the moment. Representative CABELL. What was your projected delivery for LM-3? Mr. GAVIN. LM-3 is May. Representative CABELL. May? Mr. GAVIN. Yes. Representative WAGGONNER. Joe, how does it develop that you can be as far behind on the LTA-8 and as far ahead on the LM-2 that PAGENO="0659" 196 & NASA AUTHORIZATION 655 FIGTTRE 38 PAGENO="0660" 656 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION you are? Are these just known things that you can proceed with, with- out waiting for further tests? Mr. GAVIN. Well, I think the answer is that the current vehicle status is the accumulation of a number of difficulties which have oc- curred. Probably not any one thing. Representative WA000NNER. But in the overall, does it allow you to proceed to this point in time with LM-2 and the relationship of the several vehicles being such that the difficulty or the trouble that you have on LM-1 doesn't necessarily cause you to stop on the downstream vehicles? Is that what is going on? PAGENO="0661" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 657 PLANNED MAJOR MILESTONES AT BEFHPAGE: 1967 * PLANT 5 BECOMES TEST AREA, PLANT 2 VEHICLE ASSEMBLY AREA * LTA-3 STAT I C & DYNAMIC STRUCTURAL TESTS * LM DELIVERIES TO PERFORM FOLLOWING MISSIONS: v'LMl: UNMANNED, EARTH ORBITAL, PROPULSION TEST v'LM2: MANNED, EARTH ORBITAL /LM-3: MANNED, EARTH ORBITAL, MISSION SIMULATION ~/LM4: ~ - LUNAR MISSION CAPABILITY FIGURE 40 KSC ACT IVAT ION MILESTONES ScHEDULED FOR 1967 COMPLETION * LTA-2R: LAUNCH UMBILICAL TOWER - 2 MARCH * LM-1 - O&C ~,/ ASSEMBLY TEST AREA JANUARY ~/ S-BAND & VHF LAB JANUARY - LC-37 FEBRUARY * LM2 - O&C s/ALTITUDE CHAMBER APRIL s/COMMUNICATIONS/RADAR LAB MARCH ~/S-BAND&VHF LAB MARCH - RADIO FREQUENCY TEST FACILITY MARCH * LM-3: LC-39 SEPTEMBER * LM MISSION SIMULATOR MAY FIGURE 41 Mr. GAVIN. Yes; I would say so. There is a tendency for the down- stream vehicles to keep coming while the difficulties are being solved on the earlier ones. The key point that we have to contend with here is that in solving the problems on the early vehicles, we don't allow our- selves to get trapped into doing the same thing on the later vehicle. Representative WA060NNER. You just haven't made the same mis- takes in two that you have made in one then ~ PAGENO="0662" 658 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION KSC OPERATIONS MILESTONES 1967 -. RECEIVE, CHECK OUT, AND LAUNCH: `* LTA-1OR (RECEIVED 1966) * LTA~2R * LM-1 * LM-2 * LM~'3 FIGURE 42 MSC MILESTONES SCHEDULED FOR 1967 COMPLETION * TEST PREPARATION AREA FEBRUARY * THERMAL VACUUM CHAMBER "B" JANUARY * INTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL SI MULATOR JUNE * LANDING RADAR TESTING TM-6 JANUARY TM-8 APRIL * LMMISSION SIMULATOR NASAACCEPT. MAY * RECEIVE & INSTALL LTA-8 FEBRUARY FIGURE 43 Mr. GAVIN. We sincerely hope that's the case. When we put a change into the first one, in order to fix something there, we try to make very sure that we are also fixing the downstream vehicles at the same point. Representative WAGGONNER. Maybe that was a bad statement to have said, that you haven't made the same mistakes You were `Lble to ap ply to vehicle 2 what in the way of changes you couldn't do to vehi- cle 1 ~ PAGENO="0663" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 659 Mr. GAVIN. Well, `omebody once said that experience is an accumu- lation of mistakes, and I think we have accumulated a few. I would like to press on here and to spend a little bit of time talking about manpower and cost. I think several of you have already gone ahead and looked at those charts already, judging from the early ques- tions, but let me go on, in any event. The next figure indicates total Grumman labor (fig. 45), and we seem to have peaked out in November with about 9,400 equivalent men. "Equivalent men" represents actual people on the job, plus their overtime converted to equivalent men. Representative WAGGONNER. Just for this program? WSTF MILESTONES SCHEDULED FOR 1967 COMPLETION * DESCENT PROPULSION TEST SERIES TO SUPPORT LM-2 & LM-4 (PD-2) * ASCENT PROPULSION TEST SERIES TO SUPPORT LM-2 & LM-4 (PA-i) * DESCENT STAGE TEST SERI ES TO SUPPORT LM-i, 2, & 4 (LTA-5) FIGURE 44 LM PROGRAM TOTAL LABOR LU I- FIGURE 45 PAGENO="0664" 660 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Mr. GAVIN. Yes, this is just for this program. Now- Chairman TEAGtIE. Joe, is this chart of man-hours or men? Mr. GAVIN. Well, these are equivalent men. Chairman TEAGUE. Equivalent men? Mr. GAVIN. Yes; that's right. Chairman TEAGUE. It doesn't necessarily mean that when it starts going down, you start laying off people or shortening working hours? Mr. GAVIN. That's right, because that 9,400 peak represents 7,350 people, and then, beyond that, there is contracted labor, which rep- resents another small portion. But in presenting a chart like this, I am sure it is bound to provoke questions because of the steepness of that slope, the down trend. I must point out that this has been analyzed by task and by the skills involved, and that we have estab- lished some very tight targets for our managers, and I think the proper statement for me to make is that we know we are over the hump, and the big question here is can we maintain the rate down in this forecast decline? It is also obvious that continuing delivery problems jeopardize the rate at which this trend can develop. If we were to be more conservative about presenting to you the slope or decline in labor, we would not be serving the best interests of either the program or ourselves in attempting to force the job down. The figures which back up this chart are the figures which we work with every day and are detailed to the extent of lists of people that are due to come off the job in the next months. So this is a serious problem for us and it is one of our most vital concerns right now. `Chairman TEAGUE. Who goes.first, Joe? Who are the first people to go? Mr. GAVIN. Well, I was just going to say something about that. It is interesting to note that different kinds of people come off the program first, and I have prepared another chart (fig. 46) which indicates the variation in three different engineering groups, the vehi- cle design people, the ground support equipment design people and vehicle test people; and as you might expect, vehicle test is at a peak right now, because that is where our major activity is. But on other hand, I could go back and point out that the people who design the hardware for the vehicle actually passed their peak in August, and some of our analytical groups which constitute part of the vehi- cle design area passed their turndown in November. The GSE people passed their peak in July. These are all engineering people. I could also point out that GSE manufacturing went through a sort of a flat peak in roughly July to September. On the other hand, the vehicle manufacturing people, part of those whom you saw this morning, appeared to peak in November. We had a slight downturn in December, and they are struggling with it right now to see if we can keep that downturn going. So the various skills tend to phase out of the program at different rates. I guess this isn't surprising when you dig into it, because many of the problems are behind us. Chairman TEAGUE. I think NASA gave us the figure, going down to 200,000 people this year in the total manned space laboratory. Jim, is that correct? Mr. WILSoN. Yes. It's about 200,000. PAGENO="0665" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 661 ENGINEERING MANPOWER EQUW~~ I I I I I I I 1966 1967 FIGURE 46 Mr. GAVIN. One thing I discovered is that if you add together enough groups, the rate of decline gets faster and faster, because each group has its normal rate of decline. If they peak at the same time the reduction rate could be very steep. Chairman TEAOJE. Every man working himself out of a job? Mr. GAVIN. This is the goal, and this is certainly happening. Chairman TEAGUE. Do most people leave or do you replace them somewhere in the Grumman program, or what happens to them? Mr. GAVIN. I think that one of the reasons that we have developed this scheme of lining up people by name some weeks before they are removed from the program, is to make sure that their next assign- ment is selected to best advantage. We have had numerous examples of people who moved into other programs. It is also interesting to note that it isn't just the Indians that come off the job as you go past the peak of a job, because as you go on past, you find, I am sure, that you take off perhaps the majority of the workers, but you also tend to remove some of the chiefs at the same time. You can't afford to wind up with all chiefs and no Indians. Chairman TEAGUE. Well, does this create a prc~blem for you, of people anticipating these things coming about and, therefore, looking for other jobs in the competitive market which we have in this area? Well, we have it in this part of the country and I assume you have it in Long Island? Mr. GAVIN. It creates many problems, because people do worry about job continuity, even within the company. In other words, when the end is in sight in a particular group, you find that some of the re- PAGENO="0666" 662 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION sponsible people are looking for ~ther jobs of equivalent responsibility, because they can see that one is beginning to narrow down. Chairman TEAGUE. I see. Mr. GAVIN. George, would you like to add anything? Mr. TIrrERTON. I might summarize for the company. No. 1, we have actually lost quite a few people for that reason. No. 2, for- tunately, we are able to cut the overtime down, the equivalent people, as Chairman Teague realized earlier, so we didn't have a major cut- back in personnel. In addition, we have on board some six or seven hundred contract engineers and draftsmen who are people you hire to take care of peak loads. They thviously will be the first ones let out. About March of this year, we begin to face real difficulty in Grumman, for regular employees. On figure 47, we show you the total manpower, and our engineering, by the end of 1967, is down over a thousand engineers on a straight-time basis. This allows for all the DOD programs that we know of, including what we believe are planned and will be funded by supplementaries. We believe this is a realistic picture, so we will be facing a problem; and that's why Joe stressed this rapid falloff. it is going to take an awful lot of real hardheadedness in management to peel off at that rate. Mr. GAVIN. George, I might mention that some of our earlier prob- lems in this area have been eased to a small extent by a buildup in the field operation. Some of the people that were in Bethpage have moved to sites such as Cape Kennedy. This is a small thing, but it does affect the overall planning. GRUMMAN MANPOWER (ALL PROGRAMS) 1000's OF MEN 15 5 30 25 20 10 ENGINEER ING 0 FIGURE 47 PAGENO="0667" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 663 Chairman TEAGUE. Then there actually is no shortage of scientists, engineers, that category of people in this area? Mr. TIrrERTON. There are always shortages of the right people. Chairman T~EAGUE. Well, you go all over the country and all the newspapers have ads in them advertising for technical people. Now, let's see, Bob, I was out on the west coast where you were and I think it was Lockheed that was complaining considerably about the shortage of technical personnel. * Representative GIAIMO. Well, can I pursue this a little more? Just across the sound from you, where I live here in Connecticut, they are actually advertising for skilled help, and they have mobile units even going around looking for skilled help; and I assume also and under- stand to a degree, insofar as engineers and the higher degrees of skills are concerned. Now, knowing that this market exists and know- ing that your program is going to terminate are some of your highly skilled people beginning to anticipate this and taking off, and leaving you before the bad `day comes along and taking advantage of these opportunities, what- Mr. GAVIN. This is a problem. Representative GIAIM0. Is it a problem with you? Mr. GAVIN. Yes. Mr. TITTERTON. We are advertising ourselves in the New Yoik Times for special skills. For instance, radar people, we are very short of. Things of that nature. Representative GIAIM0. Well then, there is a shortage of these skilled people? Mr. TFrTERT0N. Yes. Representative GIAIMO. Of the specially t.rained people? Mr. TITTERTON. That's right. Chairman TEAGUE. Well, is there a coordinated effort between unions, in Government, bet~veen you people, of trying to place these people that leave you, somebody watching over their shoulder somewhere down the road and know when there is a job for them and when somebody is looking for them? Mr. TITTERTON. Well, conversely, we read the papers, and when we find out there is a major layoff, we immediately set up a hotel room in that area to hire needed people. Representative GIAIMO. But aren't we also talking about the skills which are above the shop level, too? Mr. TITTERTON. Yes. Representative' GIAIM0. Engineers and the like? Mr. GAVIN. Yes. Chairman TEAGUE. Any other questions? (Apparently not). Mr. GAVIN. The next slide (fig. 48), which I suspect you have already looked at, has to do with t.he buildup at the field sites, and the key poin't is that we are close to achieving the planned staffing of these sites; and I think from the earlier comments, it is pretty ob- vious that White Sands, WSTF, is the one area that has the most operational experience at this point. MSC is building up to receive the LTA-8 test vehicle y~u saw over in the final assembly floor, and Cape Kennedy is approaching its peak. It has the LTA-1OR and PAGENO="0668" 664 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIELD-SITE MANPOWER FIGURE 48 the LTA-2R, which are the vehicles which fly on the Saturn V boosters, and it will have LM-i just as fast as we can get it there. Mr. TIrrEBTON. .1 might highlight the fact,, Mr. Chairman, and the question earlier as applied to Cape Kennedy is very, very perti- nent. We have acquired any number of really skilled people who have been on the early programs in Kennedy and know exactly how that base works. Two-thirds of the people at Kennedy come from Bethpage. The rest we have tried to hire on site. Men who know the job and know the area, and this has worked out beautifully. We have some awfully good people down there. Mr. GAVIN. Well, going on from the manpower situation to costs, I think I have already, in answer to one of the earlier questions, said just about what I was going to say as the summary. We have this forecast for the fiscal year of 196'T, $3~3 million (fig. 49). It appears to me to be attainable. It is going to be tough, and I think the earlier comments have pretty well covered this. In looking beyond the fiscal year 1967- Chairman TEAGUE. Before you leave this, do you people have any real problem between NASA and Grumman as far as money is concerned? Mr. GAVIN. Well, there certainly is a great desire- Chairman TEAGUE. I am sure there is something going on all the time. *Mr. GAVIN. There certainly is a great desire to decrease the expen- chture rate all the time, and I would say that a very large part of ACTUAL PROJECTED TOTAL 0 WSTF PAGENO="0669" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 665 FISCAL `66 & `67 EXPENDITURES: TOTAL 180 ACTUAL ----FORECAST-JULY 1966 FORECAST - DEC. 1966 140 ~ ~2'34 1234 FY `66 FY `67 JfIGURE 49 the management activity between MSC and ourselves is aimed at doing just this. I think that the MSC project group understands in great detail and very thoroughly what goes on inside the LM pro- gram, both at Grumman and its subcontractors. I think we work extremely closely together on this, and I think I can bear witness to the fact that they are continually urging every reasonable measure to decrease the expenditure rate. 1 am not sure urging is a strong enough term. Representative WA000NNER. Talking about money, what is the lapsed funding time between NASA and you for services rendered, the contract that is performed? Are you being funded at regular weekly, monthly intervals or how? Mr. GAVIN. At various times we have been on different bases. At the close of the fiscal year last year, last June, we were down on a weekly basis, because things were pretty tight. Subsequent to that point, things have improved, and we are now in a position where we are, I think, about a month or two ahead as far as funding. Mr. TIrrERTON. Yes, that's about correct. Representative WA000NNER. All right. How do you relate this to services performed by your subcontractors? Do, you adjust accord- ingly? Mr. GAVIN. We reflect virtually instantaneously. Representative WAGGONNER. That is, your relationship with NASA. Mr. GAVIN. We reflect virtually instantaneously to our subcon- tractors our position with respect to NASA. Representative WAGGONNER. Now, you say you are a month or two ahead. Are you telling me that you are in the unusual position of not having to worry about the high cost of `borrowed money? PAGENO="0670" 666 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Mr. TIITERTON. No, no. May I restate that? Instead of putting a whole wad of contract money on the line and committing it to us, they only commit 2 to 3 months ahead We oniy invoice after the fact Representative WAGG0NNER But how much after the fact ~ Mr TITTERTON At the end of each month, we invoice for thit month, and they pay quite promptly within a week or two. Representative WAGGONNER. And there is no undue hardship there? Mr. TIr2ERTON. That's right. This relationship and the payment of invoices is quite prompt and we, in turn, pay our subcontractors within 2 weeks, within a 2-week period of their submission. Representative WAGGONNER. There are a number of people who do business with the Government who have been put in a bad position during this period of high-cost money because the Government has been too slow. Mr. TIrrERT0N. We are in this position on many of our military programs, because, they have a very low-progress paymirnt permis- sibility. Representative WAGGONNER. But not with NASA? Mr. TITrERTON. Not with NASA. This is quite current. But as far as th~ other question is concerned, you would almost think it was their personal dollars they were spending, as far as monitoring us is concerned. * Representative WAGGONNER. I see. Chairman TEAGUE Bob, do you want to ask anything ~ Representative GIAIMo Not on this point Mr TITTERTON May I go back to one of the earlier questions ~ One of the questions that was referred to here, on the question of slowdown, if you will, or extension There `ire only some $250 million to go beyond that The point I wis trying to mike is that by the end of fiscal year 1967 we will have paid all our subcontrictors, because they will have made their deliveries That's the thing I ~ `is trying to show earlier The hardware has been coming in from the subcon tractors, so all those big subcontractor dollars are behind you at that point (fig 2, p 620) As of July 1, there are ipproximately $250 million remaining in the contract. It shows $930 million, and I can conservatively add another $20 million in case we stub our toe. Representative GIAIMO. To get us to what point? Mr TITTERTON To finish it up right through 1969, the present program which terminates at the end of 1969. So from July 1, 1967, to the terminal point of 1969, it is a gross of $230 million or $250 million that will come to Grumman under the present program meeting the schedule. This is cost. We always talk cost here. Representative GIAIM0. Going back to these figures that were pre- pared for the subcommittee here, is that including the $400 million estimate in 1967, or is that in addition to that? Mr. TIrrERT0N. No, this is culminating the present year, July 1, the present fiscal year, and we still feel we are going to hit the $372 million Representative GIAIM0. For fiscal 1967? Mr. TITTERTON. From that point on. Representative GIATM0. You are saying $930 million? PAGENO="0671" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 667 Mr. TITTERTON. $230 to $250 million is our estimate, if we don't stub our toe. This is a success schedule. Representative GIAIM0. Well then2 my notation that the current fiscal year of 1967 estimate of $400 million is not right, is that right? Mr. TITTERTON. No, it depends on whether you are talking cost or price now. Representative GIAIMO. I am talking cost. Mr. TITTERTON. Well, cost to the Government, it is not $372 million. It is $372 million plus fee. We talk of cost only, because the fee is an incentive thing and it is a variable thing. Representative GIAIMO. But the cost to the Government is $400 million. Mr. TITTERTON. Well, I hope I nm going to get that much. Mr. FREITAG. If you took their number of $372 million, you are saying, and put an approximate number of $25 or $30 million in fee, then you have it. Representative GIAIi~1o. But did he say $372 million, or did he say two-something? Mr. FREITAG. $372 million, and you add about $25 million in fee. That makes $400 million. Representative GIAIM0. All I am trying to arrive at is how much more money do you project in the future, that will go into the cost of these LM's? What is it that you are telling me now? Mr. TITTERTON. This is costwise? Mr. FREITAG. Yes. Representative GIAIM0. Costwise. Mr. TITTERTON. Because now you must add a fee to that. Chairman TEAGUE. Money appropriated by Congress. Representative GIAIMO. How will this total up with the original estimate? What is this LM going to cost? Mr. TITTERTON. Well, we think that we are going to be between 5 and 10 percent over. Representative GIAIMO. Total program? Mr. TITrERTON. Total program. At the present time we are pro- jecting a 5-percent total program overran dollarwise. If we, from here on out, are as inefficient, let's say, or have as much trouble as in the past, then we will have 10 percent total. If we can hold it from here, it will end up at 5 percent. Representative WAGGONNER. If you can hold it from that, by com- parison, you will perform amazingly well. Mr. TITTERTON. Thank you. This is why there is a difference of opinion between us and NASA~ They say it never happened before. We say we can do it. Representative GIATMO. Are you talking about an approximate cost of $2 billion? Mr. TITTERT0N. No, right now we are projecting a cost of $1.350 billion if we hold clean from here on out. Now, it could be $1.4 billion, if we don't do better from here on out. This is cost. Representative GIAIM0. All right, again cost. But then overall cost to the Government, including your fee, it's going to bring it very close to the $2 billion mark. PAGENO="0672" 668 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Mr. TITTERTON. I would say $1.5 billion. I don't know, your num- bers may include other things than what we are talking about. But if it is directly to Grumman, $1.5 billion should do it. Chairman TEAGUE. We have a cost of prior to fiscal year 1961, $757 million. We have another figure for fiscal year 1967, the original estimate was $350 million. Current fiscal year estimate, $400 million. Fiscal year 1968, $345 million. Then you have added $345 million as part of the $250 million you talked about. Representative GIAIM0. That brings it up close to $2 billion. Mr. TITTERTON. Well, NASA would have to go into that, because they haven't told us numbers like this. Representative GIAIM0. But using your projected cost figures then, what is the total amount that you estimate it will cost? Mr. TITTERTON. I would say $1.5 billion. Representative GIAIM0. $1.5 billion, not including your fee? Mr. TITrERTON. No; including the fee. Representative GIAIM0. Including the fee? Mr. TITTERTON. I can see about $1.4 billion cost.. Representative GIAIM0. Yes? Mr. TITTERTON. $1.42 billion, something of that sort. ~Jhairman TEAGtm. Wasn't the original estimate about $2 billion? Mr. TITTERTON. No, sir. . - Chairman TEAGUE. The original contract? Mr. TITrERT0N. The original contract was $1.290 billion cost. Representative CABELL. Cost again? Mr. TITTERTON. Cost. You see, your costs and our costs are different. Representative CABELL. That's right. Mr. TITTERTON. We don't know about changes and things like that in the company. There has got to be an allowance for changes. We don't know what allowance NASA has made for changes. Chairman TEAGUE. Maybe we are being told things that we shouldr~'t be told. Mr. FREITAG. These are estimates of work. Chairman TEAGUE. These are estimates; yes. Mr. FREITAG. It has fee and it has other expenses. Representative CABELL. You have your direct LM costs which then make up the total costs to LM. You see, that's where that discrepancy can easily well come into play. Representative GIAIM0. Well, getting back to the question I think Mr. Teague asked you, are we going to wind up much over the esti- mate or did I hear approximately 5 percent. Mr. TITTERTON. I said 5 to 10 percent. Representative GrAIM0. Five to ten percent over? Mr. TITrERTON. Would be our estimate at this point. Now, once again, I would like to restate that this is on a fairly successful sched- ule. If you run into all kinds of blockages downstream, then this might be something else again, which is, I suppose, what NASA's ex- perience has been. This is why their viewpoint has to be different from ours. Representative WA000NNER. What lie is hedging on-and "hedg- ing" is a bad word-they haven't really flown these vehicles and they don't know. PAGENO="0673" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 669 Mr. TIITERTON. That's right. Representative WAGGONNER. They have been led to believe from the tests conducted that they will fly, but of necessity, they don't know. They don't know whether they will run into any trouble, and only God knows whether there will be any trouble. Mr. TITTERTON. Contingencies; yes. Representative GIAIM0. But this is not a problem of Grumman. Mr. TITTERTON. This, I am sure, is what NASA must or will have to allow for. But from our viewpoint, we have a contract. We are fighting to meet it. We have a minimum overrun, and this is. what we are shooting for and hope to make, and-plan to make, more than hope. Representative CABELL. Are you on a sliding scale type of incentive? Mr. TITTERTON. Very much so. Representative CABELL. In other words, overrun costs you some, too? Mr. TITTERTON. We have about a $70 million variation in fee, de- pending on whether we are good or bad. That is a lot of incentive. Mr. GAVIN. The incentive is a function both of cost and perform- ance. Petformance is distributed throughout the program so that you can't make it at just one point. In the informal discussion, we have covered everything I was going to say on this particular sub- ject. I think I might add that looking ahead, we have some con- fidence, because a good many difficult problems are behind us. We do anticipate some growing pains at the Cape. We have also a cer- tain amount of sustaining activity that has to be kept going, both here and at our subcontractors, to support the Cape operation. I think that in the interests of getting on to lunch, and in view of the fact that we have discussed most of these things informally, I would just like to summarize very quickly by saying that we are at a critical period right at this time. The design looks sound to us. The many different test programs that have been brought to comple- tion have provided a very fine confidence in the equipment we are putting into the vehicle and into the vehicle itself. To a large extent we have finished designing. That's past. The program peak, we think, has passed. We are convinced it is past. The big question at this point is how fast do we go downhill from here. I think that, in a nutshell, is about the summary as I see it today, and I think that if there are any questions about some of the things we have said, we can certainly pursue them in more detail. Chairman TEAGUE. Any more questions? Comments anybody. Bob Freitag, do you have anything? Mr. FREITAG. No. Mr. FELTON. Regarding the subcontractor reorder date, what kind of money are you talking about here? This is beyond the present * schedule. Mr. GAVIN. That's correct. That is beyond LM-15, which is cur- rently under contract. Mr. FELTON. Now, going back where you show subcontractor ex- penditures, you do not include there any reorder (fig. 2, p. 620). Mr. GAVIN. That's correct. Mr. FELTON. Now, for (fig. 1, p. 619) what ki~id of money are you talking about? ~7e-265 O-e7-pt. 2----43 PAGENO="0674" 670 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION Mr. GAVIN. I think we, rather than give you an offhand figure, I think we would like to supply that. Mr. FELTON. Could you also, since 90 percent of your subcontracts have been cost plus incentive fee could you also discuss as to whether or not you would continue this or whether you would go to fixed price and the reasons for it ~ Mr. GAVIN. In looking downstream, I believe it is both to our ad- vantage and the Government's idvantage to try to reduce these to fixed price contracts That is my impression The only proviso that I would attach to that is that over the period of time that we gain experience with the current LM's, it is very likely that there will be some changes brought about. This then could raise the question of whether we should continue CPIF or fixed price; but if we can main- tain the fact that most of the development is behind and done, we should strive for fixed price arrangement. Mr RATHKE The first part of that question I think requires i little clarification as to how much reorder we are talking about Chairman TEAGUE And what date The later the reorder, the bigger the cost back to the man, working under the assumption that the reorder is good and valid Mr GAVIN I think we can give you those figures Chairman TEAGUE. Thank you very much, Joe. It is always a good pleasure to be with you. Mr. GAVIN. Well, shall we adjourn for luneh~ Chairman TEAGUE. Yes. (Whereupon, at 12 4~ pm , the hearing was adjouined) PAGENO="0675" APPENDIX B HEARINGS OP THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, TUE BOE- ING COMPANY, MICHOUD ASSEMBLY FACILITY, NEW ORLEANS, Loui- SIANA, FEBRUARY 11, 1967 INTRODUCTION This document constitutes a record of the briefing presented by The Boeing Company to members of the Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight of the Com- mittee on Science and Astronautics of the United States House of Represent- atives. The presentation was delivered at the Michond Assembly FacUlty on February 11, 1967. The attendees at the briefing were: U.S. House of Representatives NASA-Marshall Space Flight Hon. 0. Teague Center-Continued H. Gorman Hon. J. Pettis Hon. G. Vander Jagt Gen. E. O'Connor Hon. J. Hunt H. Weidner R. Kline Hon. R. Eckhardt Dr. G. Constan Subcommittee Staff Boeing J. Wilson G. Stoner P. Gerardi R. Nelson J. Felton C. Wilkinson NASA-Headquarters H. McClellan Capt. R. Freitag L. Alford J. Cramer J. Weber A. Phillips NASA-Marshall Space Flight Center ~. Horn Dr. W. von Braun F. Coeneii Dr. E. Rees J. Keller BRIEFING TRANSCRIPT Mr. NELSON. This is a very brief orientation on our Saturn program. We will start by a quick run through the agenda. (fig. 1). I will give a short orientation of what we, Boeing, are doing in the Saturn pro- gram for NASA. First, Mr. Wilkinson, our Michoud Manager, will describe the work here at Michoud on the S-IC stage; Mr. McClellan will briefly describe the work we are doino' at Huntsville in support of the Marshall Space Flight Center (M~FC) in what we call the Saturn V systems engineering and integration task; Mr. Alford will describe the Boeing task in support of the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) for the launch operations task; then, I will give you a brief summary of the costs and manpower situation. A question and answer period will follow next. To start, the Boeing organization involved in the Saturn V tasks is the Space Division and is shown on this chart (fig. 2) with Mr. G. H. Stoner, who is here with us today, as Vice President and Gen- eral Manager. All the work we are doing for NASA on the Saturn V is under one contract, NAS8-5608, but the contract is divided into 671 PAGENO="0676" 672 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION AGENDA * BOEING SATURN PROGRAM ORIENTATION .5-IC STAGE * SATURN V SYSTEMS MISSION SUPPORT * SATURN V LAUNCH OPERATIONS SUPPORT * COSTS AND MANPOWER * QUESTIONS AND DISCUSSION FIGURE 1 BOEING SPACE DIVISION ORGANIZATION - SATURN V PROGRAM ACTIVITIES I CONTRACT HAS8-5608 SPACE DIVISION G. H. STONER SATURN S-IC SATURN V STAGE DESIGN, SYSTEMS ASSEMBLY MISSION AND TEST SUPPORT SATURN V ENGINEERING & LAUNCH OPERATIONS SUPPORT FIGURE 2 PAGENO="0677" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 673 three parts that we call schedules I, II, and III. The three subparts of our contract are carried out at three locations: here at Michoud, Huntsville, and the Cape. The operations at Michoud and Huntsville are under the Launch Systems Branch, which is under my direction. The work at Michoud is Saturn S-IC stage design, assembly, and test operations, including static testing operations at the Mississippi Test Facility (MTF). This is covered under part I and I-A (schedule I and I-A) of the contract. Part II or schedule. II of the contract covers the work being done at Huntsville, supporting Marshall Space Flight Center in the sys- tems mission area and is under the direction of H. J. McClellan. The work we are doing at the Cape is under the direction of A. M. Johnston. We don't have him with us today. The Saturn portion of the work is under Mr. L. D. Alford. They are responsible for sup- porting the Kennedy Space Center for readying the vehicle for launch. So we have the three managers, who are responsible within Boeing, present today. There are other Boeing activities at Cape Kennedy such as Lunar Orbiter, Burner II, Minuteman, and there are other spacecraft activities within the Space Division in Seattle, such as the Voyager. A look at the geographic picture (fig. 3) `shows Boeing corporate headquarters located in Seattle, and Mr. Stoner's Space Division Headquarters located at Kent, Wash., just south of Seattle. Here, at Michoud, we do designs of the stage while at Huntsville our operations support Marshall Space Flight Center. Also the first three flight BOEING SPACE DIVISION ACTIVITY LOCATIONS FIGtJRE 3 PAGENO="0678" 674 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION stages were static fired at the test stand you saw yesterday at MSFC, and I believe you also visited the dynamic test tower which we, oper- ate for MSFC At MTF we will carry out static testing of the stages built at Michoud, and at the Cape they are supporting readiness for launch. In addition to the work done in-house, we are supported~ by 4,400 vendors and subcontractors (fig 5) We have subcontractors in 46 of the 50 States. The commitments total some $270 million as of January 1, 1967 (Jaliforma receives a good si7ed share, as does Lou isiana, Alabama, and other States as shown, The distribution of these dollars is in proportion to the black circles on the chart Figure 5 provides a summary look at the schedule we are work- ing to on this program The bottom three bars of this chart depict the three parts of our contract arranged on a time scale, while the top bar is a look at the principal testing activities for the launch vehicle As depicted on the second bar, stage design,, assembly, and test ac- tivities through the S-IC-15 stage, which is presently under contract, continue through 1969 Operations at the Cape to launch these 15 stages (bottom bar) carry through 1970 while the third bar, repre senting the mission support work at Huntsville, is contracted through 1968 for the first eight flight stages This contract will have to be extended to include the `idditional stages Looking at the top b'tr, there has been some very extensive testing going forward in support of the stage design and assembly The first is the static firing activity on the propulsion test st'tge at Huntsville In the qualification test program, we have tested over 1,100 parts critical to flight. Addi- tionally, we are also doing reliability testing, dyn'tmic testing, and very extensive structural testing These test progr'trns must be corn pleted prior to launch of first manned missions., S*IC SUPPLIERS TOTAL COMMITMENTS $271,393,619 AS OF JANUARY 1,1961 4400 SUPPLIERS $1.100,000. sloo,000-i,oOo,00o* $1,O00,0O0-5,00O,ooo~ $5,000,000 AND ABOVE- PROPORTIONAL MASS. R. I. CONN. LIbEL. ~MD. FIGURE 4 PAGENO="0679" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 675 At this time, Mr. Wilkinson, who is in charge of our Michoud op- erations, will tell you briefly about the S-IC program. Mr. WILKINsoN. First of all, let's take a quick look at what the S-IC does for the Saturn V (fig. 6). The S-IC must lift 6 million pounds off the pad and accelerate 11/2 million pounds (which is the weight of the upper stages plus pay- load) to 6,000 miles per hour at a 40-mile altitude in 21/2 minutes. An additional ground rule was that the liftoff thrust must exceed the weight by 25 percent. So we use five, li/2-million-pound-thrust F-i engines to give us `a total of 71/2 million pounds of thrust, which ex- ceeds the weight by the required amount. That's what we call a sim- plified design requirement for the S-IC stage. During your tour in the factory, you saw the S-IC-4 in the vertical assembly tower. Figure 7 is a cutaway of the S-IC stage and, as you can see, the five engines mounted, at the bottom are arranged with four outer engines, which are movable, and a center engine, which is fixed. The swiveling capability of `the outer engines provides steering control during powered phases `of the flight. The bottom tank contains the fuel, which is a high-grade kerosene (RP-1). The fuel tank contains 200,000 gallons of this fuel. The fuel is delivered by two 10-inch lines for each of the five engines. The liquid-oxygen tank, which is the uppermost tank of the S-IC, holds 327,000 gallons of liquid oxygen-this is the oxidizer. The liquid oxygen is delivered through five 20-inch lines that run through tunnels in `the fuel tank. The BOEING SATURN/APOLLO PROGRAM ACTIVITIES S-IC STAGE DESIGN, ASSEMBLY AND TEST (SCHEDULE I &IA) 1 MISSION SUPPORT SCHEDULE II [DOCUMENTATION COMPLETE -] AUTHORIZED SA-SOl UA 500 V VY7 V V V V V SATURN V SYSTEMS MISSION SUPPORT (SCHEDULE II) I SITE ACTIVATION____________ -SATURN/APOLLO MOVE TO LAUNCH PAD-- UMBILICAL TOWER (LUTI NO I OPERATIONAL7' LAUNCH PAD 39A OPERATIONAL / SA 501 SAS1S TV VV VVV VVVV'VVV ` SATURN V LAUNCH OPERATIONS (SCHEDULE III) BEGIN PRINCIPAL TESTING V r____TEST1NG COMPLETE-1 STATIC RELIABILITY PIRING * YNAMIC (SIC-TI QUALIPICATION TRUCTURAL PRINICI PAL TESTING ACTIVITY -GROUND TEST STAGES1 S-IC-I S-IC-D S-IC-F S-IC FLIGHT STAGES ON DOCK KSC __________ S-IC-i S-IC-15 1W , ~ 1U5~~ 1966 1967 .L.1968 1969 I 1919 FIGURE 5 PAGENO="0680" 676 196.8 NASA AUTHORIZATION APOLLO SATURN V/APOLLO _____ DESIGN REQUIREMENTS S-IC STAGE 1[f~I INSTR 1JNIU1 S.IVB LIFT 6 000,000 POUNDS OFF PAD ACCELERATE 1,500,000 POUNDS TO hi s u 6,000 MPH AT 40-MILE ALTITUDE _________ SATURN V LIFT-OFF THRUST MUST EXCEED riii INITIAL WEIGHT BY 25 PERCENT LJJJI U 1,500,000 POUNDS THRUST Lillhl PER ENGINE THRUST 7'500r°°° POUNDS (`, /,,,,,_(L ~ llh'I!'!iiiI~~\~\ ~ ~fl FIGURE 6 flow rate in these liquid oxygen delivery lines is two tons per second, while that in the RP-1 fuel lines is about one ton per second. The remainder of the equipment in the stage is sequencing equipment to start and stop the engines at the proper times, to pressurize the tanks to insure that proper flow rates of fuel and oxidizer are maintained, and a rather extensive instrumentation system to obtain performance data as the stage is checked out in the various phases of test and flight. Figure 8 shows the sequence of the vertical assembly operation. On the left, the thrust structure is located in the fixture which con- tains leveling jacks. Next, the fuel tank is shown being placed on the thrust structure, then the intertank, which connects the liquid- oxygen and the fuel tanks, then the liquid-oxygen tank and, finally, the forward skirt and the forward handling ring, which is a fixture for aiding in lifting and transporting the stage. These components are mechanically fastened, unlike the tanks, which are assembled by welding. After vertical assembly, the stage is returned to the factory where the five engines and the remainder of the mechanical, electronic, and instrumentation systems are installed. After the horizontal operation, the stage is moved to the stage test building, which is located behind the main plant. This stage test PAGENO="0681" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 677 building (fig. 9) is a four-cell facility with sets of computers with electrical and electronic checkout equipment. About 2,500 tests on the S-IC stage systems are run in this facility. These tests provide assurance that the stage has been assembled correctly and that it will perform its intended mission. I will now discuss the major test programs we are conducting for manned mission confidence (fig. 10). To verify structure, this major structural test program was conducted and is 90 percent complete (fig. 11). FIGURE 7 PAGENO="0682" 678 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 8 FIGURE 9 PAGENO="0683" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 679 TESTING FOR MANNED MISSION CONFIDENCE STRUCTURAL TEST PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: * VERIFY THE CAPABILITY OF ThE STAGE STRUCTURE TO WITHSTAND THE MAXIMUM LOADS ENCOUNTERED DURING ITS MISSION SCOPE: * 25 TESTS OF MAJOR STRUCTURAL ASSEMBLIES INVOLVING 58 MAJOR TEST CONDITIONS STATUS: * 21 TESTS COMPLETE & 52 TEST CONDITIONS COMPLETED * ONE TEST REMAINING FOR S-IC-i (TO BE COMPLETE 3-1-67) FIGURE 11 The static firing program (fig. 12) was carried out at Huntsville where the S-IC--T was test-fired 15 times for a total of 867 seconds. We accomplished that program in 1965, allowing us to make some minor design changes that came out of that testing before too much hardware had been built. FIGURE 10 PAGENO="0684" 680 1968 NASA AUPHORIZATION Next is the qualification test program (fig. 13). The objective of this program is to verify that components and subsystems perform their required functions when subjected to their most critical opera- tional environments. The environment in a rocket is extremely severe STATIC FIRING TEST PROGRAM OBJECT I VE: * VERIFY THAT ALL STAGE SYSTEMS WILL PERFORM TO THEIR OPERATIONAL REQU I REMENTS WHEN INTERACTING WITH EACH OTHER ON A COMPLETE STAGE IN A FIRING ENVIRONMENT SCOPE: * S~IC-T UNDERWENT 15 STATIC FIRINGS FOR TOTAL OF 867 SECONDS STATUS:, * COMPLETE FIGURE 12 QUALIFICATION TEST PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: VERIFY THAT COMPONENTS AND SUBSYSTEMS WILL PERFORM THEIR REQUIRED FUNCTIONS WHEN SUBJECTED TO THEIR MOST CRITICAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS SCOPE: 1136 PARTS TO BE QUALIFIED STATUS: 1095 PARTS WITH TESTS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED (96 PERCENT COMPLETE) TWO PARTS FOR S-IC~.I REMAINING (TO BE COMPLETE 2-27-67) FIGuRE 13 PAGENO="0685" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 681 in terms of vibration and temperature, and the functional perform- ance requirements are therefore quite stringent. The qualification test program is 96 percent complete with only two items remaining to be qualified for the S-IC-i. Testing should be complete on these items by February 27, 1967. The reliability test program is intended to determine how much margin there is between the qualification standards and the failure points. Figure 14 shows the statistics on that test program. These test programs must be completed before we can move along to first unmanned flight and finally manned flight. Referring back to figure 10, all of the test programs are charted there, and the arrow- heads there show when those programs must be completed to support the next activity in the total sequence. We refer to those arrowheads as constraints, but thore simply stated, these events must occur in this sequence before we can proceed to the next major program. event. Thus far we have discussed our Boeing activities at Michoud and at the Marshall Space Flight Center. But, remember those 4,400 sup- pliers Dick Nelson told you about? How do we manage these sup- pliers to ~obtain a quality product? First, you start with rigorous, clear specifications and then set forth. design requirements for the items. We specify quality-control system requirements, specify con- figuration-control systems requirements, etc. If we didn't hold to these stringent requirements, the suppliers would continue to make changes, and we might be in danger of having our qualifications testing invali- dated. This is much the same type of control exercised by the Govern- ment. We survey the suppliers before we place an order. We place RELIABILITY TEST PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: VERIFY THAT CRITICAL COMPONENTS CONTAIN AN ADEQUATE PERFORMANCE MARC IN OF SAFETY TO SATISFY THE ALLOCATED STAGE RELIABILITY GOALS. SCOPE: 64 SUBSYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS ARE SUBJECTED * TO2ITESTSERIES STATUS: 20 TESTS COMPLETE (74 PERCENT) SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE: APRIL 30, 1967 FIGtrR1~ 14 PAGENO="0686" 682 1 9 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION quality control representatives `it majoi sources, `tnd `it other sources we have representatives that make periodic visits In `iddition, we periodic'dly audit the quality control systems `it all sources We en courage the suppliers to have motivation~tl progr'~ms, such `ts zero defects to attain quality products. We review their design using a preliminary design review `ind finally `i critic'tl design review using theii final engineering We have the suppliers qu'ilify their p~rts to requirements we have specified under engineering and quality-con- trol surveillance. We have almost 100 percent acceptance tests of hardw'tre before delivery There are Government personnel who con duct source surveill'tnce at most of our suppliers' f'tcilities to check our buy off and the suppliers' systems There is `iretest upon `irrival of parts `it Michoud `ilong v~ ith `i careful receiving inspection We select parts `it r'indom from oui stores, and during assembly, w e pe riodically do a teardown `ind inspection to see if the items `ire holding up MSFC is `ilso constantly providing us with inform'ition on prob lems other contr'ictors are h'iving with suppliers so w e can hopefully identify potential problem `ireas `ind est'tbhsh some corrective `iction before the problem can arise. Still, we do get some real problems. For example, we are having problems with relays. Here in our Program Control Center where we `ire convened `it the moment, you can see there is'i w `ill panel th'tt we devote to providing management with visibility to h'ti dware problems that we are experiencing on the program We have pictures of the problem parts posted on the panel This is the relay under discussion (Fig 15) We have encountered contamin'ition in th~t relay, which obviously we can't have in a quality product. Now, I would like to discuss our master schedule (Fig. 16). To ex- plain the symbology used on the chart, 1 will describe the fifth flight stage schedule bar as an example First, we buy material (denoted by the circle at the left of the bar), which has to start 17 months before we start to assemble a stage After assembly, we test (identified as PMC on the chart) in that test building I told you about, we static fire or acceptance test (AT), refurbish (in which we replace certain test items with flight hardware), and run final poststatic testing, then we ship the stage to KSC As you can see, we have started major assembly of the S-IC-10, and we have parts for the S-IC-li through S-IC-iS already in the facto~. To summarize the S-IC program (Fig. 17), we areS weeks ahead of schedule. Of the total of three ground test stages and 15 flight stages, nine are now structurally complete; three flight stages have completed static firing and are in the various phases of being readied for ship ment. The S-IC-i is at the Cape, but has not yet been launched. Reflecting a bit on the status of this hardware, right now we h'ive sev eral stages already in being and more almost completed. Yet the first stage won't be flown until later this year. This means that if we have a problem, it will affect all of these other stages, and we are going to find that we have a problem eight or 10 times over. To continue with our summary, the qualification test program is 96 percent complete; two parts for the first flight stage remain to be quali- fied. The structural test program is 90 percent complete with only one test remaining for the S-IC-i. The reliability test program, which is PAGENO="0687" 1068 NASA AUTHORIZATION 683 intended to be accomplished before we ship the third flight stage, is 74 percent complete and is programed for April completion. Our management is continuing to place concerted emphasis on resolving the problems as early as possible. Although we have problems that arise occasionally, such as the relays, today, we have no known problems that will impact stage deliveries or flight schedules. This is a summary of the S-IC program. Now I would like to introduce Hal McClellan. Mr. MCCLELLAN. Thank you, Clint. I am going to discuss Boeing's role at Huntsville in support of the Marshall Space Flight Center. FIGUI~E 13 PAGENO="0688" 684 196.8 NASA AUTHORIZATION S- IC PROGRAM SUMMARY CONTRACT REPORTING SCHEDULE I%S IW6 f fl47 I in. I S4c.T $~CC*~Ut$fl~.Q .-.~ LEGEND S.IC.F .` `.L °~`°~ 1.W ~.w / SIC-i ____________ S4C.2 ~ *1 I ~ SIC4 *III~U S.IC.5 ~ Ii S.1C4 *II~~$II : s-IC_i I ~. - S.K.$ ___________________ I S.IC.~ _________________________ I S-IC-b ___________________ . 54~.fl tir. SIC-IS _I_![-1.I,1~III*IsIoI.1. *[.I.1~III~I*~sIoI.1, 1111-1.1-I Ij I~oj.jo II `1-I.I-II~ ~ 11,1*1.1 INS INS 5*7 I~I INS FIGURE 16 Our activities at Huntsville are concerned with the integration of the total launch vehicle (Fig. 18), that is, the marriage of each of the stages and certain ground support that goes with the total launch vehicle. We accomplish this activity under schedule II of our contract in sup- port of Marshall at Huntsville. The four main task breakdowns (Fig. 19) are: Testing; systems engineering analysis and documentation associated with the prelaunch phase of the operation; similar activities after the vehicle is in flight; and certain program-management-support activities. In the Saturn V vehicle-testing area, you saw in operation the Dynamic Test Vehicle at MSFO yesterday. The status of that pro- gram is shown on figure 20. Figure 21 is a photograph of the Dynamic Test Stand. The testing necessary before first launch will be complete in March of 1.967. We have completed, in December of 1966, the structural test of the upper portion of the S-IC stage `and lower portion of the S-Il stage (Fig. 22). This testing has been satisfactorily completed for un- manned SA-501. We operate, for MSFC, what we call a Systems Development Fa- cility or breadboard (`Fig. 23), which is a set of checkout and launch- control equipment; mechanical simulations of the S-IC, S-Il, and S-IVB; and the instrument unit. There also are other contractors involved in this program, `but we operate this facility for MSFC. From this facility, the computerized test and checkout programs have been validated and delivered to the Cape for the SA-501. PAGENO="0689" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 685 The prelaunch systems engineering activities are summarized in figure 24. Figure 25 is a photograph of Launch Complex 39 at Cape Kennedy. All of the stages and Ground Support Equipment (GSE) comes together at the Cape. In the background you can see the Ve- hicle Assembly Bui1din~; there is assembly, checkout, and launch equipment in this building for which we provide engineering and integration at Huntsville. At Huntsville, our function is to assure that flight hardware, ground support equipment, and spares supplied by MSFC will meet the requirements of the processing that takes place at the Cape. The operations and maintenaiice analysis for the first flight is complete; the spares and GSE are on schedule; and our pre- launch vehicle-processing analysis is on schedule. The third activity is concerned with the vehicle during flight (Fig. 26). In flight mission planning, we calculate the actual flight path or trajectory that the launch vehicle will take from Earth; we determine settings from the flight control system-the guidance and navigation system-which are then set into the instrumentation unit you saw in Huntsville yesterday. We predict, prior to flight, how the launch vehicle will perform and evaluate data for MSFC after the flight. The activity to support the 501, is complete-both the trajec- S-IC PROGRAM SUMMARY * S-IC PROGRAM IS 5 WEEKS AHEAD OF SCHEDULE * OF THE TOTAL OF 3 GROUND TEST STAGES AND 15 FLIGHT STAGES, 9 ARE NOW STRUCTURALLY COMPLETE. * 3 FLIGHT STAGES HAVE COMPLETED STATIC FIRING PROGRAMS. * QUALI Fl CATION TEST PROGRAM I S 96% COMPLETE WITH ONLY 2 PARTS REMAINING FOR S-IC-I. * STRUCTURAL TEST PROGRAM IS 90% COMPLETE WITH ONLY I TEST REMAINING FOR S-IC-I. * RELIABILITY TEST PROGRAM IS 74% COMPLETE. * BOEING MANAGEMENT IS CONTINUING TO PLACE CONCERTED EMPHASIS ON IDENTIFYING & RESOLVING POTENTIAL PROBLEMS AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. * KNOWN PROBLEMS WILL NOT IMPACT STAGE DELIVERIES NOR FLIGHT SCHEDULES. FIGuRE 17 76-265 0-67-pt. 2-44 PAGENO="0690" 686 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION SATURN V NASA/CONTRACTOR MAJOR ROLES F - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -, I APOLLO * r__SPACECRAFT I - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SATURN V MSFC BOEING SCHEDULE II - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 41 * I BOEING - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - ---- - - - - ~ SCHEDULE III FIGuRE 18 SATURN V SYSTEMS MISSION SUPPORT TASKS * SATURN V VEHICLE SYSTEMS TESTING * PRELAUNCH SYSTEMS ENGINEERING * FLIGHT SYSTEMS ENGINEERING * PROGRAM MANAGEMENT SUPPORT INSTRUMENT UNIT - IBM S-IVB STAGE-DOUGLAS S-Il STAGE - NAA - S & ID S-IC STAGE - BOEING SCHEDULE I FIGURE 19 PAGENO="0691" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 687 SATURN V VEHICLE SYSTEMS TESTING FUNCTIONS: * DYNAMIC TESTING * MULTI-STAGE STRUCTURAL TESTING * SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT FACILITY OPERATION `I STATUS: * FULL SCALE DYNAMIC TESTING FOR SA-5OI WILL COMPLETE MARCH 1967 * S-IC/S-Il INTERFACE STRUCTURE QUALIFIED FOR UNMANNED FLIGHT - TESTING COMPLETED DECEMBER 1966 * COMPUTERIZED TEST AND CHECKOUT'PROGRAMS VALI DATED AND DELIVERED tO KSC NOVEMBER 1966 FOR SA-501 FIGURE 20 FIGuRE 21 PAGENO="0692" 688 196.8 NASA AUTHORIZATION FiGURE 22 FIGURE 23 PAGENO="0693" 689 1908 NASA AUTHORIZATION PRELAUNCH SYSTEMS ENGINEERING FUNCTION: ASSURE 1HAT FLIGHT HARDWARE, GROUND SUPPORT EQUI PMENT AND SPARES SUPPLIED BY MSFC WILL MEET REQUI REMENTS OF ASSEMBLY, CHECKOUT AND LAUNCH AT KSC. STATUS: * OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE ANALYSES FOR SA-50I COMPLETE. * GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT & SPARES ON SCHEDULE. * PRELAUNCH VEHICLE PROCESSING ANALYSES ON SCHEDULE. FIGURE 24 FIGURE 25 PAGENO="0694" 690 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FLIGHT SYSTEMS ENGINEERING FUNCTIONS: * FLIGHT MISSION PLANNING * FLIGHT PERFORMANCE PREDICTIONS * FLIGHT EVALUATION ~ STATUS: * SA-501 FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM DESIGN, GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION EQUATIONS, AND MISSION TRAJECTORIES ARE COMPLETED * SA-50I PERFORMANCE PREDICTIONS ARE COMPLETE * EMPHASIS IS SHIFTING TO MANNED MISSION PLANNINC FIGURE 26 FIGURE 27 PAGENO="0695" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 691 tories and performance predictions. In 1968, emphasis will shift from unmanned to the later complete lunar-orbital rendezvous flights with men in the spacecraft. This work is done in the computing facility called the Boeing Simu- lation Center at Huntsville. Figure 27 shows a small part of that facility. This facility was activated 3 years ago. The final `activity is Program Management Support (Fig. 28). In this area, there are two significant activities. Boeing provides assistance to MSFC with configuration management; that is, making sure that all of the documentation and the support equipment that go with the launch vehicle are identified as to configuration and change status. The baseline for the SA-501 preflight readiness review will be established April 1. Again in the program management area, we helped MSFC activate their program control room (Fig. 29). Dr. Rudolph, the MSFC Saturn V program manager, uses this room to exercise management control. We are currently emphasing "bubbling up" the uncertain- ties or problems to get action and resolutions. These problems are reviewed every month and action assigned to resolve the uncertainties. In summary (Fig. 30), our activity is on schedule. We have no known problems that will cause delay in the launch of the first Saturn V. In fiscal year 1968 our activity will continue to place emphasis on support to unmanned flight and will shift to support of the manned flight. This is a quick summary of the Boeing Huntsville activity. I will now introduce L. P. Alford from the Cape. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FUNCTIONS: * CONFI GURATION MANAGEMENT * PROGRAM CONTROL STATUS: * CONFIGURATION BASELINE UPDATED BY APRIL I FOR SA 501 PREFLIGHT READINESS REVIEW * PROGRAM MANAGEMENT EMPHASIS: PROBLEM RESOLUTION FIGuRE 28 PAGENO="0696" 692 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 29 SATURN V SYSTEMS MISSION SUPPORT PROGRAM SUMMARY SATURN V SYSTEMS MISSION SUPPORT IS ON SCHEDULE. KNOWN PROBLEMS WILL NOT IMPACT SA-50I LAUNCH. UNMANNED FLIGHT SUPPORT AND MANNED FLIGHT PLANNING WILL BE CONCURRENT IN FY 1968. F~GURE 30 PAGENO="0697" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 693 Mr. ALFORD. I would like to express to ~OU tile excitement and con- cern we have at the Cape as we start the first flight vehicle through the processing cycle. If you could feel that, you would realize the effort taking place there. I know of nothing more exciting than to see the first launch of a vehicle. I will be talking about Boeing's support to NASA's Kennedy Space Center, which is covered under our part three of our contract. Our task is summarized on figure 31. It consists of accomplishing the site activation and launch operation functions relating to the S-IC stage and the stage ground support equipment. We also pro- vide engineering design support for some of the equipment KSC is responsible for developing. This generally consists of equipment al- ready designed and delivered to KSC, but which may require design changes to make it operationally usable. Boeing also provides sup- port to maintain a Launch Complex 39 Control Center, similar to the one that Dr. Rudolph uses at Huntsville, but with more detailed vehi- cle processing visibility. Congressman TEAGUE. Mr. Alford, four of our members haven't been to Kennedy, why don't you tell them what Launch Complex 39 is~ Mr. ALFORD. O.K. This is the Vehicle Assembly Building (Fig. 32). It has four high-bay areas in each of which a total vehicle can be stacked and processed. On the right can be seen three towers called launcher-umbilical towers. The vehicle is stacked on one of these towers and processed through the Vertical Assembly Building. MAJOR TASKS * LAUNCH COMPLEX 39 ACTIVATION SUPPORT * LAUNCH OPERATIONS SUPPORT * KSC ENGINEERING SUPPORT * LAUNCH COMPLEX 39 CONTROL CENTER OPERATION SUPPORT FIouiu~ 31 PAGENO="0698" 694 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Launch complex 39 also has two launching pads, designated A and B. Figure 33 shows a crawler-transporter with vehicle m~ving to the launch p'td Figure 34 shows the crawler transporter going up on `i the paul The craw ler, as it moves up this incline, `idjusts itself to keep the vehicle upright This is the program schedule (Fig 35) we `ire `tccomplishing foi part III of our contract We have contract responsibility foi 1'S vehicles-501 through 515-going through March of 1970 We are presently completing site activation of the first vehicle equip- ment We h'ive the 501 vehicle in its processing cycle in the Vertical Assembly Building. We had the S-IC-i erected on October 27, 1966, and we had power on the vehicle on November 7. We are now getting ready to add the S-TI stage with expected power-on March 2, 1967 We `inticipate moving to the launch pad on March 31, `ind then going into final countdown for launch. In our Launch Complex 39 activation support activity (Fig 36), set No. 1, which includes a launcher-umbilical tower (LTJT), a launch- control center (LCC) firing room, and pad A, is 95 percent completed and on schedule. Set No. 2 is also on schedule, 60 percent complete, and set No. 3 is on schedule, 30 percent complete. In launch-operations support task (Fig. 37), we maintain, operate, and refurbish ground support equipment. On the S-IC stage we erect it, check it out, and help launch it Figuie 38 is `iphotograph of the S-IC `trrivrng at the FIGURE 32 PAGENO="0699" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 695 FIGuRE 33 Vehicle Assembly Building by barge. The S-IC is then lifted into the assembly bay for erection of the launch vehicle building (fig. 39). The tota' stacked Saturn V launch vehicle without the spacecraft is shown in figure 40. In the area of KSC engineering support, we provide sustaining me- chanical design engineering support for the 17 systems listed on figure 41. We do systems engineering studies, reliability studies, logisties support (that is, get spares and documentation to support the system as required), and we procure certain items of hardware. We are re- PAGENO="0700" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 696 FIGURE 34 APQLLO SATURN V PROGRAM SCHEDULE 2/11/67 LAUNCH COMPLEX 3~ CONTROL CENTER I SITE ACTIVATION LAUNCH OPERATIONS ERECT S-IC-i (10/27) S-IC POWER-ON (11,7) LAUNCH VEHICLE POWER*ON(3/2) MOVE TO PAD 13/31) AS-501 PROCESSING 501 502 503 =504 - 505 =506 AS-502 THROUGH 507 AS-515 PROCESSING ~50U =509 = 510 . =511 512 =513 514 I =515 BOEING MISSION SUPPORT LAUNCH OPERATIONS, ENGINEERING, CONTROL CENTER CY66 ~ CY61 ~ CY68 ~ CY69 FY61 FY68 FY69 FY10 FIGURE 35 PAGENO="0701" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 697 LAUNCH COMPLEX 39 ACTIVATION SUPPORT MSFC AND KSC PROVIDED GSE ~ * ASSEMBLE & CHECKOUT *MAINTAIN& OPERATE STATUS: ON SCHEDULE 30% COMPLETE FIGURE 36 FIGURE 37 PAGENO="0702" 698 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION sponsible for making this equipment work as delivered to KSC. Among the 17 systems is the launcher-umbilical tower, which includes the service arms (Fig. 42). Figure 43 is a picture of the crawler- transporter. If this equipment has any problems, we m~ist make the necessary design change to make the equipment operable. Figure 44 shows the stacked vehicle on the launcher-umbilical tower with the service arms that carry electrical power as well as fuel to the various stages. These service arms have to operate before and during liftoff, and we must have assurance that these systems will operate properly. FIGURE 38 PAGENO="0703" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 699 We also provide a launch complex 39 control center (Fig. 45), where schedules and equipment records (such as equipment coming in and equipment being modified, etc.) are displayed so the NASA launch operations manager can bring in contractors, review the schedules with them, and determine what activities must be accomplished on any given day. There is a daily meeting held with all the contractors to review the activities necessary in leading to a successful AS-501 launch. Figure 46 shows some of the displays in the control center. In summary (Fig. 47), our activites at KSC have been directed toward getting the site ready for processing of the AS-501 vehicle. We are FIGURE 89 PAGENO="0704" 700 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION KSC ENGINEERING SUPPORT *SUSTAINING MECHANICAL ENGINEERING * SYSTEMS ENGINEERING now directing our attention toward a launch operation and success- ful launch of the AS-501. To do that, we are assuring that equip- ment, papers, people, etc., are compatible and in reliable condition. I will now turn the meeting back to Dick Nelson. Mr. NELSON. Thank you. Now, I'd like to give you a brief rundown on the money and manpower situation as it relates to our tasks on the Saturn V program. Our actual expenditures on schedule I are under- running somewhat our contract forecast, and it appears we will under- run the complete cost of the program. We are about 80 percent ex- pended. We have about 3 years left to go on the program. We are just getting started on schedule IA for the followon stages S-IC-li through -15. At this point it is too early for forecasting any devia- tion from contract price. On schedule II, we are underrunning our forecast. We are about two-thirds expended with about 2 years to go. On schedule III, we have about 3 years to go through the launch of the SA-515 vehicle with about 20 percent expended, and no devia- tion from contract target cost is forecast. (The foregoing discussion on the contract expenditures contained some off-the-record discussion, which has been deleted from this transcript.) Figure 48 shows our manpower profile. We peaked at 11,600 people at the end of 1965 and we have been coming down, and as of February 3, we had 10,837, for a reduction of about 800 people. In terms of people here in New Orleans, we peaked here at about 6,000 direct labor in early 1965 and have been coming down rather steadily since that time. We are currently, as of February 3, at 3,571. On schedule II (Huntsville) ,, the manpower peak occurred in mid-1966 *DESIGN ENGINEERING *RELIABILITY ENGINEERING *LOGISTICS ENGINEERING ~ *PROCUREMENT FIGURE 40 PAGENO="0705" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 701 When we had 2,569 people. We have been declining since then and the Boeing Saturn V direct headcount now is 2,118. It is interesting to note that while we have been declining in the New Orleans and Huntsville areas, we have been able to maintain a fairly level em- ployment in all three areas because we have been able to transfer peo- ple to the Cape to assist in their buildup. Dr. VON BRAUN. How are your Mississippi Test Facility people carriej in that chart? FIGURI~ 41 76-265 0-67-pt. 2---i45 PAGENO="0706" 702 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Mr. NELSON. The Boeing Mississippi Test Facility people are car- ried in the New Orleans part of this chart. We have about 300 of them. At this point of time, we are at the point where we can no longer utilize people from Huntsville and New Orleans at the Cape since they are about to reach their peak. We are now in a declining man- power situation in the program and it will continue throughout the remainder of the program. The area on figure 48, designated units 16-25, gives us a look at what impact the additional stages at three-per-year delivery has on the total manpower situation. As you can see, our manpower will still be decreasing. In order to prevent a dip in the manpower line, we will have to activate the S-IC-16 through S-IC-25 program very soon. If we don't, we will have to lay off and then bring people back at a later date to staff the work force. Figure 49 shows the schedule situation for those followon stages. The top bar is the schedule for the first eight flight stages built at Michoud through S-IC-b, which will be delivered late in 1968. Assembly of S-IC-il will start April 20, 1967. In order to hold this delivery schedule for S-IC-il, it was necessary to place orders for long-lead items some 38 months before the delivery date of the 11th stage. This required that we place orders for S-IC-li material in November 1965. In FIGURE 42 PAGENO="0707" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 703 order to hold an uninterrupted schedule for the S-IC-16 stage with a 38-month leadtime, which is the optimum leadtime, it would have been necessary to place orders for these long-lead items this past December. This date has gone by; however, jt is possible to shorten this leadtime to an absolute minimum of 31 months by doing out-of- sequence installations and compressing testing. We believe that we can hold the delivery schedule for the 16th article based on three-per- year rate in February 1970, if we get authorization by July 1, 1967. Doing it this way is something less than optimum from the stand- point of the cost picture. To use a homely analogy, you can build a house starting with the roof, then add the second floor, then jack the Fiomu~ 43 PAGENO="0708" 704 196.8 NASA AUTHORIZATION LAUNCH CONTROL *SITEACTIVATIONTASKTOBECOMPLETEDiUNE3~. 1961 *IAUNCH OPERATIONS TASK BEING IMPlEMENTED FIGURE 44 whole works up and add the first floor and a foundation. It's a costly way to operate, but it can be done. We prefer not doing it this way. It is just not the economical way to operate. To do an optimum job, we should have initiated procurement last December. We can still hold S-IC-16 delivery in February 1970 by managing the 38 months down to 31 months. It would appear the funds required for fiscal year 1968 for S-IC-16 and on would be approximately $28 million (Fig. 50). The first 6 months of fiscal year 1968 expenditure will be something like $6.4 million, with commitments of $13.5 million. To quickly summarize our Boeing Saturn program (Fig. 51) ac- tivities are on or ahead of schedule. Part I is 5 weeks ahead of schedule. Costs are running under targets. Testing activities are proceeding toward achieving the necessary confidence for manned mission. We have no known technical problems jeopardizing the pro- gram. We have converted schedules I and II to incentive-type con- tracts, and schedule III is an award-fee type of contract. We are phasing down manpower consistent with program requirements. We require authorization by July 1, 1967, as an absolute deadline for follow-on 16 and on stages. But in spite of these optimistic state- 39 CONTROL CENTER STATUS PAGENO="0709" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 705 ments, I want to make one major point-we still have the critical flight test program ahead of us. This has been a real quick summary of the Boeing activities on the Saturn V program. Mr. George Stoner would like to say a few words. Congressman TEAGUE. George, would you comment on how the money flows from NASA to you, and from you to your subcontractors? Mr. STONER. Well, the process is one of signing a contract with NASA, so we know what our budget is for doing a job both from a total cost standpoint and the time-phase standpoint. Then we engage in competitive selection of our suppliers much like the Government does. We have in our contracts the billing system for the contractors. When we can get fixed-price contracts with our suppliers, we do so. Where the development nature of the job makes fixed-price contract- ing impossible, we use other types such as incentive-fee or cost-plus fixed-fee contracts. Final flow of money to the contractor is as he dis- charges his contract for us, we pay him as he goes. Congressman TEAGUE. What timelag is there? Mr. STONER. Only a matter of a few weeks. Congressman TEAGUE. Does this apply to subcontractors too? Mr. STONER. When we get a bill from our subcontractors, within a few weeks on an average, the subcontractor has his money. FIGrEE 45 PAGENO="0710" 706 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM EMPHASIS AT KSC * PREVIOUSLY. DIRECTED TOWARD SITE ACTIVATION *NOW DIRECTED TOWARD LAUNCH OPERATIONS - THE CONDUCT OFA SUCCESSFUL LAUNCH * CONFIGURATION ASSURANCE * SYSTEMS RELIABIUTY * HUMAN ENGINEERING * TEST PROCEDURES * WORK CONTROL *SAFETY * QUALITY CONTROL * PERSONNEL SELECTION * TRAINING FIGURE 46 BOEING PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS FORECAST SATURN PROGRAM THROUGH SA-525 I- 6,000 FIGURE 47 PAGENO="0711" 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION 707 DELIVERY SCHEDULE S-IC-16 THRU -25 i-i CYO5 I CY0S I CYST j CYI$ cyso cvio c~u c'n~ CYT3 I CY14 FY88 FY81 FY18 FY$$ I FY10 I FY11 FY12 FY18 I FY14 [ FIGURE 48 FUNDS REQUIREMENTS STAGES S-IC-16 THROUGH S-IC- 25 S-IC PROGRAM STAGES 2_iA 2-3-67 -10 I V V V V V V ON DOCK MICHOUD ~ START LONGLEAD PROCUREMENT 11-24 11-15 ~YEAR* Al TART -11 -15 EMBLY VVy 4-20 12-1 7-1 ¶ 3/YEAR 10-10 START -16 -25 A~SEMRLY ~ ~ ~ 2-2 i-25 2-2 16-25 2 -I -I 2 2 -a FIGURE 49 PAGENO="0712" 708 196.8 NASA AUTHORIZATION BOEING ACTIVITY SUMMARY PRESENT STATUS: * PROGRAM ACTIVITIES ON OR AHEAD OF SCHEDULE * COSTS ON OR BELOW TARGETS * TESTING ACTIVITIES ARE PROCEEDING TOWARDS ACHIEVING MANNED MISSION CONFIDENCE * NO KNOWN TECHNICAL PROBLEMS JEOPARDIZING THE PROGRAM * SCHEDULE I, IA & II OF CONTRACT NAS8-5608 HAVE BEEN CONVERTED TO INCENTIVE CONTRACTS. SCHEDULE III IS CPAF * TOTAL MANPOWER IS PHASING DOWN CONSISTENT WITH PROGRAM REQUI REMENTS * PROCUREMENT FOR FOLLOW-ON STAGES (S-IC-16 AND ON) REQUIRES CONTRACT AUTHORIZATION BY JULY I, 1967 BUT: * THE CRITICAL FLIGHT-TEST PROGRAM IS AHEAD FIGuRE 50 I want to comment on the fact that the first Saturn V flight has not yet been made. These Boeing people working on this program are well aware of that fact as you could tell from the presentation today. They have a terrific act to follow in another Boeing program called the Lunar Orbiter. Figure 52 shows that Boeing-built spacecraft, and figure 53 is a shot taken by the Lunar Orbiter II. This program is helping NASA to plan the Apollo Mission. The first two Lunar Orbiters were highly successful and a third one is in orbit around the Moon today. Each Lunar Orbiter takes about 18 miles of 35mm. film. This work has been done by Boeing people working with the NASA Langley Research Center. Most of the activity was centered in Seattle with a substantial number of people at Cape Kennedy. The Boeing space division has about 14,500 people. The group you hear from today constitutes about 10,500; the remainder of people are working on Lunar Orbiter, Burner II, Minuteman, Voyager, and so forth, and these people have an act to follow. We are most pleased to have had the opportunity of briefing you today. Any questions? Congressman PETTIS. There was an estimate of a projected under- run. The economic situation was better than you projected it when you signed your contract? Mr. STONER. Both we and Marshall did our best around the negoti- ation table to arrive at the right figure for target cost for the contract. Then they gave us an incentive-fee provision which allows us to share in any cost underrun. Thanks to Mr. Nelson and Mr. Wilkinson, they have been able to manage the program thus far well enough to project that underrun PAGENO="0713" 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION 709 at this time. It's not crystal clear until the whole program is over just what the costs will be. If there are no unexpected snakes to bite us, I believe we can realize a significant underrun as Dick Nelson projects it. Mr. NELSON. Remember, when we negotiated the contract, we were sure that we would have some real tough problems to solve. So far we have been able to solve them, but with the flight-test program still ahead of us we may uncover something that we will have to fix which will eat up that underrun or possibly even more, but we hope not. Mr. STONER. At the moment we think we've done the job and have enough confidence in having done that job that Dick was able to get up here today and project that underrun. Congressman TEAGUE. Is there any doubt in your mind that when you turn loose of a vehicle to Kennedy it has been thoroughly tested, or are you limited in any way in the amount of testing you do? Or if you have doubts, can you continue testing? Mr. STONER. I have never found Dr. von Braun or his staff un- willing to permit us to proceed with cost necessary to complete tests that we or they think ought to be done. If there are any suspicions, Dr. von Braun and his staff encourage us and recommend many test- ing ideas of their own. The only qualification I can place on our having complete confi- dence in the stage is that we all are humans and we can make mistakes. FIGURE 51 PAGENO="0714" 710 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION But I think the boys here have done the best job men can do-and some mighty fine men too, I might add Congressman TEAGUE. Thank you, George, we think they're mighty fine men too Thanks Dick, for the fine briefing you and your people put together for us flOURE 52 PAGENO="0715" APPENDIX C HEARINGS OF THE SUBCOMMIrrEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, THE CHRYSLER Corn?., MICHOUD ASSEMBLY FAcThIPY, NEW ORLEANS, LA., FEBRUARY 11, 1967 ATTENDEES Committee Members Committee ~S~ta4'f Congressman 0. Teague (Texas) Mr. J. Wilson Congressman f. Pettis (California) Mr. P. Gerardl Congressman 0. Vander Jagt (Michigan) Mr. J. Felton Congressman J. Hunt (New Jersey) Congressman B. Eckhardt (Texas) - - Un> 81)5 e Dr. W. von Braun NASA Headquarters Dr. E. Bees Capt. R. Freltag Mr. H. Gorn~an Mr. J. Cramer Mr. H. Weidner NA~A-M~FC-Michoud Assembly Mr. B. Kline Facility Dr. G. Constan Mr. M. Hardee Chrysler Stpace Division> Mr. H. D. Lowrey, President Mr. B. J. Meldrum, Director Program Control Office Mr. V. J. Vehko, Director Engineering Mr. A. Trahern, Director Operations Mr. D. Jolivette, Public Relations Mr. J. Schmidt, Staff Mr. LOWREY. Welcome to the Chrysler part of the Michoud opera- tion. Just to begin with, I will show you how this thing-a model of the Saturn I vehicle-goes together, and the part that Chrysler makes. Here is the first stage. It has eight engines that have about 1,600,000 pounds of thrust; in other words it can lift just about 1,600,000 pounds. The second stage is made by Douglas in Huntington Beach, Calif. It has a single J-2 engine, with hydrogen and oxygen for propellants. The S-lB stage uses oxygen and kerosene. The work of the first stage is to put it into about a 40-mile position in the atmosphere. Then it burns out and the second stage is ignited. The vehicle is controlled by an instrument unit built by IBM, which is the black portion, here, and then the spacecraft is the responsibility, of course, of the people in Houston. This is a replica of the lunar module inside of the adapter, the service module, the command module, and the abort tower. With that, Mr. Meidrum, I think you can give the committee mein- bers the status of how our program stands horn today and what is expected. Mr. MELDRUM. All right. What we intend to do here, in the course of about an hour, is to provide a program review for the complete Saturn program that we have here at Chrysler. I 1~ave about 40 charts here, so I'll spend something less than a minute and a half on each chart. This will be tape recorded. We have asked you to sign these tickets, so that when we type up a transcript, we will be able 711 PAGENO="0716" 712 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION SATURN PROGRAM REVIEW FOR COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FEB.11,'67 to identify who asked what question, because one of our people will put "voice on voice" and say "that came from chair No. 1, or chair No. 10," and so on. Thank you. We want you to feel free to interrupt and bring up any point that you have any question on. At the con- clusion of this presentation, we will give all of you who are interested 81/2 by 11 inch copies of these charts. I think that on Monday or Tuesday we will have a transcript typed up and we will send that in to you, Mr. Wilson. You can have any number of copies that you desire. In front of you is a two-page outline of what we are going to discuss so that, if you wish, you can see where we are as we go along. I will go through this outline very rapidly. We will describe what our current contractual obligations are at the present time, and what our personnel history has been up to this time, and a cost summary of the complete program that is under con- tract at this time. We will then go into our largest schedule, schedule I, the schedule which has the 14 stages, and will tell you what our status is, what our engineering release status is, how we stand on our qualification and reliability program, our qualit,y problems, our cost plans, and personnel projections. We will never talk about cost with- out talking about people at the same time, because you can't talk about one without talking about the other. We will then talk a little about what we call our schedule VI, which is the procurement of all long leadtime items, to protect our ability to stay in business. We have a contract to get the long leadtime items needed for the four birds, S-IB-13, 14, 15, and 16. We do not have a "follow-on" program. We just have the portion occurring between now and June 30 for doing those things that have to be done if we are not to have a break in the continuity of the program. After that, logically, we will talk about what a "follow-on" pro- gram ought to be; what are the elements of planning for it, the "ground rules," the schedules, the cost plan, and the personnel pro- jections. We will talk about personnel attrition. . Given time, we will talk about our schedule II, "vehicle integra- tion," description, status, cost plans, and personnel projections. Our PAGENO="0717" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 713 schedule III, mechanical ground support equipment, description, status, cost plans, and personnel projections. Schedule IV, our launch mission work at Kennedy Space Center, description, status, cost plans, personnel projections, and then we will have a very brief rundown on the work that we are doing on other than our main contract, NAS 8-4016. We'll discuss two items, one, Saturn improve- ment studies (what we can do to increase the capability of this bird), and two, the work that we are doing in optical technology. Then we will have a summary. Our main contract, NAS 8-4016, has these six items: schedule I, supply the stages; schedule II, the launch vehicle integration effort; III, the mechanical ground support equipment for which Marshall Space Flight Center has responsibility, as distinguished from the mechanical ground support equipment for which Kennedy has re- sponsibility; schedule IV our launch mission; V is a small special test mission, involving about 20 people. It is going to end in a few months, and I'm not going to talk about it any further. Schedule VI is our procurement of long leadtime items. OUTLINE OF REVIEW DESOQIPTION OF CUP~ENT CON1~ACT OBLIGATION S PERSONNEL HISTOQY COST SUMMAQY SCHEDULE I- (STAGE SUPPLY)~STATUS ENGINEERING INITIAL RELEASE STATUS QUALIFICATION P~OG~AM STATUS RELIABILITY PQOG~AM STATUS QUALITY CONTROL P~OG~AM STATUS COST PLAN PEQSONNEL PQOJECTION SC~.1EDULE VI (PQOCUQEMENT OF LONG LEAD TIME MAT'L) DESCQIPTION AND STATUS COST PLAN FOLLOW-ON CONIQACT PLANNING ~`GQOUND QULES" SCHEDULE COST PLAN PEQSONNEL PQOJECTION PEQSONNEL ADDITION AND SEPAQATION PAGENO="0718" 714 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION OUTLINE OF REVIEW * (CONT) SCI4EDULE U VEW ICLE INTEGRATION DESCRIPTiON * STATUS COST PLANS PERSONNEL PROJECTION SCHEDULE UI-MECHANICAL GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (MSFC) DESCR%PT1OM STATUS COST PLAN PERSONNEL PROJECTION SCHEDULE ]V- LAUNCH MISSION (KSC-I) DESCRIPTION STATUS COST PLAN PERSONNEL PROJECTION WORJ~ OTHER TI-IAN NAS8-401ô A. SATURN IMPROVEMENT STUDIES DESCRIPTION IMPROVEMENT POTE.NTIAL a OPTICAL TECHNOLOGY SUMMARY Here is the way We look on personnel manning from 1962 to today. This is what we have here at Michoud, here is what we have at Hunts- ville static test. Here we have Huntsville, exclusive of static test, and here is what we have in Florida. Here is the Space Division as a whole. The ordinate scales are all the same. We hit our peak in the last quarter of fiscal year 1965 (the middle of calendar year 1965), 5,580 people. We are down to about 4,700 people now. We have gone clown about 800 people. Here, at Michoud, our peak in that same period, was around 3,300 people and we are down to 2,700 peo- ple. We have dropped 600 people in that period of time. We are at a level at about 140 people at Huntsville on static test. At Hunts- ville, exclusive of static test, we have gone down from 1,450 to about 800, so we have about a 600 drop. We have gone up about 400 in that PAGENO="0719" 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION 715 period at the Cape. We have a thousand people, roughly, at the Cape. Two hundred and fifty of those peopie came from Huntsville when some of the responsibility for mechanical ground support equipment was transferred from Huntsville to the Cape. To give you a bird's-eye view on how much these various activities cost, the work under contract as of the end of January is around $200 million, and the big item is Schedule I which is half of it, stage supplies, with $7 million for the long leadtime items. Call the sub- total $103 million, and the work at the Cape is about $70 million. These others are lesser amounts. In the case of Schedule II, as I'll get into it later, that ($15.7 million) is what we have under contract. We expect another $1 million a month for the next 24 months. Now on stage supply. The best picture of stage supply (see chart 40) is produced from this wall chart. We have a 14-stage program. Each one of these bands represents one stage. These are calendar years at the base, and the end point of each of these strips represents the date when that stage will be available to ship to Kennedy. Five of these stages have been launched. The red arrow tips indicate the dates that they were launched. This stage (S-IB-5) is in storage. You saw it downstairs. S-IB-6 is at the Cape and S-IB-4 is at the Cape. As we go down over the history, S-I-8 was successfully launched on the 25th of May and put Pegasus 2, the micrometeorite detection satellite, in orbit. S-I--b was launched on the 30th of July. Pegasus 3 was put in orbit, and is still in orbit. S-TB-i was launched on the 26th of February 1966. This was the "quarter lob" shot (a quarter of the way around the world), to help qualify the heat shield. We had maximum heat transfer rate across the heat shield. S-IB-3 was launched on the 5th of July. This was the liquid hydrogen experi- ment, and incidentally, that was launch number 80 for Chrysler Corp., 80 sequential successful launches. S-IB-2 was launched on the 25th of August. This was a "three- quarter lob" shot (three-quarters of the way around the world), and came down near Hawaii. This was the qualification test of the heat shield from the standpoint of total quantity of heat transferred. S-IB-4 is at Kennedy. It was completed on schedule in June of 1966. S-lB-S was completed on schedule in August of 1965. It is awaiting shipment. You saw it, with the blue cover on it, downstairs. S-IB-6 is at Kennedy. It was completed here in November of 1966. S-IB-7 is on schedule. It is in poststatic modification. It was the one closest to the far wall. S-IB-8 is on schedule. It's in poststatic firing mod. It has been static fired. S-IB--9 is up in Huntsville, undergoing static fire. S-lB-b is on schedule. It is in prestatic fire checkout. You saw it in the checkout room. S-TB--li and 12 are on schedule. They are in' clustering. You saw them in the clustering fixtures downstairs. From the standpoint of initial engineering releases the job is now 100 percent on S-TB-i through 7 and 99.8 to 99.6 percent on the rest. The only thing left on some of these is the "ship loose" list of the items that are shipped with the bird and some of the electrical schematics for ii and 12. From the standpoint of initial engineering releases the job is done. The engineering activity now has to be concerned with those changes (what we call the "make-it-fit, make-it-work" changes) PAGENO="0720" 716 196.8 NASA AUTHORIZATION GONTRWT N AS- 8-4016 DESCRI P110 N SCHEDULE I SUPPLY OF 14 STAGES(ST &S-FB) 5CH EDUL[ IL LAUNCH VEH IC LE I NTEGRATI ON EFFORT 3CHEDULE IlL MECHAN~ICP~LL GROUMI) 3UPPORT EQUIPMENT (M'3Fc) SCHEDULE I~LLAU1'1CH MIS3ION (Ksc-1) SCHEDULE L3PECIALTE5T MI~S1ON (HUNTSVILLE) SCHEDULE VL PROCURE M [NT OF LONG LEAD T(ME COMPOI'IENTS FOR STAGE3- 51DB-' 13,14, 15.& 16. CHART 1 required to solve the difficulties which occur on the floor of the plant at Huntsville and at the Cape. On our qualification program status, all of the stage flight critical hardware has been qualified for first manned flight. There were 96 items qualified by analysis and 118 items qualified by test programs making a total of 214; 153 interim test figure reports were written on those 118 items. Some of those reports were written on failures that occurred outside of the required range of qualification requirements. Some were written on failures that happened within the requirements. Design changes have been developed, processed, and tested on 26 of the 118 items. There were 26 cases where the failures during the qualified test occurred within the requirements and where some change had to be made. Under the reliability program, the program has been completed. Reliability test programs have been conducted on over 200 flight critical items. As of near the end of January, we have issued 284 test failure reports. Some of these occurred outside of the require- PAGENO="0721" PERSONNEL NASB-4016 MANNING HISTORY DIRECT 0 0063 0364 CV C :[fH1111' ments of reliability, and some occurred inside. In 54 caSes, items have had to be changed. Changes have had to be developed on either the design of a part or of the processing and then have bee~i successfully tested. That's what you get out of the reliability and qualification programs. SLIDE PRESENTATION Now, I'll show you just five or six of the more interesting test items in qualification and reliability. The first one is the slide which shows the qualification test on the tail. May I have the first slide. You saw this. There were over 600 channels of information connect- ing this with the data center while the loads were being applied, and the tail was qualified on the first test. Second slide. This is the 70- inch-diameter liquid oxygen tank. This has been tested up to 140 percent of design limit loads. It was the last major item to be quali- 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION 717 oo: ~ ~ I ~ I HUNTSVILLE (ExcL STATIC TEST) t LJ±LWH~ nil FLORIDA Lu' FY63 FY64 FY65 FY66 CHART 2 EYES I FY60 76-265 O-67-pt. 2-46 PAGENO="0722" 718 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION COST SUMMARY NAS8-4016 (SINCE 1 Nov.'65) WORK UNDER CONTRACT (As OF 27 JAN.'67) $(MI LLIONS) SCHEDULE I STAGE SUPPLY 97.130 49.10 1. NOV `68 SCI-1EDULE If VEHICLE 15.780 7.99 INTEGRATION SCHEDULE lIE MECHANICAL GSE O.390 4.24 (M SFC) SCHEDULE ]~ LAUNCH MISSION 68.903 34.81 (SINCE 1 FEB'65) SCHEDULE ~ SPECIAL TEST .441 .22 MISSION SCHEDULE ~[ LONG LEAD 7.200 3.64 TIME ITEMS ______ _____ TOTAL ~19Zô44 100.0 CHART 3 fled. We had to introduce design changes when we had a buckling failure at 135 percent of the load which wasn't good enough. We had something like 260 channels of information that flowed from this tank to the data center, and the message here, I think, is in the size of this operation. These are very large things. Let's look at our next slide, please. This is the typical buckling failure that occurred in the wall of the tank near the bulkhead at fin No. 4 position for which we had to work out a correction. Let's have the next slide, please. This is a typical test (both reliability and qualification) of a liquid oxygen line. This particular line is filled with liquid nitrogen. It's covered with frost because it's extremely cold. It is mounted on a shaker of 20,000 pound force capacity and it is under the same compressive load that it would have in normal installation. These jacks reacting against heavy bungee cords are squeezing it with the proper loads. It is subject to sine wave vibrations and ran- PAGENO="0723" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 719 CONTRACT NAS~8~4 016 SCHEDULE I. STAGE SUPPLY STATUS S-F8 SUCC(SSFULLY IAUNGUU) (Sk8) 25 MAY 65 (?~~so3~ Sf10 SUCCESSFULLY LAUNCHED ~SA1O) 30 JULY 65~Asos1t SIB~1 SUCCESSFULLY LAUNCHED (AS 201) 26FEB66 (Y4 LOB SHOT SIB~3 SUCCESSFULLY LAUNCHED CSA~2O3) S JULY66 (LIQUID HYDROGEN EX R) SIB2 SUCCESSFULLY LAUNCHED (AS202) 25AUG (~4 LOB SHOT) SIB4 AT I(SC.COMPL(TED ON SCHEDULE JUNE~6 SJB5 COMPL(~ED ON SCHEDULE AUG 65 AWAITING SHIPMENT 51% AT 1<50 COMPLETED ON SCHEDULE NOV. 66 SIB? ON SCHEDULE IN POST STATIC FIRE MODIFICATION SIBS ON SCHEDULE IN POST STATIC FIRE MODIFICATION 919-9 ON SCHEDULE AT STATIC TEST SIBIO ON SCHEDULE IN PRE STATIC FIRE CUEOI( OUT 91911 ON SCHEDULE IN CLUSTERING 919-12 ON SCHEDULE IN CLUSTERING CHART 4 dom vibrations and has qualified under all of the applicable stress environments. Next slide, please. This is a pair of the same lines mounted in the horizontal position so that we are testing two at the same time, moimted on the shaker, and excited in this direction for random and for sine wave vibrations over the complex frequency scale. Next slide. Here is a test of the complete "wraparound" line assem- bly. Here, again, the message here lies in the very large sizes in- volveci (practically sewer pipe sizes), and again it has an excitation in the vertical direction. We have problems in this type of structure with bosses and with the bellow connections. Next slide, please. Here is a typical series of pictures of typical difficulties that you run into; some outside of the limits of qualification and reliability, and some inside. Here's one that was inside the limits, where the complete boss PAGENO="0724" 720 1968 NASA ATJ~EIORIZATION P~JAS 8-4016 SCHEDULE 1 INITIAL ENG. RELEASE STATUS (As OF 25 JAN 1967) G+B~1THRU S+B-7 1002 S+B-8 99.8°!. S+B-9 99.8Z S+B1O 99.87. S-r-B-11 99.6Z 8-1-8-12 9967 SCHEMATICS CHART 5 breaks off. The design changes needed here were first, to reduce the mass of the boss (make it smaller), and secondly, to add a weld, not only on the outside but also on the inner ring, which was. done. We have similar difficulties in the welds here and we have similar difficul- ties in the attaching points. May we have the next slide. Here is a test of a 20-cubic-foot titanium sphere. We carry two of these on board and normally they are charged to something above 3,000 pounds per square inch pressure. These spheres had to be tested under pneumatic pressure (which is sort of a dangerous thing), be- cause we couldn't test hydrostatically for this vibration environment, because of the change in mass, SO this had to be done at a place that we call Fort Klaunch, which is built out in the "boon docks." It has a lot of sand bags on the outside, and is so arranged that if the test sam- ple were to fail, we would blow the roof off but nothing else, and the PAGENO="0725" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 721 QUALIFICATION PROGRAM STATUS 1. ALL STAGE FLIGHT CRITICAL HARD~ WARE HAS BEEN QUALIFIED FOR FIRST MANNED FLIGHT. 2. 96 ITEMS QUALIFIED BY ANAL~ISIS 118 ITEMS QUALIFIED BY TEST 214 TOTAL 3. 153 INTERIM TEST FAILURE REPORTS ON THE1J8 ITEMS 4. DESIGN CHANGES HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED, PROCESSED AND TESTED ON 26 OF THE 118 ITEMS CHART 6 people are in a separate blockhouse at a safe distance. Here we had two shakers, 10,000-pounds force each, and the sphere was mounted on the exact mounting flanges t.hat are used in flight. This is sub- jected to vibration in this horizontal plane through the sine wave and the random vibration called for by the specifications. This has been fully qualified on the first try. Next slide, please. This is the same thing in the vertical direction. We have two 10,000-pound-force shakers, side by side, operating "in phase" and again we were able to get through with this with no failure and no difficulties. This is particularly interesting, Dr. von Braun, because of the great interest in titanium spheres since the Douglas incident. This will give you a feel for the kind of qualification work and re- liability test work that go into development programs. We are going to touch very briefly on where we stand on our quality program. The first thing to say is that the test results that have PAGENO="0726" 722 1968 NASA AUThORIZATION occurred at static firing in Huntsville and at launch at Cape Kennedy (which are the real acid test of whether or not you have controlled your quality) are, as everybody knows, excellent. We have had no failures. Our quality program is active in two places, first in the house, and secondly at our suppliers. The "in-house" program is called CARE. It is an acronym for "Chrysler Always Requires Excellence." It is a motivational program, an attempt to motivate peOple to get the job done right the first time. As you rode through the plant you saw quality charts~ at every work station, which indicated the quality rat- ing for that work station for the past week. As you go through the plant you will find that we have quality problems everywhere. This is normal. The advantage of the program is that we become aware of these problems as they happen, so that we can institute corrective NAS &4016 RELIABILITY PROGRAM STATUS 1 THE RELIABILITY TEST PROGRAM L4AS BEEN COMPLETED 2. RELIABILITY TEST PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN GONDUCTEDON OVER 200. FLIGHT OR1TIQAL (TEMS 3. 284 TEST FAILURE REPOI?TS HAVE BEEN ISSUED. (27 JAN 67) 4~ ON 54 ITEMS CHANGES WAVE BEEN DEVELOPED ON EITHER DESIGN OR PROCESSING AND HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY TESTED (27JAN 67) CHART 7 PAGENO="0727" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 723 QUALITY PROGRAM-STATUS I. STATIC TEST ~ FLIGHT PERFOPMANCE RESULTS EXCELLENT 2. QUALITY PRO&RAM ACTIVE "IN HOUSE" #41 SUPPLIERS" 3. CHRYSLER #CARE~~ PROGRAM RYSLER * ALWAYS ~EQU I RES EXCELLENCE) (COM PARABLE TO `ZERO-DEFECTS" PROGQAM) 4. USE OF PEI2MANENT ~ UPDATED DISPLAYS OF QUALITY RATINGS iN EACH KEY DEPt 5. ACTIVE RATING PROGRAM FOP SUPPLIERS. CHART S procedures at the source and go downstream and make sure we have corrections before that iiardware gets into the flight article. The use of the permanent, updated displays of quality ratings in every key department is one of the key elements in trying to main- tain quality "in-house." We have an active rating program for our suppliers and here we have a very powerful tool; When we sit down, through our pur- chasing department, with our suppliers, each supplier is made aware of his quality ratings for the last period, and if he can't measure up to our quality standards, we yank him off the approval list. This is the most powerful tool that we have to insure quality in the supplier's house. Now on schedule I, the big job, the job of supplying the 14 stages, on November 1, 1965, we had a milestone. This is when we incen- tivised all of our contracts. We entered into a contract to complete this job for $9~' million and chart 9 shows the distribution of these costs. About $55 million is in labor and burden and about $31 million is in material. As we have gone along on this program, from that day to this, as we stand today, our experienced costs in comparison PAGENO="0728" 724 ~ 968 NASA AUmORIZATION COST PLAN NAS 8 - 4016 SCHEDULE I 1 NOV `65 THR[J COMPLETION 15 FEB'69 ~ (MILLIONS) ITEM F'( PARTIAL FY sq~i Pt i~os Pi' lqbq TOTAL LABOR& BURDEN ENGINEERiNG 8225 9?~4Z 5.129 1.612. 24.qos 2~43O OPERATIONS qO8~. 2939 414-4- 265 OTHER 1.675 .772 .772 .009 4.228 TOTAL LABOR & BURDEN 8982 24.653 10.045 .886 55.566 OTHER_DIRECT CHARGES MATERIAL STAGE L~608 3A26 .733 .224 8.991 MATERIAL PROCUREMENT EXR .476 .951 .42a .004 3~55 OTHER DIRECT CHARGES 3.205 4.242 J.l.56 .076 ~67q_ TOTAL OTHER DIRECT CHARGES 8.28q ~.619 3.311 .304 31.525 SUB-TOTAL 37.271 34.272 ~3.356 2~9O 8W89 G&A & TARGET FEE 4.297 3.951 1.640 .253 10.041 GRAND TOTAL(COST G&A& TARGET FEE) 4l.~568 38.223 4.896 2.44:5 ~7.I 30 OHAwr 9 with that plan are some $2 million less than we planned at the time we entered into this contract. Our projection for program comple- tion indicates that that saving is going to be greater, rather than less when we get to the end of the program. We are going to save more than $2 million over the agreed cost by the time we finish the pro- gram. Now costs are primarily people and here is chart 10 which shows personnel here at Michoud only-thousands of people-against time in calendar years. This red line is today's date. On this chart, the black here is the direct people working on schedule 1. This powder blue is the people working on our schedule II, Vehicle Integration. As you can see, we are on a steep toboggan slide. Unless we enter into a contract for additional stages, we will have finished this program---for all intents and purposes-at the end of calendar year 1968. This light gray is the indirect people supporting all of the direct. Chart 11 shows the same PAGENO="0729" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 725 data broken up into major functions; our engineering and operation functions. At Huntsville we have "hardware" schedule I effortsr- prindipally in manufacturing-shown in this black stripe. We have our schedule II effortsL__Vehicle Integration-shown here in this gray at about two-thirds of the effort which we show here at Michoud for that same function. All of our schedule III work-our mechanical ground support equipment work-is shown here in black at Huntsville. Now in order not to close up shop at the end of 1968, the Govern- ment has entered into a contract with Chrysler on schedule VI for the procurement of long leadtime components for four stages; S-IB-13, -14, -15, and -16, and our job is to do all things necessary between the 14th of October, when we signed the contract, and the end of fiscal year 1967-June 30, 1967-to protect our ability to deliver S-IB-13 on the first of November and stages 14, 15, and 16 at 3-month intervals thereafter. This chart-wall chart-is a picture of how we would approach building 16 more stages at the rate of four per year. We're here today, February 11, 1967. This broad red stripe is June 30, 1967, the end of fiscal year 1967. This chart shows S-IB-12, the last stage under current contract. This schedule VI says do everything you need, order the long leadtime parts, make the engineering releases for the first four birds-13, 14, 15, and 16-up to this date. Now, right here and now I would like to call your attention to one or two things. This November 1, 1968 available to ship date is 8 months OHART 10 PAGENO="0730" 726 196.8 NASA AUTHORIZATION after the available to ship date for S-IB-12, but our plan for the ac- complishment of this work calls for the elimination of static~ fire at Huntsville. We believe that when we get 212-both we and the Gov- ernment believe-we will be in a position where static firing no longer provides us with useful information. It won't be necessary. We will be able to say, truthfully, "In the last four stages we didn't learn anything. "We could have gone directly to the launch pad." We have one checkout instead of two and, accordingly, the time required is less than the time for S-IB-12, so that from the beginning of assembly on 12 to the beginning of assembly on 13 is one year. There's a gap from beginning to beginning 4 months greater than the gap from delivery to delivery. As you went out in the plant today you saw S-IB-12 on the assembly fixture. All of the preliminary manufacturing work on that stage has been done. That work, and the people associated with it, will not start again for a full year, so that for the next 12 months our operations in the plant are on a declining basis, even if or when we get a "follow-on" program. We are on schedule on the schedule VI work. Our initial engineer- ing releases on that whole block-13 through 28-are about 70 per- cent complete as of the end of January, which is what they should be. Our material procurement is on schedule. We have one and a half- CHART 11 PAGENO="0731" 19 88 NASA AUTHO'UIZATION 727 million dollars committed as of the end of January, which is what it should be. We are using up $7.2 million on this program to protect the ability to maintain program continuity, of which about $2 million are labor and burden and the rest is materials. Now, this little block up here is the work going on between now and June 30', the preliminary work on schedule VI, to protect our ability to maintain program continuity. This leads us to the follow-on program, and at the present time, we don't have a follow-on program. We are specifically excluded from clustering any of the parts from schedule VI for example, but we did work out ground rules for the follow-on program with the Govern- ment in order to have schedule VI. Our concept of this program calls for 16 stages, a delivery rate of four per year, with first delivery on November 1, 1968. The con- figuration is exactly like S-IB-12 with the exception of two changes. About one-third of the instrumentation will have been dropped out, in comparison with 12, and the discrete liquid level probes will have been dropped out, being no longer necessary. We will use a "frozen design," which means that only the "make-it-fit,. make-it-work" changes needed to make the work flow will be permitted. There will be no product improvement work funded. There will be no qualifica- tion work, and no reliability improvement work. We've got a 100 percent qualified design, 100 percent reliability tested. The only exceptions here would be if we had a forced vendor change because ~f fire, floods, strike-you name it-and we had to bring in new vendors. In some instances we might have to qualify those vendors and establish their reliability characteristics. There would be no static fire, with only one factory checkout. Our procurement lot size and our "make" lot size would be four; that is, we would do a years work at a time. S-IB-13*, 14, 15, 16 would be the first batch, 17, 18, 19, and 20 and so on the second. We would in- clude stage flight evaluation. We would deliver here at the Michoud dock. We would provide assistance to the Government in transport- ing the stage to the Cape, and we would maintain total stage design responsibility as we have it now, which means that if something goes wrong, at our vendors or otherwise, it's our problem, no one else's. We must have the solution to that problem. We have to maintain the hard core of people with the technical know-how to discharge this responsibility. Mr. LOWREY. Mr.' Meldrum, may I just interject one thing `here. I don't want to give the wrong impression on the ground rules for this follow-on idea. In planning our work, we planned that it would be a frozen design, completely. Obviously we all know that should some missions require something else, then the missions would necessarily have to take care of some kind of a change. Mr. MELDRUM. Yes, that's a separate contractual action, taken care of when you know what the change is. Mr. LOwREY. Otherwise, the plan is to leave the birds as they are. Mr. MELDRUM. Dr. von Braun pointed out to me at lunch that we should make sure that we understand that this type of thinking for the follow-on is tied up with missions above and beyond the mainstream Apollo missions, such as the Apollo Applications program missions and that you can't have one without the other. You can't have the AAP if you shut this plant down and put it PAGENO="0732" 728 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION 35 PERSONNEL HISTORY AND PROJECTIONS SATURN lB PROGRAM HUNTSVILLE ONLY- TOTAL 3.0 BY CONTRACT SGIEDULE \~JITU CONTINUATIOt%I - I I I I - 2.5 2.0 I 2 ~ 3 I I 1 I 2 3 I 2 1 ~ ~it ~ T ~ CHART 12 in mothballs for an indefinite period. You then face the tremendous cost of reestablishing an organization with technical competence. And you can't have program continuity unless you have the missions which require the use of the vehicles. This is a budgetary and planning cost estimate of what a program of 16 birds costs. It's about $139 million or about $8'/2 million a stage. This low cosL is possible principally due to the elimination of the static fire and cutting down checkout to just one checkout and having no qualification work, no product improvement work, and no relia- bility work. I might say right now in order to do this we have to have a request for proposal out of the Government. We have to generate a formal proposal in response to that request. It has to be evaluated by the Government. We have to indulge in negotiations, and finally we have to have an executed contract. Historically, that's a 7-month job, so if we got the go-ahead tonight we'd be too late unless we figure out some way to expedite this process. So we need the action now- we're late-this isn't something that you can put off until a year from now. You can't put it off until June 30. Now, what happens if we go this way ~ I show here in yellow, these are the charts that you saw before, if we go this way we will move from a 2,800-man organization to PAGENO="0733" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 729 l'IAS8-4o16 SCHEDULE Vt (PROCUREMENT OF LONG LENY TIME COMPONENTS FOR ¶1\GE3 5kB (3~4,I~ ~. DESCRI PTION DO ALL ThU~~GS NECE5SARY(BETWEEN H- OCT `66 AND 30 JUNE `67) TO PROTECT 1\BILIT'( TO DEUVER S-I-F~-13 ON 1NOV `68 & STAGES S-IB-~4,15 ~`16AT3MQ INTERVI\L~ THEREAFTER. STATUS 1Q~L SCHEDULE 2.INITII\L ENGINEERING RELEJ\SES 5~EB 1~ THRU ~-6%% CO~1PLETE~A5oF25JA~7) 3. MAT'L PRQCUREM[NT ON SCHEDULE (~1~5O6~OOO COMM~TLEDJ(f\3 OF~5J~N'61~ O~ART 13 about a 1,900-man organization plateau occurring in calendar years 1969 and 1970 and tailing off in 1972. Here we are today, so we would lose about one-third of our people, instead of going down this toboggan slide to extinction at the end of 1968. In terms of the kind of people used you will notice that our engineering changes from this size (1,000) to this size (500). Our operations people change from this size to this size. At Huntsville, this part yellow shows the kind of people that would be involved. There's only a narrow strip of plain yellow that would be involved in handling the manufacturing support for this operation. Here in cross hatch we show the me- chanical ground support equipment program that we expect will con- tinue at Huntsville and here in the light blue cross hatch we show the kind of vehicle integration work that we think will continue. Here is an interesting point to make in connection with losing and gaining large quantities of people. If we go back 19 months to June of 1965 when we were at our peak of 5,515, if we had not replaced any person who had left in this period from June of 1965 to mid- December of 1966, we would have lost ~,841 people. We have lost PAGENO="0734" 730 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION NAS-8-401 ~ SCHEDULE YE (LoNG LEAD TIME MAT'L PROCURE- MENT FOR STAGES SI-B 13,14,15,16) COST PLAN $ IN MILLIONS irria I ~ FYI967 14 oCT 66 -30 JUNE 67 ENGINEERING L ~ B $ OPERATIONS L ~ B $ OTHER L~B $ SUB-TOTAL. L~B $~ OTHER DIRECT COST MATERIAL (STAGE) $ MAT'L PROC. EXPENSE OTHER 1.074 .932 .033 2.039 3.600 .582 .286 4.4.68 SUIFrOTAL SUB~T0TAL G~A EXPENSE $ FEE GRAND TOTAL 6.507 .694 7.201 CHART 14 over half of our people in 19 months. Now if we had retained every person that we had hired in that period and had lost none, we would be up to 7,647 people. We added 2,132 for a net loss of 709. This is an attrition rate up to this point, when our layoffs began, of a little over 3 percent per month, and this represents one of the most ex- pensive aspects of this business. You have to hunt harder, take more trips, interview more people to get a man to come on roll when you have no assurance of program continuity. Without a follow-on pro- gram it becomes very difficult to induce people to join the team and as far as we know the only corrective means that will stop this rate of turnover is a follow-on program authorization. Nothing else will do it. Schedule VI won't do it because it is not a follow-on program. We'll talk now about schedule II. What is it ~ Vehicle integra- PAGENO="0735" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 731 FOLLOW-ON CONTI?ACT PLAWNING ~GQOUND RULES" A. NUMBER OF STAGES 16 B. DELIVERY RATE SPER YEAR C. FIRST DELIVER'Y I Nov 1068 D CONFIQURATLOM LIKE &IB-12 WITH 2 CI4ANGES E. FROZEN DESIGN "(ONLY"MA~I1flT/MAKEIT'~WORK"CI~ANGE6) NO PPODUCT IMPROVEMENT WORK NO QUALIFICATION WORK 7 EXCEPT FOR FORCED NO RELIABILITY IMPROVEMENT WORK ç VENDOR CHANCES ETC. E NO STATIC FIRE-ONLY ONE FACTOR'( CHECKOUT G. PROCUREMENT LOT SIZE AND'~MAkE" LOT SIZE -4 H. STAGE FLIGHT EVALUATION INC LUDED I. DELI VERY AT MICHOUD DOCK J. TRANSPORTATION ASSISTANCE INCLUDED k~ CHRYSLER. TOTAL STAGE DESIGN RESPONSIBILITY CONTINUED OHABT 15 tion work. The effort is directed toward the creation and maintenance of all of the required preflight and postflight analyses for each mis- sion and these are published as reports. The output of schedule II is books, not hardware. Trajectories, vehicle mass distributions, launch constraints and so forth. Current activities both here at Michoud and Huntsville is authorized until the middle of 1969 but a definitive contrast is still under negotiation. This work is being authorized on a month by month basis at about $1 million a month. We expect that this will continue for about 24 months. This will give you a bird's eye view of what comes out of that work. All the preflight mission analysis reports on 1, 2, 3, and 4 were 100-percent complete 5.82, 6.51, 7.27, 8.27, and 9.14 percent, and we have not started on 10, 11, and 12. On the postflight mission analyses reports 1, 2~ and 3 are complete and, of course, we can't start on the others until the flights take place. PAGENO="0736" 732 196.8 NASA AUTHORIZATION COST PLAN (6 ~ FOLLOW-ON"PROGPAM ~ IN MILLIONS 60 70 71 72 73 TOTAL ENGINEERING L~B ~ OPERATIONS L~B ~i OT~E~ L~B ~ (.074 .932 .033 3.709 1.437 .562 6.345 9.691 .50~ 6.8~ 9.982 .520 7.074 8.347 401 4.656 2.899 .122 .9(9 .007 .001 30.645 39295 2.144 SURIOTAI L~B ~ ~T~ER DIRECT COSTS ~AT'L(STAGE)~ MAFL PR~. EXP ~ )JHER ~ 2.039 3.600 .582 296 11108 11.700 (.365 .594 (6.541 9.30 2.a.)4 1.35 (7.370 9.299 2269 (.386 (5222 2.913 2.069 (.339 7.677 326 1.041 .9~5 .927 0 0 .031 72.084 37.199 9.530 5.945 SUB TOTAL ~ ~4EXPENSE~FEE ~ ____ ~R4ND TOTAL ~ 7201 28.~9 32.199 33.821 24.764 11(52 LOoT 139.143 CHART 16 Congressman PEAGUL What does a postflight analysis look like? Mr. MELDRUM. The postflight analysis compares what actually did happen in flight with what was supposed to have happened and tracks down, with the analysis, what could have caused the difference. It is a feedback into the designer to make sure that he is able to predict with ~reate~ accuracy what is supposed to happen, or how to make what is supposed to happen, happen on the next flight. It involves everything, telemetry, instrumentation, powerplant analysis, struc- ture, vibration, thermal environment, you name it, it covers the whole spectrum of technology. Mr. LOWREY. It might be interesting to note that, in this regard, the first four vehicles were highly instrumented to tell a very great deal of information-S-lB-i, 2, 3, and 4. After that, we feel we will not have to get that much information on the other vehicles and so the telemetry and instrumentation have been cut from maybe 1,200 channels to something like 400. ~HE PIE- L~ 67 68 FISCAL YEAR 4.468 .604 13.659 2982 12.8~ 33~ l2~54 3.497 6381 2.561 2.322 (.153 .031 .109 52.673 14~86 PAGENO="0737" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 733 PERSONNEL HISTORY AND PROJECTIONS SATURN lB PROGRAM M~CHOUD ONL? -TOTAL BY CONTRACT SC4IEDULE CU1~E~'iT cot~TRAcr 3.5 - ACTUAL -~ H 3.0 2.5 CHART 17 76-205 0-67-pt. 2----47 PAGENO="0738" 734 196.8 NASA AUTHORIZATION PERSONNEL HISTORY AND PROJECTIONS SATURN lB PROGRAM MIC+IOUD ONLY - TOTAL BY DEPARThENT CU~E1~JT COt~rrPACT 01z1314 1121 3I4I~ ~ FY1 66 67 I 68 I (V 651 66 67 68 CHART 18 - ACTUAL - 3.5 3.0 OTHER iP1DIa~T (CURRINT /1 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 .5 £ 69 69 PAGENO="0739" ACTUAL 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 735 PERSONNEL HISTORY AND PROJECTIONS SATURN lB PROGRAM HUNTSVILLE ONLY - TOTAL BY CONTRACt SC4~EPULE CURRENT CO(~JTRACT I 1 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 .5 0 FY CY Sc*~ ~l3 4 1121 314 1121314 66 67 68 65! 66 67 68 ~I3 69 691 CHART 19 PAGENO="0740" 736 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 7000 Gooo 4eo0 3ooo 965 OHART 20 PAGENO="0741" 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION 737 NAS 8~4OI6 SCI4EDULE Ii -VEH. IN1EGRAT~ON (DESCRIPTION) 1. EFFORT IS DIRECTED TOWARD THE CREATION AND MAINTENANCE OF ALL REQUIRED PRE-FLICHT ~ POST4L1GUT ANALYSES FOR EACH MISSION.THESE ANALYSES ARE PUBLISHED AS REPORTS. (TRAJECTORiES-VEHICLE MASS DISTRIBUTIONS, LAUNCH CONSTRAINTS, ETC.) 2. CURRENT ACTIVITY(AT BOTH MICHOUD AND HUNTSVILLE) IS AUTHORIZED UNTIL 30 APRiL 1969, BUT A DEFINITIVE CONTRACT IS STILL IN NEGOTIATION. WORK IS FUNDED ON A MONTH-TO .MONTH BASIS AT APPROXIMATELY ~1 MILLION PER MONTH. CHART 21 Mr. MELDRUM. This is a picture (see chart 23) of what is actually under contract as of the end of January 1967; $15.78 million, of which $14.225 is labor and burden. You see it's almost all labor and burden, and as I mentioned, this authorization is flowing at the rate of about a million a month, and as far as looking at people is concerned, it's these people until the end of January. It's these people at the end of January and we believe it's these peo- ple for the balance of the 12-bird program. Now I have not shown on any of these charts, this kind of work that would be continued when we go into a follow-on program. Some kind of work of that type will have to take place under some arrangement. Now we are going to talk about schedule III, mechanical ground support equipment. What is it? It~s sustaining engineering oriented to (1) design and maintenance of design of required meehanical ground support equipment, cooling units, pneumatic consoles, han- dling equipment, dollies, and so forth, for which MSFC has re- sponsibility. This is distinguished from that for which KSO has PAGENO="0742" 738 196.8 NASA AUPHOIUZATION responsibility, associated with the launching tower and the umbilical tower. Secondly, the establishment and maintenance of a logistics supply system for the MGSE here and (3) (this is a little unusuid) for the operation of what we call the Systems Development Bread- board Facility (SDBF). `This is a computer-oriented facility at Huntsville at which all of the functions that take place on the launch pad are simulated electrically and it becomes possible to develop the program tapes which are delivered to the computer at Kennedy for the control of the launch process. All of this work is being done at Hunts- ville. It is currently authorized through June 30, 1968. On status, we've delivered all of the materials that we should have delivered; the ground servicer cooling units, the wafer accumulators, the calibration in-place consoles, the flow control valve boxes. Our refurbishment program is 85 percent complete, which is what it should NAS 8-4016 SCHEDULE II VEHICLE INTEGRATION STATUS (As OF 1 FEB. 1967) VEH ICLE. NUMBER PREFLIGHT MISSION ANALYSES REPORTS % COMPLETE POST-FLIGHT MISSION ANALYSES REPORTS %COMPLETE AS-~0I 100% 100% AS-202 100 100 AS-203 tOO 100 AS-204 100 0 AS-205 82 0 AS-206 51 0 AS-207 27 0 AS-208 27 0 AS-209 14 0 AS -210) AS-211 ~ 0 0 AS-212) CHART 22 PAGENO="0743" 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZA~ON 739 be, and we are running, the engineering change proposals for mociifi- cation kits on schedule. Our logistics is on schedule. We've delivered the spare parts that are required. On the breadboard, we've simulated the complete Saturn lB Launch Vehicle System for AS 201, 202, and 203. On 204, all our computer programs have been "debugged," and we are now at work on the 206 computer program verification. We are 40 percent complete. We're on schedule. We have $8.4 million under contract. This is part by hardware, part by books, since we actually deliver some hardware. We expect another $4.4 million to come, and it will be spread through this whole time period as I have shown on these "people" charts. This yellow, here, is that continuation and enlargement of that schedule III work. NAS 8-4016 SCHEDULE' II VEHICLE INTEGRATION COST PLAN (1NOV65 -31 JAN 67) $ (MILLION) iTEM ` PARTIAL FY66 1NOV66 30JUN66 PARTIAL FY67 I JUL66 31JAN67 TOTAL ~ L~B$ MICHOUD HUNTSVILLE OTHER 4.363 2.376 .012. 4.830 2.631 .013 ` 9.1 93 5.007 .025 SUB~TOTAL $ OTHER DIRECT CHARGES $ 6.751 . 164 7.474 . 182 14.225 .346 SUB-TOTAL$ G~ A EXPENSE ~ FEES $ 6.915 . 574 7.656 .635 14.571 I . 209 IOTAL 7.489 8.291 15.780 NOTE : ADDITIONAL WORK IS BEING AUTHORIZED AT APPROX. $1 M PER MONTH WHILE DEFINITIVE CONTRACT IS BEING NEGOTIATED. WORK WILL CONTINUE UNTIL 30 APRIL 1969 CHART 23 PAGENO="0744" 740 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION NAS 8~4OI6 SCHEDULE 111-MECHANICAL OPOUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (MSFC ~SPONSLBILIT'I) DE2 CR1 PTION A.WOPKIS SUSTAINiNG ENGINEERING ORIENTED TO: 1. (DESIGN ç~ MAiNTENANCE OF DESIGN OF REQUIRED MECHANICAL GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT) (MGSE~ K~OOLING UNiT$~ PNEUMATIC CONSOLES, HANDLING EQUI~, DOLLIES,ETC.) FOR WHICH MSFC HAS RESPONSIBILITY. 2.THE ESTABLISHMENT ~ MAiNTENANCE OFA LOGISTIC SUPPLY SYSTEM FOR THE MGSE OF (1) ABOVE ,~ 3JHE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT "BREADBOARD" FACILITY (SD 1W) B. ALL OF THIS WORK IS BEING DONE AT HUNTSVILLE, ALA. C. CURRENT ACTIVITY IS AUTHORIZED THROUGH 30 JUNE 1968. CHART 24 Now we'll go to the Cape, schedule IV, the launch mission. We have 18 tasks. I'll point out only a few of them. Task I, which is one of the largest, is the actual job of launching the birds, with pre- launch and launch operations. Tasks 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13, are for the modification of launch complexes 34 and 37B. The rest of them~ are engineering support tasks. With regard to launching the birds, we've already run through how we stood. We've launched SA 9, 8, and 10, 201, 203, and 202 oh these dates successfully. 204 is at the Cape in prelaunch preparations. 206 is at the Cape in prelaunch preparations. We've completed the modification of launch complexes 34 and 37B on November 17, 1965, and May 17, 1966. From now on our work in these areas is to modify these launch complexes for different missions, as they come up from time to time. PAGENO="0745" 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION 741 SCI4EDULE III M~C~AN1CAL GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (MSFC) STATUS 1. M.G.S.E. (fl DELIVERED AS 201,202 AND 203 GROUND SERVICER COOLING UNITS, WATER ACCUMULATORS,CALLPS CONSOLES AND FLOW CONTROL VALVE BONES. ALL OF ThESE ARE SERVICEABLE (2~ AS 204 REFURB1SHW~ENT PROGRAM FOR ALL GROUND SERVICER COOLING UNITS-86% COMPLETE (AS OF 1 FEB 6fl. (3) ENG INEE RtNG C~I\NGE PRO P0 SAL /MODIflCATION - KITS ARE BEING DEUVERED ON SCHEDULE. CHART 25 We look at the manpower involved along with the money we've got-$69 million is involved here, of which $46 million is labor and burden. We are operating a group of roughly 1,000 people. Our contractual coverage ends in the middle of 1968. When we go to a follow-on program, all of these birds will also be launched. We will need a continuation of this work for as long as birds are going to be launched. It will involve, say 550 people for launching, and the number of people in addition to that-say, up to 750-will depend upon the amount of other kinds of engineering work needed by Cape Kennedy. That completes the program review on our Saturn work-on NAS 8-4016 work. That leaves me about two items that are not NAS 8-4016. One is the Saturn improvement study which we've done for NASA. This was done in two phases which we have finished at a cost of about a half-million dollars. The other is an optical technology study. This picture (see chart 33) shows the bird as we have it today. It is capable of putting about 40,000 pounds in near earth orbit. The next bird in line, George Stoner's Saturn V, has a capa- bility of about seven times that or more, 280,000 to 300,000 pounds in near earth orbit. There isn't anything in between. This is the so called "payload gap." There is an intense interest in a lot of areas on what are some of the best means of filling this payload gap. What PAGENO="0746" 742 1968 NASA ATJTIIORIZATION SCHED. iii (coNT'~) 2. LOGISTICS (1) PROGRAM PLAt'J DELIVERED 1.1 JAN 67 (2) DELiVERED 2975 SPARE PARIS FOR 45204-OF 3259 INITIALLY REQUIRED (AS OF 1 FEB 67). BALANCE TO BE DELIVERED PRIOR TO IMAR 67 (3) RELEASED 984 SPARE PARTS FOR PROCUREMENT FOR AS 205 AND SUBSEQUENT STAGE MECH. GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT(IAS OF 1 FEB 6?). DELIVERY SCU EDULE D FOR COMPLETION BY 3OAPRLL6Z CHART 26 5CHED. Lu (Co~T'D) 3 "BREADBOARD" AS 201 SIMULATED THE COMPLETE SATURN 202 [B LAUNCH VEHICLE SYSTEM AND 203 ASSOCIATED SUPPORT EQUIPMENT~ 49204 ALL COMPUTER PROCRAMS "DEW BUGGW" AS 206 COMPUTER PROGRAM VERIFICATION IN PROGRESS. WORk 40% COMPLETE (1 FEB 67)AND IS ON SCHEDULE. CHART 27 PAGENO="0747" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 743 NAS-8-401& SCHEDULE BI MECHANICAL GPOUND SUPPORT EQU1P~HS~ COST PLAN ~MI1UON~ 1 Nov `65 THRU 30 JUNE `6~ ITEM FY~6 FY61 FY~8 IOTAL LABOR ~ BURDEN ~ 3.388 1.945 .946 6.279 OTHER DIRECT COSTS SUB TOTAL ~ 1.154 4.542 .156 2.101 .0 .946 1310 758! G ~ A AND FEE ~ .479 .222 .100 .801 GRAND TOTAL ~.O21 2.323 1.046 8.390 CHART 28 are some of the best means of going from 40,000 to 100,000 pounds with maximum economy ~ This configuration-center-shows this same vehicle equipped with four United Technology 120-inch diam- eter solid rockets of five segments. And this picture-right-shows one where the S-TB stage has been elongated 20 feet and is equipped with four United Technology 120-inch diameter solid rockets of seven segments. Here are some of the capabilities that result from this. With this configuration-center-instead of 40,000 we can place 78,000 pounds in near earth orbit-lOS nautical miles. For a space station at 200 nautical miles we go from 33,000 to 70,000 pounds on direct injection. If we use a liohmann Transfer Ellipse we go from 36 to 73,000. For an elliptical orbit of about 85 to 200 miles, not circularized, we go from 41,000 to 78,000. For synchronous orbits-of space stations in the sky with no apparent movement-we go from zero, with what we have now, to 3,350 pounds. For escape out of this planetary system we go from 1,650 pounds to 18,000, and for near earth polar orbits from Kennedy we go from 30,000 to 60,000. If we go into the seven segments with the 20-foot extensions, we have over 100,000 pounds in near earth orbit. Here we have 11,150 pounds synchronous, 28,500 pounds escape, and 75,000 pounds for polar orbits. Dr. VON BRAUN. Mr. Meidrum, it might be worth mentioning in this PAGENO="0748" 744 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION NAS 8-4016 SCHEDULE r~ LAUNCH MISSION (icsc-i) DESC~RT I Ot'~ TASK I PRE-LAUNCH AND LAUNCH OPERATiONS (MsFc FUN PEP) TASK 2 GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT OPERATIONS TASK 3 DOCUMENTATION OF GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT TASK 4 SPARES SUPPORT G.S.E. TASK S REFURBISHMENT OF LAUNCH COMPLEXES (oFF-sITE) TASKS 6,TAND8 G.S.E. SUSTAINING ENGINEERING TASKS 9AND 10 MODIFICATION OF LAUNCH COMPLEX 34 TASKS 11,12 AND 13 MODIFICATION OF LAUNCH COMPLEX 37B TASK 14 APOLLO FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW REPORT INPUTS TASK 15 TESTING OF UPRATED SATURN I GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (FUNCTIONAL, QUALI FICATION AND RELIABILITY) TASK 16 INTEGRATION SUPPORT- (PROCEDURES-RULES-SCHEDULES, ETC.) TASK IT TRAINING TASK 18 RELIABILITY ENGINEERING CHART 29 connection that these TJTC units are already man-rated in connection with the DOD Titan III program. Mr. MELDRUM. That's a real good point, Dr. von Braun. All of this is here. This is not a scientific program. This is an engineering program. Dr. VON BRAtJN. You just stack them up. Mr. MELDRTJM. This is "state-of-the-art." We have this today. Congressman EOKHARDT. Is there any reason that you plan to do this with separate tanks rather than with the setup that you have in Saturn V with a single tank? Mr. MELDRUM. Well, this particular concept calls for using what we have, which is fully qualified and fully reliability tested; using it as it is and making only minor structural changes to attach the solid propellant boosters. Mr. LOWREY. Mr. Meldrum, I would like to add something, if I may. Mr. MELDRUM. Sure. Mr. LOWREY. I think that we are in a somewhat similar position, in some respects, to that which we were in 5 to 6 years ago, in that it is difficult for us to know all of the payloads that are going to be re- quired over the next 10-year span. As we get into them, one is going to develop another and change our pattern and change our need. With this kind of work, with this kind of strap-on unit added to this bird, PAGENO="0749" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 745 NAS 8~4OI6 8CI1EDLJLEjV~UUNCU M~SS1ON U(8C4) STATUS TASK 1 LAUNCH OPEPATIONS SA-Q 16 FEB S5 SA-8 25MAY 65 SA-lO 30 JULY 65 AS201 26 FEB 66 9A203 5 JULY 66 AS2OZ 25 AUG 66 204-RN P~E-LAUNC~4 PREPARATION 206 - IN P~E-LAUNCk PREPARATION TASK 10 ~ 11 MODIFICATION O~ LAUNCH COMPLEXES 34 AND 37B LC 3L~ C0I~APLETED 17 NOV ~5 LC 37~ COMPLETED 17 MAY 65 CHART 30 we can take a core vehicle and have the flexibility of going from a 40,000-pound load in orbit to 50,000 pounds by putting on two strap- ons. By putting on four we can get 78,000 pounds. By enlarging the core tanks and using the seven segment job we can go up to 106,000 pounds, and we can use the kind of vehicle needed to put up the kind of payload that develops over the next few years. Consequently, I think that this is a very worthwhile thing for us to get into as soon as we can. Dr. vo~ Bn~uN. I would like to reinforce a statement here. We made a study on logistic supply of a permanent space station and it just is not so that you need to resupply the station oniy once a year. You might say why don't we fly up only once a year and use a big Saturn V. There are certain areas, for example, in the scientific area where a man has a job to do up there which may take only 3 months for collection of all the scientific data that he wants. Then the man wants to come home and evaluate his data on the ground. Now if there is only one airplane going every year to bring the man home we have the guy up there for three-fourths of the year without getting much out of it. On the other hand, our study also shows that every now and then there comes a bigger payload along that you don't want to break down into smaller modules, because you burden the operation with an additional assembly operation in orbit, which again is costly, so it is PAGENO="0750" * 746 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION SCHED. IY LAUNCH MISSION (KSC~2) COST PLAN (FOR WORK UNDER CONTRACT AS OF 27 JAN (967) PERFORMANCE PERIOD 1 FEB 65 THRU 30JUNE68 ~(M1L1IONS) ITEM 1V65 FY66 FY67 FY68 TOTAL KSC L~B OTHER I ~ B 3.317 1181 I4.25~ .775 13.802 .749 11975 0 43.409 3.305 TOTAL L~B ~OTUER DIRECT COSTS 5i58 1.594 15.030 11.928 14.551 1.751 1L9?5 .226 46.7'14 hAL SUB TOTAL C~A EXPENSE~FEE 6.752 .754 26.958 2.898 16.302 1.726 12.201 1312 62 .213 6.690 GRRND TOTAL t506 ~9.856 (8.028 18.513 68.903 CHART 31 really so that a flexible logistic supply system that gives you a free choice of 40,000 pounds, or 78,000 pounds, or 106,000 pounds in Earth orbit is a reasonable kind of thing. By the way, what we are really doing here is endorsing, on the next larger scale, the same findii~gs as the Air Force made with their Titan II and Titan III philosophy. So I believe that there is great merit in this, particularly as we are ad- dressing ourselves to permanent space stations and all these Apollo Applications of Earth resources, science, meteorology, air traffic con- trol from orbit and those things that I illustrated yesterday. The elements are here. We have the advanced Saturn, the uprated Saturn in production. These 120-inch segmented units are available, man- rated so that all we have to do is put two and two together and there is that capability. If we don't take up the option, all of this capability goes to seed, and to put this together again after a hiatus in this whole thing is extremely costly. O~ngressma.n TEAGUE. Mr. von Braun, is it feasible and logical to keep the production lines intact and put some of these in storage, even though, at the moment you make it, you may not have a mission for them? PAGENO="0751" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION F~YLOAD - LBS VEHICLE TYPE 747 SPACE STATIONS (200 NM) DIRECT INJECT HOHMANN ELL85x200 (NOT CIRCULARIZED) 33,000 36,000 41,000 CITARP 82 FUTURE IMPROVED SATURN PROGRAMS MISSION SA-2I2 +44.1 TC 1206 +4-UTC 1207 NEAR EARTH ORBIT 40,000 78,000 106,000 ~YNCHRONOUS (i~0) - ESCAPE 1,650 NEAR EARTH POLAR FROM KSC 30,000 CHAET 33 PAGENO="0752" 748 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION SATURN PAYLOAD IMPROVEMENT POTENTIAL I SATURN TB `~`SA-2~2 SATURN IB+4 UTC $ZO-5 SRM'.S IB44UTC l2O~7SRM~S CHART 34 CHART 35 PAGENO="0753" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 749 WORK OThER ThAN NAS-8-4Q16 B. OPTICAL TECHNOLOGY STUDIES 1. IDENTIFY, DEFINE~ PROVIDE REQUIREMENT JUSTIFICATION FOR MAXIMUM VALUE OPTICAL TECINOLO~Y EXPERiMENT S~ 11. DEVELOP A PLAN FOR ACCOMPLISUMENT OF THE EXPERIMENTS OF PART I, DO PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENT INTE~RATIONJ SPACE CRAFT AND SUBSYSTEM CONCEPTUAL DESIGN ~ RESOURCE ANALYSIS CHART 36 Dr. VON BRAUN. We are doing it now and I would say the answer is "Yes." I think that it is probably much better over the 10-year haul to keep a limited production going, even though it is only four a year and keep that capability alive because that capability is people, really. It is not so much facilities or hardware, it is people and if that team is dissipated then we have to build up a new team. Not only is it very expensive to rebuild a new team, but we also go right back to the bot- tom of the learning curve. We start making mistakes again, things come apart, we may have mishaps in the Iauncn, et cetera. Right now we are on top of the pole. I think the answer is "Yes." If we cannot identify all of our flight missions in the Apollo Applications area precisely for the next couple of years, I would say by all means let us keep a moderate production rate of these rockets going. Whatever few part-aging problems we have-and there are a~ few-O rings age and rubber get's a little brittle-these things can be taken care of. We can identify them and we can even assemble them without the 0 rings and stick the 0 rings in whenever we are down to' T-minus 3 months. Mr. Lowiu~. Mr. von Braun, we are in agreement with that and would like to point out one thing that I feel is extremely important from the direction that you gave us on this job, and that was that we make full use of all the things that the Air Forte had developed, al- ready. We did not begin something new or something different. We took full advantage in the uprated Saturn I-B's, of all the solid rockets that TJTC was already building. Dr. VON BRAUN. It might be interesting to compare these figures of payload with the fl~ures of Titan. The Titan II, which is the non- boosted type and which was used for the Gemini launches, has an Earth 76-2~65 O-67~--pt. 2---48 PAGENO="0754" 750 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION orbital capability in the order of 8,000 to 9,000 pounds, and when you strap on the five segmented two boosters to the Titan II, making the Titan Ill-C out of it, you are at about 25,000 pounds payload. Now, we are already at 40,000 pounds with the unboosted version, and we go from there so you are actually talking about two different animals. You can see you are comparing the DC-9 with the Boeing 707 here. We can add on, and they can add on, but when they add on all that they can add on, they get to about the point where we start, unboosted, so that it is really incorrect to say that the tTprated Saturn I and the Titan III are two competing vehicles. No, it is a case of a small vehicle versus a big vehicle. I think it is as simple as that. Mr. MELDRUM. To summarize this, the outstanding characteristic that attracts attention here is this versatility. I want to thank you, Doctor, for the talk, I couldn't have done better myself. Here is another way of looking at the same data. Here we are with the Saturn I-B. With direct injection we run out of payload capability at around 500 nautical miles. With a Hoh- mann Transfer Ellipse, with S-TV-B restarting, we carry this up to 20,000 pounds escape capability. Mr. LOWREY. You'd better tell them what a Hohmann Transfer is. Mr. MELDRUM. Well, I'll quote Dr. von Braun. When you put the payload into an elliptical orbit, when you get it to the apogee (the furthest point away) you give it a kick in the apogee. This ability to restart, with a kick in the apogee, is the essence of the Hohmann Transfer Ellipse. With the 7 segment bird, again, there's no great improvement in direct injection; possibly you run out between 500 and 1,000 nautical miles, but again, with the restart capability we can go up to 110,000 pounds in near Earth orbit and up to 29,000 pounds to escape. Now what does this mean to us to do a job like this? Obviously we can't answer all of the questions on this because it depends upon how many would need to be made and when they would need to be made, but if we're here today and we were authorized to do this job today, this SIP (Saturn Improvement Program) shows the per- sonnel involved to do the engineering job; all of these would be en- gineers. So that, at the end of calendar year 1970 (3 years from now) we would be able to launch. say bird 219 and 220, the 7th and 8th birds that will come from the follow-on program in the new configu- ration anti thereafter we would be able to have versatility (see chart 35). The birds would flow, and they could be flown either with no solid boosters, with two 5 segments, and with four 5 segments, two 7 seg- ments, four 7 segments (you name it), depending upon what was needed. Mr. LOWREY. I would like to point out our purpose in showing that. Mr. MELDRUM. We have the people right here. Mr. LOWREY. We now have more than are really needed. Mr. MELDRUM. You don't have to build a new team-we've got the people here. We won't have when we get to 1968, but we do have now. Now the other item on work other than NAS 8-4016 is the optical technology study area. We have worked on this under two contracts with NASA and our work has been, in a first phase, to identify, define, and provide the requirement justification. for maxi- mum value optical technology experiments in space. Our second phase was to develop a plan for the accomplishment of the experi- PAGENO="0755" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 751 ments of part I; do the preliminary experiments integration for space- craft and subsystems conceptual design and resource analysis. Now out of this work thus far has come a concept, for example, of a space station which is built up on the LEM structure. For example, in this area we have what is called a Mirror figure test well. The word "figure" here means "shape." Here on the surface of the Earth we are constantly surrounded with a boiling atmosphere. It really doesn't pay to try to make astronomical mirrors to superpreci~ion because you cant use superprecision anyway. We are diffraction, limited, but when you put your space station above the Earth's atmosphere, it pays to be able to mamtain a shape to within a fraction of a wavelength of light and therefore, we have illustrated a concept, for example, of establish- mg a mirror attached to an extremely rigid backing plate with perhaps 30 or 40 tubes-metallic tubes-each tube under varying hydraulic or pneumatic pressure so that you can move a part of the reflecting surface a part of a wavelength of light. As this mirror is subjected to varying thermal fields from radiation from the Earth or from the Sun; as it is subjected to the presence or absence of the gravitational fields, or it's own structural deflections, these things can be compensated for. Here we have laser telescopes with some outstanding characteristics. One of course is that they utilize high frequency energy; much higher than any radio frequency~ and so they have the capability of trans- mitting enormous quantities of information. The other is that they are extremely collimated, that is, parallel. A 3-inch laser on the sur- face of the Earth puts about a 300-foot spot on the surface of the Moon. And so it's a communication means from Earth to Moon or Earth to Planet, if it can be aimed with sufficient precision, or from satellite to satellite. Certainly the laser is going to be exploited, along with its pointing mechanism, as one of the first things that is done in space technology. We have stellar-oriented telescopes. Dr. VON BRAUN. I might also mention the military significance of this. With such a. laser communication system you h'ave an inherently safe communication link, because there is no problem of code cracking, it is a problemof simply not looking at you. Mr. MELDRUM. Aiming. Dr. vo~ BRAUN. Aiming at you, and you can get messages from the Pentagon to Vietnam that nobody in principle can intercept because nobody receives any energy except the military receivers stationed at the far end. Mr. MELDRUM. Here is our summary-all of our Saturn vehicle launchings have been successful. All Chrysler Saturn work is on or ahead of schedule. The S-lB stage which we make is fully qualified, fully reliability tested, and is man rated. Our. experienced Chrysler Saturn program costs, and our cost projections to program comple- tion, are less than the targeted amounts. Activity has been authorized up to June 30, 1967, for the continuation of the program that will protect our program continuity of four TB stages per year when a follow-on program is authorized before the 30th of June. . `There is urgent need for immediate authorization of such a follow-on program. Without that authorization the major program will terminate in mid-1968. Are there any questions? If not, we're about 8 minutes after 1, I think we're running 8 minutes late. We'll probably have to move on to the Boeing area. Thank you Congressman Teague. Congressman TEAGUE. Thank you, sir. PAGENO="0756" 752 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION CHART 37 CHART 38 PAGENO="0757" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 753 SUMMAPY * I. ALL SATURN VEHICLE LAUNCHES HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL. * 2. ALL CHRYSLER SATURN WORK IS ON OR AHEAD OF SCHEDULE. * 3. THE S-I-B STAGE IS FULLY QUALIFIED, FULLY RELIABILITY TESTED, AND MAN - RATED. * 4. EXPERIENCED CHRYSLER SATURN PROGRAM COSTS AND COST PROJECTIONS TO PROGRAM COMPLETION, ARE LESS THAN TARGETED Mv~TS. * 5. ACTIVITY HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED IN FY61('SCHED.~ THAT WILL PROTECT PROGRAM CONTINUITY OF 4 S-I-B STAGES PER YEAR IF A "FOLLOW ON" PROGRAM IS AUTHORIZED BEFORE 30 JUN 67. * 6. THERE IS URGENT NEED FOR IMMEDIATE AUTHORIZATION OF SUCH A "FOLLOW ON" PROGRAM. WITHOUT SUCH AUTHORIZATION, THE MAJOR PROGRAM WILL TERMINATE IN MID 1968. CHART 39 PAGENO="0758" 754 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION CHART 40 PAGENO="0759" APPENDIX P Hi~IN~is OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION, INC., SEAL BEACH, CALIFORNIA, FEBRUARY 17, 19~'T SPACE AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS DIVISION FOREWORD Information in this document was presented to the Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, Committee on Science and Astronautics, House of Representatives, by North American Aviation's Space and Information Systems Division, at Downey, Calif., on February 17, 1967. Government personnel present were: Subcommittee: Hon. Olin E. Teague, chairman, Hon. Edward J. Gurney, Hon. Earle Cabell, I-Ion. Jerry L. Pettis, Hon. Larry Wmn, Jr. Staff: James E. Wilson, technical consultant; Peter A. Gerardi, technical consultant. NASA: Robert F. Freitag, Director, Manned Space Flight Field Center Development, NASA Headquarters; John S. Brown, Legisla- tive Affairs, NASA Headquarters. ILLUSTRATIONS Slide Page 1 Saturn S-TI Program (27SP81198X) 758 2 Outline (275P81199X) 757 3 Saturn V (S105AP83083) 759 4 Saturn S-IT Characteristics (S106SP79550X) 759 5 S-Il Program Scope-Test Hardware (S126SP80215A) 761 6 Saturn S-Il Integrated Test Program (27SP81200X) 762 7 S-Il Total Program Cost-EAC (275P812O1X) 763 8 Saturn S-TI Program Accomplishments (27SP81202X) 764 9 Saturn S-Il Program Accomplishments (27SP81203X) 765 10 Saturn S-Il Program Accomplishments (27SP812O4X) 765 11 Saturn S-Il Program Accomplishments (27SP81205X) 766 12 Saturn S-IT Qualification Test Status (27SP81206X) 767 13 Saturn S-IT Stage Delivery Schedule (275P81207X) 768 14 Problems Contributing to Schedule Revisions (27SP81208X) 769 15 S-Il Cutaway 771 16 What Is Being Done To Preclude Further Schedule Revisions (275P- 81209X) 17 What Is Being Done To Preclude Further Schedule Revisions (27SP- 8121OX) 776 18 S-Il Facilities (27SP81211X) - 777 19 Total Saturn S-IT Direct Labor Load by Location (27SP81212X) - - - 778 20 Total Saturn S-TI Program Expenditure Requirements-Including Fee (27SP81213X) 779 755 PAGENO="0760" 756 196.8 NASA AUTHORIZATION Page 21 Program Projections for Calendar Year 1967 (27SP81214X) 780 22 Apollo Basic Lunar Mission (17AP86811) 781 23 Apollo Spacecraft (S36AP84509A) 781 24 Command Module Exterior Dimensions and Details (PD78184B)~~ - 782 25 Service Module Exterior Dimensions and Details (S96PD78260B) - - - 783 26 Apollo Spacecraft S&ID Responsibilities (27AP83067B) 783 27 Apollo Program Distribution of Effort-Through November 1966 (17AP86820A) 784 28 Apollo Major Subcontractors (17AP86816) 785 29 Apollo Associate Contractors (17AP86788) 786 30 Apollo Highlights (27AP86843) 787 31 Apollo Highlights (27A86845) 788 32 Apollo Command and Service Modules Program (27AP86842) 789 33 Apollo Program (S86PD78375D) 790 34 Ground and Flight Test Schedule (27AP86841A) 791 35 Spacecraft Lunar Module Adapter (27AP86846) 793 36 Qualification Status (17AP86812) 794 37 Apollo Saturn 201 Mission-Spacecraft 009 (S16APS5001) 795 38 Apollo Saturn 202 Mission-Spacecraft 011 (S16AP85002) 796 39 1966 Technical Problem and Solution Summary (27AP86784A) 797 40 1966 Technical Problem and Solution Summary (27AP86783A) 798 41 Recent Problem and Solution Summary (27AP86815A) 799 42 Apollo Direct Manpower Load-includes Tulsa and Off-Site NAA, Excludes Major IDWA and Subcontract (27AP86804E) 802 43 Command and Service Modules Total Program Estimated Ex- penditures, Including Changes (27AP85991D) 802 44 Typical subcontractor Effort Reductions-Equivalent Manpower (17AP86817) 803 45 Program Projections for the Next Six Months (27AP86844) 804 46 Budget Message and Press Briefing Quotations (27PD80001) 806 47 What is AAP? (27PD80000A) 807 48 Program Objectives (27PD80133) 808 49 Program Objectives (27PD80134) - 809 50 Program Parameters (27PD80132) 811 51 Present AAP Scope-As Defined by NAA (27PD80002C) 812 52 Alternate Mission Concept (27PD80003B) 814 53 Lunar Mapping and Survey System-LMSS (27PD80004A) - 815 54 LMSS Mod Kits (27PD80005A) 816 55 AAP Flight Schedules-NAS9-6593 Study Guidelines (27PD80006A) 817 56 Previous Orbital Workshop Configuration-Single, Manned Launch (27AP86793C) 818 57 Present Orbital Workshop Configuration-AAP-1 through AAP-4 (27AP86780B) 818 58 Orbital Workshop Model 820 59 Multiple Docking Adapter-NAA/S&ID Approach (27PD80008) - - - - 821 60 MDA Manufacturing (27PD80010) 822 61 Applicability of Apollo Ground Support Equipment (27PD80012A) - - 823 62 Typical Surplus GSE (27PD80013A) 824 63 Typical GSE Design (27PD80014A) 824 64 Renovated Command Module-NAS9-6445 Study (27PD80015A) - - 825 65 PCM Concept (27PD80016A) 826 66 RCM Lab Concept (27PD80019B) 827 67 Preliminary Cost Relationships (27AS14444B) 828 68 Spacecraft 011 After Recovery (27PD80017) 829 69 Recovery Operations Schedule (27AS14434B) 829 70 Apollo Schedule-MDS 9, Revision 3 (27PD80021B-1) 830 71 Apollo Recovery Mode (S76SD10177C) 831 72 Advanced Landing System-Gliding Steerable Chutes Plus Landing Retro-Rockets (27PD80022) 832 73 Glide System Candidates (27PD79938A) 833 74 Slotted Circular Parawing-S&ID Development (27PD79939A) - - - - 833 75 Crew Couch Attenuation-Apollo Block II Command Module (27PD80074) 334 76 Crew Couch Attenuation-Apollo Block II Command Module (27PD80068) 835 PAGENO="0761" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 757 Page 77 Six-Man Crew Module (27PD80069) - 835 78 Potential Subsystem Changes-From Block II to "Block III" Logis- tics Vehicle (27PD80070A) 836 79 Block Il/Ill Schedule Integration (27PD80081B) 837 80 S&ID AAP GFY 1968 Costs (27PD80082B) 838 81 AAP Summary (27PD80072B) 839 82 Summary (27MS13690B) 843 83 NAA Apollo Program Total Manpower Load (27PD78320A-1) 843 84 S&ID Total Manpower Load (27PD80135A-1) 844 85 S&ID Total Manpower Load (27PD80136A-1) 845 86 Total S&ID Functional Headcount (27PD80085A-1) 846 87 Major Space Manufacturing and Research Facilities in Use by NAA (27MS13686A) 88 Major Apollo Unique Facilities Availability-AAP 1 July 1967 Go-Ahead (27M513682B) 848 89 Major Apollo Unique Facilities Availability-AAP 1 April 1968 Go-Ahead (27MS13685B) 848 90 Major Saturn S-Il Unique Facilities Availability-Per Master Pro- gram Schedule 67A, Revised 30 January 1967 (27MS13687) 849 91 Major Saturn S-IT Unique Facilities Availability-Master Program Schedule 67A, Revised 30 January 1977 (27MS13681) 850 92 Capability and Planned Utilization-Apollo/Saturn ~-II S&ID Facil- ities (27MS13680A-1, -2) 850 93 S&ID Follow-On GFY 1968 Funding Requirements (27PD80102C) - - 851 94 S&ID Follow-On Critical Events Summary (27PD80103A~ 851 HARRISON A. STORMS. Gentlemen, it is my pleasure to welcome you here today. As you are well aware, you are visiting the Space and Information Systems Division of North American Aviation, which is one of seven divisions in our corporation. I would like to have Bob Greer, our program managerin the Saturn S-IT, discuss that program with you. OLIN E. TEAGtTE. Bob, I'm not sure that Larry Winn knows exactly where the S-TI fits in this total picture. Everybody else does, but I don't know whether Larry does or not. He hasn't been on a trip with us before. So, you might tell him first where the S-TI fits in, ex- actly what it is and where it is. ROBERT E. GREER. This will be approximately a 1-hour presentation on the S-IT (slide 1). I have a chart here very early in the discus- sion whkh I believe will describe the position of the S-TI in the Sat- urn V stack, but first I would like to give you an outline of what I am going to discuss (slide 2). I will start out with a general orientation on the characteristics of t.he stage, and, at this time, I will also show where it fits into the stack; I will then talk for a few minutes on the broad scope of the program; I will then cover the major accomplishments for the calendar year 1966; then I will show you our master delivery schedule for our flight stages; T will discuss the major problems we are having and the solutions to those problems; I will then say a few words on our manpower and our funding requirements; and I will conclude by forecasting the ac- complishments we propose to achieve in the calendar year 1967. This is the Saturn V stack (slide 3). It's about 360 feet tall. We have the S-IC, first stage, which is built by Boeing; the second stage, the S-TI, which I'll talk about this morning, built by S. & I.D.; the third stage is the S-IVB built by Douglas at Huntington Beach. Then we have the instrumentation unit, built by IBM, which provides PAGENO="0762" 758 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZAflON SATURN S-Il PROGRAM 17 FEBRUARY 1967 SLIDE 1. SATURN S-Il PROGRAM OUTLINE I. ORIENTATION ON CHARACTERISTICS OF STAGE II. BROAD SCOPE OF PROGRAM III. PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS - CY 66 IV. MASTER DELIVERY SCHEDULE V. MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS & SOLUTIONS VI. MANPOWER & FUNDING REQUIREMENTS VII. FORECAST ACCOMPLISHMENTS - CY 67 SLIDE 2. OUTLINE the guidance; the lunar module adapter, which S. & I.D. builds; and the lunar module, which is built by Grumman. Finally, we get to the Apollo service and command modules and the launch escape sys- tem, which you will hear discussed later today by Dale Myers. Now, let's take a look at the S-IT (slide 4). I have a picture, in case during the talk we want to discuss the location of some compo- nent in the stage. PAGENO="0763" NAM~ LRIGTH DRY WEIGHT UFTOFF WEIGHT BURNOUT WEIGHT PROPELL&NT ~APAOT1' LH2 (-423F) LOX (.297F) ENGINES THRUST BURN TIME SPECIFIC IMPULSE ULLAGE MOTORS THRUST (TOTAL) BURN TiME PERFORMANCE ALTiTUDE AT IGNITiON ALTITUDE AT BURNOUT VELOCITY TRANSiTiON 33 FT 81.5 FT 82,000 LB (W/O INTERSTAGE) 1,070,000 LB 94,000 LB 970,000 L5/349,800 GAL 133,000 LB /264,400 GAL 815,000 LB/85,400 GAL 5 ROCKETDYNE J-2 200,000 LB/ENGINE 390 SEC 436 SEC 8 ROCKETDYNE 22,900 LB 3.7 SEC 200,000 FT (38 MI) 606,000 FT (114 MI) 7,700-20,840 FT/SEC (5,460.14,770 MPH) SLIDE 4. SATURN S-Il CHARACTERISTICS It's 33 feet in diameter, which is the same diameter as the stage tinder it. The stage. above it has slightly lesser diameter. It's about 82 feet tall. With no propellants in it, it weighs about 82,000 pounds; fully fueled, it weighs a little over a million pounds. It has about 350,000 gallons of propellant in it. In the upper tank, beginning at 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 759 SATURN V MSFC/IBM S-IVB DOUGLAS S-IC BOEING .ES 5 J-2 ENGINES ROCKETDYN E ROCKETDYNE TOTAL WT 6,000,000 LB SLIDE 3. SATURN V SATURN S-Il CHARACTERISTICS PAGENO="0764" 760 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION this bulkhead and going up to here, we have liquid hydrogen, liquid hydrogen at -423° F. There are about 260,000 gallons of liquid hydrogen. This tank here, which is almost, but not quite, a sphere right under the hydrogen tank, contains 85,000 gallons of liquid oxygen at -297°. There are five engines built by Rocketdyne, called the J-2 engines, which have a nominal thrust of 200,000 pounds each. There is an nprated version, at 230,000 pounds, which we will have on our later vehicles. The stage, after it separates from the S-IC, burns for about 390 seconds, a little over 6 minutes. A measure of how good the engine and propellant system are is called the specific impulse; it's the pounds of thrust per second of propellants burned which gives the value in seconds. At altitude, it's about 436 seconds. The specific impulse on the hydrogen-oxygen stages are characteris- tically quite high compared to liquid oxygen and kerosene. There are eight solid-propellant ullage motors that attach to the sides for a total thrust of about 23,000 pounds. When we separate from the S-IC, we momentarily go into zero g. These uliage motors are used to resettle all the propellants at the rear end of the tank, so that the engines will have plenty of pressure head. When the main engines are ready to light, we start these solid-propellant ullage motors and burn them for a little over 3 seconds; that moves the propellants to the bottom of the tank, and the main engines can start. After main engine start, we throw the ullage motors away. The S-TI stage lights at about 38 miles altitude, and burns out at abOut 114 miles. At engine start, it has been boosted by the S-IC to a velocity of 7,700 feet per second. It then gains about 14,000 feet per second, reaching an end velocity of 20,840 ~feet per second. At this time it shuts off, just before the S-IVB separates and continues the mission. This is somewhat short of orbital velocity, so this stage actually splashes back into the water. It does not go into orbit. This is one way of getting a quick broad look at the program scope (slide 5). We manufactured three vehicles that for all intents and purposes are like the flight stage but were made for test purposes. One was made for static testing, to test the structural integrity of the stage. This was the S-IT-S. It was tested at Seal Beach. Another one we call the S-TI--F, "F" standing for facility. It was made to send down to Florida to check out the facility and make sure the stage would interface properly with the SI-C below it and the S-IVB above it, with the launch umbilical tower, the stand, and the other equipment. And then we had what we call the S-II-T, "T" standing for test, which had all the flight systems in it, including the five en- gines. This is the stage that we sent to Mississippi and fired a num- ber of times to find out if we really had a good design and if it was all working. Test results were fed back into the desigii of the flight stages. The Battleship (called that because it's made of boiler plate) is mainly to test out the engines. It is at Santa Susana, up above Ca- noga Park in the San Fernando Valley. We also had an electro- mechanical mockup which is here behind Building 2. We took the stage and cut it in the middle and put half of it here and set the other half next to it, which made it a little simpler to work with. PAGENO="0765" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 761 FACILITY/DYNAMIC STRUCTURAL STATIC BATTLESHIP ELECTROMECHANICAL S-II-T - ALL SYSTEMS TEST TOWER * SSFL SITE MOCKUP SLIDE 5. S-lI PROGRAM SCOPE-TEST HARDWARE We didn't have to build an 80-foot-tall tower. The two segments are hooked together electrically and mechanically. We did set up the basic GSF~ by which we check out, count down, and launch the stage. We did check out all this equipment and gained early information on whether the design of all the gear was satisfactory. The common bulkhead test tank is also at Santa Susana, near the Battleship. The purpose of this tank was to verify the structural integrity of the bulkhead between the liquid hydrogen.. and the liq- uid oxygen tanks. This is a very sophisticated, lightweight bulk- head, and we felt it needed special test attention. We have two stands at Mississippi where we can static-fire the S- II. One of them is activated and has been used; the other will be activated within a month. There is quite a bit of ground support equipment all through the test system. We have a set at Seal Beach; we have a partial set that we use to fire the Battleship engines; there are two sets at the Mississippi test facility that go with each of the stands there; and there are some partial sets at Kennedy Space Cen- ter. Finally, we have 15 flight sta.ges coming along. Ten are on firm contract, and we have proposed the followup on five. We are cur- rently in negotiations on those five stages. This chart is meant to give you a quick picture of our test program (slide 6). All the black tri- angles are things that have been accomplished. We did have the high- force test program, which is to test stage response to acoustics and vibration. This test was performed at Huntsville. You take the stage and you subject it to the noise and vibration that it undergoes in its actual flight profile. The stage is highly instrumented and you analyze that test data and you find out if everything is going to hold COMMON BULKHEAD TEST TANK FLIGHT STAGES SITE ACTIVATION `V * GSE CHECKOUT EQUIPMENT PAGENO="0766" 762 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION SATURN S-Il INTEGRATED TEST PRbGRAM HIGH FORCE 7T5A T.6&.. A2-28 FORECAST TEST PROGRAM I 0 E 0 START-ACOUSTIC AND VIBRATION TESTING -COMPLETE A COMPLETED [~~COMPLETED 3-6 10-29 S-I-F ___________ ~ 4.4 ITENTATIVE)L\ START-KSC AS-500-F TESTING-COMPLETE -START- DYNAMIC TEST PROGRAM IMSFC)-COMPLETE -~--~ -MOD TO 5-114/S - 5 5-2E AND SHIP TO MSFC S-II-T COMPLETE COMPLETE STATIC TANKING TESTS FIRING TESTS 3-15 6-TO TO-TO 12.6 4-12 BATTLESHIP STATIC FIRING I~TS 4~_~__ - tRT.BOATTA~ Lj~ START CONFIDE CE ROVEME T-TEST PROGRAM COMPLETE (SEVEN FULL DURATION STATIC FIRINGS) 9-1 12-1 COMMON BULKHEAD TEST TANK (CBTT) START-VERIPICATION-COMpL TESTING OF LH2 TANK REPAIR METHODS 11.30 12.30 S III COMPLETED FIRST FULL_+ f-COMPLETED SECOND FULL DURATION STATIC FIRING DURATION STATIC FIRING 3-25 4-2 S-II-2 FIRST FULL DURATION-1 L_SECOND FULL STATIC FIRING DURATION STATIC FIRING SLIDE 6. SATURN S-Il INTEGRATED TEST PROGRAM up all right in the flight environment. We completed that program ahead of schedule. The facility stage I mentioned earlier did go to KSC last March and was used to check out the facility down there. At that time, we modified that stage and sent it to Huntsville, where it was stacked with the S-IC and the S-IVB for dynamic testing. That program will be completed in .June. It's currently going on and is on schedule. The all-systems test vehicle did go to Mississippi in October of 1965. We checked out the facility and had the tanking test in March. We completed a series of static firings on May 28. The original Battleship program was completed on March 15 with a series of static test firings. We then decided we needed additional confidence im- provement tests, so we initiated a program in June that is still going on. Here in the middle you see a bar that says "boattail environmental tests." The boattail is down where the engines are. The purpose of these tests was to put the liquid oxygen-liquid hydrogen on board, shroud the boattail, and get the temperature gradients like they will be on ascent when the S-IC sits below us with its cold oxygen here and our cold oxygen here. There is a circulation system where the oxygen is supposed to circulate through these engine pumps to chill them; we wanted to make sure that system is going to work. We simu- lated that environment on the Battleship and completed those tests in December. We have had a set of full-duration firings through this period. In fact, one of them is scheduled for today at 1:30. We did complete the series of tests on the common bulkhead test tank successfully; and then, since we didn't get all the testing done on the S-II-T that PAGENO="0767" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 763 we felt desirable, we actually set up an extra firing on the S-Il-i. In the original planning, the S-TI-i was going to have one acceptance firing, but we changed that to add another firing for confidence pur- poses. We did accomplish that at the end of December of last year. There were two completely successful full-duration static firings of the S-IT-i. The S-II-2, which I believe you gentlemen saw coming down the Pearl River the other day, is now at Mississippi and is set up for its first full-duration firing on March 25, and a `second one, if required, shortly thereafter, early in April. Continuing with the broad scope of the program, I have a percent- age pie chart (slide 7). The total scope of the program here in S-Il TOTAL PROGRAM COST EAC SLIDE 7. S-Il TOTAL PROBLEM CosT-EAC PAGENO="0768" 764 196.8 NASA AUTHORIZATION dollars, which will be shown on a subsequent chart, is about $1.3 billion. The purpose of this chart is to show that most of the S-TI program is at S. & I.D. as opposed to major subcontracting. Only about 4.2 percent of the work is with major subcontractors. I would now like to review the major program accomplishments for calendar year 1966 (slide 8). We did have our battleship pro- gram, and we did complete four full-duration firings in August. We did complete the environmental boattail tests that I mentioned a moment ago. On the S-II-T, we achieved some very major mile- stones. We loaded the tank with hydrogen and oxygen, and we have this insulation on the side to hold down the boiloff. It's like a big vacuum thermos bottle, and there were some worries about whether the insulation would have structural integrity: would it remain in place on the side when it was chilled? And, sure enough, it did stay on; in fact, it worked quite well. This was a major milestone. Then with the stage all up and all the systems operating, including the five engines, we fired and did burn our full 365 seconds. The static burn- ing time on the ground is a little less than it would be at altitude, in case you happen to remember that I used the number 390 seconds a moment ago for inflight firing. The nominal full duration on the ground is 365 seconds. That was a major milestone. The completion of the facility vehicle, shipment to the Cape, and the successful checkout of the facility at KSC are major milestones (slide 9). The stack went together with no problems whatever. They turned on the electrical power, and everything worked quite well. We then modified the S-IT-F, as I mentioned earlier, and shipped it to Huntsville. It's now being used as a dynamic test vehicle. When this is complete, it will be shipped back to the Cape to check out another LTJT at KSC. EDWARD J. GURNEY. Another what? Mr. GREER. Sorry. Launch umbilical tower. BATTLESHIP (HEAVYWEIGHT TEST STAGE) CONFIDENCE IMPROVEMENT TESTING AT SANTA SUSANA COMPLETED FOUR FULL DURATION (365 SECOND) STATIC FIRINGS WITH ALL FIVE ENGINES ON 08-31-66 COMPLETED ENVIRONMENTAL TEST OF ENGINE COMPARTMENT & THRUST CONE ON 12-06-66 S-II-T (FIRST FLIGHT WEIGHT SATURN II TEST VEHICLE) COMPLETED TANK LOADING WITH LIQUID HYDROGEN & LIQUID OXYGEN ON 04-23-66 FIRST FULL DURATION 365 SECOND 5 ENGINE FIRING OF FLIGHT- WEIGHT STAGE ON 05-20-66 SLIDE 8. SATURN S-IT PROGRAM ACCOMPLIShMENTS PAGENO="0769" 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION 765 Have you been to the Cape, Mr. Gurney? Mr. GURNEY. That's my congressional district, I know it well, but I don't know about LtTT's. Mr. GREER. The high-force test vehicle was to test out the vibration and acoustic testing. That program was completed actually on January 6 (slide 10). I count it as an accomplishment for calendar year 1966 because most of it was accomplished in that year, ahead of SATURN S-Il PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS S-Il-F (SATURN II FACILITY CHECKOUT STAGE) FABRICATION & TESTING AT SEAL BEACH COMPL 02-19-66 TESTED S-Il-F SUCCESSFULLY AT KSC WITH S-IC-F, S-IV-BF IN SATU RN V CONF I GURAT ION. COMPLETED 10-12-66 MODIFIED FOR VIBRATION & DYNAMIC LOAD TESTING (S-II-F/D) & SHIPPED TO MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER ON 10-29-66 S-II-F/D STACKED WITH S-IC & S-IV-B IN SATURN V CONFIGURATION. DYNAMIC TESTING IN PROCESS 11-10-66 SLIDE 9. SATURN S-Il PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS HIGH FORCE TEST (HIGH LEVEL VIBRATION & ACOUSTIC TESTING) STRUCTURAL VIBRATION & ACOUSTIC TESTS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED ON 01-06-67 (AHEAD OF SCHEDULE) AT HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA CBTT (VERIFICATION TESTS) VERIFICATION TESTING OF LH & LOX TANK REPAIR METHODS ON TEST TANK AT S~NTA SUSANA COMPLETED 12-01-66 (ON SCHEDULE) SLIDE 10. SATURN S-Il PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS :76-265 0-67-pt. 2----49 PAGENO="0770" 766 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION schedule, quite successfully; and I'm happy to say we didn't find any- thing out there that caused us to make any substantial design changes in the stage We did complete our common bulkhead test tank tests during calendar year 1966, and everybody was relieved when we found out that bulkhead was really going to work all right. The first flight stage, another major milestone, was fabricated and tested at Seal Beach and shipped on July 30 (slide 11). We fired it twice at Mississippi successfully,. and we did deliver it to KSC on January 21. It's in the low bay down there now, undergoing some late modifications. We will be moving to the high bay on February 23 for mating with the S-IC; and then the S-IVB goes on top of that, and the spacecraft on top of that about April 9. It should roll out to the pad and be ready for launch in May. The second flight stage has been fabricated and tested at Seal Beach~. It was shipped on January 21, and arrived at Mississippi on February 11. It is currently undergoing that part of the cycle known as prestatic firing checkout, preparing to fire later in. March. Among our other major accomplishments is the qualification test of major components (slide 12). As you gentlemen may know, there are major components on the stage such as vent valves and other major valves in the hydrogen-oxygen system, certain electronic equipment, and dis- connects where we hook up the facility to the stage. SATURN S-Il PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS SATURN S-Il FIRST FLIGHT STAGE (S-Il-i) FABRICATION & TESTING AT SEAL BEACH COMPLETED 07-30-66 TWO FULL DURATION FIRING TESTS COMPLETED AT MTF ON 12-30-66 DELIVERED TO KSC 01-21-67 SATURN SECOND FLIGHT STAGE (S-II-2) FABRICATION & TESTING AT SEAL BEACH COMPLETED 01-27-67 MTF ARRIVAL ON 02-11-67 FOR FIRING TESTS SLIDE 11. SATURN S-Il PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS PAGENO="0771" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 767 SATURN S-Il QUALIFICATION TEST STATUS STAGE GSE IOTAL EQUIPMENT ITEMS QUALIFIED 211 22 TOTAL PROGRAM EQUIPMENT ITEMS REMAINING TO BE QUALIFIED 5 SCHEDULE FOR COMPLETION - REMAINING ITEMS: DATE: FEBRUARY MARCH QUANTITY: 5 1 SLIDE 12. SATURN S-Il QUALIFICATION TEST STATUS When the stage launches, they have to pull apart. These major components run through separate tests to qualify them. We subject them to rather severe vibrational enviromnents and, in some cases, temperature cycling. This sort of thing, qualifying all these major critical components, is quite a task; and we are now drawing toward the end of the line on this problem. We have qualified 211 stage items, 22 ground support equipment items, and we have remaining only five for the stage and one for the ground support. These five are scheduled for completion this month and next, and I believe we are in real good shape here and should have qualified all our major components by the time we launch the first stage. Now, looking at the master program schedule (slide 13), the symbol here stands for the contract delivery date. That's the date that we contracted to deliver the flight stages in our basic contract. The triangle is our master program schedule, against which we are cur- rently projecting our deliveries. If it's black, we have already done it. You will notice on the S-IT-i we did deliver about 6 months past our contract date. The S-II-2, which has been following right behind the S-IT-i, has been going through the same facilities, such as the checkout station at Seal Beach. In other words, it was constrained by the S-IT--i use of the facilities. We are running about 6 months down on that. For the third bird, we are pulling up on it here a PAGENO="0772" 768 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION SATURN S-Il STAGE DELIVERY SCHEDULE IJIFIMIAIMIJIJ Al SIOINIDI it FIMIAIMI itS !AL~D~ ii FIMIAIMIJIJIAI SIOINIDI it FIMIAIMI ij JIAI slotNIl 7.31.66-5 - S-Il-i DELIVERY TO KSC cl- ~ ____________________ 11-30-66 c-5-6-67 LEGEND 5-11-2 DELIVERY TO KSC SCHEDULE 67A A S-II-3 DELIVERY TO KSC .~5. /~ ACTUAL COMPLETION A ~-II-4 DELIVERY TO KSC PREPARED 80 11-30-67 -C123167 S-Il PLANS & SCHEDULES -11-5 DELIVERY TO KSC - -L~-,-~ DATA AS OF- 1-31-67 2-20-68 -3-31-68 TOKSC S-Il-? DELIVERY TO KSC . 5-11-8 DELIVERY TO KSC . `1-30-68 -II.~ DELIVERY TO KSC ~.I5 -Il-TO DELIVERY TO KSC S-Il-li DELIVERY TO KSC - --2~ ~ 6 5-11-12 DELIVERY TO KSC * "`~ ~ -II.13 DELIVERY TO (SC * ---2~ ~ S-II-14 DELIVERY TO KSC 5.11-15 DELIVERY TO KSC 9~9~ ~ FJIFIMIAIMIJIJIAIS!OINID JIFIMIAIMIJIJIAISIOINID JIFIMIAIMHIJ1AISIOINID Li F1MIAIMI ~I iIAjS!~~~" 1966 1967 1968 1969 SLIDE 13. SATURN S-IT STAGE DELIVERY SCHEDULE couple of months-two and a half; by the fourth stage, we are very close, and finally, by the fifth, you will notice these two symbols re- verse themselves. Then from the fifth item down to the end, we are currently running on a schedule that will deliver ahead of our contract schedule. Now, we'll take a broad look at the problems that caused the bad schedule position I showed you on the last chart (slide 14). The first major problem is the insulation I mentioned earlier that goes on the outside of the stage to keep the hydrogen from boiling off. This was a new technology, as far as we're concerned. There are other stages, the Douglas S-IVB and the Centaur, that have used the insulation for liquid hydrogen; but we had a new approach to this, a lightweight approach, and we have had quite a few problems with it. None of them were really fundamental problems, but very -much in the nuisance category-the kind of thing you can lose an awful lot of time on. Whenever you have to make a repair on this; for example, there are long cure cycles for bonding-48 hours just to make the simplest re- pair in this insulation. `Where there is a pin hole or a rent, it takes yoii2 or 3 days just to repair that simple defect. LARRY WINN, JR. Mr. Greer, excuse me. Could you give us a little more information about the insulation? You say it's a new light- weight; what are you talking about, what type? Mr. GREER. First, looking radially out from the stage it's about 1.6 inches thick. It's a plastic resin honeycomb. If you look down at it, looking in, you see a lot of little hexagonal cells about three- fourths inch across. On top of that there are two sheets of nylon PAGENO="0773" 19&8 NASA AUTHORIZATION 769 PROBLEMS CONTRIBUTING TO SCHEDULE REVISIONS I NSULAT ION STRUCTURAL REWORK REQUIREMENTS INDICATED BY `P' TEST PROGRAM ASSEMBLY WELDING OFFSET PROBLEM ENGINEERING CHANGES MATERIAL REVIEW ACTIONS SLIDE 14. PROBLEMS CONTRIBUTING TO SCHEDULE REvIsIoNs and one of Tediar that comprise this blanket that has to be bonded onto the stage. We use a resin glue that we bake on in an oven at about 3500. We first have to put it on the quarter panels. These are major segments of the tank. Then we weld these quarter panels into a ring, and we weld the rings into the complete stage. Then we have to go back and put strips in to close out over the welds, and this requires more bonding. Originally, we had this material ~ubcon- tracted out to a number of suppliers-Eldon Plastics, for one. We didn't exercise sufficient in-process control over these suppliers and, as a result, we got some material that was below standards. We put this material on the stage. During tanking, we purge with helium gas under pressure to insulate the hydrogen from the outside ambient air; and under this pressure, about four pounds per square inch, we found the insulation failing. It would just rip, pieces would break off or a hole would appear. We would have to repair it and pump it up again and some more would break off. And we went on fighting this insulation repair for months and months. Finally we pulled all PAGENO="0774" 770 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION off the insulation in-house, and North American now makes this in- sulation. Beginning on the fourth stage, we have all North Amen- can-made insulation, and it's good. On the first three stages, we still have this supplier-made insulation. Every time we tank these stages and fire them at Mississippi, this insulation cracks when it chills down. While it's not dangerous, after we have detanked or fired, we have to ~o in and repair all those cracks That runs us like 10 to 14 days, which is just lost time. Right now, down at the Cape in the low bay, we're repairing insulation damage left over from the last firing at Mississippi. Does that sort of give you a feel for it? Mr. WINN. How does the new thickness compare with what you were using in the past? You said 1.6 inches. Mr. GREER. It went through the several design iterations, Mr. Wimi. There were some assumptions on thermal coefficients back at the begin- ning which led them to believe that eighth-tenths inch would be suf- ficiently thick The facility stage v~e built had eight tenths inch thick insulation We found out the boil off rate of hydrogen could be too high. So, we increased the thickness to 1.6 inches. This was picked as a proper design point to control this boil-off rate of liquid hydrogen. Mr. WINN. Thank you. Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Carroll, can we see some of that later? ROBERT E. OARROLL. We have a piece of insulation being brought in. Mr. GREER. We had the all systems test vehicle at Mississippi, and while completing our basic testing there, it did rupture under pres- sure This rupture turned out to be, on close examination by putting the pieces together and looking at them, caused by a crack in a boss in the tank. This crack basically came from a sharp corner on the boss. It should have been radiused more. This caused us to look all through th~ tank at various other places on the stringer ends. You can't really see this too well, but there are stringers that run around here, and every place you change from one quarter panel to another these stringers terminate and there is a splice plate across them (slide 15) At the termination of these stringer ends we found small cracks, so we had to do something about that We scalloped them out smooth er and polished them down There were some other bosses th'~t we found that were prone to have cracks, so ~ e radiused `md smoothed those also So, while these are very small cracks, ieally, the word is kind of a "scare" word. Although they were very small, we never- theless had to do something about all of them. We thought we had a completely qualified structure, about June of this last year we sud denly found it wasn't qualified The rework on all these problems set us back considerably on the schedule That's another major item The fusion welding that ~e used on this stage in order to keel) it lightweight is also pushing the state of the art somewhat in the welding business, `rnd we have had various problems getting our Vv elds up to our own specifications We h'ive lost quite `i bit of tune on tins problem I'll give you one example of the type of problem you i nil into. PAGENO="0775" 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION 771 SLIDE 15. S-Il CUTAWAY The No. 6 cylinder here, which is at the top of the stage, has to be welded to this bulkhead which runs over the top. We weld up to the No. 6 cylinder from quarter panels as a complete cylinder, then we weld gores, little pie-shaped pieces, in to make the bulkhead, then we have to make what is about a 1.200-inch weld all the way around to put this `bulkhead on that cylinder. The thickness of the material that we are using there is slightly over a quarter of an inch, and we can't have a mismatch, an offset at any point, of more than 10 percent PAGENO="0776" 772 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION or twenty-sixth one-thousandths of an inch. And we have had some problem getting these welds within that spec. What happens if it's too far out is you have to cut it out and re,weld it, so there goes at least a week. We have lost quite a bit of time in our schedule fight- ing the welding problem. Then we have the general statement here called "engineering changes." These are all the things that occur in an R. & D. program, where, as you progress downstream and you put the hardware to- gether, you learn new things. You now have to go back and change the hardware you have already built. This is a process that goes on continuously throughout the life of almost any program, particularly R. & D. programs, such as this. But even the airplanes you gentle- men are flying in today are still getting minor changes on them. So it's a process that goes on continuously. We expect it; nevertheless, depending on how severe some of these changes are, they do impact the schedule. Now, these changes (I'll just say one other word to clarify them) come about in part due to our own design not being just exactly right the first time. They also come about in part from changes that re- sult from interfaces with the stage below us and the stage above us. So these changes come from all directions, both from the customer to North American and internally. I have listed a thing here, which is probably not too familiar to most of you, called "Material review actions." This is the cycle, part technical and part administrative, that we get into any time we have a problem such as having made a weld which is not up to specification. We have to X-ray the weld; we have to read the X-ray; we have to discuss it with our quality control people and discuss it with our en- gineering people and our manufacturing people; we have to decide whether it's acceptable as is or whether we have to fix i~; and we have to discuss it with the customer. Every time we have an insula- tion problem, or a weld problem, we get into one of these material review cycles. And if we get a number of these actions, quite a bit of time goes by. Every time you don't do something exactly right, you have to go back and do it over, and this is one of the major things that makes the schedule slip. If we could do every job right the first time, we'd save a lot of time. We wouldn't have to go through this cycle. This is the 1.6 insulation. These are the hex cells I was talking about. It's filled with a foam material. This glues on the side of the stage, all the way around the hydrogen tank. This is the nylon-Tedlar cover. This piece was made by North American, and, while it looks pretty husky, we actually had trouble with that faring sheet ripping off under pressure. Now, we have had so much trouble with this in- sulation that we developed a simple foam insulation. We are pro- posing now, at about stage 7, to use this simple foam. We just spray this foam on the side like you would paint a garage. It foams up, then we go over it with the cutters and smooth it off and we wind up with about an inch thick of the foam which has similar thermal char- acteristics to current 1.6-inch insulation. Mr. WINN. Doesn't Tedlar have a similar type of cover there? That's more like an onionskin paper, and that's more like cardboard. PAGENO="0777" 19 68 NASA AIJTHORIZ4TION 773 Mr. GREER. There are three layers there; there are two nylon and one Tedlar. Mr. WINN. I see. Mr. GREER. The Tedlar is on top and the two underneath are nylon. This is the way foam looks after it's cut. Mr. CABELL. Do you have to mill this to fit it to the contour of your bird? It's not flexible enough to be able to wrap it, is it? Mr. GREER. Yes. You see, you have got a radius of about 200 inches, a very gentle curve. Mr. CABELL. It will conform? Mr. GREER. You get a bi~ sheet 9 by 27 feet and it's got some play in it, actually just lays on it. It looks very stiff, but a large piece is quite pliable. Mr. GURNEY. In an effort to understand how the program works a little better, let's go back to this insulation problem. How and when did you discover the defect in the original insulation you got from the subcontractors? Mr. GREER. We really didn't discover it until we had put some on the quarter panels of the stage and had them in proof-pressure tests. Mr. GURNEY. Is this the very first stage you are talking about? Mr. GREER. Yes. Mr. GURNEY. Incidentally, again, had you bought a lot for all of your stages or only for this one? Mr. GREER. We procured a considerable amount and it was in the pipeline coming in and there was no good alternate source where we could just terminate that and get some new insulation right away. At that time we found we were in trouble, we were committed through about three stages. Now, we could have stopped right there. Then you would have seen a bigger schedule impact than I showed you a minute ago. So we chose to fight the repair cycle. When you pres- sure-test this and it rips, you repair it. You test again, and maybe you blow another place and repair it. Eventually, you get to where it's repaired and it works. Mr. GURNEY. You are making your own now, you are not getting it through subcontractors? Mr. GREER. That's right. Mr. GURNEY. What was the matter with this? Was it poor work- manship, poor quality, poor design, or what? Mr. GREEn. The design is all right, it's OK, it works. There was lots of lab work done on this insulation by the engineer who designed it and built test items, and if you build it right and you glue it on right, it's great. In fact, it lulled us a little bit into complacency- we should have been more alert. For example, the actual pressure that this sees, when it's on the pad and we pump it up with helium, is like 4 pounds per square~ inch above atmospheric. As the stage goes aloft, then this vents off and you actually peak out somewhere around 5 or 6 pounds per square inch relative to the vacuum outside. We started out at 15 pounds per square inch proof test, because our laboratory samples would go to 40-they would all go to 40. We started blowing this up to 15 and it was ripping right and left, so then we went back and rechecked our real requirements for design and found that we could live with 7 pounds per square inch for proof- PAGENO="0778" 774 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION pressure. Even that caused quite a few flaws to occur in this insula- tion. Mr. GURNEY. What was the matter then, was it poor workman- ship? Mr GREER Yes, it just wasn't glued on ~ell A piece would up off, a piece of this laminate, and underneath you would find some lit tle piece of debris or something. Mr. WINN. Do you think these constant repair systems or jobs that you have done are going to make an acceptable unit before you are done? Mr GREER Yes, as I say, once you get all the bad spots repaned The way you repair it depends on what the defect was. We would either cut out a whole piece like this and put a new piece in, or we would pull back the laminate and very carefully prepare the surface and then we would glue back on another piece of laminate. By the time we had done all the repairs, and there were quite a few of them on the S-~II-1, it was okay Mr WINN Pretty expensive, though ~ Mr GREER It was very expensive in time Mr GURNEY One other question You said you had to commit yourself to three stages before you could cut it off. Why was that? Is it because it had come in before you really found out what was the matter? Mr GREER That's correct It was in the pipeline in various stages of being put on quarter panels and in our ~arehouse We had about three stages worth when we found out we were in trouble If Vv e stopped right there, and decided to make it in house and junk all that, I'd say we'd have lost several months We decided ~e ~ ould live with it and repair it, and that's what we are doing. Mr. GURNEY. I see. Thank you. Mr. GREER. I have already given part of this, I believe. This is what we are doing to stop this schedule slippage type of problem I have just been talking about (slide 16). As I say, we have now brought all the insulation in house, and not only in this laminate 16 inch foam insulation made by North American, and it's good stuff, but we have progressed from that to this foam on insulation, which is a much simpler process and will save us `~ lot of time in manufac turing We are going to pick that up on `tbout the seventh stage And that should eliminate once and for all the repair type problem we have been having with insulation One of our problems in this material review world, that I mentioned earlier, was an actual shortage of X-ray equipment, because, after every weld, we X-ray that weld; and this is a long weld, and there are lots of X-ray pictures, and it's a lot of developing. Then people have to look at the welds. So we actually have moved the X-ray processing equipment; we have gotten more of it and moved it right to the manufacturing station, so that we can speed up this inspection of the weld after we have made it It used to be quite a period of time from the time we made a weld until we had gotten all the X.rays. You have to clear all the people away because this is a very powerful X-ray machine. We would take the film and develop it over in another building; people would read it, and it would be a day later before we got the word back on whether we had porosity and oxide in the weld and where and how to repair it. So we shortened the PAGENO="0779" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 775 WHAT IS BEING DONE TO PRECLUDE FURTHER SCHEDULE REVISIONS ALL INSULATION NOW FABRICATED IN NAA FACILITIES; IN-HOUSE PROCUREMENT HAS ELIMINATED LATE DELIVERY & DEFECT PROBLEMS PROVIDING X-RAY PROCESSING EQUIPMENT IN MANUFACTURING STATIONS TO EXPEDITE WELD INSPECTIONS PULLING BACK DEFERRED MODIFICATIONS TO SEAL BEACH WHERE WORK CAN BE DONE WITH LESS DIFFICULTY THAN AT FIELD SITES ESTABLISHED JOINT NASA & NAA TEAM TO EXPEDITE MATERIAL REVIEW ACTIONS ON A 24-HOUR BASIS IMPROVED WELDING TECHNIQUES: USING NASA (HAWTHORNE) CLAMPS REDUCES BULKHEAD/CYLINDER OFFSET PROVIDING ADDITIONAL WELDING TOOLING & FIXTURES TO PREVENT STATION LOADING CONSTRAINTS TRAINING & CERTIFYING ADDITIONAL SHOP TECHNICIANS SLIDE 16. WHAT Is BEING DONE To PRECLUDE FURTHER SCHEDULE REVISIONS line of communication and got some more equipment there to speedup that process. In the change world that I mentioned earlier, we found that a lot of the changes (we didn't like to do this, but it seemed like the best thing to do) were moving out into the field. In other words, we would come up late in the cycle~ when we were about to ship a stage from Seal Beach, we would get a change that had to be made. And we would send the stage on to Mississippi and make the change there. The change traffic is dropping now. I think we have enough control over it so that, beginning with about stage 3, we should be able to pull almost all that work back to Seal Beach. It's always better to do the work back at the factory than it is out in the field. So we are moving in that direction, and I believe it's going to help us on the schedule. `As to the material review action, that I mentioned earlier, which does involve several of our own functional departments as well as the customer, we have formed a joint team. Twenty-four hours a day there is somebody available down at Seal Beach for rapid processing of these material `review actions. And where we might have used a day before, now we get it done in an hour. All this adds up to quite a bit in the schedule. We have improved our welding techniques. One of the things we have done is use a set of clamps spaced around these welds so that we can bring that offset in this 1,200-inch circumference well within specification. In other words, we zero it out all the way around before we put in the tack weld. These clamps have made it much PAGENO="0780" 776 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION easier to get these welds without that offset I mentioned earlier.. That's working out well. We found that we had just a few stations where we could do these welds, and, as we began to drift behind schedule on the first three stages, we were backing up. In other words, we were being constrained by weld stations, so we actually opened up additional weld stations, and now we have more welding tooling, and more fixtures where we can do these welds, and we are getting more done in parallel. This just happened in the last month, and it's paying off. Right along with this, we have trained and certified additional shop technicians in certain of these critical jobs, like welding. In other words, we have more of the specialized man- power on stream now than we had previously. Still talking about things we are doing to preclude schedule revi- sions (slide 17): We found that the decision time was especially lengthy on those problems that involved us very heavily with Marshall Space Flight Center. Due to the distance and the communications, it was taking quite a while to get some of these major decisions. I am talking about cases where maybe a contractor had a slightly dif- ferent point of view on what should be done than the customer, so that much discussion would take place. We decided to ask the custo- mer to move more people right here to town, so we could sit down with them every day and talk over these things. The program man- ager, Colonel Yarkin, brought a staff from the labs at Huntsville, and is in residence here. We see him every day now, and it has really improved the time involved in getting decisions out on inspection and technical-type problems. We found that some of our stage-handling equipment, things we lift the stage with and climb into the stage with, that sort of thing, had not had perhaps the same attention that we had been giving the stage and the primary ground support equipment. So to tighten down WHAT IS BEING DONE TO PRECLUDE FURTHER SCHEDULE REVISIONS (CONTD) NASA RESIDENT STAFF INCREASED TO PROVIDE IMMEDIATE ACTION FOR INSPECTION & TECHNICAL REVIEW FUNCTIONS RECERTIFICATION OF ALL STAGE HANDLING EQUIPMENT, WORK PLATFORMS, ETC. TO PREVENT EQUIPMENT FAILURES ESTABLISHED MORE DETAILED WORK PLANS & `SCHEDULES (HOURLY PLANS OF CRITICAL OPERATIONS) ESTABLISHED NASA/NAA TASK TEAM FOR PROBLEM INVESTIGATION & RESOLUTION SEAL BEACH ENGINEERING & ADMINISTRATIVE FACILITY EXPANSION TO CONSOLIDATE SATURN PERSONNEL ON SITE SLIDE 17. WHAT Is BEING DONE To PRECLUDE FURTHER SCHEDULE REvIsIoNs-Oontinued PAGENO="0781" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 777 on small accidents, some of which could be traced to this handling equipment which had been built to somewhat less rigid specifications than our basic stage and GSE, we have reviewed all of that gear, how it is used, whether it's critical or not, and recertified it by proof loading as required. We X-rayed welds if that was indicated, and we have generally tightened down on the specifications of any new things we build. The object of this one is to prevent these small accidents which are so costly to schedule. It became pretty obvious that we could do a lot better if we put a lot more attention on planning-sitting down and figuring out exactly what' we're going to do before we would all rush out and start doing it. So I made this the year for more detailed planning, and I believe that's paying off. This is particularly true in the manufacturing and test world. And, while we spend a little more time before we start the job, the job goes much better after we start. This item is actually related to this other item on the chart. We did have this task team in town under Colonel Yarkin. We do sit down with him, we do take all our major problems, and we have an action item list. We discuss these and take the necessary action to get our problems resolved. Some of these actually involve interfaces with other contractors. Some of these are just local problems right here. Finally, we have been living with the S-TI program split geographically with a large number of my staff and workers-the engineering department particularly-here at Downey and at the manufacturing final assembly and part of our engineers down at Seal Beach. And, while it's not a long drive, it's 20 to 30 minutes-more like 20 now that the freeway is in-nevertheless, it's a little harder to get things done working from two major locations. So, we have a North American facility down there across the street from the basic manufacturing facility, which is NASA-owned; and we are moving down there beginning next week. By about June, I should have all my people down at Seal Beach. I'll show you a picture just for quick orientation (slide 18). Off to the right there is south, this way is north, it's east across there~ SLIDE 18. S-lI FACILITIES PAGENO="0782" 778 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION and west here. These are the North American buildings going up: administrative building, engineering building, warehouse Across Bay Boulevard is the Seal Beach manufacturing plant This is where we are accomplishing final assembly for the stage This is the build ing I was 3ust talking about-the one we're moving down to between now and June-and it will administratively make things go a lot smoother Back on my outline, I promised you a look at manpower and fund ing (slide 19). Here is our direct-labor load by location. These are equivalent personnel Under this line is the load in southern Cah fornia. We peaked out around 9,000 equivalent direct-labor person- nel, and, as you see, when we move on toward 1970, this line comes on down. We have the manufacturing work that's done at Tulsa, and here's the manpower at Tulsa; we have the testing to be done at the cape, KSC, that's this increment here, testing that's done at Missis sippi is the increment here. This is division work authorization. That is the term we use for work that goes out to other North Ameri- can divisions, such as the Los Angeles Division and Autonetics Divi- sion, and there is a considerable amount of work we call minor IDWA and major IDWA that is shown by these lines. Beginning out in here, these lines do reflect the five follow-on stages, which are not on firm contract yet, but which we do have long leadtime procurement for. The funding, these are actuals (slide 20): 7.3 million, 54, 137, 209, 251. This is the fiscal year we're in now. Our actuals were 125.5 to the end of December We are going to come out for the year at about TOTAL SATU'~N S II DIRE(1 L~('OP LOAD BY LOCATION 14000 - 12000 SLIDE 19. TOTAL SATURN S-TI DIm~cT LABOR LOAD BY LOCATION PAGENO="0783" 779 750 500 234. This is the budget we said we would make when we started in the fiscal year, and we are going to make it. The whole program totals about 1.3 billion. Finally, a projection for what we are going to accomplish in the next fiscal year (slide 21). Fabrication, checkout and delivery of the S-II's 2, 3, 4, and 5 to the cape and S-II-6 to Mississippi. We will have activated another checkout station at Seal Beach; we will have activated another stand at Mississippi; we will have completed these dynamic tests that are now going on at Marshall. We will have completed our battleship confidence improvement programs; and we have completed our qualification program. And finally, not on this chart, I'm sure we will have several successful launches. Thank you, gentlemen. Mr. CABELL. Could I raise one question? Is there any substance to the charge that some of your metal cracks and the failures were occasioned by excessive vibration on the test stand? Mr. GREER. No. We found these cracks correlate back to the way we form these panels, to the way we put these splice plates in between stringers with heavy loads on the rivet guns to the pressure cycles we give it at Seal Beach, where we proof test it-pneumostat and hydro- stat-with gas and water. There have been rio cracks that have oc- curred after we have fired a bird that wasn't there before we fired it. Mr. CABELL. Has vibration been a problem? Mr. GREER. No. We have had enough experience since the last of June when we found these cracks that we have checked stages before ACTUAL REQUIREMENTS 300 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION TOTAL SATURN S-Il PROGRAM EXPENDITURE REQUIREMENTS - INCL FEE MILLIONS OF DOLLARS LEGEND ACTUAL EXPENDED AUTHORIZED 250 ANTIC. CHGS (10) FOLLOW-ON (5) ANTIC. CHiTS (51 200 CUM REQUIREMENTS 1,500 11,250 1000 250 SLIDE 20 TOTAL SATURN S-IT PROGRAM EXPENDITURE REQUIREMENTS-INCLUDING FEE 0 PAGENO="0784" 780 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM PROJECTIONS FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1967 FABRICATION, CHECKOUT & DELIVERY OF S-II-2, -3, -4, & -5 TO KSC FABRICATION & DELIVERY OF S-II-6 TO MTF ACTIVATION OF CHECKOUT STATION IX AT SEAL BEACH ACTIVATION OF CHECKOUT A1/C1 TEST COMPLEX AT MTF COMPLETION OF DYNAMIC TESTING AT MSFC (S-~II-F/D) COMPLET ION OF BATTLESH I P CONFIDENCE IMPROVEMENT TEST PROGRAM AT SANTA SUSANA COMPLETION OF QUALIFICATION PROGRAM SLIDE 21 PROGRAM PROJECTIONS FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1967 shipment from Seal Beach. We have gone in, found the cracks, and we have made the repairs and shipped it to Mississippi. We climbed in the tank and checked again, and the shipping didn't cause addi- tional cracks. We have fired them, then we have been back in the tank now at the cape on the S-TI--i, and there were no additional cracks. It all goes back to initial handling, really, and, in some cases, to design. We had some sharp corners where we should have had some smoother radii. Mr. TEAGUE. Bob, we' saw that big shaker at Huntsville working. The whole stack was in the shaker filled with water. Bob, on your five follow-ups, tell us a little about your pi~oduction line. What are the problems there? What happens to your produc- tion line when you have to have some firm decisions? Mr. GREER. We need a full go-ahead in March. We have been liv- ing off the long leadtime procurement. DALE D. MYER5. (Slide 22) Gentlemen, I'd like to go into the CSM portion of our work here at S. & I.D. and give you a quick rundown on the status of the program. I would like to keep this very informal. If there are any questions that occur to you as I run through these slides, don't hesitate to interrupt. Be sure to question me if I use an unfamiliar acronym in my briefing, because we use these extensively in the Apollo program as part of our communication system. PAGENO="0785" 196:8 NASA AUPEORIZATION 781 The portion that I'm responsible for is the launch escape system, the command module, the service module, and the spacecraft lunar module adapter, which is the carrier for the LM (slide 23). This adapter splits back after the end of the boost into orbit to expose the LM for the command module docking. APOLLO BASIC LUNAR MISSION SLIDE 22. APOLLO BASIC LUNAR MISSION APOLLO SPACECRAFT LAUNCH ESCAPE SYSTEI BOOST PROTECTIVE COVER COMMAND MODULE SERVICE MODULE LUNAR EXCURSION MODULE `INSTRUMENT UNIT B SLIDE 23. APOLLO SPACECRAFT 76265 O67~ipt. Z-50 PAGENO="0786" 782 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION Just a brief feeling of the size of the spacecraft (slide 24): The command module is about 12 feet high and about 13 feet across at the widest place-down in the heat shield area. The service module looks like this with the engine bell (slide 25). However, you don't see the bell in building 290 since it is left off until we go to Florida. We actually check out the spacecraft engine actuation with a little adapter that hooks onto this frame. With the engine bell, the total service module is about 24 feet high and matches the 13-foot diameter at the base of the command module. Now, giving you a little more depth in the areas that we have here in the division (slide 26), the command module is built here, and the service module is built here. However, some of the structure of the service module is built at our Tulsa facility. The launch escape system and the boost protective cover that goes over the command module for boost are built here. This is the spacecraft. lunar module adapter; it is built at our Tulsa facility and is carried to Florida in the superguppy. Some of our early SLA's were flown to Florida, a helicopter dragged them through the air-quite an operation. Fortun~tely, we have the superguppy now for transport. Ground support equipment for support of all these activities, spare parts, the trainers, and the management of subcontractors that we have in large quantities constitute the balance of our responsibilities in the program. Of course, facility and test site activation down at Florida, where we do much of the ground support equipment installation, is also a major task. In some cases, the cases where equipment can be common to the Grumman LM, we supply GSE to support t.hat pro- gram too. COMMAND MODULE EXTERIOR DIMENSIONS & DETAILS TENSION TIE DOCKING MECHANISM BOOST COVER FWD PITCH ENGINES 2 FT 7 IN. 0 Li-" \_L~ 1 FT 11 IN. O/~ ~/\~4BFT4IN. \ \ ~F~11 IN. ENGINES - I~T~~PITCH ENGINES PLACES) URINE \ \ (TYP 2 PLACES) I `LES TOWER AM \ AIR VENT (IN BOOST COVER) CREW ACCESS HATCH' LEG WELL STE ROLL ENGINES (TYP 2 PLACES) RENDEZVOUS VENT WINDOW 0 FWD HEAT SHIELD (TYP 2 PLACES) ®CREW COMPT HEAT SHIELD ®AFT COMPT HEAT SHIELD SLIDE 24. COMMAND MODULE EXTERIOR DIMENSIONS AND DETAILS ci PAGENO="0787" SLIDE 25. SERvICE MODULE EXTERIOR DIMENSIONS AND DETAILS APOLLO SPACECRAFT S&ID RESPONSIBILITIES COMMAND SERVICE LAUNCH SPACECRAFT MODULE MODULE ESCAPE LUNAR MODULE SUBSYSTEM ADAPTER 1968 NASA A1JTHORIZATION 783 SERVICE MODULE EXTERIOR DIMENSIONS & DETAILS DOCKING LIGHT FLY AWAY UMBILICAL -- - BAIL `GREEN DOCKING LIGHT 1 FT 11 IN. 12 FT 10 IN. SECTOR - RUMOVAILE PALLET SECTOE II suvicE PROPULSION SYSTEM SECTOR III J OXIDIZER TANKS SECTOR IV - OXYOEN TANKS,NYDROOEN TANKS & EPS FUEL CELLS SECTOR V SERVICE PROPULSION SYSTEM SECTOR VI J FUEL TANKS CENTER SECTION.UERVICF PROPULSION SYSTEM HELIUM TANKS GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT SPARES MAJOR SUBS TRAINERS FACILITIES INTERFACE WITH ASSOCIATE CONTRACTORS (GUIDANCE & NAVIGATION, ACCEPTANCE CHECKOUT EQUIPMENT, LUNAR EXCURSION MODULE, ETC.) TEST SITE ACTIVATION SLIDE 26. A~oi~o SPACECRAFT S. & I.D. RESPONSIBILITIES PAGENO="0788" 784 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Distribution of costs in the program is shown here (slide 27). Through November of 1966, we have about 50 percent of our dollars going outside North American Aviation. We have a large percent- age here at S. & I.D., Downey, and some pieces at Tulsa and other divisions of North American. Some of the more complex electronic assemblies, for example, are done by the Autonetics Division. J~aunr L. PErrIs. May I ask a question about that? Mr. MYERs. Yes, sir. Mr. PErrIS. Would a further breakdown of major and minor sub- contracts show about the same as yours in labor? Mr. MYERS. As you go down through the tiers beyond us? Mr. PETTIS. Yes. Mr. MYERS. Yes; in major subcontractors like Minneapolis-Honey- well and Collins it does. If I can move to the next chart, I can show APOLLO PROGRAM DISTRIBUTION OF EFFORT (THRU NOV 1966) ID 2% OTHER COST 2.4% OTHER NAA DI~ SLIDE 27. APOLLO PROGRAM DISTRIBUTION OF EFFORT-THROUGH NOVEMBER 1966 PAGENO="0789" 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION 785 YOU some of the larger subcontract activities (slide 28). Honeywell, for example, the last time I saw their activity, was about 40 percent subcontracted below them. So, in that sense, the breakdown stays fairly much in the same pattern. I think the nature of the command module tends to break into these fairly heavy subcontracts and tiers of subcontractors below, as opposed to the boosters where there is so much basic fabrication involving a single contractor. Here are `the big ones for us: Honeywell, for stabilization and con- trol of the spacecraft; Aerojet-General for the engine that brings us back from the moon, This is the service propulsion system engine, 22,000 pounds thrust, that's the bell that you see on the back of the service module. Collins supplies all the radio communications and data equipment for us. Other elements of the program: cryogenics storage, built by Beech in Colorado; AiResearch, over here at the Gar- rett Corp., builds our environmental control system; Northrop does the parachutes for us; Pratt & Whitney the fuel cells, and so on in these smaller groups. These have been the big ones, and these are the ones that we have the very special management system for within the division. We call it designated subsystem program management. Reporting to me, they do technical and funding management of these major subcontractors. We also have a lot of what we call associate contractors (slide 29). They are not subcontractors to us, but are primes to the NASA, and we have many pieces that fit together with other pieces supplied by these people. For example, MIT does the guidance and navigation equipment technical management; AC Elec- tronics actually builds the guidance and navigation equipment, and we APOLLO MAJOR SUBCONTRACTORS AEROJET-GENERAL SPS ENGINE TOTAL $584.3M BASIC PROGRAM EXPENDITURES THRU NOV 1966 SLIDE 28. APOLLO MAJOR SUBCONTRACTORS PAGENO="0790" 786 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION APOLLO ASSOCIATE CONTRACTORS MIT GUI D & NAV EQUIP TECH MGMT ACELECTRONICS GUID&NAV EQUIP. -MFG CHRYSLER S-I BOEING S IC NAAS&ID S-Il DOUGLAS S-IV&S-IVB GENERAL ELECTRIC ACCEPTANCE CHECKOUT EQUI P GRUMMAN LUNAR MODULE HAMI LTON STANDARD SPACESUIT & PORTABLE EQUIP SLIDE 29. APOLLO ASSOCIATE CONTRACTORS rnstall that equipment in our spacecraft So, they are not subcon tractors to us, but we still have to have the right connections to tie all this stuff together. There is quite a management job in working with these other companies to develop what we call interface control documents which define exactly, to every little bit and piece, how these things all fit together, both technically in their performance and also physically. Mr Ti~aaui~ How do you coordinate that ~ Mr. M~rr~s. We have interface meetings, as we call them, where we define with them all the interactions that occur with the spacecraft and the lunar module Grumman is really one of the lesser problems in our coordination The kinds of things we deal with, for example, would be in the docking probe to be sure all the meshes and mecha nisms are right We build a piece called the drogue, that is shipped to Grumman to install in their module, which provides the docking interface directly with us In addition to that, we have to define the loads, the inertial loads, for example, as we dock, so their structure is built to properly match ours Wire runs between us are worked out in these interface meetings, and all this is approved by NASA They sit in on the meetings with us, or we have summaiy meetings where we finally settle these interface problems It has worked out quite well with our interface with Grumman Actually, we have had more prob lems in the areas of guidance and navigation because their wires sort of run like veins through the spacecraft, and there have been much more detailed technical interfaces there It has taken more effort with the guidance and navigation equipment than it has with the lunar module. PAGENO="0791" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 787 To give you an idea of the things that have been accomplished in 1966, I have put down what I considered some of the highlights (slide 30). In January, we had our final water impact test for Spacecraft 007, which is structurally the same as our spacecraft and is dropped from our tower out here into a big pool to give worst-case landing conditions of the spacecraft in water. From White Sands we shot Spacecraft 002, also a spacecraft structure, in what we call the tumbling-abort test, where we simulate breakup of the booster and pulling away of the command module from the booster in a tumbling mode, which snaps the chutes out in that condition. It's a. worst-case abort and we tested it in January. In February, we had Spacecraft .009's mission. I have a chart on that I'd like to show you later. In March, 004A's thermal structural tests were completed. We heated the outside of the command module t.o simulate the reentry conditions. Spacecraft Oil's qualification tests were completed. We call it certification testing. Actually, it's a qualification program where we conduct tests under the worst conditions that we expect to occur to the equipment under vibrating conditions atmospheric conditions, humid- ity, radio interference, and so on. This is to be sure, essentially, that we have designed the equipment with the factor of safety with respect to all the conditions that it can meet in flight. We call that a certifica- APOLLO HI-LITES 1966 JAN 2ND (Fl NAL) Sc 007 WATER IMPACT TEST SC 002 TUMBLING ABORT TEST FEB Sc 009 MISSION ACCOMPLISHED MAR . SC 004A THERMAL STRUCTURAL TESTS COMPLETED APR SC 011 CERTIFICATION TESTING COMPLETED 14-DAY MANNED ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SUB SYSTEM BREADBOARD TEST COMPLETED JUN Sc 004 STRUCTURAL TESTI NG COMPLETED SERVICE PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM STANDPIPE FIX VERIFIED ON SC 001 AUG CM-004A STRUCTURAL TESTING COMPLETED SC 008 THERMAL-VACUUM TESTS (NO. 1 & 2) AT MSC SC Oil MISSION ACCOMPLISHED SEP SC 011 TESTING AT WSTF COMPLETED SC 012 DESIGN CERTIFICATION REVIEW SC 007 FLOTATION TEST AT MSC SLIDE 30. APOLLo HIGHLIGHTS PAGENO="0792" 788 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION tion test plan. That was completed for Spacecraft 011 in April. The 14-day manned environmental control test on a breadboard here at Downey was completed in April. Our structural testing was com- pleted in June. We had a problem on Spacecraft 009 in flight that had never shown up in any of our ground testing. It was associated with not only zero-G environment, but with the combination of zero-G environment and thrusting of the service module. We found this from our flight data. We had completed our testing at White Sands in April, had to make correction, and retest the fix, as shown, in June. In August, we completed our command module static tests; Space- craft 008's thermal vacuum tests, in a large vacuum chamber at MSC Houston, were completed; and Spacecraft Oil's mission was accom- plished. In September, we had the completion of our service propulsion sys- tem testing at White Sands. Spacecraft 012 had the design certifica- tion review, in which we reviewed all of the design criteria and sys- tems, with Dr. Mueller and the various NASA program and technical people, and had one last look at the design elements of the system prior to the certification that the spacecraft was ready to go. Spacecraft 007 flotation tests at MSC, where the astronauts par- ticipated in egress and recovery operations, were completed in Sep- tember. In October, we moved into our block II parachute qualification drops at El Centro (slide 31). We had our first 750-second block II APOLLO HI-LITES (CONTINUED) 1966' OCT FIRST BLOCK II PARACHUTE QUAL DROP AT EL CENTRO 750-SEC BLOCK II SERVICE PROPUlSION SUBSYS1EM FIRING AT ARNOLD ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT CENTER SC 008 THERMAL-VACUUM R[l[ST (NO. 3) AT MSC NOV FIRST 2S-1 WATER IMPACT TEST DEC FINAL 2S 1 WATER IMPACT TEST [UN/N M/PPI NO 0 SURVEY SD E;SYN i EM P~ I IN N/NY DESIGN REVIEW 1937 JAN SC 017/AS 501 TESTS CONU L~$~U Al KSC co:~PLE1E{) CLOCK II EAR:N LANDING SYS1EM QUILIFICAHC1N DROPS - EL CENTNO SLIDE 31. APOLLO HIGHLIGHTS PAGENO="0793" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 789 service propulsion subsystem firing in an altitude chamber back at the Arnold Engineering Development Center, and this is, by the way, about a factor of almost 2 over the longest running of the, engine which we would require in a lunar-return operation. So, we satis- fied ourselves that we have a topnotch service propulsion system en- gine. Spacecraft 008's thermal vacuum retest No.3 was completed at MSC. rrhis is a condition where we operate in a vacuum chamber with the spacecraft operating as it would in flight. In November, we had our first block II water impact tests and completed that program in De- cember. We have brought in the lunar mapping and survey subsys- tem as an element of additional equipment in the Apollo program, and in December we held a preliminary design definition with the NASA. In January, Spacecraft 017-501 mating tests were completed at KSC, and we completed our block II earth landing system qualifica- tion drops at El Centro. rrhat~s the test program where a C-133 drops a boilerplate version of our spacecraft to verify the parachute opera- tion. I am going to talk about the program schedules. These schedules have not been adjusted for the impact of Spacecraft 012 (slide 32). `fhe schedule effects of the considerations of the NASA board can't be included here because their considerations are not completed. * APOLLO CSM PROGRAM I MPACT OF Sc oi~ I S NOT REFLECTED I N PROGRAM PLANS PENDING NASA 204 BOARD CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS SLIDE 32. APOLLO COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES PROGRAM PAGENO="0794" 790 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Based upon their conclusions and recommendations., we will be review- ing these schedules to see what, if any, impact there will be. Mr TEAGUE Will you hold up, because of not knowing what is the impact on the program ~ Mr. MYERS. Right now, nothing is being held up. We are moving as if there were no changes to be accomplished, and that seems the better part of valor at the moment because we don't really know what the impact will be We have no idea whether there will be a large or small impact If it's some small thing we can find, it may have no impact. If it is a larger design change, of course, then we will have to look back across the program to see what will slow down or stop in place or what will take care of this. Since the board had not reached any conclusions on that, we felt, with the NASA, that it was best to just keep things moving as they are right now. And now the overall picture of where we stand in the program at this time (slide 38). We have actually gone through many of the conceptual and design definition phases of the progiam, and most elements of the program now have been proven in one series of tests or another. You can see that early in the program we put a lot of emphasis on the land and water impact and the parachute system-the things we could get on with as components in development We then began to get to the place where we had to go through transonic aborts in tests down at White Sands (our launch abort operations where we are simulating conditions of loss of either the booster or other elements of launch operation). Here we tested, for the first time, all of the systems together in what we call the house spacecraft. Then we went APOLLO PROGRAM SLIDE 33. APOLLO PROGRAM MASTER DEVELOPMENT SCHEDULE NO. 9 REV 3 SPACECRAFT DESIGN BLOCK 1 BLOCK~I3 I LAND & WATER rPARACHUTE PARACHUTE RECOVERY IMPACT BP~~ RECOVERY (BLK I) BP19 (BLK II) BP 6B EARTH RECOVERY I PAD A~ORT BP6-1 rTRANSONIC POWER-ON TUMBLING ABORT SC 002 ~ ABORT BP1 2 THERMAL VACUUM SC 008 LAUNCH ABORT I I BLK II PROPULSION TESTS F-2A HOUSE SC NO. 1 BP14 UPROPUL~ON ~ ~BLK II - THERMAL VACUUM INTEGRATED SYSTEMS TEST MICROMETEOROID EXPERIMENT BPI6 LAUNCH ENVIR BP 13 I till ~ I - LM PROPULSION SLA 7 CIRCULAR SATURN I ~REENTRY [~IST POSSIBLE MANNED SC L~ATURN I-B LAUNC~j7 ELUNAR MISSION HEATSHIELD PROOF SC 017 CSM/LM I SC 104 ~/4 I~102~ -- I EIISATURN V LAUN~~ii1 PAGENO="0795" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 791 through propulsion tests down at White Sands, and these integrated system tests, like the thermal-vacuum test here, and then the block II propulsion tests at White Sands. We went through launch environments where we determined the vibration environment and the "G" effects of the launch in the Saturn I launching; supported the micrometeoroid experiments with Boiler- plate 16; went into our first of the real spacecraft flights here in Feb- ruary on Spacecraft 009; and had our Spacecraft 011 launch in August, which was a three-quarter Earth orbit flight. Then, we move to the position where we're getting ready for the first possible manned spacecraft flight for Spacecraft 101. These are all Saturn I-B launches, and down at the cape now we are getting ready for the first of the Saturn V launches with the unmanned flight of Space- craft 017. That should be accomplished in the second quarter of this year. That flight, by the way, will be a flight which will reenter with lunar reentry velocities. It will be the first opportunity we have to actually match lunar reentry velocities of 36,000 feet per second on reentry to test our heat shield. As far as program schedules are concerned, this is the status of the program at the moment (slide 34). Spacecraft 017 is down at the cape. It is just now being destacked from its mechanical fit with the Saturn V booster. We have some testing to do back at what we call the MSOB, the manned spacecraft operations building. Then we go back ontG the stack with the Saturn S-TI that's moving into position for this launch here in the second quarter. GROUND & FLIGHT TEST SCHEDULE ~ i~i~ ]2~'~i~ ~ E ____ Sc AS SOS) ~RCIRAJlA* 200052 _________ SCOOS (AS SOS). SUPOOC)RCULAR REENTRY ~ BLOCK I __L_}__f__ BPNJCMFONP ACAUT005COSERY BLOCK II F.SALOPULS(ONLSYFUYURI I :::~~:,. ~IEES00IT SC4CMFON4O(NG1OS(5~ ___ - = c - - - ~ = SC10(AS.200SPAcECRAFTN(~S)00 = = ±3 001 ~MTORWAYO~IMPACT+ C = 052 SIATcSTRUCTURAUTOSTSI - ~ scIoTisSoS SJCICRNTTMILON ..., ~ T~ ~ 5.0L5100 SJCECRAFT NSS)000 L ~ 5~00L5505 SPIcECRAFTMSS)ON I 3 COO~SPAcOCRNFTL)SSION c : i SCIORLcECRAflL)SSION ~ : : * SCIO)SPScECRAFLISS)ON r : : , . 3 * SCISOLAcECNAO)RISSION : : * SCIOR'SPAcECROF)NISSICN I : = ~ SCI11SPAG0CRAF~MISSICN C ~ SCI12'SPAc0CRAF~M)S5)OSO lYU~)J' ,o~ SLIDE 34. GROUND AND FLIGHT TEST SCHEDULE PAGENO="0796" 792 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Spacecraft 020 is still here at Downey. You saw it out in building 290, and it will be shipped in about March to the field. Our Boiler- plate 6-B parachute recovery test program is complete. Our propul- sion test fixture at White Sands is moving along on schedule for the support of the program. Spacecraft 00Th. is a modification. We have added the Block II configuration changes, and it will be shipped to Houston for post- landing tests there. Then we come to our vacuum-test model. This is a spacecraft which has essentially a flight spacecraft capability. It has a couple of things left out of it; we left out the cryotanks because we don't use them in the vacuum chamber at Houston. That is going to be moving down to Houston in the next month for exten- sive chamber tests in their large chamber down there. Spacecraft 101, which is the first manned spacecraft capability, is in building 290 going through its last part of checkout. It's about 2 weeks down on schedule. There have been some directions from the customer that have added work activity to it, and we have had some problems in the details of getting parts to support the manufacture of that ship. As we move on down the schedule, you can see all ships beyond this are on schedule within our manufacturing operation. Mr. Pi~rris. Mr. Chairman, may I ask what you mean when you say "customer"? MF.MYERS. NASA. Mr. PETTI5. NASA is the customer? Mr. MYERS. Yes. There are bits and pieces that come in as a direc- tion from NASA that affect the spacecraft configuration and leave us open to negotiation of schedule impacts. They are generally, as you can see, quite detailed things. We are not having large changes. Mr. PETrI5. This leads to one other question, if I may, Mr. Chair- man? Mr. TEAGUE. Go right ahead. Mr. PETTIS. Then, when you have a simulated test or a test of one kind or another at the cape, it's the customer who calls for that test rather than you or someone else? Mr. MYERS. Right. We work out the details of the test plan and the detailed procedures to be accomplished to meet an overall objective that NASA has. Mr. TEAGUE. It's a cooperative effort, is it not? Mr. MYERS. You bet. We work together on these things. In fact, it starts very early in the program in the definition of all the different types of tests that involve suppliers tests of their parts, then our tests of those parts in assembly, then the tests in the spacecraft- first, as individual systems tests, then as integrated tests, where we play them all together. We go through planning that involves sort of a trade-off with NASA-is it better to do a particula.r test here or in Florida. All that coordination activity is going on in a continuous operation. Then, when we get to Flori~1a, what we call operational checkout procedures are written by us to meet these overall plans that have previously been worked out between us and NASA. So it's very much an integrated activity. Of course, they are the customer, they are the guys in charge, and if they direct us to make a change in a PAGENO="0797" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 793 different way, why, we either go along with them, or I take it on up through Joe Shea, and we reach a conclusion that is satisfactory to both parties. The other major element of hardware that's involved-the space- craft lunar module adapter (SLA)--is built at our Tulsa facility. They have been on schedule throughout the program and are con- tinuing to meet schedule (slide 35). This qualification program is something that we track almost daily (slide 36). This is one of the key elements of the program, for with- out qualified parts you are always in a position that next week some test may fail which will require a change back in the spacecraft. So we press very hard on these qualifications, and we have pressed to meet qualification at a time prior to delivery of the spacecraft. That is our goal and our objective in the program. We don't always meet this because, as you see in some of our problem areas that we have had in the program this year, there are things that do cause trouble and do need correction and~ requalification before we can actually fly. ROBERT F. FREITAG. Dale, can you mention the difference between block I and block II ~ I don't think you mentioned that. Mr. MYERS. I'm sorry, I had planned that to be in the first chart that I had. The basic change between block I and block II is the docking capability. What happened is that when the program began there were decisions yet to be made concerning the mode of operation to make the lunar landing. So, we went ahead with the early defini- SLA#IO(SC 101) SLAI14(SC 1~) 010,11)1c 108) SLIDE 35. SPAOECRAFT LUNAR MODULE ADAPTER PAGENO="0798" 794 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION SC 012 - 268 CTR'S - SCO11 BLOCK I 261 CTR'S COMPLETIONS sc 009 293 CTRS - COMPLETION~~,.'~1'~ JJFJMIAIMIJIJIAIS IOINT6 1965 J JFJMIAJ~] JIAISIOI~T~b~I JIFIMIAIMTJ 1966 I 1967 SLIDE 36. QUALIFIcATIoN STATUS tion of the Apollo. When the lunar module came into the program, there was a requirement to change the top of the spacecraft to in- clude a docking mechanism so the LM could dock with the command module. At that time, there was also additional identification of some of the environments of space that had come out of the Mercury and Gemini programs; so, there were other changes that were com- ing into the program at that time, and we felt we ought to group those changes, make the docking change, and include some of the elements that had come out of the Gemini and Mercury programs We. called it the block II configuration and defined what we had been building as block I. Detailed changes in panel configuration, light- ing of the panels, and some weight saving in the service module all came in and were defined as block II configuration. As you can see, the block I qualification is essentially completed. We have two items yet to complete in support of spacecraft 017 and 020. They are special items that weren't needed in these earlier spacecraft, so they had been planned out beyond 012 certification completion. In the block II program, we are moving up just about on schedule- a plan that we had set up about a year ago. We're about 2 weeks behind in our qualification of block II, and we put a tremendous amount of our management effort into trying to complete this qualifi- cation prior to delivery of that spacecraft. It looks like we're going to do it. 1000 -~ QUALIFICATION STATUS 900 800 0 I- 0 I.) U 0' z 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 ~.854 I 25 `Ill PAGENO="0799" 1968 NASA AUTHOEIZATION 795 The big payoff came in these flights. Spacecraft 009 was launched in February (slide 37). It was a fairly complex mission for the first unmanned mission in the program. We went through boost and separation at about 10 minutes; we separated the command and service modules from the spacecraft LM adapter here in about 14 minutes. We use many of the systems of the spacecraft for that separation. We then went through a realignment of the spacecraft for a first burn, which lasted 180 seconds, on our service propulsion system. We stopped it, had a restart for 10 seconds, did a turnaround and separa- tion, reentry, parachutes out, and landing. The major problem that we had in it was this helium ingestion problem in the service pro- pulsion system, and I think that's interesting in itself. There was an ingestion of helium into the engine which changed the mixture ratio and changed the thrust of the engine. It didn't give us any safety problems on the flight; however, it did make the thrust of the engine uneven, so we changed the standpipe to eliminate that helium ingestion for the flight of spacecraft 011 and subsequent vehicles. Mr. TEAGiJE. Dale, did these objects come out of 009? Mr. MYERS. Yes, those are pieces of 009's heat shield. As you can see, they aren't very heavily burned. The reentry velocities on 009 and 011 were up in the 29,000 feet-per-second range. We drive back in with the service module to increase the velocity higher than the normal reentry of an earth-orbiting satellite, but we don't get up to the lunar reentry velocities of 36,000 feet per second, so the heat shield doesn't really get burned too badly from these. flights with the Saturn I-B. APOLLO SATURN 201 MISSION (SPACECRAFT 009) +18..2MIN?~ t~ SLIDE 37. APOLLO SATURN 201 MISsION-SPACECRAFT 009 PAGENO="0800" 796 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Spacecraft 011 was an even more complicated mission (slide 38). We had four service propulsion system burns. We had tests of our reaction control system during this flight. This was a three-quarter earth-orbit flight and used many of the elements of the ground track- ing network that will be used in the Apollo program. That flight was essentially 100 percent successful. I think the only anomaly in it was an argument we ended up with finally, on whether the ground system or the spacecraft system was causing some decrease in the power output of an antenna system on reentry. But it was a highly successful flight. Mr. PErrIs. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt there on a question not related to this exactly? Do we use nationals of other countries in these tracking stations as employees, or are they all American? Mr. TEAGUE. Yes; many. Jerry, I think when I was in Australia, we had five Americans down there and I don't know how many thousand British and Australians. In Madrid just as soon as they can they will turn it over to nationals. We put the minimum number of Americans in tracking stations. Right, Bob? Mr. FREITAG. That's right, sir. And they have access to informa- tion. Mr. TEAGUE. Carnarvon, as I remember, was mostly British. Mr. MYERS. Here is a list of what I call problems and solutions in 1966 (slide 39). They deal with the kinds of things we have run into during the development program and as we have moved toward com- pletion of the major problems in the program. You will find that z I- -J 0 uJ 0 Lu 0 I- -I APOLLO SATURN 202 MISSION (SPACECRAFT 011) SLIDE 38. APOLLO SATURN 202 MISSION-SPACECRAFT 011 PAGENO="0801" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 797 1966 TECHNICAL PR~BLEM & SOLUTION SUMMARY PROBLEM SOLUTION ZERO-G WATER GLYCOL EVAPORATOR REDESIGN OF WICKS, WETNESS SENSOR OPERATIONS & CONTROLS (BLOCK II) CONTAMINATION OF ECU REDESIGN OF DISTRIBUTION PLATE & DISTRIBUTION PLATE FILTER (BLOCK hA) TITANIUM-N2O4 INCOMPATIBILITY GREEN N2O4 (ADDITION OF 0.4 TO 0.8% NITRIC OXIDE) SERVICE PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM REDESIGN OF STANDPIPE HELIUM INGESTION (SP-009 MISSION) ASTRO-SEXTANT DOOR MECHANI SM PASSIVE ASTRO-SEXTANT THERMAL PROTECTION POTENTIAL RECONTACT OF APEX COVER ADDITION OF SEPARATION CHUTE IN APEX AFTER JETTISONING (BL I) DUAL POSITIVE EXPULSION (BL II) SERVICE MODULE REACTION CONTROL FOUR-ON-DOOR QUAD CONCEPT PVT SYSTEM PROPELLANT CAPACITY & GAGING GAGING CONCEPT ACCURACY SLIDE 39. 1966 TECHNICAL PROBLEM AND SOLUTION SUMMARY some of these are not major in themselves, but caused some real scrambling on our part to catch back and not have an impact on the schedule. For example, we concluded with the NASA, after a lot of soul searching, that the water glycol evaporator in our environ- mental control system couldn't be proven to work at zero G. It would work at one G in a laboratory, and it would work upside down, but you couldn't prove it would work at zero 0. So after a lot of analyti- cal work and some studies of the possibilities of it failing in zero 0, we changed to a design which would work under any conditions of operation. We had a contamination problem in the ECU distribution plate and had to redesign the distribution plate with larger holes; this is within the ECU. Mr. CABELL. ECU? Mr. My~s. Actually, it is the environmental control unit of the overall cabin conditioning system of the spacecraft. We had a problem with titanium and nitrous oxide, an incompati- bility that caused a stress corrosion, and by adding four-tenths to eight-tenths of 1 percent of nitric oxide to the oxidizer, we got away from that problem and conclusively proved that it was a stress cor- rosion problem due to the interaction of very pure oxidizers. Mr. WIWN. Dale, what shows up? You're talking about stress cor- rosion? Mr. MYERs. This particular one was a very interesting story. We were running a life test back at the Bell Aircraft Co., who supplied these tanks, and we popped 20 tanks in a period of 2 days-a sudden rash of failures of tanks. We couldn't understand it because we had 76-265 0-67--pt. 2-51 PAGENO="0802" 798 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION tanks under pressure out here, and we ~ having any trouble. We started metallurgical studies, and all the guys started to look through the data, going back through what we call traceability of our equipment. To make a long story short, there had been a change in specification of the oxidizer by the Air Force for the Titan II pro gram, and they were the suppliers of this oxidizer They didn't have any trouble with this change, but it turned out that the alloy that we used was incompatible with this much purer oxidizer And by changing back to the old spec, we were back in business again So what happened was they had sent the first of this new oxidizer to the Bell Co., while we still had a storage tank of the old oxidizer here. We couldn't break our tanks, but they were breaking every time they put in a tank there, so we got the spec changed. I have already talked of the helium ingestion problem. In the astro sextant door mechanism, we were having trouble with the mech anism itself. We went to a passive thermal protection of that door, which we tested on Spacecraft 011, it was very successful Another problem was potential recontact of the apex cover. The top of the command module pops off when you are getting the para chutes out, and the aerodynamic wake of the command module tends to bring that apex cover back down and recontact. We changed to a separation chute in the apex to pull that cover off, and it. was tested on Spacecraft 011. On block II, because the docking mechanism is up there, we can't use the parachute, so we have gone to a dual-posi- tive expulsion system that pops the top apex cover off at greater ve~ locity than the single expulsion system. Service module reaction control syst.em propellant capacity and gag- ing accuracy were problems in the program There was a radiation source in the gaging system which looked like it might get us into a problem later in the scientific experiments, so we changed to a system that actually had come out of the Gemini program. That was a much simpler system. In the earth landing subsystem (slide 40), we had a test out at El Centro on what we call a boilerplate vehicle We had a tear in the 1966 TECHNICAL PROBLEM & SOLUTION SUMMARY PROBLEM SOLUTION EARTH LANDING SUBSYSTEM MAIN REINFORCING TAPES AROUND CANOPY CHUTE FAILURE TITANIUM ALCOHOL INCOMPATIBILITY REASSI GNMENTS OF SERVICE PROPULS ION SYSTEM TANKS NOT EXPOSED TO ALCOHOL, DELETE USE OF METHYL ALCOHOL IN PROCESSES BLOCK II SERVICE PROPULSION SUB MOD INJECTOR TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL SYSTEM ENGINE POPPING & STABILITY PORTS & COUNTERBORING SLIDE 40 1966 TECHNICAL PROBLEM AND SOLUTION SUMMARY PAGENO="0803" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 799 chutes, and, in about a 2-week period, Northrop put some additional reinforcing tapes around the canopy; we have since qualified that parachute. The titanium alcohol incompatibility required realignment of serv- ice propulsion system tanks, so as not to expose them to alcohol, and deletion of the use of methyl alcohol in all processes. In the Block II service propulsion subsystem, we had an engine popping problem and a dynamic instability problem earlier in the program. Through some reshaping and actually some very good analytical work by Aerojet, we were able to completely eliminate that. I think we have the most stable engine in the business right now. New things we are getting into (slide 41) : There is much greater emphasis in extravehicular activities now. As a result of the late flight of Gemini, there was a lot learned about the problems of man in space. We're in the process of some design changes with the NASA, soaking up these things that have been learned so recently in the Gemini program. We have been through one preliminary design review with NASA, and we are moving into some detailed design changes of the vehicle for handholds and foot constraints for the astro- naut on the outside of the command module. Mr. WINN. Say that again. Mr. MYERS. These guys have trouble when they're outside the command module trying to get a purchase on something to accom- plish whatever they are going to try to do. RECENT PROBLEM & SOLUTION SUMMARY PROBLEM SOLUTION DESIGN PROVISIONS FOR EXTRA IN PROCESS - PRELIMINARY DESIGN VEHICULAR ACTIVITY REVIEW JAN 31, 1967 SUSTAINING ENGINEERING CENTRAL RESEARCH, ENGINEERING, AND TEST SUPPORTS IN HOUSE NEEDS, SUB- CONTRACTOR ENGINEERING SUPPORT LEVELS TO APOLLO EXTREMELY REDUCED DALMO VICTOR DEEP SPACE ANTENNA CLOSE SURVEILLANCE BY NAA AND DALMO VICTOR MANAGEMENT ON QUALIFICATION TEST COMPLETION AIRESEARCH COMPONENTS COMPONENTS WHICH FAILED QUALIFI- CATION TEST HAVE BEEN MODIFIED OR REDESIGNED BEECH TANK QUAL MINIMIZE HEAT LEAKAGE BY USING VAC- ION PUMP FOR MAINTAINING VACUUM BETWEEN TANK SHELLS SLIDE 41. RECENT PROBLEM AND SOLUTION SUMMARY PAGENO="0804" 800 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Mr. WINN. To do the tests and the work? Mr. MYERS. Yes. If they are going to do any work outside of the command module, they tend to twist a wrench and they torque off the other way. So the kind of thing we are geUing into is getting good handholds so a man can grip something. The most recent one-they actually tested it on Gemini 12-is a couple of foot stirrups that you put your feet into, and, by twisting this way, they lock in position. So a guy is out there with good purchase with his feet so that he can do something like get the hatch out of the way or whatever. That's a very recent innovation, I guess that's the way to put it, to aid the guy when he is outside the command module. So these ideas from late flights of Gemini are now coming into the Apollo program. Mr. WINN. Prior to this, they had to hold on with one hand and work with one hand? Mr. MYERS. Or they tried gripping their legs over the front of the Gemini, and they had some real problems trying to work in space. This recent work that NASA has done in a water tank, where they tested these things before they went out with Gemini 11, proved a lots of things that helped the guys in the definition of work in space:. Mr. PETTIS. About this new material we saw down in Huntsville last weekend, it's sticky-does that work well outside? Mr. MYERS. Velcro. Mr. PETTIS. Velcro? Mr. MYERS. Yes. They have used it on the outside. They actually used some steel Velcro on the outside of the command module. This is because of the heat problem during the boost. Inside we have had Velcro, which is sticky nylon material, for attaching things to the side of the spacecraft when they are. not using them. But there is some yet to be learned about this problem of extravehicular activity and we need it in an emergency situation. If there is trouble with the LM as far as docking is concerned, the men come outside the LM and across to the command module for return to earth. So we do need extravehicular activity even on the main line of the job of getting to the Moon. Some of these changes will come in here as we learn more about extravehicular activity. I'm going to show you a chart on our manpower shortly here, and we talk of an area called sustaining engineering. In the absence of continuing development activity for Apollo, you would normally say fine, get rid of the engineers, and we'll just run a production program. But it isn't that simple. We are going to be in the position when we go on lunar flights that we need top technical people here and at MSC who really understand these systems so they can communicate, while the guys are on the lunar flight, concerning any anomalies that show up during the flight. So we have looked into a thing we call sustain- ing engineering. It may be a poor choice of words. What we are looking for here are substantial and challenging programs that can hold top technical people, as required, in certain companies to sup- port, from a subcontractor's standpoint, their equipment. We have concluded here at North American that our central research and en- gineering activity under John McCarthy, and the various test activi- ties we have in-house, indicate that we don't need a basic sustaining engineering program. I guess we are betting on the thought that PAGENO="0805" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 801 there will be other programs and other contracts that will come so that we can pull specialists back to support our activities, if required. Some of the smaller subcontractors, however, don't have future busi- ness coming their way, so we have talked to the NASA and, in fact, made proposals now for very small special tasks that will maintain high-level skills at places like Beech and the cryogenics business, and in a couple of the other outfits, for small groups of engineering people to be available in the 1967 to 1968 time period when we go toward the lunar flights. It's not a lot of money that is involved, and it will pay off as far as keeping skills available for this activity. We're recently having a problem with our Dalmo Victor deep space antenna. We have what we call a tiger team up there in a special continuing management review with them to get their qualification tests complete in time to support the program. We have had some problems with AiResearch components, most recently in the area of a control `box for the water boiler and an oxygen regulator, and we have had continuous surveillance with them. Most recently, we had a Beech tank qualification failure. Through long-term tests, we showed that we had a migration of molecules through the outside of the titanium shell into the vacuum space. This actually decreased the vacuum within the sort of thermos bottle we have for carrying our hydrogen, and would in fact eventually lead to loss of heat pro- tection in the cryogenic tank. So we have had to add what we call a vac-ion pump. It's a vacuum-ion getter that is outside the vacuum space and pulls all the little molecules out of this vacuum area. That decision has just recently been made, because we had not recognized that as the molecules begin to fill this vacuum space there is a sudden sharp break in the increase in heat leak versus time. While it was down in the thing they call the mechanical shorting portion of the heat leak, we weren't having a problem; but it turns out these tanks, after storage for a period of about 6 months, begin to suddenly lose, very sharply, their vacuum capability. So putting this vac-ion pump on the thing, which is not a pump in itself, it's really a little electronic gadget that picks up the molecules that are in that vacuum space, we are able to sustain vacuum for a long period of time. That has caused us some rejuggling as far as getting tanks to support our pro- gram. But that work is one of the standard businesses that we have, and that's to work around these problems to support our schedules. Here is our manpower in the program (slide 42). As you can see, it's going downhill very sharply. Our engineering level is down below 2,000 now and is heading down into sort of a straight-line reduction; our total activity, including our manufacturing and support, is also in a very hard down drive right now. This has been the funding for the program up to the present time (slide 43). In fiscal year 1967, we have spent, up through December, $285 million. We have a half year to go with a lot less than half of the funding for the year because we do plan, as you saw, a very sharp reduction in manpower here as we go on through 1967. It looks like we're staying within those funds right now. There may be changes in funds required as a result of the conclusions that are reached by the board on Spacecraft 012. PAGENO="0806" 802 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION APOLLO DIRECT MANPOWER LOAD INCLUDES TULSA & OFF-SITE NAA EXC!UDES MAJOR IDWA & SUBCONTRACT 11111 111111 Ilif I -ACTUAL -- FORECAST III - - - h% ,TOTAL 1ENGINEERING ~`% - .,,. ~ c, - r ~ c- % M~ .,~ S ~ %,, ~ ~ SC ~ ~~4~S4 ~41_1"% I 113, - 14, - 15 - . - 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 SLIDE 42. APOLLO DIRECT MANPOWER LOAD-INCLUDES TULSA AND OFF-SITE NAA, EXCLUDES MAJOR IDWA AND SUBCONTRACT CSM TOTAL PROGRAM ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES INCLUDING CHANGES TOTAL ~ LEGEND 3, 100.3 ~ ACT.EXpENDED 0 - 3000 700 AUTHORIZED ANTIC .CHGS (THRU SC112) 600 FOLLOW-ON (3) ANTIC.CHGS (3) 0111111111 500- - 2000 GFY ~ - 285.9 1\ AC1 CUM EXPEND 12-31-66 EXPEND ($P~ __ ($M) 300 - - 1000 200 - 100 - GFY 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 AUTH EXP 35.1 238.9 507.2 601.2 680.6 489.6 270.9 96.8 7.5 ANTIC.CHGS(THRUSC1I2) 10.4 15.0 6.0 1.5 FOLLOW-ON (3) 46.5 60.4 25.2 ANTIC.CHGS (3) 1.5 3.0 3.0 TOTAL REQMTS 35.1 238.9 507.2 601.2 680.6 500.0 333.9 166.2 37.2 SLIDE 43. COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES TOTAL PROGRAM ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES, INCLUDING CHANGES EQUIVALENT HEADCOUNT 20,000 18,000 16,000 14,000 12, 000 10, 000 8, 000 6,000 4,000 2,000 0 PAGENO="0807" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 803 Just to give you a hint on what some of the subcontractors are doing, they're going downhill very dramatically, too (slide 44). Honeywell, on the stabilization control system, will complete their activity by early 1968. Collins' activities include some system tests and refurbishment out in this time period; and they spill out a little further, but they're really down in the very low level of activity, too. Mr. WINN. What is Collins-radio? Mr. MYERS. Collins is radio, Cedar Rapids, Iowa. They're an old company. They used to be in the amateur radio business back in the early 1920's. Mr. WINN. That's what I thought it was. Mr. MYERS. They now supply very high-quality communications equipment for the Air Force and have done all the radios and com- munication equipment for Mercury and Gemini. They are our sub- contractor on the communications and data system for Apollo. Mr. TEAGUE. If you get another contract for four or five of these a year, what will it do to those charts? Mr. MYERS. Well, Collins and Honeywell are both in the electronics- type business, and, to minimize costs in the program, we actually have them building ahead of our requirements. Electronics equipment can be done that way; it can be built and stored to a certain extent before it begins to age. And, in the case of Collins, for example, we had worked out a lot of detail. What happens to them, they just pick up a little bulge here which in terms of their overall business is a very small impact. For some of the little outfits, it makes a big difference. TYPICAL SUBCONTRACTOR EFFORT REDUCTIONS EQUIVALENT MANPOWER 1000 800 600 400 200 \JELL GFY 1966 GFY 1967 GFY 1968 GFY 1969 \~COLUNS~NS GFY 1966 GFY 1967 GFY 1968 GFY 1969 AVCO * HONEYWELL KEY PERSONNEL WITH 500 - SPECIALIZED TALENT DIVERTED TO OTHER GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 400 - * COLLINS GENERALLY NO PROBLEM IN AVAILABILITY OF SKILLED PERSONNEL ON 300 - SHORT NOTICE * AVCO SPECIALIZED NATURE OF HEATSHIELD PRODUONG SKILLS VERY SLOW TO SLIDE 44. TYPICAL SUBCONTRACTOR EFFORT REDUCTIONS-EQUIVALENT MANPOWER PAGENO="0808" 804 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Mr. TEAGUE. What kind of charts do you have on your own com- pany? Mr. CARROLL. I will be covering that, Mr. Chairman. Mr. MYERS. Bob will be covering that. We have worked out with each one of the major subcontractors what does happen as a function of when we really go, what happens to their manpower and their schedules on t.his. Some of the big things coming up in the next 6 months (Slide 45) Spacecraft 020 will be shipped to KSC; for 017, we expect the first Saturn V launch with 36,000-foot-per-second reentry velocity. We expect to meet. our qual-test schedules. As I said, we only have two items to go in the Block I program. In Block II, our thermal vacuum vehicle will be shipped to Houston; the water egress ship will be shipped to Houston; Spacecraft 101, the first possible manned flight vehicle, will be shipped to KSC; our static test program will be com- pleted; Spacecraft 102, the second of our manned capability vehicles, will complete its checkout and be shipped; 103 should be through its shipment; and our qualifications test for the basic lunar mission should be complete. Any questions? PROGRAM PROJECTIONS NEXT SIX MONTHS BLOCK I SC 020 COMPLETE SHI PMENT TO KSC SC 017 FIRST SATURN V LAUNCH COMPLETE QUAL TEST BLOCK II 21V-1 COMPLETE FINAL CHECKOUT & SHI PMENT SC 007A REFURBISHMENT& SHIPMENT SC 101 COMPLETE FINAL CHECKOUT & SHI PMENT 2S-2 COMPLETE COMMAND & SERVICE MODULE STRUCTURAL TEST PROGRAM AT DOWNEY SC 102 COMPLETE FINAL CHECKOUT & SHI PMENT SC 103 COMPLETE FINAL CHECKOUT & SHI PMENT COMPLETE QUAL TEST FOR BASIC LUNAR MISSION 2- 15-67 SLIDE 45. PROGRAM PROJECTIONS FOR THE NEXT 6 MONTHS PAGENO="0809" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 805 Mr. TEAGUE. Thank you, sir. Mr. CARROLL. Mr. Len Tinnan, from our advanced systems opera- tions, will now cover some of the things we have looked at downstream for Apollo Applications. Mr. PErrIs. May I ask one question? Have you changed in any major way the aerodynamics of this total craft in the last little while? Has it proved to be pretty much what you wanted to begin with? Mr. MYERS. Yes. The only thing we have to worry about in the aerodynamics of the vehicle is really the location of the center of gravity. All the wind tunnel tests we have made have proven the shape was right. By having the right location in the center of gravity, this ship gets its lift-to-drag ratio by having the center of gravity off- set. It tilts in the wind and gets lift from the aerodynamic forces on the heat shield and the rest of the ship. By having that tilt, and by rolling the ship with the reaction control system, we can maneuver it to come in. So there has always been a very sharp control of the center of gravity by the proper location of equipment in the ship, and it has worked out very nicely as far as the flights go. Mr. PETTIS. Just to look at this thing at launch, you would think the thing is really going to go out of control right off the bat. Mr. MYERS. At launch, there is a buffeting right at the edge of the command module down against the service module because of that sharp break there. That buffeting is an acoustic-forcing function normally on the service module, but we originally designed it to have a thick sandwich honeycomb structure there, and we have had no prob- lems with it. We have tested it to the acoustic conditions that we learned from these early flights that we had on Saturn I. It's in good* shape, we haven't had any problem. Mr. TEAGUE. Before you start, Len, what you are going to present, are they strictly North American ideas? Has it gotten down into NASA? L. M. TINNAN. I'm going to touch on various aspects of what we call Apollo Applications programs, as we define them at North Ameri- can. Some of these have been done in conjunction with and under contract to NASA; others have. been done under our own funding and pertain to ideas that have been suggested to the Government. I will cover both types of activities. I am actually pleased to state at the very outset, that since my last opportunity to meet with Mr. Wilson and other members of your staff during their visit here last summer, that the Apollo Applications program has improved from what we then considered to be a bleak and uncertain picture to an outlook now which is reasonably clear and meaningful. This improvement has resulted primarily from two fac- tors: First, from among the many space missions and vehicle design options that were then under consideration, the NASA and the in- dustrial contractors, like ourselves, have been able to chart a course of action that we believe to be of significant national value. Secondly, and of equal or perhaps even greater importance, is the fact that, whereas in fiscal year 196'T the funds available to support the Apollo Applications program were virtually nil, there now appears to be a high probability that within fiscal year 1968 a reasonable level of PAGENO="0810" 806 1 9 6 8 NASA ~ AUTHORIZATION funding will exist with which to initiate the program. The prime problem now, I believe, remains simply to mount and move out. As he pointed out in his budget message of just about a month ago, President Johnson indicated, and I quote here an excerpt from the message (slide 46) : We have progressed far enough that we must look beyond our original obJec tive and set our course for the more distant future Indeed we have no alter native unless we wish to abandon the manned spacecraft capability that we have created On the heels of this message came the news release and the press briefings that NASA had relative to the budget, which included an approximate $450 million request for the Apollo Applications pro gram. And as Dr. Seamans from the NASA indicated: There are a number of unique contributions with practical application opera tional capability, science and technology that we can make with this program. And in addition we can place the Nation in a position to assess on the basis of valid experimentation and experience the value and feasibility of future space flight That sets some of the background for what I am going to cover We are often asked the question, "What is the Apollo Applications program ~" (Slide 47) The inquiry is unlike that when someone asks the question "what is the Apollo program?" where we could bring forth the mental image of a particular spacecraft configuration and we think of that vehicle going to the Moon. By contrast, however, the Apollo Applications program is not a vehicle concept It is, in fact, ~ low cost program concept that is aimed at determining in `~ firm sense the character of the U S next generation space activities- whether they be manned or unmanned, whether they be planetary, lunar, or earth orbital in nature-and at the same time, maintaining "IN 1961, THIS NATION RESOLVED TO SEND A MANNED EXPEDITION TO THE MOON IN THIS DECADE. MUCH HARD WORK REMAINS AND MANY OBSTACLES MUST STILL BE OVERCOME BEFORE THAT GOAL IS MET. YET IN THE LAST FEW YEARS,WE HAVE PRO- GRESSED FAR ENOUGH THAT WE MUST NOW LOOK BEYOND OUR ORIGINAL OBJECTIVE AND SET OUR COURSE FOR THE MORE DISTANT FUTURE. INDEED, WE HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE UNLESS WE WISH TO ABANDON THE MANNED SPACE CAP ABILITY THAT WE HAVE CREATED." JANUARY 1967 BUDGET MESSAGE PRESIDENT L B JOHNSON THERE ARE UNIQUE CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRACTICAL APPLICATION OPER ATIONAL CAPABILITY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY THAT WE CAN MAKE WITH THIS PROGRAM AND IN ADDITION THAT WE CAN PLACE THE NATION IN A POSITION TO ASSESS ON THE BASIS OF VALID EXPERIMENTATION AND EXPERIENCE THE VALUE AND FEASIBILITY OF FUTURE SPACE FLIGHT AND THE INTERRELATED ROLES OF MANNED AND UNMANNED SYSTEMS IN ORDER TO GET THE BEST COST TRADE-OFF IN THE FUTURE FOR ULTIMATE OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS DR ROBERT C SEAMANS JR DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR NASA JANUARY 24~ 1967 PRESS BRIEFING ON NASA FY 68 BUDGET SLIDE 46. BUDGET MESSAGE AND PRESS BRIEFING QUOTATIONS PAGENO="0811" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 807 WHAT IS AAP? APOLLO APPLICATIONS PROGRAM IS LOW COST PROGRAM CONCEPT FOR MAINTAINING PRODUCTIVE & VIABLE POSTURE OF PERTINENT EXISTING INDUSTRIAL & GOVERNMENTAL RESOURCES --WHILE FIRMLY DETERMINING CHARACTER OF U.S. NEXT-GENERATION SPACE PROGRAMS SLIDE 47. WHAT Is AAP? the viable posture of pertinent national resources that has beeii created. Mr. TEAGUE. I certainly hope that both Houses of Congress agree with you that it's a low-cost program this year. Mr. TINNAN. We think the Apollo Applications program that has been defined to date and the plans that are being made by ourselves and other contractors in conjunction with the NASA represent a reasonable cost, a relatively low-cost program. However, I think, and the NASA has said, it does not necessarily represent the most ambitious program that could be laid out. Within the Apollo Applications program, as it is currently defined by North American Aviation, there are five major objectives (Slide 48). The first of these, related to usefulness of man in space, appears on this slide. This and all of the other objectives are aimed toward a fundamental scientific and economic payoff. As contrasted to the past, where planned activities were very heavily oriented toward the scientific contributions, we think the program as presently defined is equally or even more heavily oriented toward a national econothic payoff. In the category of usefulness of man in space, the approach is not simply to prove that man is necessary in space, but, rather, involves a series of activities in which we will try to determine in which of the subsequent space operations man is best suited. In some cases, continuous manned operations may be indicated. In other cases, he may be best suited for intermittent operation, for example, like visit~ ing an unmanned spacecraft, repairing or maintaining it as necessary, or, perhaps, gathering up film records and other data, and then bring- mg them home. Finally, it is evident that there may be other cases where the unmanned satellite fits best. Now, these can be broken down into several categories: meteorology, Earth resources, satellite communications, navigation, as indicated here. The primary interest and heavy emphasis are oriented toward PAGENO="0812" 808 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM OBJECTIVES ~.JSCIENTIFIC & ECONOMIC "PAYOFF" *USEFULNESS OF MAN IN SPACE METEOROLOGY *EXPLORE/UNDERSTAND MOTION & BEHAVIOR OF ATMOSPHERE `REDUCE IMPACT OF WEATHER ON OPERATIONS & ECONOMY EARTH RESOURCES * AGRICULTURE & FORESTRY * CROP STATUS & PRODUCTION * GEOLOGY & MINERAL * WEED CONTROL * GEOG, CARTOG & CULTURAL * CATTLE * HYDROLOGY & WATER * FLOOD CONTROL * OCEANOGRAPHY * FOREST INVENTORY SATELLITE COMMUNICATI ONS * VOICE (TELEPHONE) * TELEVISION NAVIGATION SLIDE 48. PROGRAM OBJECTIVES the Earth resources operational application: agricultural and forestry in nature, geological and mineral explorations, and the other items indicated here. In exploring these resources, both from national and international aspects, we feel that orbital vehicles-some manned, some unmanned- will eventually lead to supporting the Nation in determining factors such as crop status and production. For example, this would repre- sent an extension of some of the work that has been done in aircraft flying over small citrus areas with infrared sensors-we have been able to detect diseased orange trees. Such information would enable us, therefore, to distinguish which trees should be pulled out and re- placed by new saplings, so as to maintain the production levels. The same could be done relative to many types of crops. Further, by repetitive orbital surveys, we would be able to distin- guish good grazing areas for large cattle herds that are not otherwise visible to us on the earth's surface. And, within the broad view of repetitive orbital vehicles, we can monitor changing weather con- ditions; and we can detect, perhaps in the same vehicles, data perti- nent to flood control and forest inventory assessment. With the meteorological explorations being considered, we can try to understand the motion and behavior of the atmosphere. We may not be able to change the weather, but we can certainly try, at least within the present technology, to reduce impact of the weather on our daily operations and economy. Mr. GURNEY. When you are talking about usefulness of man in space, do you mean total space activities or manned space flights? Mr. TINNAN. I'm sorry, I don't quite understand the question. PAGENO="0813" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 809 Mr. GURNEY. The term usefulness of man in space, do you mean our total space activities like spacecraft unmanned, or are you talking about manned space flight? Mr. TINNAN. I'm talking about all of them. We are trying to determine in which of these possible operational applications we would be better off having a manned spacecraft as opposed to having an unmanned satellite; or the case where a manned spacecraft would simply be shuttle vehicle back and forth between various unmanned spacecraft. If I understand your question, sir, a combination of the two. Mr. WINN. Would you tell me what the last two things under "Satel- lite communications" are? Thank you. Mr. TINNAN. To continue with our five primary program objective categories, the first I touched on. The second relates to scientific advancement (slide 49). I believe you have and will be hearing much from the NASA along these lines, therefore, we will not try to amplify further here. PROGRAM OBJECTIVES (CONT) * SCIENTIFIC ADVANCEMENT SOLAR ASTRONOMY (1968-70 PEAK ACTIVITY) SPACE PHYSICS * X-RAY ASTRONOMY * U-V SPECTROSCOPY *ION WAKE *PARTICLES & FIELDS *R&D SUPPORT OF D.O.D. PROGRAMS *CAPABILITY FOR ECONOMICAL SPACE FLIGHT HARDWARE REUSE LONG-DURATION OBJECTIVES * MEASURE EFFECTS ON MEN & SYSTEMS *ACQUIRE OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE * LUNAR EXPLORATION UNDERSTANDING OF LUNAR SURFACE & INTERIOR PERSPECTIVE IN UNDERSTANDING SOLAR SYSTEM ESTAB ROLE OF MOON IN FUTURE SPACE OPERATIONS SLIDE 49. P1~OGRAM OBJECTIVES PAGENO="0814" 810 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION The objective is to acquire information of a purely scientific nature. The third objective relates to in-orbit research and development support of Department of Defense programs--for example, trying out operational techniques and possible hardware equipment. The fourth major objective identified is to explore what our capa- bility is for economical space flight. This relates back very heavily to the initial objective I discussed on the preceding slide. And as you will see in a few moments, our current investigations lean heavily toward the consideration of reuse of hardware from previous flight; whether we leave it in space and go back and reuse it., or whether we bring it home from space and then launch it again. We'll touch on some of the results of our work there later. In terms of long-duration objectives, as Mr. Myers pointed out earlier, we have much to learn about men in space. Men have been there 14 days, but we have yet to know the full extent of extended- duration zero-G exposure. Here I am referring to time spans out to the order of 600 to 900 days, the types of duration that would be involved with manned planetary, flights. The fifth objective, and incidentally these are not in any order of priority, the fifth category listed relates to lunar exploration. This involves getting a better understanding of the lunar surface and what is beneath the lunar surface, and trying to better understand, from our lunar explorations, the total solar system and how it evolved. And perhaps most important is to establish the role of the moon in future space operations-for example, as an astronomical observatory. Some of the primary parameters that govern the program within which we operate are based upon the common use of modules (slide 50). By this, we mean that the steps that we presently consider taking evolve from or revolve about the consideration of hardware that would be used, for example, in early earth orbital space station operations, being potentially useful in subsequent space activities, even leading to planetary activities. With this approach, we can make use of every step along the way. The use of the long-range planetary "goal" is intended simply to set some of the standards for the earlier near-earth type of operations. The use of that "goal" does not require an early decision for the long-term commitment to place a man on or near the planets in the 1980 period or later. But, in fact, each step of the program, as it is currently defined amid as we are pur- suing it with NASA, is a complete step by itself, and is one that is of major national significance. Mr. PETTIS. Mr. Chairmnami, may I ask a question? You aren't going on to this, so I'd like to go back to a previous slide. You don't have to go back to it, just the question. Relating this to manned flight o'i this earth, or airplanes, let's say, the chain is no stronger than its weak- est link. Now, somet.hing in this space capsule is weaker than the craft itself. Is there research and development going on toward the de- velopmnent of a way to maintain these weak links in the spacecraft? Take, for example, the radio, I don't know how advanced the ail is in this particular field, but ultimately some parts of this are going to go before the total hardware has gone; and in servicing this, is there thought for taking care of it so that. you don't. have to throw the whole thing away because some part. of it. wore out before the rest of it? PAGENO="0815" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 811 PROGRAM PARAMETERS s/HARD WARE * EARTH ORBIT SPACE STATION COMMONALITY r~j~s\ * LUNAR SHELTER MODULES * LUNAR ORBITING STATION * PLANETARY MISSION MODULE s/STEP-BY-STEP PROGRAM DECISIONS * ESTABLI SHMENT OF PLANETS AS "GOAL" DOES J~QI REQUIRE EARLY DECI SI ONS FOR LONG-TERM COMMITMENTS * EACH STEP COMPLETE-AND OF SIGNIFICANT NATIONAL VALUE-- BY ITSELF SLIDE 50. PROGRAM PARAMETERS Mr. TINNAN. There are two aspects to your question, I believe, and we have examined both of these extensively. One is what happens when failure occurs in orbit; that is, can we remove a failed component and replace it with a spare that we have carried along? Yes. Our studies have indicated that such can be done, and usually some tech- nical debate occurs on whether the "spare" should be built in so that the man simply throws a switch from the bad unit to the good one, or whether he should physically remove the failed unit and put the new one that's carried as a spare in it~ place. Our analyses have shown that both approaches are possible. In fact, some previous studies which we reported on to your committee previously have indicated that the Apollo spacecraft is nominally defined as a 14-day mission vehicle. In fact, we don't know how to design the equipment for just 14 days. We qualify it for 14-day missions, we believe it is good for many more days. Our early estimates were that the spacecraft could operate for `well over a month without failure of many of the sys- tems. In summary, the answer to your question is that the best solu- tion is a function of the mission duration that you expect. Mr. CARROLL. And you carry the expendables on board? Mr. TINNAN. Yes. The mission duration may tend to be more lim- ited by the oxygen, the food, the chemicals which remove the carbon dioxide that the astronauts expel, and the other on-board expendables, rather than the equipment life. PAGENO="0816" 812 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Mr. PE~rrIs. You are talking about the manned. I'm talking about the unmanned, the satellite which you are talking about keeping some- thing up there for meteorological studies and surveys. Mr. TINNAN. I believe you're referring to the category which I defined earlier as intermittent manned operations. If we had a fairly sophisticated unmanned communications satellite that operated well for a year and all of a sudden it failed, it would be possible for a manned vehicle to visit it and make certain repairs on it, thus putting it back in operation. Mr. WINN. You are talking about a maintenance system? Mr. TINNAN. In-flight maintenance, yes. Mr. PETTIS. All right. After all, they say it costs, in terms of weight, the equivalent of an Oldsmobile to get a pound of weight up there. I'd like to see it stay up there a while and stay in service with maintenance behind it. Mr. TINNAN. It's quite feasible and is under study now. Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Tinnan, are you going to comment at all on the recommendations of the President's Scientific Advisory Board in con- junction with this? Mr. TINNAN. Sorry, Mr. Teague, I'm not personally familiar with those recommendations, so it's not possible for me to comment on them. Within the scope of the Apollo Applications program as we define it, and I believe this gets back to one of your earlier questions, Mr. Teague, there are two areas that are covered by current or recent NASA contracts with us (slide 51). The first of these relates to the PRESENT AAP SCOPE (AS DEFINED BY NAA) ~APPLICATION OF SATURN & APOLLO VEHICLES TO ALTERNATE EXTENDED-DURATION MISSIONS * EARTH ORBITAL OPERATIONAL INVESTIGATIONS * LUNAR EXPLORATION ~REUSE OF SPACECRAFT * RE-VISITATION & RE-EMPLOYMENT OF ORBITAL VEHICLES * RENOVATION OF RECOVERED APOLLO COMMAND MODULES (CM) * ALTERNATE USE OF APOLLO-QUALIFIED HARDWARE * SUBASSEMBLIES FOR NEW ORBITAL MODULES * SUBSYSTEMS & GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (GSE) FOR DOD PROGRAMS * DEFINITION & DEVELOPMENT OF `BLOCK III' COMMAND & SERVICE MODULES (CSM) 6-MAN LOGISTICS (SPACE STA RESUPPLY) VEHICLE WITH ADV LANDING SYSTEM SLIDE 51. PRESENT AAP SCOPE-AS DEFINED BY NAA PAGENO="0817" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 813 application of Apollo and Saturn vehicles to alternate missions. They would employ launch vehicles and spacecraft, which, if they are not required for the lunar landing program, could be applied to the types of earth-orbital operations which I touched on earlier, and to some of the lunar-exploration type of activities. The second activity relates to reuse of spacecraft. The reuse of spacecraft falls into two subdivisions: One, can we take a vehicle into space, return the crew to earth, return only part of that vehicle, and leave part behind which can be subsequently revisited? That aspect is the heart of what is now known as the Saturn-IVB orbital work- shop, I'll touch on this in more detail. The other aspect relates to the vehicles that result from the Apollo program, which Mr. Myers has described for you, recovering these vehicles again on the earth with their three astronauts, taking them back into the shop, refurbishing them, putting them back on the stack, and launching them into orbit again. We will show you the results of the studies that have shown that vehicle reuse of this type is quite a reasonable thing to do. Another category of interest pertains to some in-house study results that we have only recently presented to the Government, relating to alternate uses of Apollo hardware, or Apollo-qualified designs. One example that I will touch on relates to use of Apollo command module hardware in a new spacecraft module, such as the multiple-docking adapter in the orbital workshop. Another example within this cate- gory, but outside of the NASA world, pertains to some recent investi- gations of ours that show that significant cost savings might be accrued by the Department of Defense in their Air Force MOL pro- gram,by the use of ground support equipment that had been developed under the NASA Apollo program. The fourth category I will touch on that falls within our own definition of AAP scope, relates to the development of Block III command and service modules. Mr. Myers touched on the Block I early development vehicles, the Block II lunar mission vehicle, which added such items as the docking capability, and other minor revisions. This change is analogous to the change from the F-86A to an F-86D airplane, and now we're talking about going to the next version of the same basic vehicle, but in this case carrying possibly six men in the command module instead of three men, and using it as a logistics resupply vehicle in support of space station operations. I am going to run through these four categories of effort, touching only on examples of the work in each category that we have underway (slide 52). In the first category, the ultimate use of Saturn-Apollo vehicles for these missions is primarily focused on a "modification concept." Tinder this approach, we take standard Apollo Block II command and service modules (CSM), and, concurrent with ship- ment in a standard lunar mission configuration to the Kennedy Space Center, we will ship minor modification kits which can be installed in that vehicle at KSC, and the incremental checkout will then be per- formed there. After that is accomplished, this vehicle, with the appropriate modifications, can then be coupled with experimental packages or with payload modules to give us what we call an AAP mission spacecraft. ~7e-265 O-67----~pt. 2-~-i52 PAGENO="0818" 814 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION ALTERNATE MISSION CONCEPT r~~i EXPERIMENT I Ii PKG(S) II OR I I PAYLOAD £1 MODULE A L~J STANDARD AAP APOLLO BLOCK II I CSM SPACECRAFT INSTALLATION & 4 CHECKOUT AT KSC MODIFICATION KITS SLIDE 52. ALTERNATE MISSION CONCEPT I'd like to show you an illustration of one such example, and Mr. Myers touched on this briefly when he pointed out that we had just, t.his past December, completed the preliminary design review on the lunar mapping and survey system (slide 53). In this program we take the standard Apollo command and service modules, and in the LM adapter section, instead of carrying a lunar module, we carry the lunar mapping and survey system. The LMSS, the lunar mapping and survey system, is housed in a payload module that is carried on a support rack which is built in-house by the Marshall Space Flight Center. The vehicle is launched into orbit, and depending upon whether it's going toward the Moon or into Earth's orbit, on a Saturn V or an uprated Saturn launch vehicle. After reaching orbit, the command and service modules lift off slightly and turn around. We call this a transposition maneuver; it then (locks to the vehicle as shown in the upper right-hand corner of the slide, and then operates in that mode. The potential mission applica- tions being considered include those listed in the lower right-hand corner. These include certification of possible lunar landing sites either for initial or later Apollo lunar landings, and here we're talk- ing about mission durations on the order of 2 weeks. Next, for lunar cartography, and now instead of placing the vehicle into an orbit around tie Moon's equator, as we do in a normal Apollo mission, we would niace it in a polar orbit, orbiting the poles of the Moon so that it will be able to cover the entire lunar sphere and give us PAGENO="0819" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 815 LUNAR MAPPING & SURVEY SYSTEM (LMSS) A (CCA 1026 TO NAS 9-150) * LUNAR CARTOGRAPHY (`-35 DAYS) * EARTH-SENSING APPLICATIONS (~1 YR) cartographic coverage, a map, of the entire Moon. That mission, in- cluding the transit time out and back, would be on the order of 35 days. If we use the mapping and survey system for some of the sensing functions, for example, related to the Earth resources applica- tions we were talking about before, like crop control, location of cattle grazing areas, and the like, it could be used in a more continuous mode of operation. In order to adapt the CSM to these missions, we find that minor hardware modification kits are required (slide 54). I won't try to describe them in detail but they include, for example, placing within the command module film cassette stowage kits. This entails simply adding relatively small hardware items so that the film cassettes, the containers, can be carried home with the men. There are also some modification kits that are associated with ground support equipment. The important point is that to convert from the basic lunar mission to the mapping and survey system capability costs nominally $2 mil- lion, a rather small incremental cost. Mr. GURNEY. Is that manned or unmanned flight? Mr. TINNAN. This is manned flight. Mr. GURNEY. Duration? Mr. TINNAN. In its primary mode, as presently defined, it is nomi- iially a 2-week mission. Mr. GURNEY. The lunar mapping and survey system which you mentioned, was going to be built in-house. Whose idea was that? Mr. TINNAN. Only the rack which supports the payload module in the adapter section is built by the Marshall Space Flight Center. I (MFSC) MISSIONS * LUNAR LANDING SITE CERTIFICATION (-12 DAYS) SLIDE 53. LUNAR MArPING AND SURVEY SYSTEM-LMSS PAGENO="0820" 816 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION LMSS MOD KITS' ~/ TOTAL ESTI MATED COST = $2, 100, 000 (I NCLUD I NG ALL MISSION-UNIQUE SERVICES) * DOCKING DROGUE FOR LMSS PAYLOAD MODULE (PM) * AUXILIARY DISPLAY & CONTROL PANEL * FILM CASSETTE STOWAGE KIT (2) * CM CREW COMPARTMENT WIRE HARNESS * CM-PM ELECTRICAL UMBILICAL * SLA SWING ARM & GUILLOTINE REMOVAL * RF CHECKOUT KIT * DOCKING ALIGNMENT GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT * SLA/PM TRANSPORTER MOD KIT SLIDE 54. LMSS MOD KITS have no idea as to how that decision was reached. The payload mod- ule itself is built by an associate contractor. This is the flight schedule which is used for our current AAP study (slide 55). It does not represent a firm proposal on the part of either North American Aviation or NASA; it is intended only as a study guideline. Flights that we are considering could begin as early as mid-1968. In 1968, there are actually two series of two flights each being considered-one manned and one unmanned in each series. The first pair of flights could produce a manned mission duration of 28 days; and approximately i~ months later the second pair of flights could produce. a manned mission duration of 56 days. I am going to get into some of the characteristics of these specific missions which comprise the so-called orbital workshop missions. In looking ahead, however, just very briefly to 1969 and later possi- bilities, we are examining a series of four flights at 3-month periods of 3 months' duration each. With this series, before one set of astronauts would come home, the second set of men would arrive, and by selective crew rotation, the program could provide for one man remaining in orbit for a full year under the flight sequence being considered. That PAGENO="0821" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 817 AAP FLIGHT SCHEDULE (NAS 9-6593 STUDY GUIDELINES) CALENDAR YEAR 1968 1969 1970 1971 AAP1/ ..~_AAP3/ AAP2 AAP4 207 4~210~ 209 211 (28) (56) ``~ I I A 4 A ~ 212 213 214 215 (90) (90) (90) (90) `~ 218 216 217 ` ~4&221 ~" A 219 220 222 ~ I ` ` ` ~ AAAA 514 515 516 517 A 510 r AA A 511 512 513 NOTES: (1) L~INDICATES UNMANNED LAUNCH; ALL OTHERS MANNED (2) 200 SERIES = UPRATED SATURN I 500 SERIES = SATURN V (3) MANNED MISSIOI~I DURATION SHOWN IN PARENTHESES SLIDE 55. APP FLIGHT SCHEDULES-NAS9-6593 STUDY GUIDELINES could be done in conjunction with the orbital workshop which is ini- tiated in 1968. When Mr. Wilson visited with us last summer, I covered some of the details of the orbital workshop configuration that was then under study (slide 56). At that time, only a single manned launch on an uprated Saturn I into Earth orbit was being evaluated. The spent S-IVB stage, the Douglas-built stage, would be evacuated in space to get rid of residual propellant and then pressurized with oxygen to per- mit habitation by astronauts performing experiments. Attached to the end dome of the S-IVB would be an air lock which is being built by the McI)onnell Co. The command and service modules would turn around and dock to the air lock and then this would sort of give a form of an embryonic space statioi~. At this point in time, however, it has been shown to be more effective if we assemble in orbit a clustered configuration which is represented by this slide (slide 57). However, rather than describe the drawing on this slide, we have a model of this configuration and I think I can perhaps describe it better by showing how it works (slide 58). On the first flight, called AAP-l in present terminology, this com- bination, the standard lunar and mapping system survey combination, previously described, would be launched into Earth orbit. It would operate in orbit for 5 days doing photographic sensing operations. This first launch is a manned operation. Five days later an unmanned launch of the uprated Saturn I would be accomplished, and it would place in orbit the spent S-IVB stage. At the top of this is the air lock, similar to the one I mentioned just a moment ago. On top of the air lock is a module called a multiple-docking adapter. These are the PAGENO="0822" 818 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION PREVIOUS ORBITAL WORKSHOP CONFIGURATION (SINGLE, MANNED LAUNCH) SPACECRAFT LM ADAPTER (SLA) PANELS ELECTRICAL UMBILICAL N S-IVB SPENT STAGE / / POWER CSM / / AIRLOCK / FLUID CRYO UMBILICAL (112 AND 02) I SLIDE 56. PREvious ORBITAL WORKShOP CoNFIGuRATIoN-SINGu~, MANNED LAUNCH SLIDE 57. PRESENT ORBITAL WORKSHOP CONFIGURATION-AAP-1 THROUGH AAP-4 PAGENO="0823" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 819 panels on the LM adapter vehiéle that Mr. Myers referred to as the SLA. They would fold back, and then solar-cell panels would fold out to provide electrical power. The AAP-1 vehicle, which is in a differ- ent orbit, would transfer and rendezvous with the second AAP flight. It will dock the lunar mapping and survey system payload module to one of the side ports of the multiple-docking adapter. The command and service modules will back off and then dock to the top port of the multiple-doëking adapter. That then becomes our 28-day mission configuration. The three astronauts will operate for 28 days, per- forming various experiments that were carried up on the unmanned launch. At the end of that period of time this vehicle (the OSM) would depart and carry the astronauts back to Earth. Approximately 6 months later, when AAP-3 is launched to start the second mission sequence, manned command and service modules would be launched into orbit. Approximately 1 day later, an unmanned lunar module, the LM built by Grumman, would be launched into Earth orbit carry- ing on the bottom, instead of the lunar descent stage, a rack with s~e-~ cial solar observation equipment. These vehicles would rendezvous in Earth orbit and would then transfer to and .rende~vous with this sta- tion. The lunar module would dock to one side port and the command and service modules to the end port. That would give us our 56-day manned mission configuration. Now, that's where most of our present AAP contract study effort is focused. Mr. TEAaU1~. Bob, let me understand something: North Ameriea*n has this proposal, I assume other cQmpanies have proposals. What are the steps we go through to get this thing going? Mr. FnsITAG. This is not `a North American proposal, per sê; this is a plan worked out jointly by Marshall, by Houston, by all of the contractors who contribute parts. North American works, on their parts, Grumman on their parts, and each of the other contractors, a~ well as a few potential new contractors, who are involved in some of the new equipment that's coming along, works on jts parts. Mr. TEAGUE. Is this within the $400 million? Mr. FIuaTAG. This is within the $400 million. Mr. TEAGUE. And if you get the $400 million, then you would as- sume youwould go ahead with this kind of a program?. `Mr. FREITAG. That's right. With last year's $41 million we got started on the definition. That's what we're doing, we're defining the program. And `we also got started on some of the design work, not fabrication and building, but design work on some of the key parts. For example, that air lock you see on the end of it, we have given a contract to McDonnell to start designing it because that's one of the real long leadtime items we talked about, and that's out of the $41 million you authorized last year. With the money we are asking for on the $450 million, we do three major things: One is to provide additional launch vehicles and space- craft modified to do this work; two, we buy lots of experiments that go inside of this spacecraft and on the spacecraft; and three, we start continuing to define the following year's work so we are always 1 year ahead on the definition part. The.re is `always a possibility that, if the Apollo program goes very well beyond this point now, some of PAGENO="0824" 820 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION the Saturn TB's that are remaining in the program could be used for this at an early date. So we are extremely anxious to get started with the design of the spacecraft now or during the current period so we can have the stuff ready to transfer to the available Saturn I-B's should they ever become available. Otherwise, the program is faced with the vehicles that are being bought with the $450 million. This is a plan that's worked out by the entire. manned space flight team with North American contributing its share of it. Tomorrow, SLIDE 58. ORBITAL WORKSHOP MODEL PAGENO="0825" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 821 at Douglas, you will probably see a model just like that where Doug- las is doing their share, and so on down the line. Mr. GURNEY. Did that come out of this year's Apollo Application money? Mr. FREITAG. Yes. The $41 million of Apollo Application money that you authorized in the current year did several things. It bought long leadtime items for some of the vehicles and spacecraft; it defined this project which is what you are seeing now; it also paid for some long leadtime experiment definition and design and some of the design of the hardware. Mr. GURNEY. Was this idea here the product of this year, last year, or the year before? Mr. FREITAG. This idea is the product of the $41 million that you authorized a year ago last July. We had ideas as far back as May. You may look in your testimony last year where you had a spent-stage experiment which was proposed originally by Douglas. For example, a modification of the MORL house study that was proposed a year ago at this time was picked up and the money put into it out of. the $41 million to really see what could be engineered. And you can see it is being engineered and now we are moving up, .designwise, but not hardwarewise. Mr. TEAGUE. Thank you, Bob. Mr. TINNAN. Within this embryonic space station, the item called the multiple docking adapter is sort of the hub of the operation since it is the element to which all vehicles dock (slide 59). Fabrication and development of this new element has not yet been fully initiated. BASED ON USE OF APOLLO QUALIFIED HDWR DESIGN SLOW TECHNICAL RISK `MINIMUM SCHEDULE RISK * MAN-RATED QUALITY WITHOUT EXTENSIVE QUALI FICATIONS *MINIMUM COST MULTIPLE DOCKING ADAPTER (NAAIS&I D APPROACH) SLIDE 59. MULTIPLE DOCI~ING ADAPTER-NAA/S. & I.D. APPROACH PAGENO="0826" 822 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION SLIDE 60. 1~1DA MANUFACTURING We have recently delivered to the Marshall Space Flight Center a proposal (this is a part which is a North American proposal) for the front end of the multiple-docking adapter to be built by us using all Apollo-qualified hardware to preclude the necessity for expensive and time-consuming development. This proposal is based on taking the same hardware that we designed and have built many times for the Apollo spacecraft and shipping that to the Marshall Space Flight Center for subsequent assembly into the total module (slide 60) This activity would employ some of the existing facilities and the experi- ence of our Apollo personnel. This proposal takes the existing com- mand module inner pressure structure, combines it with a 37-inch-long cylindrical section, and places at four positions around its periphery the standard Apollo docking mechanism-adaptei rings, probes, and drogues. The assembly operation would be performed on this existing weld device, which under the Apollo program took us one year to qualify, so it would make full use of a very expensive and very effec- tive piece of machinery Now, switching to another area I mentioned earlier, we have begun some investigations on our own related to ap plicability of Apollo ground support equipment, to possible other pro- gram needs like those of the Air Force MOL program (slide 61). The kinds of applications that have been examined fall into two basic categories: the use of existing surplus, and I'll qualify the surplus terminology in just a moment, surplus ground support equipment; and the category of using qualified ground support equipment designs and simply building identical copies of these In the former category, PAGENO="0827" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 823 surplus does not mean it was an excess procuremneimt. There were many pieces of ground support equipment that were built to support the early developmental phases of Apollo; for example, the propulsion system development that we accomplished at the White Sands Test Facility is now complete and we no longer have any need in the Apollo program for, much of this equipment. That kind of equipment could be picked up, and with minor refurbishment, used, elsewhere. In other cases where existing surplus items are not carbon copies of exist- ing Apollo support equipment, designs could be fabricated, also saving considerable funds and time. Touching very briefly on examples, there are items like these (slide 62). In the upper left-hand corner is shown an electrical power system test unit which is completely surplus audi could be made avail- able to any other U.S. program. In conjunction with NASA, we have begun discussions with the Air Force to determine their possible use of such equipment. Many hundreds of thousands and possibly millions of dollars are tied up in equipment that could be used else- where. In the other category, the lower right-hand corner of this slide shows a picture of an Apollo reaction control system servicing unit (slide 63). This is the system which actually loads the oxidizer into the reaction controls of the Apollo spacecraft prior to launch. This hardware is not excess equipment; it is now down at the Cape required for servicing of all spacecraft. But oum. analysis indicates that. a duplicate copy of that ground vehicle which has undergone extensive engineering and development could be built and used for the MOL program, since their needs for that. kind of subsystem servicing are APPLICABILITY OF APOLLO GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (GSE) CLEAN UP & REFURBISH APOLLO GSE (SURPLUS) EQUIPMENT AF MOL PROGRAM I _______ I COPY zj~ ___ ___ ~ } 4 FABRICATE] SLIDE 61. APPLICABILITY OF AroLLo GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT PAGENO="0828" 824 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION SLIDE 62. TYPICAL STJRPLU~ GSE SLIDE 63. TYPICAL GSE DESIGN PAGENO="0829" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 825 probably very similar, if not identical. So again, we suggest this as one way of saving money in the MOL program within the Air Force jurisdiction. When I discussed the reuse of spacecraft in the orbital workshop, I mentioned that we could revisit and reuse the orbital element, the piece that was left in orbit. Another reuse possibility, that we have recently examined under contract to the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, deals with the RCM, renovated command module, program (slide 64). Our studies have shown that renovation and reuse of the Apollo command module is very practical: it is technically feasible, and the accomplishment of such a program would not inter- fere with on-going lunar program commitments. I will show you in just a moment that the technique of flying a vehicle over again provides major economic advantages over buying another vehicle for a flight of an identical type. We have for the moment been somewhat conservative and have restricted ourselves to examining the accom- plishment of a second flight in earth orbit only, as opposed to using a vehicle that's gone to the moon for a second lunar mission. The crew safety factors are much less difficult to satisfy if we restrict the second flight to earth orbital missions. TJnder this RCM program, the existing facilities and GSE would be fully applicable with only very insignificant modifications. Under this concept, we recover a command module in the normal fashion, bring it on board one of the recovery ships and, as I will describe a little later, perform some RENOVATED COMMAND MODULE (RCM) (NAS 9-6445 STUDY) * RENOVATION & REUSE TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE * RCM PROGRAM WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH NORMAL APOLLO ACTIVITIES * RCM PROVIDES MAJOR ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE OVER NEW VEHICLE * ADAPTABLE TO AAP EARTH-ORBITAL MISSIONS (RCM OR RCM LAB) * EXISTING FACILITIES & GSE SUITABLE WITH ONLY MINIMAL MOD SLIDE 64. RENOVATED COMMAND MODULE-NASO-5446 STVDY PAGENO="0830" 826 1968 NASA ATJTH01~IZATI0N preliminary postflight operations (slide 65) The vehicle would be returned to our facility here in Downey, where inspection and tests would begin with the recovered vehicle Certain subsystems would be removed, the heat shield could be removed, if necessary, and these would be returned to the subcontractors for refurbishment and/or replacement of individual elements. The vehicle would be reassem- bled,~ using the same primary structure, and after checkout would be reshipped. The renovated command module would be shipped, with a new service module, a new launch escape system, and a new adapter, back to the Cape for a second flight. There is one other version we have studied at NASA's direction in which we go through a similar process, but after we inspect the recovered vehicle, we remove the heat shield and subsystems. We would purge and store these subsystems and the heat shields for possible use as spares for later flights The stripped dow n inner vehicle minus the subsystems would be assembled with a new support rack and with an air lock that attaches to the side. This would pro- vide what we call an RCML, renovated command module lab (slide 66), that could be carried in the adapter section on the same support mounts which carry the lunar module on a normal lunar mission Once in orbit, the CSM, transposes and docks to the RCML. We would thus have another type of small space station that fits certain applications well, for example, operations at synchronous orbit `titi tude where payload becomes fairly critical. RCM CONCEPT RECOVER CM SHIP TO (SC SHIPBOARD PREP - RETURN TO DOWNEY INSPECT & TEST REMOVE HEATSHIELD REMOVE SUBSYSTEMS REASSEMBLE ~ RETURN TO _______ SUBCONTRACTORS FOR ~ ~ `~`V REFURBISH AND/OR REPLACE SLIDE 65. RCM CONCEPT TEST `SM (NEW) * SLA (NEW) PAGENO="0831" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 827 In the cost studies that we did under NASA ground rules, we have indicated that the cost of a new command module based on the cost model of Spacecraft 103, this is our third block II vehicle, is approxi- mately $25 million (slide 67). And then, in a very conserative vein, we have shown that over $9 million could be saved by refurbishing it and flying it again instead of a brand new vehicle. I say very conservative because our flight experience so far has been limited to two unmanned spacecraft flights. So, much like a used car dealer, we have to be somewhat wary and plan or lay out the program costs for the worst case rather than the best case. We believe, however, that significantly greater savings than that which is reflected here would be possible. In the case of the lab, the renovated command module lab approach, our analyses have indicated that for less than $2 million per copy we could provide a laboratory which is based upon the use of a renovated command module. Our analyses have not been limited to paper studies. We have actually flown Spacecraft 009 and 011, as Mr. Myers has indicated to you. They have been returned to the factory and undergone ex- tensive inspection and disassembly operations; so we have a reason- ably good feel for what's involved. We found, for example, that the ablator that is used on the heat shield may be reused in some cases. You have a small specimen from Spacecraft 009; this is the specimen from Spacecraft 011. Both of these have been earth orbital flights, have reentered at velocities between 25,000 and .30,000 feet per second and at varying angles so that the heating rates would vary. But you RECOVER CM SHIPBOARD PREP RETURN TO DOWNEY INSPECT & TEST REMOVE SUBSYSTEMS RCM LAB CONCEPT SLIDE 66. ROM LAB CONCEPT PAGENO="0832" 828 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION PRELIMINARY COST RELATIONSHIPS NOTE: COSTS SHOWN DO NOT INCLUDE FDP & DO NOT REFLECT SAVINGS FOR RCM/RCML COMBINED PROGRAM will note, both on the one you have and the one I have in my hand, which shows even more severe charring, that we have used actually less than 30 percent of the total ablator. This charred area could simply be machined off and we could use the remainder. The total ablator has been designed for a lunar mission reentry at velocities in the order of 36,000 feet per second. So, if the first flight is an earth orbital mission, we simply machine this off, and fly again without having to buy a new heat shield. One of the problems we did find, however, when we brought these vehicles back into the plant was the problem of corrosion of the inner pressure vessel and the heat shield substructure (slide 68). The inner pressure vessel is obviously air- tight and watertight. The outer shell, the heat shield, however, is not a completely sealed structure, and when the vehicle dips into the sea, water penetrates through various openings and into the cavity between the inner and outer vessels, and it begins a corrosion process which would make the vehicle unusable unless we take special action shortly after we pick it out of the sea. Our studies indicate that when we first hoist the command module aboard the recovery ship, certain operations should take place within the first few days prior to its shipment back to Downey, which would prevent corrosion from start- ing (slide 69). One would be to open up some ports to let the sea water drain out, and then to flush it with deionized water so that the sea water would not have any corrosive effect on exposed surfaces. We have done laboratory studies that show this action would be fully effective. We do have to provide some shipboard postflight equip- ment in order to provide this capability, or else the vehicle corrosion will begin. *NEW CM = $24.8M (COST MODEL SC 103) * REFURBISHED CM = $15. 8M (AVG COST FOR 5 VEHICLES) *DEPENDENT LAB = $1.9M (AVG COST FOR 6 VEHICLES) SLIDz 67. PRELIMINARY CosT RELATIONSHIPS PAGENO="0833" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION RECOVERY OPERATIONS SCHEDULE SLIDE 69. RECOVERY OPERATIONS SCHEDULE `76-265 O-67~---pt. 2--'53 829 SLIDE 68. SPACECRAFT 011 AFTER RECOVERY T ` 2 I 4 15 6 8 19 110 jii 12 13114 [~ HOIST CM ABOARD SHIP ~~RD _____________ SHIP BOARD OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES ` START AFT HEAT SHIELD REMOVAL & CORE SAMPLING __________ - 11REMOVE CM FROM SHIP & TRANSPORT TO FWD AREA I I COMPLETE AFT HEAT SHIELD REMOVAL, I ~j CORE SAMPLING, AND WASH DOWN Eli PYRO FORWARD AREA RCS DECONTAMINATION ACTIVITIES ECS SAMPLING, PURGE, & DRY LI PREPARE CM FOR TRANSPORTING (ATTACH AFT HS & ACCESS PANELS) PAGENO="0834" 830 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION What are the schedule aspects of this? The schedule indicated here is what we call Master Development Schedule 9, revision 3 (slide `TO), which is currently being followed by Mr. Myers' Apollo program activity. The schedule shows the delivery-the "5" means ship-to the Cape of the 12 Block II spacecraft for which we have a firm We have separately, under the renovated command module study, laid out some of the steps that are involved in order to provide foi the renovation capability (slide 70) Some engineering and develop ment work must be accomplished to provide the shipboard ground support equipment prior to flight And we have indicated here the flight of a vehicle that we will try to renovate by this mark, and then, of course after recovery of the flight we retrieve the command module, remove the systems, refurbish, and check them out, and ship the ve- hicle back to the Cape for subsequent operations. A conclusion that has come out of our analyses is shown by an overlay of slide `TO. If a contract for `t renovated command module program were awarded on July 1, 196'T, as indicated here, which is the beginning of fiscal year 1968, then the first spacecraft we could renovate satisfactorily is Spacecraft 105. The first four block II spacecraft will not have had sufficient provisions made in advance of their flights. If we could advance the contract start date to April 1, we could move this effec- tively back to cover one additional spacecraft The point is that the program must be initiated early or the spacecraft will simply have been dumped into the ocean, in the nominal recovery mode, and will not be satisfactory for reuse due to the sea water corrosion problem. APOLLO SCHEDULE FINAL EF OF ~E TS FINAL DESiGN s.= SHIP SC' & DEVELOPMENT FO FIELD OPS.(KSC) S FO :` SC 102 S F~ CM RETRIEVAL Sc 103 S FO SYSTEM REMOV, Sc 104 S FO REFURBI H CM SC I S FO SYST i INSTALLATION F _____ ~LOUT~k&~ONS I &SHIP SC1O9 S FO GOJHEAD Sc 1I:c~:E~OF~::3 I ..~SC112~f!I~3 J] j~tjAJM[~J A1SIO~fb [!!±~ 1967 J}L~4A1MIJIJ [~i~1°JF~I~ 1968 J]M1~1JIJIA1 ~1°]I~4I~ 1%9 SLIDE 70. APOLLO SCHEDULE-MDS 9, R~wisio]~r 3 (MDS9, REV3) I `SC IC JIFIMIAJ PAGENO="0835" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 831 Though the nominal recovery mode for Apollo is water recovery as indicated here (slide `Ti), safe landing can be accomplished either on water or on land. I will show you the effects of what happens, what the extreme variations would be. But normal recovery is, as in the case of the Mercury and Gemini programs, in the water, with recovery by Navy forces. At the direction of the NASA we have carried out analyses and design studies pertaining to advanced land- ing systems (slide 72). We prefer this terminology, though it is often referred to as the land-landing system, since the latter is somewhat confusing because Apollo does possess a land-landing capability. With an advanced landing system-which would include steerable gliding chutes instead of the conventional parachutes, coupled with an attenuation device like landing retrorockets-we could have greater mission flexibility and choice of landing areas. We would not have to land in the ocean. Instead, we could recover, for example, at Edwards Air Force Base or other recovery areas on land within the continental United States. In so doing, we could minimize the cost of the recovery force and retain only that which is necessary for emergencies-for example, when a quick abort from orbit would re- q~uire us to come down into the sea. With the land landings, we could significantly enhance the reusability of the Apollo command module. The last, but most significant point, is that the incorporation of the advanced landing system will permit us to carry three more men in the Apollo command module. That's where the economy of opera- tion would come in. If we can carry six men to a space station, instead of three, then the cost of transporting each man is cut in half. APOLLO RECOVERY MODE DROGUE CHUTES RELEASED a PILOT CHUTES DEPLOYED AT 10,000 FEET HEAT SHIELD JETTISONED AT 24,000 FEET V ~`(.»=~`` ~° AFTER 1.6-SEC ~` TIME DELAY DROGUE CHUTES DEPLOYED REEFED 8 SEC MAIN CHUTES EXTRACTED £ DEPLOYED TO A REEFE CONDITION AT APPROX 10,000 FT ri~' SLIDE 71. APOLLO RECOVERY MODE PAGENO="0836" 832 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION ADVANCED LANDING SYSTEM (GLIDING STEERABLE CHUTES + LANDING RETRO-ROCKETS) * PROVIDES GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN CHOICE OF LANDING AREA * MINIMIZES SIZE & COST OF RECOVERY FORCE-- ONLY EMERGENCY CAPABILITY REQD * ENHANCES REUSABILITY OF APOLLO COMMAND MODULE * PERMITS INCREASE OF CREW COMPLEMENT (TO 6) IN APOLLO CM SLIDE 72. ADVANCED LANDING SYSTEM-GUIDING STEERABLE CHUTES PLus LANDING RETRO-ROCKETS Reuse and the ability to carry twice as many men will result in major economies. A number of different glide chutes are being evaluated at present (slide 73). This parawing is one that's under study by the Langley Research Center of NASA. It is a triangular form device that resulted from the earlier Rogallo paraglider concept; it is a limp, noninflatable paraglider. Another concept called the Barish sailwing is under development and flight test by the Manned Spacecraft Center. I have here a model of another chute with a scaled version of the Apollo (slide 74). This is the slotted circular wing devised by North American engi- neers. It can operate in a pure parachute mode or operate in a lifting mode. I won't try to glide the model here, but it does work quite well. A reasonable choice of landing area is possible with any of these types of gliding chutes. More important, they allow you to avoid obstacles in the landing area which can upset and therefore possibly damage the vehicle or injure the crew. In the standard Block II Apollo command module, three astronauts are lying abreast as indicated there (slide 75). In orbit and pre- impact, this triple couch is at this upper position. In the worst water-landing case-now, this would mean one of the three chutes PAGENO="0837" 833 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION GLIDE SYSTEM CANDIDATES SAILWING (MSC) SLIDE 73. GLIDE SYSTEM CANDIDATES PARAWING (LRC) SLIDE 74. SLOTTED CIRCULAR PARAWINO-S & ID DEVELOPMENT PAGENO="0838" 834 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION CREW `COUCH ATTENUATION (APOLLO BLOCK II CM) - -- INNER STRUCTURE MOLD LINE SLIDE 75. CREW COUCH ATTENUATION-APOLLO BLOCK II COMMAND MODULE had failed-this couch (which is supported on shock struts, which are much like the shock absorbers in your automobile oniy they have a longer stroke) moves down to this position, a distance of about 6 inches, it's just like a shock absorber. In the case of an extreme land- landing case, which would represent an emergency of off-nominal mode for the Apollo, the hydraulic shock struts would allow the couch to come down to the position indicated, a travel of about 16 inches instead of 6 inches, and again act like a shock absorber in an automobile. However, in order to provide the land-landing capa- bility with this type of attenuation system, we have to reserve the space underneath the couches; we cannot put anything there because the seat has to have the ability to go down and not be blocked by equipment. A side view of this indicates the various seat positions (slide 76). However, with a gliding chute and with small landing retrorockets that will fire about 20 feet above the ground to cushion the vehicle, instead of hitting the ground at 20 to 30 miles per hour, it will touch down at a very few feet per second. Therefore, the seats would not need the stroke and we would not have to reserve the space under the present triple-couch system. With the advanced landing system, then, we could install another triple couch and carry six people (slide 77). All that has to be done is to change the couch mounting system, and add the new landing system with glide chutes and retrorockets. Mr. CABELL. Can you stand that extra weight? Mr. TINNAN. Yes, sir. I mentioned earlier that one of the unique features of thern early AAP flights entails the use of Apollo-Saturn vehicles, not required for the lunar program, for alternate applications by simply adding low-cost modification kits. When we begin, however, to consider the logistics vehicle, we believe that the mod kit approach, the idea of modifying many systems at the Cape rather than in the factory prior PAGENO="0839" /~ /1 / / / / / ( SEAT PRE-IMPACT P05 / / / / / / / ~CANIS~ERS SLIDE 76. CREW COUCH ATTENUATION-APOLLO BLOCK II COMMAND MODULE 6-MAN CREW MODULE RIGID COUCH SUPPORT LINKS COUCH IMPACT ATTENUATORS 1 COUCH IMPACT / -. -y COUCH EXCURSION COUCH EXCURSION IN IN V-V PLANE ZZ PLANE ~7.5 INCHES ~5.O INCHES SLIDE 77. SIX-MAN CREW MODULE 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION CREW COUCH ATTENUATION (APOLLO BLOCK II CM) 835 PAGENO="0840" 836 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION to checkout and shipment, seems to become impractical and exces- sively costly. In spite of the. fact that our so-called Block III logis- tics vehicle has not yet been fully defined, some of the possible sub- systems additions and deletions being considered now are itemized here (slide 78). We would, for example, have to take out the three- man couch and replace it with a six-man couch. Certainly, that modification could be done at the Cape. We could add the advanced landing system and take out the regular Block II recovery system; we could take out the fuel cells and put in a simpler battery system, for electrical power, that is suitable for the logistics function; we could take out some of the propellant tanks and make any of the other modifications that I have indicated here. The point is, however, that there appears to be, within the logistics vehicle version of the com- mand and service modules, a large number of complex subsystem changes. Any one of these could be done off site, but it seems to us to be more costly and more complex to do it in that way. Rather, we would recommend instead a Block II lunar mission vehicle ship- ment, the AAP Block III logistics vehicle shipped from Downey. In this way, all the changes and all the associated facilities, equip- ment, and supply problems at the Cape can be avoided. We think significant dollar savings can be realized and the impact on normal operations can be avoided. Let us go back again to schedule considerations, and assume we were to start in the middle of the calendar year 1967-which is the start of the Government fiscal year 1968-with a final definition study POTE~flAL SU~SYS1r~ CH[~GES (FROM BLOCK II TO "BLOCK III' LOGISTICS VEHICLE) SUBSYSTEM ADD DELETE CREW SYSTEMS 6-MAN COUCHES (OPTIONAL) CM FOOD STORAGE . , EARTH RECOVERY . LAND LANDING (GLIDE CHUTE & LDG RETRO-ROCKETS) 0 OPTIONAL-3 MEN OREQD-6 MEN 3 RINGSAJL PARACHUTES (IF LAND. LDG ADDED) . GUiDANCE & CONTROL . / 1(0PT10NAL) ELECTRICAL POWER (EPS) BATTERIES 0 FUEL CELLS 0 EPS RADIATORS CRYO STORAGE ENVIRON CONTROL $ 0 WATER SUPPLY O G02 STORAGE PARTIAL LIOH STORAGE PROPULSiON (SPS) O SOLID MOTOR DE-ORBIT SYSTEM 0 SPS TANK GAGING o SPS HEATERS o 2 SPS PROPELLANT TANKS - OR 0 4 TANKS (ADD 2 SMALL TANKS) REACTION CONTROLS (RCS) 0 BIGGER RCS PROPELLANT TANKS 0 RCS TANK GAGING 0 METAL BELLOWS TANK ALL TANKS ON SM RCS QUADS COMM/DATA SYSTEM * TV 0 S-BAND (DEEP SPACE) ITEMS STRUCTURE CARGO SUPPORTS IN SM O REMOVABLE SM SECTOR COVERS SLIDE 78. POTENTIAL SUBSYSTEM CHANGES-FROM BLOCK II TO "BLOCK III" LOGISTICS VEHICLE PAGENO="0841" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 837 of the Block III logistics vehicle. In the 9-month final-definition phase, all the necessary engineering would be accomplished, allowing us to produce and test the vehicle and ready it for shipment. Based on the time phasing which would be indicated by our Apollo ex- perience, and assuming go-ahead on July 1, 1967, we could not deliver our first Block III vehicle, arbitrarily titled here as Spacecraft 201, until the end of 1970 (slide 79). For reference, Spacecraft 112, the last spacecraft that Mr. Myers' present CSM contract will deliver, will be shipped to KSC at the beginning of 1969. This would result in a lapse of 21 months without production activity in the Apollo industrial facilities here at Downey and elsewhere throughout the country. In order to maintain the present production capability at six spacecraft per year or one every 2 months, production of 10 addi- tional spacecraft would fill the gap. Incidentally, Spacecraft 113, 114, and 115 are now the subject of discussions and negotiations with NASA. Behind those, seven additional Block II spacecraft could be procured to fill the gap. An alternate approach would entail pro- curement of only three new vehicles-113, 114 and 115-and the simul- taneous implementation of the renovated command module program. Then, we could recover the Block II spacecraft, refurbish them, and put them back in flight service. In this way, we could fly 106-R instead of 116-"R" meaning Spacecraft 106 renovated-107-R, then 108-B, et cetera. With this approach-using three. new Block II's plus seven renoirated command modules-an estimated cost saving in excess of $80 million during that period of time could be realized. I'd like to show next one part of North American's fiscal 1968 cost requirements to implement our portion of the NASA AAP program BLOCK Il/Ill SCHEDULE INTERACTION DELIVER DELIVER Sc 112 FIRST A 113 BLOCK III A 114 SC 201 A 115 ~A 116 ~ 117 106R A 118 ______________ 107R~ 119 FINAL DEF ] . 108R A 120 (9 MOS) ~ A 121 I ~122 Ii ________ 1 BLOCK III DEVELOPMENT ] CALENDAR 1967 1968 1969 1970 1 GFY 1968 21 MOS [4 $207~ ____________ 110 BLK II AT 6/YR PROD RATE (~-$450i~) OR 13 BLK II + 7 RCM'S (-$370M) SLIDE 79. BLOCK Il/Ill SCHEDULE INTEGRATION PAGENO="0842" 838 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION (slide 80). The three categories sh9wn here relate to activities that I have previously touched on. Only NASA-approved or NASA- planned activities are included. The cost of Block II mod kits is approximated at $8 million for fiscal year 1968. For the renovated command module program, including 5 months of definition and 7 months of actual hardware activities related to one spacecraft, a total of $19 million is estimated To begin the Block III program, which would produce our first operational flight article in late 1970, $20 million, including $13 million for the 9 months of final definition, would be required. This would yield a composite of $47 million as fiscal year 1968 requirements for NASA's AAP development efforts. This does not include production vehicle costs that would occur in this year. Mr. Carroll will touch on those in a few moments. In summary then (slide 81), I have touched on the four basic cate- gories within the scope of the AAP program as we have defined it. In the first of these, we believe that significant space accomplishments can be realized at relatively low cost, providing 1968-69 flights of th~ lunar mapping survey system, the orbital workshop, and so forth, using Apollo vehicles which are not required for the lunar-landing pro- gram with appropriate mod kits. The 1968-69 date is only for plan- ning purposes; it cannot be stated as a firm situation since we don't actually know when vehicles will be available from the lunar program. The application of Apollo hardware designs to other uses, both within NASA and Department of Defense programs, offers minimum risk, cost, and schedule solutions to a number of current needs. This S&ID AAP GFY 68 COSTS * BUDGETARY & PLANNING COST ESTIMATES BLOCK II MOD KITS $8~ RENOV COMMAND MODULE * 5MOFINALDEF * 7MODEV(SC 105) 19 (4) (15) BLOCK III PROGRAM * 9 MO FINAL DEFINITION * 3 MO DEVELOPMENT 20 (13) (7) TOTAL $47i;~ * NOTE: (1) BASED ON 1 JUL 67 CONTRACT AWARD (2) DOES NOT INCL SUPPLEMENTAL BLOCK II PRODUCTION (3) DOES NOT INCL S-Il COSTS SLIDE 80. S. & I.D. AAP GFY 1968 COSTS PAGENO="0843" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 839 SUMMARY * SIGNIFICANT SPACE ACCOMPLISHMENTS POSSIBLE AT RELATIVELY LOW COST VIA 1968-69 AAP FLIGHTS--USING APOLLO VEHICLES NOT REQD FOR LUNAR LANDING PROGRAM WITH MOD KITS * APPLICATION OF APOLLO-QUALIFIED HDWE DESIGNS TO OTHER USES OFFERS MINIMUM RISK/COST/SCHED SOLUTIONS * MULTIPLE DOCKING ADAPTER FOR ORBITAL WORKSHOP * GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT FOR AF MOL PROGRAM * USE OF RENOVATED COMMAND MODULES PERMITS SAVINGS OF APPROX $10 MILLION PER FLIGHT--BUT PROGRAM NEEDS TO BE STARTED NOW * MOD KIT APPROACH FOR LOGISTICS VEHICLE APPLICATION OF CSM CONSIDERED MORE COMPLEX & COSTLY THAN USE OF `BLOCK III' APPROACH * SYSTEM AVAILABLE LATE 1970 WITH 1 JUL 67 PROGRAM START SYSTEM DEFINITION STILL REQD SLIDE 81 AAP SUMMARY pertains to the multiple docking adaptei foi the orbital workshop, for example The use of the renovated command modules, `~s opposed to the use of totally new vehicles, the third aspect, e think will result in even tual savings in excess of $10 million per flight. We have to be con- servative at this point, but we think this cost saving can be even greater But, in order to accomplish this, we need to stait the pro gram now or many of the spacecraft will just normally land in the ocean and the corrosion process will begin, which then preempts this reuse possibility. The last point that I have covered relates to the CSM mod kit con cept approach This makes `i lot of sense in early flights, but is a veiy costly and complex way to go for the logistics vehicle. We strongly urge that the system definition of a Block III vehicle be initiated now if we are to provide flight vehicles at `i re'tsonably early d'Lte Mr TEAGtTE Thank you, sir Mr FREITAG Mr Chairman, Len s comments about the refurbished command modules `ire very valid I think, for the new members of the committee, it's significant to note that in Gemini we have done this already One of the major contributions of the NASA program to the Air Force MOL program was that we took the Gemini II space PAGENO="0844" 840 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION craft, turned it over to the Air Force, allowed them to modify it and refurbish and modify it, just as Len described, and it was done and flown-has been flown twice. And it took less than 50 percent of the original cost of the Gemini to refurbish it and modify it with a new heat shield; it was a very successful program. So the feasibility of what he described has been demonstrated by actual flight. Mr. TEAGUE. Bob, his proposal on schedule, how realistic is that? Mr. FREITAG. We consider it quite realistic, and it's within the framework of the overall AAP plan. Mr. TEAGUE. If you get your money by July, you'll be lucky. Do you have to have money? Mr. FREITAG. Well, that's going to be a tough proposition because this is a new program and requires new authority. Continuing au- thority from our previous program doesn't apply. Mr. TEAGUIE. You can't possibly know how much money you are going to get. Mr. FRETAG. That's right. This is a difficult problem. It's unlike an annually funded program that's previously authorized. This means new authority as well as new money. Mr. Ti~otm. I think it will be real tough to expect it by July. Mr. FREITAG. He is pointing out our savings by July can't accom- plish it. The same thing Boeing pointed out on the long-leadtime items that follow on the Saturn V vehicle. Figuring it to that date is the best planning date we can operate under. We can't figure earlier. Anything we take after that date is lost. Mr. WINN. I'd like to ask a question of Len: On the reuse idea, it seems, and I don't know the cost, of course, but it would be pretty expensive to take the craft and dismantle it, and send it clear back to its original subcontractor. Would not a smaller ver- sion on an overall base at Kennedy or Houston save a lot o~f trans- portation? Mr. TINNAN. Yes. Actually, the transportation cost has turned out to be a relatively small percentage of the total program cost.. The refurbishment center could be set up in Florida just as well as here or elsewhere. The new pieces would still come out of Downey, like the new service module that has to fly with it. Keeping it in Florida, however, would mean that the checkout which is normally done with a mated command module and a service module would then be done there rather than in our building 290 checkout facility here. Mr. Wn~N. Yes, but you are talking about your part of it only. I'm talking about the overall deal. Mr. TINNAN. Yes. Mr. GURNEY. Your discussion of Apollo Applications seems to me to be a NASA-generated idea; is that correct? Mr. TINNAN. NASA is the customer, but I think the ideas reflect interests of a lot of organizations like our own. Mr. GURNEY. Does North American have any ideas of its own of what Apollo Applications ought to be? Mr. TINNAN. NASA's Apollo Applications program? Mr. GURNEY. Well, the space program of this Nation, not confining it to NASA. I mean just the Nation's space program. Do you have any ideas of your own? PAGENO="0845" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 841 Mr. TINNAN. I tried to touch on a few examples of these. One is the Block III approach, which I don't think is a real NASA position at the moment. We are in discussions with them on this. We have had several studies underway, both under contract as well as our own, which lead to later lunar exploration activities that are based upon Apollo-derived hardware; I did not try to delve into this in this brief- ing. Mr. GURNEY. I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if we could have those for the record? Mr. TEAGUE. Ed, our oversight committee wrote North American and asked them to tell us every item they had on post-Apollo, and we do have a very complete document spelling out not only North Ameri- can, but all of them on this thing. I think it goes much further than what you have gone into. Mr. TINNAN. Yes, sir. When Mr. Wilson was here this past sum- mer, I think we ran clear through the manned planetary activities that we would suggest. Mr. TEAGTJE. Yes, it's very complete. Mr. CABELL. Mr. Tinnan, this post-Apollo appears to be a composite of collaborative efforts. Are any of your original ideas incorporated in this comprehensive program? I think what Mr. Gurney was get- ting at is: How much originality? Mr. TINNAN. I think we could, in many of the design features in- corporated here, stand up and take credit for North American innova- tion as opposed to being simply responsive to the NASA. I think it's been a complete cooperative collaborative effort. Mr. STORMS. Len, you might point out on that model over there the portion that you are proposing that NASA has not agreed with you on or picked up. Mr. TINNAN. Yes. Mr. STORMS. That portion in here. Mr. TINNAN. This center portion, which is called the multiple dock- ing adapter, is a North American innovation. Not the idea of a multi- ple docking adapter, but the specific design that we think could provide a minimum cost and schedule solution. We are talking speci- fically about providing the top or forward part of that based on the use of Apollo hardware. So we are trying to take the benefit of the ex- perience and the dollars that have been invested in the Apollo pro- gram. The proposal now rests with the Marshall Space Flight Center. Mr. FREITAG. May I comment very briefly, Mr. Chairman, on this point: NASA does the synthesis of ideas, but we are using ideas that are not only from the Apollo family, but from all other contractors. For example, the Apollo telescope mount-there were at least six separate proposals for how to do this-one using the lens as we have it. Homer Newell, in the Office of Space Sciences, their astronomer, had two or three other proposals; other contractors had other proposals. And in that particular case, we brought together everyone who wanted to contribute, who had an idea, and ended up using this as the most effective means. We actually ended with a synthesis of some OART on controlled-movement gyro work they had, plus the LM, plus some of OSSA's astronomy and telescopes, and it was a combination. There PAGENO="0846" 842 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION are contractors who are new to the operation. For example, we .haye. two contracts, one with the Martin Co., and one with the Lockheed Co., which studied the very questions Mr. Winn brought up. FQr example Is it better to do it with one eontractoi who has an exten sion of a program, like North American, or to do it in a modification center where several contractors can work into the program This is a part of the definition program supported with the $41 million to define the best way of doing it. And during the hearings of the Manned Space Flight Subcommittee, we will report on all of these, how they work in detail. Mr. GURNEY. My question was not to indicate that NASA's ideas were not good. I mean I was just curious, since we're here at North American, what ideas are we talking about? There's not much use in the subcommittee coming out if we don't ask questions. Mr. TEAGUE. Ed, we had a bunch of proposals. At Douglas, we had a bunch of proposals last time. It's obvious from seeing this that all of you have been working together Mr. TINNAN. I think we're all working together on the same basic project applications. Mr. TEAGUE. Even in the Senate's Budget Committee, they defi- nitely came out with generally the same thing. Mr. TINNAN. The point we make here, just as we suggest that the multiple docking adapter be built out of parts of the Apollo com- mand module, this item (on the model) uses the LM ascent stage and the same rack which is used to support the lunar mapping and survey system payload module. There is commonality of modules, so we don't have to redesign and qualify a new piece for every use. The Marshall Space Flight Center builds this; another associate builds this; Grumman builds this. Se we're all involved in the process. Mr. CARROLL. Mr. Chairman, recognizing the time situation, let's quickly go through the material we have in summary. There are several charts I'd like the opportunity to include in the record rather than take the time during the session here. Quickly, in summary, I'd like to review for you a little of the manpower status, the facility status, the Government fiscal year 1968 funding requirements, and a list of time-phased critical events, in order to refresh your minds (slide 82). You may recall during this past year, we were asked, when Mr. Wilson was out here, to present not merely an S. & I.D. level of partici- pation in the Apollo program, but that of the corporation. This gives you some idea of the total North American personnel participating in the program (slide 83). The two lines on the chart represent the fact that, at the time we made our forecast a year ago, we ~ ere forecasting manpo~ er drop as shown by the dotted line Based on a conceited effort by the cor poration, we have actually been able to achieve a manpower savings, and we are now at the beginning of the solid line, and here is the current forecast for the total North ~nierican work force on the Apollo program In this next chart we have S. & I.D.-only manpower status and forecast (slide 84) It sho~s that approximately 33,000 personnel are n~w in the division, and the vast majority of those are working on PAGENO="0847" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 843 SUMMARY RESOURCES * MANPOWER - PRESENT AND PLANNED UTILIZATION * FACILITIES - PRESENT AND FORECAST UTILIZATION * FUNDING - S&ID FOLLOW-ON GFY 1968 REQUIREMENTS S&ID FOLLOW-ON CRITICAL EVENTS lot SLIDE 82. SUMMARY NAA APOLLO PROGRAM TOTAL MANPOWER LOAD JU ~ ~ NE 1966 FORECAST . ~% ~ ~ /JANUARY 1967 FORECAST ~ 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 MANPOWER (THOUSANDS) C GFY SLIDE 83. NAA APOLLO PROGRAM TOTAL MANPOWER LOAD PAGENO="0848" 844 z 0 z z o 20 z 0 0 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION SLIDE 84. S. & I.D. TOTAL MANPOWER LOAD the Apollo program. In the event that NASA were to be able to obtain Government fiscal year 1968 funding to permit an AAP go- ahead by July 1, :ft5 Mr. Tinnan talked about, the S. & I.D. manpower forecast would then follow the dotted line across the chart. It should be noted that July 1 go-ahead also involves funding for additional Block II spacecraft to fill the gap that he showed between the current deliveries of Spacecraft 112, 113, 114, and 115, which would go out into the middle of calendar year 1969 and the beginning of Block III production and deliveries. To prevent this gap in the CSM produc- tion line, seven additional basic spacecraft would be required. In the event that we were to slip from a July 1 go-ahead to an April 1 go-ahead, the lower dotted line represents the manpower forecast at S. & I.D. The time phasing would result in a 9-month slip in availability of Block III spacecraft, and it would require go- ing through Spacecraft 126 in the Block II, rather than Spacecraft 122, again to fill in the line to keep it in being and to permit economical production of the Block III's without a down time and a restart time. In the event that we went to the renovated command module pro- gram, we would still need Spacecraft 116 through 118, plus seven renovated command modules. This chart depicts the manpower load you would have on that pro- gram (slide 85). Here, again, this chart is based on a July 1, 1967, go-ahead and an April 1, 1968, go-ahead. In the event that April 1 of next year turns out to be the case, you can see that the manpower difference is less than on the programs involving all new spacecraft. 30 I I I I ID TOTAL MANPOWER LOAD I -AAP 1 JULY 1967 ti GO-AHEAD GO-AHEA (9 MOS SLI PAGE) I \ I I - - I BASIC APOLLO SC 116 HRU 126 1ST BLO K III SC D LIVERED TULSA ~ 1968 ~ CSMS/SATURN ~ I AND MISC ~ ~ i ~% ~ DOWNEY' -~ UDES: S-Il ~ IN JUL 1971 (GFY 72 1[ - - -~. -% ~ ~ INCL - SC 116 THRU 122 CSMTHRU SC 115 151 BLK II SC DELIVERED - - 4 S-Il STAGE THRU 15 IN NOV.1970 (GFY 1971) - MISC SMALL CONTRACTS I JAN 1967 - - FORECAST I c--fl___~__- 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 10 GFY PAGENO="0849" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 845 However, at the same time, you do have a little sharper buildup in the Government fiscal year 1972-73 time period. Mr. TINNAN. That's if the renovated command module program started on 1 July. Mr. CARROLL. That's correct. The facilities material, I think, we will cover in the record. We are now depicting headcount by major function as opposed to equivalent personnel shown on the previous charts (slide 86). As you can see, the trend follows closely that established on the prior charts, and, even with a July 1 go-ahead on AP, overall headeount at S. & I.D. will continue to decrease, but at a lower rate. Shifting then to our next major resource, that' of facilities, slide 87 indicates the major space manufacturing* and research facilities in use by North American Aviation. These total about $514 million, representing a very sizable capability, and include both Government- furnished and NAA funded facilities. This chart is basically the same as that shown to Mr. Wilson during the oversight briefing in July 1966. The next several charts show the phasing from our present con- tracts for CSM and the S-IT into the AAP program. In slide 88, we take the primary CSM unique facilities, show how they will phase out of the present program in percentage of utilization, and show the effect of Spacecraft 113 through 115 to utilize these facilities based I I I I I S & ID TOTAL MANPOWER LOAD I OFF-SITE 30 fl AAP 1 JULY 1967 GO-AHEAD TULSA AAP APRIL ~968 - - - - GO-AHEA (9 MOS SLI \ ~.s% BASIC APOLLO ~ - ICSM/SATURNS-II ~ ~ 1AND MISC I DOWNEY I - J INCLUDES: - I CSMTHRU SC 115 S-Il STAGE THRU 15 S I MISC SMALL CONTRACTS 1 JULY 1966 FORECAST - - I JAN 1967 I FORECAST I I (__I_ 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 t~AGE) SC 1 1ST BL INJU ~ C 116THRU TIIEU SC CK III s/c Y1971 (GFY ~ SC 118&7 9&7RCM ELIVERED 1972) ~ RCMS ST BLK III 5/ N NOV 1970 ~ .~ ~ . 1971 DELIVERED (GFY 1971) . 1972 . 1973 1974 0 z 0 z Z 20 0 15 SLIDE 85. S. & I.D. TOTAL MANPOWER LOAD 76-265 0-67-pt. 2-54 PAGENO="0850" 846 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION TOTAL S&IID HLADCOUNT FUNCTIONAL HEADCOUNT 35 000 LOGISTICS ~ TEST & QUALITY ASSURANCE 25,000 ~ BASE FORECAST 20,000 15,000 MANUFACT4ING El ~ d 5,000' - ENGINEERING~ I' El 0 1 ~ 196~ f 1967 J 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 SLIDE 86. TOTAL S. & I.D. FUNCTIONAL HEADCOUNT on a February 15, 1967, go-ahead. `The next space beyond the dotted area for Spacecraft 113 through 115 shows how Spacecraft 116 through 122 would phase in and out to keep the production line going on manufacture of basic spacecraft prior to the Block III production operation. As you can readily see, without these filler basic space- craft, there will be a sizable ~ap in facilities use, which would require us to drastically reduce the highly trained manufacturing work force that we have on hand, with the obvious result of added restart costs and possible time delays. Slide 89 shows the same type of presentation based on an April 1, 1968, go-ahead for AAP Block III. The date of April 1 has been chosen based upon the possibility that the Government fiscal year 1968 budget might not be approved until December 1967, which, in turn, could result in not having the contractor under contract for 3 more months. The critical time period is again filled with Space- craft 116 through 126, prior to the formal Block III production, and is almost 2 years in duration. Please note that in either case, Spacecraft 116 and subsequent will require a go-ahead for long leadtime items on April 1 of this year and a full go-ahead of July 1. If this does not come to pass, then we will again be faced with a gap ~~~AAP ~ PAGENO="0851" S&I D TULSA STRUCTURES GSE $23 i~ RD NEVADA FIELD LAB HI ENERGY TEST $13 ~ \. ROCKET ENG PROD \ & TEST LAD MAJOR TESTING HEAVY MACHINING McGREGOR PLANT $27 t~ SOLID PROPUL DIV / S&ID / S&ID AN ~ LAD DOWNEY SEAL BEACH ELECTRONIC ASSYS .E.UQI~Q. $12OI~ ~IVEMCLE & COMPONENTS ~ MGHENERGYFORMING $41 $O.725~ SLIDE 87. MAJOR SPACE MANUFACTURING AND RESEARCH ~`ACILITIES IN USE BY NAA 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 847 in the production line Slides 90 and 91 show the major Saturn S-IT unique facilities available In this case, the situation does not ap pear as severe as that of the CSM in that we have projected NASA Headq~uarters planning which indicates follo~ on production at a rate of four per year after the present additional five vehicles, which are now in negotiation and which have been authorized by the Mar shall Space Flight Center Summarizmg the capability and planned utilization of S & I D fa cilities in support of the overall Apollo program, we are already down somewhat from 100 percent usage (slide 92) As we come down the line, we will eventually be reaching less than 50 percent uti lization, even with the kinds of programs which have been discussed today. So, the point we would like to make is that we are not ca- pacity-limited as far as the ability to meet the AAP program. In fact, there will be plenty of facilities space available at S. & I. D., which could be used for other Government contracts. Looking at GFY 1968 Space Division funding requirements, slide 93 shows the requirements for follow on effort over and above that presently on contract. These are S. & I. D. requirements only, not other North American division funding requirements, such as for rocket engines, which will be needed for the various boosters and things of that nature. There are funding requirements for Spacecraft 113, 114, and 115, which are not yet on contract, and for Spacecraft 116 through 122, which could be alternates for spacecraft using the reno MAJOR SPACE MFG & RESEARCH FACILITIES IN USE BY NAA RD CANOGA PARK COMPLEX Al ENGINE R&D LEAR POWER - TOTAL 514 ~ `J'SS_~' -S RD SANTA SUSANA TESTING-PROPULSION $77 ii PAGENO="0852" 848 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION * MAJOR APOLLO UNIQUE FACILITIES AVAILABILITY AAP 1 JULY 1967 GO-AHEAD FACILITY CAPABILITY DESCRIPTION UTILIZATION FACTOR - 1009 I I I I I I ] I 8-1 DETAILMFG& B-287 BONDING & TEST FAC 100 ~ B-289 REACTION CONTL FAC S-635 IMPACT TEST FAC 1009(, UNDETERMINED ~ ENGRGSUPPO~'TFAC - GFY 1966 1967 11968 11969 1970 1971 1972 1973 AVAILABLE BLK III BASIC PROGRAM (THRU SC 112) ~SC 116-122 (LONG LEAD TIME GO-AHEAD, 1 APR 67) SC 113-115 BASED ON 2/15/67 GO-AHEAD (FULL GO-AHEAD, 1 JUL `67) NOTE: BASED ON: MDS 9 REV 3 REVISED 12-29-66 SUDE 88. MAJOR APOLLO UNIQUE FACILITIES AVAILABILITY- AAP JULY 1, 1967 GO-AHEAD MAJOR APOLLO UNIQUE FACILITIES AVAILABILITY AAP 1 APR 1968 GO-AHEAD IDENTITY B-287 ~ S-635 B:290 FACILITY CAPABILITY DESCRIPTION DETAftMFG & 100% BONDING & TEST FAC 100: REACTION CONIL FAC 1000: IMPACT TEST FAC 100% ENGRG SUPPORT FAC 100% GFY UTI LIZATION FACTOR ~ ~ ~ UNDETERMINED ~ 1966 1967 1968 1 1969 1 1970 1971 1972 11973 * AVAILABLE BLK III BASIC PROGRAM (THRU Sc 112) SC 116-126 (LONG LEAD TIME GO-AHEAD, 1 APR 167) (FULL GO-AHEAD, 1 JUL 67) SC113-115BASEDON 2/15/67 GO-AHEAD NOTE: BASED ON: MDS 9 REV 3 REVISED 122966 SLIDE 89. MAJOR APoLLo UNIQUE FACILITIES AVAILABILITY- AAP APRIL 1, 1968 GO-AHEAD PAGENO="0853" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 849 MAJOR SATURN S-Il UNIQUE FACILITIES AVAILABILITY PER MASTER PROGRAM SCHEDULE 67A REVISED 30JAN67 FACILITY CAPABILITY DESCRIPTION UTILIZATION FACTOR ELECTRO MECHANICAL "MOCK-UP" 100% BATTLESHIP TESTING 100~ STAND 0 STRUCT STATIC TEST TOWER 100% 0 FOLLOW-ON S-Il AT 4/YR BULKHEAD FAB BLDG 100% FOLLOW-ON S-Il VERTICAL ASSY BLDG 100% /-J FOLLOW-ON S-Il PNEUMATIC, PAINT & PKG 100% AT4/YR BLDG 0 ___________________________________ BASIC PROGRAM (10 VEHICLES) UTIL _______________________________________ ADDITIONAL 5 VEHI CLES UTI LI ZATI ON 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 GFY SLIDE 90. MAJOR SATURN S-Il UNIQUE FACILITIES AVAILABILITY- PER MASTER PROGRAM SCHEDULE 67A, REVISED JANUARY 30, 1967 vated command modules. You then have, as Mr. Tinnan showed, $47 million for the development operations in the Block III, as well as ren- ovated command module alternates. In the Saturn S-TI program stages 11 through 15, for which, as Mr. Greer mentioned this morning, we have coverage on just a short-time basis-through March-we need additional funding of $58.5 million for these. The additional stages 16 through 19, which would be used for the launch vehicles for ad- ditional AAP missions, will require initial funding of $12.2 million. In summary, with reference to critical events coming up in the com- mand and service modules area (slide 94), we need full go-ahead on Spacecraft 113, 114, and 115 by February 15. We have actually had long leadtime procurement authorization on those items, on the basis of using the spare parts contract, but not full coverage. We are cur- rently in negotiation with NASA, and we need to consummate that and get full go-ahead. We need the procurement of long leadtime items for the followon vehicles, which we discussed earlier, to fill the gap. This is necessary if we are to have no break in the production line and particularly this is true at the major subcontractors, especially at Beech and several others where they have a short-time cycle. Alterna- tively, we need the full go-ahead on the renovated command module program by July 1, and we need contract authorization by July, if we are to live with only 10 additional Block II spacecraft (Spacecraft 113-122). The longer we delay this contract authorization, if we are going to maintain the line in order to keep the cost down and utilize PAGENO="0854" 850 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MAJOR SATURN S-Il UNIQUE FACILITIES AVAILABILITY (CONT) MASTER PROGRAM SCHED 67A REVISED 30JAN67 100% ~~/#//////////////////A~\\~1 FOLLOW-ON 1966 1967 1968 1969 J 1970 1971 GFY 0 FACILITY CAPABILITY DESCRIPTION UTILIZATION FACTOR CRYOGENIC FACILITY PROPULSION SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT FAC VERTICAL CHECKOUT FAC SUB-ASSY FAC 10 VEHICLES ADDITIONAL 5 VEHICLES ELI] AVAILABLE S-Il AT 4/YR 100% /////////////////////4~~\\\\~1 FOLLOW-ON 0 S-lI AT 4/YR 1 Z~/J/////////////////,h\\\\\~1 FOLLOWON 100% 0 FOLLOW-ON S-Il AT 4/YR SLIDE 91. MAJOR SATURN S-TI UNIQUE FACILITIES AVAILABILITY- MASTER PROGRAM SCHEDULE 67A, REVISED JANUARY 30. 1967 cAP,~r~uTY & PLANNED UTILIZATION APOLLO/SATUUN S-Il FACILITIES CAPA CSMTHRU SC 115 J - ,1-4-68 SLIDE 92. OAPABILITY AND PLANNED UTILIZATION-APOLLO/SATURN S-TI PAGENO="0855" 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION 851 S&ID FOLLOW-ON GFY 1968 FUNDING REQUIREMENTS CSM PRODU CII ON Sc #113 - 115 $52. 0 M Sc #iio - 122* _______ $69. 5 M DEVELOPMENT EXTENDED MISSIONS RCM, FDP + DEV* $19.0 M BLK III FDP + DEV $20.0 M BLK II MOD KITS $ 8.0 M $47.0 M SATURN S-Il STAGE STAGES #11 - 15 $58.5 M STAGES #16 - 19 $12.2 M $70. 7 M *ALTERNATES February 15, 1967 SLIDE 93. S. & I.D. FoLLow-oN GFY 1968 FUNDING REQUIREMENTS S&ID FOLLOW-ON CRITICAL EVENTS SUMMARY COMMAND & SERVICE MODULES * FULL GO-AHEAD FOR CSM 113, 114, 115 BY 15 FEBRUARY 1967 * PROCUREMENT OF LONG LEAD TIME ITEMS FOR CSM 116 - 122 BY 1APRIL1967 OR FULL GO-AHEAD ON RCM PROGRAM BY 1 JULY 1967 (EFFECTIVITY S C #106 & SUBSEQUENT) * CONTRACT AUTHOR IZAT ION FOR F INAL DEFIN IT ION OF BLOCK III BY1JULY 1967 LAUNCH VEHICLES * FULL GO-AHEAD FOR S-Il STAGES 11 - 15 BY 15 MARCH 1967 * GO-AHEAD FOR LONG LEAD TIME ITEMS FOR S-Il STAGES 16- 1.9 BY 1 OCTOBER 1967 February 15, 1967 SLIDE 94. S. & I.D. FOLLOW-ON CRITICAL EVENTS SUMMARY PAGENO="0856" 852 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION the proper facilities and experienced personnel in the fabrication of Block III vehicles, the more Block II vehicles we have to build. In the launch vehicle area, as mentioned this morning by Mr. Greer, we need full go-ahead by March 15 for stages 11 through 15, and for long leadtime for stages 16 through 19, by October 1 of this year. That concludes our material, Mr. Chairman. Mr. TEAGUE. Thank you, Bob. Mr. WINN. I hate to slow it down a minute; I know what you're talking about, I get the picture, real fast, but are you talking about the production of the same type of capsule or space unit clear to 26? Mr. CARROLL. Len, if I may go back into your charts here- Mr. WINN. In other words, 126, is that the same as 101, 103, and 104? Mr. CARROLL. Let me use Mr. Tinnan's chart (slide 79). As you can see, this would be using the same basic Block II vehicle, using it with modification kits, and using it with experimental packages, such as we are doing right now. We have currently defined additional AAP-type missions which utilize these vehicles-the identical con- figuration as far as the total vehicle is concerned-but with certain changes made inside the service module and certain changes made inside the command module to do different kinds of things and to carry different types of experiments. Mr. TEAGUE. That answers your question, Larry? Mr. WINN. Yes. What if we wanted to make a drastic change in this? You keep talking about minimum changes. What if at 114 or 112, that you want to be funded for shortly, we wanted to make a drastic change in this thing? Mr. CARROLL. Len, do you want to step in and answer that? Mr. TINNAN. Yes. Mr. TEAGUE. You pay for it in money and time. Mr. TINNAN. Spacecraft 112 is under firm contract; 113, 114, and 115 are under current negotiation and we have had long-lead author- ization there. Last year at this time we presented to the committee the points that if we were to in fiscal 1967 get authorization, we could come right behind it with our first Block III drastically changed vehicle. We have lost 1 year, which says the first one here. Now, we can com- press this schedule in response to your question, hut it will cost if we try to go into a high-priority accelerated run. The point is that we have laid out this schedule based upon our Apollo experience on a nonemergency, nonovertime basis. Mr.WINN. OK. Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Storms, may I thank all of you. Mr. STOÜMS. It's been a pleasure to have you here. Mr. TEAGUE. It's always a pleasure to come out here. PAGENO="0857" APPENDIX E HEARINGS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT COlu'ORATION, HUNTINGTON BEACH, CALIFORNIA, MARCH 28, 1967. DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT Co., INC., OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Santa Monica, Calif ., March 28, 1967. Hon. OLIN E. TEAGUE, Chairman, Manned Space Flight Subcomrn'tittee, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. M~ DEAR MR. TEAGUE: Your visit to our Space Systems Center on February 18 with members of your subcommittee and staff gave us a welcome opportunity to report on the present status of our efforts as prime contractor to the National Aeronautics and Space Administra- tion on the Saturn S-IVB stage, and on our view of the essential ele- ments of the national space program beyond Saturn/Apollo. The record of the day's discussion has been compiled in the enclosed document for your future reference, as you requested. It includes a transcript of the presentations by T. P. Smith, senior director, Saturn/ Apollo programs; and C. J. Dorrenbacher, vice president, Advance Systems and Technology, with all of the graphic materials they used. As you know, progress in the Saturn/Apollo program has reached the point where future applications beyond the lunar landing are demonstrable. The essence of this report is that the experience we have gained will allow us to go forward with existing systems and hard- ware, while continuing to develop the essential technology for even greater advances in the long-term future. Once again, I would like to express my thanks to you, your subcom- mittee, and staff for inviting us to make this presentation as a part of your deliberations. Your continued awareness and personal interest in the progress and needs of the space program are most gratifying to those of us in the aerospace industry. Sincerely, Dow4u4n W. 1)OUOI4AS, .1 i. 853 PAGENO="0858" PAGENO="0859" Representatives for the National Aeronautics and Space Administra- tion were: Col. Leonard Hall Capt. Robert P. Freitag (USN) Mr. John S. Brown Mr. Robert Pease, J-2 representative, Rocketdyne 1)ouglas representatives and attendees were: Donald W. Douglas, Jr., president Charles R. Able, group vice president J. P. Rogan, vise president-general manager, MSSD C Jim Dorrer~b'tcher, ~ ice president, Advance Systems `md Technology, MSSD Ted Smith, senior director, S'tturn/Apollo pro~r'tms, MSSD Osmond J Ritland, vice president, reliability ~nd launch operations Walter C. Cleveland, director, public relations, MSSD 855 PRESEI~~TATION TO THE HONORABLE OLIN TEAGUE, CHAIRMAN, MANNED SPACE FLIGHT SUBCOMMITTEE, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, WASHINGTON, D C Presented at Douglas Missile and Space Systems Division, Space Systems Center, Huntington Beach, Calif., February 18, 1967 Congressman Teague and his party consisted of Congressman Edward J. Gurney Congressman Earle Cabell Congressman Jerry L. Pettis Congressman Larry Winn, Jr. Mr James E Wilson, committee st'tff, technical consultant Mr. Peter A. Gerardi, committee staff, technical consultant Representative for the U.S. Air Force was: Col. E. A. Kiessling PAGENO="0860" PAGENO="0861" CONTENTS Page Introduction by Mr. D. W. Douglas, Jr 859 Saturn/Apollo stage status 860 Advanced technology 895 Advanced systems technology review 897 857 PAGENO="0862" PAGENO="0863" INTRODUCTION (By D. W. Douglas, Jr., President, Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc.) Gentlemen, I hope the tour we have just completed will be helpfu] to you in the course of the report we will present to you this morning. We are making good progress in the production of Saturn S-IVB stages, and we are helping to explore the possible advanced applica- tions of Saturn and Apollo hardware to refine and extend the couii- try's aerospace technology. I feel very strongly that we must keep moving ahead in this field. There's a proper pace and effort in the program, that I've discussed before on your previous visits here. If you go too fast, you may be wasting money, and taking too high a technical risk. On the other hand, if you go too slow, you do not have the spirit- the enthusiasm for space exploration-which is very strong in most of the people in the space program, and which I believe is a very impor- tant factor in our success. It's very difficult to keep that spirit. We do have to consider all the economic factors, so there is a proper kind of schedule, a proper approach that we should follow. We feel that with all the tremendous work that's been done in the Apollo/ Saturn program, that we should `definitely move on into the Apollo Applications program. As you know, we are working on the "hotel in the sky," so to speak, as part of that program; we feel that it is a very important step ahead, and so will be some of the other things being planned-the solar ob- servatories, observing the stars, and all the various possibilities of the Apollo Applications program are further steps ahead. I personally feel that just visiting the Moon once doesn't do the whole job; that we must be able to move ahead with further exploration. What we are going to find, none of us is absolutely sure, but we are sure we're going to find tremendously interesting and exciting things. I sincerely hope that the Congress this year can see fit to carry on what I think is a pretty moderate, `forward-looking program. `That's about all I have to say, except you are most welcome to interrupt at any time and ask us any questions. With that I'll turn the program over to Ted Smith. Most of you gentlemen know, but I'll repeat it-our Missile and Space Systems Division is prime contractor on the Saturn S-IVB stage, which is used as the top stage on both the uprated Saturn I and the Saturn V launch vehicles. Ted is the program director on Saturn at Douglas; he's been on the program since its inception. 859 PAGENO="0864" SATURN/APOLLO STAGE STATUS (Presented byT. D. Smith, Senior Director, Saturn/Apollo Programs, Missile and Space Systems Division) I've talked to you gentlemen before-I think this is the third year. Today, I've got a rather unpleasant duty; I've got to tell you about one of the most serious incidents we've ever had in the program. And I think it bears taking a moment to reflect that the reason the `Saturn! Apollo program has had such tremendous flight success is because we put the money we have into ground testing and redundant testing and this incident, as unpleasant and unfortunate as it is, it was better to have it happen at Sacramento than at the Cape. So with that, I thought before I started the basic Saturn briefing, I would tell you a little bit about the loss of the S-IVB stage at our Sac- ramento Test Center. It was down-played with the other incident, at the Cape the following week. But this one is our prthlem, we think we have it solved, and we think you are entitled to know about it. On January 20, we were static firing the third Saturn V/S-IVB (fig. 1) at Sacramento. I was in the `blockhouse. It was a very smooth countdown. It was about 4:30 in the `afternoon, about 10 minutes from the time we planned to ignite the engine. As you know, we simulate the entire Saturn flight during these static tests. At simulated S-IC liftoff, we do exactly the same things we would on the pad at the Cape. We pressurize our propellant tanks, FIGURE 1 860 PAGENO="0865" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 861 we bring our gas supply bottles up to pressure, and we check the list for liftoff: then the S-IVB sits quietly on the pad for the simulated boost time of the S-IC and the S-IT stages, and then we ignite our stage, burn a third of the propellant, shut it down, and finally simulate the three- orbit coast and then relight the remaining propellants. On this particular day, at about 20 seconds prior to T-zero or the simulated liftoff time, our stage exploded. I think I was talking to MSSD Vice President-General Manager Jack Rogan, within 2 minutes after it happened, and by 6 o'clock that evening, an hour and a half later, Mr. Rogan, Charley Able, Jack Bromberg, our chief engineer, and the members of our Douglas investigation committee were assembled and on the way to Sacramento. Before we left the base that night, we had organized ourselves into teams to gather the data and to interview every man who .was par- ticipating in the countdown. We organized committees to scrub our procedures to see if there was a procedural problem. We organized eight committees and by the time the NASA official board was convened in Sacramento on Monday, we were completely prepared to support their investigation. In the succeeding week, within about 4 days, we pinpointed the cause as one of the helium gas bottles mounted on the thrust structure of the stage; we had the data and physical evidence all correlated. This bottle came apart; half of it drove down int&the engine, tore up the engine, then it went down, hit the flame bucket, and washed out into the flume. Either the other half of the bottle or the overpressure caused by the release of 41/2 cubic feet of gas stored at 3,000 p.s.i., tore up the S-IVB LOX tank and the hydrogen-LOX tank interface. The propellants mixed and within half a second from the bursting of the bottle the entire stage was destroyed, and all instrumentation was lost. This (fig. 2) is a plan view of the engine gimbal point plane showing the relation of the bottle. In correlating the evidence we found that the overpressure against the engine bell, in such a burst, can be calcu- lated to give exactly the pressure rise we observed in the hydraulic actuators as well as the engine link restrainers which have load cells in them. The thing that triggered us into looking at the bottles very carefully was the fact that over here on the stairs (fig. 3), and one down-range, and one up-range, we found three helium bottle halves that were burst right on the weld seams. We went back and looked at our previous records of tests on those bottles. We had never seen a failure like that. Always before, they burst in many pieces with failures going right across the welds. We immediately went to the vendor who built this bottle for us and collected and brought back to our plant his relevant records. Within a few days we discovered documentation that indicated he had accepted from his supplier an improper bundle of welding wire of pure titan- ium rather than alloy titanium. He welded 12 bottles with this wii~e, which reduces their strength some 40 percent. They still were strong enough tO pass the proof test, but in addition to reducing strength, the 76-265 O-67-pt. 2-55 PAGENO="0866" III 862 196.8 NASA AUTHORIZATION 503 INCIDENT THRUST STRUCTURE VIEW LOOKING AFT OFF STAND II BOTTOM HALF-~ ~ PITCH ACTUATOR ,,,,/ (NO LOAD) DOWN RANGE ~. f YAW ACTUATOR (HIGH LOAD)- ON STAND ~-OFF STAND TOP HALF----~ `IV TOP HALF FIGURE 2 503 INCIDENT PART MOVEMENT DIAGRAM /. FIGURE 3 PAGENO="0867" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 863 combination of pure titanium with the alloy that we use has a habit of forming titanium hydrides at the weld face, which can give you a creep-type failure under sustained load. This has been determined as the cause of the accident. This. is an artist's sketch (fig. 3) of where the various pieces of the debris landed. The explosion occurred down at the~ intersection be- tween the LOX and hydrogen tanks. The engine and the thrust structure were pushed downward, everything else went up. Some of the upper skirt equipment is not even singed. The damage to the stand approximates 10 percent. This stand cost in the order of $8 million 2 or 3 years ago. It's estimated it will require something close to a million to refurbish it. The ground support equipment replacement cost is of the same order of magnitude. Mr. ABLE. You might mention the fact that we were not only look- ing at the data, but also the burst tests we conducted on a series of bottles in order to try to reproduce the conditions. Mr. SMITH. We have probably spent 5,000 engineering manhours since the accident in correlating the data available, and we have moun- tains of data from a statictest like this. As we zeroed in on various possibilities, we initiated test programs. We have now located all the helium bottles that. were bad. We have devised a test that will tell us whether or not the correct weld wire was used. We find the vendor's documentation was accurate. The 12 bottles that his records show he made the wrong bundle of wire are verified and have been impounded. All the other bottles have been checked and we are now sure they have been welded with the right wire. We have absolute confidence that the cause has been determined. As a result of this, we feel there will be certain things we will do with all our vendors to prevent any such thing from ever happening again. The basic fundamental error was the receiving inspector's accepting a bundle of wire into stock with9ut checking the certificate that the supplier sends with this kind of material against the purchase order. The purchase order clearly called for the alloy wire, the certificate coming with the wire clearly stated he was filling that purchase order with another wire, in error. The vendor made an error in sending the wire; the persoi~i receiving the wire failed to check and cross-check his documentation. He accepted the wire, and put it into stock. A very unfortunate circumstance. Mr. Douor~s. Well, I think we learned one very fundamental thing; that bottle was supposed to be good for burst of 8,000 pounds, but, this proof test unfortunately didn't tell the whole story, due to the "creep." That's why we developed a new testing technique. Mr. SMITH. Unfortunately, the proof testtook this particular metal combination right to ultimate. Once you've had a metal up to ultimate strength, you don't know~ how many cycles are left in it. The next time it can go at half strength. Mr. PETTIS. Don, what do you mean when you use the word "creep"? Mr. DOtRiLAS. "Creep"? The creep failure is when you have a cer- tain piece of material under force, under sustained load-and they had to have a hold in this case-and it just means it starts to give slowly, and stretches so to speak, and then-boom. PAGENO="0868" 864 196.8 NASA AUTHORIZATION Mr. SMrrn. It's a characteristic of brittle-type material, and this combination of metal is subject to precipitation of hydrides along the interf ace of the two. They don't want to mix. Mr. ABLE. Ted, I think it is interesting to point out there remains quite a technical argument whether you could use, or should use, pure titanium-and there are definitely some differences of opinion. There is a group agreeing you can use pure titanium wire under certain cir- cumstances if your processes are right, such as if it's thin walled and under different pressure conditions. Mr. SMITH. There is still a technical argument going on, but this happens to be a very thick walled, high-pressure vessel. Many of the titanium containers in the Apollo program are welded with alloy sheet and pure titanium wire, but always in thin gages. They are welded from both sides, so that there is mixing in the weld nugget with the parent metal. The metal near the weld is purposely thickened so that the stress levels in the weld are way down compared to the parent metal. In our designs the weld thickness and the parent metal are equal. Mr. TEAGUE. What was your wait, Ted, before you came out of the blockhouse? Mr. SMITH. ]~t was probably 45 minutes before the stand was secured. I might mei~tion that the NASA investigating board was extremely complimentary, and I think it was very well justified. I think our crew performed in exemplary fashion. Our test conductor had the deluge system on within 30 seconds. In every part of the countdown, the institution of the emergency backout procedures was really something to behold. Mr. DOUGLAS. Didn't you also do something else, Ted, that was to immediately tape-record all the people? Mr. SMITH. Everyone who was connected with that countdown, Don, had a nondirected interview by Sunday morning. This was Friday, at 4 ~30 p.m. By Sunday morning, at 8 a.m., the 68 people who were involved in that countdown had had a nondirected inter- view, and had had their observations recorded on tape for Dr. Debus. Mr. DOUGLAS. Well, in that one week, we were 99 percent sure we had the answer. Mr. SMITH. Since that time, every scrap of data has been correlated and has fallen right into line. Mr. WINN. What do you do to somebody like the inspector, or to the vendor that supplied the bad wire? Mr. SMITH. We've had the vendor's records impounded ever since the day of the accident. We've just had our first meeting with him on Thursday. The Marshall legal people asked us to hold off .until the official accident report was issued. We don't know what happens to him yet; we know of no situation where any punitive action was taken in a case like this. Whether or not there will be in this case, I do not know. Mr. WINN. Do you plan to continue to use the same vendor, or will you look for someone else to do the job? That's what I'm trying to get at. Mr. SMITH. I don't know yet. We will have to use him for a certain length of time. There is nothing wrong with his technical process, PAGENO="0869" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 865 other than this mistake. It is a certified company. Every product he's made with the right wire more than exceeds all the specifications. Mr. TEAGUL It was done by one person in his organization, and you'd probably destroy his company if you went too far. Mr. SMITH. This is a decision that will have to be made between ourselves and Marshall. We have confronted the company. I met with their general manager, their inspection head, their chief design engineer, along with our procurement head and our legal counsel Thursday. We showed them the records, the findings we had made from examining their records, and presented them as fact. We did indicate that we had drawn these conclusions from the records. We asked them to study the records and to come back again next Thurs- day and see if they could contribute anything to the factual evidence. We have been in contact with Marshall's Chief Counsel Ed Guillan, and we'll make a decision on how to proceed. Mr. WINN. Let me continue on the line we are in. If this man or woman that received the bad wire knew it was bad, then through the job of the various remaining people involved in the installation of this wire-did anybody-anyone speak up and say this doesn't seem like the right stuff we're putting in here? Mr. SMITH. If you'd like to pursue that a minute- Mr. WINN. Since you are the prime contractor, am I wrong in assuming that you are responsible for the results of their work? Mr. SMITH. W are fully responsible to the Government, for our prime cQntract obligations, yes. You have to be aware that in all Government contracts, certain disciplines are laid down on the prime contractor. There is a point at which there isn't enough money in the world to have one prime contractor man for every one of the subtier vendors. That is why we strive to select subcontractors of proven competence. This particular bottle vendor has four addi- tional subcontracts: forging supplier, weld wire supplier, heat treat- ing subcontractor, and testing contractor; and the amount of money involved putting absolute surveillance in all these things is almost beyond comprehension. When you consider that this one is just one of perhaps two or three hundred that Douglas uses for the Saturn program, one of two or three thousand in the Apollo program. Mr. FRIETAG. 20,000 is closer. Mr. DouGlAs. 20,000 is closer, Bob. Mr. SMITH. On the other hand, we are certainly going to take a good look at our own procedures. As a result of this, we are starting to look at hardware-we look at hardware in many ways. Are they critical to the flight? 4re they critical to the safety of the astronaut? We are starting to look at them in terms of: Do they contain enough potential energy to destroy the stage? On these we will go back and review our requirements: Do our requirements, if followed, insure that every piece of hardware that comes out of the vendor is proper? Then we will look to see whether or not we have the disciplines that insure he is following those requirements. I'm sure that as a result of this incident, both our- selves and other NASA contractors, Government contractors, will change some of their methods of surveillance of these potentially dangerous components. PAGENO="0870" 866 1 9 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION Mr PErrIs What is your approximate value of this third stage ~ Mr SMITH About $10 million Replacement co~t would be )ust under $10 million Mr Ti~otn~ Ted, as a result of your investigation, would you comment on the ~ay this is being handled at the Cape as far as ho'~ the board and the panels are going about trying to solve it Mr SMITH I'd rather not try to do th'~t I'm not involved, 1 don't know first hand. Mr TEAGUE It disturbs me to have newspaper people say that it's going to be a whitewash Mr DoUGLAs I'd like to make a comment I don't believe the people in this program, be they NASA or the contractors, have any `tpproach to whitewash My own person'd opinion is th'rt if you have an accident you should include the contractor and, obviously, the Government people in your investigation But, I think 0± the quality of the people in this program, and I used to be in charge of `tccident investigation in airplanes for many years, and I've never seen the time when the technical person wasn't doing everything he could to find out the cause of an accident. He just has too much pride in his career to do anything else. And I don't appreciate the press or any- body else saying somebody is going to whitewash it. Mr ABLE We certainly have never seen that, and I might comment on that myself I flew up on Sunday with Jack Rogan, the general manager. We were a little hesitant to sit in on some of the hearings they were holding with our own people We felt; it might inhibit them Jack Bromberg and Ted Smith said no, so we sat in the back of the room All the items were brought out that we could consider as deviation from the ultimate of perfection Even though they were irrelevant to the incident, they didn't hesitate to bring them out As a matter of fact, in an incident like this, it really becomes a most thorough review then of ill your procedures and you will cover lots of things that might eventually cause trouble in the future Because it is a real tough job, with all these technical disciplines and pro cedures that have to be follo'v~ed, to get everybody right exactly where they should be all the time Mr TEAGUE Well, Bob, if I understand what's happening, it would be a complete impossibility for it to be whitewashed, `ts broad as the scope of this investigation is Mr. DOUGLAS. I just don't believe it. Now I'm not trying to make a hero out of myself, but some of you may remember the very serious Bryce Canyon accident of the DC-6 A short; time later there was an accident in Gallup, N Mex A DC-6 landed with part of it burned `iway I grounded every P0-6 in the United States, much to the dis gust of my airline customers, some of them, who i~ eren't exactly sure that I was smart enough But I could tell technically by looking at the thing there was something seriously wrong Any engineer that has been in business all his life has only that attitude I mean it there is something wrong, he is going to say, "no soap, it's not going" We called all those airplanes back in and fixed them with Douglas money. I think if you're in this business, you're in it all your life-there is just no idea of white~ash I believe the Government people h'tve this PAGENO="0871" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 867 same feeling of responsibility as the contractors. I don't believe any suggestion of a whitewash. Colonel KIESsLING. It will establish a precedent, Mr. Congressman, if there is anything of that nature, and we've had a batch of accidents in this business, obviously this is what the testing procedure is for. The thoroughness of the procedures are pretty well known. The way you go about them, and the way you make sure there is no fooling with records, no possibility, even when it turns out to be personnel glitch. Boy, these guys get pretty traumatic results when they really realize they may have contributed to an accident. We even had some guys go nearly off their rocker. We have no evidence in the past of anything but just plain straight honesty. It's embarrassing at times, but I don't think tha;t there is any evi- dence to sustain the idea there has been a whitewash, or anything of this nature. Mr. SMITH. In spite of the personal factors, our motivation is also that-you just would have no rock to hide behind if you ever let the same thing bite you twice. Then in my position, and Don's position, and Charlie's position, if we don't nail that to the mast and know what happened, if we ever have another one of these and didn't find it, we just couldn't live with ourselves. Mr. GURNEY. Ted, is there any difference in welding techniques, using pure titanium wire and titanium alloy wire? Does the welder sense any difference in the work of the good wire? Mr. SMITH. I'm not that much of a metallurgist to know, I don't believe so. Mr. ROGAN. There is a divided opinion. Mr. ABLE. Some of our welding people think the consistency of the weld is-some of our welding people claim a good welder can tell by the way it puddles. But there are some others that think you can't. Mr. GURNEY. It's a gray area? Mr. SMITH. It's a gray area, I'm sure. Just to summarize (fig. 4). We feel that our documentation, our operational test and our emergency procedures and controls were good. I think the launch site crew is really to be commended on their per- forma.nce. The automatic checkout equipment was not involved in any way and the cause has been determined and we are in the process of taking corrective measures on this and all other components that have a potential of destroying major hardware. Now, to get into the Saturn program itself-we have looked at schedules, since the incidents at Sacramento and the cape, in relation to the need dates for our stages at the cape. These (fig. 5) are not even official yet, but only the initial planning since the two incidents. They are based on the idea that whatever comes out of the capsule accident investigation can be corrected within the current schedule. The impact on our program is that we will have to fulfill the Apollo/ Saturn 503 mission with our 504 stage, and likewise, the 504 mission with our 505 stage, and so on down the line. We plan, if the decision is made to refurbish Beta 3, we will be operating with one stand down to this point (fig 6). This stage is on the stand now. We will run about 7 weeks behind in meeting this stage, so we have an opportunity to bring this up. PAGENO="0872" 868 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 503 INCIDENT SUMMARY * EXPLOSION EQUIVALENT TO 1% PROPELLANT MIXING * SAFETY PROGRAM DOCUMENT & CONTROL WERE GOOD * CREW PERFORMANCE EXCELLENT * AUTOMATIC CHECKOUT EQUIPMENT NOT INVOLVED IN EXPLOSION * IMPROPER WELD WIRE IN AMBIENT HELIUM SPHERE CAUSED LOWER ULTIMATE STRENGTH DUE TO HYDROGEN EMBRITTLEMENT FIGURE 4 SATURN S-IVB PROGRAM MILESTONES STAGE K 4G FORECAST FORECAST NUMBER DATE SCHEDULE WITH BETA 3 WITHOUT BETA 3 208 5/15/67 7/15/67 3/17/67 3/17/67 504 8/29/67 6/21/67 (503) 7/24/67 7/24/67 209 8/15/67 10/15/67 8/25/67 8/25/67 505 11/30/67 8/31/67 (504) 10/2/67 10/2/67 506 2/28/68 11/30/67 (505) 11/27/67 11/27/67 210 11/15/67 1/15/68 1/4/68 1/17/68 211 2/15/68 1/15/68 1/26/68 3/22/68 507 4/30/68 2/28/68 (506) 3/4/68 5/10/68 212 5/15/68 4/15/68 4/15/68 7/1/68 FIGURE 5 PAGENO="0873" 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION 869 SATURN S-IVB PROGRAM MILESTONES STAGE K 4G FORECAST FORECAST NUMBER DATE SCHEDULE WITH BETA 3 WITHOUT BETA 3 508 7/31/68 4/30/68 (507) 4/15/68 8/23/68 509 9/30/68 7/31/68 (508) 7/5/68 10/17/68 510 11/30/68 9/30/68 (509) 8/16/68 12/11/68 511 1/15/69 11/30/68 (51.0) 11/15/68 2/4/69 512 3/14/69 1/15/69 (511) 1/3/69 3/26/69 513 5/15/69 3/15/69 (512) 3/1/69 5/15/69 514 7/15/69 5/15/69 (513) 5/1/69 7/7/69 515 9/15/69 7/15/69 (514) 7/1/69 8/25/69 5O3R 9/15/69 (515) 9/1/69 10/17/69 FIGURE 6 This is a first cut of the schedule and does not involve extraordinary overtime. If it appears warranted, we can bring that date up a little. It looks as though we're in fine shape against that date, but there is some talk that they would like to have the stage a couple of weeks earlier than this, in order to go into the stack on the S-TI spool again, and come up the way 501 was handled. We show the 209 stage as being a little late, but it appears that when they really get their plan- ning done, the Saturn I stages will take care of that discrepancy. On the 504 mission, they would like to see our stage down there in August and we're going to be about 3 months late if this schedule holds. On the 506, we're about 21/2 months late. Then we'll come back into schedule position as soon as Beta 3 comes back on line. And from here on down we can meet all the Apollo schedules. Now, whether or not there is a further reshaping as the result of the Apollo accident we don't yet know. We are working with these to see if we can't pull up our skirts and keep the program going. I beg your pardon, I was looking at the wrong dates. Here are the dates that we will be able to make. Now we will be about 4 weeks late here. We'll make that date, because this stage is already built. We'll be `about one month late here, and almost back on schedule there, and from here on out our schedule is back in gear with Apollo. Mr. DOUGLAS. I want to make a point right here. There have been many questions on these new incentive contracts and the incentive bonuses about schedules. The point I want to make is-the reason we're going to be so close on schedule is that we were fighting real hard to make our incentive bonus, and it proves to me the value of the incentive programs. Mr. SMITH. As you can see here, Don, we have the entire program running approximately 2 months ahead of our contract requirement. PAGENO="0874" 870 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION This is going to allow us to come very close to moving these stages up and meeting the required dates. With extraordinary effort, if it is indeed necessary, I think we'll probably meet them all as a result of the incentive schedule. Mr. PETrI5. Is there a lot of thievery of technical people in this busi- ness here in southern California? Mr. S~1ITH. Proselyting you mean? Mr. PETTIS. Maybe there is a better word which might have some relativeness to phrasing or slowing one program down in one company. Highly qualified people say, `Well, there is no future here" and they go somewhere else to work. Mr. SMITH. I don't really believe it happens too much. If any- thing, it affects people who are not so highly qualified as some others. Mr. PE'rrIs. Oh, it does? Mr. SMITH. If the newspapers start~ saying that a given program is having funds withdrawn, `or slowing down, then the lower echelons of technical people who think their jobs might be in jeopardy some- times start looking elsewhere. But, I don't think that it is a serious factor ait all. Mr. ABLE. I believe that we `actually have one of the lowest turnover rates in the industry, it's so minor. Mr. DOUGLAS. On the other `hand, according to popular consensus, if there is a great big rhi~barb and lots of discussion that t:he,re are go- ing to be big cuts in a program, then you're going to lose some men. Mr. SMITH. That~s `when we start losing them-4these younger en- gineers who are not `confident of their positions in the company, start to look around. Mr. TEAGUE. They wouldn't `be human if they `weren't trying to im- prove the situation. Mr. SMITH. These charts we `have shown you before. As you notice, on one side (figure 7), we `have graphically depicted the various major strudtures of the S-IVB: the lox tank; the forward dome; the tank cylinder, which is consolidated; the full tankage; the thrust structure; and so forth. The first third of our program is complete. These stages are built, checked out, test fired, awaiting launch. When some of you were here last August, we were at this `point (fig. 8) in the middle third of the program. Since last August, we have completed that phase. In other `words, the 6 months, we `have made about four to five of every major structure. We are working on a rate of some- where close `to 8 to 9 per year. And this is `what we offer on our pro- gram `addi;tions in the future (fig. 9). So, as you can see, the hard- ware is roughly 60 percent concluded. The 212 stage, the final uprated Saturn I stage under the present contract-you saw the last of it in the shop this morning. Unless there is a follow-on order from here on out, we are talking only about Saturn V. These (figs. 10, 11, and 12~ are the structural components, the black boxes, the wires, the tubes, the valves, the instrumentation and the purchased parts. This shows about the same picture-the first third of the program is complete; we are about through with the Saturn I. About `60 percent of the overall program is complete. The manufacturing performance (fig. 13)-I think the learning curve on PAGENO="0875" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 871 SATURN S.IVB PRODUCTION LINE STATUS 201 202 203 204 206 201 501 502 TANK e COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP FWD /~` DOME (-i COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP SKIRT fifihliliTlil COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP llh1fflh1il~ COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP THRUST ~ STRUCT. \1' COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP ~ COMP STAGE ~ (JOIN&FINALII ~` NSTLN) ~ COMP COMP COMP , COMP ~ COMP COMP COMP COMP AFT INTER 1flThTcV~ STAGE !//IIl\~&\ COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP FIGURE 7 SATURN S~lVB PRODUCTION LINE STATUS Lox k TANK ~ 208 COMP 504 COMP 209 COMP 210 COMP 505 COMP 211 COMP 506 COMP -- 212 COMP ---- 507 73% COMP - FWD /~\ DOME (1 COMP COMP ~--~--~--~ COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP STARTED ~K LID P COMP ~ SKIRT COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP "~ COMP 15/0 COMP 36% COMP -_ START FEB 67 START MAR 67 -~ START APR 61 ~ START MAR 61 START APR 61 SKIRT C0MP COMP COMP co~ co~p 54% COMP START FEB 61 -- START MAY 61 .--- THRUST ~``~ STRUCT. 70" COMP COMP COMP - 99% COMP STARTED COMP -- COMP -__- COMP 50% COMP 56% COMP -_- START FEB 67 START APR 61 - START JUL 61 START MAY 61 STAGE ~ (JOIN&FINALtO ~` INSTLN) ~ COMP COMP START MAR 61 START JUN 67 START JUN 67 START AUG 61 ~ AFT INTER lIffl1flhl1Tll STAGE L1!J.IILLWIU 13% COMP 54% COMP START MAR 61 START APR 67 START SEP 61 START OCT 61 FIGURE 8 PAGENO="0876" 872 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION SATURN S-IVB PRODUCTION LINE STATUS 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515; TANK e STARTED 3-28-61 6-1-61 8-8-61 10-11-61 12-15-61 2-20-68 4-24-68 DOME ~ 3-23-67 5-29-67 8-3-61 10-6-61 12-12-67 2-15-68 4-19-68 6-24-68 3-9-67 5-15-67 7-20-67 9-22-61 11-27-67 2-1-68 4-4-68 6-10-68 TAK ~ 5-24-67 7~31-67 10-3-67 12-7-67 2-12-68 4-16-68 6-19-68 8-22-68 SKIRT IfIflTflhllJJ 6-16-67 8-22-61 10-24-67 12-29-61 3-4-68 5-1-68 7-11-68 9-13-68 ~I~T 1111111 J~ 7-11-61 9-13-61 11-14-67 1-22-68 3-25-68 5-28-68 8-1-68 10-4-68 ~j3~ 7-26-67 9-28-67 12-1-67 2-6-68 4-9-68 6-13-68 8-16-68 10-21-68 JOIN& FINAL INSTLN) 10-4-67 12-8-67 2-13-68 4-17-68 6-20-68 8-23-68 10-28-68 1-6-69 STAGE /fJJiIft\~\ 1-24-68 3-28-68 6-3-68 8-6-68 10-9-68 12-13-68 2-19-69 4-24-69 FIGURE 9 SATURN S-IVB MANUFACTURING & PROCUREMENT STATUS 201 202 203 204 205 206 201 501 502 55 BLACK - BOXES -- COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP ~ COMP COMP COMP COMP 16 WIRE ~ COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP HARNESSES . 310 ~ TUBE COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP ASSEMBLIES . VALVES~ 40 COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP TRANSDUCERS PURCH PARTS COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP FIGURE 10 PAGENO="0877" 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION SATURN S.IVB MANUFACTURING & PROCUREMENT STATUS 873 208 504 209 210 505 211 506 212 501 BLACK COMP COMP COMP - COMP COMP COMP COMP - COMP COP c~ ~P - ~oi 0 c~ - ~ 0 c~ - 16 ~ WIRE ~ COMP COMP 0 HARNESSES T~E ASSEMBLIES 99/0 COMP 96% COMP 16% COMP COMP 29% COMP VALVES~ 940/ ~ 860! C~MP 2 0/ 23°! P 12°! ~ 8°! ~ TRANSDUCERS 3,250 PARTS COMP ~ COMP ~ COMP 9L99% AVAIL COMP 99~8% AVAIL COMP 9L91% AVAIL ~p 99~1% AVAIL COMP 99~4% AVAIL COP 99~6% AVAIL COMP 95% AVAIL FIGURE 11 SATURN S-IVB MANUFACTURING & PROCUREMENT STATUS 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 °~TI~ ~ 13% COMP 10% COMP WIRE ~ HARNESSES °I~°~ COMP COMP - - TUBE ~ ASSEMBLIES 24% COMP 20% COMP 35 ~* VALVES CL-" 3% COMP 40 ~ TRANSDUCERS 14% COMP 10% COMP 3,250 - ~ 90% AVAIL 80% AVAIL 50% AVAIL 25% AVAIL 10% AVAIL FIGURR 12 PAGENO="0878" 874 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION SATURN S-IVB/IB & V MANUFACTURING PERFORMANCE - - -~ - LEG END HOURSINCLUDE -~ * MAJOR STRUCTURES * INSTALLATIONS * CHECKOUT - -. ESTIMATED HOURS ~ ACTUAL HOURS . 212 508 S-lB \ ~\ \~ ;-v 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 VEHICLES 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 FIGURE 13 this program is an excellent one These are all actual points, particu larly on Saturn V We started out using about 120,000 man hours per stage We have expressed a good learning curve, we are down here now, at about 60,000 Saturn V has come closer to the TB than we thought possible, all in all I think it represents ~tn excellent per formance Now, the ground test program (fig 14) We have spent an awful lot of money on ground tests and I thrnk it's well justified I think it's responsible for the wonderful record that the Saturn/Apollo pro gram has had to date in flight Our program-our component test program-has a total of about 1,132 tests Each one of these tests could be composed of anywhere between 10 to 30 separate tests of `t given component shock, vibration, cold, heat, vacuum, salt spray, and other things, and combinations of these things We are roughly at the 92 or 93 percent level Tests on all of the vehicle associated things are either finished or very shortly will be If you will remem ber, last year ~`e showed you how, before the 201 launch about 60 per cent of the program ~ as required to be complete We have proceeded on these flight assocrited tests (fig 15) to be complete by the 501 launch: all the things that were required for the 204 are done; as were all the things that were required for the 503 static fire We have about three open items before we qualify 501 for launch The remaining 10 percent of the test program is associated with miscellaneous GSE tests and the reliability quality maintenance program that was just initiated, which will continually test various components in the pro gram. These programs stretch out now. But the testing effort is largely behind us As you know, we have flown three of the uprated Saturn I's (fig 16) About all you can say is that all three flights were superb Cl) z - Cl) &~, 0 I- Cl) ~40 PAGENO="0879" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZAflON SATURN S*IVB COMPONENT TEST PROGRAMS 875. 1400 JIFIM 1966 AIMIJ JIAIS OINID JIF~M~ 1967 .~_L~L~L JIAIS OIN1D~ 1200 -~- 1000 800 60C 40C 20C STA RTS -~-~ ~-- 1098 ;7;;~4~: ~ \ ~ ~ \COMPLETION - S______ ~1031 - -~ - - FIGuRE 14 SATURN S-IVB QUALIFICATION TEST PROGRAM MILESTONES CATEGORY 204 LAUNCH 503 STATIC 501 LAUNCH GSE RELIABILITY VERIFICATION MISC VEHICLE 1967 JAN1 FEB L MAR ~ MAY JUN JUL ~r1 I 100%l I ~ I I 100% 190% ~+:i~Ii 30%' I ~ I I I~. I I~&~i AUG ~~~1 115% I ] I I I ~ I I FIGuRE 15 PAGENO="0880" 876 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Any parameter you want to look at is so close to nominal, it is scarcely worth talking about. In thrust, impulse, propellant consumption, orbital parameters-everything was so close that it just goes into the records as perfect. Now, turning to the manpower picture on the S-IVB. If you re- call, last February `we showed you our fiscal 1967 requirements. Look- ing at the authorized program (fig. 17), which `was the four Saturn TB stages and six Saturn V's, we had a ba'sic program estimated at almost $141 million. We were expecting $5 million additional tasks to come into the program. We were expecting `to finalize :a launch- site effort of about $17 million and `we `were expecting to finalize the Saturn V follow-on for stages 507 through 515, wi'th requirements of about $33 million, for a total of about $195 million. In that year, since you were here last, we have substantially underrun the `basic program to the tune of about $8 million. More scope has come into the program than we had expec~ted; about $15 million as opposed to $5 million. `The KSC effort `has grown `by about $1 millior~, but this has been reprogramed and the amount actually envisioned now to be spent has been cut about in `half, or this program has been reduced `by about $15 million. However, additional requirements of `the follow-on long lead author- ization on Saturn I has been `authorized to the tune of $6 million. If it is decided to replace Beta 3 and the 503 stage, additional funding in the amount of $2 million `will be required. We have included the bonus fees-since 1966 `we have negotiated the incentive contract. This represer~ts the Government's total liabil- ity and therefore does not represent what we have earned. We have FLIGHT PERFORMANCE RESULTS PARAMETER ~ PERCENT OF PREDICTED RESULTS 201 (FINAL) 202 203 AVERAGE ENGINE THRUST (LB) 99.97 102.07 99.34 ENGINE TOTAL IMPULSE (LB-SEC) 100.34 100.59 100.19 PROPELLANT CONSUMPTION 100.09 99.34 99.59 TELEMETRY EFFICIENCY 97.22 99.54 97.3 . 98.0 (P~L~) (ORBIT) CUTOFF ALTITUDE 100.5 98.36 100.00 CUTOFF VELOCITY 100.0 100.00 99.99 FIGURE 16 PAGENO="0881" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 877 earned to date about $3 million of that. But we have been asked to present this all today in terms of the Government's greatest potential liability. You might remember these manpower curves (fig. 18); the green lines are the estimates that we showed you last year, the red lines indi- cate our actual performance. It was right in here that we put the heavy emphasis on schedule, and we reloaded our program slightly to get on schedule and to do what the Government has advised us to do- to get ahead of schedule. We allowed our people to staff a little higher than first anticipated to get ahead of schedule and then pulled them off in this fashion. The net result, in addition to getting a couple of months ahead of schedule, actually resulted in about an $8 million savings in man-hours throughout the year. The year 1968 looks like this to us (fig. 19), showing the total au- thorized program through stages 212 and 515. We envision a program with fee and bonus incentive of $108 million-total bonus available is $8 million-how much of it we will earn remains to be seen. KSC launch site effort figures figures out at about $20.9 million. We hope that these adcjitions will come into the program during the year; the TB follow-on would require about $25 million and the Saturn V follow- on, beyond the 515 stage, would figure out to about $10 million in 1968. So the total funding requirement envisioned for the next fiscal year, would by $178 million. I thought I'd show you our production rate. As you know the fa- cilities here at Douglas were conceived and built to handle 12 stages per year, and the entire Apollo program is geared around 12 per year. lip to here, we are at the 8-stage-per-year level. In the next fiscal year, SATURN S-IVB 7.101 NASA FY 1967 FUNDING REQUIREMENTS (MILLIONS) FEB. 1966 ASSESSMENT FEB. 1967 ASSESSMENT SEPT 26, 1965 BASE 141.591 133.022 201-212 501-506 ADDED SCOPE THRU 12-26-65 5.027 THRU 12-18-66 15.840 KSC ON-SITE EFFORT 17.265 18.128 S-V FOLLOW ON 507-515 33.847 17.093 FUNDING REQ'TS WITH DECOMMITMENTS 195.130 180.763 ADDED REQ'TS BONUS FEE 6.346 SIB FOLLOW-ON 213-216 6.384 BETA III GSE & FACILITIES 1.500 REPLACEMENT STAGE .470 TOTAL FY 67 FUNDING 195.463 FIGURJ~ 17 76-265 0-67-pt. 2--56 PAGENO="0882" Cl) z Cl) 0 ~: LU 0 0. z S LU S-lB 201-212 S-V 501-515 INCENTIVE FEE S-lB AND S-V KSC ON-SITE S-lB 201-212 SV 501515 SUB TOTAL PENDING ADDITIONS S-lB FOLLOW-ON 213-228 S-V FOLLOW-ON 516-525 BETA III GSE REPLACEMENT STAGES 878 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION SATURN S-IVB ALL PLANTS TOTAL - MANPOWER LOADING PROFILE NRSR FY 19b7 r~I htnlMIP FIGURE 18 SATURN S IVB 7 101 NASA FY 1968 FUNDING REQUIREMENTS (MILLIONS) AUTHORIZED PROGRAM 108.608 8.135 20 957 137.700 SUB TOTAL TOTAL FUNDING AUTHORIZED AND PENDING FIGURE 19 25.700 10.100 .500 4.200 41.500 178.200 PAGENO="0883" 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION 879 if the TB follow-on oniy is approved, we will be at nine per year. We anticipate (fig. 20) building these Saturn V stages and these Saturn lB's. If the Saturn TB or the Saturn V is not approved, of course, we wouldn't build to 14, we would cut off at eight per year. We would be down to the Saturn V only in the following year and this would be the end of the program. If the Saturn TB's are approved, then we would continue in this fashion and we would have both 1968 and 1969 at nine per year, then drop down to five per year in 1970 and four per year in 1971, and there would be one bird built in 1972. Now, another option open to NASA is to continue the Saturn V pro- gram witho~t the TB. -In this case the production rate here at Douglas would look like this (fig. 21). Again, the following year would be seven. There would be no end at 13 or 14. Then the Saturn V would run out in this fashion: five per year in 1969, three in 1970, and three in 1971, and that would be the end of the program. Now if both of these, the Saturn I's and Saturn V's, are authorized, the program would look like this (fig. 22) up to nine for 2 years to 1969, then down to eight, seven, and then we would be down to Saturn V only for 3 more years at three per year. Mr. DoUGLAs. These programs are the ones that are contingent on the Apollo applications program. Mr. FRIETAG. Yes, I think the continuing rate is close to four and four per year, for Saturn TB's and Saturn V's. Mr. SMrni, Yes; I didn't know whether these charts (figs. 20, 21, and `22) were going to make sense or not, but basically, they show how the various production options would affect us here at Douglas, keep- ing in mind the fact that we are really facilitized `and quite capable of higher production than this. Even with the program envisioned, we will only be at a percentage of our capacity. S-IVB STAGES PRODUCTION RATES BASIC PROGRAM PLUS S-lB (213-228) ONLY I~s~B1 L~ s~v - ~. - 207-210 . ~02 203-206 ~ 2~23 1964-65 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 FIGuRE 20 8 7 2 1 0 PAGENO="0884" 880 LU I- 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION S-IVB STAGES PRODUCTION RATES BASIC PROGRAM PLUS S-V (516-528) ONLY S-IVB STAGES PRODUCTION RATES COMBINED PROGRAMS II~1.J' S-IB] ~~s-v1~ 207-210 - - 21 9-223 :-:- ~. 224-227 203-206 F~1~- :~ - - 306- 510 - .~11-~ 515 :~ -~- ~: - - 201 -202 -n- :::::: [::::.:1 :-:-:- -r - I 503- 505 ~ - ~ - ~ - ~ - ~ 518 ~ - ~ 519-- 521 ~ 1964-65 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 FIGURE 22 Mr. PErrls. Mr. Chairman, before you go into that may I ask a question? What is the modus operandi for working with prime con- tractors above you and below you on the birds-as far as mating? Mr. SMITH. The interfacing? Mr. PETTIS. The interfacing, with the other companies? I'm ignorant of this, being a newcomer. How do you work with North American? Fiauiu~ 21 8 7 LU I- 4 2 1 0 PAGENO="0885" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 881 Mr. SMITH. The vehicle itself, of course, is all contracted by Mar- sha~ll Space Flight Center. The Boeing S-IC, the North American S-IT, and the Douglas S-IVB are built under separate contracts from Marshall. We have working group meetings, and the interface documents are controlled by the Government. Anyone who makes a change or a request for a change, which would effect an interface, has a set proce- dure that we go through. Various testing programs are put together with joint participation of the contractOrs and. the Government. I mentioned on the tour that we have tested the structural joints between the S-Il and S-IVB here at Douglas, and I assume there are similar programs between North American and Boeing. We have been involved and we have tested in our 39-foot space simu- lator chamber the complete Saturn instrument unit, the IBM instr~i- ment unit, and its interface with S-IVB upper skirt. They share a com- mon thermoconditioning system. The instrument unit provides a refrigerant fluid that circulates through the cold plates that cool all the S-IVB electronics. Mr. Douoi~&s. Well, is it true, too, that we make the master tools as a part of that interfacing? Mr. SMITH. Yes, that's part of the interface, Don, and part of the implementation. An interface drawing is made and controlled by Marshall. Then they contract that out. Somebody makes the tool and they make a duplicate master. One goes to North American and one goes to us. Mr. TEAGUE. Well, Ted, what about the part General Electric plays in this? In the checkout? Mr. SMITH. Well, that is at the Cape. Mr. `TEAGUE. They are only at the Cape? Mr. SMITH. Yes, ~ctually the independence of the three stages is quite complete. Mr. FREITAG. I think I might make one comment here, in addition to the contract that produces the first stage, Boeing also has a contract for certain total integration responsibilities. Mr. SMITH. That's true. Mr. FREITAG. The preparation of much of the common interface documentation and checkout list and so on, is a contract that Boeing has for the Saturn V. Chrysler has a similar contract on the TB. Marshall has the basic responsibility, but Boeing and Chrysler support Marshall in this area. Mr. ABLE. It's worth pointing out too, Ted, that during qualification testing, where some peculiar phenomena comes out at any one of the contractors, the data is made immediately available to all of the con- tractors on the Saturn stack. Mr. PETTIS. Behind my question, being a business type and knowing the fierceness of competition between corporate entities, I just wonder how you have the great grand love affair you see here. Mr. ABLE. It wasn't to begin with, Jerry. Courting took place and it got better and better. Mr. PETTIS. I See. Mr. ABLE. Really, we have had an awful lot of experience with this through our Air Force programs. We have been quite used to the PAGENO="0886" 882 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION associate contractor relationship, for a number of years We all ha~ e everything to gain if we make `L vehicle work, and everything to lose if we don't make it work. Mr. PEms. That's the real key, then. Mr DORRENBACHER I think it is fair to say that the fierceness is there when you are still competing for a contract. But, once the con- tract is awarded, then you better work together or you're cutting each other's throats and your own too. Mr. SMITH. Also pertinent is that for the real integration job on these large programs the responsibility has to go back to the Govern- ment They hired Boeing and Chrysler to help them with their task, but basically, we get our direction from the Government rather than another contractor. Mr. HALL. Ted, I might say that also from the Government view- point, we are very much interested in this type of cooperation. I think in the Apollo program, more than any other program, it has forced this mass integration between prime contractors. It's some- thing they each desire to do, and we are very cognizant of any prob- lems in this local area. We maintain a very~ close interface beVween the :NASA people at ~North A~merican, at Rocketdyne,. and ourselves. We encourage the exchange of information, and the contractors on both sides are very anxious to do that. Mr. DOUGLAS. Besides that, we have our Apollo executive council, where frankly we wash everybody's linen in front of everybody else We happened to have been sitting in council when they had this un- fortunate accident at the cape. There are no holds barred at these meetings. There is a list of critical items; it may have a Boeing item, a Douglas item, a North American item, or anybody else's. We all know what all the problems are. Mr. PErrIs. This is something I haven't come across. Thank you. Mr SMITH There is a tremendous integration task, `tnd it is being handled in a very efficient manner. Now, let's go on to the Apollo Applications program, and orbital workshop If the primary objectives of the Apollo progr'~m are suc cessful enough it's planned that the first Apollo Applications mission will be a four bird mission with the spent stage workshop The way it is presently envisioned (fig 23), if and when the birds `Lre converted for this purpose, it's first `L dual launch, where Saturn I will carry `tn Apollo command and service module with a mapping and survey module payload. They would go into orbit at the 125-mile level, perform a 4 day mapping and survey mission Four or five days later another Saturn I would launch the spent stage with an airlock, and various experiments with the equipment to be used in the spent stage workshop activity (fig 24) Mr TEAGUE Ted, excuse me 1 minute Anybody ~ ant him to go through this again ~ Some of us have seen that chart, Ted, but done in a different way Jerry and I have seen this chart, `i~nd Larry and Earl have seen others not quite the same Mr SMITH I'll rip through this very quickly then, if you are that familiar with it I would like to point out the participation that we `tt Douglas are either doing or hope to do (fig 25) PAGENO="0887" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 883 ORBITAL WORKSHOP & SOLAR OBSERVATORY 1968.ASSEMBLY, ACTIVATION & INITIAL USE WORKSHOP ORBITAL SOLAR MAX ASTRONOMY ACTIVATION REACTIVATE WORKSHOP r ~ 28 DAYS ORBITAL ~ [CSM & LM/ATM\ STORAGE L ~ RENDEZVOUS CSM RENDEZVOUS M&SS OPNS ~ RENDEZVOUS LM/ATM j 4 DAYS ~M&SS1 I 14.51 AA 1 AA 2 ORBITAL CSM WORKSHOP M&SS UNMANNED FIGuR1~ 23 NASA DETAIL OF ORBITAL WORKSHOP QUICK RELEASE MANHOLE 260 200- 100 - 14 J~M!J~DAY CSM RESUPPLY LM/ATM MODULE UNMANNED INITIAL EXPERIMENT DEPLOYMENT AREA COMPARTMENT NO. 2 373 CU. FT. FIGURE 24 PAGENO="0888" 884 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Let me go through in this order. One of the three things that we are presently participating in is the passivation system. The first thing the astronauts have to do, before they climb into this spent-stage tank, is to make sure it is safe and that involves venting down, and so forth. The passivation system (fig. 26) now is conceived as an auto- matic operation. it will be programed into the sequencer in the in- strument unit and then automatically the tanks will be vented down. The command destruct system will be deactivated. All of the gas bottles will be depressurized, as well as the gas supplies in the auxiliary propulsion system, to make the tank safe for the astronauts to enter. If this thing is to stay in orbit a year, most people. feel that some type of meteoriod protection will be needed around the spent stage (fig. 27). We are doing a study and will make a proposal to Marshall. The scheme we like best is the very thin micrometeroid bumper which wraps around the stage with straps during boost. The straps are disposed of by explosive bolts, after it's out of the atmosphere; the bumper springs out to the optimum distance of 5 inches after you get the thing in orbit, and will provide micrometeroid protection. It is not completely clear whether or not this is going to be required. We are just looking at various means to do it. The second thing is a hatch. The Gemini experience has indicated that you don't want to have astronauts undoing 150 half-inch bolts, As we conceive it opening the door is a power-assisted operation (fig. 28). Figure 29 is an artist's likeness of an astronaut opening the hatch. The astronaut would be in the body of the airlock. His only ORBITAL WORKSHOP TASKS * PASSIVATION SYSTEMS * METEOROID PROTECTION * QUICK OPENING DOOR (HATCH) * FIRE RETARDANT LINER 1 STRUCTURAL INSTALLATIONS FIGURE 25 PAGENO="0889" LH2 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION STAGE PASSIVATION FOR ASTRONAUT SAFETY 885 COMMAND DESTRUCT RECEIVER FIGURE 26 FIGURE 27 PAGENO="0890" 886 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 28 FIGURE 29 PAGENO="0891" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 887 action would be to pull a locking pin and actuate a pneumatic lever handle which compresses a split ring which forms the seal between the tank and manhole cover. With the cover of the hatch removed, you can see the sourc of the power (fig. 30). We have, a stored gas bottle, a valve, and an actuator that does the shrinking and allows the hatch to be opened. The'fire retardant liner we looked at in stage 211 this morning. This is an internal shot (fig. 31) of the 8-foot test tank we showed you as we were driving through the building. We have insulated this tank, lined it with aluminum, had it at Sacramento, run multiple cryogenic loadings under full pressure,. and checked, many different coatings in the tank and determined that the foil was the optimum liner. We are now going ahead and lining the 211 bird. Perhaps our most basic job is to provide mountings within the tank that various equipments can be attached to the floor, sleeping quarters, and so forth. Each place that the waffle pattern ribs in the tank skin intersect, there is a boss (fig. 32); there is enough metal there that we can insert a stud. We put about 200 of these in each stage that has a possibility of being used as a workshop, so that there will be a kind of pegboard arrangement that has great flexibility in installing equipment. Mr. PErris. Does the floor for the work area and living quarters attach to these points? FIGuRE 30 PAGENO="0892" 888 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION ORBITAL WORKSHOP ATTACHMENT DETAIL FIGURE 31 FIGURE 32 PAGENO="0893" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION. 889 Mr. SMITH. Yes. This is shown in figure 33. The crew quarters and work area are toward the bottom of the liquid hydrogen tank. The following series of slides, figures 34 through 39, show some of the experiments and their locations within the stage. These are the presently proposed experiments. Our primary involvement in this program is how these experiments and the associated hardware attach into the tank area. ORBITAL WORKSHOP WORK AREA & LIVING QUARTERS WORK AREA HYGIENE GALLEY FIGuRE 33 USAF ALTERNATE RESTRAINTS EXPERIMENT (STOWED) MSC BIO-MEDICAL EXPERIMENT METABOLIC COST INFLIGHT TASKS EXP. (DEPLOYED) FIGURE 34 PAGENO="0894" BlO-LAB UTILIZATION (HABITABILITY) 240 CU. FT. ENCLOSED VOL. CPT. RECORDER METABOLIC COST INFLIGHT-~ TASKS EXPERIMENT FIGuI~E 36 890 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION CREW COMPARTMENT NO. 2 FIGURE 3~S 0 PLAN VIEW TO VAC GAS METER & CHROMATOGRAPH PAGENO="0895" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION BlO-LAB UTI LI ZATION (HABITABILITY) 240 CU. FT. ENCLOSED VOL. CPT. 891 PLAN VIEW TO VAC LBNP SYSTEM AIR CIRCULATION READ-OUTS & TIMER NEGATIVE PRESSURE EXPERIMENT (LBNP) ORBITAL WORKSHOP HIGH PRESSURE GAS EXPULSION EXPERIMENT ZERO `G' EVACUATION DEVICE FIGURE 37 FIGURE 38 PAGENO="0896" 892 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION ORBITAL WORKSHOP HEAT EXCHANGER SERVICE EXPERIMENT ZERO `G' Now the one other thing that we have been asked to look at by Huntsville, is what does it take to make the Saturn V suitable for a synchronous orbit? A synchronous orbit is 22,000 miles. An orbit- ing body rotates at the same rate the Earth turns and you can make a payload hover over a given spot, or over a figure eight area crossing the equator, if it is nonequatorial. We are in a 2-month study to see what we would have to do, and most of the changes would have to be in the S-IVB. We have com- pleted a study that indicates that the best way to get into a syn- chronous orbit is a three~burn mode (fig. 40). We burn into earth orbit as we do in a lunar mission. But we don't use all of the remain- ing propellants as we would on a lunar mission, in going into the transfer orbit. Then we relight the engine for a~ third burn to inject into the synchronous orbit. There is a 13-hour coast time for the S-IVB in this mode and you can see the payloads that can be achieved in the synchronous orbit for whatever missions are approved. Our net working payload varies between 60;000 and 70,000 pounds. To date, it appears that outside of making the engine capable of a third start (it is now capable of two), the changes necessary for this mission are relatively minor and inexpensive (fig. 41). We would have to have some battery changes for capacity; we would have to have a little more high pressure gas capacity; and minor modifica- tions to the J2 engine. Additional slosh baffles would be needed in the hydrogen tank; a little different and longer duration thermal protec- tion system for the electronics. It looks as though the auxiliary pro- pulsion system would need a little more propellant and a very minor TO VACUUM (UTILIZE EXISTING VALVING) LH2 HEAD STEAM STAGE WORK SHOP FIGuRE 39 PAGENO="0897" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 893 SYNCHRONOUS ORBIT THREE BURN S-IVB, S-IVB INJECTION EQUAT INCLINED I PAYLOAD 1000 1=28.5° 1=6401 MAX WT IN SYNCH ORBIT 95,000 103,100 97,000 L!ET WT ABOVE IU 59,800 67,900 6~~j HOVER POINT SELECTION COMPLETE EARTH COVERAGE NUMBER OF S-IVB ENGINE STARTS THREE S-IVB COAST TIME 13 HOURS 2ND BURN FIGURE 40 sYNCHRONOUS ORBIT SIGNIFICANT HARDWARE MODIFICATIONS * ADD 1 BATTERY AND CHANGE 1 BATTERY IN FORWARD SKIRT * ADD 2 BATTERIES AND CHANGE 2 BATTERIES IN AFT SKIRT * ADD 2 COLD HELIUM BOTTLES * ADD J-2 ENGINE RECHARGE LINE IN ENGINE AREA * ADD LH2 AND LOX SLOSH BAFFLES * ADD ACTIVE AND PASSIVE ELECTRONICS THERMAL PROTECTIVE SYSTEMS * ADD AUXILIARY FUEL TANK TO APS * REPLACE TRANSMITTER AND AMPLIFIER AND ADD A COAX SWITCH FIGURE 41 3RD BURN 1ST BURN r16-265 O-67---~pt. 2--57 PAGENO="0898" 894 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION change in the communication gear. But, all in all, it looks as though this hardware is extremely versatile with very minor changes. The conclusion (fig. 42) of the S-IVB program report-just to re- peat a few points I would like to make-is that we are experiencing substantial underruns in manpower, under what we predicted last ~ ear Discounting the effects of the 503 incident, in general, we are either on schedule or ahead of schedule in delivering stages for the Government need date We have had `~ failure, we have determined the cause, and have taken preventive action. We can meet our com- mitments to Cape Kennedy. If the program is to continue to run in an efficient manner, we will need timely contract authorization for the follow-on stages in the coming year. Generally, it looks as though the S-IVB is a very versatile piece of hardware, that `with minor modifications can be made to do many other missions than the current Apollo mission. CONCLUSIONS * SUBSTANTIAL UNDERRUN FOR FY `67 COST AND MANPOWER PROJECTIONS PREPARED LAST YEAR * PROGRAM DELIVERIES IN ADVANCE OF CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS * CAUSE OF 503 INCIDENT DETERMINED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION BEING TAKEN * KSC STAGE REQUIREMENTS CAN GENERALLY BE MET * TIMELY CONTRACT AUTHORIZATION FOR FOLLOW-ON PROCUREMENT REQUIRED * S-IVB STAGES ADAPTABLE TO ADVANCE MISSIONS, SUCH AS ORBITAL WORKSHOP AND SYNCHRONOUS ORBIT FIGuRE 42 PAGENO="0899" ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY (Remarks by C. R. Able, Group Vice President, Missile and Space Systems) Our next topic is advanced technology. The space-directed pro- grams within the Missile and Space Systems Division's area of future interest are the responsibility of our Advanced Systems and Tech- nology directorate. We often describe this entire advanced technology operation as analogous to working with technical building blocks. In effect, the AS&T engineering staff creates the building blocks that will even- tually comprise a space system. In practice, as each building block requirement is identified, every aspect is researched and engineered until it becomes technically practical. This activity is supported by our own Independent Research and Development (IRAD) program and by Contract Research and De- velopment (CRAD) funding. The projects and programs undertaken are relevant to and. directed toward a matrix of selected end-point systems. Typically, they are study contracts or technical building blocks experimental contracts that range in funded cost from a few thousand dollars to as much as $3 million. The total effort in our Advanced Systems and Technology activity now exceeds $30 million a year. Since 1961-62, when we established a separate program for manned spacecraft, the considerable expenditure that we have made advanced our technological capability until we were able to bid for and win the contract to design and build the Manned Orbiting Laboratory. Our "homework," these IRAD and CRAD funded studies and experi- ments, was the most important factor contributing to that success. By identifying what the general needs of the manned space station business were, and by doing our homework, Douglas has become quali- fled to lead the way in the development of manned space stations. Through these processes, we have been able to systematically resolve the technical problems that were critical to the space station develop- ment. We are still conducting studies and experiments that will lead to the eventual development of increasingly sophisticated space stations. Looking ahead to a more diversified manned space program, we are now conducting studies of problems ranging from those associated with the approaching need for reusable spacecraft an.d launch vehicles, to the development of nuclear stages and new concepts for providing secondary power. Our belief that maneuverable spacecraft and lift- ing-body entry vehicles will constitute important steps in the evolution of reusable spacecraft has prompted us to supplement our contracted studies in this area with company-funded studies. 895 PAGENO="0900" 896 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION In a similar manner, our Advanced Systems and Technology opera- tion is also concerned with missiles. Obviously, when operations become as complex as those concerned with manned space and sophisticated missile programs, it is vital to identify goals that will contribute most to the mainstream technical requirements and which are most compatible with the company's tech- nical and financial capability. The net result of this kind of logic is an orderly progression of building block capabilities. These are not, however, easy goals to achieve. They preclude the "shotgun" approach. Instead, they make it necessary to take careful aim at well defined objectives that have as an end product a specific building block immediately related to the requirements of the com- pany goals. The importance of being selective in AS&T activities, and the need to build a high degree of technical competence have become more and more pronounced as systems continue to reach higher levels of sophisti- cation. This trend is continuing. Today, competition is so strong because all of the organizations that can legitimately compete for major con- tracts have had to follow courses similar to the one we have taken. Capabilities have to be achieved before definitive descriptions of future systems are available. Established capability in the required disci- plines has become so important that no organization can be considered capable of designing and building the future space systems unless it has had previous recognition and contract support from the Govern- ment's technical laboratories. It is highly impractical for a proposing contractor to bid on a future system unless he has done his homework through related study contracts and experiments. The work and cost required to attain this kind of capability makes it almost imperative that the contractor win the majority of those competitions for which he has worked to qualify. Our next speaker, Jim Dorrenbacher is responsible for the direction of MSSD's research and development activities that lead to the major system contracts. As vice president in charge of the Advanced Sys- tems and Technology organization, he is most qualified to describe our space-directed programs and projects, how they influence Douglas as a contractor and what they contribute to the future of thQ United States in space. Jim directs an engineering team that consists of over 1,000 highly qualified engineers, each a specialist in one or more aspects of advanced technology-this group is separate from our Development Engineering Department. The members of this group are chartered to concentrate their efforts on systems and technology programs that will he realized as state of the art developments 3 to 10 years in the future. PAGENO="0901" ADVANCED SYs~rE.Ms TECHNOLOGY REvIEw (Presented by 0. J. Dorrenbacher, Vice President, Advanced Systems and Technology, Missile & Space Systems Division) I kind of feel like the dog in the dog .and pony show-I've talked to members of your committee three times before, Mr. Chairman, like Ted Smith. They are probably getting tired of seeing us. Mr. TE.AGUE:. No, sir, Jim, I don't think so. Mr. DORRENBACHER. Everytime I stand before you, I feel kind of humble, because I'm really trying to talk on a subject which is much broader than any one contractor-namely, what does the future look like? Today, rather than bore you with a lot of pet concepts, I will try to use some suggested concepts as a way of putting into perspective what we believe the next 20 years of the space program should hold. You have to start by talking about cost and effectiveness, in what- ever context our national space goals appear. Twenty years from now, assuming that the number of dollars ap- propriated for space applications remains constant, those dollars will buy only half the product-by weight-that we get today. Inflation is one reason for this, but the second reason is increased sophistication of the product. Thus, the dollar cost-per-pound of space hardware will increase. At first glance, you might think this means that the space budget has to double in the next 20 years to maintain our present pace. But that is not the case. When you examine the progress to be made in 20 years, it turns out that the product this industry can provide 20 years downstream will be about 50 times more effective than what it produces today. This will come about because of increases in payload effectiveness, and increases in transportation effectiveness. Some of this will be shown in our presentation today. With the gross national product increasing, if you again assume a constant level of space appropriations, then in 20 years we will be spending only about half the percentage of gross national product that we are now spending for space. Thus, if we spend our space appropriations wisely, and new programs are timed to start in the proper sequence for cost effectiveness, then the years ahead will give us a much improved yield on our investment. At present, the space program produces dividends mainly in the area of scientific experimentation, and the value of this is already in- creasingly apparent. This new technology already contributes to everyone's personnel well-being, and to the general conomy. But as the space program approaches the 20-year mark, we should reach the point where true commercial utilization of space will start to pre- 897 PAGENO="0902" 898 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION dominate, as opposed to simple Government utilization for experi- mental purposes. Now, in that broad context of cost and effectivity, the discussion today should be broken into two parts: first, the near-term problem- the decisions that must be made now and in the next 2 or 3 years to provide us with the next 10 years of capability. The second part is the long term problem-those decisions for which the technological work must be done within the next 5 years, to allow us to make de cisions on 5- to 15-year hardware programs after the 5 years. Starting with the near term problem, it seems clear that our efforts and decisions will fall in four general categories (fig. 43). First, there is the need to develop an Earth orbital operations capability for civilian and scientific use Second, depending upon what m in finds when he lands on the lunar surface, decisions will have to be made that will establish the follow on lunar exploration tasks The thn d cate gory of decisionmaking for the near term future is concerned with the need for an improved transportation capability These improvements will be needed to accommodate the increased demands for Earth orbi tal capabilities, lunar exploration, and the unmanned planetary pro gram The fourth category, unmanned planetary missions, will pro vide the information required to make decisions concerning the future of manned planetary missions. One of the first priority considerations to be faced in the near-term future is the function and mission capability of manned earth orbital space stations. In this area, many configurations and functions have been proposed The S-IVB cluster (S-IVB workshop) shown in figure 44 is a typical example of an early configuration It utilizes a spent S-IVB stage as the manned workshop area and incorporates adapter systems to `iccommodate docking other spacecraft This con figuration is also designed to incorporate a telescope. Regardless of the configuration, the basic intent of this first Earth orbital program is NEAR TERM FUTURE (0-10 YEARS) * EARTH ORBITAL - CIVILIAN AND SCIENTIFIC * LUNAR EXPLORATION FOLLOW ON * TRANSPORTATION IMPROVEMENTS * UNMANNED PLANETARY FIGURE 43 PAGENO="0903" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 899 S*IVB CLUSTER to accomplish a variety of specific tasks that will provide basic infor- mation about what can be expected in terms of the economic utilization of space by civilian and scientific personnel. The Manned Orbiting Laboratory contract that we have here at Douglas also marks a begin- ning step in this direction. Basically, the near-term future space station goals must be con- cerned with the need to appraise what can be accomplished with multi- spectral sensors; and find out about the psychological and physiolog- ical reaction of men when they are subjected to the space environ- ment for long periods of time. These first step requirements are corn- parable to the utilization of Gemini to develop rendezvous techniques. The psychological and physiological aspects of this initial program will contribute much to the science of medicine and human behavior. The use of Earth sensors will demonstrate the potential value of space stations as platforms for geographical, topographical, national re- source, and weather surveys. The proposed communications experi- ments will help to determine the utility of using manned space stations as relay and transmission systems. The economic aspects of these applications are readily apparent. To achieve economic uJtilization of space, there is an important requirement for developing methods of resupply. Problems such as the difficulty of transferring liquids in space must be resolved. Without this capability, the very important economic advantages that are anticipated cannot be achieved. The accomplishments of these and related near-term goals will provide the increased efficiency that had been extrapolated for the long-term future. Ultimately, it will be necessary to get the scientist to the space sta- tion where he can operate his own testing equipment. With that pur- pose in view, within 10 years an astronomer on board the space station will look through a 100-200-inch telescope into space. When that day comes, this scientist is going to learn more in the first year than FIGURE 44 PAGENO="0904" 900 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION has been learned since mankind first began to watch the stars in the sky. Learning to meet the scientific and logistic requirements of space station operation will supply the fundamental knowledge required for Earth orbital operations. This is the challenge now. In a sense, this Nation has arrived at the second milestone in its space program. In fiscal 1968 two tests must be faced: now that the latest designs are beginning to come together as hardware, the effectiveness of this hardware for use in future missions must be appraised; then it must be decided whether to maintain that capability or whether to continue to improve the ability to operate in space. Merely permitting the status quo to continue during fiscal 1968 will amount to a negative decision, and will be as though this Nation had deliberately elected to stop improving its space mission capability. If nc~thing is done, industry's technological capabilities, in terms of experience, and avail- able techncal manpower, will have deteriorated by 20 to 30 percent by the end of fiscal 1968. Because most space directed funding is going into hardware, the developmental technologies are not being utilized at their most effective level. This developmental technology is a most important facet of the in- dustry's capability; it is the leading edge of our Nation's competence to achieve and maintain a dominant international role in space and planetary exploitation. Among the next steps that must be taken to maintain this capability is the development of self-contained space station packages that~can rendezvous in space. Then, a more sophisti- cated device, still in the "brute force" category, will be needed. An example of this kind of system (fig. 45) is an S-IVB stage com- pletely equipped before it is launched, as opposed to rendezvous and S-V DRY LAUNCH AIR LOCK EXPERIMENT SENSOR. ENGINE ROOM G E P TELESCOPE METEROID BUMPEI RCS THRUSTOR5. FIGu1~E 45 PAGENO="0905" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 901 furbishment after the stage is in orbit. Something similar to this example is the next logical step. This is merely one concept. For example, the same purpose can be accomplished by clustering manned space stations and launching them on a Saturn V. In this late con- cept, the clustered laboratories would be deployed in a spoke configur- ation, or in other configurations, depending upon the nature of the mission. The basic difference between orbiting a number of space station components and then rendezvousing and assembling them in space, or orbiting a completely equipped laboratory system, primarily involves the sophistication level of the sensing and observing equip- ment that can be employed. In the first instance, sophistication is limited by the size and weight of equipment that can be delivered to rendezvous and connected. At present it is quite difficult and expen- sive to perform interconnections and manufacturing operations in space. Tools and techniques for this purpose are still in the rudi- mentary stages of development. As a consequence of these limita- tions, it is not possible to employe large, complex sensing and observ- ing equipment. To achieve that capability, it is necessary to accept the increased complexity of having to orbit larger payloads and sup- port larger crews. This second step, orbiting large payloads, is more useful but it is still part of the brute-force method in that no attempt is made to im- prove the logistics cost pattern. However, the most acceptable ap- proach has always been to keep the investment cost as low as pos- sible while the programs are in the early development stages, even though a penalty accrues in the cost of operations. Although the ste 1 system is assembled in orbit and the step 2 system is furbished an launched from the ground intact, both are brute-force systems. First these systems will be used in lower orbits; then they will be used in synchronous orbits. The data obtained from these missions will pro-. vide the information leading to the development of long duration space station operations. Essentially, the approach to lunar exploration will follow the same growth pattern that has been assumed for Earth orbital missions. For lunar explorations, first there were the photographic orbiter missions, then, a soft landed photographic mission on the Moon. Soon, the Apol- lo lunar orbiting and landing mission will be undertaken. What should come next in the logical progression appears to closely parallel the missions that will probably be assigned to the Earth orbiting space stations mission. At this junction, it appears advantageous to orbit a sophisticated payload around the Moon to complement the Apollo landing capability. The lunar applications of spent stage-orbital (LASSO) survey mission shown in figure 46 is a typical example of this kind of support capability. Again, the precise configuration is not the important consideration. What is important is that, through extensions of the existing Apollo hardware, it is possible by this method to obtain the capability to map the lunar surface from an orbiting vehicle. This capability, in con- junction with lunar surface activities, will greatly improve the ca- pability to explore the lunar surface. In reply to those who doubt the scientific and economic worth of lunar exploration, I should like to say that I believe that by ex- PAGENO="0906" 902 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION LASSO SURVEY MISSION 1-APOLLO LAUNCH #2 / ,-LASSO LAUNCH #1 / / /CSM S-IVB SPENT STAGE J-2S ENGINE ///~ // -POWER SYSTEMS AND SCIENTIFIC EQUIPMENT ___________ & /7-' - .- STANDARD LEM /// -~ ~- LANDING MISSION / IVJUVI~ - - FIGURE 46 ploring the Moon, this Nation will learn enough about the origin and structure of the Earth to more than pay for the effort. Many other kinds of information and scientific opportunities will present them- selves during this era. And although I will not list them here, I am personally sure that each of them will, in time, return far more than the cost. of the initial adventures. After the first missions to the Moon, when follow-on missions such as lunar applications survey are undertaken, a situation will exist which is similar to the one extrapolated for the Earth orbiting space stations. It will be necessary t.o have an expanded capability beyond t.hat of the initial Apollo configuration in order to accommodate the requirements of t.he scientific observers who will necessarily accompany the astro- naut-pilots on these missions. To meet this requirement, payloads must be greatly increased and the transportation system will have to be modified. It appears entirely feasible t.o expand the basic capabilities of the Apollo hardware to facilitate greater lunar landing payloads. One possible configuration is shown in figure. 47. The figure illustrates a lunar application for spent stages (LASS). This configuration ca.n be achieved by adding two throttleable engines to, for example, the S-IVB stage. By utilizing such a system it will be possible to land appreciably larger payloads on the lunar surface. Achievem.ent of that capability will have accomplished a large part of the objective of accommodating scientific investigators on t.he Moon. The general pattern of Earth orbital activities, extended lunar orbit.- ing, and lunar surface operations appears to be the most feasible direc- tion to take in the near term future. The configurations of the hard- PAGENO="0907" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 903 ware required to accomplish this purpose are not the most immediate considerations. What is important are the decisions that have to be made in the immediate future in order to support this kind of pro- gressive increase in space operations capability. Progressing in this fashion will make it possible to maintain the required level of indus- trial competence and provide for a smooth transition from the Apollo hardware confl~urations and capabilities to the eventual capability that will be available when a reusable transportation system has been achieved. The hardware that will be available if this kind of transi- tion is undertaken will provide a usable base for about.1O years. While it will not be feasible during this transition period to signifi- cantly change the efficiency of the transport system., it will be possible to deliver larger and larger payloads. Using the Thor and Delta systems as an example, the payload capabilities have been increased by a factor of 4 or 5 over the original configurations, at essentially no increase in launch cost. When we described that progression at one of our previous conferences, we said that we were studying a similar pattern to increase the efficiency of the Saturn vehicle. A possible candidate growth pattern for the uprated Saturn I is shown in figure 48. The corresponding cost pattern as a function of this growth pattern is shown in figure 49. It looks very similar to the corresponding cost pattern that we showed you at our last meeting. If we propose to follow a growth pattern similar to that of the Thor, the incremental increase in payload capability will be obtained in a similar manner. As payload requirements increase, the Saturn vehicle can be uprated to match. Assuming that payload requirements con- FIGURE 47 PAGENO="0908" 904 U) 0 -J -J 0 z -J LU I- U) 0 0 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION UPRATED SATURN I - GROWTH CONFIGURATION I- LU LU L~ 300 - 250 - 200 150 100 - 50 - 3 X 156" SRM (3 SEG.) UPRATED SATURN I - OPERATING COST 260" SRM FL 0 FIGURE 48 50 45 40 - - 5 X 120 SRM (5 SEG~ # / ~ 4XMM ~ -~ 5Xl2OSRI~lI -~ (7 SEG.) ~ ~56 S~tP~~ 0(S-~VB) 260 SRM STAGE ~I-~ o STD. ~ S-lB `/2 LENGTH 3,4 LENGTH I FULL LENGTH O~-~-__ 040 50 60 70 80 90 100 MAXIMUM ORBITAL PAYLOAD CAPABILITY (THOUSANDS OF POUNDS) FIGURE 49 tinue to follow the pattern that has been established in the past, the first uprated configuration will utilize strapon booster elements. In the second uprating cycle, solid basement stages comprised of 156- to 260-inch motors will be employed. This uprating option is limited at about 100,000 pounds. PAGENO="0909" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 905 The decision to uprate the Saturn TB does not have to be made until after specific payload requirements have been established. However, it is important to insure that funding is available for development options to meet increased payload requirements. Except that there are more options available, the Saturn V uprating would follow a pattern similar to Saturn I (fig. 50). There is an additional option because it is possible to use a higher pressure engine. Again, where the payload capabilities can be increased by a factor of 2 or more, the cost pattern (fig. 51) is similar to the one shown for Saturn I. Essentially, operating costs remain constant. As with Saturn I, the precise pattern of growth is not the major consideration. However, it is important to anticipate operating requirements so that they can be accommodated when specific payload requirements have been established. Increased payload capabilities and uprated booster systems consti- tute the general growth pattern that we believe will be the most prac- tical approach to improvement in the near term future. We believe that it is possible to increase transportation efficiency by a factor of 2 or 3, both in the Saturn I and Saturn V class of hardware. This kind of increase is the first step toward achieving the 50-fold improve- ment in system effectiveness which I have proposed can be achieved within the next 20 years. Certainly, the uprating philosophy applies to the projected hard- ware for manned planetary systems. The same uprated transporta- tion system, assembled as shown in figure 52, can be employed for manned planetary flyby missions. Accompanied by unmanned probes UPRATED SATURN V - GROWTH CONFIGURATION 400 410 FT-,~ 410 364 Fl- 350 300 -/ Ui ~ 250 -- 200 150 NEW HIGH 4 x 156" SRM STD S~V P~ ENGINE _______ (3 SEG.) 0 FiGulni 50 PAGENO="0910" 906 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION capable of planetary sampling, this form of transport can be feasibly employed in the near-term future. The configuration (fig. 52) em- ploys the Saturn V vehicle and terminates in an orbital assembly which consists of three S-IVC stages and a payload. The S-IVC stage is a modified version of the S-IVB. It employs the same engine, Cl) z 0 -J -J = 0 z -J `JJ a- I- Cl) 0 0 UPRATED SATURN V - OPERATING COST FIGURE 51 PLANETARY ORBITAL LAUNCH VEHICLE MAXIMUM ORBITAL PAYLOAD CAPABILITY (THOUSANDS OF POUNDS) J~1S~IVC ,~S-IVC S-Il S-Il S-IVC S-Il S-IC S-IC ~L~2r~ S-IC ORBITAL ASSEMBLY - CHECKOUT - LAUNCH PAYLOAD S-IVC PAYLOAD S-IVC S-IVC S-IVC S-IVC x MARS VENUS FIGURE 52 PAGENO="0911" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 907 but is capable of sustaining longer coast periods and it can be as- sembled, checked out, and launched from orbit. This version incor- porating three S-IVC stages could deliver a 200,000-pound payload to Mars. A two-stack version could deliver the same payload to Venus. These systems, used for planetary flyby missions, could obtain a suffi- cient quantity and quality of data to permit a decision to be made relative to manned planetary landing missions. If the data thus obtained supports the feasibility of a manned planetary landing, and if the decision is made to support such a program, the transition to nuclear stage hardware will have to be undertaken. Meanwhile, merely by modifying existing hardware, it will be possible to accom- modate the required missions leading to a planetary landing decision. These then are the near-term future decisions that must be made: goals for civilian and scientific utilization of space must be established during the next 10 years, there must be definitions of the follow-on lunar exploration missions, the sequence of transportation improve- ments must be established, and the requirements for manned planetary exploration must be defined. Concurrent to the problem of defining the goals for the immediate and near-term future are the additional problems inherent to the long-term decisions that must also be considered. At present, it is not necessary to commit hardware or to define specific long-range pro- grams, but there is a very real need to commit Government and in- dustry to the task of acquiring the advanced technologies that will have to be available in the future. At Douglas we are firmly convinced that there are five major elements which we can identify as keys to the future of our space program (fig. 53). There is urgency and need to commit ourselves to the task of acquiring the advanced technologies that will contribute to realization of these long-term building block capabilities. LONG TERM BUILDING BLOCKS (5 TO 20 YEARS) * LONG DURATION ORBITAL EXPERIENCE * REUSABLE SPACECRAFT * REUSABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES * NUCLEAR STAGES * SECONDARY POWER FIGURE 53 PAGENO="0912" 908 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Long duration Earth orbital capability has been identified as one of the major long-term building block capabilities that must be ac- quired within 5 to 20 years. Obtaining this experience will begin with the first orbiting workshop. The end product of that experience will be the accumulation of data to describe a space station that will func- tion with optimum efficiency in Earth orbit or on planetary missions. Many concepts for permanent orbiting space stations have been ad- vanced. The configuration shown in figure 54 is one which both NASA and Douglas have studied extensively. The most unique fea- ture of this concept consists of the optimization of subsystems to re- duce resupply requirements. In this instance, resupply requirements were reduced by incorporating a sophisticated environmental control system which, because of its closed cycle operation, reduces the logistics requirement for that subsystem by a factor of three. The other sub- systems amenable to that kind of approach are also designed to reduce resupply requirements to a minimum. The size of the vehicle is limited to a level which affords sufficient space to accomodate the mis- sion-required equipment and personnel, but which is no larger than necessary to perform the functions for which it was intended. Again, with optimized logistics requirements as a basic design constraint, the vehicle is as small as possible in order to limit the amount of drag; additional drag increases the amount of propellant that must be re- supplied to maintain the station in orbit. When these permanent space stations have been orbited, they will make it possible to consider methods for employing scientific and en- gineering personnel who are not astronauts or pilots. When this has ORL INBOARD PROFILE FIGURE 54 PAGENO="0913" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 909 been achieved, the effectivity of the space station for scientific pur- poses will have been multiplied by a factor of 3. In this early era of space station utilization, it is extremely important that transport and orbital systems be derived that can support scientific personnel who are not trained as astronauts. Even with a space sta- tion functioning in orbit, and even though it is manned by astronauts who have had competent scientific training, it is not possible to achieve maximum effectiveness and utilization until members of all of the disciplines in the scientific fraternity are able to conduct their experi- ments and make their observations on board the space station. Al- though information can be obtained by astronauts and relayed to the earth, most scientists will not be satisfied with this method of observa- tion. The scientific method of investi~ation cannot tolerate "second hand information," no matter how qualified the relaying observer may be. If scientific information cannot be accommodated, the scientific community will be less than enthusiastic about what must be consid- ered as "remote" testing and observation. To achieve this end, it will be necessary to improve the transporation systems. Attainment of this permanent orbital capability is dependent upon the amount of support that the affected technologies receive, as shown in figure 55. At least 2 years of technological work has yet to be accomplished and, after that, about 51/2 years of development work must be completed before that kind of orbiting laboratory capability can be achieved. While it is not yet time to make the decision to im- plement an orbiting laboratory having such a high degree of sophisti- cation, the required technology should be available by the time that BUILDING BLOCK DEVELOPMENT TIME YEARS 5 10 15 __________ I__I I I__I I__I__I I LONG DURATION SPACE STATION REUSABLE SPACECRAFT ______________________________ REUSABLE LAUNCH _______________________________ CLUSTER NUCLEAR STAGE ________________________________________________________ `-MODULE SECONDARY POWER ~S:~~_ T ~I1 ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT FIGURE 55 76-2&5 O-67~----pt. 2-58 PAGENO="0914" 910 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION the earlier programs show that more sophisticated laboratories are required. Studies investigating possible uses for more complex operational stations are being conducted and, while no definitive conclusions are possible, preliminary results indicate that sufficient requirements will be available to make their employment economically feasible within the next 20 years. Already, there is much evidence to support the probability that the greater part of the communications service and most of the surveillance of natural resources will be done from space. The economic logic has already been demonstrated by the commercial communications satellites now in operation. It remains to be seen what part of the communications load will need to be carried by manned satellite systems and, as yet, there is no conclusive evidence that will either substantiate or preclude the need for permanently manned stations to do resource tracking There are also the attendant questions about the possibility of intermittently manned substations and of operating them remotely for the majority of the time. A con- current problem is proposed by the need to define the configurations and functions of the devices that would be used to accomplish the com- munications and tracking tasks. This requirement, too, is dependent upon whether or not the station is manned However, assuming that space stations prove to be functionally feasible, the problem of transport has still to be resolved Again it appears that present systems are not equal to the foreseeable personnel transport and resupply task It is unreasonable to suppose that more than a few scientific investigators, maintenance crewmen, or station operators will be willing to tolerate the transportation environment to which astronauts are now subjected. Obviously some astronaut- scientists will always be available. However, the pure scientist and the development engineer will need a more stable transportation envi- ronment. To fill that need, and to afford the cost of resupply, reusable spacecraft will have to be developed The utility of reusable spacecraft is not questioned It increases operational efficiency and, once it is achieved, spacecraft operating costs will be reduced by a factor of 2 to 4 This advantage will accrue even though expendable boosters are used in conjunction with the reusable spacecraft. At this time, while various space transport configurations are still being investigated, there is a wide variety of opinion about what the optimum reusable spacecraft should look like. One school of thought has it that a reusable spacecraft should resemble the Apollo in its fundamental landing characteristics, others propose a spacecraft that looks like a hypersonic or supersonic airpl'tne (fig 56) This con troversy may continue for some time However, so far as we are concerned here at Douglas, a logical consideration of cost/effectiveness in conjunction with the mission requirements shows that neither the 6 g device (shown at the right of fig 56) nor the comforts of the commercial airline `ipproach (shown at left in fig 56) should be employed. Scientists and engineers who are not trained as astro- nauts cannot be expected to fly in a 6-g. device. On the other hand, space transports will not be carrying little old ladies from Pasadena, at least not in the immediate future Consequently, we believe that PAGENO="0915" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 911 the moSt reasonable solution is a compromise vehicle which has a lift- ing body configuration and that will operate at a level of approxi- mately. 2.g.'s during launch and reentry. A typical configuration for this type of device is shown as it might look when used as a space- craft payload on the Saturn TB (fig. 57). SPACECRAFT/CARGO MODULE CONFIGURATIONS FIGURE 56 EARLY REUSABLE LAUNCH CONFIGURATION lB FIGURE 57 PAGENO="0916" 912 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Accepting the fact that, eventually, reusable spacecraft will be re- quired, the argument is sometimes advanced that "if we have reusable spacecraft we should achieve reusability from the ground up, making the booster reusable as well." However, there is a fallacy in that argument; first, because the need for a reusable spacecraft is more urgent, it should have priority both in terms of engineering inputs and in terms of funding; then, because the financial commitment that would have to be made to achieve reusability for both the spacecraft and the booster at the same time would be prohibitive. While both of these advancements need to be made, they should be undertaken sequentially. When reusable transportation is discussed, there is always dis- agreement about whether the vehicle should be designed to take off and land horizontally or take off vertically and, land horizontally. No matter whether the horizontal or vertical takeoff system (figure ~8) is eventually adopted as the standard configuration, it is clear that the horizontal takeoff vehicle cannot be operational until the end of the 20-year period that we are talking about today. Also, no mat- ter when it is built, a horizontal takeoff/horizontal landing vehicle is going to be initially and operationally more expensive than one which takes off vertically and lands horizontally. The only rationale that could support the need for a horizontal takeoff/horizontal landing vehicle would be a requirement for a widely variable launch azimuth capability. If such a requirement were imposed, it would be neces- sary to fly in the atmosphere to reach the proper position for ejection into orbit. At this time, there is no reason to believe that this re- quiremen.t exists. That kind of operational flexibility is a luxury that is difficult to afford; particularly since space destinations are known and launch sites have been established to match them. HTOHL & VTOHL CONFIGURATIONS HTOHL VTOHL FIGURE 58 PAGENO="0917" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 913 Another reason for postponing construction of a reusable booster system, until after the requirements for spacecraft capability have been met, is that merely making booster systems reusable will not improve conditions for the pilot or the crew. When the time comes and a reusable booster capability is acquired, efficiency will increase, logistics cost will further decrease, and an- other improvement factor of 2 to 4 will have been achieved, thus be- ginning to approach the increase in transportation efficiency that we predict for the space system evolution in the next 20 years. The re- mainder of the efficiency increase that can be obtained will be the result of the increased capability to carry larger payloads and more sophisti- cated equipment. Employing the new sensor technologies that are becoming available will provide more and better equipment per pound of payload. At least equally important is the fact that, with reusable spacecraft, it will be feasible to bring payload~ back to earth, improve them, or repair them if required, and send them back to orbit again. This is the pattern that is beginning to evolve, and this is why it is possible to propose that, in the next 20 years, improvements will in- crease the return on dollars invested by as much as 50 times more than is available today. Assume that the decision to achieve a reusable spacecraft and launch vehicle capability were made today: then, if the decision to proceed with the technologies that must be advanced in order to arrive at these long term building block capabilities were made immediately, the lead time required to achieve them would be approximately 4 to 5 years (fig. 55). After that the program leadtime required to obtain them would be approximately 10 to 12 years. It must be remembered that there is no need to commit a hardware program. The important task is to support the technologies that will provide the capability to make a commitment decision at the right time. The nuclear stage that I briefly mentioned earlier will be required if the decision is made to have manned landings on the planets. It is almost impossible to accomplish those missions using chemical propul- sion systems. Again it is important to have the technological capa- bility at hand when the decision is made. The leadtime required to improve the nuclear technology to the point where the development of a nuclear stage is feasible will be approximately 3 years. Once again there is a need to obtain a building block capability. A great deal of work toward the development of the engine portion of the nuclear powered vehicle has been completed. Far too little work has been done leading to the vehicle design. One concept for a nuclear stage module cluster is shown in figure 59. The progress that has been made in engine design has left the vehicle design with somewhat of a technology gap. The vehicle technology is at the state-of-the-art level available in 1960; and, at the other end, engine sophistication is approaching 1975 technology. This situation is beginning to change, but it is still a technology problem. Now, for example, it is necessary to look at titanium alloys for use in the development of the large pressure vessel. This requires new concepts in design and manufacturing. By maintaining the proper technological readiness, industry will be prepared for whatever new direction is prescribed. For example, PAGENO="0918" 914 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION NUCLEAR STAGE MODULE - CLUSTER BASIC PROPULSION MODULE T LUNAR DIRECT & UNMANNED [~,,j DEEP SPACE if lunar activities became profitable, and it was worthwhile to trans- port larger and larger payloads, a modular system of nuclear stages could be employed. That utilization would reduce the cost of the transportation system by a factor of about 3. The same modules could accomplish the Mars flyby mission in a more economical fashion. A five module cluster would accomplish the manned Mars landing mission; however about 15 years in leadtime would be required to achieve this mission capability (see fig. 55). Beyond the 3 to 4 years still required for technology improvements, are about 10 more years of development and integration before a basic module can be produced. Then 2 to 3 more years would pass before a cluster capabil- ity could be achieved. These leadtime requirements reinforce the need to begin to advance the basic technologies now. It is still not necessary to make decisions about what kind of hardware to build. And not all of the advance technology requirements have to be resolved at the same time. The urgency, then, is in the need to pursue the technologies for which the most leadtime is required. Underlying all of the technological requirements for spacecraft and booster systems is the requirement for secondary power. The usefulness of any of the proposed space systems is limited by the avail- ability of secondary power and by the reliability of that subsystem. Spacecraft life depends on secondary power for environmental con- trol, for operating experiments, and for all of the electrical functions associated with spacecraft electronics subsystems. The various sources of secondary power are shown in figure 60. They are displayed against scales which relate power level (in kilowatts of electricity) to the length of time that each source may be expected to operate. MANNED MARS FLYBY MANNED MARS LANDING FIGURE 59 PAGENO="0919" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 915 A great deal of work has been done with batteries and fuel cells. However, because of the short duration operating time and limitcd power levels, they are not practicable for long duration mission appli- cation. For the new generation of space activity, secondary power systems must be available that can produce from 10 to 100 kilowatts and that will operate for as long as 5 years. Obviously, a reactor sys- tem will provide the highest power level and survive for the longest period of time. However, the prohibitive weight of the reactor sys- tem shielding will deny access to the reactor's advanta~es during the foreseeable future. Unless radical changes occur in this technology, isotope dynamic and thermionic systems will most likely be employed. These systems weigh less and are approximately twice as efficient as the solar-cell battery or isotope thermoelectric power system. For these reasons, Douglas is concentrating on the development of these systems. For some applications, the system can be derated to supply low level power needs; for other applications, it can be used in multi- ple to supply the `highest demand for secondary power. Since we (Douglas) `believe in the necessity for a nuclear `stage, and because we are committed to the proposition that long-term future secondary power requirements cannot `be met without employing reac- tor or isotope systems, Douglas has committed extensive resources to the task of developing a `strong nuclear capability. We believe so strongly that nuclear power is going to be required during the next 15 years, that, in conjunction with operating the plutonium production reactor facilities at Hanford, Wash.., we have constructed a nuclear laboratory nearby in Richiand (fig. 61). We have just occupied that facility. The laboratory represents a $2 million investment; the lab- oratory equipment cost another $1.5 million; and currently, the staff of nearly 100 now has a payroll of about $2 million a year. SECONDARY POWER SYSTEM APPLICATIONS 200 REACTOR ~100- _____________ I- CHEMICAL ISOTOPE DYNAMIC 10 - ISOTOPE THERMIONIC FUEL 1 - CELLS SOLAR CELLS BATTERIES ~ ISOTOPE THERMOELECTRIC MIN HR DAY WEEK MO YR YR OPERATING TIMES FIGuRE 60 PAGENO="0920" 916 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Mr. ABLE. We believe so strongly in the future of both the nuclear stage and isotope secondary power tha:t we made an aggressive effort and won the contract to operate the plutonium production facility at Hanford. Essentially, the work involved in that contract is routine. However, we believe that it contributes much to our technology capa- bility because it gives us a continual opportunity to work with radio- active materials and to become experts at the task of reactor opera- tions. This activity has firmly ~stablished Douglas as a member of the nuclear community. We constructed the laboratory at Richiand so that we could use the tremendous reservoir of technical ability that exists in that area. What we learn from that advance technology, and from our operations at Richiand, will give us the stature and experi- ence required to qualify us as prime competitors when the decision is made to build a nuclear stage. We are already experienced in the production of space vehicles. Mr. DORRENBACHER. In summary, there are a number of decisions affecting the fiscal year 1968 budget that must be made if the con- tinuity of the space program is to be maintained. The general orien- tation required to meet near-term future goals, and to provide the technological capability needed to maintain the direction of continuity is shown in figures 43 and 55. These are the tasks that must be under- taken in order to have the option, 5 or 6 years from now, to describe future missions, and to insure the attainment of the hardware capa- bility required for those missions. If the go-ahead to support these FIGURE 61 PAGENO="0921" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 917 advance technologies is available now, it will be possible to exercise our national options, after which, operational equipment can be avail- able in 10 to 20 years. By that time, our space program will become commercially profitable and self-sustaining. We are all aware of the difficult problem imposed by financial limi- tations. However, this Nation has already made a very large invest- ment in people. The reservoir of scientific and engineering experience that these people represent is a national resource of incalculable value. It is unthinkable to allow a situation to occur that would dissipate that resource. It is a practical fact that any significant reduction in the technical population of the space community will create a gap in our technological capability that will be extremely difficult to repair. This is a national problem; but industry is affected in the same way. For example, a 25-percent reduction in the technical population at Douglas would disrupt the continuity of the company's technological capability to an extent that could not be repaired for years. There is no way to rebuild the lost capability except through a time- consuming training program. The people who are lost by any com- pany cannot simply be hired back. They will take other employment and many of them will move to positions outside the aerospace busi- ness, and thus be lost to the entire industry. If the technical popula- tion is reduced now, and 2 years later it is necessary to build it up again, irreparable damage will have been done. Consequently, Con- gress is faced with the problem of having to decide at what level the technical population should be sustained; if that level is less than what it is today the space program will have to be adjusted accordingly. But if a reduction is not what is planned, then a 20- to 30-percent loss in population must not be permitted to occur by default. Default, in this instance, will occur because the Apollo program technology, and the technologies of other programs now reaching the hardware stage, are nearing completion. With no new advanced technology programs to undertake, a de facto reduction in the technical popula- tion is going to occur. This Nation's reasons for .going into space are well known. Those of us who have dedicated our professional lifetimes to that pursuit, confidently anticipate that the space business will be commercially profitable. I believe that both Government planners and manage- ment in the space industry are in basic agreement about what has to be done to put the exploitation of space on a paying basis. I believe that, in 20 years, work being done from space platforms will be accomplished on a paying basis. The sequence of events that I have just described will lead to that conclusion. Beyond 20 years, changes in orders of magnitude will be achieved. Mr. Tr~ou~. Jim, have you read the progress report from the ad- visory board, the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) report? Mr. DORRENBACHER. No, I have not. I have heard of it but I haven't had an opportunity to read it. Mr. FREITAG. In that report, for example, the committee members agree that the orbiting workshop effort should be continued, but they aiso say that we should take a long look at what we do after the first workshop. An important point is that costs will have to be reduced PAGENO="0922" 918 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION before the scientific community can achieve as much as they want by way of scientific information Mainly, the scientists `ire concerned with the cost of transportation; they'd rather put. more emphasis on missions and operations How ever, the report `igi ees that it is neces sary to have the workshop capability in order to learn to operate the space vehicles required for those missions. Mr. DORRENBACHER. I t.hink their hesitancy is almost entirely based upon this problem of transportation cost. If the scientists can't look at the workshop as a place where they can conduct their own experi- ments, eventually they will be inclined to prefer to take the less precise but more immediate information that they can get from less expensive, unmanned orbiters and probes. They think of the information that they get back from astronauts, or even from astronaut/scientists, as essentially remote reporting That is why they are just `is willing to accept information from sensors in unm'inned vehicles Mr GURNEY In your references to scientists, who do you mean, specifically, people like astronomers ~ Mr. DORRENBACHER. Astronomers are good examples. But basically, I am referring to any scientist who feels that his discipine has appli- cations in space. I believe that these people will contribute immensely to our national well-being and scientific advancement. We know that the science of astronomy will improve by an order of magnitude when we can get the astronomer and his telescope to work in space. Surveillance of our natural resources can hardly be accomplished in any other way Even now we `ire paying far too much for w eather survey stations and probes scattered about on the surface of the Earth Mr GURNEY How is industry communicating with scientists in projecting the import'ince of their role in space ~ Mr DORRENBACHER Initially, that communication was poor How ever, it has been greatly improved. The efforts of our NASA program have begun to produce results during the past year. Four years ago, few scientists knew what they would be able to do in space. Conse- quently many of them were apathetic to the scientific aspects of the space program. Today, they are quite enthusiastic. When we can tell them that we can transport them in `i2 g vehicle, md that they will have the tools they need in a space station, `md that they can operate their own equipment `md conduct their ow n experiments, we will have their complete cooperition Even now, with the astronauts operating the equipment that the scientists would r'mther operate them selves, they are still quite pleased with the information that they are getting. Mr TEAGUE We have some scientists with astron'mut training now Mr FREITAG We h'mve five These people `ire scientists who were recruited as astronauts. Five more are regular pilot-astronauts who have scientific training through the doctorate degree Th'mt gives us 10 people, already in the program, who have professional academic training through `m doctorate degree `md who have had profession'ml experience in their m'mjor fields Mr DORRENBACHER Certainly th'mt is a step in the right direction The scientific community has confidence in those people. But, in gen- eral, in spite of their education, those astronauts are not thought as of practicing scientists in the purest sense PAGENO="0923" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 919 Mr. GURNEY. What about the leaders in the various scientific fields? Do industries such as Douglas, for example, brief those people the way you are briefing us? Mr. DORRENBACHER. Where we have some specific requirements, NASA has built some direct lines of communication. In particular, astronomy has received much attention, and that segment of the sci- entific community is informed and fully cooperative. The coopera- tion is beginning to pay large dividends in the form of specific re- quirements for equipment that the scientists most urgently need in the space vehicles. Industry can define scientific requirements on paper but, in the final analysis, it is imperative that the user-scientist make specific recommendations. Mr. ABLE. Adding to that, Douglas has a corporate scientific ad- visory board. The people who staff this board are outstanding sci- entists. For example, Dr. Libby, the Nobel Prize winner, is a member of this board, and he is also a member of the Douglas board of di- rectors. The members of this corporate scientific advisory board meet with the officers and directors of Douglas; they are thoroughly fa- miliar with our work, and they are very enthusiastic about it. Be- cause of their enthusiasm, they devote a lot of effort to keeping the rest of the scientific community informed. If you remember, this kind of enthusiasm is what we predicted over 2 years ago. Now it has become easier to ~et scientific cooperation. Mr. FREITAG. I think that the President's Scientific Advisory Com- mittee itself is an excellent example of the improvement that has come about. I believe that its membership consists of nearly 100 of the top scientists in this country. They devoted all of last year to many, many briefings, conferences, and subgroup meetings in the process of making a critical appraisal of all aspects of the space program. The PSAC report that we are talking about represents their collective opinion about where the program stands from a scientific point of view. This is really a big step forward from 2 years ago. Mr. DOUGLAS. Right here, at Huntington Beach, we are supporting a fairly expensive program of pure science; our corporate research organization is essentially autonomous. It has a charter to investi- gate all kinds of scientific phenomena. For example, one of our sci- entists, who is a rock expert, can hardly wait to get to the Moon. He has a technique for getting water out of the rocks. The day that he can get out on the Moon with his rock pick, and make a pi'actical ex- periment in water recovery, and when other scientists like him have and opportunity to exercise their disciplines, the entire scientific com- munity will have been enlisted in the cause of manned planetary exploration. Mr. FREITAG. One of the important factors in this change of attitude on the part of the scientific community has been the change in the emphasis of investigation that was brought about by the advent of the space age. Ten years ago, the scientists in positions of greatest au- thority were extremely competent specialists in their own field, but since the space activity was so new their specializations did not include space-oriented activity those scientists did not have time to go back and become specialists in space. Now, however, younger men are be- ginning to fill the influential positions in the scientific community. PAGENO="0924" 920 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION These scientists have grown up with the space program, and the uni- versities where they were trained were also adjusted to the new science. *These new scientists are from 30 to 40 years old. They now have 10 years of experience and a thorough understanding of the potentialities of space. The educational process was a natural evolution and now its effects are beginning to appear. Mr. GURNEY. Take the Earth sensors as an example. This is a new concept, to use space to aid in the management of our water and food resources. What was the source of that concept? Is it a product of the scientific community, industry, or the Government? Mr. ABLE. A combination of all of them. Crude sensing devices were first produced for military application; then more sophisticated sensors were developed for the space program. Now their capabilities have improved so substantially that we are able to project many eco- nomically productive applications for their use in space. This is a brand new field, and we are just on the threshold. Mr. DORRENBACHER. Still on the subject of Earth sensors and how they relate to the surveillance of our natural resources on a national or global scale, we see this kind of evolution: from 30 years `ago, when we had crude weather prediction sensing devices and nothing more, we progressed to somewhat more sophi'stica!ted sensors, and `better corre- lation and reporting systems, to the use of sensors in aircraft.. The first aircraft systems were used to survey larger surface areas than had ever `been surveyed before. It was then possible to conduct large area surveys in a very short period of `time. Looking at color differences on `the surface of the Earth gave us a whole new category of intelli- gence. From the first use-to detect camouflage-the science w'as ad- vanced to include surveys `of vegetation and the prediction of food resources. This capability led to an increase in our economic well-be- ing. The problem is that it is expensive, prohibitively so, if we want to repetitively survey large areas of the E'arth's surface. If we wanted to cover a single county in `California once every 10 years, we could do it from an airplane. However, if we need continuous surveil- lance of the total pattern of how water pollution, air movement, and smog effect groundcover an'd dther natural resources, aircraft surveys are totally impractical and cannot provide complete continuity. Th'at kind of task has to `be done by sensors fro'm a space platform. Few people would con'tradict this logic. The Tiros satellites are relatively unsophisticated systems. How- ever, studies now show that the economic `benefits that they provide, range to millions of `dollars pe.r year, and are responsible for saving a number of lives. Yet the data that we get from Tiros is very crude in comparison to what we can expect from an orbiting laboratory. To- day, differences of opinion a.re mainly concerned with whether simi- lar `tasks `can be accomplished sufficiently well from unmanned satel- lites or whether manned satellites can provide a great enough degree of increased sophistication to maintain an attractive ratio of cost ef- fedtiveness. Our opinion here at Douglas is that it can. Mr. ABLE. Well, gentlemen, we're winding this up right on sched- ule. `The one element that goes `throu'gh all that we have shown you today is that existing space hardware has future applications and PAGENO="0925" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 921 modifications, and existing technology has even greater application in the future. The hardware and technology developed in present programs allows a program like MOL to go forward without reinventing the wheel. The experienced people who learned and were good engineers on Saturn are moving over on other programs, and there is a tremendous payoff from their experience. That is why, if we can keep this thing going then, as Jim has said, you don't need to increase the space budget. If you hold the budget level, you can still bring in a tremendous increase in the return, while the cost becomes smaller as a percentage of the gross national product. One of the big strengths of the NASA program has been the stability of its budget since its beginning. Mr. Douor~s. Yes, but if we don't get the follow-on orders that are planned in the present budget, then our manpower is going to come off pretty fast. Mr. DORRENBACHER. And for every man that leaves the space pro- gram, whether he goes into an ordnance program or whether he goes to oceanography, it's going to take 5 years to replace him when the realization comes that we should have kept him on the job. The money already spent in the combined military/NASA space programs is money spent on education. Mr. ABLE. Mr. Teague, we certainly appreciate the interest that you and the members of your committee show in the part that Douglas plays in the space program. Thank you for coming here today. PAGENO="0926" APPENDIX F HEARINGS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, MAR SHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER, HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA, FEBRUARY 9, 1967 STATEMENT OF DR WERNHER VON BRAUN ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS AND CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES Mr Chairman, Gentlemen I would like to welcome YOU 011 behalf of the staff of the Marshall Sp'toe Flight Center, Huntsville, Ala We have prepared ~ briefing this evening on some of our Center activities Tomorrow we will visit a number of our facilities and hold other brief ings Before I delve into details, I would like to present our proposed `tgenda This is essentially the subject that I propose to cover tonight Marshall Space Flight Center Management, Administrative Opera- tions and Construction of Facilities. Tomorrow, General O'Connor will present to you the Saturn apollo program, and I propose to dis- cuss the Apollo Applications program and the general future outlook of Manned Space Flight. We are prepared to put what I will say to- day on record. In addition, you sent us a number of questions and we have prepared a report, ready for insertion into the Congres sional Record. My next chart shows the organization of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration On top we have the Administrator, Mr James Webb, and his Deputy, Dr. Robert Seamans. There are four program offices under the Administrator: the Manned Space Flight Office, the Space Science and Applications Office, Advanced Research and Technology Office, and the fourth one, Tracking and Data Acqui- sition, which is essentially the running of the worldwide net support- ing the three others. The head of the Manned Space Flight Program Office: George E. Mueller; Space Science and Applications: Dr. Homer Newell; and Advanced Research and Technology: Dr. Mac C. Adams. The Marshall Space Flight Center is one of the three centers re- porting to the Office of Manned Space Flight, the others being the Manned Spacecraft Center, in Houston, and the Kennedy Space Center, at Cape Kennedy, Fla. In somewhat simplified terms, the Manned Spacecraft Center, in Houston, is in charge of spacecraft development, `tstronaut training, mission planning, and also mission control for manned space flights The Marshall Space Flight Centei furnishes the large booster rockets for the Apollo program, particu larly the uprated Saturn I and the Saturn V rockets The Saturn I can carry an Apollo spacecraft into low Earth orbit Saturn V can 922 PAGENO="0927" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 923 MANNED S PACE FL I G HI S U BC 0MM I ITEE Hearinj Schedule at MSFC in Huntsville February 9 and 10, 1967 TONIGHT MSFC Management Ti Administrative O~rations ~ (von Braun) Construction of Facilities J TOMORROW R&D: Saturn/Apollo Program (O'Connor) R&D: AAP and Future (von Braun) CHART 1 CHART 2 PAGENO="0928" 924 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION carry it to the Moon. The Kennedy Space Center is in essence the launch center, where the various modules or stages of spacecraft meet with the launch vehicle, and are stacked one on top of the other. The whole thing is then checked out against elaborate ground support equipment and launched. Although we report to Manned Space Flight, we nevertheless con- ducted about $23.7 million worth of business in fiscal year 1967 for the three other program offices. Let me now come to the internal organization of the Marshall Space Flight Center. I brought two charts. The one to your right is the organization of the Center as it looked when we submitted materials to your committee last year. The chart to the left shows today's status, and the elements marked in blue involve changes between last year and this year. Starting from the top, Dr. Lange went over to the Army and has become chief scientist for the Nike X program. Dave Newby took over this job, as assistant director for scientific and technical analysis. We have established the patent counsel as an entity separate from the chief counsel's office, and we have established a new Saturn Apollo Ap- plications Office in Industrial Operations and have moved the former head of the engine program, Lee Belew, to head this office. Lee's for- mer deputy, Bill Brown, has become head of the engine program office. We closed out the Saturn TB/Centaur program office because this program was terminated. Thus, the total number of program offices in Industrial Operations is the same as it used to be. Another important change is that Lee James, who was our program director for the Saturn I-TB program, became deputy to General Phil- lips in Washington. Bill Teir, who had been deputy to James, took over his job. Another important change is in Research and Development Opera- tions. With the activation of the Saturn/Apollo Applications pro- gram, our involvement in experiments to be conducted in space vehicles and space stations of course had to be expanded, so we established an Experiments Office in Research and Development Operations. At the same time, we closed out the Technical Staff. Another important change is that Mr. Fred Cline, who had been run- ning the Propulsion and Vehicle Engineering Laboratory, under Re- search and Development Operations, has been replaced by Dr. Lucas. Mr. Cline went back to industry. Those are the major changes during the past year. Now let me dis- cuss the basic philosophy of our organization. The Marshall Space Flight Center is made up of two major operating elements: Research and Development Operations and Industrial Operations. Maybe we should call Industrial Operations the Office of Program Management, and Research and Development the Office of Penetration in Depth, in- cluding operating our own in-house laboratories. Most of the money that we are spending in industry goes to the director of industrial operations, Ed O'Connor, who, through his program managers, administers these four programs. There are two major facilities attached to Industrial Operations. The Michoud Assembly Facility, in New Orleans, which you will visit Saturday morning, and the Mississippi Test Facility, which you will PAGENO="0929" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 925 GEORGE CJA**4LL PACE ILIGRI *$TER 4" 4$rn*~* ~ ~ ~ m~Jt*t ~ a ~ ht * k a ~iz~ *W ~ ~&*r~ ~ Es L ~ ~ *mvttb~i % ` ~ ~ ~ ~, ~%*4 ~fj~ff~ ~:t:1:L_~ flOØ$aT ~nr ~u*s t ~ ~: t 441St $M$~*$ WEt 4) ~ t I ~ ~ pLi $ ~ :~ ~ ~ ~ ~:r::H ~ ~ ;;;!:~riP~Ae~: ~. I AD~ttO sM* 4~ k~ ,s v~ a$fl* ~3M%~ t a ` ~ I t * ~ ~z s! ~ ~ 7~f& 3~r~ ~ ~ ~ ~ z;~ \7t a E1~ £~M ~tU47~re tuna > ~ ::r ME CHART 3 CHART 4 PAGENO="0930" 926 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION visit Saturday afternoon. Also shown is the Mission Operations Of- fice, which represents the interests of launch vehicle development with the Mission Oper'Ltions, in W'tshington, `md `ilso with the Mission Control Center, in Houston Certain functions `ire centralized in General O'Connor's st'mff He has an expert for large industrial contr'tcts I would like to mention th~t the great majority of these contracts `ire now incentivized That is, we have an incentive fee `irrangement on these contr'mcts which en ables the contractor to make a greater profit if he delivers for lower cost, on schedule, and if there `ire no deficiencies in his deliveries He can also be penalized for sending something incomplete to the Cape that requires some retrofitting or some rework. The Facilities Office deals essentially with the building of new pro gram facilities and has shrunk to `m relatively small oper'mtion now because our facility construction progr'mm for Apollo h'is `mlready been completed Project Logistics deals with supplying our f'mcilities, pirticularly test f'mcihties, with test fuel, such `is liquid oxygen It provides the transpor'thon systems that bring st'mges from st'mge `issembly plants to test facilities and on to the Cape. We have a fleet of about eight b'irges operated out `of this office that bring the stuff `ill the w `my from California, to Mississippi, and down to the Cape. Barges also handle large-stage transportation between Huntsville and the Cape. We also have two over-sized aircraft (converted Stratocruiser airplanes) to fly second stages of Saturn I's and large engines across the country. Finally, there is a Resources Management Office that deals essentially with the resources in terms of manpower and money in the program. These two things, of course, go closely together. Whenever you want to save money you have to reduce manpower because that is where the money goes, `md keeping track of manpow er `md money, `md staying on schedule, is a primary job of Industrial Operations. Whenever there is a serious technic'ml difficulty in `my of the in dustrial programs here, the progr'im m'in'mgers may require help They may require knowledgeable people who can get in there, like firefighters, to put out the fire before it spreads too far. Now our main resources for providing this firefighting service in the Apollo program are the expert scientists, engineers, `md technicians in Re search and Development Operations. Research and Development Operations is not organized by pro grams, but by disciplines For example, w e have an Aero Astro dynamics Lab This lab de'mls with wind tunnels, flight dynamics and trajectories, and the aerodynamic loads created on a vehicle as it passes through turbulent layers in the atmosphere. So the pri- mary orientation of this lab is in the `imeas like optimization of guidance equations, dynamics, mathematics, aerodynamics, even aerodynamic heating. Astrionics is another laboratory Astrionics deals with everything involving electricity, you might say gyroscopes, electronic computers that fly along in the rocket in flight, electric'ml checkout equipment, telemeter transmitters that send dat'i from the flying rocket back to the ground to enable engineers on the ground to e~ iluate the per formance of the rocket in flight; and actuators that swivel the rocket PAGENO="0931" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 927 motors and keep the rocket on the flight path. All this is done in Astrionics. Next is Propulsion and Vehicle Engineering. This is our chief mechanical engineering lab. It deals with propulsion, structures, ma- terials, things that are so important in rockets. We have a test laboratory here which deals with testing of large rockets on static test stands where the rocket is tied down to the test stand and fired at full throttle so we can fully measure the perform- ance of the rocket prior to flight. We have a manufacturing engineering lab. The function of this laboratory is not to produce, but to familiarize itself with modern manufacturing techniques used in industry, and at the same time re- main astute with respect to adequacy of manufacturing methods. For example, if one of the companies, and this happens to the very best ones, uses an unacceptable welding method, our people move in and virtually show our industrial contractors how you can do a better job. Now, you can do that only if you keep your own fingers dirty, of course, and that is the secret of success in all these laboratories. There must be a certain amount of in-house work going on all the time, so that these men know what they are talking about. I think the fact that all our laboratory directors and their assistants enjoy a great deal of respect with our industrial contractors stems from the fact that time and time again they were able to go in and help them solve a problem. One contractor said, for example, "Your specifications are too stiff. Nobody can build it so accurate." We take a piece to them and say, "Here it is; build it just like this. You see, it can be done." We consider this, our continued ability to keep a yardstick in the hands of the Government to assure that we are getting our money's worth, as one of the most important tools we must have. If you throw your yardstick away, you become the victim of your own contractors. So we consider this a very important capability. Now, how did we get this capability ~ Well, that is more a question of history. Before we joined NASA, we were with the Army Ballistic Missile Agency. The Army, at that time, operated to a great extent on the arsenal concept. Thus, we did a lot of development in-house, and one of the reasons why NASA wanted this elemeiat from the Army was the realization that, if you want to build big rockets, you must have within the Government knowledgeable people who can judge the qual- ity of what you are buying. Let me come back to the other elements of our organization. We have a qiiality and reliability assurance lab which sees to it that the necessary quality control screens are provided between industry and the Government, and that even industry protects itself with adequate screens between contractors. For instance, as it happened to us a major aerospace contractor buys some titanium bottles from a vendor, who, in turn, buys welding rods from another vendor, and this latter vendor sends the wrong welding rod to the vendor that makes the titanium bottles, and as a result a bottle blows and with it a whole Saturn V stage, causing several million dollars' worth of damage, then you have a case where the quality assurance system in industry has not worked properly. Now, it is probably too much to ask that the Government PAGENO="0932" 928 1 968 NASA AUTHORIZATION itself provide quality assurance penetration down to the third, and fourth, and fifth tier subcontractor. But, nevertheless, it is our job and the job of this quality and reliability laboratory to provide a qual- ity assurance network throughout our industrial organization to make sure that we are really getting our money's worth and to avoid to the extent humanly possible the kind of incident I have just cited. This is a very difficult thing to do because our lunar program is low-density fabrication in industrial terms. We are not building millions of some- thing. We are building only a dozen or so pieces of a very expensive commodity in this program, and a space vehicle can meet with cata- strophic failure if only one nut or bolt is inadequate. Now, how do we protect our prime contractors from using some wrong material when they cannot possibly control their vendors' qual- ity procedures with the necessary depth? For example, shall we tell a prime contractor, "You can never buy anything from Company X because we don't know whether their product is adequately tested"? Well, we make it the contractual duty of our primes to either assure themselves that `the product delivered to them gets special treatment or, if that is technically impossible, to assure themselves by acceptance control, that nothing slips into their system that is unacceptable. The continuous surveillance of these techniques, processes and standards comprise the main function of our quality laboratory. Of course, our Apollo program has many thousands of quality inspectors throughout industry trying to protect our program from a little over- sight that can have major and disastrous consequences. The Research Projects Laboratory deals with the application of new research ideas to the over-all program. After we froze our design for Apollo, this Research Projects Lab took a `back seat for a while because we had committed ourselves so heavily to a major development effort for Saturn that there was very little room to experiment with new ideas. But now that the Apollo Applications program is moving into the foreground, and we are trying to use Apollo hardware for new scientific `objectives, the Research Projects Lab will again play an increasingly important role in Center operation's. Finally, I would like to mention the Computation Laboratory which is a large electronic computation center, one of the largest in the coun- try. This lab serves not only all elements of the research and develop- ment operations, but also industrial operations and the supporting staff offices of the Center. As to the center-level staff offices, these are normal organizations that a facility of this size would require, and I shall not discuss them in detail. My next chart shows our permanent manpower positions. At the end of fiscal year 1966, we had ~T,271 permanent manpower positions at the Marshall Center. We shall fall off to `T,030 by the end of fiscal year 1967, about 240 spaces. This reduction is due to economy measures we have taken. In 1968 we would remain at the fiscal year 1967 level. You may have one question in connection with our stability here. You know that in many areas the total Apollo Program is over the manpower hump. Most stages and major elements of the program are on the assembly floor and there is no need to keep our industrial corn- PAGENO="0933" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 929 plements up to the peak levels of about a year ago. However, the civil service work force cannot follow that same trend. In fact, as we reduce the manpower provided by industry, in any of our con- tractors' plants, we must retain a highly skilled engineering team just to shoulder the burden to meet unforeseen emergencies. Let me explain this by using our engine program as an example. More than one-half, in fact about two-thirds of all rocket engines in our programs, both for the Saturn I and Saturn V, have already been delivered. They are in various assembly plants waiting to be put into stages. Many have already been placed into stages. So, obviously, we have to reduce the manpower at Rocketdyne, the manufacturer of these engines. But suppose we suddenly have a setback in a flight and we must fix these engines, or we have to retrofit something, or we have to change something. Who would evaluate all this? Who would implement the changes, if we have sent everybody home? To the extent that we reduce the ability of our contractor to take care of these problems, we ourselves in the Government must shoulder the burden. We must retain a well-balanced skilled work force to see the Apollo Program through to a successful conclusion. A small number of our people have been assigned to our Apollo Applications follow-on efforts to prepare for Apollo Applications and MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER MAN P0 WE R Permanent Positions End Of: Ceiling FY-66 7271 FY~67 7030 FY-68 .7030 CHART 5 PAGENO="0934" 930 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION other programs in the event `iuthoriz'ition is obtained In view of lo~ er funding for these progr'tms, Dr Se'im'tns h'ts estimated that the percentage of ~ ork going out of house NASA wide will drop from more th'tn 90 percent to `ibout 85 percent Wh'tt Dr Seamans is s'Lying here is th~t, `is we go into AAP, ~ e estim'tte th'tt henceforth ~e will only spend 85 cents out of the doll'tr in industry and 15 cents in the Government We `ire cert'unly not going b'ick to the `irsen'il concept We `ire just shifting the ratio a bit My next slide deals with the distribution of our people by product. It summarizes the numbers given to the Congress in our Fiscal Year 1968 Budget Book. You see a gradual decline in the total ceiling as shown on the previous ch'trt You see th'tt the vast m'tjority of the people, n'imely, the white `trea, is still in S'iturn Apollo There is `i comparatively slight incre'tse in ~s h'tt ~ e c'tll nonmainstream work, including the st'iffing of m'in'tgement organiz'itions for this work Finally, you see that at the administrative level we have dropped about a hundred people during the past 2 years. My next chart deals with our civil service distribution by class. The chart depicts classification of Marshall Space Flight Center man- power since the start of the Center in 1960, and reflects a gradual re- cl'issification of our ~ ork force from essentnlly `in in house oper'ition in 1961 to our present highly profession'il staffing p'tttern We `ilso sho\% our projection to the end of fiscal ye'ir 1968 Note that our wage board complement-some people call them blue collar-has been continuously decreasing as our professional groups have increased. And, of course, to the extent that our program man- agement job has expanded, both business, professional and the clerical categories have also increased. Steps taken in 1963 and 1964 in the manpower management area allowed us not only to staff up to oversee the work of contractors in our mainstream program, but it also laid the groundwork for the manpower capability we need for post-Apollo activities. We have a policy of continuously assessing our manpower skill profiles and gradually adjusting our skill areas through new hires `ind updating our know ho~ to meet future needs Knowledge is be ing updated through retraining and graduate education programs. A total of 350 Marshall people are today pursuing graduate degrees. Twenty are pursuing master's degrees and 10 will receive Ph. D. de- grees at the end of this school year. About 1,500 people attended sem- inars and noncredit courses in the past year to further update their knowledge. This chart reflects that since the Marshall Center was formed in 1960 we have used support contractors in the Huntsville area. There are, in essence, two reasons for this. Support contractors provide you with a certain flexibility in manpower management to take care of the unavoid `ible peaks `ind v'tlleys `is you go into t commitment such `is Apollo `ind the Finding of a man on the moon `ig'iinst `i h'ird schedule Secondly, certain skills were simply not available in house. Our sup- port contractor force increased between 1961 and 1964 as the comple- ment of the M'trsh'ill Sp'ice Flight Center itself increased In 1964, a peak ye'ir, we h'id `i total of 39 contractors holding 77 support contracts in the Huntsville area. In 1964, we changed our policy and PAGENO="0935" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 931 adopted the so-called single support contractor concept. This means that each of our laboratories and certain staff offices requiring help in their respective areas were authorized one contractor to provide this support. For example, Astrionics could go into competition and select one and only one contractor to support that entire laboratory. I think we fared very well with this scheme. It turned out to be a more manageable scheme than the large number of contractors we had before. In fiscal year 1967, our total contractor support cost at Marshall in Huntsville will come to about $58.8 million and this is buying about 5,200 man-years of effort. This is down from about 6,100 man-years in fiscal year 1965. So we are generally declining in this level of support and this trend will continue in fiscal year 1968. I would like to distinguish between housekeeping contractors and engineering support contractors. The engineering support con- tractors support our laboratories. The housekeeping support people run our motor pool, provide janitorial services, administrative support service and the like. Here we have identified our 11 support contractors and the organi- zation each is serving. For example, Northrop supports Aero-Astro Lab; Sperry Rand-Astrionics Lab; Computer Sciences-Comp Lab; Hayes of Birmingham-Manufacturing Engineering Lab; Brown Engineering- P. & V. E. Lab; SPACO, a small company in Huntsville-Quality and Reliability Assurance Lab; again Brown Engineering-Research Projects Lab; and Vitro-the Test Lab. PERSONNEL 8000 MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER PROGRAM DISTRIBUTION OF MANPOWER SUPPORTING RESEARCH SPACE SCIENCE ADVANCED MISSIONS, AAP SATURN/APOLLO ADMINISTRATIVE FY-1966 FY-1967 FY-1968 CHAnT 6 PAGENO="0936" 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0 I-'--FY-61 -~-j-'- FY-62H--'--FY-63 `+`FY-64 ~ FY-65 `+~FY-66 ~-FY-67 ~+-FY-68-'-~ 1/31/67 E-D A500-12B 932 PERSONNEL 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MSFC MANPOWER RESOURCES CIVIL SERVICE DISTRIBUTION BY CLASS 0 FY-61 I FY-62 I FY.63 I CHART 7 PERSONNEL 0-Ann MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER SUPPORT CONTRACTORS 2 AflA ~PING SUPPORT ~~NTSVILpVILLE ENGINEERING SUPPORT ku NTSV ILLEI CHART 8 PAGENO="0937" 1968 NASA AUTHOI~IZATION 933 In the housekeeping support area, it's RCA for management serv- ices, Management Services of Knoxville for technical services, and Rust Engineering for facilities and design. The principle of contracting used at Marshall is that all work to be performed by contractors will go out through normal competitive procurement channels except that work which cannot be sufficiently described and packaged within the time allowed for the work to be performed. It is only this latter type of work that will be performed by our support contractors. But even task assignments to support contractors are performed under full contractor management responsibility. Mr. TEAGUE. Doctor, would you take one of those laboratories and tell us, for example, what support does Sperry Rand furnish? Dr. vo~ BRAUN. Yes, maybe Dr. Haeussermann, you can help me a bit here. *Dr. HAEU55ERMANN. They give engineering support in our labora- tory, manufacturing support particularly for our pilot manufactuin group, and support in various areas of scientific development. Al~ tasks given to the contractor are clearly defined in advance. Dr. vo~ BRAUN. Maybe I can say a few more words about the mode of operation. Attributes of our single-support contractor concept are the following: The office management of each laboratory directs the respective support contractor, and retains full control of dollars and manpower. The functions and task assignments of each support contractor are exactly specified. The system provides continuity GEORGE C. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER EA~STANT DIRECTOR' 1DI RECTOR I FOR_SCIENTIFIC~ TY DIRECTOR, ISEPUTY ~ 1~~.~jJjj1_1 [~iiI1 ~ I~!!~ICAL ANALYSIS DEPII ADMINISTRA 9~~EL ~!!~EL ~~~~IONS ~TIVE~ MANAGENi& ~OL~Y [~RC~~j ji~ii~HCAL FINA~IàA~] [,d~1t?~ WEE FACIUTIE NA ____ U ~J FNAGE ~N r~;ii ~~IN ~ I SERYIc~J1JYLIZATIYLI ___________ ___________ CA MGI. SERV. RUST ENGR. I OPERATIONS I ~ANcED ~R(H&DEVELOPMIN~ ~~TRIALOPERA~ONS_ _________ _________ _________ ~NTRAC~] EI~ZECTS I LOGISTICS MANAGEMENTI __ __ ____ EI~ Ith~ ~JECTS [~URCES [~MS __ ____ SAT. /APOLLO .!~MIC5 [~i1~cS 1 - k~M~UTATIOI~ TURN~i~' [iA~URN V ENGINE LAB. ] ________ ROGRA~J PR~!.~I [~RAM PROGRAM I _____ _____ ~ 1 __ APPLICATIONS1 NORTHROP SPERRYRAND j COMPUTER SCIENCES HAYES ~UAL. flUAI rRCH ~B. ~BL~1jNS~T~ VEHICLE I I ASSURANCE I PROJEC1 ___________ ___________ ___________ CJLIIY _ __ L~ITY {JN.GRJABRJ L~. LAB. ..~.J LAB.~.J __________ BROWN ENGR SPACO BROWN ENGR. VITRO CHART 9 PAGENO="0938" 934 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION throughout the program, with each contractor holding a 1-year con- tract with an option to renew for a total of 5 years. These contracts are award-fee contracts. Our experience shows we are getting better work for less money under this approach. The laboratory support contractors are under the management surveillance of Mr. Cook, who is deputy director of research and development operations. The entire single support structure is under the top management surveillance of Mr. Gorman, who is my deputy director, administrative. He also serves as the fee- determining official in all cases. This chart shows Marshall funding level by appropriation for fiscal year 1967 and the proposed fiscal year 1968 budget in the President's budget. The total funding level for fiscal year 1968 would be about $59 million higher than in 1967-$59 million higher for the Marshall Center. Mr. WAGGONNER. What brings that added cost, Doctor? In research and development, is it Apollo applications? Dr. VON BRAUN. Yes, it is predominantly in the area of the Apollo ipplications program As you see, we are dropping off slightly in administrative operations. Construction of facilities is slightly in- creased, but not very much. The big increase is in research and devel- opment and we shall discuss that in detail tomorrow. Tonight I will concentrate on administrative operations and construction of facilities. But before we do this, I'd like to show you a summary of our fiscal year 1967 obligation and cost pictures. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER FUNDING LEVELS BY APPROPRIATION (In Millions of Dollars) Proposed A~ppropriation FY 1967 FY - 1968 Administrative Operations $ 127 8 $ 126 3 Construction of Facilities 17 2 9 Research and Development 1377 7 1437 4 TOTAL $1507.2 $1566.6 CHART 10 PAGENO="0939" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 935 This chart shows our obligation plan for Marshall's total program in fiscal 1967 and our actual progress against this plan. We are pretty well on target, as you can see. We are right now at this point here. I think we can state flatly that we shall achieve our planned obligation level by the end of the fiscal year with the possible exception of a small number of technology tasks involving only a few thousand dollars. Our problems with obligations in this particular field usually are with research institutes or universities, because they don't have the pro- fessional administrative staffs for contract handling you will find in industry. But then the amounts of money are quite small so it doesn't affect the big picture. My next chart shows our cost plan for Marshall's total program in fiscal 1967 and progress to date. I don't know how familiar you are with these obligation and `cost figures. "Obligations" means, essen- tially, we have firmly committed this money to the contractor. He has the green light to spend it. "Cost" means, in essence, we have paid the bill. So actual expenditures always `trail obligations timewise. If we have obligated every penny in a given fiscal year, the differ- ence between cost and obligations is the carryover into the next fiscal year. Some carryover is necessary for the continuity of the operation, of course, just like a man should have a little carryover on his check- ing account between two successive paychecks. But in our Apollo program there is little left for comfortable carryovers. The outlook for Marshall's meeting cost targets is uncomfortably good. I think MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER FY.67 OBLIGATIONS, PLANNED AND ACTUAL ALL APPROPRIATIONS-AO, R & D, AND C OF F CHART 11 PAGENO="0940" 936 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION General O'Connor will discuss this carryover question tomorrow. It is a very important aspect in our program. In fact, we feel in the Apollo program we are shaving things pretty tightly going with very, very thin reserves over into the next fiscal year. Mr. TEAGUE. Doctor, are we shaving it too close? Dr. vo~ BRAUN. I wouldn't say "too close." We are shaving it close. Mr. TEAGUE. Do you have sufficient money for doing testing so that you have no question when the vehicle leaves here that you are satisfied with it? Would you test more if you had more money? Dr. vo~ BRAUN. We are shaving things a little tight and we have to cut some corners. I have to admit that. With more money we could do a more thorough job. There is no question about it. Mr. WILsON. I asked a company a couple of days ago that builds an airplane that also builds a very important part of the Apollo pro- gram, and they told me that they did not test the Apollo part as much as they tested the plane which they were building for the commercial market. This rather disturbed me. They said they just didn't have `the money to do it. Dr. VON BRAUN. There is no question that in many areas one could do a more thorough job with greater resources. But when you look at the program in its totality, you will find that most program elements are coming along quite well, while there are always a few things on what we call the critical path. These are the pacing items, the parts MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER FY.67 COSTS, PLANNED AND ACTUAL ALL APPROPRIATIONS.AO, R & D, AND C OF F (IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) CHART 12 PAGENO="0941" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 937 everybody is waiting for. If an item is on the critical path, you really have an incentive to rush it through as fast as you can and it is here where you are tempted to cut corners. There is no question that in such cases more money and more time would help. In many areas we are testing enough; in some areas we would feel more comfortable if we could test a little more. Let me put it this way. My next chart shows our Marshall cost-reduction program. We were given a goal of $43 million in fiscal year 1966 and actually accom- plished cost reductions of $60.4 million. In fiscal year 1967 the goal we were given was again $43 million. We accomplished $48.6 million through the second quarter. We are not yet at the end of `the year. NASA's cost-reduction program reaches out into its contractor plants. The way NASA administers this part of the program is `by assigning certain contractors to each NASA Center. For example, we were asked to run the cost-reduction program for Boeing, Brown En- gineering, Chrysler, Douglas, GE, and the other companies listed here. Some of these companies do not hold major contracts with the Marshall Center, For example, United Aircraft. Most of `the busi- ness United Aircraft has with NASA is actually in the space suit and life-support-equipment area and fuel cells for spacecraft. But we were given the job of running that cost-reduction program, `too. MSFC COST REDUCTION PROGRAM * MSFC In-House *FY - 66 Actual $60.4Million Goal $43.OMillion *FY - 67 Actual $48. 6 Million (through 2nd Quarter) Goal $43.OMillion * Contractors Mon itoredj~yMSFC *12 Contractors Boeing, Brown Engr., Chrysler,, Douglas, G.E., Hayes, IBM, Mason-Rust, Spaco, Sperry- Rand, Vitro, United Aircraft *FY - 66 $99.5 Million CHART 13 PAGENO="0942" 938 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION My next ch'trt introduces our discussion of `tdministr'ttive opera tions This ch'trt shou s M'~rsh'tll s portion of the `tdmimstrative op erations appropriation for fiscal years 1967 and 1968 broken down into the three principal items th'tt compi ise the `tdministr itive operations `tre'L In the center column, you find the figures in the President's budget for fisc~J ye tr 1968 Total idministr'i~tive oper'ttions for fisc'tl ye'Lr 1968 ~ ould be $11/2 million less th'in in fisc'd year 1967, shown in the column on the left We asked origin'illy for the `~mounts listed on the right. Between NASA and the Bureau of the Budget, these figures were scrubbed down to the ones shown in the center column, so that's actually what you'll find in the President's budget. Mr. WAGÔONNER. Dr. von Braun, how do they figure with 7,032 personnel, the same number as last year, and in-grade pay increases, they c'in reduce future personnel compens'ttion ~ H'tve you got that much turnover in personnel ~ Dr vo~ BRAUN Hirry Gorman, will you answer the question ~ Mr GORM ~N Appirently they hive figured about 100 fewer man years of effort due to the fact that in fiscal year 1967 we are gradually reducing from 7,271 to 7,030, whereas in 1968 we shall remain on the 7,030 level throughout the year. Mr. WAGGONNER. Do you agree that the lapses they might have anticipated are in line with what your experience has been? Mr. GORMAN. No, we think that the personnel compensation is go- ing to be closer to 89.1. Dr. VON BRAUN. Personnel compensation between fiscal year 1967 and fiscal year 1968 would drop about $900,000 from 88.0 to 87.1 mil- lion Operation of installations would drop about $600,000 from the MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS FY-67 & FY-68 (In Millions of Dollars) MSFC Proposed FY-68 Item FY-1967 FY-1968 Request Personnel Compensation $ 88. 0 $ 87. 1 $ 89. 1 Travel 3.3 3.3 3.3 Operation of Installations 36 5 35 9 39 5 TOTAL $127.8 $126.3 $131.9 CHART 14 PAGENO="0943" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 939 1967 figure and is a full $3.6 million below our request. This item includes such things as communications, utilities, supplies and ma- terials, maintenance, and, particularly, computer rentals. The next chart shows in some detail why we are so concerned about this very tight situation in the administrative operations area. The proposed budget for administrative operations, as you saw on the previous chart, is 3.6 million under our requirements. The first is travel. The amount budgeted is the absolute minimum figure in view of the critical period we are entering in the Saturn program. Let me give you an illustration here. We are confronted with a very major problem with our second Saturn V stage, particu- larly in the manufacturing and quality control areas. So we have, at the present time, a firefighting team of approximately 30 of our research and development experts in the structural, propulsion and the quality control fields, and so forth, out at the contractor's assembly plant at Seal Beach, Calif. These men will stay there at our resident office until this problem is ironed out. These people are in travel status. Now, if travel funds are curtailed, or limited, our ability to take these emergency measures is reduced. The effect is like with- MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS AREAS QF CONCERN * Travel * Work ForceConsiderations * Paid Overtime * Summer Student Program * Conversion to Third-Generation Computers OIIART 15 PAGENO="0944" 940 196$ NASA AUTHORIZATION holding gasoline from the fire department. Your fire trucks don't do any good if you can't move your fire engines out. The amount of money involved in travel is relatively small, $3.3 million a year. The President's budget recommends the same figure we proposed at Mar- shall and I hope the final figure appropriated will not be cut at all. Then there are work-force considerations. Our total personnel compensation money is $900,000 less than we have requested. This means, first of all, we must reduce the number of promotions. This could have a morale impact and affect our ability to retain critically needed good people. It could also reduce our flexibility to attract good people to join the Marshall team because we shall not be able to ~offer salary levels commensurate with the kinds of talents we are seeking. As we get closer to the wire and the moment of truth in the activation of our Apollo hardware, it is all the more important that we retain first-class staffs. A relatively minor saving in personnel com- pensation can hurt us in keeping the critical kind of people we need to bring success to the program. Next, paid overtime. We are already following a very rigid over- time policy. We are employing compensatory time features, but we shall have to watch this area very carefully. Now, overtime is the kind of a subject that lends itself to many motherhood statements, such as, in a well-planned organization you don't need overtime. But in a program like ours, where setbacks suddenly strike, where one item is suddenly critical and thousands of people are waiting for that one item to come back to be delivered, there is just no other solution but to work some people day and night to get that problem out of the fire. Now if you tell people they can do this only by working compensatory time (in other words, they work Saturday and Sunday, then they do not work Monday and Tuesday) you are not helping the total situa- tion very much. And we just haven't got the money to pay these people overtime. We think this situation can be very wasteful, es- pecially in our closely meshed program where everyone waits for the slow man in the class. So we think the use of paid overtime is helpful in a program like this. It is not wasteful at all; it's actually a savings. And I am afraid we are not in a position to always set our own pace as if we were in the business of making shoes. Reduced administrative operations funds also impact our summer student program, which means we are going to have fewer summer students which help ease our workload burden during the summer months and have become a very effective source for future recruiting. A final area of concern is our conversion to third generation com- puters. This conversion is a very major undertaking. Third generation computers are essentially computers where the interface between the user of the computer and the machine itself has been vastly improved. In principle, you have a centralized computer and lots of outlets, al- most like telephone outlets, to individuals who have direct access to the computer, because their input and output devices are wired to the computer. This does away with the need for people to talk to pro- gramers in another building, having to wait in line for service, et cetera. This is a new concept of better use of the inherent capabilities of these very high-speed electronic computers. It resolves the problem PAGENO="0945" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 941 of communication between slow man and fast computer that has re- stricted full utilization of these high-speed computers. The industry has made a major effort in the so-called third generation computers to improve that interface. The result is that for less money you get a lot more computation capability. Now, we are converting from our present second generation computer to third generation in phases. And we can phase out the second generation computer only after the third generation system is really completely on stream. Our lack of funds in this area will not allow us to run these parallel operations and could delay the introduction of the third generation computers. We are actually paying more for the older computers with less results, so we would like to make this move now in order to save money. That's the message. Specifically, fiscal years 1968 and 1969 are actually the conversion periods during which we had planned to continue the second genera- tion computers while phasing into third generation. Although there would be higher additional cost during this temporary period of parallel use, substantial economies in subsequent years could be ex- pected. And the conversion cost would easily be amortized in 1970 and from then on it would be money in the bank. This chart shows the program facilities in support of that part of the Apollo program that is run out of Marshall Space Flight Center. You see the Huntsville test facilities, and the Mississippi Test Facil- ity, and the Michoud Facility which we are going to visit on Saturday. On the West Coast is Rocketdyne's Canoga Park rocket engine man- ufacturing facility, with engine testing at nearby Edwards Air Force MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER THIRD GENERATION COMPUTER SYSTEM * Principle Centralized high~'speed data processing and storage; decentralized input output devices. * Reasons for Change~ovQr * Greater capacity * I mproved service to users * Greater economy of total o~ration CHART 16 76-265 O-67--pt~ 2---60 PAGENO="0946" 942 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION CHART 17 Base. Then there is North American's Seal Beach assembly facility where the Saturn V second stage is being assembled, and Douglas' Huntington Beach Facility, where the S-IVB is built This stage serves as the second stage of the Saturn I and also the third stage of the Saturn V. In Santa Monica, Douglas manufactures parts that go into assembly at Huntington Beach At Sacramento is the static testing facility where the S-IVB's are static tested Since 1960, the Congress has `ippropriated more than one half bil lion of construction of facilities dollars for the facilities that you see here at these v'Lrlous loc'ttions This is about one third of the total construction of facilities program for Manned Space Flight. This investment~ is testimony to the vision of this subcommittee in build- ing `t n'itional space flight c'tp'tbility As Mr Webb stated recently, the Nation has invested $2½ billion at Michoud, Mississippi Test Facility, Huntsville, Houston, `tnd Cape Kennedy, to give the country `i b'isic cap'tbility to operate its sp'ice program for the next 50 to 100 years As to our ow n f'tcthty here in Huntsville, we have a broad capability to support rese'trch, manufacturing assembly, and testing of sophisticated flight `irticles up to a relatively large size These facilities, although largely created for Apollo, provide a versa- tility for adaptation to follow-on programs. Although you will not see it in our request for fiscal year 1968, we foresee the need to modernize that portion of the Marshall plant which consists primarily of obsolete World War II facilities which we ad'ipted for interim use In `tddition, cert un specialized environ mental `ind development testing ficilities `tre needed to complete the rounding of our c'tpabihty for futuie programs The scope of these PAGENO="0947" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 943 additional needs will be minor when compared to investments today at Marshall. We are currently considering this matter for inclusion in the fiscal 1969 budget. Fiscal year 1969 is the very latest we should begin work on the facilities we shall need for that follow-on period. Our facilities people are working closely with our future programs planning people to identify those future needs as precisely as pos- sible. We are now taking inventory of facilities both here in Hunts- ville and throughout the country to see what facilities will be available for this future work. My next chart presents construction of facility funding approved by the Congress for each fiscal year since 1961, when Marshall began. These figures include all of the locations shown on the previous chart. You see that we peaked in fiscal year 1963. Facilities, of course, must precede the hardware that you are going to build in those facilities or that you are going to test on these facilities. The building of these facilities had to precede the operations on the assembly floor. You see a rapid dropoff in our facilities program. We feel our entire facilities program was very successfully and effectively executed. As Mr. Webb said the other day, "A billion-dollar building program and no scandal." This next chart presents a thumbnail status of our facility planning, design, and construction at all locations. Projects approved in 1964 and prior have been completed. The overall status of our facilities work from fiscal year 1965 to the present is indicated in the columns listed here. No problems. Here are the construction of facilities projects we are requesting in the fiscal 1968 budget. There is a water pollution control item for Huntsville that would provide holding basins and flow control devices to control disposal of our industrial waste into the Tennessee River. 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES MILLIONS OF CHART 18 PAGENO="0948" 944 1068 NASA AUTHORIZATION MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER STATUS OF FACILITY PLANNING, DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION (All Locations) SUMMARY No. of Planning Design Construction FY Projects %Co~p % Comp % Comp 65 18 100 100 96 66 9 100 100 72 67 3 100 58 0 68 4 95 0 0 January 27, 1967 ChART 19 MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER STATUS SUMMARY OF FY-68C of F BUDGET (In Thousands of Dollars) CONGRESSIONAL HUNTSVILLE BUDGET Water Pollution Control $350 Fire Surveillance System 520 Huntsville Total $870 MICHOUD ASSEMBLY FACILITY Extension of Saturn Boulevard to State Road System $1, 130 Repair, Rehabilitation & Improvements 880 Michoud Total $2, 010 MSFC Total $2,880 January 18, 1967 CHART 20 PAGENO="0949" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 945 We are requesting a fire surveillance system which would provide a central fire protection system at Marshall. At Michoud, we have the Saturn Boulevard project. This would provide for the construction of 8,200 feet and two-lane road to connect the Michoud complex to the limited access highway facilities that are being constructed in the area by the State of Louisiana. It would integrate the local traffic pattern into the total area pattern. The final item at Michoud would cover improvements in such areas as replacement of the 200,000-gallon elevated water storage tank, road repair, replacement of heating and cooling equipment, and replace- ment of deteriorating lighting and primary electrical systems. Mr. WA000NNER. Can you tell us, Dr. von Braun, a little more about this fire surveillance system? Dr. VON BRAUN. The purpose of the system is to reduce the time for our fire police to reach a station that is in jeopardy. We have a num- ber of hazardous facilities here where the time elapsing between the start of the fire and the arrival of the fire engines may be decisive for saving the entire facility. The system is designed to give us a faster response time. Mr. Dykes, can you comment on this? Mr. DYKES. The existing fire surveillance system is a manual alarm, telephonic call-in system. The proposed system provides a graphic display panel in the fire hall. As Dr. von Braun says, it cuts the re- sponse time by providing direct central alarm. We also have, in some of our older facilities, some fire alarm systems which are. energized on the wrong side of the electric power source, and in case of power inter- ruption during a fire these manual systems would not work. This project is, in effect, an across-the-board look at the fire system and re- vises the individual systems to bring them back or puts them in a condition to allow installation of a central system. Mr. WAGGONNER. What Government installations have such a sys- tem as you proposed at the present time? What military installa- tions? What other NASA installation? Mr. Dn~Es. I can't answer that offhand, but we have this infor- mation back in the office and I shall submit it for the record. (The following information was submitted:) Practically all arsenals and other Government installations with widely dispersed facilities particularly those engaged in research and development and electronics have central fire alarm systems. Industrial complexes of most large private corporations like Ford Motor Co. and General Shoe Oorp. have central fire reporting systems. This lowers fire insurance rates and affords personnel and property protection. Government agencies known to have central fire reporting systems: Atlanta General Depot Mississippi Test Facility, Picayune, Warner-Robins SAC Base, Macon, Ga. Miss. Fort Gordon Army Base, Augusta, Ga. Redstone Arsenal-Army Missile Com- Fort Jackson Army Base, Columbia, mand, Huntsville, Ala. S.C. Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, Dobbins AFB, Marietta, Ga. Tex. Turner AFB-SAC, Albany, Ga. Barksclale AFB-SAC, Shreveport, La. Fort Benning Army Base, Columbus, Coswell AFB, Fort Worth, Tex. Ga. Milan Arsenal, Tenn. Charleston AFB, Charleston, S.C. White Sands NASA Test Support, Arnold Engineering Dev. Center, Tulla- N. Mex. homa, Penn. Fort Sill Army Base, Okia. Michoud Assembly Facility, New Or- Fort Bliss Army Base, Tex. leans, La. PAGENO="0950" 946 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Mr. WAGGONNER. Does any NASA installation have such a system? Mr. DYKES. I think Houston has one. Mr. WAGGONNER. That's all, Doctor. Mr. HUNT. Dr. von Braun, on your water pollution control, did I hear you correctly when you said this would be something that would be necessary to prevent pollution of the Tennessee River? Dr. VON BRAUN. That's correct. Mr HUNT Do you have `tny w'lter pollution control at the present time ~ Dr. vo~ BRAUN. Would you handle this, Mr. Dykes? Mr DYKES Currently ~ e `ire using `i system w hich is man con trolled. But the TVA and the Fish and Wildlife Servicer-we have a wildlife area immediately adjoining us-have complained on a couple of occasions about accidental dumps of industrial chemicals. Normally, we are able to control these and dilute them adequately but they are still subject to human failure and there have been accidental dumps. This system we are proposing will control the discharge so that we don't contaminate beyond levels icceptable to the Fish and Wildlife Service and TVA Mr. HUNT. In other words, they are going to remove danger of a. manmade error through an automation process Mr DYKE5 In effect, that's so It retains and dilutes in a deten tion reservoir so that we can meter the effluent out. Dr. VON BRAUN. If there are no more questions about this chart, I would like to show you an area map. This chart gives you a rough orientation of where we are. This i$ the city of Huntsville. You landed on this strip here and you are presently in this area here. During the committee's last visit, Hunts- ville had 125,000 people, today, we h'tve about 150,000, so we are still growing pretty rapidly The Mirshall Space Flight Center is im bedded into the larger complex of Redstone Arsenal, all of which was formerly Army Find The Marshall Center, completely surrounded by Army land, occupies a total of 1,800 acres. We have a total of 6,500 people of our 7,000 man complement in Huntsville. The rest is in resident contractor plants and at our Michoud plant and the Mississippi Test Facility About 200 of oui loc'tl 6,500 are in down town buildings at the Huntsville Industrial Center Building (which we call the HIC Building) and the Clinton Street building. In addi- tion, we have a small radio facility on Greeii Mountain, to the east of the city Adj'~cent to the Redstone Arsenal `irea is the so called Research Industrial Park We drove through this `trea `is you came in from the `urport You saw some modern industrial buildings to your left, and facilities of the Research Center of the University of Alabama on your iight The tot'tl rese'trch p'irk includes an `tre'i of 625 acres which is part of a zoned area of 3,000 acres that the city has zoned solely ±or this kind of an industrial development There is `i total of 1 million square feet of industrial area under roof in the Industrial Research Park The tot'il investment of th'tt p'irk is `tbout $100 million `tnd the work force in this whole `tre'i is `tbout 10,000 people The comp'tnies in this park include IBM, Brown, Boeing, Chrysler, Lockheed, Northrop Avco, and six smaller companies PAGENO="0951" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 947 The University of Alabama, Huntsville campus, is located adjacent to this area here. There are about 2,000 students in the Huntsville campus; 25 percent are graduate students. There are undergraduate degrees given by the Huntsville campus in English, history, math, and physics. Advanced degrees of the university in Huntsville include math, physics, aerospace engineering, electrical engineering, mechan- ical engineering, industrial engineering, and engineering mechanics. I mentioned already the Research Institute of the university campus, right here. My next chart shows the little green complex imbedded in the Army area in a little more detail. This is the Marshall Center proper- 1,800 acres. Utilities and security are provided by the Army, because this area was virtually carved out of Army land and all buildings were supplied with electricity, water, and so forth, by the Army before this portion was given to NASA. It was only logical that we continue security service and utilities by the Army. The Army's cost- Mr. WA000NNER. Do you reimburse the Army for the services they provide? Dr. VON BRAUN. Yes, sir. The Army is also policing our main arteries going in and out. In other words, after you have safely passed all the hazards posed by the county and city police when you drive in here you can still get a ticket from the Army. We have leased 49 buildings from the Army outside of this complex. This includes warehouse and storage buildings, igloos, and so forth. Mr. WA000NNER. Is that what the 66,000 square feet represented that you showed on the previous slide? Mr. DYKES. No; that was leas9d space. CHART 21 PAGENO="0952" 948 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Dr. VON BRATJN. That was leased facilities in downtown Huntsville; the Huntsville Industrial Center and the Clinton Street building. These buildings here are leased from the Army and are located on Redstone Arsenal. For example, we have leased some igloos down here to store material. For instance, when the Jupiters were decom- missioned in Italy and Turkey, all of our guidance equipment came back from these vehicles and was stored in these facilities. We also have fallout shelters there that have been turned over to Marshall. All this is included in those 49 Army-leased buildings. My next chart shows the Marshall Space Flight Center complex as seen from the North. You landed here on the strip and drove out in this direction. Tomorrow you will come in here on this road, and, after the tour, we shall go into this tall building, our Center head- quarters. Now, this is our manufacturing engineering complex here. This is Propulsion and Vehicle Engineering. This is the Astrionics Lab- oratory. Over here is our Research Projects Laboratory and way down here, in the rear, you see the large test stands of our Test Lab- oratory. Most of the other laboratories are accommodated in these buildings. For example, Astrionics is in here. Industrial Opera- tions sits in this rear building here, and this building accommodates major elements of Research a.nd Development Operations. Mr. Weid- ner and Mr. Cook, who run Research and Development Operations, share this tall building with my own staff here. This last chart shows the test area. This test stand in the f ore- ground is the static test facility for static testing of the Saturn V first stage. It can be fired up with all five F-i engines burning full- duration. This test stand here is a single F-i engine test stand. Both CHART 22 PAGENO="0953" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 949 CITART 23 CHARP 24 PAGENO="0954" 950 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION test stands are operated from the same blockhouse. This is a water pump facility to cool the jet deflectors. rllhis is the headquarters area Of 0111 rIlest Laboratory. Here are some older test stands and these are our dynamic test stands where the rockets are not fired up but are subjected to shaking tests to learn their structural behavior under vibration. This, by the way, is an old technique, developed originally for aircraft. You oscillate an airplane or a large Space rocket with an eccentric mass, for instance, to see what the resonance pattern is. rFlliS gives you a very good clue on structural damping and general structural integrity. It. also pinpomts soft spots in the structure. We have evaluated all our space vehicles iii this facility. You will have an opportunity to see the Saturn V full scale in this facility tomorrow and actually see how such a shake test works. We will also see an F-i engine firing in this test stand. When we visit the test. area tomorrow, you will first go into the bottom of this facility where we will see a dynamic test of Saturn V and then we will drive up to the roof of this blockhouse and you will see a test in this test stand. This, Mr. Chairman, ends my presentation. Mr. P1~TTIs. Dr. von Braun, one question. May I have the slide back again. The large Saturn V dynamic stand that you indicated was where you subjected it to the vibration, could that also be designed to point u~ any molecular fatigue in the structural design of the metal? From time to time we have a molecular fatigue which develops in certam types of metal. Now will this particular design of the Saturn V dynamic stand show this up likewise? Dr. VON BRAUN. It might. But fatigue failures are more likely to show up in our structural load testing program, which is conducted on another facility. The main purpose of the dynamic stand is to learn about the dynamic behavior of the vehicle. How does it. vibrate? ITow- does it. respond to control forces? How does the space vehicle bend and vibrate., for example, as it penetrates a jet stream in flight., and how does its structure dampen out. these oscillations? We need this information not only to check on the integrity of the structure but also to see whether our controls are stable throughout the flight. You can very easily run into a situation where the control system starts "hunt- ing" amid may rip a rocket to pieces. One cannot. simulate this corn- pletely in model tests and! so full-scale dynamic testing is necessary. Mr. PETTIS. Doctor, you made note of a patent office which is a new department, at. Huntsville. Does this indicate that. there is a- ma~rbe this isn't a correct word-commercial or industrial, fallout from the research and development, that is being clone here which has a utilization on the ground for immediate application? Dr. VON BRAUN. Very much so. Mr. PETTIS. Which is of benefit not. only to the Government but to the people'? I-Tow does this work? Dr. VON BRAUN. The problem you just mentioned has quite a few aspects. One is, of course, that some of the things that. develop in the program can indeed be patented, either by an employee of the Gov- ernment, or by a contractor. But since a contractor is under a Gov- ernrnent comitrac.t the Government. has almost unlimited use for our specific applications. But the contractor can, in certain cases, say, ~bWrei1, I would like to use this particular patemut in connection with something that. has nothing to do with Saturn V. Would you release it for my commercial use?" PAGENO="0955" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 951 This brings up a typical legal question that this patent office ad- dresses itself to. But this problem of technological fallout has also another interesting side. Many of the things that come out of our Saturn and Apollo program may not be patentable. You cannot get a patent unless you are presenting a genuinely new idea, but all you may have may be just a new technique. But, although that new technique was developed in conjunction with the Saturn and Apollo program, it may still offer new possibilities in entirely unrelated areas. This is where NASA's technology utilization program comes in. There is a separate office in NASA Headquarters, the Office of Technology Utilization, that has the sole task of continuously scanning the entire industrial and university effort sponsored by NASA and to investigate the possible utility of new products and new techniques for other fields of human endeavor. We have a contract with the University of In- diana under which they make a literature search through papers pro- duced by and for NASA for things of potei~tially more universal utility. When they find something worthwhile they prepare a paper with a description of the gist of that new idea or method and dissemi- nate it throughout industry. Mr. WAGGONNER. It's a technogram-gives a problem and solution, or spin-off. Dr. VON BRAUN. Let me give you an illustration. We pioneered a technique here at Marshall called the magnetomotive hammer. This is essenti~fly a technique to deform aluminum tubes with an electric power surge. For instance, you can make a female die of a bellows and place a simple aluminum tube into the die. Then you discharge a powerful electrical current through a coil and the resulting magneto- motive force drives the aluminum tube right into the die and forms so it becomes a bellows. We have used magnetomotive forming to solve some of our manufacturing problems. The Office of Tech- nology Utilization found this idea interesting. They wrote a little pamphlet on it and disseminated it all over the world. We have had several thousands of letters of inquiry from people who wanted to know more about this technique. Inquiries came not only from the United States, but from as far away as Europe and the Near East. The real problem for these Technology Utilization people is to be able to detect what has potential for nonspace activities to discover potential industrial diamonds among that vast mass of material that NASA and its associated industrial contractors are handling. Every now and then something really exciting turns up. Mr. KLINE. Dr. von Braun, do you want to show them the office at Marshall that coordinates it? Dr. VON BRAUN. Marshall's Technology Utilization, under Jim Wig- gins, reports to a staff office, called Management Services. There is an office at NASA Headquarters in Washington formerly run by Mr. Kerr, son of the late Senator Kerr. Technology Utilization is one of Mr. Webb's personal projects, and we all in NASA think it's a most valuable thing. Every now and then we see industrial products that obviously borrowed techniques that were (leveloped in conjunction with the Saturn/Apollo. Mr. ECKHARDT. Would there not be a negative aspect of this Patent Counsel? For instance, you have developed an obvious basic principle that can be adopted in certain industry which might be seized by the first comer and it might be desirable for patent processes to com- PAGENO="0956" 952 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION mence with someone who would protect it for the original discoverer or avoid the seizure of this plan inequitably by someone who is building on research done at the expense of Government. Dr. VON BRAtTN. Well, I agree that this potential does exist. I don't believe we ever had any serious abuses here. At least I don't know of any. As I understand this, whenever a contractor develops something for the Government, and in the process of developing this item he runs into some idea or method that he considers patentable, he can file a patent. But the Government by virtue of having fi- nanced and sponsored the development program automatically owns the right to use this patent, not only for that particular development, but also for anything else. Mr. EOKHARDT. That's exactly what I was saying. Mr..HEBERT. The same thing in universities. Dr. VON BRATJN. But in some cases a contractor may plan to utilize this patent for something entirely out of our area, and this he can do, with the Government's permission. How is this, Harry? Mr. GORMAN. Our problem is to get the contractors to make their patent disclosures to us. It is a problem for a number of reasons. Mr. ECKHARDT. There might be a public policy against an individual or contractor patenting a device to the exclusion of other persons, when in fact the original research was initiated by Government. In other words, there can be public policy against restriction of use, and without an active Patent Counsel, it would appear to me that there can be inequitable seizure on ideas actually originally developed by Government. Mr. GORMAN. Part of the Patent Counsel efforts here are directed toward obtaining the disclosures on the part of the contractors. Mr. TEAGtJE. Doctor, thanks for a very good briefing. GEORGE C. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER D~POTY DIRECTOR, I I I 1 ADMINISTRATIVE [ püiik~I I CHIEF PATENT I LAROR~1 OORNAH L AFFAIRS Lc~NORL COUNSEL [~RLATIGNS I EXECUTIVE STAFF1_.__ MANA~M~L PURCHASING LT~L I I MANAGRMEHT ~Td~ ~[ INSON L_~ I R:EARcH&DEvEL0PMENT 1 ~ ADVANCED TECHNICAL 1 I ESP RIM~~' I OPERATIONS SYSTEMS SYSTEMS I ___________ I~ANAGEMRNT ___________ ___________ ___________ __________ [AEROiSTRO. ASTRIONICS 1 __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ DIRE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ~ [~RACTS~ITIR~r ____ LPR~J HIRSCH DAIS PRGJRCTS~1 1i~R~E~1 LOGISTICS [MANAGRMRNTI __ __ I PROP. & ~j I GOAL & EELIA SPACE* ENGR SAM. I ~SORANCR LAM. ~uHm:IR HOMBURG I I I _____ _____ _____ _________________________ ________________________ _________________________ _________________________ I _________________________ ETIONSi COMPUTATIO~l I MFG. I J SATURN I/ij l~RN V J ENGINE 1 SAT /APOLLG I ENGINEERING I LAR. I I LAB I I PROOEGN ___________ ___________ ___________ L~!AM PROGRAM__J L!!OORAM HOEIOIR RUIRS TIIR RUDOlPH BROWN 1111W __ E~?RATI~1TESI~1 ASSEM _______________ ______________ FACIL _~TY CONITAN SPIll 1*101 1/AT I.D AlliS OHARP 25 PAGENO="0957" STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. EDMUND F. O'CONNOR PART II. SATURN PROGRAM STATUS SATURN PROGRAM STATUS Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, in my briefing this morning and by way of introduction (fig. 1), I will touch on the organization of Industrial Operations to acquaint you with some of our practices and policies. I will cover, as well as I can in the scheduled time, the status of launch vehicles and engine programs. I will highlight some of the more significant program developments; some of these will be accomplish- ments and a few will be problems. You asked earlier for an expression of our judgment and experience with incentive contracting, and I will touch upon that along with our *funding for fiscal year 1967 and our proposed funding for fiscal year 1968, and close with some summary remarks. I might add further that I have a second part which is not on the outline and will take about 5 minutes. This will be a discussion of the Mississippi-Michoud complex which you will be visiting tomorrow. Shown here in figure 2 is the ludustrial Operations organization which Dr. von Braun described to you last night. I am General O'Connor, Director of Industrial Operations. The mission of Industrial Operations is to manage the programs-the Uprated Saturn I, Saturn V, and Engines, and now the Saturn/ Apollo Applications Program. The Program Managers are the heart OUTLINE * INTRODUCTION I, UPRATED SATURN I, SATURN V, AND ENGINES * PROGRAM DEVELOPMENTS AND PROBLEMS * CONTRACTING AND FUNDING OUTLOOK * SUMMARY REMARKS FIGURE 1 953 PAGENO="0958" GEORGE C. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER [~TANTDIRECTOR1 I DIRECTOR L I FOB SCIENTIFIC & [!!~NICAL ANALYSIS __________ __________ __________ HIWIT EXECUTIVE STAFF ~ PO:CHASING roxwo~oy `` MANAGEMENT I _____ _____ I ADMINISTRATIVE [~iiLIC 1 CHIEF I PATENT I I LABOR GOEBAN IRS COSNSEL [COUNSEL] I~LATIONS I I I I I ADVANCED1 I TECHNICAL OPERATIONS CONTRACTS I FACILITIES PROJECTS RESOARCES SYSTEMS I [ SYSTEMS ___________ MANAGEMENT ___________ L PROJECTS LOGISTICS NANAOEMENT WILLIAMS RICHARD IOHHSOH FELLOWS NIESCN DALY SOODRUM ANDRISIRN I I I I I~-~ I I I AFRO ASTRO ASTRIONICS L J[~~o L~!::~..J L.PR~A~..J PROGRAM _________ PROP. & GOAL & REL RISRARCM MICHOSD MISSION MISSISSIPPI ENGR LAB. ~ANcR±~. ~_pR~~S [TEST ~ ~ 1 OPERATION~j FACILITY FIGURE 2 954 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION RESEARCH & DIVELOPMENT INDUSTRIAL OPERATIONS OPERATIONS MANPOWER I FACILITIES NASA NASA & ADMIN. L & DESIGN INSPECTION AUDIT of our organization. They are charged with the responsibility for complete control of their programs. The staff elements, i.e., Con- tracts, Facilities Projects, Projects Logistics, and Resources Manage- ment Offices, spend about 20 percent of their time and capability in a staff capacity, while the other 80 percent is spent in working with the Program Managers in all of their functions-contracting, logistics, and so forth. In our Mission Operations Office is a group of 42 people who pri- marily support the Program Managers in the launch and flight opera- tions chores and ~ ho interf'~ce very closely ~ ith Kennedy Space Cen ter and the Mission Control Center at Houston. Here is `~ pictori'd (fig 3) of ho~ ~s e `tctually manage our programs and our interfaces with the contractors, Marshall's Research and De- velopment Operations, and other NASA Centers. There are two or three points I would like to make here. One of our obligations and capabilities in program management is to use the Marshall R&DO technical competence which exists in depth to the extent of some 4,500 personnel. The point I would like to make is that we really have a "swinging-door" operation through R&DO where I, the Program Managers, and the Project Managers work horizontally and vertically with R&DO staff members and down into the branch level of the laboratories. There is good technical competence in depth in the offices of the Program and Project Managers, but the Reservoir of scientific and engineering support is supplied by Research and De- velopment Operations. Next, in our day-to-day activities in managing the contractors, which is our primary activity, since over 90 percent of our business is out- side, we work basically through our resident managers. This proce- PAGENO="0959" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 955 dure is followed by both the Program and Project Manager's office, hut more so on a day-to-day basis by the Project Manager's office. I might say right here that we have approximately 20 Project Man- agers. Were you to compare this to industry, which in one sense per- haps is not fair, it would give you an idea of the responsibility as- signed to these people. The Program Manager might be considered as the president of an entire division within industry, whether that be within the aerospace industry or an organization like General Motors; I would consider the Project Manager as the vice president for a particuiar product. The intricacies and costs of our programs are large enough to require this kind of attention. I will briefly explain the role of a Project Manager. For each of the three engines we have a Project Manager to oversee the entire engine project. For example, the F-i Engine Project Man- ager has been charged with his staff of 27 people to manage all aspects and phases of the F-i project from design to acceptance test and delivery. As another example, Dr. Rudolph is the Program Manager for the entire Saturn V launch vehicle. He has Project Managers assigned to each stage or major system such as the Instrument Unit which you saw at IBM this morning. Any one of these projects, and my funding data will disclose this later, is running on an average of $175 million per year which is the reason for my earlier comparison with industry. Now, I will explain briefly our interface with other centers using our relationship with Kennedy Space Center as an example. We do not deliver our hardware to the dock at the Cape and back away from FIGURE 3 PAGENO="0960" 956 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION it. We have responsibility for performance of the hardware through our relationship with Kennedy Space Center as an example. We do not deliver our hardware to the dock at the Cape and back away from it. We have responsibility for performance of the hardware through of our hardware must be maintained there for 5 or 6 months before launch. We retain, for example, configuration control and accounting of our hardware at the Cape. This has been worked out by agreements and understanding with the Cape. The point I would like to make is that our traffic or commerce with the Cape is continuous and persistent. You were told last night that we have some 7,200 Marshall employ- ees. Approximately 10 percent of the Marshall Space Flight Center employees are out in the field in locations such as indicated in figure 4. Of the approximately 1,200 program management people at Marshall, that is, the Industrial Operations group, about 45 percent are out in the field doing the program management job which I briefly described earlier. A large number, approximately 250 people, are located at Michoud, where we have dual missions-program management and associated functions plus institutional management of that large facility. At Space and Information Division, North American Aviation, where the second stage of the Saturn V has been designed and is now being manufactured, we have 67 of our people; they are a mixture of Industrial Operations people and technical people from Research and Development Operations. There are a few places such as Flexonics, Elgin, Ill., where we have only one person. These are quality assurance type individuals who make sure that the products we are getting are to the proper quality standards. FIGURE 4 PAGENO="0961" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 957 We have a few other people assigned to other NASA Center con- tractors. For example, at Grumman, at the request of Manned Space- craft Center, we have an individual who is helping survey the Grum- man manufacturing operations on Long Island. Here is a pictorial-figure 5-some of our major contractor inter- f aces. We have added a few of the `Government interfaces such as Manned Spacecraft Center and Kennedy Space Center. However, the importance of these interfaces is not really evident from. the chart. We have about 98 active contracts spread out over the United `States. For simplicity, which we did not really portray with this chart, we have shown the locations of `the 40 contractors who have contracts valued in excess of $1 million each. As I proceed with my presentation, I think you are going to see some of the pitfalls of managing a program with hardware being de- signed and produced all over the country. Were we to take any of these contracts, for example RCA or North American, and break them down through the fourth tier of subcontracting and through their vendor structure, we would have an unintelligible chart. But this is the type of situation the Program Manager is faced with in assuring that the total finished product is adequate. The troika of Saturn vehicles is represented by-figure 6-the Saturn I, the Uprated Saturn I, and the Saturn V. We could talk all afternoon about the accomplishments in the Saturn I program, but I intend to summarize only. The technology which went into the. Saturn I was derived directly from the Jupiter and Redstone tech- nology. FIGURE 5 76-2e5 0-67-pt. 2~-6i PAGENO="0962" 958 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 6 On the Saturn I progra.m there were 10 flights programed, scheduled and flown successfully. There were no losses or failures. The pro- gram, completed in 1965, went a long way in preparing us and serving us as flight prototype hardware for both the Uprateci Saturn I and the Saturn V. For example, in the Saturn I program we proved that clustering of the engines was a satisfactory and workable method toward accom- plishmg the objectives being laid out for ]ater Saturn programs. The art of kerosene and liquid oxygen propulsion was developed with the first stage of the Saturn I. The art of liquid hydrogen and liquid oxy- gen was first successfully applied in large quantities to the Saturn I second stage which was manufactured by I)ougla.s. Later this basic technology was improved upon in development of the second stage of the Uprated Saturn 1 and the third stage of the Saturn V. In adcli- tion, Saturn launch-vehicle ba.sic design and structure w-ere proven and that knowledge was carried across into the remainder of the family. the early prototype Apollo hardware-the escape tower aiid the corn- manci module-was flown on Saturn I vehicles. And the last. three Saturns, VIII, IX, and X, flew time Pegasus micromet.eroicl detection payloads; put them out. into earth orbit w-here they are still function- i ng, and registering micrometeroid dat a. On figure 7 is a. comparison of the Upra.tecl Saturn I and Saturn V vehicles. Starting from the top of the launch-escape system and goilig clown through the Uprat.e.d Saturn I second stage and the Saturn V third stage, we have essentially the same hardware now being flown on time Uprateci Saturn I that w-iil be used for the Saturn V lunar mission. PAGENO="0963" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 959 The first stage of the TJprated Saturn I is a clustering of nine tanks and eight engines; kerosene and liquid oxygen are used as propel- lants. The second stage (S-IVB.) is the improved second stage which I mentioned we flew on the Saturn I vehicle. This stage is serving a dual role-second stage for the TJprated Saturn I and the third stage of the Saturn V vehicles. So one might say that from the Saturn V second stage down we developed two new propulsive stages to meet our lunar objectives. We acquired the knowledge and experience and technology with the Saturn I, then we went to a larger diameter (33-foot) stage with Saturn V. You saw the second first-stage flight article in the quality laboratory this morning. The basic differences, other than size, are the use of an integral tank rather than a cluster- ing of tanks, and use of an F-i engine rather than the much smaller Il-i. However, the same kerosene and liquid oxygen propellant is employed and one can s~y this is within the state of the art. The second stage is manufactured by the space and information, division of North American Aviation andis probably the largest liquid hydrogen-liquid oxygen stage in existence. It is a new stage. How-' ever, we did `apply the Saturn I second-stage liquid hydrogen-liquid oxygen technology to this stage and, to the best of our~ ability, `trans- ferred that knowledge and experience to the prime contractor, North American. ` UPRAT~D SATURN I PROORAM In the TJprated Saturn I `program (figs. 8 and 9), three successful Apollo missions, designated AS-201, 202, 203, have been completed. These served to prove the design of the TJprated Saturn I vehicle and FxGuru~ 7 PAGENO="0964" 960 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION to prove the flightworthiness of the J-2 engine and the liqui.d hydro- gen second stage. We gained considerable confidence with these flights with regard to propulsion maturity and developmental status, the guidance and control system and, in fact, all of the subsystems and components associated with t.he T5prated Saturn I vehicle. I should inject at this point that the Saturn I program was run in a much smaller, closer manner than we are able to do today with the Saturn vehicles for the lunar program. The organization has grown, contractor participation has grown large and the interfaces have be- come a very important part of the program. We are able to optimize these to serve the program well. One of the most important accomplishments thus far in the TJprated Saturn I program is the liquid hydrogen experiment flown on AS-203 FIGuRE 8 PAGENO="0965" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 961 (fig. 10). This is a cutaway of the second stage with its single J-2 engine and "payload" which was a nose cone shroud provided by the Marshall Space Flight Center. To accomplish the lunar mission, the engine will be required to burn for about 100 seconds to place the tremendous lunar payload into earth orbit at a speed of about 17,000 miles per hour. After attaining earth orbit and within a time period of 11/2 to 4½ hours; thereafter, the engine will be required to restart to. take us out of the parking orbit, into the lunar corridor, and onto the lunar trajectory at a velocity of approximately 25,000 miles per hour. That i~ quite a trick. How- ever, we have worked out much of the technology associated with re- starting this engine. Part of the problem, or one of the unknowns, was the behavior of liquid hydrogen which only weighs six-tenths of a pound per gallon. We had to be sure that the hydrogen would settle into the bottom of the tank and remain settled in earth orbit so that the engine could be properly restarted. I have a film clip (fig. 11) which shows stage separation and onboard camera coverage of the experiment. The second stage separates from the first stage. The flames you see are from the ullage motors which are fired to settle the hydrogen into the bottom of the tank. Here you see the hydrogen settled. To observe LH2 behavior, markings were placed on the tank wall as points of reference for viewing from two onboard tdlevision cameras. One of the cameras was inoperative; how- ever, we decided to go ahead with the launch anyway. The second stage fires for the first time. The hydrogen bubbles up into the top of the tank and, subsequently, resettles into the bottom of the tank. ACCOMPLISHMENTS - 1966 UPRATED SATURN I THREE SUCCES SFUL A POLLO M IS S I ONS * PROVED DESIGN * SECOND STAGE WORTHINESS OF J-2 ENGINE AND LIQUID HYDROGEN * AND ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS OF PROPULS ION, GU I DANCE AND CONTROL * MSFC-CONTRACTOR ~KSC-MSC I NTERFACE EXPER I ENCE * APOLLO MISSION SUPPORT CAPABILITY I T~TYFONTROL LIQUID HYDROGEN DURING Fioui~ 9 PAGENO="0966" 962 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 10 The experiment verified that the liquid hydrogen could be. controlled and could be kept in a settled condition in a zero gravity environment. The t.eclmique employed for settiiimg was through the continuo~is vent- ing system. which 1)1~ovi(le~l just. enough forward thrust. to keep the hydrogen at the Imottoiui of the tank, and subsequently, Support the second start of the engine. When compared with other decisions we have had to make, the prob- leni with the TV camera on AS-203 is considered minor. For example, the first stage of the first TTprat.ecl Saturn I flight, vehicle was on the launch pad and! muiclergoiimg test. and checkout when the forward bulk- head of one of the nine clustered tanks collapsed dine to au overpres- suriza.t.ion in the forward part of the chicle.. We were then faced with PAGENO="0967" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 963 the question of what to do. A number of alternatives were considered including removal of the stage from the pad and replacing it with AS-202 first stage which would have caused a program delay; repair of the forward bulkhead at the Cape; return of the stage to Michoud for repair. T~ illustrate the working relationship and the ability of the team to respond to situations of this sort, we decided to take the one tank up over the top and out ~f the stack and replace it rn the reverse manner with a tank flown down from Chrysler at Michoud (fig. 12). ~1'he importance of this is not that we changed the tank in 45 hours, but that we were able to do at the Cape a complex operation normally done in the factory, with the stage in a horizontal position, and with extremely precise tooling. Prior to the AS-204 accident at the Cape, we were faced with a similar situation. Questionable equipment was found in one, of our H-i engines at the Cape and the engine had to be changed out (fig. i3). Again, this occurred after the launch vehicle had been erected on the launch pad. The importance of this was not just exchanging the engine but being able to acquire an engine from Rocketdyne, check it out with the other engines in the cluster with ground support equip- ment, particularly electronic support equipment, and maintain the launch schedule asrequired. This was done successfully.. ~ Figure i4 is intended to convey the launch vehicle program flexi bility which we have been trying to acquire to deal ~ ith contingencies and unexpected events. Flight AS-202 was scheduled to belâunched in April ]~966. In e.arly i966, problems plagued the spacecraft, and FIGuRE 11 PAGENO="0968" 964 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGrEE 12 FIGURE 13 PAGENO="0969" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 965 UPRATED SATURN I AS-202/203 RESCHEDULING LAUNCH VEHICLE 1966 MN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV [C DELIVERY SCHEDULED TO KSC LAUNCH LAUNCH AS.202 V -.-------.-------.-1 J DELIVERY TO KSC LAUNCH V AS-203 FIGURE 14 it was not delivered to KSC as scheduled. Marshall was asked if AS-203 could be launched ahead of AS-202. After some detailed examination and some reprograming within our own sphere of in- fluence, we decided that AS-203 could be launched prior to AS-202 with only minimum effect on the program. This was more desirable than sliding the schedule down through the Uprated Saturn I and even into the Saturn V program. We moved and AS-203 was launched, as indicated. AS-202 was launched about 1 month later. The importance of this is that we have our hardware qualified and rolling into the manufacturing process, as subsequent illustrations will show. We `do have some flexibility to deal with uncertainties which we may be required to deal with as a result of the AS-204 spacecraft loss and tragedy. In view of the accident 2 weeks ago and the probability of reprograming following the Accident Investigation Board report, the delivery dates and mission assignments that I refer to today may be changed at some later date. Despite changes to manned flight schedules, NASA does plan to pro- ceed with the launch of' three unmanned flights this year. These are the Uprated Saturn I AS-206'and the. Saturn V AS-501 and AS-502. The first manned orbital flight will be accomplished with a Block II Command and Service Module on an Uprated Saturn I launch vehicle. When the AS-204 investigation is completed, changes will be deterL mined and flight schedules will be established. PAGENO="0970" 966 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION The current outlook for the Uprated Saturn I program is shown in figure 15. We and our contractors are standing by at Kennedy Space Center to give launch vehicle AS-204 thorough examination and inspection. The vehicle has not been released to us by the Acci. dent Investigation Board, but release is expected soon. Marshall, our contractors,, in fact, all of NASA have been charting a course to proceed with the fabrication, delivery, static test, and checkout of hardware so whatever impact results from the AS-204 accident, we will be ready to deal with it. We feel the AS-206 launch will go on as outlined. The vehicle is stacked on Pad 37 at the Cape. This is `an unmanned launch, sched- uled for the second quarter of calendar year 1967. Its primary mission is development of an unmanned Lunar Module. There is a possibility of dual missions `for rendezvous and docking maneuvers later. You will recall, in November there `was a mishap at North American with the Service Module., At `that time the dual AS- 207/208 mission was reprogramed to AS-205/208. Basically, this is the flight of a Command and Service Module on AS-205, followed the next day `by launch of the AS-208 which will place the Lunar Module into earth othit for rendezvous maneuvers with the Command and `Service Module. The Uprated Saturn I launch `vehicle, AS-204, is qualified for flight, it has been through numerous tests; it was certified and remains cer- tified through the Design Certification Review process which Dr. OUTLOOk-UPRATED SATURN I * AS-2041.AUNCH DATEAND MISSION BEING ASSESSED * AS-206 * LAUNCH VEHICLE STACKED ON PAD 37 AT KSC * LAUNCH SCHEDULED SECOND QUARTER CY67 * UNMANNED LUNAR MODULE DEVELOPMENT MISSION * MISSION SEQUENCE * WORK PROCEEDING FOR SUBSEQUENT MANNED LAUNCH * BLOCK II COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE * POSSIBLE DUAL LAUNCH MISSION FOR RENDEZVOUS, DOCKING AND PROPULSION EXERCISES * UPRATED SATURN LAUNCH VEHICLE QUALIFIED FOR MANNED FLI GHT * STAGES THRU AS-207 IN STORAGE OR ON SCHEDULE FIGURE 15 PAGENO="0971" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 967 Mueller has established in Washington. A'S-20~ was scheduled for flight on February 21. The mission may be rescheduled later with some other vehicle; therefore, it might interest you to see the mission sequence (fig. 16). The launch vehicle places the Command and Serv- ice Module in an 85 to 130 nautical mile elliptic orbit for the so-called, open-ended mission of up to 13 days. Event's 2 through 5 (fig. 16) are Service Module burns or firings in orbit to take the Command and Service Module in and out of the elliptical planes as shown. Some 13 or so days after launch the Service Module is fired for the eighth time to deorbit the payload for return and recovery in the Atlantic Ocean. Here, in figure 17, is the AS-206 mission sequence. It is an un- manned Lunar Module mission. This is the first Lunar Module, and it will be delivered very shortly from Grumman Aircraft. The sequence of events is to launch the vehicle into an elliptical earth orbi't, separate the launch vehicle and the nose cone from the Lunar Module, and then perform exercises with the Lunar Module descent and ascent engines. This is an interesting operation inasmuch as the ascent stage burn's through the hole of the descent stage, simulating the departure from the lunar surface. To summarize the TJprated' Saturn I program (fig. 18), three launches were successfully completed in 1966. Vehicles through AS- 206, with exception of AS-205, have `been delivered to Cape Kennedy. AS-205 is ready but is being held for the potential dual mission `with AS-208. In the fiscal year 1968 period, all 12 launch vehicles which constitute the mainstream TJprated Saturn I/Apollo Program, will be delivered. The last Uprated Saturn I (A~S-~212) of the current buy is midway in manufacture and assembly today. FIGURE 16 PAGENO="0972" 968 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 17 FIGURE 18 PAGENO="0973" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 969 SATURN V LAUNCH VEHICLE Turning now to the Saturn V vehicle (fig. 19), some of the recent accomplishments in the program are shown in figure 20. The Ground Test Program is practically complete. Our facilities are essentially complete and for all intents and purposes, are supporting the entire program. The first stage is considered mature. I will discuss the sec- ond stage accomplishments and failures in detail later. We did lose one of our third stages-the stage for AS-503 which I will cover very briefly. With regard to our Ground Testing Program, I have selected what is probably one of the most important elements, the component and subsystem qualificaJtion program (fig. 21) whioh is comparable to FAA certification of aircraft. On the Saturn V, approximately 3,500 components, valves, pumps, actuators, and so forth were selected to be qualified. Some 2,500 of these were qualified by prior application and use on ballistic missiles, Saturn I, and TJprated Saturn I vehicles. One thousand of these components `had to be qualified by strenuous test prior to the flight of AS-501. These components have `been subjected to rigorous conditions far in excess of those expected to `be encountered during the actual launch and mission operation. These tests vary from vibrations for hour after hour on shake tables to thermal vacu- um tests. Of the 1,000, only 11 remain to be qualified. In fact, I was FIGuRE 19 PAGENO="0974" 970 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION SATURN V ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND SIGNIFICANT EYENTS~ ~966-67 * GROUND TEST PROGRAM NEARING COMPLETION * FACILITIES CHECKOUT COMPLETED * FIRST STAGE AND ENGINE MATURITY * SECOND STAGE ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND FAILURES * THIRD STAGE LOSS AT DOUGLAS - SACRAMENTO * LAUNCH VEHICLE GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT - FOR EARLY FLIGHTS DELIVERED, INSTALLED AND CHECKED OUT * FIRST FLIGHT VEHICLE DELIVERED TO KSC FIGuRE 20 SATURN V COMPONENT QUALIFICATION 3, 500 COMPONENTS IDENTIFIED FOR QUALI F I CATION. 2,500 QUALIFIED BY PRIOR USE, SIMILARITY OR ENGINEERING ANALYSIS 1,000 REQUIRED QUALIFICATION BY TESTING. - ELEVEN REMAINTOBEQUALIFIED NINE FLIGHT CRITICAL TWO NON-FLIGHT CRITICAL FIGuRE 21 told this morning the num!ber is now down to 10. We expect to quali- fy these remaining components before rollout of the AS-501. rfIlel.e is nothing pai~ticularly constraining about this except that when a unit. fails, it must be run through the entire qualification process again. Another facet of `the Ground Testing Program is Vehicle Dynamics Testing (figs. 22 and 23) which you saw this morning. These tests are conducted to monitor the dynamic response of the flight vehicle tinder all simulated flight conditions such as launch and stage separa- tion. The tests are planned to confirm flight control system design; to verify vehicle structure dynamic analysis; and to finalize the vehi~ ole guidance and control systems. PAGENO="0975" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 971 One of our most important accomplishments in the recent past was the delivery to Kennedy Space Center and use of the Saturn V Fa- cilities Oheckout vehicle (fig. 24). This is a near flight-worthy article from top to bottom with a few exceptions such as engines which were not needed `to achieve program objectives. The vehicle was delivered on schedule to the cape. I think, Mr. Chairman, you were there when the rollout `took place. The impor- tance of the operation was checkout of the ground crew personnel in- cluding contractor personnel, mating of the vehicle stages and the FIGURE 22 PAGENO="0976" 972 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION total vehicle to the ground support equipment, and checkout of pro- pellant handling and loading procedures. The vehicle `was fueled with kerosene, liquid hydrogen, and liquid oxygen. Of equal signifi- cance was the automatic oheckotit of the vehicle by the electronic sup- port equipment contained in the firing room at the cape. This opera- tion went very smoothly and is one that cannot be portrayed in a picture due to the great mass of electronic equipment involved. After the Facilities Checkout vehicle was `destacked, the second stage `was returned to Huntsville and is the second stage which you saw in the dynamic test tower. FIGURE' 23 PAGENO="0977" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 973 FIGuES 24 In the Saturn V first stage project, we have successfully static fired the first three flight stages at Huntsville (fig. 25). The second flight stage will be shipped to KSC in ~bout a week; the third one is at Mich- oud undergoing refurbishment and post ~tatic checkout. The fourth and subsequent first sta~ge flight articles, will be static tested at our Mississippi Test Facility. There have been failures in the Saturn V program (fig. 26). This was the second stage All-systems test article manufactured not for flight but for developmental ground testing to prove second stage flightworthiness. The stage was delivered late to the Mississippi Test Facility; numerous problems were encountered after it was erected in the stand and prior to static firing. Five short duration firings were accomplished, on the order of 6 seconds and 43 seconds; some were cutoffs due to recilinè conditions. One full duration test of 360 sec- onds was achieved; this is the requirement for the second stage in its launch trajectory. The second stage project was progressing quite well when last fall, the All-systems stage failed due to an overpres- surization in the hydrogen tank. Note the spool-like fit-up fixture in the lower part of figure 26. The fixture is being used to great advantage in the program, and I will show you how later. . We underwent some agonizing reappraisal subsequent to the loss of the All-systems. It was quite a blow to the program. We had `some plans for that stage which we could no longer achieve; however, we 76-265 O-67--pt. 2~----62 PAGENO="0978" 974 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 26 PAGENO="0979" 1~9 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION 975 have not relaxed the program. The stage was immature and to pro- vide more project assurance the test program for the first flight stage was intensified to require the contradtor to perform two consecutive full duration firings. The first flight second stage ~as placed in. the stand at Mississippi, and the objectives were achieved (fig. 27). The stage has been checked out, refurbished and sent to the Cape, and is now stacked in the low bay of the Vertical Assembly Building. The first flight stage, like the All-systems, was late and as a result, it was shipped to the Cape with some manhours of work to be corn- ploted. However, it is scheduled to replace the fit-up fixture in the AS-501 stack toward the latter part of this month. Here is. a short film clip of the AS-501 erection showing the use of the second stage fit-up fixture (figs. 28 and 29). We determined the fit-up fixture could be used to represent the second stage in the AS-öOl stack to preclude the loss of 3 to 3J~4 months which otherwise would have been lost by late delivery of the second stage. The point to be made is that very valuable schedule time would have been lost had we not done this. This was not only a mechanical im- provisation; we wired around the fit-up fixture so that the ground support equipment, and particularly the all important electrical sup- port equipment, could check out the vehicle stages that were there. Turning now to the third stage of the Saturn V, two flight stages have been acceptance tested (fig. 30). One is at the Cape and the FxGuRI~ 27 PAGENO="0980" 976 1968 NASA AUTHOIUZATION FIGURE 28 second is in post static checkout like so many of our ether stages. The third stage project has been progressing rather satisfactorily; however, I am sure that you heard and read and were perhaps briefed on the fact that we lost the third stage for AS-503, as it was being prepared for static firing at Sacramento. Damage to the stage, Beta III test stand, and the surrounding area is shown in figure 31. We PAGENO="0981" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 977 FIGURE 29 do have the Beta I stand which can accommodate the on-coming third stages. As a matter of fact, the fourth flight stage, for AS-504 was shipped to Sacramento for testing about a week and a half after the incident. Again, this is indicative of the schedule flexibility which I tried to illustrate earlier. in the immediate aft skirt area of the third stage (fig. 3~) are eight spheres which are titanium pressure vessels and which are pressurized PAGENO="0982" 978 I 1968. NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 30 FIGURE 31 PAGENO="0983" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 979 FIGURE 32 to a nominal pressure of 3,000 p.s.i. The purpose of these vessels is to store the pressurants used for propellant tank repressurization for restart. A protective cover is placed over each sphere for shipment and handling. When the stage is static fired, the protective cover is removed. These spheres are manufactured in hemispheres with an equatorial type weld around the center. These are about 4½-cubic-foot titanium spheres. The titanium. is alloyed with aluminum and vanadium. During the accident investigation, Dr. Debus and his board reported that the failure of one of the spheres on the third flight stage occurred in a very clean manner at the point of the weld nugget circumferen t.ially around the sphere where was under some 3,100 p.s.i. pressure (fig. 33). In qualification tests, these. spheres have been taking ulti- mate pressures on t.he order of some 9,000 p.s.i and all of the failures have occurred perpendicular and in a jagged manner across the weld (fig. 34). This immediately became a very suspect condition. The weld is supposed to be made with a titanium alloy which is identical to the structure of the tank: namely, a titanium-aluminum-vanadium alloy. The accident board and the people in the laboratories here at Marshall found that some small amount of pure commercial ti- tanium had been shipped to the manufacturer of the `sphere; it was used in the weld nuggest and as a result, the sphere's structural strength was reduced to 30 to 40 percent. Ten of these spheres had been manufactured with the wrong welding wire; all have been lo- cated and taken out of the system. PAGENO="0984" 980 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FrnURE 33 FIGURE 34 PAGENO="0985" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 981 Although the first Saturn V flight vehicle is at the Kennedy Space Center and in preparation for launch, several items remain to be ac- com~lished before launch (fig. 35). The third-stage engine restart test is in progress at the Arnold Engineering Development Center; I will discuss that in just a moment. We expect to complete the dy- namic testing in time to support the AS-501 flight. I have discussed the qualification program and the status of the first flight second stage. We will have a detailed flight readiness review before AS-501 will be certified for flight. I might spend a few minutes discussing the missions of the early Saturn V launch vehicles. AS-501 will be an unmanned flight (fig. 36). The mission is to verify launch vehicle design, hardware and performance in the flight environment, and flight development of the command and service module. Following first and second stage burn and first burn of the third st.age, we are in a circular orbit of about 103 nautical miles. Second burn of the third stage will occur at an altitude of 100 nautical miles. The second burn will be less than the full duration second burn re- quired for the lunar mission. The third stage second burn is followed by about a 10-minute coast, after which the stage and spacecraft are separated. The command and service module will reach an ellipse of about 8,000 nautical miles before reentering at a velocity of 36,000 feet per second. The mission for AS-502 will be very much the same as AS-501. MAJOR ITEMS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BEFORE LAUNCH OF FIRST SATURN V O THIRD STAGE ENGINE RESTART TEST O DYNAMIC TESTING (CONFiGURATION I) O COMPLETE COMPONENT QUALIFICATION O CERTIFY AND MATE SECOND STAGE INTO VEHiCLE O HOLD FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW FOR VEHICLE CERTI Fl CATI ON FIGURE 35 PAGENO="0986" FIGURE 36 AS-503 may or may not be manned; however, the launch vehicle will have a manned capability. This is a lunar mission simulation (fig. 37). After the second burn of the third stage, the command and service module will be t.raiisposecl and docked with the lunar module. The third stage is separated from the spacecraft. These maneuvers are designed to closely simulate the maneuvers which will be required for the lunar mission and will involve going out into a 4,000-nautical- mile elliptical orbit and returning for reentry. Similar to the uprated Saturn I, figure 38 is a summary schedule of Saturn V launch vehicle activity in fiscal year 1968. AS-501 is at the Kennedy Space Center. AS-502 will follow very closely. You can see that by the end of fiscal year 1968, we will have delivered to Kennedy Space Center about half of the proposed and authorized Apollo Saturn V hardware. Here again, you can see that during fiscal year 1968, the AS-515 or the last flight article will be well into the manufacturing process for subsequent delivery in late calendar year 1969. ENGINE PROGRAMS Let's look at our engine program for a moment (fig. 39). Eight H-i engines power the first stage of the uprated Saturn I. The J-2 engine is used in a cluster of five on the second stage of the Saturn V. It is used individually on the third stage of Saturn V and the second stage of uprated Saturn I. The F-i engine is used in a cluster of five which produce 7.5 million pounds of thrust to power the first. stage of Sat- urn V. I would like to emphasize that our engines have served us cx- tremely well. We have never delayed a launch because of engine fail- 982 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION PAGENO="0987" 1908 NASA AUTHORIZATION 983 FIGrRE 37 FIGuRE 38 PAGENO="0988" 984 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION ure. We have never lost a mission nor equipment because of engine failure. All H-i engines for the current Apollo uprated Saturn I buy have been delivered. You can imagine that engines are long-lead-time items. All of our engines are manufactured by Roiketdyne, a division of North American, and must be manufactured, individually static tested, and then shipped to the stage manufacturer to be available at the right time for the stage fabrication sequence. We feel quite confident that we can retain the high standard of quality and performance on the J-2 and F-i engines that we have enjoyed on the H-i. We have a wealth of experience in engine test time; over 13,000 sec- onds have been logged in actual flight time on the Saturn I and uprated Saturn I programs (fig. 40). There are 155 J-2 engines on order to support the entire Apollo Saturn program, and 100 of these have been delivered. These 100 engines represent, for example, the last J-2 engine to equip Saturn V vehicles through AS-507. We are already half way through delivering the J-2 engines for the entire Saturn V program. We have 273,903 seconds of test time on the J-2 engine, and some good experience, in excess of 1,000 seconds, in actual flight. One hundred and six F-i engines are on order to support the Apollo Saturn program. Again, half of these have already been delivered to Boeing at Michoud. We are approaching 200,000 seconds of developmental test time on the engine and, of course, we cannot acquire any flight time until the first Saturn V is launched. I mentioned earlier some of the disappointing things that can hap- pen when a program of this magnitude is spread out over the United FIGURE 39 PAGENO="0989" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 985 SATURN LAUNCH VEHICLE ENGINE MATURITY FACTORS* ~ENGINE TOTAL DEUVERED I TOTAL TEST TIME TOTAL FLIGHT TIME H-i 262 483,233 SEC 13,323 SEC J-2 100 273,903 SEC 1,185 SEC F-i 54 167,035 SEC 0 AS OF FEB. 1, 1967 IND B1488B FIGuRE 40 States. Another typical example is the problem experienced on the up- rated Saturn I AS-208 first stage. During static test at Marshall a few months ago, an H-i engine turbine wheel failed. The blades actually left the turbine wheel `(fig. 41). Subsequent investigation showed that we had human error in the manufacturing process. Fig- ure 4~ represents the turbine wheel blade production procedure and illustrates from point 1 to 14 turbine wheel manufacturing and assem- bly. The majority of the turbine wheel blades for rocket engines, including DOD rocket engines and jet engines, are manufactured in Kokomo, md., by Ha.ynes Stellite Division of Union Carbide. The basic manufacturing process is to take bar stock and form it into BB-size pellets which are weighed, placed in storage cans and delivered to multi-bin storage for use in blade manufacture. Unfortunately, employees seeking pellets for casting turbine wheel blades drew ma- terial from the wrong ~storage. bin. These blades were ultimately de- livered to Rocketdyne where they were assembled into turbine wheels. Approximately ~6O turbine wheel blades were manufactured from the wrong material, stainless steel. However, it is important to note that all of the blades and the wheels to which they were attached have been located, except for those which were scrapped. The system has been purged of this particular malady. The importance is not that we lost the turbine wheel of course, but with the thousands of people in the United States who are working on the program, this is the kind of thing that can happen. The chal- lenge is the preventionof problems of this sort. I mentioned earlier the J-2 engine restart requirement and the rea- son for this requirement (fig. 43). We found on Uprated Saturn I PAGENO="0990" FIGURE 41 [ PELLET MANUFACTURING ~ ROTATING 0 I WATER HEATEr) INTO BAR STOCK PELLETS £~I PRODUCTiON WEIGHED [TURBINE WHEEL ASSEMBLY ~ TURRINE WHEEL BLA DES PER ~` ~J © ~~MASTER HEAT BLADES TO VISUAL TO VERIFY MAC}IINE AND 11 MATERIAL SHOP DIMENSIONAL RE-EXAMINE INSPECTION X-RAYS FIGURE 42 986 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION PAGENO="0991" 1068 NASA AUTHORIZATION 987 J-2 ENGINE RESTART DEFINITION: * HOT CROSSOVER DUCT NECESSITATES MODIFICATIONS TO THE ENGINE START SEQUENCE FOR SECOND BURN. IMPACT: O POSSIBLE DELAY OF AS -501 SCHEDULE RECOMMENDED SOLUTION: _*. *__*__. __.__ _. O SATURNVAS5O1* PROPELLANT UTILIZATION VALVE FULL OPEN FOR RESTART** REDUCED START BOTTLE ENERGY BY SELECTIVE USE OF VENT VALVES RETIMED MAIN OXIDIZER VALVE TO REDUCE RAMP TIME * FOR RESTART ORBITAL TIME LESS THAN FOR SATURN V AS-501 PAINT CROSSOVER DUCT POSSIBLY PURGE DUCT* - * VERIFICATION TESTING TO BE COMPLETED BY APRIL 1967 ~ REQUIRED STAGE CHANGES ARE IN PROCESS OF BEING ACCOMPLISHED FIGURE 43 AS-203, which was heavily instrumeilted, that in earth orbit the J-2 engine crö~sover duct did not. dissipate the heat resulting from the first firing as rapidly as expected. The way this engine works, in a simplified manner, is the gas gen- erator provides the gaseous driving energy to the L112 fuel turbine and those same gases then pass -through the crossover duct and drive the LOX turbine (fig. 44). The -sequencing and timing between the speed and operation of the fuel turbine and-the LOX turbine is- an extremely delicate balance Gases on mission AS-203 were found by measure ment to be hotter than predicted; consequently, we would be driving the LO.X turbine faster and sooner than required. On AS-203 we programed the engine through restart sequencing to just short of actually firing, and the onboard instrumentat-ioii gave us the insight as to this potential problem. This is a normal development-al prob- lem; however, it must be resolved- in support~Qf th~ Saturn V, AS-501 launch. - -- - - - - - In figure 45 a J-2 engine is sho~u installed with third stage tankage in the J-4 test cell at the Arnold Engineering Development Center, Tullahoma, Tenn. - The engine is tuidergoing weekly firings; the test cell is equipped with the proper heating elements and equipment to duplicate.the environment found on the AS-203 mission. We are actually going to simulate the third stage restart for -the Saturn V, AS-501 mission. - Now to move to incentive contracting (fig. 46). The basic objec- tive of our incentive contracting is to motivate- -and to reimburse the PAGENO="0992" FIGURE 44 FIGURE 45 PAGENO="0993" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 989 contractors for more efficient or better performance (fig. 41). They are motivated in their performance in the critical areas of schedule, cost, and reliability or in a combination of these. We committed our- selves a year and a half ago to convert-or award-all of our major systems and component contracts from cost-plus-fixed-fee to incentive- fee contracts (fig. 48). We have now fulfilled that commitment with the exception of the Saturn V second stage contract. We have had longstanding difficulties with this stage, so with good and suffi- cient reasons of a sound business nature, we prevailed on NASA Headquarters that this contract not be converted. Our principal consideration here was that the status of the project did not warrant or sustain conversion at this time. The overall value of the other 2~ major contracts was $3.1 billion. Those contracts converted were in the middle of the procurement stream, so we actually converted these contracts from a particular date INCENTIVE CONTRACTING FIGuRE 4- INCENTIVE CONTRACTING OVERALL OBJECTIVES Place greater responsibility on the contractors for accomplishment of Saturn program schedule, cost and performance objectives by providing rewards and penalties in calculable monetary terms for management efficte ncy. FIGURE 47 INCENTIVE CONTRACTING OVERALL STATUS * 22 OF 23 MAJOR CONTRACTS BEAR SOME TYPE OF CONTRACTUAL I NCENTIVE * NAA CONTRACT FOR SATURN V SECOND STAGE REMAINS CPFF AT THE PRESENT TIME * TOTAL CONTRACT I NCENTIVE VALUE OF $1,921, 000, 000 * OVERALL CONTRACT VALUE OF $3, 768, 000, 000 FIGURE 48 76-2i65 O-67~--pt. 2-63 PAGENO="0994" 990 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION to contract completion Figure 49 illustrates a cross section of the experiences we have had and listed is oniy a few of the measurements which we have made with regard to current performance, as opposed to what was happening before incentive contract conversion. It should be remembered that when I say we incentivized costs, schedules, and performance, there are literally hundreds of minor elements of cost, scheduling, and performance which required incentivization. As an example of our incentive contracting experience, in post- manufacturing checkout the contractors were told that at a certain point you have the incentive in delivering a complete, checked out stage. Prior to this incentive feature, and for example, Uprated Saturn I AS-202 second stage was delivered by Douglas from manu- facturing with some 180 shortages which would not be incorporated until the stage was delivered tO Sacramento. Here these shortages would catch up and be installed prior to testing. Since incentivization, the shoFtages have been reduced by a factor of 18 on the AS-209 second stage. With regard to delivery of the AS-202 second stage prior to in centivizmg, the contractor was runnnig some 8 to 10 weeks potentially behind schedule After incentivization, the contractor delivered the AS-207 stage 21/2 months ahead of the required delivery schedule contained in the contract One of the things we do not want to do is send open work down to Kennedy Space Center. It is our responsibility to deliver as coin- plete a stage as possible. Uprated Saturn I AS-202 second stage was shipped to Kennedy Space Center with over 1,000 man-hours PROJECT STATUS - INCENTIVE CONTRACTING SATURN V THIRD STAGE - DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT CO ASPECT STATUS PRIOR TO CONVERSION SINCE INCENTIVE (`ONVFRS ION Parts Shortages AS-202 Entered Checkout With 180 Shortages AS -209 Entered Checkout With 10 Minor Shortages Stage Deliveries PERT Data Showed 8.8 Week Potential Delay AS202 AS-207 Delivered 75 Days Early Open ~Vork To KSC AS 202 Shipped dlith 1056 Open Hours AS 206 Shipped With 331 Open Hours Costs Potential 50M - 70M Overrun at Program Completion - FY67 Cost $3M Under Estimate of June 1966 - Manpower Under Previous Forecast Contract Administration - Effort Expected to I ncrease - Technical COmmunication Expected to Become More Difficult - Effort Not Materially Affected - Technical Communications Have Remained Open FIGURE 49 PAGENO="0995" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 991 of open work; whereas, the second stage for AS-206 was delivered with only a third as many man-hours. Another example, Douglas was showing a potential cost overrun on the cost-plus-fixed-fee contract by some $50 to $70 million. After contract incentivization, Douglas incorporated more effective cost monitoring, and their costs are now under good control. I might add that Douglas also brought their schedule and quality under control and are coming down and under their target cost. We anticipated some problems in the administration of these in- centivized contracts we were particularly concerned with our ability to work with the contractor, "direct" him if you will, in an informal way. Experience has shown us, however, that we can communicate with the contractor in the flexible manner that we did before contract incentivization. Prior to incentivizing the J-2 engine contract, we were faced with a $28 million cost overrun (fig. 50). After incentivizing the con- tractor is now reporting about an $8 to $10 million underrun. He was behind schedule prior to the incentive time period with some 24 J-2 engines delivered versus a requirement of 42. Since incenti- vizing, he has delivered 74 engines, either on schedule or ahead of schedule. In terms of a development activity, the qualification test on any engine is an extremely important milestone in the development of that engine. After incentivizing the qualification schedule for the J-2 engine, the contractor completed the test some 3 months ahead of schedule. PROJECT STATUS-INCENTIVE CONTRACTING J-2 ENGINE, ROCKETDYNE ASPECT STATUS PRIOR TO INCENTIVE TODAY PRODUCTION COST $28M OVERRUN UNDERRUN OF $8-1OM IS INDICATED ENGINE DELIVERIES BEHIND SCHEDULE - 24 DELIVERED VERSUS 42 SCHEDULED NONE OF 24 DELIVERED ON SCHEDULE ON SCHEDULE - 74 DELIVERED SINCE CONVERSION ALL ON SCHEDULE DEVELOPMENT MILESTONES CONSISTENTLY MISSED BY CONTRACTOR - FLIGHT READINESS TEST COMPLETED 6 MONTHS BEHIND ORIGINAL SCHEDULE ACCOMPLISHED ON OR AHEAD OF SCHEDULE - ENGINE QUALIFICATION COMPLETED 3 MONTHS AHEAD OF SCHEDULE FIGURE 50 PAGENO="0996" 992 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION We planned to convert the Saturn V second stage contract along with the other 22 conversions which I have mentioned earlier (fig. 51). But considering the status of hardware at the Space and In- formation Division of North American; their schedule position, their manpower and cost trends which were going upward, and the inade- quate overall program control-it was decided that the Saturn V sec- ond stage was not in a position where either the Government or the contractor could benefit from incentivizing. Contract inceativization was deferred, and the contractor was given a list of criteria, based generally on improved performance, that he must meet before the contract will be converted. Regarding the incentive contracting overall assessment (fig. 52), I do not believe that incentive contracting is completely responsible for the program improvements I have mentioned; however, it does deserve a good part of the credit. This chart (fig. 54) includes all obligations of the Saturn Apollo programs: the Uprated Saturn I, Saturn V, Engines, and a small amount of money ,for supporting development for fiscal years 1967 and 1968. The fiscal year 1966 total was $1.5 billion. A sharp decline is noted for fiscal year 1967. The reduction is mostly attribut- able to a decline in uprated Saturn I funding. Approximately $1.2 billion are planned for fiscal year 1968. This is in line with the Presi- dent's budget. This sharp drop exists even though only 3 of the 12 uprated Saturn I vehicles have been launched. For obvious reasons Saturn V is holding rather steady. STATUS OF INCENTIVIZATION SATURN V SECOND STAGE CONTRACT I. PRELIMINARY PLANNING BEGAN IN 1965 II. PRIMARY CONCERTED EFFORT TO CONVERT IN FALL 1966 III. CONVERSION POSTPONED BECAUSE OF: SCHEDULE POSITION - COST AND MANPOWER TRENDS - STATUS OF HARDWARE - OVERALL PROGRAM CONTROL IV. INCENTIVES TO BE APPLIED: - AFTER SETTLEMENT OF COST VARIANCE AND OUTSTANDING CHANGE ORDERS BASED ON CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE Fiaum~ 51 PAGENO="0997" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 993 INCENTIVE CONTRACTING OVERALL ASSESSMENT Saturn/Apollo incentive Contracts at MSFC Are Achieving Objectives: * Contractors Have Responaed to Motivation. * Cost Stature Shows Improvement. * Schedule Being Maintained or Exceeded. * Technical Integrity Maintained. * Technical Performance Goals Being Attained. FIGtTRE 51 APOLLO FUNDING FIGURE 52 The engine program funding is decreasing quite rapidly although not as rapidly as the engine figures might indicate. This is because funding for engine production is carried in the launch vehicle account, both in fiscal year 1967 and 1968. A breakout of the uprated Saturn I major stages (fig. 55) shows a drastic decline of almost 50 percent between fiscal year 1966 and fiscal year 1968. For example, vehicle ground support equipment is now approximately $6 million; it had been $26.5 million. Saturn V funding for the same 3-year period (fig. 56) is holding somewhat steady. Since fiscal year 1966, our costs, as Dr. von Braun indicated last night, have averaged $136.1 million per month (fig. 57). It is in- teresting to note however, that the peak amount was actually $145 million per month in fiscal year 1966, and since that time we have been declining, as indicated to an average of 116 in fiscal year 1967 and $102 million, the forecast for fiscal year 1968. These are sizable PAGENO="0998" 994 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MSFC SATURN APOLLO FUNDING PLAN' (OBLIGATIONS) FY66 FY 67 FY68 APOLLO UPRATED SATURN I 249.0 199.8 129.9 SATURN V 1,106.5 1,051.8 1,019.7 ENGINES 133.2 49.8 24.5 SUPPORTING DEVELOPMENT 18.2 12.7 14.0 TOTAL 1,506.9 1,314.1 1,188.1 FIGURE 53 MSFC UPRATED SATURN I FUNDING PLAN (OBLIGATIONS) FY66 FY67 FY68 UPRATED SATURN I S-lB 51.6 43.1 30.5 S-IVB 64.0 56.9 37.1 IU 47.7 40.6 22.6 VEHICLE GSE 26.5 11.5 6.5 ENGINES 23 7 14 8 6 1 VEHICLE SUPPORT 35.5 32.9 27. 1 TOTAL 249~ ~8 DOLLARS IN MILLIONS FIGURE 55 PAGENO="0999" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 995 MSFC SATURN V FUNDING PLAN (OBLIGATIONS) ____________ FY66 FY67 FY68 SATURN V S-IC 191.9 184.9 174.7 S-Il 256. 1 248.6 245.9 S-IVB 162.0 154.0 151.2 I U 61.8 72.9 75.1 VEH I CIE GSE 107. 6 60. 9 35. 8 ENG I NES 133.4 175. 8 183. 8 VEHICLE SUPPORT 187.7 154.7 153.2 TOTAL 1106.5 1051.8 1019.7 DOLLARS IN MILLIONS FIGuRE 56 MSFC SATURN APOLLO PROGRAM COST RATE FY66 FY67 FY68 150 MILLIONS DOLLARS 120 ~..... 90 60 AVER GE MONTHLY COST R it FY66 FY67 FY68 30 136. 1 116.7 102.4 FIGuRE 57 PAGENO="1000" 996 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION reductions, particularly for a program that has so much critical work ahead and which has so much yet to accomplish. Dr. von Braun stated last night that I would discuss uncosted amounts. In June of fiscal year 1965, we had a 1965 funding carry- over of $352 million (fig. 58). This carryover plus new obligations totaled $1.840 billion in available funds. The cost curve reflected here is consistent with the curve on earlier charts except that a small amount of supporting development money is excluded. We plan to spend in fiscal year 1968 an average of $102 million per month. This is actually about 1 month's value of dollars carried over. The flexibility af- forded by the funding carryover is rapidly diminishing, and we feel that the equivalent 1-month carryover is a minimum to cover unfilled orders and termination liabilities. Our manpower trend is following parallel to the cost trend; this is for major contractors only and not necessarily the manpower total (fig. 59), although the total decline would be even more rapid. The decline in manpower from fiscal year 1966 to fiscal year 1968 is quite drastic. To summarize the funding for the Apollo Applications program, there has been very little funding in fiscal years 1966 and 1967 (figure 60). For example, the $24 million received in fiscal year 1967 was applied to the procurement of long-lead-time items for the uprated Saturn I AS-213 and subsequent vehicles. The Marshall Space Flight Center portion of the President's 1968 budget is $199.6 million. MSFC SATURN APOLLO FUNDING RELATION FY66 FY67 FY68 UNCOSTED PRIOR YR 352.2 208.1 109.6 NEW OBLIG 1488.7 1301.4 1174. 1 AVAIL 1840.9 1509.5 1283.7 COSTS 1632.8 1399.9 1228.9 1800- ~ ~,-COST CURVE 1500- ________________ i:oo- OBLIGATIONS 600- 300- DOLLARS IN MILLIONS EXCLUDES SUPPORTING DEVELOPMENT FIGURE 58 PAGENO="1001" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 997 MSFC SATURN APOLLO SELECTED MAJOR CONTRACTOR MANPOWER PLAN - FY66 FY67 FY68 50,000- DIRECT 40,000- MANPOWER 30,000- AVERAG MONTHLY MANPOWE LEVELS. 20,000- FY66 FY67 FY68 41,900 33,500 28,000 10,000. FIGU1~E 59 In conclusion (fig. 61), our confidence is quite high with regard to the uprated Saturn I program. The vehicle is qualified, and we hope that the perturbations and requirements resulting from the AS- 204 accident will be rather routine engineering changes that will not seriously delay the program. With regard to Saturn V, we plan to launch the first vehicle in the second quarter of this calendar year. I have discussed some of its major problems with you. We feel that to some extent our second stage is showing signs of improvement; we look forward to the first flight second stage being stacked in the AS-501 at KSC later this month. We are proceeding with the initial steps for refurbishment of the Beta III Test Stand at Sacramento which was damaged by the third stage explosion. Estitnates run about three-quarters of a million dol- lars for repair of this facility. Our funding level, as contained in the President's budget while not as much as requested, should be adequate. Adequate that is, if no major failures or technical problems are encountered. Of course; we are always subject to our funding being reprogramed from Washington. Over the past year or so, by coordinating with headquarters and paring our programs, we have reprogramed about PAGENO="1002" 998 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MSFC APOLLO APPLICA1'JONS FUNDING PLA~1 (OBLIGATIONS) FY66 FY67 FY68 AA P UPRATED SATURN I 1.0 24.0 78.5 SATURNV 45.6 LAUNCH VEHICLE MODS 5.0 EXP~RIMENTS 4 3 9 0 39 2 MISSIONSUPPORr .1 4.4 31.3 TOTAL 5.4 37.4 199.6 DOLLARS IN MILLIONS FIGURE 60 $200 million in order to help solve problems at the other manned space flight centers, Manned Spacecraft Center and Kennedy -Space Center. We do have an active cost reduction and accident prevention pro- gram One example of cost reduction is the elimination of a set of ground support equipment for the. Saturn V second stage vertical checkout building at the Mississippi Test Facility. An identical set was required for the second stage test stands, and by conducting the postfiring checkout in the stands instead of the vertical checkout build- ing, we saved several million dollars without impeding the static test schedule. Our Manned Flight Awareness program and Accident Prevention program are very highly motivated programs. The examples shown today were not to leave you with the feeling that the program is acci- dent prone but rather to acquaint you with the type of unplanned occurrences that can happen on a program of this sort. There are human errors and mistakes made even though the product has good design, and the Accident Prevention program is what is thought to be the ultimate. This concludes the Saturn program review. PAGENO="1003" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 999 CONCLUSIONS * UPRATED SATURN I - VEHICLE MATURE, PROGRAMMATICA1~LY MANAGEABLE * SATURN V - LAUNCHSECONDQUARTER, CY67 - TECHNI CAL (DEVELOPMENT) PROBLEMS - SECOND STAGE SCHEDULE AND PERFORMANCE * ENGINES - HIGH CONFIDENCE - FIRST FLIGHTOF F-i ENGINE - J-2RESTART * FACILITIES - ADEQUATE AND AVAILABLE - BETA III TEST STAND, DOUGLAS SACRAMENTO * FUNDING - ADEQUATE, BUT CONSTRAINING PROGRAM FLEXIBILITY O AS-2O4ACCIDENT * CONTRACTOR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS * WASHINGTON REPROGRAMMING * COST REDUCTION * ACC I DENT PREVENTION Fiotrn~ 61 NASA MICHOtTD-MISSISSIPPI COMPLEX Before your visit to the New Orleans/Mississippi complex (fIg. 62), I should take a few minutes to explain the facilities and how they are integrated into an efficient and self-sufficient operation. The Michoud Assembly Facility, which is one of the best aerospace manufacturing and assembly plants in the country, is located in the northeastern part of New Orleans (fig. 63). This site is ideal for it is adjacent to intercoastal waterways. The Michoud A~sembly Facility is located on 897 acres near New Orleans. Forty percent of the plant is occupied by Chrysler which manufactures the first stage of the IJprated Saturn I and the remain- ing 60 percent of the plant is occupied by Boeing for the manufac- ture of t.he Saturn V first stage. The facility includes hazardous test facilities where the stages are pressurized and pressure-checked. A runway is used to take the stages to the dock where they are loaded on barges for intercoastal waterway transportation. Barges and ships PAGENO="1004" 1000 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 62 ~cHOUDASSEMBLV FACILITY FIGu1~ 63 PAGENO="1005" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1001 are used to transport the stages to the Mississippi Test Facility and to Kennedy Space Center. Closely associated with this is the Slidell Computer Operations Of- fice Facility (fig. 64) located be.tween the Michoud Assembly Facility and the Mississippi Test Facility in the small town of Slidell, La. This facility originally belonged to the Federal Aviation Agency and was surplus a few years ago when we acquired it. Like MichoucL the Slidell operation is one of the best in this part of the country and serves both the Michoud and Mississippi facilities. The Mississippi Test Facility (fig. 65), located northeast of Michoud, is in reality an important national test range. Here the first and second stages of Saturn V are test fired. Surrounding the test site fee zone where the Government owns the property, is a buffer zone in which we have certain rights which preclude, for example, habitation. Located across the canal from the Michoud Assembly Facility is the Air Products & Chemicals Inc. plant (fig. 66). This is the plant from which we acquire most of the liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen for the Saturn vehicles. Cryogenic barges transport the pro~ pellants along the intercoastal waterway, up the Pearl River and to the test stands at Mississippi (fig. 67). To summarize the activities and the relationship of the facilities lo- cated in the Louisiana and Mississippi area (figs. 68 and 69), the FIGURE 64 PAGENO="1006" 1002 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE ~35 FIGURE 66 PAGENO="1007" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1003 FIGURE 67 FIGURE 68 PAGENO="1008" 1004 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Saturn V first stage is manufactured at Michoud. The stage is barged to the Mississippi Test Facility for static firing. The Saturn V sec- ond stage, manufactured on the west coast and shipped by ocean-going vessel to Michoud, is also barged from Michoud to the Mississippi Test Facility for static firing. The first stage is returned to Michoud for checkout and refurbishment; second stage refurbishment is accom- plished at the test site. Both stages are shipped by water to the Kennedy Space Center. Many ancillary facilities have been activated by private industry in this area in support of the total Saturn program. The complex has a work force of approximately one-half billion dollars or more. It is a very vital element in the Saturn Apollo and Manned Space Flight program and is one of the newest and most im- portant national assets in the United States. FIGURE 69 PAGENO="1009" STATEMENT OF DR. WERNHER VON BRAUN PART III. APOLLO APPLICATIONS PROGRAM AND FUTURE PROGRAMS FEBRUARY 10, 1967 Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, my presentation this afternoon will cover the Apollo Applications Program, and, in more general terms, some thoughts about our space program of the future. I will also touch upon the Voyager Program which, as you know, would send an un- manned probe to the planet Mars. Voyager is not a Manned Space Flight Program; it is under the cognizance of Dr. Newell's Office of Space and Applications. Marshall will play at least the role of launch vehicle supplier for this program because Voyager will fly aboard the Saturn V. It is possible that we shall also play a major part in the development of the interplanetary spacecraft. Finally, I would like to say a few words about potential applications in space of nuclear propulsion. You have just heard a comprehensive report by General O'Connor on the status of our Saturn Program for Apollo. Perhaps the best way to begin a discussion about our next steps in space is to catalogue the manned space flight capability our country will have after the Apollo hardware and supporting capahiliti~s become fully operational. This chart lists these capabilities. First, Apollo will provide us with a capability to conduct manned space exploration as far out as the distance to the moon, about 250,000 miles from earth. It will provide us with the capability to make a manned lunar landing and allow two men to spend 36 hours on the lunar surface. Apollo will give us the capability to accommodate a three-man crew for a period up to about 2 weeks in earth orbit. The flight hardware which will be provided by the Apollo Program includes two launch vehicles, the Uprated Saturn I and the Saturn V, and a spacecraft cOnsisting of a command and service module, and a lunar module. *The lunar module, in turn, is a two-stage rocket consisting of a descent stage and an ascent stage. The development and manufacture of all this hardware, as well as the operations capability, are the product of a unique resource base which can readily be employed for our next steps in space. We have our worldwide data acquisition network. We have the factories and the laboratory and test facilities, such as Sacramento, Mississippi, Cape Kennedy, Houston and right here in Huntsville-about $4 billion worth of Government investment. And all of this is undergirded by a highly skilled manpower base. Today we have about 290,000 people in the Apollo program, about 60,000 less than the peak figure of 350,000 about, 1 year ago. We be- lieve that the $20 billion investment in our manned space capa- bility is really best manifested by these people. That's the greatest 1005 76-265 0-67--pt. 2-h-64 PAGENO="1010" 1006 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MANNED SPACE FLIGHT CAPABILITIES PROVIDED BY APOLLO PROGRAM * Manned exploration of space as far as 250, 000 miles from earth, including manned lunar landing and 36-hour stay time on lunar surface * Ability for three-man crews to carry out o~rations and ex~riments on earth-orbital flight missions up to two weeks in duration * Flight hardware Launch vehicles Up-rated Saturn I and Saturn V Spacecraft Command and Service Module, and Lunar Module * Unique resource base World-wide tracking and data acquisition Facilities and logistics Highly skilled manpower base Management know-how CHART 1 single resource that this program is producing It has been said many times that in Apollo we are not spending our money on the Moon, we are not spending our money to pick up a handful of lunar dust and bring it back to earth. We are spending it right here on Earth, and by far the greatest single factor is the payroll People, who are learning how to do things in an unprecedented way by developing these systems for Apollo, are certainly our most vital resource as they apply their new won skills to future programs Finally, to get this big job done, we have developed the management know-how: the know-how for keeping a large program, costing more than $120 million a month, on track by providing sufficient visibility of the progress of all elements and subelements of the program in such a way that we can detect early enough where trouble can be expected. This, I would say, is really the gist of god management of such a program. If we wait until something caves in, it is then too late to take remedial action. So the eyes and ears of our management net- work must penetrate the contractors, Government agencies and univer- sities participating in this program in such a way that we get seismic readings early enough to apply remedial action So management know how is also a c'tpability which is a direct prod uct of our Apollo program, a capability, I might add, that can be ap plied not only for our future space progr'tms, but for the management of other major private and government progr'tms ~is well PAGENO="1011" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1007 This brief listing of the Manned Space Flight capability provided by our Apollo program suggests the very considerable first steps we have taken to establish our country as a preeminent spacefaring na- tion. But we must remember that, impressive as these achievements are, they are only first steps when we consider the vast possibilities for the future which mastering this new ocean of space opens up to us. I have listed on this chart areas which I think hold out the greatest promise for man as he continues his space adventure. There are four major areas. First, and certainly most important today for our prob- lem-plagued planet, is providing systems to improve man's lot on Earth. Secondly, using new scientific tools for the general advance- ment of knowledge in fields like astronomy, physics, biochemistry, and so forth. Third, exploration of the Moon and the planets, manned and unmanned, and, finally, technological support to other national pro- grams, to feed the know-how developed under the aegis of the space program into other sectors of national activity2 so that we can keep our industry vigorous and progressive, and continue our technological leadership. THE FUTURE PROMISE OF MAN IN SPACE I mprovement of Man's lot on earth * Earth resources management * Weather forecasting and control * Navigation and traffic control * World-wide communication and television Advancement of Knowledge: Service to Science Exploration of the Moon and Planets Technological support to other National Programs CHART 2 PAGENO="1012" 1008 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Now let me address myself to these four points in more detail. Improvement of man's lot on Earth. We believe one of the most exciting prospects of the space program is providing a highly sophis- ticated tool for Earth resources management. As you know, the Earth is presently undergoing what is called a population explosion. The number of people on Earth is growing at an unprecedented rate. Let me give you a few figures. Between the birth of Christ and the year 1700, mankind doubled. It doubled again between 1700 and 1900; and in that interval it didn't take 1700 years, it took only 200 years to double. There are 3 billion people on Earth today, and right now the number of people on Earth is doubling every 33 years. This means there will be over 6 billion people by the year 20P0 and from 12 to 13 billion by the year 2033. Now the year 2033 is only 66 years away from us. This means our own children will be very deeply involved in the consequences of our exploding world popula- tion. Our own children, born today, will be around 60 or 65 years old, and they will live in a world of 12 or 13 billion people. Now the experts believe that the Earth has enough basic resources to support 12 or 13 billion people. Even if many more countries become indus- trialized during that period of time, these experts believe there are enough resources in the form of oil, mineral resources, and so forth to support this population for hundreds of years. But the problem is deeper than these absolute figures or the rate of growth. The areas of greatest population growth on Earth today, both absolutely and relatively, are the underdeveloped nations of the world. Modern medicine has begun to make its beneficient inroads in these nations, reducing the infant mortality rate and increasing life expectancy. But the rate of births has been rising, too. And so it is here, in these underdeveloped areas where people already have too little to eat, where the population explosion is having and will have its greatest impact. Moreover, more than 50 percent of the entire population in many underdeveloped countries consists of chil- dren under 15 years of age. No wonder we read forecasts of famine for vast areas of Asia: Breadwinning in these areas becomes the sole preoccupation, as these nations spend their meager resources simply to stay alive, with. little or no money left over for the development of new production facilities to improve their own lot or `that of their children. It is a hopeless, almost vicious situation. We believe that one effective antidote is a worldwide Earth re- sources management system, something which today is a very primitive thing. For example, only 9 percent of `the land surface of the Earth is presently used, either in the form of acreage where food plants are being grown or where livestock are being raised, to feed the world's people. Much of the other land cannot be used because it is too moun- tainous, or too cold. But there is plenty of land that potentially could be used for agricultural purposes, if, for example, we are willing to go into the jungles of Brazil and convert these jungles into an agricultural area, a step which would require tremendous additional investment in the form of things like roads, railroads, telephone, and electricity. In view of the cost, many people who have studied this problem believe that the smartest thing to do, at least for the time being, is to get more PAGENO="1013" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1009 food out of the 9 percent that i's presenly `being used. For it is a fact that the average crop yield in underdeveloped countries is about 25 per- cent of that found in highly developed agricultural countries such as the United States or Western Europe. Yields are excessively low in India, large parts of Africa, sections of Latin America, and so forth. Now then, what has all this to do with out space program? We have all seen the pictures taken with a Hasseiblad camera from the Gemini spacecraft. The Hasseiblad is a simple hand-held camera, not very sophisticated, but its pictures showed a tremendous amount of detail. Now, if we can combine more sophisticated cameras, with hetter resolution, with some new types of film material `that have re- cently been developed, `we shall be able to use the `space medium to conduct continuous, never-ending surveys of our Earth resources. We shall be able to tell rye from barley, and ric~ from `soybeans. We shall even be `able `to tell how those soybeans or that rice is coming `along. And this includes seasonal variations. We `shall be able to mark the progress of `these crops through their growing seasons, and the impact `of weather-droughts, Storms, hurric'ane damage-on that progress. And at harvest time, we can predict the harvest yield in various parts of the world. Now this bu'siness of being able to iden- tify "what" and "where" and "how much" is going to be harvested in various location's `of the Earth i's half of the problem of Earth re- sources management; namely, the supply of food `available. The other half i's `the demand, and this is measured in numbers of people. The very `same system that enables us to distinguish hetween types and qualities of crops can also give us `the pattern of population growth. If `we continuously overfly the same areas we can learn by city `and town where man is mul'tiplying most rapidly. We can know how many eaters there are and where they live. These supply-and-demand data gleaned from Earth-orbi'ting space- craft would give us the information needed for resource management. We would feed this information into a computer, and the computer would `tell us many weeks `ahead of time of famine in Calcutta or somewhere unless we do `something soon. Food shipments could be initiated before disaster hits. This i's one benefit. But there are other benefits. Suppose we learn that the yield in cer- tain parts of the world are consistently poor. A's part of our world- wide system `we could employ multispectral sensors to find out what the problem is-too much salinity in the soil, poor fertilization, not enough water, maybe `soil erosion. We could convert this information not only into food shipments, but into words of advice to solve a chronic agricultural problem. Instead of food, we could ship fer- tilizer, or even consultants to give some advice on the spot. And then, if we bring our communication satellites in'to play, to educate people directly on steps they can `take to help themselves, we have another powerful tool in space for solving `the problem. The system I have been describing could `do more than just look at crops .and people. In addition to application for food management, these same `sensors could also be used for prospecting for ore and oil deposits and for up- dating maps. It has been estimated tha't it costs about $1 billion a year to update all the map's in the worl'd. And no systems are simpler PAGENO="1014" 1010 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION and more effective than doing this updating with photography from orbit could be. We could also use this tool for oceanography, another important aspect of earth resources. Not only could we determine things like sea state and water temperature, but we could also measure, for in- stance, salinity of water and plankton content. These elements in corn- bination. have a direct effect on the habits of fish. Plankton is a basic food material produced by the sea, and wherever there is plankton, there you will find little fish. And where you find the little fish, you find the big fish. So if we keep an eye on the plankton distribution in the oceans, we can tell our fishing fleets where to go. Now I don't want to mislead you in this area. We are not in a posi- tion to inaugurate, effective tomorrow, a complete worldwide resources control system that can do all these things. This is a very major re- search and development proposition. Much work would have to be done in what we call ground truth correlation tests It is necessary to overfly accessible patches of land, for instance, not only in the United States, but also in other climatic regions to calibrate our sensors and photographs under conditions where we can compare the pictures with what we really find on the ground. And this procedure of calibrating sensors and cameras is the first step. Now, the question may arise, "Why go into orbit to make these sur- veys? Can't we simply get this information by sending questionnaires to the Department of Agriculture?" Well, maybe in the United States we can, but we surely cannot do this in areas like India or central Africa, or northern Latin America. These data certainly have not been collected and organized, and the farmers individually don't know. So photography from above is necessary. Then the question, "Why not take the pictures from an airplane?" Well, it's a question of cost, really. Whenever we want to continu- ously watch, record, or measure on a global scale anything that con- stantly changes, like crops, we would have to run up an exorbitant fuel bill if we did it with an airplane. On the other hand, sending a space system to orbit may be more costly, but once it gets up there, it stays there; and the longer it stays there the more economical it becomes. We can easily establish fixed points where we can say, for example, that a Saturn V, after half a year, breaks even with a DC-8; and after 1 year breaks even with a Cadillac; and after a year and a half breaks even with a Volkswagen; and beyond that, even beats a Honda scooter in miles to the gallon. So whenever we have need for a system that we need to do a job for a long, long time, such as constantly surveying vast expanses of earth, the space system is simply more economical. You know, all these questions about one booster being a little cheaper than another are completely masked by this overall effect: that., if we extend the operating usefulness of the system, it will pay for itself. It will pay for itself just because of this basic feature that in orbit we don't have to burn fuel to stay there. So, I personally do not believe we can run a syst em like this any other way with anywhere near the economy than we can from space. This is a new capability that space is providing us The way we would do it would be to put a satellite, or several satel lites, into orbits with sufficiently high inclination to the Equator, so PAGENO="1015" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1011 that earth rotates within the orbit. The northernmost part of the orbit would be close to the Arctic Circle, and the southernmost part close to the Antarctic Circle. Thus we would have basically all of the interesting land and sea masses under the swath of the spacecraft that continuously overflies it. One of the most challenging aspects of this whole operation will be data processing. The computer center on the ground, unless we do it right, can be virtually drowned by the continuous torrent of data coming down from the spacecraft. The spacecraft gets its electrical power from the sun, through solar cells that never wear out. Inci- dentally, our little Vanguard satellite is still beeping although it went up 9 years ago. So here the question is "What shall we do with all this data?" Well, much of the data collected is probably not needed, such as that picked up when overflying oceans or cloud-covered areas; or if we have 4 weeks of good weather somewhere in the United States, we don't need any more data of that particular area. Yet there may be other areas where the weather is, on the average, pretty bad and where we can get a good clue to the crop situation only occasionally. These data are important. The most important function of this computer center will be to reject the useless data and select what's really im- portant and process it. This includes distribution to the interested parties. For example, the Department of Agriculture or the Depart- ment of State may want to know about crops; the U.S. Geological Survey may want to get data on oil or mineral deposits; and maybe the Navy would like to get some data on oceanography. So dissemina- tion to many, many agencies would be involved. Another application for improving man's lot on earth is global weather forecasting. The basic technique would be the same. We would look down at the weather from the spacecraft as we have already done with Tiros and Nimbus satellites, and get all the information on the movement of cold fronts, overcasts, and so forth. Now these early systems, Tires and Nimbus, certainly real achieve- ments in their own right, may be considered primitive when considered with future possibilities. Tiros and Nimbus use television cameras. But imagine for example, the employment of a technique called cross- beam correlation. With this technique we can measure turbulence layers, including the famous clear air turbulence in the air at various altitudes. Clear-air turbulence is a problem for our high-flying mili- tary and commercial jets. And advanced satellite weather forecasting system can also employ ground stations. For example, we could have 100 stations on the ground in various locations, some even in buoys anchored in the oceans, so that whenever the satellite appears on the horizon, the ground station would release a balloon. As the balloon rises through the atmosphere, it would record the temperature, ~nsity and humidity, stratification of the atmosphere, and then radio this in- formation up to the passing satellite. The satellite would simply record it.. It would code the number of the station and write down what the station records. Then whenever this same satellite overflies a central weather report station in the United States, it would just dump its information collected from all over the world into the central station. The station would feed it to a computer, and the computer PAGENO="1016" 1012 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION would process it and provide forecasts, for example, of what the weather will be in New York in the next 2 hours, 4 hours, 6 hours, 8 hours, 24 hours, and so forth. The question of how we could make such a system pay-it must ob- viously be done on an international basis-could be solved quite easily by offering people who participate in the program the benefit of this weather service. Take a smaller country, like Portugal, that cannot afford its own major space program. The Portugese could either sub- scribe to the service or they could get this service in exchange for making a few trawlers available to service some buoys in a cert.an~ stretch of the Atlantic Ocean. Now the next item listed for improving life on earth is navigation and traffic control. We are conducting a study here at the Marshall Center on what else one can do in the area of navigation and traffic control from orbit. You may be aware that there are transit satellites in orbit today that are used by the Navy to track ship positions. Such satellites are relatively simple. When such a satellite comes over the horizon of a ship anywhere on earth, the satellite furnishes its own orbital data, in coded form. Now these orbital data were orig- inally established when the thing went into orbit, but due to normal orbital decay, it is necessary to update these data and this is done with ground tracking stations. Every now and then they send the satellite a new set of updated orbital data on its own position in orbit that's good for the next few weeks. Now there's a receiver on the ship that gets this signal from the spacecraft as it passes. It makes use of the doppler effect. For an example of the doppler effect, when a locomotive is approach- ing you with its whistle blowing, the tone suddenly drops as the loco- motive is passing you. It is just as if you are in a boat running against the waves; you see waves of higher frequency than you would if you were running with the waves. So as the sound waves are coming from the train approaching you, you hear a higher frequency than when the train is going away from you. The same doppler effect, the elec- tronic equivalent of it, is used in these navigation satellites. The satellite produces a tone, and you measure the doppler effect. If you have a slanting pass, the doppler effect is not as great and not as abrupt as if it passes directly overhead. Now for the ship to calculate its position, it follows a procedure similar to that used by a surveyor who wants to know where he is. He looks at mountain A and moun- tain B, and makes a triangulation. He knows the distance between the two mountains, so he knows the baseline of the triangle. He meas.- ures the angle between the two mountains and thus determines where he is. Well, when the satellite goes through an orbit, it knows its orbit and it knows: At this moment I am here, a little later I am there, and still a little later I am over yonder. So what the ground- or ship-based computer really does is make a triangulation with a single but "mov- ing mountain." The ship itself iieed not send out any signals at all. It carries a handbook showing when a particular satellite will be vis- ible from a certain part of the world just like you get a sunrise and sunset chart. So all the skipper does is take the satellite's signal, and after the satellite has passed, the little combination receiver-computer in the ship gives him a print-out of the longitude and latitude of his PAGENO="1017" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1013 own ship. Incidentally, if you have a seagoing yacht, you can buy, for about $12,000, one of these little gadgets. At any rate, this shows us what is being done with satellites today in the area of navigation. Traffic control is a more elusive thing. Right now in the North At- lantic we have the problem of increasing air traffic. During the same optimum time of day or night, every transatlantic airline wants to go across at the optimum route and altitude westbound or eastbound, as determined by wind and weather conditions. For customer conven-' ience every line wants to fly during a few rush hours, so there are tre- mendous peaks where a lot of traffic is condensed into a very narrow airlane and a very narrow time window. Today they space these air- liners at a minimum separation distance of 120 nautical miles, at the same altitude. This is considered reasonably safe, but they are now talking about reducing this to 90 nautical miles. This proposal has caused some heated debate among airline captains as to whether this is really a safe thing to do. If any one of these planes isn't exactly on the spot where it's supposed to be, it will endanger the plane ahead or behind. So there is a pressing demand for positive transoceanic air traffic control, particularly in the North Atlantic area. Air traffic experts would also like this traffic control to be integrated with better weather advisory service, preferably in the form of a weather map being cast directly onto the pilot's weather radar so that he can see where he is, where the other planes are~ and where the bad ~veather is-the whole thing in an integrated display. We believe this is a very promising thing and may be so promising that it could even become attractive for aviation over the continent. The final item on the chart, under improving man's lot, is worldwide communication and television. Today Syncom is the only undertak- ing in the world that is making money out of space. They are leasing channels for transatlantic telephone now, I believe, for 11 cents a min- ute for telephone calls, which is a fraction of the cost to lease a cable. Again, I believe, this is only a beginning. A relay satellite system employing synchronous satellites at 22,000 miles' altitude, moving from west to east, in the plane of the Equator, with the speed of the rotating earth, provides relays that are simultaneously visible from all North America, Latin America, Europe, and Africa. They are high enough so that they are in direct line of sight, and since they rotate at a period of revolution of 24 hours, they appear to stand still at one point above the Equator, for example, a little bit east of the mouth of the Amazon River. There are several satellites sitting there at this very moment providing such radio telephone relay links. You can use these same things for global television. In fact, they have already been used. The method is to tie up a large number of telephone channels and use them for television. But in due time there will be full-time television relay satellites of this kind. But one can go even beyond that. If we put into such a synchronous orbit a relay satellite, not only operating at a couple of hundred watts as these pres- ent things do, but put a 50-kilowatt station in there, we can go directly into home antennas on the ground. All we would have to do is give people about a 2-foot dish that's pointing at one point in the sky, and they could receive these signals directly. We call that television broadcast by satellite. The present relays, by contrast, work through PAGENO="1018" 1014 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION a large ground station with a big dish on the ground, which in turn rebroadcasts the television programs locally. Now the political implications of direct TV broadcast are pretty clear If a country wants to participate in a worldwide television and telephone service, it can arrange this under the present relay concept by buying a ground st~tion for something like $3 or $5 million With that ground station, it can pick up from the satellite whatever it wants to rebroadcast locally. The essential point is that the government that controls the ground station also controls the switch that permits it to turn programs on and off. If it doesn't like a program, it doesn't rebroadcast it. Now if we go with more powerful satellite transmit- ters directly from orbit into the home antenna, we could bypass these governments, something which might not be so popular with many countries. On the other hand, of course, such a system would be an extremely powerful tool for `ill kinds of programs from educational television to political propaganda. Fully recognizing that economic and political pitfalls exist, we should bear in mind that this technique is technologically within reach today David Sarnoff, chairman of RCA, once said that with such a television system, we could eradicate illiteracy from the face of the globe within 10 years. I think this is no overstatement. Well, I think I have said enough about improvement of man's lot on earth, but I would like to leave a message with you that we can indeed do a great deal ~ ith our present space capability to help man right here on earth This doesn't mean that we don't believe that space as an arena to advance science is important After all, it is science that feeds the mechanism of progress You had a briefing this morning about our astronomical telescope mount and its purpose to observe the sun in the light of X rays, gamma rays, and far ultraviolet Because the atmosphere of *the earth is opaque for these radiations, very little knowledge is available about ;the sun's appearance in the "light" of these rays. To those who would question why we should study a thing as obstruse as X rays emanating from the sun, I `aould say that thermonuclear energy was first observed in the sun Our hydrogen bombs today, as well as our efforts to generate thermonuclear energy for other purposes, is a direct result of discoveries made while observ ing the sun And yet, all we know about the sun today is what we have learned in the region of visible light for which the earth's atmosphere is transparent. But when you look at the entire electromagnetic spectrum, this region is only a tiny little window. For most of the rest of the spectrum, our atmosphere is opaque, the sole exception being a "window" for certain radio waves, which has led to the new science of radio astronomy during the last few decades Dr Fred Whipple, head of the Smithsonian Observatory, once said that all we know about the universe is what we've learned through the dirty base ment window of the atmosphere This is certainly true, and I think we are liable to learn a great deal about the most fundamental processes at work in the universe simply by opening up this dirty basement win dow. We are about to do this now in our Apollo applications program by going out in space and observe and measure these ultraviolet, X-ray. and gamma radiations from the sun and stars. PAGENO="1019" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1015 Another area holding great promise for man in space is exploration of the moon and the planets. I do not have to say very much about this. Man has always been curious, and he has learned through history that it has paid off very handsomely to continue to satisfy his innate curiosity. It is hard to predict what the direct payoff of exploratory ventures will be. After all, curiosity was a primary motive compelling Columbus to sail westward, and look what he found. Who knows the bonanza awaiting us through exploration of the moon and the planets. The final item on this chart is technological support to other national programs. This includes the application of the new knowledge, new technologies, and new management techniques provided from our space program to other national endeavors, running the gamut from military to industrial and medical programs. Thus, we can see t.hat man in space holds out simply tremendous pos- sibilities for the future. But, after all, this is what I have been doing for these past minutes: Attempting to describing what can be in store for us in a future space program. Today, in manned space flight, we stand on a plateau of technology provided by the Apollo program. This technology provides much of the platform for doing many of the things I have been describing, but it certainly does not satisfy all of our technology requirement for such a future program. We cannot stop now. `We must continue t.o grow technologically if we are to realize the real promise of man in space. If we want to utilize fully man's capability in space, we shall need a space station. `We shall need a capability for man to stay in orbit for long periods of time so that he can work and rest and sleep and eat under conditions as similar as possible t.o what he's used to here 011 earth. You saw today our humble beginnings in this area in our orbital workshop, and we feel that this is really a bargain basement cleaT to come to grips with the habitation problems in outer space. We don't propose to have all our future space stations built into empty tanks of rockets, but we feel since t.hese Saturn TB's are going up there anyway, this is the cheapest and easiest. way t.o learn. Techniques on how t.o build space stations can very well be based on this learning, too. Long stay time in space involves not only building a space station but also the provision of a logistics supply system. We can have a space station that is good for several years, but nobody would like to stay there for the life of the station. So we have to rotate crews; we have t.o fly new supplies up there; we have to bring data back to the ground; we have to update equipment; we have to support this entire system with logistic supply systems. It was actually this interrelationship between the logistic supply system and t.he conduct of science at the far end of this logistic supply system that motivated Robert Gilruth and Max Faget of the Houston Center and Ernst Stuhlinger and myself from the Marshall Center to take a trip to Antarctica a few weeks ago. `We had long felt that there was a great deal of similarity between some aspects of the space program and the Antarctic program. Of course, we knew they don't wear space suits in Antarctica, and you can't wear a parka on the Moon. Also, t.hey don't fly in rockets to the South Pole, but in turbo- props. But other than that, we found our belief fully confirmed that PAGENO="1020" 1016 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION many operational aspects of work in Antarctica and future work in space are similar enough to make fullest use of the tremendous body of practical experience accumulated "down there" over the years. When they have sudden emergencies on the ice, their logistics system must respond just as quickly as ours will have to respond in space. And the scientists in those remote polar stations are just as vulnerable and just as dependent on the working of this long logistic supply sys- tem as an astronaut scientist would be in a space station. We just wanted to know how this interface between science and operational support looks and how it really works. We learned a great deal. Now the question: how do we get from here to there? How do we get from the capability provided by the Apollo program to the kind of capability we shall need to realize a future in space of the type I have just described? We can answer this in the abstract, or we can answer it in the light of today's realities and constraints. I prefer to do the latter, because it is these constraints which have provided the basic rationale for the Apollo Applications program. This chart lists these constraints. First, our next step must be a logical one toward our longer range objectives in space. Next, because we are confronted with an austere budget situation for new starts in fiscal year 1968, we shall have to make maximum use of the hard- ware and resources provided by Apollo-and this includes capitalizing on the momentum of Apollo. One unknown in Apollo is that we really don't know exactly how many flights we will need before we are suc- cessful in meeting our objectives, so there may be some hardware left over from the mainstream Apollo program. If there is, we would like to employ this hardware immediately in the follow-on program. So it is highly desirable to convert this not-needed Apollo mainstream hardware as fast as the situation will permit to these follow-on objectives. To summarize these first three points, we want to provide the great- est gain in space capability at the lowest possible additional cost. This chart lists the dbjectives of the Apollo Applications program. A great deal has been said about what men "can" do in outer space, but in Apollo Applications we plan to address ourselves more and more to the question of what "should" he do. For example, is a man desirable as a maintenance man or does he just get in the way if you have him up there? Where can he really make a major contribution? For instance, it's pretty obvious that when it comes to measuring cosmic radiation in outer space, man doesn't have a built-in sensor to measure it, so his only function would be to bring up an instrument and read the instrument. Man really is not necessary for this kind of a job because we could much more easily telemeter the information down and read the instrument on the ground. But let's take another example. Any geologist can tell you that an untrained man can walk many miles in an area and find nothing, but a trained geologist might find a single pebble in that same area that is the key to the geological history of the whole area. In this case, man is very necessary with his ability to a'bsorb information, correlate it with previous experi- ence, and draw a conclusion. No computer can do this today and probably never will. We must learn those activities where men can really make a great contribution. PAGENO="1021" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1017 THE NEXT STEP AFTER APOLLO CONSTRAI NTS * Logical evolutionary step toward proposed national space objectives. * Austere budget to support new starts. * Maximum use of Apollo investment: hardware, resources and momentum. * Greatest gain in space capability at lowest possible additional cost. OHART 3 APOLLO APPLICATIONS PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: Use Apollo capabilityto Determine role of man in space science, applications and o~rations: what can he do; what should he do. Develop capability for economical space flight by modifying flight hardware for long-duration flight and re-use. Determine whether sensing devices can be effectively and economically employed in earth orbit for earth resources management, meteorological, communication, navigation and traffic control purposes. Conduct observations in astronomy and space physics. Conduct extended lunar exploration. CHART 4 PAGENO="1022" 1018 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION We will always have to pay a price for carrying man along. He has to be kept alive and provided all the equipment with which to live and function. This costs money, so we must identify those areas where man can contribute more than he costs. We are deep in the process of doing that. I mentioned the question of long stay-time. This, of course, ties in with man's ability to be effective in space. We must answer im- portant questions here, too. Do we need artificial gravity as we extend our stay-time in space, or will people be perfectly happy with the zero gravity they had so far ~ To wh'it extent can man use his manipulative skills if he is encased in a space suit? Then there's the question of just simple, plain creature comforts. I think it was astronaut Frank Borman who was asked, "What is it really like to spend 2 weeks in a Gemini spacecraft?" He replied, "Have you ever spent 2 weeks in a stall in the men's room?" I think this a pretty vivid description. We have to get out of this very primitive state of affairs and provide them with a little more comfort so that they can sleep better, eat better, and have a little more privacy so they can do some thinking, some paper work, and maybe have a little entertainment. Our Apollo Applications program aims at providing a 1-year stay- time capability as a first objective. This program~ will also provide the means for men to do a great deal in the development and evalua- tion of sensing devices. I mentioned these sensing devices earlier for Earth resources control, for prospecting, for weather, and also for traffic control. Now while some of these systems may ultimately run unmanned, it is still necessary to first evaluate which of the many possible sensors are really optimum. And we believe that men will play a very important role in a spacecraft during the development period to make these evaluations, even if he does ultimately withdraw and the operational system then works unmanned To take traffic control as `tn example I don't think we would want to expose North Atlantic air traffic control to new-f angled, untested automatic satellites without first having monitored and evaluated the system by people on the spot to make sure the system will actually do what we want it to do. So man may play a temporary role in some areas. This may be the case in some portions of our future space astronomy program. Find- ing out what measuring methods are most effective, say to study the Sun, may require man, but an eventual operational Sun-monitoring system designed to predict radio communications disturbances on Earth from X-ray bursts emanating from the Sun may well be auto- mated. It is my conviction, and most of us feel this way in NASA, that the demarcation between manned and unmanned space flight, a very nat- ural split while we were learning how to fly man in space, will get more and more fuzzy in the future. After all, now that we know that man can fly in space, his reason for being there is essentially in the area of applications and in the area of science. To say it differently, if we want to conduct applications and science first class, we better use man in those areas where his contribution is necessary We shall have to address ourselves to this problem more ~nd more in the future No longer can we compartmentize things as we have in the past PAGENO="1023" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1019 Here we see the fiscal 1968 budget estimates as shown in the Presi- dent's budget fOr Apollo Applications. The total NASA Apollo Ap- plications program for 1968 is proposed at a level of $454.7 million, of which Marshall would have $199.6 million. The lion's share of our $200 million would be to buy launch vehicles-to buy Saturn I and Saturn V rockets for the follow-on period. About $39.2 million would go into experiments for Apollo Applications and $31.3 million for mission support, which includes the integration and qualification of these various payloads so that we can safely fly them. Now I would like to show you some of the things this money would buy. Here is the orbital workshop. We have seen this thing today in the flesh, so I don't want to go into too much detail. We visited all these rooms here; here's the airlock again; this is the upper end of the hydro- gen tank; this space is for what one might call "extravehicular tests inside the vehicle"; this is the multiple docking adapter to which modules for resupply and mapping, the astronomical telescope mount with its associated LM control room, as well as the service and com- mand modules, can be docked. The working area of the workshop is roughly 10,000 cubic feet or about 35 times the crew area in the Apollo command module. Our fiscal year 1968 money would pay for some of the experiments as well as modifications we would make to all this basic Apollo hardware. Here we see again the ATM, the Apollo telescope mount, which we saw on tour, which will be used to conduct solar astronomical observations during the 1968-70 maximum of the solar cycle. The Sun has an 11-year cycle ranging from maximum and minimum solar activity. By activity, we mean not only the number of sunspots, APOLLO APPLICATIONS PROGRAM FY-68 B udget Esti mates (In millions of dollars) NASA Total $454.7 MSFC Total $199.6 Space Vehicles 129. 1 Experiments 39.2 Mission Support 31.3 CHART 5 PAGENO="1024" 1020 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION CHART 6 CHART 7 PAGENO="1025" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1021 but also the number of emissions of solar flares. These flares are vast clouds of protons and electrons exuded by the Sun which travel millions of miles through space. They can play havoc with communi- cations on Earth, they affect the total number of electrically charged particles trapped in the Van Allen belt and the~y cause many other effects. The most important aim of this research is not just the establish- ment of a better Sun monitoring system for the prediction of radio communications disturbances, but simply a better understanding of the underlying mechanism of interactions between the Sun `and the Earth. After `all, everything that lives on Earth depends on the Sun. So we have a vested interest in the Sun. And yet `the detail mechanism by which the Earth receives energy from the Sun is not very well known. It was only a few years ago man began to realize that although the Sun doesn't seem to change in appearance at all, except as to the sunspots, actually the Sun is undergoing continuous change. For example, the energy conveyed to the Earth in the ultraviolet region varies greatly over a period of hours and days. Long-term weather conditions are `affected quite a bit by the variations in ultra- violet energy transferred to the Earth. Man's role in the Apollo telescope system will be first, that of point- ing and carefully alining the telescope. We will have a pointing accuracy in the ATM system that permits us to vector in precisely any given spot on the Sun and to study that area in the light of radiations not received at the bottom of the atmospheric shell. Next the scien- tist-astronaut, working the ascent stage of the lunar module from where the ATM is operated, can change camera settings, exposure sequences, and filters according to visual observations or previously obtained results. The astronaut-scientists will also provide main- tenance, monitor the operation of the equipment., rephice film casettes, record their visual observations on t'ape, and send films and tapes back to Earth. Of course they could also select visual "targets of oppor- tunity" on the Sun. Whenever `there is something conspicuous devel- oping on the Sun, they will `aim their instruments on the interesting spot and capture the incident while `the action is on. We consider this solar astronomical telescope only the forerunner of another instrument for similar observations, not of the Sun, but of the stars. It would be used for the study of ultraviolet, X-ray, and gamma rays emissions from the stars. Out of these first generation projects may develop in due time something like a Mount Palomar Observatory in orbit, a tool of inestimable worth to our astronomers. Our fiscal year 1968 budget would provide some of the funding for development of the Apollo telescope mount. This chart shows the sequence of events by which we would put our workshop and ATM into orbit. We would use a `total of four Apollo Applications flights. Here are the days, counting from day zero here, marking the time intervals between flights. On the left margin is the altitude of the orbit. We would start out by sending up a manned Saturn I with a mapping and survey system. That is the high-reso- lution camera you saw mocked up in the hangar today. In orbit, the service and command module would detach, turn around, and make the transposition just like with the lunar module. After transposition, the 76-265 `O-67---pt, 2--65 PAGENO="1026" 1022 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION CHART 8 service and command module pulls this mapping module out of the nose of the rocket. The crew would then calibrate this mapping and survey system which will be used for later high-resolutions pictures of the Moon, by photographing certain targets on the Earth. This would take something like 5 to 8 days. Next, the orbital workshop would be launched. It would fly up unmanned, and would look like this. The airlock in front of it would be an aerodynamic shroud so the entire configuration would look like this on takeoff. The shroud would be jettisoned upon arrival in orbit. Here's our orbital workshop, with the airlock that you saw, arriving in orbit unmanned. It would now be visited by the same spacecraft that has finished its mapping job. The spacecraft would dock to the airlock, whereupon the same three men who activated the survey sys- tem will activate the orbital workshop. They would first vent the re- maining hydrogen out, let all the pressure out of the bottles, activate the electrical power generation system, move the experiments from the docking adapter into the workshop, make the whole complex habitable, and then sleep in their new "orbital hotel" for a couple of hours. All this activation work would take about another 2 weeks. So after 28 days, these astronauts would finally come home and leave the complex unattended. Later the `third vehicle would go up with a Command and Service Module carrying three new men, and a resupply module. This module would furnish a fresh supply of oxygen, water, and some hydrogen for PAGENO="1027" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1023 the fuel cells that generate electricity. The astronauts would dock the resupply module at one of the docking positions of the multiple docking adapter and activate the workshop again. Then they would get busy and continue the scientific program. You saw during your tour the 21 experiments that we are preparing. Most of these experi- ments would go up on the first flight of the series, but some of them would be exercised only now. Some are medical experiments, some are experiments in support of DOD, and some are just pure scientific tasks. Finally, with the fourth flight we would send up our Apollo Tele- scope Mount. This flight is again unmanned. After it is in orbit, the manned Service and Command Module would pick it up, place it into another part of the multiple docking adapter and then dock itself again into another position. That's how we come to what we call our orbital cluster configuration. We would activate this complete cluster for up to 56 days and during that time carry out all our astronomical research. Even after this period, the entire cluster, of course, remains in orbit. The "orbital hotel" is there, the mapping module is there, the astronomical telescope is there, and if we continue to send new resupply modules, we could continue the operation of the entire scientific complex indefinitely. Gradually, of course, the oribit would decay, but it happens very slowly. It is entirely feasible to use the rocket engine in the Service Module to kick the entire cluster back up some 10 or 20 miles, thereby increasing the lifetime another 10 to 15 years. So the orbital work- shop cluster with its scientific modules, and supported by resupply modules, really offers us an open-end scientific program in orbit. It puts us in a position to decide at any time to either continue it for another few years or to say, "We've learned from this cluster as much as we can and on the basis of all the things we've learned, we should flow build a better second generation space station." That, in essence, is the idea. We call the whole concept the Apollo Applications Program because we follow the ground rule that existing Apollo hardware is used to the greatest possible extent. This chart shows the cluster again in more detail. Here's the tele- scope mount, the mapping module, service and command module, and here's our orbital workshop. From the cluster I have just shown you, we can progress to other more sophisticated concepts and still adhere to the same basic princi- pie of using Apollo hardware. For instance, should we find out in all these tests, that artificial gravity over long periods of time is not a good thing, we could keep a spent second stage of the Saturn V at- tached to an S-IVB workshop which we have completely outfitted on the ground. That is, in this case, we would not put propellants into this S-IVB stage and use its propulsive force to climb into orbit. Rather, we would equip all our laboratory and living rooms in that stage on the ground and put that "prefabricated orbital workshop" in orbit with the first and second stages of a Saturn V. Now, by put- ting a spin on this thing, which we could do with the existing attitude control nozzles on the S-IVB, the orbital workshop would revolve around the center axis using the empty S-TI stage as a counterweight. The rotation would produce artificial gravity on the various floors of PAGENO="1028" 1024 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION CHART 9 RESUPPLY MODULE S.Iv8 S~II STAGE ONE-YEAR S-IVB WORKSHOP STATION CHART 10 PAGENO="1029" ASTRONOMICAL SENSOR INSTI. LAB - ASTRONOMY & BIOLOGY LAB-GENERAL R&D AND LONG TERM FLIGHT DOCKING, EMERGENCY ESCAPE DEVICES, STORAGE & EVA EQUIP. SUBSYSTEMS & CONTROLS LIVING QUARTERS LIVING QUARTERS LAB-EARTH RESOURCES & METEOROLOGY SOLAR PANELS (STOWED) 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1025 the orbital workshop so that an astronaut could stand upright on any one of them. Depending on whether we want 1/4 g. or ½ g., we would use a slower or a faster spin. This artificial gravity configuration would use the same multiple docking adapter. As the command and service module approaches for docking, the astronauts line themselves up with the axis of the slowly rotating station and just drive into the docking port, for the center of gravity would be precisely at the location of these ports. Resupply of such a rotating station, of course, could be done in the same fashion. c~:1 0 0 0 SPACE STATION CONCEPT 9 MAN, ZERO G, 260" DIA. 1 CHART 11 PAGENO="1030" 1026 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Beyond this, we can tjiink of more advanced concepts of space sta- tions such as this completely modularized unit This station would be built of a series of modules, one atop the other We could make the stack as long as we wish Down through the center of the station would be a tunnel for traffic between floors For example, on top could be an astronomical department with a swivel-mounted telescope. Next, we could have an astronomy and biology slice. Then we could have a general research and development station. The next lower floor may accommodate power supply and life support subsystems, then come living quarters and Earth resources and meteorology de- partment, and down here at the bottom maybe the kitchen and food storage for the station. This is just one idea of how this modular stack concept could work and how it could grow organically and logically out of the Apollo Applications program In other words, using the S-IVB workshop as an interim learning tool, we would ultimately wind up with a tailormade, optimized modularized station. Several of such more advanced space station concepts are presently under study. There is no reason why this country couldn't have a second- generation space station such as this in the 1973-75 time period. Here is a typical "slice" module several of which would make up the "stack" I just showed you. This one is a research and develop- ment laboratory for advanced space-related technologies. For in- stance, look at the space here: It could be evacuated (by opening valves to the vacuum outside) and repressurized (by reconnecting it to the pressurized volumes). With these remote manipulators operated from the pressurized control room, a man could perform experiments in the vacuum here. If he wanted to get back into the test chamber, Ca~RT'12 PAGENO="1031" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1027 he would just repressurize it, open the door, and reenter. This kind of arrangement would offer an ideal physical, medical or biological laboratory that combines zero-gravity with the hard vacuum of outer space without necessitating extra-vehicular activity. My next chart shows a more advanced astronomy laboratory. With- out going into detail, you can see a great variety of instruments deployed in this concept. This is just one possible arrangement. I would now like to discuss a few tasks we are working on which are aimed at extending manned exploration of the lunar surface under the Apollo Applications program. Our sister center in Houston has over-all responsibility for all this post-Apollo lunar surface work and the things we are doing in this area here at Marshall are in support of the Manned Spacecraft Center. We at Marshall have been studying lunar surface transportation vehicles for quite some time. One of the fundamental problems in an intelligent post-Apollo lunar exploration program is that an area that may be safe to land on is not necessarily an area of greatest scientific interest. Just as on Earth, the places of greatest geological signifi- canoe are not always suitable for landing airplanes. So we may have to land on a level surface 10 or 50 miles away and go from there up a rugged ridge to visit an interesting crater or maybe a place where CHART 13 PAGENO="1032" 1028 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION previously collected photographic evidence indicates occasional clouds of volcanic gases. We have been working for some time with two contractors, Bendix and Boeing, on lunar surface vehicles for this kind of problem. Build- ing a "lunar jeep," which is what it really amounts to, is quite an inter- esting problem and not nearly as straightforward as one might think. In the first place, there is no air on the Moon to burn the gasoline of a combustion engine. Secondly, there's also no air to cool the engine. Thirdly, there are great differences in surface temperatures between lunar day and night, which would be rough on rubber tires. After all, you don't want to wind up with a flat tire on the Moon and not be able to fix it. All these considerations call for novel approaches. Metallic tires with metal elastic spokes look very attractive. In fact, in the lunar gravitational field, which is one-sixth of a g, a vehicle like this draws a lot less power than a tracklaying vehicle. Tracks may provide bet- ter traction, but the traction is not really needed. As far as the power supply of the vehicle is concerned, we believe at the moment that battery power and electromotors are attractive. Now a normal elec- tromotor needs air cooling, and since there is no air on the moon we would have to provide the cooling in some other way. We propose to cool these electromotors by conducting the heat from each of the wheel-mounted motors to a radiator that looks like an extra-large hubcap, but which actually does not rotate with the wheel. This gives us a short heat path. If we build the electromotors so they CHART 14 PAGENO="1033" 1968. NASA AUTHORIZATION 1029 can run at elevated temperatures these radiators can simply radiate the extra heat away. The batteries may be recharged after each surface trip by the LM shelter power supply system. It may be of interest that our work in this area has benefited from the electric automobile efforts which you have all heard about. I would think that the automotive activity in this field has likewise benefited from our work on the lunar jeep. One interesting aspect of such lunar surface transportation vehicles is that due to the lack of the atmosphere, radio communications is pos- sible only by line of sight-in other words one can radio only as long as he can see the other party. It may be feasible to maintain a degree of radio contact after line-of-sight connection has been lost by bounc- ing the radio waves off mountain walls. But a more reliable way of maintaining radio communication between two distant points on the Moon will be to use the service and command module in orbit around the Moon as a relay, or perhaps even a communications satellite orbiting the Earth. Another thing we have been working on extensively here at Marshall is a Moon drill. Geologists are very interested in drilling holes and recoverin.g complete cores from the lunar ground. A core drill means the drill doesn't cut everything up into little chips, but rather cuts a ring around the material and then lifts an entire, intact core to surface which represents geological stratification down to a depth of 10,30, or 100 feet. CHART 15 PAGENO="1034" 1030 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION On the Moon, there are some difficulties in doing this, too. We cannot cool the drill with water because this would weigh too much. Also, we don't want to interfere with the composition core that we try to raise. Not being able to use water, and not having air, the question is, how do we cool? Well, it seems the smartest thing to do is to use an internal, closed-cycle air or water cooling system, and to reject the excess heat in the coolant through a radiation cooler on the surface. Pending approval of the Voyager program by the Congress, we ex- pect that the Marshall Center will play a major role in its develop- ment. Voyager is an unmanned spacecraft designed to gO to Mars, explore the planet from orbit through photographic and remote sensor techniques, and send a lander to measure the Martian atmosphere and surface. The present plan is to fly four Voyagers, the first in 1973; the second in 1975; the third in 1977; and the fourth in 1979. Each mission would be launched by a Saturn V, and each flight will carry two independent planetary vehicles as shown here. Each of the planetary vehicles would consist of the spacecraft that goes in orbit around Mars and a lander that will soft-land, unmanned, on the Martian surface. This chart compares the configuration of the Saturn V for Voyager with the Saturn V Apollo configuration. It is a little bit different in the nose end, that's all. You can see the two Voyagers here. The total space vehicle will fit neatly into complex 39 at the Cape and use much of the same checkout and launch equipment that we employ for, the Saturn-Apollos. CHART 16 PAGENO="1035" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1031 This chart shows a very sketchy flight profile from Earth to Mars. The third stage of Saturn V carries the payload into a parking orbit around the Earth, where the forward shroud would be shed. The two spacecraft are released separately, and are timed in `such a way that due to minor velocity differences in spacecraft 1 and spacecraft 2, the two spacecraft arrive in Mars orbit about 10 days apart.. This way the same set of ground stations on Earth can first handle one and then the other. In other words, rather than have the two payloads arrive simultaneously and cause a traffic-handling problem on Earth, this mode spreads them `a little bit apart. From Mars orbit the two space- craft would then dispatch their capsules, each possibly going to a different point on the Martian surface. One last subject I would like to mention very briefly before closing is the work we have been doing toward a nuclear stage. We have had a group of people engaged in `the study of nuclear rocket propulsion systems, extending all the way back to 1957 when we were a part of the Department of the Army. Since becoming a part of NASA we have `worked closely in support of the national nu- clear rocket program, `the ROVER project, under the leadership of Harry Finger's Space Nuclear Propulsion Office of NASA and the Atomic Energy Commission. These studies have concentrated on the need for nuclear propulsion systems in our long-range space programs, and the most promising concepts for their application. In view of the high `cost of nuclear rocket engine and stage develop- ment, we favor what `we call a modular vehicle `approach. By de- CHART 17 PAGENO="1036" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION VOYAGER SAT V - MISSION PROFILES veloping one basic propulsion module, as shown here, with a single nuclear engine, the so-called NERVA engine, we would have the basic building block for performing a variety of space missions which exceed the capability of a single Saturn V, such as manned plan~tary trips. The nuclear propulsion module would have the `same diameter, 33 feet, as our Saturn V launch vehicle and could be carried aloft as a Saturn V's third stage. This is important because it would hold down the cost of such a follow-on program by getting the most out of exist- ing hardware. This chart illustrates how this basic nuclear propulsion module could be used. Fully loaded modules would be delivered to Earth orbit by 1032 Fwd Shroud CHART 18 CHART 19 PAGENO="1037" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1033 the Saturn V. With the configuration shown on the bottom, made up by three nuclear propulsion modules in what you might call the first stage, and a single nuclear propulsion module for both `the second and third stages, we could send an expedition of 10 people `to the planet Mars, land on the Martian surface, and bring them back. The first stage would drive the expedition from Earth departure orbit into a Martian trajectory, the `second stage would deboost us in'to a Martian orbit, and the third stage would drive us, after completion of the Mars surface mission, from the Martian orbit back to Earth. The landing on the Martian surface and return `to Martian orbit would be done with a separate chemical vehicle something like the Apollo lunar module. Other possible applications of nuclear-powered modules shown on the chart would be for lunar logistics, direct ascent to the Moon, and a manned flyby of Mars. Based on our own assessment, I am convinced that the feasibility and high-performance potential of nuclear rocket propulsion has been thoroughly demonstrated in the extensive series of successful reac'tor and breadboard engine system tests which have already been conducted in the Nevada desert at the Nuclear Propulsion Test Station at .Jackass Flats. I am convinced that nuclear propulsion is a must for our fu'ture space needs. And in view of `the very long leadtimes this program requires, it would be most advisable that funding be made available in fiscal year 68 to continue development work on the critical engine and reactor phases of the program. If we are willing to make this investment `today, we should `be able to be on `the planet Mars, with man, in less than 20 years from now. Mr. TEAGUE. I hope I'm here, Wernher. I'll find out if you're right or not. Thank you very much, gentlemen, we appreciate it. CHART 20 PAGENO="1038" PROGRAM AND MANAGEMENT INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE MANNED SPACE FLIGHT SUBCOMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRO- NAUTICS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 90TH CONGRESS, FEBRU- ARY 9, 1967 (By the National Aeronautics and Space Administration) CONTENTS I. Programs and projects: (a) Fiscal: (1) 1968 budget allocations by major programs with consistent comparable budgets for fiscal years 1965, 1966, and 1967, including current totalcost to corn- Page pletion estimates for each major program 1035 (2) Analysis of fiscal year 1967-68 budget realinernents by programs 1035 (3) Actual versus planned expenditure by programs for fiscal years 1965, 1966, and 1967 (to date) 1036 (4) Budget requested by Center for fiscal year 1968, amount reduced, and final budget 1036 (5) "No-year" funds carryover by programs for fiscal years 1964, 1965, and 1966 1036 (6) List of R. & D. contracts in order of dollar value &urrently in force 1037-1050 (7) List of construction contracts with estimated com- pletion date and total costs 1051 (b) Procurement for research and development: (1) Number of procurement plans submitted to Center Director (less than $5 million) 1052 (2) Number submitted to NASA headquarters (more than $5 million) 1052 (3) Exceptions to (1) and (2) above 1052 (c) Contracts (calendar year 1966): (1) Number of competitive participants in each R. & D. negotiated contract 1052 (2) Fixed price contracts converted to CPIF 1053 (3) Contracts scheduled to be converted to CPIF 1053 (4) Contracts to a review board to determine fitlal fee~. 1053 (5) Organization identification of contract approval au thority (organization level and type of authority) - 1053- 1054 (6) Contracts renegotiated 1054 (7) Percentage of contracts to small businesses 1054 (d) Facilities: (1) Furnish information to show the status of facility planning, design and construction for fiscal years 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968 and future years when incrementally funded. Provide fiscal data to in- clude unobligated balances as of January 1, 1967. (An unobligated balance exists for this purpose when available funds are not obligated to a con- tract or work order to another government agency.) - 1054- 1055 (2) Furnish a listing of cost-plus-fixed fee contracts entered into for facility management, services and construction. Provide information as to the pur- pose of each 1056 (3) An estimate of future construction fund requirements for facility together with a general description of probable work 1056 1034 PAGENO="1039" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1035 CONTEN~TS-Continued II. Management: (a) Changes in organization chart from 1966 with identification Page of mission relationship of each major subarea 1056 (b) Number and cost of contracts administered by other govern- ment agencies, with agencies identified in 0-$100,000, $100,000-$500,000 and over $500,000 groupings 1058 (c) l'ercent of overtime of total time on individual projects or programs over $50,000 1058 (d) Average annual cost of each direct Center employee with comparison to previous year 1058 (e) A listing of each support contract pertaining to the facility, together with- (1) The annual estimated cost and the duration of the current contract 1059-1062 (2) Name and corporate address of contractor 1059-1062 (3) Number of personnel employed by contractor under support contract 1059-1062 (4) Functions performed by contractor under support contract 1059-1062 (5) Average annual salary of contractor employees used on support contract 1059-1062 (6) Amount of overtime involved annually 1059-1062 (7) Amount of subcontracts placed annually by support contractor 1059-1062 I. PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS (a) Fiscal-Project programed levels by fiscal years for manned space flight programs [In millions of dollars] Fiscal year 1965 Fiscal year 1966 Fiscal year 1967 Fiscal year 1968 Saturn I Saturn lB Saturn V Launch vehicle engine development Supporting development Advanced studies Apollo applications Total projects Administrative operations - - - - Grand total 35.1 255. 5 952.9 166.3 20. 7 5.5 0 249.0 1, 106. 5 133.2 18.3 5. 7 ~.4 199.8 1,051.8 49.8 12. 7 2.6 37.4 129. 9 1,019. 7 24. 5 14.0 3. 1 199. 6 1, 436.0 137.8 1, 518. 1 128. 4 1,354. 1 127. 8 1,390. 8 126. 3 1, 573. 8 1, 646. 5 1,481. 9 1, 517. 1 GEORGE C. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER Analysis of fiscal year 1967 budget realinements of manned space flight projects [In millions of dollars] Manned Space Flight projects Fiscal year 1967 budget estimates -- Requested Anticipated Difference Apollo Advanced missions Apollo Applications 1 Total 1,461.8 4.5 - 0 1,314.1 2.6 37.4 -147.7 -1.9 +37.4 1,466.3 1,354.1 -112.2 1 Authorization act (adjusted) for fiscal year 1967 showed $66900 000 for Apollo Applications. MSF's current operating plan for Apollo Applications is $80,000,000 as noted and described in the fiscal year 1967 reprograming letter to Congress. This $37,400,000 if MSFC's anticipated portion of that $80,000,000. PAGENO="1040" 1036 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Actual obligations versus planned by projects for fiscal year 1965, fiscal year 1966, and fiscal year 1967 (to Dec. 31, 1966) [In millions of dollars] Fiscal year 1965 Fiscal year 1966 Fiscal year 1967 Planned Actual Planned Actual Annual plan Actual to Dec. 31 Saturn I Saturn lB Saturn V Engines Supporting development Advanced studies Apollo applications Total 35.1 255.5 952.9 166.3 20.7 5. 5 32.5 257.8 955.6 166.3 22. 5 5.6 249.0 1,106.5 133.2 18.3 5.7 5.4 248.9 1, 105. 5 133.2 18.2 3.3 1. 5 199.8 1, 051.8 49.8 12.7 2.6 37.4 124.3 684.5 68.9 6.3 0 11.2 1,436. 0 1,440.3 1,518. 1 1,510.6 1,354. 1 895.2 Fiscal year 1968 MSFC budget for NASA manned space flight 1?. & D. projects [In millions of dollars] Project Requested Change Anticipated Saturnl Saturn I-B 140.9 -11.0 129.9 Saturn V Launch vehicle engine development Supporting development Apollo applications Advanced studies Total 1, 074. 1 24. 5 34.0 204. 9 14.0 -54.4 -20.0 -5. 3 -10.9 1, 019. 7 24. 5 14.0 199. 6 3. 1 - 1,492.4 - -101.6 1,390.8 Fiscal year 1968 MSFC budget for NASA manned space flight construction of facilities projects [In thousands of dollars] Project Requested by MSFC, August 1966 Change Anticipated Huntsville: Water pollution control Fire and security surveillance system Michoud Assembly Facility: Extend Saturn Blvd. to State road system Repair, rehabilitation, and improvements Mississippi Test Facility: Facilities to support S-Il and S-IC stage testing program Various locations: Upgrading and modifications, test and manufacturing facilities Total 357 666 1, 130 1, 100 2, 000 2,000 -7 -146 0 -220 -2, 000 -2, 000 350 520 1, 130 880 0 7, 253 -4,373 2,880 Carryover funds by R. & D. projects for fiscal years 1965 and 1966, carryover funds for fiscal years ending as of Dec. 31, 1966 [In thousands of dollars] fiscal year 1966 fiscal year 1965 Saturnl Saturn I-B Saturn V Engines Supporting development Advanced studies Total 0 0 578 0 2 1,589 0 18 255 2 61 174 2,169 510 PAGENO="1041" 1968 NASA AUThORIZATION 1037 11 .~ ~ ~C)t- +~ 0 0 fl :~ 2~ ~ :~ :~o ~ :~ VOo~E~ ~3cxr~ ~ ~ 0 C) &~ ~o ~c ~Z~C) :.~ H ~1 ~ ~ :°~ IC) ~ :o ~ ~ :~ ~ ~ ~o ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 b~ Z~o~ Q~ ~C)~E~Z~Q o~~Z :~Z~Z ZZ~Z~o~ 0 0 ~bI~ ~ ~ ~ ~~Q~C) ~ ~18~ Zz~Z 1o~Z~Zc~c~ ~ `0 {0 k~ ~W rI~ `~ E `C)~ ~ ~ ~ ~Z~~EO r'~QQ~-~ 0 0 C) :~ ~ ~ ~ ~ :~ ~ 000-00 000- OQ 00 00 z~;zzz~zzzzz~z 76~-265 O-6~7--~pt. 2F-'---GG PAGENO="1042" 1038 0 F rJ:2 0 19 NASA AUTHORIZATION Co PAGENO="1043" 1039 ~nn~ ~ ~ ~ O~O6~DO~ O~O~ ri~rI~ ~C1~CI~~) CI~~ ~ZZZZZZZZZZ~Z ~ZZZ~~ZZ ~ZZ 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 8 0 z PAGENO="1044" R. & D. CONTRACTS ADMINISTERED BY PURCHASING OFFICE, MSFC [Listed in order of dollar valuel Contractor Contract Description Date Amount Engineering, operation, and fabrication services in support of the propulsion and vehicle engineering laboratory, MSFC. Design, development, fabrication, testing, and documentation of 6 items of ducting for the Saturn S-IC. Engineering, operation, and fabrication services in support of the astrionics laboratory, MSFC. Engineering services in the areas of scientific computations, analog simulation and data reduction. General support services to the MSFC technical services office Mission support services for the quality and reliability laboratory Engineering operation and fabrication services in support of test laboratory - - Engineering, operations, and fabrication services in support of manufacturing engineering laboratory. Mission support services for the computation laboratory, MSFC Mission support services for the aeroastrodynamics laboratory Research and development of open cycle fuel cell system for space vehicles Development of fuel and LOX prevalves Digital events evaluator Research and development engineering services in support of the Saturn re- liability program. Support services MSFC test division Design, fabricate, and test breadboard liquid hydrogen pump Design, development, fabrication, and delivery of AROD system test model haidware. Manufacturing of tooling and S-IC LOX and fuel pressure volume ducting~ Technical support for the MSFC reliability program Investigate methods of fabricating and joining sandwich segments for forming domes. Design, develop, manufacture, and test outboard LOX and fuel pressure vol- ume ducting. Design, develop, fabricate, and furnish 2 prototype secure digital docodes Design, fabricate, test, hydrodynamic support system for Saturn II Development ofacryogenicgyro Fabricate, test, and deliver 11 items of telemetry equipment Feasibility evaluation of toroidal hoop combustion chamber Apollo logistics support systems payloads Engineering and operation services in support of the research projects Evaluationoftheplugmultichamber Development of a titanium S-IC skin section Brown Engineering Co., huntsville, Ala Federal Mogul Bower Bearings, Inc., Los Alamitos, Calif. Sperry Rand Corp. (space support), Huntsville, A1a General Electric Co., Phoenix, Ariz Management Services, Oak Ridge, Tenn Spaco, Inc., Huntsville, Ala Vitro Corp. of America, Fort Walton Beach, Fla - - - Hayes International Corp., Birmingham, Ala Computer Sciences, El Seguendo, Calif Northrop Corp., Huntsvifie, Ala Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co., Milwaukee, Wis The Garrett Corp., Phoenix, Airz Scientific Data System, Santa Monica, Calif Arinc Research Corp., Washington, D.C Vitro Corp. of America, Fort Walton Beach, Fla United Aircraft Corp., West Palm Beach, Fla Motorola, Inc., Scottsdale, Ariz Calumet & Hecla, Inc., Bartlett, Ill Federal Electric, Paramus, N.J Douglas Aircraft Co., Santa Monica, Calif Calumet & Hecla, Inc., Bartlett, Ill Avco Corp., Cincinnati, Ohio Martin Marietta Corp., Baltimore, Md General Electric Co., Pittsfield, Mass Brown Engineering Co., Huntsville, Ala North American Aviation, Inc., Canoga Park, CahL Bendix Corp., Ann Arbor, Mich Brown Engineering, Co., Huntsville, Ala United Aircraft Corp., West Palm Beach, Fla North American Aviation, Los Angeles, Calif NAS8-20073 NAS8-5097 NAS8-20055 NAS8-11209 NAS8-l4109 NAS8-2008l NAS8-20070 NAS8-20083 NAS8-18405 NAS8-20082 NAS8-2696 NAS8-5107 NAS8-11809 NAS8-11087 NAS8-5l78 NAS8-1l714 NAS8-11835 NAS8-540l NAS8-20412 NAS8-1l648 NAS8-5400 NAS8-5381 NAS8-I1903 NAS8-2418 NASS-11985 NAS8-40l3 NAS8-11287 NAS8-20166 NAS8-11436 NAS8-20530... Mar. 9, 1965 June 25, 1962 Mar. 1, 1965 Mar. 30, 1964 Mar. 25, 1965 Apr. 1, 1965 Mar. 16, 1965 do July 1,1966 Mar. 16, 1965 May 14,1962 June 29, 1962 June 25, 1964 Aug. 12, 1963 Oct. 29, 1962 June 19, 1964 Nov. 30, 1964 May 20,1963 July 11,1966 June 11,1964 Mar. 20, 1963 May 9, 1963 Feb. 15,1965 June 29, 1961 May 5, 1965 Mar. 16,1962 June 27,1964 May 3, 1965 June 27,1964 June 29, 1965 $21, 541,835 20,790,977 18,833,533 16,565,930 15,208,196 11,096,033 10,745,484 10,049,443 5,854,454 5,421,156 4,824,180 4,570,211 4,477, 571 4,084,425 3,643,810 2,841,253 2,769,829 2,437,955 2,205, 557 2,036,645 2,001,316 1,877,915 1,865,842 1,646,238 1,501,235 1,495, 204 1,370,000 1, 250,390 1, 167,311 1,156,502 PAGENO="1045" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1041 30 00 30 00 00003000 z z ZZZZZZZZZZZZZ CO CO - - ?~ - - ~ - ~ - ~ PAGENO="1046" 1042 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Cl Cl 0 C) 0 Cl C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) S ~ Cl) ~ CO ~ I ~6 O~J~ ~ ~ ~ CO rI)r.J~ COWCOwcl)cOc~ Cl) Cl) COW Cl) WWWCI)W COW COrl)el)rJ) z zz zzzzzzzzzzzz z z zz ~ zzzzz ZZ ZZZZZZ ~2 ~2~2~2~8 C) C)C)C)C)C) C)C) C)C)C)C)C)C) S ~ ~ ~ Cl 14+) B ~, C) r12 H Ti) C) Cl Cl) H Cl Cl) C-) C) PAGENO="1047" NAS8-2057&..... NAS8-20252 NAS8-5068 NAS8-11925 NASS-17439.... NAS8-11314..~.. NAS8-11514 NAS8-11304 NAS8-5257 NAS8-11184 NAS8-18404 NAS8-20533 NAS8-20378 Development of reliable long life, high-performance fuel cell systems Mobility test article Advanced control system for Saturn C-5 configuration Design, development, and delivery of 1 breadboard model and units of an integrated static inverter. Scanner computer system Study of research and development in the field of physical determination for mass properties. Experimental determination of system parameters for thin-walled cylinders~. Electron shielding studies Study to derive and define a technique to assure satisfactory disposal of Saturn orbital hardware. Research work pertaining to telemetering, measuring, and radio frequency systems. 3d generation of computers for MSFC, Huntsville, and MSFC, Michoud- Slidell. Research and development for fabricating a simulated tetanium alloy "y" segment for the S-IC fuel tank. Specified LSSM design study Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co., Milwaukee, Wis Bendix Corp., Ann Arbor, Mich Martin-Marietta Corp., Denver, Cob Texas Instruments, Dallas, Tex Honeywell, Inc., Huntsville, Ala Space, Inc., Huntsville, Ala Republic Aviation Corp., Farmingdale, N.Y General Dynamics, San Diego, Calif Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Sunnyvale, Calif Auburn University, Auburn, Ala Sperry Rand Corp., Washington, D.C North American Aviation, Los Angeles, Calif Bendix Corp., Ann Arbor, Mich Boeing Co., Seattle, Wash Watkins Johnson Co., Palo Alto, Calif Trans Sonics Inc., Lexington, Mass Douglas Aircraft Co., Santa Monica, Calif Pennsalt Chemical, Philadelphia, Pa Canadian Corp., Ottawa, Canada Datacraft Inc., Gardena, Calif - Lockheed Aircraft, Sunnyvale, Calif North American Aviation, Downey, Calif Lockheed Aircraft, Sunnyvale, Calif Goodyear Aerospace, Akron, Ohio Goodyear Aircraft Corp., Akron, Ohio Monsanto Research, Everett, Mass Peninsular Chemresearch, Inc., Gainesvffle, Fla Armour Research Foundation, Chicago, Ill LTV Ling Altec, Inc., Anaheim, Calif Northrop Corp., Huntsville, Ala Scientific Atlanta, Atlanta, Ga Greer Hydraulics, Inc., Los Angeles, Calif International Telephone & Telegraph, San Fernando, Calif. Astrodata, Inc., Anaheim, Calif Douglas Aircraft Co., Santa Monica, Calif General Electric Co., Lynehburg, Va NAS8-11987 NAS8-11957 NAS8-18053 NAS8-20648 NAS8-20529 NAS8-11760 NAS8-11798 NAS8-20265 NAS8-11238 NAS8-11761 NAS8-11070 NAS8-11371 NAS8-5352 NAS8-5251 NAS8-11981 NAS8-11221 NAS8-18298 NAS8-5373 NAS8-11673 NAS8-17443 NAS8-21023 NAS8-16550 Feb. 23, 1966 June 30, 1965 June 26, 1962 Apr. 27, 1965 June 29, 1966 June 12, 1964 June 29,1963 June 29, 1964 Feb. 18, 1963 Mar. 1, 1964 Aug. 1,1966 June 30,1965 June 29, 1966 June 30,1966 June 29,1965 April 26,1965 Aug. 1,1966 June 30,1966 June 25,1965 June 19,1964 June 30,1964 Dec. 6,1965 June 19,1964 June 30,1964 June 29,1963 June 29,1964 May 10, 1963 Mar. 5, 1963 June 28, 1965 May 20, 1964 June 9, 1966 May 29, 1963 June 26, 1964 June 29, 1966 Dec. 8, 1966 June 29,1965 399,907 399,500 399,462 394,099 389,778 384, 756 383,890 371,803 370,090 362,980 362,949 350,000 350,000 350,000 348,037 345,212 344,005 343,339 340,347 339,000 337,132 329,624 328,992 324,349 318,673 318,516 316,408 309,436 309,060 308,240 305,440 302,977 302,578 301,400 300,000 29~ 200 I-' 06 06 0 N 0 Design, fabrication, and delivery of S band power amplifiers Design and fabricate a prototype 120.channel digital measuring system A study on earth orbital experiments for low gravity fluid mechanics Design, fabrication, delivery, and installation of vacuum pumping system Development of a micrometeoroid simulation device Acoustic and vibration measuring program for solid propellant Beryllium fabrication methods and development - Studies of improved Saturn V vehicles and intermediate payload Saturn vehicles. Determine the aerselastic Development of a high weight cryogenic insulating system Evaluation of structural reinforced plastics at cryogenic temperatures Development of improved semi-organic structural adhesives for elevated temperature applications. Development of vulcanizable elastomers suitable for use in contact with.llquid oxygen. Develop materials for slip ring assemblies - System design and installation of vibration and acoustic equipment Analytical study and mathematical research for development and implementa- tion of the patl-adaptive guidance mode. Portable automatic tracking antenna systems - Design, development, fabrication, delivery, and installation of a fluid power package. Development, design, manufacturing, and delivery of a prototype guidance system. Analog to digital recording system Orbital astronomy support facility Video transmission system PAGENO="1048" 1044 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Q~ ~ ~ ~rD ~o ci~coc~ ci ~CQW W~WWC(~ ~ Z Z ZZ Z ZZZZZZzzzZ~ Z ZZ~ ZZ~Z~ Z~~~ZZ r12 ~ ~o PAGENO="1049" Whittaker Corp., San Diego, Calif- University of Alabama, University, Ala Westinghouse Electric, Pittsburgh, Pa North American Aviation, Canoga Park, Calif Ling Temco Vought, Dallas, Tex lIT Research Institute, Chicago, Ill Avco Corp., Everett, Mass Applied Dynamics, Inc., Ann Arbor, Mich Heat Technology Lab, Huntsville, Ala Mechanical Tech, Latham, N.Y Astrodata, Inc., Anaheim, Calif Lockheed Aircraft, Sunnyvale, Calif General Applied Science Lab, Westbury, Long Island, N.Y. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Sunnyvale, Calif North American Aviation, Los Angeles, Calif Ampherol Borg Electric, Chicago, ill North American Aviation, Downey, Calif Fairchild Ruler, Rockville, Md Raytheon Co., Norwood, Mass lIT Research Institute, Chicago, Ill Systems Engineering Lab, Inc., Fort Lauderdale, Fla. Applied Dynamics, Inc., Ann Arbor, Mich General Cable Corp., Birmingham, Ala Douglas Aircraft Co., Huntington Beach, Calif Parker-Hannifin Corp., Los Angeles, Calif Perkin-Elmer Corp., Norwalk, Conn Electro-Optical Systems, Pasadena, Calif Lockheed Aircraft, Sunnyvale, Calif TRW,Inc., RedondoBeach, Calif Garrett Corp., Los Angeles, Calif American Machine & Foundry, Alexandria, Va Raytheon Co., Santa Ana, Calif North American Aviation, Los Angeles, Calif Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus, Ohio Tulane University, New Orleans, La North American Aviation, Downey, Calif Oak Ridge Technical Enterprises, Oak Ridge, Tenn NAS8-ll958~..~. NASS-20172 NAS8-1l929 NAS8-20237 NAS8-lllOO NAS8-11333 NAS8-5279.~.....-- NAS8-2O622~...-.. NAS8-11850 NAS8-l1678 NASS-15l08 NAS8-11498 NAS8-1l032..-..-- NAS8-11476 NAS8-11733 NAS8-11832 NAS8-20289 NAS8-20343 NAS8-11604 NAS8-20l07 NAS8-ll9ll NAS8-15ll2 NAS8-l767l NAS8-l1309 NAS8-11694.--- NAS8-20115 NAS8-ll934 NAS8-20377 NAS8-l8056 NASS-2026L---- NAS8-lll6&~ NAS8-l7431 NAS8-lllO8 NAS8-ll837 NAS8-ll135 NAS8-20258 NAS8-l1080 Optimization of the performance of a polyurethane adhesive system over the temperature range. Study and analysis of the FM/FM and SS/FM telemetry systems for the Saturn vehicle. Light weight, versatile, nonvacuum-electron beam welding unit System analysis of plug multichamber configuration Wind tunnel testing of Saturn I-B launch vehicle static longitudinal stability Research study on development of lightweight thermal insulation materials for rigid heat shields. Experimental investigation of advanced superconducting magnets Models of four AD-2-64 PBO analog computers Study of thermal environment problems of Saturn vehicles Analysis, design, and prototype development of squeeze film bearings for AB-5 gyro. Statistical correlation computer system Delay lock techniques for AROD system Experimental investigation of combustion phenomena in the base region of vehicles caused by upstream injection of fuels. Investigation and development of an R-F liquid level sensing techniques Development of nondestructive testing techniques for honeycomb heat shields. Design, development and manufacture of fiat cable connectors Study of impact on 5-11 stage of improved 1-2 engine Satellite control center (Satcon) operation Design and development, fast-scan infrared detection and measuring instru- ment. Survey of optical components for fluctuation measurements on Saturn models... Manufacture, documentation, delivery, installation, and checkout of plotter interface system. System analog computing Cable Design study of MS-IVB stage formod. launch vehicle Saturn V Design, development, manufacturing, and preflight certification testing of submerged shutoff valve. Optical technology experiments for a satellite Study and investigation, design, development and fabrication of cryogenic pressure transducer. Design requirements for reactor power system for lunar exploration Alternativemissionmodesstudy Early lunar shelter design and comparison study Development of lightweight magnesium alloys for low-temperature applica- tions. Centralprocessorsystem Development of high-strength, low-density composite materials for Saturn applications. Processing, development, and pilot plant production of silane polymers and dials. Development of data analysis methods for high intensity son: id propagation - - Scientific mission support sttidy for extended lunar exploration Study of surface barrier silicon detector May 14, 1965 June 10, 196a5 June 15, 1965 June 29, 1965 Sept. 27, 1963 June 25, 1964 May 13,1963 June 2, 1966 Oct. 13, 1964 June 18, 1964 June 30,1965 Oct. 15, 1964 June 26,1963 June 30, 1964 June 29, 1964 Apr. 16, 1965 Dec. 20,1965 Feb. 15,1966 June 19~ 1964 June 4,1965 Apr. 16, 1965 June 30, 1965 June 9,1966 June 30, 1964 do Apr. 29,1965 Apr. 9,1965 June 30,1966 Aug. 23,1966 Feb. 17,1966 June 19,1964 Mar. 16, 1966 Sept. 27, 1963 Nov. 27, 1964 Nov. 7, 1963 Dec. 13, 1965 June 29,1963 227,853 226,971 225,935 225,857 223,935 221,852 221,097 219,152 218,863 217,529 216, 683 216,474 215,509 215,292 215,271 212 700 210,440 207,800 207,460 207, 447 207, 280 206,010 205,565 205,432 204,775 204,300 200, 012 200,000 200,000 200,000 196,736 196,641 196,014 195,360 195, 258 195,060 194,795 0 0 PAGENO="1050" Application of feedback techniques to transducers Finalize electrical design, construct and deliver complete set of system bread- board circuits. Develop nondestructive methods determining residual stress and fatigue dam- age in metals. Investigate digital compensation thrust vector feedback control system for Saturn-type space vehicles. Saturn I-B improvement study (solid 1st stage), phase II Research study of large, flexible launch booster control Gustcriteriastudy Study of phase variation characteristics of very low frequency transmission - - Instrumentation, development, fabrication, and furnishing techniques to measure vehicle engine performance. Study on cryogenic container thermodynamics during propellant transfer Verification of criticality data Improvement of techniques for derivation of vibration test specification Acoustic scale model tests of high speed flows Design, develop, and deliver 20 prototype units for production of high relia- bility mierominiturized d.c. amplifier. Air-conditioning modifications - Development of heavy gage bonded honeycomb Mission engineering study of electrically propelled manned planetary vehicles~ Research on celestial mechanics and optimization Environmental effects on AES scientific instruments Design, investigation, and development of design improvements for ST-124M stabilized platform slipring capsules. Design, development and fabrication evaluation land delivery of breadboard upper stage fire detection system Saturn vehicle. Cryogenic liquid experiments in orbit Lunar dust removal/prevention techniques for radiators (AES) payloaas Environmentairesearch Study applications of tracking filter to stabilize large flexible launch vehicles...~ Electronic packages environmental control system ana vehicle thermal system integration. Stuay ot zero-gravity, vapor-liquid separators Design, development and fabrication of prototype high temperature, hign frequency response pressure transducer. Design criteria for theoretlcai and experimental dynamic analysis Special stueses of AEOD system concepts and designs Study of filtration mechanics and sampling techniques B. & D. CONTRACTS ADMINISTERED BY PURCHASINI OFFICE, MSFC-Continued [Listed in order of dollar value] Contractor Contract Description Date Amount Princeton University, Princeton, N.J Electronic Communications, Inc., St. Petersburg, Fla. Benson, R. W., and Associates, Nashville, Tenn Auburn University, Auburn, Ala Douglas Aircraft Co., Huntington Beach, Calif Minneapolis-Honeywell, Minneapolis, Minn Lockheed Aircraft, Sunnyvale, Calif - Auburn University, Auburn, Ala Bell Aerosystems Co., Buffalo, N.Y Lockheed Aircraft, Sunnyvale, Calif Brown Engineering Co., Huntsville, Ala Measurement Analysis, Los Angeles, Calif Martin-Marietta Corp., Denver, Cob Motorola, Inc., Scottsdale, Ariz Eskew, H. L., & Sons, Birmingham, Ala General Dynamics, Fort Worth, Tex General Electric Co., Philadelphia, Pa Republlc Aviation Corp., Farmingdale, Long Island, N.Y. Hughes Aircraft Co., El Segundo, Calif Litton Precision Products, Blacksburg, Va North American Aviation, Canoga Park, Calif Martin-Marietta Corp., Denver, Cob Northrop Corp., Huntsville, Ala Wyle Laboratories, Huntsville, Ala Sperry Rand Co., I'noenix, Ariz Nortn American Aviation, Downey, Calif General Dynamics, San Diego, Calif Battelle Memorial institute, Columbus, Ohio General Dynamics, San Diego, Calif Adcom, Inc., Oambrlage, Mass Oklahoma State Dniversity, Stiliwater, Okia NAS8-5343 - NAS8-20643 NAS8-202o8 NAS8-l1274 NAS8-20242 NAS8-11206 NAS8-1l453 NAS8-20l54 NAS8-5491 NAS8-20362 NAS8-20233 NAS8-2002o NAS8-20223 NAS8-11922 NAS8-15078 NAS8-11943 NAS8-20372 NAS8-20130 NAS8-20244 NAS8-20578 NAS8-11656 NAS8-11328 NAS8-20116 NASS-11312 NAS8-2008o NASS-20320 NAS8-2o146 NASS-11933 NAS8-11486 NASS-2or28 NAS8-1l009 June 15, 1963 $193, 491 May 31, 1966 193,300 July 9, 1965 193,008 May 28, 1964 192,573 June 30,1965 191,479 ~ May 9, 1964 188, 746 ~ June 27, 1964 188,398 Oct. 14,1965 187,901 ~4 June 29, 1963 186,940 ~. June 30,1966 186,682 ~s- June 29,1965 186,220 Apr. 19,1965 185,927 ~- June 30,1965 185,479 d June 23, 1965 185,241 June 22, 1965 184,598 ~ May 4, 1965 183,312 ~ June 27,1966 182,300 ~ June 30,1965 180,698 ~. - 180,000 ~ Mar. 31,1966 179,868 June 19, 1964 179,841 Sept. 8, 1964 179,712 Mar. 8,1966 179,000 iune 30,1964 178,303 May 7,1965 176,322 Apr. 20,1966 176,020 June 7, 1965 175,634 Mar. 30,1965 174,700 Oct. 15, 1964 173,945 June 15,1965 173, sn~ June 12, 1963 173,361 PAGENO="1051" Adcom, Inc., Cambridge, Mass- Electro Technical Corp., West Caidwefl, NJ Bryson Construction, Decautur, Ala Kinelogic Corp., Pasadena, Calif Boeing Co., Huntsville, Ala North American Aviation, Downey, Calif Boeing Co., Huntsville, Ala lIT Research Institute, Chicago, Ill Honeywell, Inc., Huntsville, Ala Radiation, Inc., Melbourne, Fla Bendix Corp., Teterboro, NJ Standford Research Institute, Menlo Park, Calif Westinghouse Electric, Pittsburgh, Pa Southwest Research Institute, San Antonio, Tex Alabama, University of, University, Ala American Machine & Foundry, Stamford, Conn~ Westinghouse Electric, Baltimore, Md United Aircraft Corp., Norwalk, Conn Vanderbilt University, Nashvifie, Tenn Teledyne Inc., Hollister, Calif Metrophysics Inc., Santa Barbara, Calif North American Aviation, Downey, Calif Smith Electronics, Brecksvifie, Ohio Westinghouse Electric, Huntsvifie, Ala Arde Inc., Paramus, NJ Bendix Corp., Teterboro, NJ Southern Research Institute, Birmingham, Ala Midwest Research Institute, Kansas City, Mo General Electric Co., Philadelphia, Pa Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md Boeing Co., Seattle, Wash Lockheed Aircraft, Sunnyvale, Calif Raytheon Co., Inc., Bedford, Mass Sylvania Electric Products, Waltham, Mass NAS8-20001 Engmeermg studies analyses of communications telemetry radio frequency probes related vehicle system instrumentation. NAS8-5082 Development of highly reliable capsule-type slipring assemblies NASS-1789'2 Construction 05 elevator for test stand and addition to steam plant at MSFC~ - NASS-20510 Design, aevelopment, and fabrication of airborne tape recorders NAS8-20534 Research and development for fabricating simulated titanium alloy base gore segment lower bulkhead S-IC fuel tank. NAS8-1l495 Design criteria, guidance flight mechanics and trajectory optimization NAS8-20090 Research on passive instrumentation and stimuli generation for Saturn V equipment checkout. NAS8-20640 Development of continuous scanning laminograph nondestructive inspection niultilayer printed circuit boards. NAS8-l7448 Analog magnetic tape recording system NAS8-180i1 Design, fabrication, and delivery, telemetry redundancy analyzer NAS8-11585 ST-124M platform system resolvers NAS8-20220 Investigation of reactivity launch vehicle materials with liquid oxygen NAS8-20678 Sell-contained electron beam welding gun to conduct an "in orbit" welding experimentation. NAS8-11045 Study of nonlinear dynamic behavior of liquids in cylindrical elastic containers.. NAS8-11202 Study of measurement of Earth tremors produced as result of large rocket firings. NAS8-5134 - Design, fabrication, and installation of a gimballed engine simulator NAS8-20245 Study of emplaced lunar scientific station for Apollo extension systems.... NAS8-1l961 Design, manufacture, test, and delivery prototype semiconductor integrated circuits. NAS8-2559 Research and numerical integration of 2d order differential equations NAS&-11939 Design development fabrication testing of type B high temperature detonating fuse assembly tee and ordnance manifold. NAS8-20516 Design fabrication test delivery portable prototype tube flare inspection in- struments. NAS8-11490 Study longitudinal oscillations propellent tanks wane propagations fuel lines~-- NAS8-11592 Study of short term stability - NAS8-1l914 - NAS8-1l977 NAS8-11916 NAS8-20190 NAS8-11012 NAS8-20360 NAS8-5253 NAS8-20156 NAS8-11410 NAS8-ll007~ - - - - NAS8-11588 Design, manufacture test, ahd delivery prototype semiconductor integrated circuits. Research and development cryogenic stretch-form helium bottles for Saturn V-S-IC vehicle. Design development fabrication delivery microelectric circuits stabilization of gas bearing gyro servologs. Study of polymers containing silicon nitrogen bonds Study for indicational load effects on multistage missile systems Derivation analytical methods rapid convergence to solution optionized trajections. Investigation of behavior dielectric material at high field strengths in vacuum environment. Study of dissimilar metal joining by solid state welding Dev empirical model estimating statistical chartics unsteady pressure flelth~~~ Optimization multistage three dimsnl boost trajectories Dev optical superheterodyne receiver Nov. 19, 1965 June 30,1962 May 17,1966 lune 23,1965 June 30, 1965 June 29,1965 June 26, 1965 June 20 1966 June 30 1966 do Feb. 26,1964 June 23 1965 Nov. 29, 1966 June 29, 1963 Mar. 21, 1964 Aug. 6,1962 June 26,1965 Apr. 23, 1965 Dec. 28, 1961 June 29,1965 June 24, 1965 Jan. 6,1965 Mar. 16, 1964 Apr. 23,1965 June 24,1965 Apr. 14, 1965 May 4, 1965 June 21, 1963 Apr. 27, 1966 Apr. 1, 1963 May 20,1965 June 27,1964 June 27, 1963 Mar. 10. 1964 172,100 171, 965 171,146 171,053 170,500 168,704 168,354 166,715 166,250 166,176 165,803 164,722 164,342 164,196 164,191 162,869 162,594 155, 682 155,456 154,819 156,204 153,593 153,300 151,818 151,652 151,362 150,047 150, 043 150, 000 149, 998 162,275 162,168 162,018 160,768 PAGENO="1052" a 1048 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION )Ca) ~ ~ ~ ~ C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C C) C) C) c ~ r/~ .~ 0 ~Q~O~O6J~ ~6 ~D~oho6~c ~ Ct~CCcacaw c12~O ~ zzz~zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz~ zzzzz zz zzzzzzzzz~ PAGENO="1053" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1049 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ bI)~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ W~)WcL»= ~WC~ WC(~J)CI~Ct~rJ~ 1~I~ zz~zzzzzz~ zz~zzzz~ zzzzzzzzzz zzzzz: PAGENO="1054" 1050 196.8 NASA AUTHORIZATION I C cI~ c) PAGENO="1055" MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER Construction contracts for facilities (current contracts over $100,000 a~s of Jau. 1, 1967) [List of construction contracts with estimated completIon dated and tota 1 costs. Add4tlonal information furnished is the contract number and thu contractor]' HUNTSVILLE Contract No. Title Amount (thousands) Contractor-Name, city, and State Estimated completion date ENG NAS-2929 NAS 17137 NAS8-17892 NAS8-17898 NAS8-17903 NAS8-17908 Roadnet modifications, phase II Extension to load test annex Elevator for test stand and addition to steamplant Modifications to 1st floor, B wing, building 4663 Addition to building 4481 AdditiontoAwing,bUilding4O63 $1, 753.0 175.1 171.1 219.1 217.4 115.0 Ashburn & Gray, Hunstville, Ala D & A Equipment, Pensacola, Fla Bryson Construction Co., Decatur, Ala Bagby Elevator & Electric Co., Huntsville, A1a Bryson Construction Co., Decatur, Ala do MICHOUD ASSEMBLY FACILITY NASS-17142 NAS8-17881 Plant utilities monitoring system Modifications to potable water systems, and plant utility system modifications. $385.0 Johnson Services Co., New Orleans, La 905.0 South Central Heating & Plumbing, Inc., Jackson, Miss. April 1967. May 1967. MISSISSIPPI TEST FACILITY ENG (NASA) 2876 ENG (NASA) 2899 ENG(NASA) 2900 ENG (NASA) 2934 ENG (NASA) 9006 NAS-w-410 NAS8-19528 1-10-5(19)276 S-Il test complex, test position A-l S-IC test stand, test position B-l Componentsservicefacility Widening and improvement of Mississippi State Highway No. 43 in connection with NASA, Mississippi Test Facility. Addition to heating system for S-IC test stand, position B-2 Phasesllandllltechnicalsystem Equipment interface modifications and additions to the S-IC test stand. NASA funding for bridge for U.S. Interstate 10 $10, 068.3 5,633.5 3,498.3 1,250.0 178.1 23,206.7 200.0 5,430.0 Koppers Co., Inc., and Malan Construction Department, New York, N.Y. Blount Bros. Construction Co., Montgomery, Ala. MikeBradfordCo.,Inc.,Miami,Fla Yates & Patterson, Picayune, Miss Carpenter Bros., New Orleans, La Q~neralElectric,BaySt.LOuis,Miss Boeing Co., New Orleans, La Fairchild & Snowden, Hattiesburg, Miss March 1967. April 1967. March1967. Do. July1967. April1967. Do. July 1969. VARIOUS LOCATIONS May 1967. April 1967. - Do. March1967. C) *Do. 00 Do. 0 N 0 z NAS8-5609(F) NBY-69907 DACA-09-67-C-9004 Relocation and rehabilitation plating and processing facility Construction of the subassembly building, Saturn S-Il facility Rehabilitation of access roads and reservoir site slopes (Edwards Air Force Base, Calif.). $410.6 Texarkana Construction Co., Texarkana, Tex~~ 1,596.1 Santa Fe Engineers, Inc., Lancaster, Calif 275.0 do July 1967. February 1967. April 1967. PAGENO="1056" Contract No: NAS8-18405 NAS8-20412 NAS8-20262 NAS8-20334 NASS-20G72 NAS8-1875~ NAS8-18O~5 NAS8-17439 NAS8-18404 NAS8-18053 NAS8-20648 NAS8-18298 NAS8-17443 NAS8-21023 NAS8-18926 NAS8-17446 NASS-18118 NAS8-18760 NAS8-17051 NAS8-~21O21 NAS8-20622 NAS8-17671 NASS-20377 NAS8-18056 NAS8-20261 NAS8-20362 NAS8-20372 NAS8-20116 Number of Contract No.-Continued participants NAS8-2O~32O 6 NAS8-17892 3 NAS8-17448 5 NAS8-18011 6 ~AS8-2O663 11 NAS8-20363 12 NAS8-18296 1 NAS8-20318 7 NAS8-11291 5 NAS8-17894 8 NAS8-20630 4 NAS8-20314 4 NASS-20601 2 NASS-18649 2 NASS-17907 2 NAS8-20316 7 NAS8-17698 2 NAS8-20667 4 NAS8-2066fj 4 NAS8-20605 4 NAS8-19205 3 NAS8-17908 4 NAS8-20309 1 NAS8-2Q5~7 2 NAS8-21014 13 NAS8-20625 6 NAS8-20337 4 1052 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION (b) Procurement for research and development Purchasing office, MSFC Number of procurement plans submitted to Center Director (less than $5 million) : Four. Number submitted to NASA headquarters (more than $5 million) : One. Exceptions to (1) and (2) above: None. Contracts office, MSFC Number of procurement plans submitted to Center Director (less than $5 million): Six. Number submitted to NASA headquarters (more than $5 million) : None. Exceptions to (1) and (2) above: None. (c) Contracts (calendar year 1.966) Contracts officer, 1.0. Number of competitive participants in each R&DO negotiated contract. Number of Contract No: participants (a) NAS8-18732__________________________~ 3 (b) NAS8-17221 4 (c) NAS2-17205 2 (d) NAS8-172li~ 2 (e) NASS-18725 (f) NAS~17217___________________________~___ 4 (g) NAS8-18740 _______________________~ 1 Purchasing office, JIThTFC Number of competitive participants in each R&DO negotiated contract. Ntsmber of participants 5 6 8 5 2 2 5 2 6 7 3 2 6 7 3 3 9 3 3 3 2 1 3 4 7 14 5 4 PAGENO="1057" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1053 Contracts office, 1.0. Fixed price contracts converted to CPIF: None. Purchasing office, MSFC Fixed price contracts converted to CPIF: None. Contracts office, 1.0. Contracts scheduled to be converted to OPIF: Contract No. and contractor: Description NAS8-.5608, schedule II: The Boe- Systems engineering, integration, and ing Co., Huntsville, Ala. GSE. NAS8-4016, schedule II: Chrysler Systems engineering, and integration. Corp., COSD, New Orleans, La. NAS8-4016, schedule III: Chrysler I-I/IB/GSE. Corp., CCSD, New Orleans, La. Purchasing office, 3L~1FC Contracts scheduled to be converted to CPIF: None. Contracts office, 1.0. Contracts to a review board to determine final fee: None. Purchasing of/ice, MFJFC Contracts to a review board to determine final fee: None. MSFC-OFFIcE OF THE DIRECTOR Delegation of contracting officer authority Name Monetary limitation of signature authority Monetary limitation of approval authority Harry H. Gorrnan Wilbur S. Davis David H. Newby (1) (1) (1) $2, 500,000 2,500,000 2,500,000 1 Unlimited. MSFC-PURCHAsING OFFICE Delegation of contracting officer authority Name ~ Monetary limitation of signature authority Monetary limitation of approval authority Garland G. Buckner Andrew Wood 3. R. Jones W. 3. McKinney L. Garrison James W. Fletcher C. M. O'Bryant Jack Grosser Gerald Ridgeway Edward Harper H. M. McCullough Fred Boles Duron Crider (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) $250,000 250,000 250, 000 250,000 250,000 (1) 250,000 $1, 000,000 500,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 25,000 25, 000 25, 000 25,000 100,000 25,000 1 Unlimited. 76-265 O-67~---pt. 2--67 PAGENO="1058" 1054 196~8 NASA AUTHORIZATION DELEGATION OF CONTRACTING OFFICER AUTHORITY Contracts Office, 1.0. [MSFC 3-4, dated July 7, 1966] Name of contracting officer Project Monetary limit of signature authority Monetary limit of approval authority 1 O M Hirsch All None $1 000 000 John R. McCombs do do 500,000 Marion S. Hardee Michoud (all) do 1,000,000 P. L. Burton Engines do 100, 000 Earl H. Eubanks Stages do 100,000 Elbert B. Craig lU/USE do 100,000 John H. Hyer Lo~gistics and liaison do 100,000 Charles K. Hatch, Jr MTF do 100,000 John E. Sharkey MTF do 1,000,000 William L. Goodrich MTF do 100,000 William D Goldsby NAA stages do 100 000 Harold P. McMillan Sli stage do 100,000 Melvin B. Sundstrom DAC stages do 100,000 Thomas B. Swaggerty NAA engines do 100,000 Burch H. Aidridge Michoud (all) do 100,000 Paul B. McCutcheon Property do 100,000 Ross W. Hunter AMR do 100,000 1 Notwithstanding the herein specified limits, and in accordance with NASA PR 50.105, the following categories of actions shall be submitted to the Director of Procurement for approval; (1) certain utility service contracts re PR 4.5006, (2) architect-engineering service contracts when the total dollar value is $250,000 or the work to be performed under a cost-plus-fixed-fee or fixed-price contract includes services of the type described in 4.201(b) (ii), (iii), or (iv), and the fee, inclusive of the architect-engineer's costs, to be paid to the architect-engineer for the performance of such services exceeds 6 percent of the estimated cost of the related construction project, exclusive of the amount of such fee, (3) facilities contracts providing facilities having total acquisition value exceeding $250,000, or which provide real property regardless of amount, (4) all leases for real property where annualrental exceeds $25~000 or where certificate of necessity under 40 U.S.C. 278b is required, (5) each negotiated contract or modification which by itself obligates the Government of Contracts office, 1.0. Oontracts renegotiated: None. Pe~rchasing Office, MSFC Contracts renegotiated: None. Contracts Office, 1.0. - Percentage of contracts to small businesses 15 percent Purchasing office, MSFC Percei*age of contracts to small businesses: 55 percent. (d) Facilities The attached summary indicates the overall status of the C of F program by fiscal year, FY 1965 through FY 1968. The project amount and unobligated balance are also shown. Construction of facilities-Status of facility planning, design, and construction (as of Jan. 1, 1967) HUNTSVILLE [Amounts in thousands] Project No. Project title Percent complete Plan- Con- ning Design struc- tion Project 1 Unobli- gated balance FISCAL YEAR 1965 6256 Extension of propulsion and vehicle engineering.... 100 100 98 2,221.0 36.0 6252 Extension of utility systems 100 100 50 3,066.7 2 1, 029.9 6255 Saturn support test area 100 100 96 3, 417.0 71.4 6236 Extensions to Saturn V USE test facility 100 100 100 2, 435.0 28.8 6221 Expansion of components test facility 100 100 100 1,907. 0 20. 5 See footnotes at end of table. PAGENO="1059" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1055 Construction of facilities-Status of facility planning, design, and construction (as of Jan. 1, 1967)-Continued HUNTSVILLE [Amounts in thousailds] Project No. Project title Percent complete ~ Plan- Con- ning Design struc- tion Project amount1 Unobli- gated balance 6234 6258 8259 6271 6274 FISCAL YEAR 1986 Test engineering building extension Addition to materials laboratory Nondestructive testing laboratory FISCAL YEAR 1968 Fire surveillance system Water pollution control 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 0 91 95 85 0 0 493.5 890.6 649.0 580.0 388.0 41.2 41.0 117.6 (3) (3) MICHOUD ASSEMBLY FACILITY FISCAL YEAR 1965 6313 Alterations to Saturn 1st stage (S-IC) production 100 100 90 350. 1 50.0 facilities 6314 Utility extension, alteration, and rehabilitation to support Saturn S-IV and S-IC production - 100 100 85 1,507.7 61.0 6315 Facility additions, extensions and alterations to Saturn S-lB and S-IC production 100 100 100 3,285.0 25.8 6316 Central computer facility extensions and altera- tions 100 100 100 1,435. 3 10.4 FISCAL YEAR 1966 6319 Improvement to storm drainage system 100 100 100 346. 7 11. 2 FISCAL YEAR 1967 6320 Modification of chemical waste disposal system...... 100 100 0 750.8 705. 5 FISCAL YEAR 1968 63XX Repair rehabilitation, and improvements 100 0 0 900.0 (3) 6322 ExtensIon of Saturn Bid. to State road system.. -- 100 0 0 1, 184.0 (3) FISCAL YEAR 1965 6422 Saturn V 1st stage (S-IC) static test facility 100 100 95 15,879.9 367. 1 6423 Saturn V 2nd stage (S-Il) static test facility 100 100 98 27,562.6 3. 1 6425 Addition to utility installations and support fa- cilities 100 100 99 10,942.0 53.0 6421 Components service facilities 100 100 99 6,593.5 11. 4 FISCAL YEAR 1987 6427 Facilities to support S-IC and S-Il test prOgram.. 100 0 0 1,700.0 1,700.0 FISCAL YEAR 1965 9109 Facilities for F-i engine program 100 100 99 3,417.4 350.0 9118 Facilities for S-Il stage program 100 100 90 2,217.0 380.2 9130 Facilities for S-IVB stage program 100 100 99 5,247.0 74.8 9131 Facilities for J-2 engine program 100 100 97 3,037.3 0 FISCAL YEAR 1966 9109 Facilities for F-i engine program 100 100 50 735.0 62.3 9118 Facilities for S-Il stage program 100 100 90 2, 090.0 7.0 9131 FacilitIes for 1-2 engine program 100 100 25 711.9 16.0 1 Includes facility planning and design funds. 2 Transferred to Bureau of Public Roads. Planned obligation, 3d quarter, fiscal year 1967. Not available. PAGENO="1060" 1056 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Construction of facilities-Cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts (as of Jan. 1, 1967) MISSISSIPPI TEST FACILITY Contract No. Contractor Category Purpose NASw-4l0 General Electric Procurement - To provide for design, procurement fabri- cation, installation, and checkout of technical systems for S-Il test stand A-i, S-IC dual test stands B-i and B-2, electronics instrumentation and materials NAS8-19528 - - - ~ Boeing Co Construction laboratory, sonic-measuring facilities, components service facility, data handl- ing center, data acquisition facility, and S-Il checkout and storage building at Mississippi Test Facility. To provide equipment Interface modifica- tions and additions to the S-IC test complex (excluding position B-i). Construction of facilities, 1ttichoud Assembly Facility.-Estirnate of future year funding required for projects submitted in the President's C of F budget: Approximately $.5 million per year will be required for continuing rehabilita- tion, additions and improvements to the Michond Ass~mbly Facility. These are essential to the operation of the plant and the protection of the Government investment in this facility. II. MANAGEMENT (a) C1~anges in organizaion chart from 1966 Changes to organization The MSFC Organization chart as of March 1, 1966 is enclosed as Attachment A. The organization chart as of February 1, 1967 is enclosed as Attachment B. Changes to the organization chart include the following: (a) The Associate Deputy Diredtor, Aclminis!trative, has been assigned, in addition to his present duties, as the Assistant Director for Scientifid and Tech- nical Analysis to provide a Center focal point for Voyager Program assignment which MSFC may receive. (Block B-i) (b) The Patent Counsel (Block B-5) has been established as an entity sep- arate from Chief Counsel. (Block B-3) (o) The Technical Staff Office (Block A-18) in Research & Development Op- erations has been abolished, and the responsibilities absorbed by other R&D offices. (d) The Experiments Office (Block B-18) has been created to assist the Director, Research and Development Operations in the identification, definition and development of the flight experiments program carried out by our labora- tories, and to manage the ART/SRT program. (e) The Saturn lB/Centaur Program Office (Block A-34) was abolished due to the cancellation of the program. (f) The Saturn/Apollo Applications Program Office (Block B-34) has been created in Industrial Operations. It is responsible for the overall planning, coordination and direction of all AAP activities assigned to the Marshall Space Flight Center, just as the other program offices are for mainstream Apollo activities. PAGENO="1061" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1057 NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION GEORGE C. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER ~WRECTOR~ (~` 31 r~4i ___r'~ ~ _________ _________ Li:~( `~!`L ~gI1 =~ ~ H=~ I ~ _____ [DEVELOPMENT J _____________ ____ I R9181[~VP1~ I ~ ____ Ii~P~1~I 991!I~T ~ [~10t] ~ [1 1~t*341TE 01flU35] onc: 361 r~ ~T 21 L~ L'III LI ~iT~iT03 ~ /O~ (j~ ) of M~ch 1, 1966 CHART 1 NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION GEORGE C. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER i:~::~1:1 ~ DDLY 1 211 COUNStI 311 `°`~~41 ~ I I I ~ ~ ~-1 I ~ PUROIASSNS1 I~1~L~' I I 1~~1r?O I °`~~12 II ISSIONCI ~6ON* EWP~~~ ~ L ~ I ~ I 0~18I I ~ ~ L `~~301TI ~1 I ________ ~ I __________ ___________ ~ r5~~t, S2~?i~1~ c1~S'~ PM [~~~?R~J J ~3ORATORY2J 26 1 LAIO~ORY __________ ~TI ~) I/~ CHART 2 PAGENO="1062" Fiscal year Fiscal year 1967 1968 Total permanent civil service employees Average annual salary 7,030 7,030 $11,661 $11,805 1058 (b) 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Number and cost of contracts administered by otltcr Government agencies Pwrclvasing office, MSFC Primary administration by other Government agencies of contracts for MSFC Category and agency Number of con- Amount (thousands) tracts Under $100,000: Atomic Energy Commission Army Air Force Commerce Department Corps of Engineers GSA 3 59 32 7 10 12 $110.5 1, 177.7 1,284.3 468.4 307.0 218.4 Navy 8 232.8 Interior Department $100,000 to $500,000: Army AEC 3 10 1 83. 4 2, 142. 5 145.0 Air Force Navy 10 2 1,771.5 602.0 Interior Department Department of Commerce Corps of Engineers Over $500,000: Air Force Army Navy AEC 1 10 7 5 6 2 1 165.0 1,221. 5 2,341.0 5,652.0 8,651.9 2,046.0. 726.5 Corps of Engineers 13 38, 166. 1 Contracts o/7tice, 1.0. Under $100,000: None. From $100,000 to $500,000: None. Over $500,000: None. (c) Percent of overtime of total time on individual projects or programs ov~er $50 000 Percentage of overtime hours worked to total hours for major M1SFC projects/programs for period July 1, 1965, through Dec. 31, 1966 Project Actual fiscal year 1966 Actual fiscal year 1967 through Dec. 31, 1966 Total hours worked Overtime hours - worked Percent of overtime to total Total hours worked Overtime hours worked Percent of overtime to total Saturn 1 Saturn I-B Saturn V Launch vehicle engineering development.. MSF other All other Grand total 148,233 1,961,581 5,845,307 381,337 60t, 689 518,343 6,728 122,083 436,082 18,447 14,802 14,031 4.5 6.2 7.5 4.8 2.5 2.7 5,694 789,868 1,788,507 148,165 401,622 313,552 349 30,347 139,405 5, 136 10, 520 4,984 9,456,490 612,173 6. 1 3.8 5.0 3.5 2.6 1.6 6. 5 4, 447, 408 190,741 4.3 (d) Average annual salaries for civil service employees (with comparison to previous year) MSFC average annual salaries for civil service employees fiscal years 1967 through fiscal year 1968 PAGENO="1063" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1059 (e) Listing of eaoli~ support contract pertaining to the facility CONTRACT NAS8-1 4017 General support services to the Miohoud Assembly Facility 1. The annual estimated cost and the duration of the current contract: (a) FY67 estimated cost: $10,451,092. (b) Duration of current contract: Mar 1, 1965 thru Dec 31, 1967 with one (1) additIonal one (1) year option. 2. Name and corporate address of contractor: Mason and Rust, Mason Hanger Silas Mason Company, 200 East Main Street, Lexington, Kentucky; Rust Engineering Company, 930 Fort Du- quesne Boulevard, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 3. Number of personnel employed by contractor under support contract: 773. 4. Functions performed by contractor under support contract. (a) Transportation & Michoud Port Operations. (b) Security & Safety Purposes. (o) Fire Protection Services. (d) Photographic Services. (e) Medical Services. (f) Food ServIces. (g) Supply, Messenger & Mail Services. (h) Communication Services. (i) Custodial Services. (j) Plant Maintenance & Repair Services. (k) Engineering Services. (1) Reproduction & Documentation Services. 5. Amount of overtime involved annually: 45,000 hours. 6. Amount of subeontracts placed annually by support contractor: $6,030,540. CONTRACT NA5W-410, M5FC-1 General sapport services to the Mississippi Test Facility 1. The annual estimated cost and the duration of the current contract: (a) FY67 estimated cost: $33,163,600. (b) Duration of current contract: Tune 3, 1963 thru June 30, 1968 includ- ing oritions. 2. Name and corporate address of contractor: General Electric Company, 570 Lexington Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022. 3. Number of personnel employed by contractor under support contract: 1349. 4. Functions performed by contractor under support contract: (a) Transportation Service (Exclusive of Marine). (b) Security. (o) Fire Protection Service. (d) Mail and Messenger Service. (e) Marine Operations. (f) Custodial and Refuse Service. (g) Logistic and Material Service. (h) Plant Maintenance and Land Management Service. (i) Reproduction and Graphic Arts Service. (j) Food Service. (k) Communications Service. (1) Industrial Health Service. (m) Industrial Safety. (n) Technical Library. (o) Test Support Operations. (p) Data Systems Operations. (q) Quality Assurance. (r) Project Management. (a) Engineering Support. (t) Program Visibility. 5. Amount of overtime involved annually: 208,501 hours. 6. Amount of subcon'tracts placed annually by support contractor: (a) Subcontracts $6, 162, 400 (b) Materials and supplies 8, 101,500 (o) Leases 552, 400 Total 14, 816,300 PAGENO="1064" 1060 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION CONTRACT NAS8-1 8403 Support contract for the MSFC Computation Laboratory 1. Annual Estimated Cost: $5,455,104. Duration of Current Contract: July 1,1966 through 30, 1967 with option for 4 one year periods. 2. Name and Address of Contractor: Computer Sciences Corporation, 650 North Sepulvedo Boulevard, El Segundo, California 90245. 3. Number of Personnel Employed by Contractor under Support Contract: 529. 4. Functions Performed: Resources Management, Data Systems Engineering, Digital Projects, Data Reduction, Simulation, Engineering Systems, Industrial Systems, and Special Projects. 5. Amount of Overtime Involved Annually: Estimated 87,280 manhours. 6. Amount of Subcontracts placed annually by Support Contractor: $559,000. CONTRACT NA58-14109 Support contract for the MSFC Technical Services Office 1. Annual Estimated Cost: $5,560,941. Duration of Current Contract: April 1, 1965 through March 31, 1967 with option for one additional year. 2. Name and Address of Contractor: Management Services Inc. of Tennessee, Post Office Box B, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37832. 3. Number of Personnel Employed by Contractor under Support Contract: 421 Prime, 34 Sub. 4. FunctIons Performed: Motor Vehicle Support, Photo Support, Maintenance and Repair of Instrumentation, Chemical, Hydraulic and Ultra-Sonic Purgin, Miscellaneous Crafts Effort, Grounds and Landscape Maintenance, Logistics Support, Operations and Maintenance of Government-Owned Aircraft. 5. Amount of Overtime Involved Annually: Estimated 59,404 manhours. 6. Amount of Subcontracts placed annually by Support Contractor: $1,832,162. CONTRACT NA58-l 4110 Support contract for the MSFU Management Services Office 1. Annual Estimated Cost: $5,089,067. Duration of Current Contract: April 1, 1965 through March 31, 1967 with option for one additional year. 2. Name and Address of Contractor: RCA Service Company, Division of Radio Corporation of America, Cherry Hill, Delaware Township, Camden, New Jersey 08101. 3. Number of Personnel Employed by Contractor under Support Contract: 397 Prime, 368 Sub. 4. Functions Performed: Telecommunications, Reproduction, Graphic Arts, Technical Publications, Technical Documentation, Protective Services, Custodial Services, Maintenance and Repair of Photographic equipment, Safety Engineer- ing, Laundry Services, Refuse collection, Medical Services, Technology Utilization. 5. Amount of Overtime Involved Annually: Estimated 38,600 manhours. 6. Amount of Subeontracts placed annually by Support Contractor: Estiniated $2,522,500. CONTRACT NAS8-1 4108 Support contract for the MSFC Facilities 1, Design Office 1. Annual Estimated Cost: $657,954. Duration of Current Contract.: March 1, 1965 through February 28, 1967 with option for one additional year. 2. Name and Address of Contractor: Rust Engineering Company, P.O. Box 101, 1130 South 22nd Street, Birmingham, Alabama 35202. 3. Number of Personnel Employed by Contractor under Support Contract: 49. 4. Functions Performed: Engineering Design, Master Planning and Construc- tion Inspection of Facilities. 5. Amount of Overtime Involved Annually: Estimated 4,540 manhours. 6. Amount of Subcontracts placed annually by Support Contractor: $36,512. CONTRACT NA58-20083 Support contract for the MSFC Manufacturing Engineering Laboratory 1. Annual Estimated Cost: $6,324,303. Duration of Current Contract: March 9, 1965 through March 15, 1967. PAGENO="1065" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1061 2. Name and Address of Contractor: Hayes International Corporation, P.O. Box 1568, Huntsville, Alabama 35801. 3. Number of Personnel Employed by Contractor under Support Contract: 314. 4. Functions Performed: Engineering services such as tool modification and maintenance, process engineering, reliability assessment, tool design, documen- tation processing, plant processing, manufacturing development, and research and fabrication of components and tooling. 5. Amount of Overtime Involved Annually: 38,607 manhours. 6. Amount of Subcontracts placed annually by Support Contractor: $324,432.61. CONTRACT NAS8-20070 Support contract for the 1I[SFU Test Laboratory 1. Annual Estimated Cost: $6,783,337. Duration of Current Contract: March 15, 1967 plus 3 additional 1 year options. 2. Name and Address of Contractor: Vitro Services, Division of Vitro Corpo- ration of America, Patton Building, Fort Walton Beach, Florida 32548. 3. Number of Personnel Employed by Contractor under Support Contract: 617. 4. Functions Performed: Engineering services in support of the Test Labora- tory such as operation and maintenance of test equipment, evaluation of data, analysis of tests and fabrication in support of test equipment. 5. Amount of Overtime Involved Annually: 110,689 manhours. 6. Amount of Subcontracts placed annually by Support Contractor: $3,813,696. CONTRACT NAS8-20073 Support contract for the MSFC Propulsion and Vehicle Engineering Laboratory 1. Annual Estimated Cost: $14,801,679. Duration of Current Contract: April 1, 1965 through March 31, 1967, with 3 additional 1 year options April 1, 1967 through March 31, 1970. 2. Name and Address of Contractor: Brown Engineering Company, Incorpo- rated, 300 Sparkman Drive, Huntsville, Alabama 35805. 3. Number of Personnel Employed by Contractor under Support Contract: 956. 4. Functions Performed: Engineering, operation and fabrication services in support of P&VE Laboratory to include design studies; systems engineering; propulsion, mechanical, material, and structural research and development; pro- gram coordination; engineering and documentation; fabrication; and systems, subsystem and component testing. 5. Amount of Overtime Involved Annually: Estimated 72,000 manhours. 6. Amount of Subeontracts placed annually by Support Contractor: $228,000. CONTRACT NA55-20055 Support contract for the JISFU Astrionies Laboratory 1. Annual Estimated Cost: $12,000,000. Duration of Current Contract: Ex- pires February 28,1967 plus 3 additional 1 year options. 2. Name and Address of Contractor: Sperry Rand Corporation, 1290 Avenue of the Americas, New York, New York 10019. 3. Number of Personnel Employed by Contractor under Support Contract: 820. 4. Functions Performed: Engineering services in support of the Astrionics Laboratory including design, qualification documentation, fabrication, evaluation and testing of electronic components and systems. 5. Amount of Overtime Involved Annually: Estimated 80,000 manhours. 6. Amount of Subcontracts placed annually by Support Contractor': $1,000,000. CONTRACT NA58-20166 Support contract for the MSFC Research Projects Laboratory 1. Annual Estimated Cost: $963,872. Duration of Current Contract: May 3, 1965 through May 2, 1967 with 3 additional 1 year options -May 3, 1967 through May 2, 1970. 2. Name and Address of Contractor: Brown Engineering Company, Ineorpo~ rated, 300 Sparkman Drive, Huntsville, Alabama 35805. PAGENO="1066" 1062 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 3. Number of Personnel Employed by Contractor under Support Contract: 53. 4. Functions Performed: Experimental research activities and documentation and engineering and scientific services in support of the Research Projects Laboratory. 5. Amount of Overtime Involved Annually: Estimated 1,433 manhours. 6. Amount of Subcontracts placed annually by Support Contractor: None. CONTRACT NA58-2008 I Support contract for the MSFU Quality Laboratory 1. Annual Estimated Cost: $6,284,901. Duration of Current Contract: Ex- piration date-March 31, 1967 plus 3 additional 1 year options. 2. Name and Address of Contractor: Space, Incorporated, 3022 University Drive, Huntsville, Alabama 35805. 3. Number of Personnel Employed by Contractor under Support Contract: 415. 4. Functions Performed: ~nduct quality and reliability training, mainte- nance, calibration and testing of instruments, compilation of data, documenta- tion, quality analysis and fabrication of special tooling and te~t equipment. 5. Amount of Overtime Involved Annually: 80,684 manhours. 6. Amount of subcontracts placed annually by Support Contractor: $2,308,994. CONTRACT NA58-200s2 Support contract for the MSFC Aero-Astrodynamics Laboratory 1 Annual Estimated Cost $4074490 Duration of C~irrent Contract Through March 15, 1907 plus 3 additional one year options. 2. Name and Address of Contractor: Northrop Norair, Northrop Corporation, 3901 West Broadway, Hawthorne, California 90250. 3. Number of Personnel Employed by Contractor under Support Contract: 251. 4. Functions Performed: Engineering services for the Aero-Astrodynamics Laboratory including conducting R&D studies in aero-dynamics, astrophysics. flight evaluation, dynamics, maintenance and operation of aerodynamics facilities. 5. Amount of Overtime Involved Annually: 19,111 manhours. 6. Amount of subcontract's placed annually by Support Contractor: $1,537,000. CONTRACT NA58-20412 Support contract for the JIISFU Reliability Laboratory 1 &nnual Estimated Cost $1 788 000 Duration of Current Contract Through July 10,1907 plus 2 additional 1 year options. 2. Name and address of Contractor: Federal Electric Corporation, Industrial Park, `Paramus, New Jersey 07652. 3. Number of Personnel Employed by `Contractor under Support Contract: 102. 4. Function Performed: Engineering services in `support of the MSFC Relia- bility Program to review, evaluate and recommend corrective changes in the overall program and to develop reliability management techniques. 5. Amount of Overtime Involved Annually: 10,132 manhours. 6. Amount of `subcontracts placed annually by Support `Contractor: $500,000. PAGENO="1067" APPENDIX G HEARINGS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, CAPE KENNEDY, FLORIDA. FEBRUARY 24, 1967. OPENING REMARKS BY CONGRESSMAN OLIN E. TEAGUE AND DR. KURT H. DEBUS INTRODUCTION BY ChAIRMAN TEAGUE I understand I am to make an opening statement. We are glad to be here, and we have with us Mr. Waggonner, Mr. Cabell, Mr. Guriiey, and Mr. Winn, a new member. We have been out to North American, Douglas, down to Mississippi, and up to Huntsville. I think that's all I have, Kurt. Dr. DEBUS. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is my great pleasure to welcome you to the Kennedy Space Center and to the hearing. I would like, briefly, to go through the proposed schedule with you. We have presentations to be given here in `this room. First, I will make some general remarks. The Director of Launch Operations, Mr. Petrone, will talk about the role of launch operations at KSC. Mr. Siepert, my deputy, will talk about management aspects of our work. The Manager of the Apollo Program Office, Mr. Shinkle, will talk about the Apollo program at KSC. The Acting Director of the Apollo Applications program, Mr. Hock, will talk about the Apollo Applications program at KSC. Mr. Miller, who joined us a half year ago, will talk about insti- tutional support. He is the Director of our Resources Management Office. Then, Mr. Siepert will `talk about a point that might be of interest to you, which is the status of the Visitor Information Center. Later `on we will have lunch in this room and then start a guided tour of the facilities. We will go by some of the satellites that are presently being prepared for launch. Mr. Neilon, Bob Gray's deputy, will talk about them. Then we will go to Launch Complex where presently the Apollo- Saturn 206 is in preparation for launch. It will carry a lunar module. Then we end the tour, possibly at Launch Complex 39. At both Launch Complexes 37 and 39, there will be briefings by Mr. Petrone. Tomorrow morning we will visit some of our contractors. As you 1063 PAGENO="1068" 1064 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION may recall, we have two `types of contractors working here at Kennedy: "Mission" contractors; that is stage contractors, who prepare (for launch) the Saturn stages and spacecraft, and the support contrac- tors who help us operate the facilities here and `bring in the necessary support for launching. That gives you a full schedule; if you desire this can `be changed, Mr. Chairman. I would like to submit for the record a statement, a. copy of which is in front of you. Also, Mr. Chairman, we have answers `to the ques- tions that you directed to the institution. We are ready and willing to answer any questions you may have as to these two statements. I would like to address myself to a broad overview of KSC. May I have the first Vu-graph, please? (See fig. A-i.) This is a listing of our responsibilities. You have visited the Marshall Space Flight Center and its ancillary institutions at Michoud and Mississippi Test Facility and you plan to visit the Houston f a.- cility, the Manned Spacecraft Center. The Marshall Space Flight Center, of course, is charged with the development of the launch vehicles. The Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston has as its responsibility the development of Apollo space- craft and also, of course, for the control of flight missions. They were also responsible for the development of the Mercury and Gemini space- craft. The KSC, (Kennedy Space Center), responsibility is an operational one. Also it has a development responsibility. As far as the total overall Manned Space Flight `mission goes, we are to prepare here, check out, aiid launch, the assigned NASA space vehicles. This is in response to the manned space program requirements as well as those relating to unmanned space flight or the scientific effort which is car- ried out on a series or family of vehicles that we will talk about a little later. PRINCIPAL KSC RESPONSIBILITIES L PREPARE, CHECKOUT, AND LAUNCH ASSIGNED NASA SPACE VEHICLES. 2. ASSURE FLIGHT HARDWARE CONFIGURATION CONTROL BY DEVELOPMENT CENTERS. 3. DEVELOP NEW LAUNCHING CONCEPTS AND PROVIDE LAUNCH REQUIREMENTS AFFECTING LAUNCH VEHICLE AND S C DESIGN. 4. DESIGN, INSTALL, AND OPERATE LAUNCH FACILITIES, INCLUDING GSE. 5. FURNISH ON.SITE TECHNICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT FOR ALL NASA PROGRAMS. 6. PROVIDE NASA A SINGLE CHANNEL FOR OBTAIN!NG LAUNCH SUPPORT FROM THE EASTERN TEST RANGE 7 ASSURE GROUND SAFETY COMPLIANCE FOR ALL NASA MISSIONS FIGURE 1 PAGENO="1069" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1065 *We are to assure that the flight configuration is managed under the overall control of the development centers. It is, of course, unthink- able that we would make modification not in the sense or intent of the developers. Our part of this job here is to make absolutely sure any changes that are needed are under the overall configuration control of the responsible Manned Space Flight installation; also that the in- tent of the developer, as far as launch vehicles go, and as far as space- craft go, are fully preserved. Any changes, therefore, that are needed are done with the concurrence of the development center. We are, of course, specialists here in launch concepts. Therefore, we are continuously overseeing the concepts that are being applied in the launch preparation, and we provide launch preparation require- ments as a feedback into the vehicle. In other words, at a very early point of a design of a launch vehicle or a spacecraft, the way in which it will have to be operated here, and the means which are available to operate and prepare it must be built into the vehicle that is to be flown. Therefore, early inputs into the design of the flight hardware are de- fined by the concept which will prevail for the checkout, assembly, and launch preparations. The development job we have here is to design, install, and operate launch facilities, including that type of launch support equipment which is not an integral part of the flight hardware and not developed at the development centers. We furnish on-site technical and administrative support for all NASA programs and we provide NASA a single channel for obtain- ing launch support from the Eastern Test Range. Here we are a close neighbor and also a tenant as an agency that uses the Eastern Test Range. The Eastern Test Range (formerly the Atlantic Missile Range, and before that the Joint Proving Ground) as a national range facility provides data acquisition, telemetry, tracking, and similar instrumen- tation services, as well as support in ground safety, propellants, some logistics, et cetera. `We operate as tenants in the Cape Kennedy area and also provide a single entry channel for obtaining any support for NASA's requirements from Easterii Test Range. Now, as to the geography, a few words. Next slide, please. (See Figure A-2.) You see outlined here in red, or orange, the old Cape Canaveral or Cape Kennedy area. This is, if I remember right, something like 15,000 square acres. The early guided missile j~rograms at the cape were started with facilities to the southeast in this area, and there you will find launch pads for the Redstone, for the Thor, for the Pershing, and for the Polaris missiles in this area. General firing direction is 105 to 110 degrees down this area into the Atlantic. Some of these islands carry all kinds of instrumentations. As the size of these ballistic missiles grew, the intercontinental bal- listic missile pads went up on this north shore. Here you find four pads for the Atlas and four pads for the Titan. So this is the overall geography. Let me point out, it has some considerable growth potential for future launch configurations that might be decided upon. PAGENO="1070" 1066 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE A-2.-Kennedy Space Center location map. Now, to give you a description of some of the types of vehicles that are accommodated by Kennedy Space Center: Next slide, please. (Fig. A-3.) This is Mercury/Redstone-utilizing the old Redstone Army vehicle with some elongated tanks-carried the first astronauts, Shepard and Grissom. This specific location we are trying to preserve as a future historical site to show the hardware that was used at the time. We are looking for ways and means to restore it to the exact configuration that it had for Alan `Shepard's flight. PAGENO="1071" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1067 FIGURE A-3.-Mercury/~edstone No. 3 carrying Alan B. Sheparci, Jr., on first suborbital flight The Atlas/Mercury-next slide, please (fig. 4-A)-this is the cOn- figuration as it was flown here. It's well known to you. It made use of the ballistic missile Atlas sites, and with some conversion of the facility accommodated the Mercury flights. Later there was a pad complex built for the NASA Centaur, which is now operational. Also in this area were built the first Saturn sites, pads 34 and 37. A detailed study was made of eight potential sites, starting with Hawaii, the Pacific west coast, Texas, New Mexico, Georgia, and also PAGENO="1072" 1068 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE A-4.-Launch of Mercury/Atlas carrying Gordon Cooper from launch complex 14 south to the Caribbean to determine where the Apollo/Saturn V or, at. that time, NOVA, or ally future larger ]auuch vehicles would have to be accommodated. After congressioiia.l approval and fund allocation, the green areas, plus the dark green area here, were purchased and acquisition is now almost complete. It turned out to be a parcel of 88,000 acres. This allows a potential expansion from what is now Saturn V into this northern area., so that. for some time to come launches ca.n be accommo- dated from this total area. PAGENO="1073" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1069 We are presently here in the industrial area, which has all been built up since the decision was made to proceed with the launch complex 39, which we will see when you visit it this afternoon. The Air Force built its Titan III complex in this fashion here; partially on reclaimed land, partially on the old Cape Kennedy area, and partially on the newly acquired land. Then the Gemini/Titan-next slide, please (fig. A-5)-of course, used the Air Force Titan vehicle-and launch sites that were developed for the Titan. Again, with some small configuration changes, these sites were used. FIGURE A-5.-Gernini GT-3 launch vehicle lifts from launch complex 19 with Astronauts Virgil Grissom and rohn Young ahoard for three-orbit flight. 76-265 O-67~--pt. 2-6S PAGENO="1074" 1070 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION After completion of our Gemini program and Mercury program, these sites were not identified for further use. One of the other Atlas sites still carries the Atlas/Agena. I believe it is planned to even- tually eliminate the Atlas/Agena from unmanned flight vehicles and move all unmanned vehicles of this type to the Atlas/Centaur. Next slide, please. (Fig. A-6.) The Saturn I-B-this is Apollo/Suthurn I-B-201---has been accom- modated from pads 34 and 37. Both pads have now been converted FIGURE A-6.-Apollo/Saturn 201, first of the Si-B series, liftoff at launch corn- p1e~ 34. PAGENO="1075" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1071 to the advanced Saturn I-B and are presently configured to accom- modate the lunar module and command/service modules. The pro- gram office is presently investigating if both pads could be configured to be able to accommodate both types of Saturn I-B payloads. The Saturn V (fig. A-7)-this is Saturn 500-F, a nonflight con- figuration as it was pulled out and deposited on pad A some time ago. Presently being `assemibled and checked out in the VAB is the first flight configuration, A:S-501--this you will see this afternoon. Now, the Thor/Delta (fig. A-8), using one of the old Thor in- stallations, is still very active and is slated to remain active. The Thor vehicle, some augmented with solids, so-called thrust augmented Delta, have carried and `will carry. such satellites as the Orbiting Geo- physical Observatory (OGO), Biosatellite (BIOS), and communica- tions satellites. `The Thor/Agena (fig. A-9) has carried the Ninibus weather satellite and other payloads. This is the basic Thor vehicle again with an Agena upper stage. Then the Atlas/Agena (fig. A-b), which uses the Atlas booster, and an Agena upper stage being launched here for the Lunar Orbiter; it also carries AT'S and Mariner payloads. The next slide, please (`fig. A-li), Centaur which has carried Surveyor and will carry GAO and Mariner in 1969. FIGURE A-7.-Saturn 500-F configuration served as a facilities checkout vehicle. PAGENO="1076" 1072 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION These are the type vehicles that are being launched; the total or- ganization here, of course, is in support of this main activity of ours, launching of unmanned and manned flight configurations. The next slide shows the evolution of Kennedy Space Center (fig. A-42). It was originated as a missile firing laboratory in January 1953. As such it was a field activity of the. Army Redstone Arsenal, 700 miles away. After the recognition, in July 1960, that one could not continue to support launch operations at such a remote site by moving people back FIGURE A-8.-Launch of thrust augmented Delta from launch complex 17A. PAGENO="1077" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1073 and forth continuously, the organization became a launch operationc directorate under Dr. von Braun. It became a NASA institution called Launch Operations Center on July 1, 1962, and renamed after the assassination of President Kennedy, as the John F. Kennedy Space Center, NASA, on December 20, 1963. Next slide, please (fig. A-13). This shows our current work force as compared to last fiscal year and to what we estimate to be the fiscal year 1968 numbers. We have a combined contractor work force, com- bined in the sense of mission and support contractors of 18,700 by the FIGURE A-9.-PAGEOS I launched by Phor/Agena-D rocket to map the Earth. PAGENO="1078" 1074 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION end of this fiscal year. We estimate this number will be slightly de- creased by the end of fiscal 1968. Over the past year it has gone from 15,000 to 18,400 the end-of-the-year figure. Only one major contractor, Grumman, is still on the buildup. Please note the numbers of civil service compared to our contractor work force. We will have more to say later about the philosophy underlying this ratio of contractor personnel versus civil service. The civil service are the prime contractors; you might say, are the managers of this total effort. Our present strength is over 2,600 and we are FIGURE A-1O.----Range 9 launched by Atlas/Agena from launch complex 12. PAGENO="1079" FIGURE A-11.-Atlas/Centaur 6 lift-off from launch complex 36B. authorized up to 2,720. We are proposin.g to keep that figure fiat through the end of fiscal year 1968. The composition of this number and the relationship between our civil service and contractors are of prime significance in the sense that the Government makes maximum use of the contractors' industrial and operational capabilities but re- tains full responsibility for the overall management of the total work effort at KSC. This, I believe, is proving to be very successful, and we will have more to say about it during the hearing. 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1075 PAGENO="1080" 1076 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION As to the funding-if I may have the next slide, please (fig. A-14). This will later be shown in more detail. We have listed here R. & P., C of F, and AO as the three sources of our funds. We want to point out that the R. & P. funds that will be shown as line items for the Ken- nedy Space Center are not the only R. & P. funds expended here. It i.s important to show the relationship of the administrative operations funds to the total R. & P. expenditure. This comes into the proper perspective only if one considers the total manpower funded by B. & P. here. EVOLUTION MISSILE FIRING LABORATORY JANUARY, 1953 - JUNE 30, 1960 LAUNCH OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE JULY 1, 1960 - JUNE 30, 1962 LAUNCH OPERATIONS CENTER JULY 1, 1962 - DECEMBER 20, 1963 JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, NASA DECEMBER 20, 1963 Fxauiu~ A-12 WORKFORCE Actual Estimate Estimate End FY 66 End PY 67 End FY 68 Contractor Personnel 15,450 18,700 18,400 Actual Authorized Proposed End FY 66 End FY 67 End FY 68 Civil Service Personnel 2,589 2,720 2,720 FIGURE A-13 The total R. & P. money expended at KSC is a composite made up of Kennedy Space Center funds and moneys from other centers. It con- tains a share-and you can see, a considerable share-of $69 million proposed for fiscal year 1968, of Marshall Space Flight Center funds to support work conducted at the Kennedy Space Center under the control of the Marshall Space Flight Center and covered in KSC con- tract supplements to the base prime stage contracts~. This amounts, then, this year to $61 or $62 million, and almost $70 million by next year. A further input comes from Manned Spacecraft Center. This is shown estimated because we do not have accurate data. It is estimated on the basis of a projected manpower figure of those personnel under contract to the Manned Spacecraft Center but working here for North PAGENO="1081" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1077 American on the command and service module, and for Grumman on the lunar module. These then are the estimated moneys spent at this Center but budg- eted by the other Manned Space Flight `Centers. Furthermore, there are funds from the Office of Space Science and Applications for un- manned operations in a total amount of $43 million for next year, $44 million for this year. Again, broken down, as from John F. Kennedy Space Center and other centers, these are moneys that are expended here in support of other than the Manned Space Flight program. Also, there is an amount for the Office of Advanced Research and Technology. The total numbers we are talking about are $391 million for the proposed year as compared to $232 million that will appear as the KSC B. & D. line item. It is in support of this R. & D. effort that our "Administrative Operations" budget should be considered. Construction of facilities will be some $24, $25 million for next year, compared to $35 million for this year. This concludes my introduction. I now call on Mr. Petrone. JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER ACTUAL AUTHORIZED PROPOSED FY 1966 .FY 1967 FY 1968 ~RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 2.14736 ~ 391171 OFFICE OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHT ~j~Q7 347,739 JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 128, 859 224, 050 232, 200 GEORGE C. MARSHALL SPACE FLT CTR 6,261 61, 982 69, 659 MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 34,138 (EST) 51, 278 (EST) 45, 880 (EST) OFFICE OF SPACE SCIENCE & APPLICATIONS ~ JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 4,647 3,987 3,332 OTHER CENTERS 40,616 (EST) 40. 015 (EST) 40,000 (EST) OFFICE OF ADVANCED RESEARCH & TECHNOLOGY 215 -0- 100 JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 193 -0- 100 OTHER CENTERS 22 -5- CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIE~ OFFICE OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHT 6,030 34, 021 22, 595 OFFICE OF SPACE SCIENCE & APPLICATIONS 887 1,737 2,290 ~~IIN1STRATIVE OPERAT~~ ~22 99,575 FIGURE A-14 PAGENO="1082" BRIEFING BY NASA'S JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CEN- TER FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAU TICS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 24, 1967, PRESENTATION TO THE CONGRESSIONAL HEARING Mr. PETRONE. Thank you, Dr. Debus. Mr Chairman, gentlemen, in a few minute,s I am going to attempt to describe our role in launch operations We are later going to see the breakdown in terms of what it costs to do the job. I am going to use the Saturn V Apollo, 500 series, since this is typical of our large operations in the future. I am going to use our Saturn V operations to show how we check out the hardware, how we interface with the development centers, and how we actually launch the vehicle Now, in terms of launch operations, we carry on activities at 17 of the unmanned facilities that Dr. Debus just spoke about. We also carry on Centaur operations at pad 36. We have just concluded oper- ations at pad 19, which was, of course, Gemini. We have been and are now performing. Apollo Saturn I launch operations at launch complexes 34 and 37. However, I am going to spend this time dis- cussing Saturn V operations at complex 39 and at our spacecraft check- out facilities in the industrial area Figure B-i is an artist's concept of complex 39. Shown is the VA~B (vehicle assembly building), the Launch Control Center, and the pad we will be visiting this afternoon. You m:ight say a major part of our job is to plan far in advance. As many of you know, this all started some 5 years ago, in the summer of 1961. We must take flight hardware from the time it arrives, inspect it, assemble it completely by stage-first stage, second stage, third stage, and instrument unit-as it arrives from the manufactur ing sites around the country, and marry it to the ground support equipment, a most important function. We then have to get the vehicle from the vehicle assembly building to the launch pad, and then ready it for launch some weeks later. Now, how do we go about concluding that cycle? The artist makes it appear very simple. With a stroke of the brush he shows it taking off. Now let me give you some insight on how we go about it. Figure B-2 is an operation plan flow. Starting with program sched- ules and mission definitions out of NASA Headquarters, we at KSC have to develop master schedules. We also have to consider other Center requirements such as those from M.SC and MSFC. These criteria control such things as the amount of fuel needed, tolerances, and the type of testing. KSC converts these criteria to test pro- cedures. Every step we take is documented. The other centers are 1078 PAGENO="1083" 1079 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE B-1.-Artist's concept of vehicle assembly building, and area, complex 39. Fiouaz B-2 PAGENO="1084" 1080 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION furnished these procedures for review, procedures which we have developed from their basic criteria. We also must generate require- ments documents to forecast the support we need both from the Air Force and our own resources, allowing time to plan many months in advance. In turn, support documents are produced which detail how our requirements will be fulfilled. We then make detailed daily schedules. You will see, when we visit complex 39, our operations control room where these schedules are prepared. Let me point out what this means in terms of laying out our job; that is, of taking all these large tasks and breaking them into meaningful areas of work so that many thousands of people, not only here but in the development centers or at the factories across the country, can support this operation. We are now ready to begin the checkout itself. In the case of Saturn V we are speaking of a period of time in the vehicle assembly building of approximately 10 to 12 weeks in a normal flow. AS-501 has not been normal in this respect, being the first Saturn V flight vehicle. Specifically, our second stage arrived later than it will on future schedules. What is the mission of AS-501? What do we want it to do? Our mission rules provide these answers in the form of pre-thought-out actions mandatory for a successful mission. For example, if the flight is to determine certain strength characteristics or heat char- acteristics, obviously those measurements, that data, are mandatory for that mission. In turn, there is the question of launch conditions. For example, with what winds can we launch? What is tolerable in terms of a ceiling? This all goes into the mission rules. With our test procedures, our mission rules, and our support docu- ments, we are ready to commence checkout. Figures B-3 and B-4 illustrate some major tests which are per- formed on the flight hardware prior to space vehicle electrical mate. The first step in launch vehicle checkout is receiving inspection. Next, certain checks are performed in the low bay of the vehicle assembly building. Following these checks, we then erect and mechanically mate each stage in the high bay. This is the first time these stages see each other. We go through compatibility checks in which we check the compatibility of the smallest modules by attempting to make sys- tems checks. We do not want to go into the component level. They have been checked out at the factory, either at the Michoud plant, or Huntington Beach plant, or Béthpage, in the case of the Lunar Module. Now, our job is to put these systems together. Therefore, our testing is aimed at verifying the total electrical mate of the space vehicle. These are systems tests, a series of tests that allow the checkout of the launch vehicle. We use the same checkout philosophy with the space- craft, with one difference-the flight crew. So our tests leading up to the altitude chamber tests are much the same as those for the launch vehicle. The first tests involving the crew are performed in the alti- tude chamber, where we take the spacecraft being tested to an altitude of over 200,000 feet. These tests are laid out jointly between our test people and the astronauts themselves. Normally, these tests run from 12 to 16 hours at altitude. PAGENO="1085" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1081 LAUNCH VEHICLE CHECKOUT PRIOR TO S PACE VEH I CLE ELECTR I CAL MATE 1. RECEIVING INSPECTION ALL STAGES 2. LOW BAY CHECKOUT, S-Il AND S- IVB 3. ERECTION, MECHANICAL MATE ALL STAGES - S-iC, S-Il, S-IVB, IU 4. COMPATIBILITY CHECKS WITH GROUND SUPPORT EQU I PMENT 5. I ND IV I DUAL STAGE CHECKOUT - MECHAN I CAL, ELECTR ICAL SYSTEMS 6. LAUNCH VEHICLE ELECTRICAL MATE 7. SW ITCH SELECTOR FUNCTIONAL TEST 8. GUI DANCE & CONTROL SYSTEM CALl BRATION & FUNCTIONAL TESTS 9. PROPELLANT DISPERSION TEST 10. GUI DANCE COMMAND CHECKS 11. POWER TRANSFER & FLIGHT SEQUENCE TEST 12. SEQUENCEMALFUNCTIONTEST 13. PLUGS-IN TEST 14. INTEGRATED SWING ARM TEST FIGURE B-S When the altitude tests are finished, certain hardware items are installed to complete assembly of the spacecraft. It is then moved to the vehicle assembly building and made, ready for integrated testing with the launch vehicle. Please notice that I use the words "spacecraft" and "launch vehicle" until the spacecraft and launch vehicle are mated. Then I use the term "space vehicle." PAGENO="1086" 1082 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION SPACECRAFT CHECKOUT PR IOR TO S PACE VEHICLE ELECTR I CAL MATE 1. RECEIVING INSPECTION 2. MATE COMMAND MODULE/SERVICE MODULE 3 SPACECRAFT SYSTEMS TESTS 4. ALTITUDE CHAMBER TESTS 5. INSTALLATION FLIGHT NOZZLE, ORDNANCE 6 MOVETOVAB 7. ERECTION 8. COMPATIBILITY TESTS WITH GROUND SUPPORT EQU I PMENT 9. INTEGRATED TESTS WITH LAUNCH VEH I CLE S I MULATOR FIGURE B-4 Figure B-5 lists major tests performed during space vehicle check- out. Here the spacecraft has been moved from the industrial area to the vehicle assembly building and has been erected. Now all our test- ing is a composite, first stage, up to spacecraft, for total testing. And again we are making systems tests. For example, for No. 3, the "plugs-in test" we run through the entire countdown and go into what we call "plus time." We do this by simulation. The vehicle remains on the launcher, but we continue to T-zero, then go through a "plus time" powered flight phase, a simulation of the entire mission. This is all done electronically with- out ever, of course, having fuels aboard. The flight crew would be on board for that particular run. The "plugs-out test," No. 4, is sim- i]ar, but involves disconnecting the swing arms for a complete elec- trical disconnect test After successful plugs in and plugs out tests, certain tests concerning ground support equipment are made, and the space vehicle is prepared for a "simulated flight test." This is the last test to be accomplished within the building, and demonstrates that the flight hardware is ready to be moved to the launch pad. Upon successful conclusion of simulated flight, the space vehicle is moved to the pad. At the pad, we run through a further series of tests. Initially, the time spent at the pad prior to launch will be about 6 weeks. After an initial learning curve, we expect to reduce this time to less than a month. The one thing that we do at the pad that cannot be done elsewhere is the countdown demonstration test, where we fuel the vehicle and run through a total test This is in truth a dress rehearsal Our count down demonstration test is run before the flight readiness test during AS-501 to check out the fuel system as early as possible. During sub- sequent missions, we will run our countdown test after the flight readi- ness test and then reconfigure and go into the final countdown. PAGENO="1087" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1083 SPACE VEHIcLE CHECKOUT VAB 1. S PACE VEH I CLE ELECTR I CAL MATE AND EDS TEST 2. INTERFACE COMMAND TEST WITH HOUSTON FLIGHT CONTROL 3. PLUGS-IN TEST 4. PLUGS-OUT TEST 5. SW I NG ARM OVERALL TEST 6. S I MULATED FL I GHT 7. MOVE TO PAD PAD 1. COMPATI B I LITY TESTS WITH GROUND SUPPORT SYSTEM 2. LAUNCH VEHICLE LOADING S IMULATIONS 3. SPACECRAFT SYSTEMS TEST 4. CUT-OFF AND MALFUNCTION TEST 5. COUNTDOWN DEMONSTRATION TEST 6. FLIGHT READINESS TEST 7. RECONFIGURE, PREP FOR COUNTDOWN 8. COUNTDOWN FIauiu~ B-5 Figure B-6 shows our "task force" for carrying out launch opera- tions during the final countdown~ You will not see this on our organi- zation chart, because these elements are drawn from the total NASA organization and not only from our Center. We have a Mission Director who is assigned out of NASA Head- quarters and who will operate part-time here before the actual launch, when he will be in Houston. The Launch Director at KSC will work through the Launch Operations Manager and the Space Vehicle Test Supervisor. The Space Vehicle Test Supervisor coordinates the activities of the Launch Vehicle Test Conductor and the Spacecraft Test Conductor PAGENO="1088" 1084 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION as well as the necessary support elements such as the Eastern Test Range and our own technical support personnel which the Center furnishes. Now we tie in spacecraft activities with the Aeromed and the Astro- Communicator in our Launch Control Center. The test conductors will carry out commands from the test super- visor and carry them out through a contractor structure. They inter- face, for example, with the Boeing test team. In addition, the test conductor will have a systems engineer for each major system support- ing him for the `test. This is where the Government team and the con- tractor counterparts work together for the conduct of the operation on a task force basis. The real time command will flow through this line to the launch vehicle or spacecraft. Although there is an agreed- to countdown, a contingency line is also available if the countdown does not proceed as planned and rehearsed. There is a Launch Vehicle Operations Staff as well as a Spacecraft Staff. These staffs consist of the senior people; for example, Dr. Gruene, Director, Launch Vehicle Operations, or John Williams, Director, Spacecraft Operations. They have a contingency line direct to their test conductor if they have to resolve a specific technical problem. In addition, they will have with them representatives from MSFC for the launch vehicle and repre- sentatives from MSC for the spacecraft. One of the contingencies may be a question concerning a necessary waiver. For example, if a measurement listed as "highly desirable" in the mission rules fails, or if a tolerance approaches a red line-not necessarily passes it-there I DOD MGRFOR POST I I.-.~ MANNED S/F ~ I MISS~N DIRECTOR I . _J FLIGHT DIRECTOR LAUNCH DIRECTOR I - PRE UFT~FF_ ~. - FLIGHT CREW - MEDICAL DIRECTOR FIGURE B-6 PAGENO="1089" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1085 has to be consultation with the appropriate development center in order for us to get a waiver to proceed. Shown also in figure B-6 is the task force consisting of the Flight Director, the Medical Director, and the Flight Crew Director. 1)e- cisions needed involving status of the crew or the world net would flow from the Flight Director sitting in the. Mission Control Center at MSC. This then gives an overlay of how a task force made up of Government and contractor people carries out the execution of this very large endeavor where real time communications are most important. Next, we will look at som.e of the facilities used to launch our Saturn V vehicles. Figure B-7 is a cutaway of the Vehicle Assembly Building, while figure B-8 is a cross section showing the erection of stages. Yesterday we erected the S-li stage. This afternoon we should have completed erection of the third stage. Next week we will put up the spacecraft. This is all leading to the final flight configur- ation for the AS-501 launch this summer. Figure B-9 shows the bay where we are now working. Bay No. 1 is fully equipped and ready. Bay No. 2 will be ready shortly. We plan to, erect AS-502, the second Saturn V flight vehicle, in late March or early April. Bay No. 3 is presently on contract. Figures B-b and B-il illustrate 6 major steps in our launch opera- tions flow at the Vehicle Assembly Building. 1 shows a stage FIGURE 11-7.-Artist's concept of 1, ~ Assembly Building (cutaway). 76-2G5 O-67--~pt. 2~-69 PAGENO="1090" 1086 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION VEI....Tlc.A.L ASSIEMBLY BUILDING FIGURE B-8 FIGuRI~ B-9 PAGENO="1091" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1087 arriving and going into the center aisle. Step 2 shows a stage arriv- ing and going into the center aisle to be erected onto the launcher by a large crane. Our third stage (step 3), our instrument unit, and spacecraft can be flown in. The first and second stages must come by water. Step 4 shows operations on the second stage taking place here in the low bay before erection. Step 5 shows erection ol the spacecraft itself, while step 6 illustrates the checked-out vehicle being transferred to the pad. Figure B-12 shows the S-IC stage from below. This is the stage made by Boeing. The F-i engines are visible in the photograph. Figure B-13 shows the stage after erection sitting on four hold- down arms. The five engines are 10 feet below the deck of the launcher and the stage is being made ready for further cabling that has to be connected before proceeding with stage checkout. Much of our time has to be taken up with physical assembly. The S-TI has to be mated to its inner-stage units (fig. B-i4) and then be bolted together on a table before erection. Normally, our work on the S-IT stage would be about 7 to 10 days. In this specific case, we had some modifications to do prior to erection; however, the work was completed and the stage erected yesterday. FIGURE B-1O PAGENO="1092" 1088 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE B-li Figure B-15 shows the third stage (S-IVB) in the center aisle of the low bay. We have moved it out of the checkout cell, and are preparing it for erection. In figure B-16, the S-IVB has been erected on the S-IT, and the instrument unit is being lowered into place. At this point in time, the launch vehicle is ready to begin checkout. We now have the three stages and the instrument unit erected on the launcher. Concurrent with launch vehicle erection, spacecraft operations are proceeding in our operations and checkout building as described earlier. Systems tests are performed in the altitude chamber with the astro- nauts. There are usually two runs, with the prime crew and the backup crew running the spacecraft through its paces. Figure B-111 shows the combined command and service module in front of an altitude chamber. You will note that the engine thrust nozzle is in place although we cannot handle it in the chamber because of the chamber size. When nozzle installation is completed, the com- mand and service module is then mated to the spacecraft LM adapter (fig. B-18). PAGENO="1093" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1089 FIGURE B-12.-Erection of Saturn 10-501 in the Vehicle Assembly Building. PAGENO="1094" FIGURE B-13.-Stage S-IC sitting on hoiddown Arms. Figure B-19 shows the hinar module being assembled within a part of the spacecraft LM adapter. Now, although this will fly on AS-501, it is not a complete lunar module. It is called an LM test article. AS-501 and AS-502 will have test articles wherein we will be able to measure dynamic data. There will be no fuel aboard and nO life support system on the LM t.est article. Figure B-20 shows the. complete spacecraft being erected in the high bay. Figure B-~1 is the launch control center for the launch vehicle. The contractors are each working at certain rows of equipment. The row of racks in the foreground is for the command and management elements of both spacecraft and launch vehicle. rUle detailed checkout. of tile spacecraft that started when it arrived in tile operations and checkout building is carried out with a system we call the ACE system, automatic checkout equipment system (fig. B-22). Overall control of spacecraft checkout is maintained by the ACE system located 6 to 7 miles from the vehicle assembly building. As described earlier for the launch vehicle, connection to the space- craft is accomplished by digital-data techniques. Once our checkout is complete within the biiildiiig, we are ready to move to the launch pad. We accomplish this with what we call tile Crawler-Transporter. 1090 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION PAGENO="1095" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1091 FIGURE B-14.-Ereotiofl and mating of S-Il stage to innerstage and placement in cell. PAGENO="1096" 1092 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE B-15.-Ereet Saturn IVB in center aisle of vehicle assembly building low bay. PAGENO="1097" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1093 `I Mr. ~. I have one questiol they get to the pad, then you P0 I to severa then they have to be mated. I don't quite follow to the pad initially ii maining pedestals. the launcher has to b outside - L - nece~ t that after said PAGENO="1098" 1094 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION Fiauim B-17.-Combined command and service module. PAGENO="1099" FIGURE B-18.-Lunar module adapter. PAGENO="1100" 1096 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION Fiaunu B-19.-Assembly of lunar module within part of lunar module adapter. PAGENO="1101" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1097 FIGURE B-20.-Erection and mating of Apollo spacec Saturn 501. nand module to PAGENO="1102" 109S 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE B-22.-Automatic checkout equipment system. PAGENO="1103" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1099 FIGURE B-23.---Orawler leaving vehicle assembly building. PAGENO="1104" 1100 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE B-25.-Vehicle approaching launch complex 39A. FIGURE B-26.-Vehicle in place on launch complex 39A. PAGENO="1105" 1968 NASA AUPHORIZATION 1101 Mr. PETRONE. When you get to the pad, you have, in effect, severed the electrical connections when you left the building. Mr. WINN. Oh,Isee. Mr. PETRONE. Then you have the launcher which has now lost the electronic connections to the test equipment. Mr. WINN. Yes. Mr. PETRONE. When you get to the pad, you now restore those con- nections, `and since we are using this digital data technique, it is quite simple to reinstall these connections to get your configuration. The main thing you have not done is break the connection between the vehicle and the launcher, because there are many as compared to the relatively few connections between the launcher and the ground. Mr. WINN. I see. Thank you. Chairman TEAGtTE. Th~ak you, Rocco. Dr. DEBTJS. I will now ask Mr. Siepert to talk about management. Representative WAGGONNER. That is the best overall presentation of the process from start to finish that we have ever had. Dr. DEBTJS. Mr. Siepert. Mr. SIEPERT. I will discuss with you certain points concerning our basic management; that is, how we are organized, what our growth in staffing has been in recent years, and certain characteristics and concepts of the Government/contractor team. I will close with a progress report on some current procurements that are underway for the recompetition of certain of our major support service contracts. This, figure C-i, is a condensed version of the basic functions which Dr. Debus showed on an earlier chart. A second chart, figure C-2, of the Center shows our primary organizational structure and also shows an allocation of the manpower to these several blocks. Tinder each box you will notice figures on the left showing the civil service resources; on the right are the contractor resources which directly serve in that function. Our first function is, of course, to prepare, checkout, and launch NASA space vehicles. That is our only reason for being here. The operating component which does that is the launch operations direc- torate, the one that Mr. Petrone heads. You will notice it is divided functionally among launch vehicle, spacecraft, and unmanned launch operations. You will have a. chance to see something of all three of these operations this afternoon. A second function is to assure that the designer back in the develop- ment center retains responsibility at all times for the precise con- figuration of the flight hardware in the final flight. This is achieved by the launch operations group working with the development center to figure out what the engineering changes need to be. However, all changes are coordinated between centers and if it is Apollo flight hard- ware, are approved and cle~red by the manager of the Apollo program office, in each Center which is affected. The third function is to develop new launching concepts and imple- ment them. This is a responsibility which emerges from the collective experience of the launch operations group, the technical support people, and the design engineering organization. Mr. G. Merritt Preston has just taken charge of design engineering. Once the con- cepts have been cleared, the Design Engineering Directorate has re- 76-265 0-67-pt. 2---70 PAGENO="1106" 1102 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION KENNEDY SPACE CENTER'S BASIC FUNCTIONS 1. PREPARE, CHECKOUT, AND LAUNCH NASA SPACE VEHICLES. 2. ASSURE CONFIGURATION CONTROL OF FLIGHT HARDWARE BY DEVELOPMENT CENTERS. 3. DEVELOP NEW LAUNCHING CONCEPTS; DESIGN AND INSTALL LAUNCH FACILITIES, INCLUDING GSE. 4. OPERATE LAUNCH COMPLEXES AND VARIOUS TECHNICAL SERVICES IN IMMEDIATE SUPPORT OF LAUNCH TEAM. 5. FURNISH BASE INSTALLATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT FOR ALL NASA OPERATIONS. FIGURE c-i PROPOSED FT -68 STAFFING JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, NASA LEGEND. AS OF JUNE 30, 1968 DIRECTOR TOTAL CIVIL SERVICE 2,7U5 ________________________________________ CS U TOTAL CONTRACTOR 8, DEPUTY DIRECTOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR 21,347 CENTER CENTER MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS ____________________ 1 I~ ~ NASA DIRECTOR r ~ 1 NASA~ AUDIT OFF~E ASSURANCE EXECUTWE COUNSEL INSPECTOR CS- 18 CS 32 CS-9 CS. 12 ~ I 1 [~NAGER 1 MGR. APOLLO DIRECTOR APOLLO APPLICATIONS OF PROGRAM PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION CS 104 CONTR-I96 CS 40 CONTR-I4O CS-401 F I 1 I DIRECT"1 PDIRECTOR ~DIRECTOR r DIRECTOR OF OF I OF OF LAUNCN OPS [~~GN ERG TECHNICAL SPT INSTL SUPPORT CS-43 CS344 CONTR-2401 `~`5O I CS.345 COHTR.37O4 I I 1 DIRECTOR r DIRECTOR DIRECTOR I DIRECTOR DIRECTOR LAUNCH VEHICLE SPACECRAFT UNMANNED INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS OPERATIONS LAUNCH OPS L SYSTEMS OPERATIONS CS.383 CONTR.3884 CS-36O COHTR-2379 CS-139 CONTR16I3 CS-247 CONTR.1060 CS-2I6 CONTR-3183 INCLUDING 34 AT DAYTONA BEACH OPS EXCLUDES MSFC & MSC AT KSC FIGURE C-2 sponsibility for designing and installing the actual launch facilities, including any related GSE or ground supporting equipment.. Once facilities are built, KSC has a fourth function, the responsi- bility for operating the laullcll complexes and the various technical services in immediate support. of the launch team. PAGENO="1107" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1103 To recapitulate at this point, the concept of the present KSC struc- ture is to locate within one operating Directorate (the Director of Launch Operations) all functions which are unique to our being an installation that launches hardware into space. In other words, these are functions which occur only because we are in the launching busi- ness, but these, moreover, are functions which need to be performed directly by the launch team itself. Basically, the Launch Operations Directorate is concerned with the flight hardware and with that GSE in intimate support of the flight hardware. The rest of the total ground environment is operated by the Tech- nical Support Directorate, the function that Mr. Ray Clark heads. The fifth and last major function is furnishing installation support and administrative services. By installation support we mean func- tions which have to be carried out on a 24-hour-a-day basis, whether we launch or not. Obviously, there is a great accentuation of such functions during an actual countdown or critical test, but these are the things that have to be done to keep in operation a very large and com- plex installation representing a capital investment of close to $1 bil- lion. These base installation services are managed by the Directorate of Installation Support, Mr. Keith O'Keefe. Administrative services cover the functions that the Government itself must perform in areas of procurement, personnel, inaiiagement analysis, and resources management. This is done by the Director of Administration, Mr. George Van Staden. Note that certain of these organizational boxes, and particularly this box, have no contractors working with them, the reason being that they are performing a func- tion which cannot be delegated in any fashion outside the Government's own hands. Over the last 5 years we have recently gone through a period of rapid growth. The civil service component of governmental people stands at 2,785 in our budget projections for fiscal year 1968. This is the same figure as last year. I should note that the figure is somewhat larger than the one shown in Dr. Debus' earlier chart. He showed 2,720. The difference represents temporary positions not included in his figures. You will notice that our team is made up of several important com- ponents (fig. C-3). I would like to comment on each of these as we pass. First, the TJLO stage contractors are those who work with unmanned launch operations. You will notice that this group' has been constant at about 1,500 over the last 4 or 5 years. On the other hand, we had until recently a group here for the Gemini program. Until that program was completed during the cur- rent year,there were about 500 Gemini stage cOntractor personnel. Constrtiction workers were a very1 significant part of our total work force 2 years ago. They are winding up their work as our facilities on Merritt Island are completed. By the end of 1968 we expect there may be as few as 600 people in this category. That contrasts with 5,900 here in 1965 when complex 39 was at its greatest peak of activity, that is, when it was under construction. The area called Support Operations on figure C-3 represents 9,800 contractor personnel who provide mission support for operating our total installation but are not concerned with the checkout of the flight PAGENO="1108" 1104 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION KSC PERSONNEL GROWTH TOTAL 2~,897 hardware itself. Flight hardware is handled entirely by the un- manned launch operation stage contractors or the Apollo stage con- tractors. You will notice that the peak in total KSC personnel is reached in the 6 months immediately ahead of us. In the budget year ahead of us we do expect a slight tapering off in the numbers of people that are actually needed to prepare the Apollo flight hardware. On the other hand, support operations will have a slight increase, rounding out the organization at about 9,800 people. This slight in- crease will occur because of the fact that the full arrray of facilities for complex 39 will come into operation only when pad B becomes operational. I have also prepared as a matter of information figure C-4, which lists the various companies supporting these operations: the vehicle contractors, the space contractors on Apollo, the array of contractors for the Unmanned Program, and the support contractors who provide total support for this whole operation. All are located here in Florida with the exception of Unitec, which is a small supporting contractor out on the Western Test Range. It supports the unmanned launch operations conducted from that launch site. It is apparent from looking at this growth that the Kennedy Space Center in the past 5 years has made major moves to build up a Govern- ment-industry team rather than develop a Government-operated organization in its entirety. This is in accordance with a basic NASA policy for accomplishing the space program. Excluding the construc- tion workers, the ratio in 1964 was about two civil service people to GEMINI FIGuRE C-3 PAGENO="1109" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1105 every three contractors. It is now at a ratio of ito 7', and will probably remain there through 1968. So it follows that the way Kennedy Space Center and the contractors work together becomes a very important element in whether we are successful in achieving our goals. I would like to show a chart which will attempt to summarize four of the main concepts in our contractor relationships (fig. C-5). The first concept is that each stage and each support contractor is held responsible for performance of a specific mission. His contract defi- nitely prescribes a scope, or scopes, of activity for which he, as an in- dustrial organization, is expected to produce a satisfactory result. The question of whether this performance is satisfactory, of course, KSC STAGE & SUPPORT CONTRACTORS END OF FY 68 APOLLO PROGRAM VEHICLE STAGE CONTRACTOR MANPOWER UNMANNED MANPOWER MANPOWER CNRYSLER 685 LMSD - AGENA 299 AAP 140 DOUGLAS 532 GDC - AGENA 205 BOEING 2,322 BURROUGHS - AGENA 23 SUPPORTING OPERATIONS NORTH AMERICAN 540 GE - AGENA 45 IBM 747 WECO - DELTA 54 *~fl/ 740 AEROJET - DELTA 7 ~ 2,939 SPACECRAPT ROCKETDYNE DELTA 3 UNITEX 30 CONTRACTOR DOUGLAS - DELTA 343 BENDIX 2,609 GDC - CENTAUR 240 `RCA 574 NORTH AMERICAN 924 HONEYWELL - CENTAUR 3 *PEC 1,060 GRUMMAN 1,000 WECO - DELTA AGEHA 60 GE 1,270 MIT 10 ROCKETDYNE DELTA AGEHA 14 * DOW BECHTEL 607 AC ELECTRONICS 45 TRW - SUSTAINING ENG. 18 KOLLSMAH 6 UHM - SUSTAINING END. 2U TOTAL 9,829 RAYTHEON 13 JPL-SURVEYOR 33 LINK 204 HUGHES - SURVEYOR 33 GRAND TOTAL 18,562 INTERNATIONAL LATEX 6 BOEING - LUNAR ORBITER 60 HAMILTON STANDARD 6 GE - BIOSATELLITE 15 TOTAL 7,040 TOTAL 1,553 `SUBJECT TO RECOMPGTITION IN PY 67 FTGURE 0-4 KSCCONTRACTOR RELATIONSHIPS 1. EACH STAGE AND SUPPORT CONTRACTOR HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR PERFORMANCE OF A SPECIFIED MISSION, 2. GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR INTEGRATING THE TOTAL MISSION, INCLUDING MONITORING, AND REDIRECTING THE CONTRACTOR'S EFFORTS WHERE APPROPRIATE. 3. KSC EVALUATES CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE AGAINST INCENTIVE OR AWARD FEE TARGETS. 4. KSC'S OFFICIAL INTERFACES WITH THE CONTRACTOR ARE KEPT TO THE MINIMUM AND CLEARLY SPECIFIED BY DELEGATIONS FROM THE KSC CONTRACTING OFFICER. Fiauiu~o 0-5 PAGENO="1110" 1106 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION depends. upon how well the contractor responds to specific require- ments that have been hid upon him by the Kennedy Sp'tce Center organization. The second point is that the Government remains responsible, and must be accountable, for integrating the total mission, pulling to- gether the efforts of a variety of contractors. This includes monitor- ing and redirecting the contractors' efforts wherever appropriate. Third, these present contractors are operating with KSC on the basis of an award fee return. Their profit from the operation is de- pendent upon satisfactory performance which is measured and evalu- ated by the Kennedy Space Center people against certain incentive targets or award fee targets. You have heard in your discussions with other NASA Centers, or you soon will hear, about their progress in installing incentives in their flight hardware contracts. Our Center took the lead in developing methods of handling award fee concepts for service support con- tractors. We do this by a series of periodic evaluations. At the present time the awards are made quarterly. They are preceded by monthly feedbacks between KSC civil service monitors and the contractors so that the contractor knows every month how he is standing in terms of doing things that are laid out `~s priority items Narr'ttives and numeric scores are pulled together on a quarterly basis and formulated into `i report which the line operators must defend before `t senior awards board appointed by Dr. Debus. The board makes recom- mendations to the Center director, who then determines the fee. In the case of the stage contracts, we do not have much experience yet with the KSC stage contract supplements that have been negotiated covering the actual launch services work of the stage contractors down here. With the exception of the Chrysler Saturn I-B contract, all of the Saturn I-B and V contracts have now been renegotiated with specific incentives built into them Milestones have been established for scheduled accomplishments whwh they expected to do within cer tam cost, time, and quality targets. We judge their performance against these. On a semiannual basis the stage contractor will be given an award fee based on how well he has accomplished the mile stones. Again, the Center director will be the final authority on the extent of that fee. We are asked the question, of course, whether all this emphasis on incentives is worthwhile in terms of getting the job done better As of today, our overall assessment is that this has been a successful and useful management device. As our organizations were learning how to integrate the needs of contractors, it has been particularly helpful in getting them to do their best work in our environment rather than retaining methods used back in their factory plant The incen tive awards process requires, to be successful, a tremendous amount of communications between us and the contractors That in itself, is time consuming. But I think, on balance, we very much needed that kind of communication in the first instance in learning how to work together. This has been a useful exercise, but we do feel that in the future, now that we have learned how to work together, we should be able to accomplish these awards with less overall time tied up in the PAGENO="1111" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1107 paperwork in making these evaluations than was necessary during the initial period. At least, we are trying to simplify that process. Now, the fourth and last concept on this chart states that the Ken- nedy Space Center deliberately keeps the number of interfaces with the contractors down to a minimum, and~ to assure this, we have speci- fied exactly what are the delegations of authority for each individual who interfaces with the contractor. There are four main types of interface, or working chains for man- agement action (figure C-6). Each is covered by formal written delegations which emanate from the top procurement officer. He is the contracting official and the formal representative of the Government in committing the Government to any activity undertaken by the contractor. He, therefore, is responsible for issuing all formal directions and all scope changes. Putting additional money on the contract, assigning additional work requirements, or directing the preparation of additional reports-all these are the responsibility of the top contracting officer. However, these are highly technical contracts, and an understanding of what is actually required for accomplishment must come from the key line officials-the technical engineers. For each contract we desig- nate a contract technical manager who is the senior line official in the actual operations. He develops and approves technical plans. He issues operational instructions to the contractor on his own initiative, providing they are within the scope of the contract and provided he keeps the contracting officer advised. He also has the major technical responsibility for evaluating the overall technical performance of the * PRINCIPAL KSC INTERFACES WITH THE CONTRACTOR TITLE DUTIES CONTRACTING OFFICER ISSUES ALL FORMAL DIRECTIONS AND SCOPE CHANGES (TOP PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY) CONTRACT TECHNICAL.MANAG~R * DEVE°LOPS/APPROVES TECHNICAL PLANS (KEY LINE OFFICIAL) ISSUES OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTIONS WITHIN SCOPE EVALUATES OVERALL PERFORMANCE TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVES FOR A MAJOR FUNCTIONAL AREA: ~SENioR TECHNICAL SPECIALISTS) IDENTIFIES SPECIFIC WORK REQUIREMENTS ISSUES WORK REQUESTS WITHIN SCOPE MONITORS END RESULTS CONTRACT MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE COORDINATES CONTRACT RESOURCES OFFICER (STAFF AIDE IN EACH OPERATING CONSOLIDATES AND PREPARES AWARD FEE PERFORMANCE DIRECTORATE) * REPORTS * *. REPRESENTS DIRECTORATE IN CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS (ISSUES NO DIRECTIVES TO CONTRACTOR) FIGURE C-6 PAGENO="1112" 1108 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION contract, while the contracting officer evaluates the business manage- ment compliance of the contract. However, the contract technical manager cannot do the job un- assisted. Several technical representatives are designated basically one for each major functional area within the contract. The "tech rep" is responsible for identifying specific requirements, issuing work requests, provided they are within the contract scope, and monitoring the end result. We have recently introduced one other participant-a contract man- agement assistance officer. He is a staff aid to the operating direc- torate. He coordinates resource problems, consolidates the prepara- tion of performance evaluations for the award fee process, and represents the directorate contract negotiations. Note, however, he does not have authority to issue any instructions or obligatory actions upon the contractor. Those go through the contracting officer. The chart does not show all the people who talk to the contractors. It is apparent that, in the kind of technical activity we are in, an operating director-for example, the head of launch operations, Mr. Petrone, or the Apollo program manager, Mr. Shinkle~-must have the opportunity for direct communication with the senior industrial lead- ership on these contracts. They do discuss policies and program requirements directly wi.th the key company managers, but I want to emphasize that anything that is placed upon the contractor's mis- sion goes through the formal contracting officer channels that are shown here. My last chart deals with the recompetition of major support service contracts (fig. CL4). We have listed the present KS'C contracts over v'~WA/ ,~ I~(4,/Vf/17 5/~&'E C6A' ~ ,ti,q _________ I fP-~7 f)'-~8 f)'-~9 ,C~'.7~9 f>'-!~ FY-72 -- r ~ ~uI~ III liii ~I9P~~T ________ 1?1UR~ ~ I"M~ "Wi. H II IF II /k%~awi~# I I I ~P4W 2~ I ~V~1fr 4'11171 ,A~,I/i71,~ _________ ~w - 51rn'!T ______ IlIuIluIllIll ~I,I(,w~ cawzvr/i.m'a'm,ø) ~ ,V40'i'OMff/7/?P1 IXTt#//Df' #4~1' ~VN4WVF ~W6'ts~VT FIGURE 0-7 PAGENO="1113" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1109 here in the left column and have charted the expiration of the current contracts. In some cases, certain contracts are being extended beyond the original time in order to synchronize them with other contracts. In solid bars is showi~ the proposed period for the new contracts which will be awarded. As a matter of history, when this Center put together its contractor structure for the first time, the NASA Headquarters authorized orig- inal contracts-the ones shown on the left here-for periods not in excess of 3 years. There was intense competition for this business at the time. As a result, KSC obtained extremely favorable arrange- ments, offered by the successful contractors, on their organizational structure, their overhead costs, minimum staffing, high quality per- formance, and a very reasonable competitive fee scale. In anticipation of that kind of experience, NASA made crystal clear at the start to all proposers, including those who later won these awards, that they would definitely be recompeted at the expiration of the original contract. Now, our challenge here has been to build a Government/industry team which accepts that policy and goes ahead to develop new procurements and lays p'lans for a possible succession of any or all of these present contractors with a minimum of handicap to our going operations. `That has not been easy, but we believe we have gone a long way to minimize the difficulties. Let me illustrate how we have proceeded. The Kennedy Space Center is particularly concerned with a situation where it might have to change contractors right in the midst of our most critical launch phase of the Apollo/Saturn program. We could not afford to have the launch support contractor, who works in the most intimate asso- ciation with the launch assembly team, be changed to a newcomer right at the time we have finally shaken down our operational launch procedures. As a result, NASA has authorized us to extend this contract for 2 years. It will go out for recompetition in fiscal year 1970 In the other cases, though, the original contracts were all expiring at least a year earlier than the one for launch support services. KSC made a decision that it would be better to put these contracts under recompetition now rather than later. As a result, these have been extended only far enough to time-phase certain of the contracts with others which, under present guidelines from NASA, are being co- ordinated or put together in a larger packag&-that is, with fewer contracts. There are three sets of two contracts each which are being combined in a recompetition into larger packages. These combinations will permit us to have the contractor manage- ment deal with only one major element of the KSO organization. It complicates the organization structure of a contractor if he must work for a variety of contract technical managers throughout the Govern- ment's organization. The communications and instrumentation sup- port contract, for instance, will now be handled `by one directorate, the technical support office. Base operations and administrative sup- port, which today are TWA contracts and the Ling-Temco-Vought contracts respectively, are to be combined within one installation con- PAGENO="1114" 1110 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION tract. It will be administered by only a single KSC element, the installation support people. One activity which is now in the LTV contract has been transferred and combined in our information systems directorate under the tech- nical support operations of Mr. R. Clark. This function is automatic data processing (APP) which, for efficiency, has been consolidated with scientific computation. Facilities engineering, which is a design support function, and f a- cilities modifications or repair, which is a quick-response-repair-on- the-pad type of function, are being combined. This requires extend- ing the Bechtel contract out to ~June 1967, when the Dow contract on facilities engineering also expires. Putting this together in a smgle package will give a single manageable package. It will be admin- istered by our design engineering direct.orat.e under Mr. Pr~stoii. This package has been on the market since last. December. Proposals arrived in the middle of February-seven proposals-and are under evaluation right now. The other rec.ompetitions are in preparatioli and proposal requests will be ready t.o go out. in time to meet. the award dates shown on the chart. Note that two new lines have been added on the top o.f the chart showing the KSC support service contracting plan (fig. C-7). Although it is NASA policy to consolidate service contracts wher- ever practicable, decisions have been made that two parts of the pres- ent TWA scope will be put into separate contracts. One is medical services, or occupational health, where NASA on the basis of its expe- rience with industrial medicine programs in a variety of NASA field centers has determined they can attract the highest grade of competi- tion in that area by con 6ning the proposal just to the medical pro- gram. Accordingly, a. specialized contract will be awarded as a sep- arate procurement.. We have also pulled out the public tours program from this group. During the initial year of t.he tours, Trans-World Airlines has been handling this activity as an adde~d part of its base operations contract. That activity will be a separate competition because we have now enough experience with public tours to believe that they can be handled on a concessionaire contract and not on a cost reimbursement contract. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Does the committee have any questions? Mr. WAGGONNER. You were talking about not wanting to be caught short in some critical period in the area of launch support. Say that NASA has authorized you to extend on a noncompetitive basis the services for the iresent contractor up until the last part of calendar year 1969, or well into fiscal year 1970; how do you stand as a result of the possible Apollo schedule revision? Is it likely tha.t you are going to have to go back to NASA again and ask for authority to continue in a noncomnpetitive way with the presemit contractor and his personnel? Mr. SIEPERT. I have no judgment whether that will be necessary later. You are quite right that this question must be faced, but some- time after we know what the revised launch schedule is. However, we accepted these extensions for planning purposes and definitely expect to go ahead with them unless a later launch schedule makes that obviously an unwise thing. We do not. now have any judgment on that. PAGENO="1115" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1111 Mr. WA000NNER. Won't the next 60 to 90 days be critical there in making these decisions about revising your plans? Mr. SIEPERT. Well, I don't know whether the next 60 to 90 days will give us the answer to this question, but we have time to make that kind of a decision. To give you an idea of a leadtime, we will need 8 or 9 months to implement the kind of decision to which you refer. I am putting in the necessary leadtime to do all the work of getting out proposals, evaluating them, and awarding the contract. Mr. WAGGONNER. In consolidating your operations-for example, combining instrumentation support and communication support-and abandoning the idea of noncompetitive extension of contracts and going to competitive awards from this point on, by what are you going to be guided in awarding these contracts, other than dollars and cents? Is this going to be just a perfunctory operation on the part of NASA, or are you going to become so enamored with those here that it would be useless for somebody else to bid? Mr. SIEPERT. I think that is a central question. Mr. WAGGONNER. You know your judgments are going to be based on what the people in the field think about them. Are the people in the field saying, "We are not going to be able to get rid of the people now like you"? Mr. SIEPERT. I don't think that will be the judgment of all the people. Some of our people will feel very strongly, through experi- ence, that some of the present contractors are, in `a sense, irreplaceable. On the other hand, what has happened in the last 3 years is a tre- mendous sophistication by a number of contractors in doing the work of supporting aerospace operations. Initially, when we went on com- petition 3 years ago, we had some preconceived ideas of how many companies could actually bring to bear the sort of specialized ex- perience we are after. We were greatly surprised. Certain of the contractors `who won the award were ones we had never envisioned were in `the field. ~Yet they put together the kind of technical and business proposal that was clearly superior to that of the companies who presumably were the established competition. From this earlier experience, we can't make a prejudgment that the existing contractors will have superior proposals to those who enter the competition from the outside. Mr. WA000NNER. You are going to consider something other than money? Mr. SIEPERT. We must. Mr. WA000NNER. You say that in consolidating the support service contractors in different areas, you want no more than one interface between the Kennedy Space Center personnel and these contractors where you consolidate the different areas-Communications and In- strumentations, for example. Are you going to allow these present contractors, who supposedly have ability in only one area, to con- solidate and, in effect, stay on the job? Is this perhaps big enough to be representative in the consolidated area? Mr. SIEPERT. All of our procurement proposals in this field will leave to the discretion of the proposers whether they propose as a prime without any subs, whether they come in with a joint venture, or whether they come in as a prime with certain subcontractors under PAGENO="1116" 1112 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION them. All we require is that their proposal demonstrate that KSC will not be dealing, if it is a joint venture, with two different com- panies. We have to deal with a single responsible agent to get this job done. The answer to your question is, Yes, we are quite prepared to accept joint ventures. Mr. PRESTON. To answer the point you have made regarding two contractors, where two contractors have their work combined into one new contract, we will have to change one of them at least. Mr. WAGGONNER. What did the record show in the way of unsatis- factory performance by any contractor of any size? Who did you start with that you dropped because he couldn't cut the mustard? Mr. SIEPERT. We have not dropped any contractor because he couldn't cut the mustard. However, we have had growing pains and substantial learning curves. Mr. WAGGONNER. How do you relate that answer to my first ques- tion about becoming enamored with the people you started out with, all staying on the job because their performance was good? Dr. DEBTJS. From the very beginning these were incentive award contracts. Some of these will have almost no fee if their performance is only satisfactory. From the very first procurement process, these contractors were aware that we were asking for top management and top performance, and evaluation is only between satisfactory and ex- cellent. Continued nonsatisfactory performance would have led to termination of the contract. So~ we have had better than satisfactory or satisfactory performance. We were quite pleased with this in- centive award scheme. I don't believe that one could say our people have become enamored with these contractors. We are satisfied, but this does not mean that there cannot be better proposals and they will be evaluated by the best objective means. As to your question about people staying on the job, I believe that whoever would be successful in competing against one of the existing contractors would count on taking over quite a number of people living here who would be phased to a new contractor. Mr. WAGGONNER. I think that period of transition is the key to it. It seems impossible to me, in spite of the argument I advanced or the question I raised, that you can take an integral contractor and move him and his people out and move new people in. Mr. SIEPERT. We have, in most of these cases, made specifications to all the proposers that, if a new contractor should win the award, he needs to plan on a 60-day startup time while the other contractor man- agement is involved in a 60-day tapering-off time. We have an over- lap to that extent. Our procurement proposals make clear that we expect anyone pro- posing on this business to take into maximum account the utilization of local talent that is already here. We don't mean to say that there will not be transition problems, but we think they are quite manageable. Mr. WAGGONNER. You commented that you were quite successful and fortunate with the contractors and the quality of the personnel that they supplied here at the Center for you to do business with, and I think that is fine. But all the charts and everything that you had PAGENO="1117" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1113 to say to this point, show we have been fairly level in the administra- tive cost-not administrative cost, but in personnel numbers. If I read correctly the charts you have shown, there has been a dispropor- tionate increase in administrative cost as related to the number of personnel-both contractors and civilian-that you have had, and I think this is reflected on some of your earlier graphs. Now, you come along and propose in the area of support service contracting that you are consolidating on a competitive basis in some of the areas with an idea that, when you consolidate some of the support services, you should have to deal with no more than one man and just have one NASA man to interface with. How is this going to affect your ad- ministrative costs? Measurably? Or insignificantly? The trend points to administrative costs even though you said you now have a ratio of 1 to 7, whereas you once had 2 to 3. I think your administrative cost figure is $99 million here this year as compared 2 years ago to $83 million. How do you account for that? Mr. SIEPERT. I should have defined our terminology better. The "Administrative operations" appropriation is used to pay all the civil service people. That pays for the total technical competence of the Government, not its administrative competence alone. The AO funds pay for that too, but we need to keep in mind that over 40 percent of our total manpower consists of highly trained engineers. They are not doing administrative work. They are the heart of the technical operation that integrates the contractors' missions. Mr. WAGGONNER. Classified as administrative personnel? Mr. SIEPERT. They are classified as A'ST, that is, aerospace tech- nologists-space engineers. Now, on the contractors side we described a large group called support operations. The great bulk of those people are not doing administrative work. They are performing direct technical or operational functions that are needed in order for us to carry out our launch activity here. Mr. WAGGONNER. I know that the trend affects the operation cost, but what part is overtime playing for administrative personnel in those administrative costs? Mr. SIEPERT. Overtime is a special problem. Once KSC gets the impact of a schedule change down here, the question is whether or not we can get the flight hardware assembled, checked out, and launched in the agreed time. Overtime money is tight in the present budget, but its availability can make the difference. Mr. WAGGONNER. On the basis of what was said, it was planned to shorten from 6 weeks to about a month that time at the pad to be ready for launch. Now, have you been able to shorten that? Mr. PETRONE. We expect to be learning. It would be our first launch off pad A. As you go into subsequent operations, you should- and we expect them to-proceed smoother and faster. That would not be reduced by overtime operations. Mr. SIEPERT. In Launch Operations, for example, what is your overtime at the present time? Mr. PETRONE. Of course, it varies. You might say it varies week by week. We average 10 or 11 percent. Mr. SIEPERT. It has been higher `than `that, hasn't it? Mr. PETRONE. We have been up to 20 percent. PAGENO="1118" 1114 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION Mr. SIEPERT. If I could move over to an administrative area, the Office of Administration, what is your overtime in the present terms of administration? Mr. VAN STADEN. I would say something on the order of 3 to 4 percent on an overall. Mr SIEPERT And within installation support ~ Mr. PARKER. Two percent. Mr. SIEPERT. The procurement overtime load runs a little higher `be- cause of the current urgency in preparing the service contract recom- petitions. Mr. WAGGONNER. The increases are not in the administrative area, but in `the operational performance areas. You had `two graphs prior to this which had to do with the incentive contract and evaluation of incentive contracts. Somehow, for the first time, I got the faint impression that there was a new ingredient in this incentive formula that I wasn't aware of before. That is, every contractor is judged, and his overall award is based upon evaluations or a compiling of what `all the Cen'ters have to say about wha:t that man's performance was, is that right? Mr. SIEPERT. I am sorry that I left that false impression. I think I can clear it up. The evaluations that are made here by `this Center are based upon an evaluation of the work entirely by Kennedy Space Center people and not by inputs from other centers. Mr. WAGGONER. On that part of the contract which is actually done here? Mr. SIEPERT. Yes. For instance, Marshall has contracts with Chry- sler, Douglas, IBM, North American, and Boeing for their develop- ment of Saturn stages, Marshall incentivizes each contract There is a negotiated formula under which Boeing's fee is determined by how well it does its job for Huntsville. We have separate supplemental contracts for their launch services down here. The technical per- formance of everything they do down here is judged in accordance with the criteria set up here by the KSC launch operations people and not by Huntsville. Mr WAGOONNER I have one other question about overtime and being able to do things better in reducing this period from 6 weeks to 4 weeks out at the pad You said you hoped that you could reduce significantly the number of personnel and the time and cost involved in evaluating these incentive contracts. Could you tell me now how many people are actually involved at Kennedy Space Center in evaluating the contracts on the incentive basis? Mr. SIEPERT. No, I can't, but I would be glad to compile that (com- pilation attached). Let me illustrate an example. We had on one contract as many as 24 different people who were making narrative and numerical score evaluations of the work of a contractor. I should note here that these numbers will include not only the immedi'mte senior managers for the contracts but also the other officials who devote only part of their time to such evaluations And of course, there are many other technical systems specialists in our civil service ranks who pro vide factual information to these senior managers as a part of their normal operating functions. PAGENO="1119" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1115 Number of people invol'ved in a,ward fee evaluation evclusive of board TWA 41 Douglas 11 LTV 21 IBM 13 Bendix 14NAA 10 RCA 9 Boeing 16 FEC 20 - Chrysler 17 Total 172 Mr. WAGtIONNER. A single contractor? Mr. SIEPERT. Practically all of these were technical representa- tives-Kennedy Space Center top specialists-in each of these subfunc- tions. We now feel the number can be abbreviated, because the people. above that level are sufficiently close to the functions of a contractor to provide evaluations of equal or superior objectivity. This means eval- uations from as few as, let's say, six or seven rather than the two dozen. Now, the two dozen technical representatives are still monitoring the contractor and are still giving information up the line in terms of how the contractor is doing, but they are not engaged in the formal written evaluation process. Mr. WAGGONNER. The only thing you are saying is, you have gotten better at that game? Mr. SIEPERT. Yes, we have learned, and I think the contractor has very much appreciated our efforts to focus the evaluation higher in our.organization rather than lower. The CHAIRMAN. Why not two or one contract instead of four? Mr. SIEPERT. That's a hard question. There is no magic number in saying "four" versus "five." For the benefit of some of the members of the committee who have not visited here before, we ought to answer this historically. At the time this Center was getting underway in 1963, we made a study of how many supporting service contracts there should be on our Merritt Island installation. We studied four possible ways to get our job done. One was to have no support contractors of our own, but just go to the Air Force Eastern Test Range and utilize their `prime con- tractor, Pan American. The second one was for us to have our own separate contract with Pan American. The third was to do it all with civil service. And the fourth was to do it with a series of specialized contractors. I am going back 4 years. Our people first reached the conclusion that they wanted to work with a wide variety of specialized contraotors. I recall that the desired number initially was as many as 12 or 15. We actually obtained approval to work with six. It turned out to be seven, as you see here. The negotiations with NASA Head- quarters really rested on the question of whether the Center, if it had fewer contracts, would be able to handle the monitoring and direction of the total effort with less overall increase in the civil service. The burden of evidence was that we could economize if we dealt with fewer contractors, but we could not answer then that seven would be better than six or eight. The basic management question there is whether or not you have to cross organizational lines within the Center in order to deal effectively with a contractor. My personal appraisal, Mr. Teague, would be that if we had only two contractors at the Kennedy Space Center, we would have more organizational problems than if we had three or four. PAGENO="1120" 1116 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION The CHAIRMAN. Is your philosophy different from that of Hunts- ville and Houston? They had 26 supporting contractors-one for each laboratory. Mr. SIEPERT. If they had 26 at MSFC, they had more than one for each laboratory. The CHAIRMAN. They have 26 now. Mr. SIEPERT. I don't know their current situation. However, their main operational structure for the kind of work they are doing is the laboratory. They were obliged to get out of the situation where two or three companies were serving the same laboratory, so they com- peted for one contract in each major laboratory area. The CHAIRMAN. What would be the cost to offer a proposal for this competition? Mr. SIEPERT. May I refer that to Mr. Lohse, our new procurement officer? Mr. LOHSE. From $50,000 to $80,000. The CHAIRMAN. This Commission would be interested in seeing your costs of operations go down as a result of this, but I bet it will go up. Dr. DEBUS. If you reduce the comparison to a unit of workload, I don't believe so. The workload is supposed to go up, and it will go up until it reaches a level. The total cost will go up, but the cost per unit worked and the cost of overhead should stay the same or go down. Mr. SIEPERT. If, in your offer to bet, you excluded the inflationary costs, which we cannot control, this would be an interesting thing for us to track and later report to the committee. Mr. CLARK. We are trying to relieve the competition pressure for people now on existing contracts, whoever they might be-f orinstance, the communications and the instrumentation contracts. They really use about the same types of skill. We found, for example, present con- tractors were competing for the same man. We wanted to pool the same types of skill under a single contractor. Mr. SIEPERT. This offers better utilization of every man. The CHAIRMAN. You have had a real good operation. Mr. WAGGONNER. How could you remove competition for people without removing, to some extent, the competition of the man who oversees those people-the contractor? Does it follow that a little of that spills over? Mr. CLARK. It could very well. Mr. WAGOONNER. You have to make the contractor secure to remove the competition of the people, and in making him secure you are ignor- ing competition to a certain extent. Mr. GURNEY. When did you make your basic decision to go from seven groups to four groups? Mr. SIEPERT. Let's see. The basic decision was made before the end of the last fiscal year. Mr. LOHSE. It started in December of 1965. Mr. SIEPERT. We were asked to study the problems beginning in December 1965, and our proposal for implementation was completed during the summer. The proposal has been changed~ timewise, only by the decision here to extend these two contracts, TWA and LTV, by another 6 months. This occurred for two reasons: We, at Kennedy, were worried about our ability to mount three concurrent major source evaluations at the PAGENO="1121" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1117 same time. Now, when I say "source evaluations," what I mean is we cannot do an objective job of really looking at these proposals-and some of the proposals are more than 1 foot thick-without pulling out of the line many of our very best people to do this kind of evaluation. This often becomes a continuous, full-time, closed-door assignment. It is almost like convening a grand jury. Under such circumstances, they are real limitations as to how many source evaluations you can handle well. We were worried about doing this in the same time scale. The other factor we were concerned with is that this is a very large contract in terms of the amount of money involved. The level of Fiscal Year 1968 administrative operations funds directly affects this contract. It was our feeling that we would be better off if the scope of that contract during this period were negotiated with a better knowl- edge of what might be the actual funding level in the budget. We have gained some time to remove that uncertainty. Mr. GURNEY. Did the idea of reducing this from seven to four come from you or from Washington? Mr. SIEPERT. It came from Washington. Mr. GURNEY. You made no suggestion or proposal that the mode of operation be changed? Mr. SIEPERT. This is not exactly what we proposed, but, given the guidelines that we were asked to consider, this is the Kennedy Space Center proposal. In other words2 our Center assumes total respon- sibility for the particular combination of contractors. Mr. GURNEY. You did not initiate the idea of changing the mode of operation? Mr. SIEPERT. To fewer contractors; no, sir. Mr. GURNEY. What were the reasons given when you were instruct- ed to do this study? Mr. SIEPEET. As resources for the total space program had become more and more stabilized, and the cost requirements have, in fadt, been increasing, NASA has been under a great self-initiated pressure to make its dollars go further. Headquarters analysis of service support contracts was that field centers can get overall economies and a more economical response from a contractor if the packages are in larger chunks. Mr. GURNEY. How long have you had experience with the seven contractors? Mr. SIEYERT. Three years. Mr. GURNEY. How many did you have before that? Mr. SIEPERT. Well, we didn't have these contracts, Mr. Gurney, be- cause we weren't operating a facility of our own. You see, we were entirely at the Cape as tenants of the Air Force, and, therefore, the people doing this kind of work for us were contractors of the Air Force. So, I can't answer your question. Mr. GURNEY. The seven-plan is really your plan, initiated when, you started operating your own Space Center? Mr. ISIEPERT. Yes, sir; but it is again `the result of agreements reached after guidelines and negotiations were signed off by NASA in Washington. ~T6-~&5 0-67-pt. 2---~71 PAGENO="1122" 1118 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Mr. GURNEY. One other question touched on before. I asked how long you had been operating under the seven plan to find out whether you have a little concern about the morale problem of your personnel as well `is whether your personnel `ire going to chop around for other jobs when they know these contracts are up for bid? Obviously, some are not going to be retained by the new man, aaid, as far as they are concerned, maybe none of them will be. There has been such experience down here. Mr SIEPERT I am sure there is some unrest on this point among the local employees. Our own studies of this, however, show that there is very little movement in and out of the community when contracts change h&nds For example, contractors on the stage site, as you know, leave the Cape when the Air Force contracts have been finished. Yet the per- sonnel do not, by and large, leave the area, because they are, due to their experience, readily hired by the new contractor Mr. GURNEY. Those have been a little different. When those people c'irne onboard, they knew the contract was going to end `it a certain time This is somewhat different Dr Di~iirns They were renewable options each year up to a maxi mum of 3 years Mr SIEPERT Most of these contracts have a period of time which is renew able 1 year at a time in order to preserve the Government's ability to terminate for convenience or unsatisfactory performance. Mr. WAGGONNER. You said that you had 3 years of experience in the support contractor area of dealing in seven areas. Isn't it a fact that the 3 years of experience had its start at the time of the separation of Marshall and Kennedy? Dr DEBUS These started with the activation of the new area In the old area at Cape Kennedy we were still relying on the Air Force- the Eastern Test Range, specifically. Our support was by Air Force contractors-Pan American and jts subcontractor, RCA. When we started to activate this area, we needed a similar type support., and we assessed this in two ways. As you may recall, the mission contractors at the Eastern Test Range were really Air Force personnel and contractors to the Systems Divi- sion The Eastern Test Range was operating with Pan American and RCA, and this support is still given to us at Cape Kennedy However, we did not conclude that it would be in the best interest of the Government for the civilian space agency, the landlord of the new Merritt Island facilities, to make the Air Force its executive agent by extending the Air Force contract into this area Another possibility w'is to do it all by adding large numbers of civil service personnel All factors considered, the most practicable way was to develop a NASA team of civil servants and mission contractors. It seemed likely that some of the best specialization in the country lay with industrial contractors-color photography, for example. We want to bring to be'ir the best knowledge in color photography and keep it up to date as this technology increases and improves Costs may go down and new processes may develop, so we want to have a contractor who is right at the pulse of this technology and can bring it to bear in our area The same is true in other support areas PAGENO="1123" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1119 We wanted industrial capability from the company to help support and manage this area. We feel now that the specialization of four or five is adequate to bring this concept to bear. Mr. GURNEY. One other point now. The initiation of the study of this change of operation, as you say, came from NASA Headquarters in Washington. Then you made a study, and you came up with this idea. The reason for the change of operation, as I understand, was for economy. Just exactly what economies do you propose to get out of this change in operation? What fewer men are you going to use on your side? How do you think the contractor operations will be improved, either in fewer men or basic cost economies,? Mr., SIEPERT. We do not predict fewer men on either side of this interface in fiscal year 1968. We do not think it is practical to expect a net decrease, because the workload imposed on both the civil service and the contractors during this period of time is greatly in excess of what we estimated in our early planning. This job has a complexity for which we, frankly, did not fully plan, that is, the kind of man- power requirements involved. In terms of greater efficiency for the men that we have, we look for- ward confidently to being able to show even better utilization. How- ever, the NASA Headquarters position with respect to the consolida- tion should not be oversimplified to rest on this point alone. The committee may wish to have in its report the actual statement by headquarters as to why it approved the consolidation support plan. The Manned Space Flight Office was requested by NASA general management to come up with an overall set of guidelines to implement service support contracts. Their final proposal, which was approved by Dr. Seamans on April 1, 1966, had the following paragraph on the question of consolidation: The policy of consolidation Into a few large service support contracts is based on several basic management principles. In general, it reduces the total of con- tractor management personnel required for administration, reduces interface problems, allows cross training and cross utilization in some instances, and causes less administrative effort to NASA. These advantages are obtained principally if the tasks are grouped into similar types of work, since wide and diverse tasks under one contract tend to dilute the gains achieved by consolidation. However, the management simplicity warrants consideration of consolidation in any case. Mr. `GURNEY. Actually, your manpower projection, `at least for the Center, doesn't reflect that there is going to be any change in numbers, does it? I mean, you have leveled off last year and assigned the method. This is exactly the level you plan to continue for some time, isitnot? Mr. SIEPERT. That is correct. The statement here with respect to less manpower was with respect to administrative manpower to manage the contracts and report the costs and the like for both' Government and industry. There is no discussion here that you would be able to save, really, the end product technical manpower necessary to do the job. In our case, that's where the workload is increasing steadily. Mr. GURNEY. I don't know whether the plan is good or not. It may be a better operation administratively, but certainly it doesn't seem to indicate economy ~here as the principal object as was stated in the beginning. PAGENO="1124" 1120 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Mr. SIEPERT. We do not have an a priori case of being able to prove economy in the absence of having a new contractor on board- Dr. DEBUS (interposing). There's a hidden economy, Mr. Gurney. Inasmuch as those people who are now engaged-technically highly qualified technicians-can free some of their time to be applied to the technical systems, management and operation, and can be freed from the administrative and paperwork procedures, we gain manpower. It will not show in numbers, but it will show in the technical talent we can apply totally to our basic management, and this is very badly and sorely needed. Mr. GURNEY. I understand that. That was my concept of efficiency. That's all. The CHAIRMAN. Al, you people have been working these studies for years. You know just exactly which company does a good job, and you can probably take a pencil right now and list the degrees of efficiency of the existing contracts. Suppose one of these companies that is less efficient spends $100,000 in writing up their proposal, and the efficient one spends $50,000- we are told over and over, more and more, that the companies have all the good men writing proposals and the second-rate men doing the work. How are you going to decide this when you get down to the stack of stuff I have seen about this high (indicating)? Who is going to go through 500 or 600 pages of detailed statistics and whatnot? Mr. SIEPERT. A Source Evaluation Board of Kennedy Space Center people which will also include- The CHAIRMAN (interposing). And you know these companies. How are you going to decide? Mr. SIEPERT. We do not know which one is better in a competition for the same piece of business. We know how good that contractor was on a particular contract that he had. Let's take one as a case in point. You have RCA doing communications, and you have Federal Electric doing instrumentation. Federal Electric also has extensive communication capabilities. They are in that line of business. How- ever, KSC has not had any actual experience with FEC in that area. The question of which of these contractors, if they should choose to compete against each other, would have the best proposal would be based on the Source Evaluation Board's appraisal of the content within that proposal. This would be supplemented by, and checked against, any information that we couid obtain on how this contractor had done similar work for other governmental customers. We are not dependent only upon personal information concerning a contractor's work with KSC or with NASA. So, the Source Evaluation Board can and should approach its task without a preconceived notion that the proposal is unimportant compared to the known experience of the company with KSC bus1ness. The proposal is very critical in the competition. And that is why American industry puts its good people on it, just as you say. Mr. GURNEY. What about this concept? Have you thought of this? I mean, ordinarily when the person is doing a particular job, like one of those seven, and is competent, he learns how to do this job `better as time goes on, and becomes more efficient. That's the human way things work. However, instead of putting it out for competitive bid every PAGENO="1125" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1121 3 years, or instead of this new arrangement of consolidating seven to four, had you ever thought of using your incentive fee arrangement for you and the contractor to work out another deal, another extension that would save you money or get you better efficiency based on the prior experience that you and the contractor had in this job? Mr. SIEPERT. We have considered this. We are implementing the idea that you raised in a little different fashion.. These new contracts with the incentive fee arrangement in them will place considerably greater emphasis on the contractor's actual ability to measure up and to meet preagreed cost targets. In other words, this will be a significant factor in his profit return. Mr. GURNEY. Well, the point I make there, Al, is, would it not be possibly better to use that arrangement than this great mass of paper- work, the rearrangements, and all the rest of the redtape to put this new plan into action? Dr. Di~nus. Are you asking whether it should be largely noncom- petitive procurement? Mr. GURNEY. What I am saying is this: We all believe-all of us on this committee-that once you have gone through a competition such as you have here, and you have a pretty good, fairly well orga- nized, and streamlined operation, as you have said-seven as opposed to four-it isn't, obviously, a tremendous amount of change here; I simply say that your incentive fee business with the persons on the job, and doing it now, might be a substitute to preserve the competitive arrangement so that you can get the best bargain and also the best efficiency. Mr. WAGGONNER. If you follow that attitude all the way through the cycle, from the time it begins at NASA until somebody pays off the last subcontractor down the line, ultimately you won't have a new man doing the business. There won't be anybody for him to supply. He will be foreclosed. There won't be any way for a man to establish a new business and break that hiring circle. Mr. SIEFERT. I think NASA is merely, in this situation, Mr. Gurney, being consistent with its original commitment to American industry. In effect, it said: We are endorsing competition for NASA procure- ments as a basic policy matter, and we are going to recompete not only because we believe that's in the overall Government interest, but also because we want this to be a basic incentive for the one who wins the contract the first time. Then he knows he must be trying all the time to improve his performance posture. We have instances where we have been impressed that our support contractors, rather than move ahead and spend money authorized in the contract, have come up with ways where it didn't need to be done. The contractor has chosen not to staff up to that peak yet, although, contractually speaking, he had authority as a mission contractor to move. You do not expect that kind of response from a contractor who believes he is locked in and assured noncompetitive extensions for his services. Mr. GURNEY. I can understand that. Dr. DEBUS. A learning curve element, I think, is retained, because we negotiate every year. Any experience we make over that year PAGENO="1126" 1122 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION can be brought to bear within the total time the contract is completed. We do that every year when the time comes to renegotiate. Mr. WINN. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mr. Winn. Mr. WINN. May I ask a question for my own information? Chang- ing the subject a little bit, are these contractors still paying-at least, I have always been of the opinion that they have been paying premium wages for their type of labor-premium, meaning much higher than in most other places in the country. Am I wrong in that? Mr. SIEPERT. I do not believe that is the correct perception of the support contractors we have been discussing. You may be referring ~o two other kinds of situations. One in particular got publicity sev- eral years ago. That was the wages earned by construction workers of the building trades who were engaged in modifying and building launch pads; things like unusual portal-to-portal pay and premium wages for hazardous work and the like. This was looked into quite carefully by Senator McClellan's committee. That type of craft labor is not involved in `these supporting service contracts. Another possibility to which you may be referring is that a number of the aerospace manufacturers, when they brought their flight hard- ware down here to be tested and flown, came with the idea that they were actually not going to be a permanent part of the Cape com- munity. They paid a sort of isolated-duty-station premium that is sometimes called swamp pay. Some still do. In all of our contracts with those stage contractors we are attempting to get such pay elim- inated, because we now know the people who come here do stay and make their homes. Mr. Lohse, are there any that still have that? Which ones? Mr. LOHSE. Boeing and Douglas still have it. Mr. SIEPERT. None of our support contracts. Mr. WINN. Is this so-called swamp pay union pressure on these men? Mr. LOHSE. It' is pay to both groups. It is about 50 cents an hour in the union categories, and some of the stage contractors are nonunion, and it's about ninety to a hundred dollars a month in the managerial levels. It's a joint problem which NASA has with DOD and this is currently being explored at the headquarters level. Mr. WINN. How can we get rid of it? Mr. LOHSE. DOD and NASA are trying to bring pressure down on the corporate managements involved. This is no longer an isolated area. In some instances, they brought enough pressure to correct it. Lockheed, on the other hand, just incorporated a $0.40 to $0.50 per hour increase in their basic rate structure and labeled it a "test base" rate. They did drop swamp pay for salaried employees. There is no easy solution to it. Mr. WINN. It would seem to me that after 3 or 4 years of operation some of those costs could be renegotiated or just plain thrown outs and that this thing should have leveled ofF as the rest of your charts show. We keep talking about economies, and I think this committee wants to start seeing in this operation and Government operations, too, some type of economy. PAGENO="1127" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1123 Mr. LOHSE. It is locked into the union agreements, some of which have 2 or 3 years to run-long-term labor contracts. Mr. SIEPERT. The best guarantee of working on this situation, really, is the competitive world. This was not true in an earlier period of time. There were once only a few contractors that really knew this aerospace business, and now there is hardly a single piece of business about which you can say any one company really has a technical pre- eminence in the field. The idea of being able to make a sole source justification, in lieu of competitive justification in areas like this, would just be a very difficult thing to establish. Mr. WINN. Going back to Mr. Gurney's question, basically, the com- pe~itive system is possibly how you can arrive at some economies in the program. Do you have any other ideas on where you can arrive at some economies? Mr. SIEPERT. Yes; we believe so. I would rather not amplify my answer beyond that. The competitive situation, plus the necessity to negotiate with these companies each year as they go along, makes for a clean-cut, preagreed work program; we have to agree on what is the minimum amount of staffing required to do the jobs as we lay them out. We believe that our new contractors will seek to become and remain efficient in an environment of competition. Mr. WINN. I think you are right to a certain extent, except when you automatically extend the contract like you did in one, two, three, or four cases, if I am reading your chart right. You don't renegoti- ate by extension, do you? Mr. SIEPERT. There was a specific negotiation as to what the levels would be for this period of extension. Our only reason for doing that, sir, was to get one contract synchronized with another. Mr. WINN. I understood that; but I didn't realize you renegotiated. Mr. SIEPERT. Each period of operation has a specific cost determi- nation. Mr. SHINKLE. Gentlemen, I would like to begin my portion of the hearings by taking a closer look at the KSC organization chart (fig- ure D-4) and defining the relationship between my office, that of the Apollo program manager, and the KSC line organizations, which were previously discussed. Generally speaking, this office provides appropriate assignments, guidelines, and resources, so that those charged with the execution of specific aspects of the overall Apollo program move effectively to get the total job done. Specifically, my office translates general and spe- cific program requirements and schedules received from the OMSF Program Director and the other MSF centers into discrete packages, which we forward to line organizations for preparation of detailed plans to meet such requirements. After we receive, validate, and coordinate such plans of execution as prepared and priced by the line executive, my office then analyzes these plans against total program needs and available resources, tak- ing appropriate action to assure that these are kept in balance. Upon approval and funding, such plans become a directive for execution by the line organization. In carrying out our mission, we have the inherent responsibility of establishing all program schedules and are specifically concerned with PAGENO="1128" 1124 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, NASA the effect of problems arising from late delivery, installation work- around times, and other schedule or cost impacts. Everything within the Apollo program which is executed at the time of launch has its focal point here at KSC (fig. D-2). All the various stages, modules, materials, and hardware from other cog- nizant NASA Centers converge here. We then use a. series of con- tractors to assemble and checkout this hardware and perform the launch operations at the proper time. Our objective is to perform a quality service; that it, a launch at the proper time within the cost allocated in accomplishing the program. Activities at KSC call for a service to be performed, as opposed to a physical product being delivered. Hence, we cannot easily draw upon the experiences of other centers in developing and implementing incentives and controls. The problem is compounded when you consider the number of con- tractors that interface with each other and are interdependent in meeting schedules (fig. D-3). The contractor's ability to meet their schedules within cost is not solely within each contractor's own capa- bility. Varying delivery and launch dates, unpredictable modifica- tion requirements, and limited statistical history useful to predict Saturn V launch operation requirements add to this problem. In this chart (fig. D-4) we have identified in brief terms the func- tions of each contractor. Some of these stage contracts are launch operations supplements to MSFC contracts, while others are the re- sponsibility of KSC. In the Boeing and Chrysler contracts we have added functions where it was to the Government's advantage to do so. We do not have qui.te the same responsibilities delegated to us from DIRECTOR I DIRECTOR SPACECRAFT UNMANNED OPERAT~~J LAUNCH OPS. DIRECTOR I DIRECTOR INFORMATION I SUPPORT SYSTEMS OPERATIONS FIGURE D-1.-Kennecly Space Center organization chart. PAGENO="1129" FIGURE D-2.-Apollo impact at KSC. MSC for the spacecraft contracts such as Grumman and NAA. In- stead of having official contractual responsibility, we have secondary delegation for technical direction. The support contractors are the sole responsibility of KSC. The Apollo R. & P. manpower posture chart (fig. D-5) represents statistically the contractor and civil service personnel allocated to the Apollo program for fiscal year 1967. The contractors are identified according to their respective effort, such as spacecraft, uprated Saturn I, Saturn V, and launch support. You will notice that only 10 percent of the total manpower allocation is civil service personnel. These personnel act as the prime contractor here at KSC to coordinate the activities of this entire group of con- tractors. The Apollo R. & P. program represents approximately 67 percent of the total manpower at KSC. Unmanned launch operations accounts for approximately 7.5 percent and administrative operations for the remaining 25.5 percent. Allow me to point out that the AO budget pays for all these civil service personnel plus their overtime, transportation, telephone calls, and the operation of those contractors who perform printing and re- production services and the base housekeeping services. Our stage contractor manpower level (fig. D-6) is shown for fiscal years 1967, 1968, and 1969. This chart shows personnel working on the uprated Saturn I, Saturn V, and spacecraft programs, respectively. We are fully operational on the uprated Saturn I program and are moving well into the Saturn V program. Notice that the uprated 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1125 ~9HN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 1 KSC CCSD MSC GE MSFC BOEING DOUGLAS NAA IBM LI FEC~ TWA I DOW~j GRUMMAN MIT RCA CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS BECHTEL BENDIX LTV PAGENO="1130" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION PROBLEMS IN MEETING GOALS PROGRAM \~sb MANAGEMENT COST FLUCTUATING MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS RESULTING INTERFACES WITH OTHER CONTRACTORS FROM VARYING LAUNCH SCHEDULES AND AS A RESULT, VARYING MILESTONE DATES UNPREDICTABLE MODIFICATION REQUIREMENTS LIMITED STATISTICAL HISTORY FIGuBE D-3 Saturn I program terminates in fiscal year 1969 The Saturn V and spacecraft contractor manpower curves are parallel, peaking about middle fiscal year 1968 and then decreasing. The support contractor manpower chart (fig. D-7) represents the cumulative total of all our R. & D. support contractor personnel of FEC, Dow, RCA, Bechtel, and GE Consistent with the recompeti tion as discussed by Mr Siepert, Dow Bechtel and FEC RCA are represented by the facilities support contractor and the communica tions/instrumentation support contractor, respectively, in fiscal year 1968 and fiscal year 1969. You will notice that our support require- ments increase until middle fiscal year 1969 because we are entering an operational phase which increases until that time This funding summary chart (fig D-8) is a rather dramatic illustra tion of the transitional phase occurring at KSC It illustrates C of F and corresponding R & D costs from fiscal year 1963 through fiscal year 1968. 1126 KSC's CONTRACTOR /7 PAGENO="1131" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1127 KSC APOLLO CONTRACTORS & FUNCTION STAGE BOEING PREPARE, CHECKOUT AND LAUNCH THE S-IC STAGE; OPERATE, MAINTAIN AND PROVIDE DESIGN SUPPORT FOR COMMON MECHANICAL GSE; INTEGRATE LAUNCH VEHICLE INPUTS FOR LAUNCH AND MISSION RULES DOCUMENTS AND INTEGRATED TEST PROCEDURES; PERFORM OTHER RELATED LAUNCH SERVICES CHRYSLER PREPARE, CHECKOUT AND LAUNCH THE S-lB STAGE; OPERATE, MAINTAIN AND PROVIDE DESIGN SUPPORT FOR COMMON MECHANICAL GSE; INTEGRATE LAUNCH VEHICLE INPUTS FOR LAUNCH AND MISSION RULES DOCUMENTS AND INTEGRATE TEST PROCEDURES; PERFORM OTHER RELATED LAUNCH SERVICES DOUGLAS PREPARE, CHECKOUT AND LAUNCH THE S-IV STAGE AND PERFORM OTHER RELATED LAUNCH SERVICES IBM PREPARE, CHECKOUT AND LAUNCH THE I.U. STAGE; OPERATE AND MAINTAIN COMMON SATURN V LAUNCH VEHICLE ELECTRICAL GSE; PERFORM OTHER RELATED LAUNCH SERVICES NAA (5-Il) PREPARE, CHECKOUT AND LAUNCH THE S-Il STAGE AND PERFORM OTHER RELATED LAUNCH SERVICES NAA (S/C) PREPARE, CHECKOUT AND LAUNCH THE APOLLO CSM. PROVIDE INTEGRATED PLANNING FOR GSE SITE ACTIVATION IN SPACECRAFT INDUSTRIAL AREA AND THE LAUNCH COMPLEXES. OPERATE AND MAINTAIN SPACECRAFT GSE. PRO- VIDE INPUTS FOR LAUNCH AND MISSION RULES DOCUMENTS AND INTEGRATED TEST PROCEDURES. GRUMMAN PREPARE, CHECKOUT AND LAUNCH THE APOLLO LUNAR MODULE (LM). PRO- VIDE PLANNING FOR GSE SITE ACTIVATION IN THE SPACECRAFT INDUSTRIAL AREA AND THE LAUNCH COMPLEXES. PROVIDE, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN SPACECRAFT GSE. PROVIDE INPUTS FOR LAUNCH AND MISSION RULES DOCU- MENTS AND INTEGRATED TEST PROCEDURES. FIGu1~ D-4 KSC APOLLO CONTRACTORS & FUNCTION (CONT.) SUPPORT BENDIX MAINTAIN AND OPERATE MAJOR FACILITIES ON COMPLEXES AND IN INDUSTRIAL AREA BECHTEL SPECIAL MAINTENANCE AND MODIFICATIONS DOW FACILITIES ENGINEERING SUPPORT SERVICES GE GENERAL ENGINEERING AND FABRICATION SUPPORT FEC OPERATE, MAINTAIN, INSTALL AND REPAiR INSTRUMENTATION EQUIPMENT RCA PLAN, O1'ERATE, AND MAINTENANCE OF COMMUNICATIONS FIGU1~E D-4A PAGENO="1132" 1128 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION KSC APOLLO R & D MANPOWER POSTURE FY.67 You can see that starting in 1963 we were spending large sums of money to bring our facilities such as launch complex 39, which you shall see, into being. As construction of facilities nears completion or is completed, our operational costs increase as indicated by the growth in the R. & P. budget from $10 million to a fiscal year 1968 request of $228.5 million. I would like to point out that, although the costs in fiscal years 1966, 1967, and 1968 are quite small in the C of F, in actual fact we had about $100 million not under contract at the end of fiscal year 1966. This chart (fig. D-9) represents a breakdown of the R. & D. fund- ing, the R. & D. portion of the summary chart. We have taken the liberty of correlating it with the major segments of our program such as the Saturn I phaseout into the uprated Saturn I project, Saturn V, launch support operations, launch instrumentation, and spacecraft operations. Spacecraft operations was a field operation transferred to us from the Houston organization in 1963. The fiscal year 1968 funds are a request on the part of KSC from NASA Headquarters and repre- sent a growth in the R. & D. budget because we are moving into the operational facets. For exactly the reason our C of F budget has come down from its peak of $332 million, the B. & P. budget has gone up as we phase out site activation. In order to give you an idea of how much money will actually be spent here, I have added two other things. I have added MSFC costs because they budget for a certain part of the work done in these areas by their contractors here, so that, although the money is spent here, it FIGuRE D-5 DOES NOT INCLUDE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS PAGENO="1133" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1129 Lu 0 0~ z 9000 8000 7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 KSC APOLLO STAGE AND SPACECRAFT CONTRACTOR MANPOWER POP 67-1 doesn't appear in our budget. The same is true with the MSFC total. This is an estimate, and it was shown on some of the charts used by Dr. Debus earlier. Continuing our discussion of KSC budgets, this Apollo C of F fund- ing summary (fig. D-10) highlights how we have spent and intend to spend our money in the C of F area. The main thing it shows is the dramatic falloff of the money allocated to us after the fisëal year 1965 and prior year funding of $830 million. This chart (fig. D-11) is the detail of the largest single construc- tion that we have here, launch complex 39. You will see that this afternoon. Starting in fiscal year 1963 we had money allotted to us as illustrated on this chart. At that time we projected a cost run- out on LC-39 at less than $500 million. We are going to meet that goal. As you can see, the planned obligations run out to approxi- mately $490 million. The obligation curve shows the various com- ponent items during the construction period. The chart (fig. D-12) illustrates the C. of F. procured plant value of KSC planned through fiscal year 19~'0. You can see it increases to approximately $890 million. This is an indication of the scope of FIGuiu~ D-6 PAGENO="1134" KSC APOLLO SUPPORT CONTRACTOR MANPOWER (R & D) -~ FY 67 FY 68 FY 69 FIGURE D-7 work that KSC must manage This plan, which has been under activa tion and is almost complete today, will continue to require considerable effort for day-to-day operations and maintenance. To pictorially illustrate some of the major items contributing to our plan value, I would like to show you some before and after photo- graphs of our facilities These photographs represent the KSC industrial area as it appeared in 1963 (fig D-13) and as it appears today (fig D-14) As a ref erence point this is the KSC Headquarters building Figure D-15 is a photograph of the vehicle assembly building in 1963 and figure D-16 as it is today You will be visiting this facility later today. And finally here (fig. D-17) is launch complex 39, pad A, as it ap- peared in its early construction stages in 1964 Figure D-18 is an aerial view of the same launch pad with the 500 F vehicle in place. I believe you saw that milestone, Mr Chairman 1130 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 7000~ 4000. 3000 - 2000 - 1000- BENDIX -- I COMM./INSTR. SUPPT. CONTRACTOR ~L.SUP~ONTRACTOR I I I I I PAGENO="1135" 400 350 300 2763 250 44.8 101% FIGURE D-8 KSC APOLLO RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT PROJECT FUNDING SUMMARY (DOLLARS IN MILLIONS) KSC ____________________ FY.65 & PRIOR FY-66 FY-67 FY-68 - SATURN I _________________ ______________ _____________ _____________ UPRATED SATURN I _________________ ______________ _________________ _____________ SATURN V ______________ _________________ _____________ LSO'LAUNCH INST. _____________ ______________ ___________ _____________ SUP. DEVELOPMENT ___________ ______________ _________________ _____________ KSC TOTAL MSFC __________________ _______________ __________________ ______________ SATURN I _______ ______________ _________________ _____________ UPRATED SATURN I ________________ ______________ _________________ _____________ 69.7 MSC MSC TOTAL 18.4 22.5 49.6 44.3 TOTAL ALL CENTERS 149.5 157.0 I 335.1 342.5 FIGURE P4) S C OPNS 13.2 - - - 13.5 25.8 36.8 26.3 21.8 28.4 83.8 88.8 64.3 - 65.6 92.6 100.7 1.9 - 1.1 1.3 2.5 7.3 9.0 10.2 114.7 128.2 223.5 228.5 14.0 - - - 1.0 2.0 21.7 21.2 SATURN V 1.4 4.3 40.3 48.5 MSFC TOTAL 16.4 6.3 62.0 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1131 APOLLO R&D AND C OFF FUNDING SUMMARY FY 63 THRU FY 68 _________ 128.2 85.0 ~ 223.5 228.5 z 0 -J ~ 200 z 150 100 51 FY63 FY64 R & 0 10.1 44.8 C o( F 332.2 276.3 R & D Cof F -~ 6~ FY65 FY66 FY67 556 1282 2235 85.0 6.0 34.0 FY68 228.5 22.5 PAGENO="1136" 1132 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION KSC APOLLO C OF F FUNDING SUMMARY (DOLLARS IN MILLIONS) LC.39 443.756 -0- 29. 500 16.660 LC.34 37 97.859 -0- -0-. 5.725 OTHER 288.547 6,030 4.521 .210 400 IALLOTMENT I $ "OUTFI 3RD Fl ~ALLOT ÂME DEFLECTORS TTING 3RD HI BAY RING ROOM MENT J S ..*-FL 300 - ~ I-PAD B p,,. 4s ~4~,_MOBILE S "SWING ARM o~~-FILL FOR PAD B - j'4-START PROPELLANT j /.~_VA~ OUTFITTING LAUNCHERS, P S'4-PAD A & CRAWLERWAY 100 - ~,~""MOBILE LAUNCHERS, PHASE I j VAB FOUNDATIONS & STEEL ~?,~-CRAWLER TRANSPORTERS *~s~-_CANAL_&_FILL_FOR_VAB_&_PAD_A -PROPELLANT SY ()BILE LAUNCHE~ & CRAWLERWAY ERVICE STRUCTUR S SYSTEMS, PAD A HASE II STEMS, PAD B PHASE III - E FY65 & PRIOR FY-66 FY67 FY-68 TOTAL 830.162 34 .021 22 .595 6.030 FIGURE D-1O LAUNCH COMPLEX 39 COST RUNOUT FY65 FY66 500 FY63 FY64 FY67 FY68 0 z 0 FIGURE D-11 PAGENO="1137" z 0 -J -J z -J -J 0 0 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION C OF F PROCURED PLANT VALUE (CUMULATIVE) FIGURE D-13.-KSC industrial area in 1963. 76-265 0-67-pt. 2-72 1133 FISCAL YEARS FIGURE 12-D PAGENO="1138" 1134 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE D-14.-KSC industrial area in 1967. Fiounu D-15.-Vehicle assembly building in 1963. PAGENO="1139" 1968 NASA ATJTTIORIZATION 1135 FIGURE D-16.-Vehicle assembly building in 1967. FIGURE D-17.-Launch complex 39, pad A in 1964. PAGENO="1140" 1136 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION Over the past year, we have had some troubles, and here is an event which I thought would be of interest to you. Figure D-19 is the liquid oxygen storage tank at pad A. This drawing (fig. D-20) will be used to illustrate the operations of this facility and the problem that occurred. The lox tank is a large tank, as you can see. The outlet pipe is located as shown in the figure. It has an outlet out to the pads, through the I joint and by the redundant lines. These two pumps, each capable of 10,000 gallons flow per minute, serve the two outlet lines. From the T the line goes in this direction through a manual valve, through an automatic valve, which could be actuated remotely, then through the pump and up to the pad. At the time the accident occurred, this particular line (fig. D-21) was being used. What happened was that suddenly this pipe broke as shown. An analysis showed the following series of events to have occurred: (1) The manual valve was opened and then the automatic valve started to open by remote control; (2) as the second valve started to open, gas against the face of the valve came through very quickly; (3) suddenly the gas was followed by a wall of liquid oxygen which impinged on the valve element opening against the flow of liquid, and the forces were such that it broke the pipe; and (4) the section at the flexible connection broke, as you can see. A point that I would like to make is that the operation just described is, in fact, an R. & D. effort. The flow of liquid oxygen through this pipe is 10,000 gallons a minute. Nobody has done that before. We FIGURE D-18.-Launch complex 39D with vehicle 500 F in place. PAGENO="1141" VENT LINE CHECK VALVE- 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1137 FIGURE D-19.----Liquid oxygen storage tank at launch complex 39, pad A. LC-39A LOX FACILITY OUTER SHELL DIA. 68' 8-5/8W ID INNER SHELL DIA. 62' 9~ ID 14~ DISCHARGE & MAIN FILL FIGURE D-20 PAGENO="1142" 1138 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION are using 18-inch lines. Nobody has transported liquid oxygen at that rate through 18-inch lines before. This particular break occurred on August 20. In 1 calendar month, September 20, this particular liquid oxygen tank had been refilled, the correction of the deficiencies had been redesigned, and it was back in operation. Mr. WA000NNER. Was the solution to open the se~cond valve manu- ally? Mr. SHINKLE. No. A recirculation and precooling system was in- stalled in front of the second valve so that there would always be liquid against the face of the valve rather than gas. Mr. WA000NNER. Couldn't you have done the same thing by simply opening that second valve manually and allowing enough time to elapse to be sure that liquid was against that valve to prevent the gas from doing what you described? Mr. SrnNKu~. Experiments were conducted on opening the second valve very slowly to allow the built-up gas to escape without creating the severe shock of impinging with the liquid oxygen. These experi- ments failed, since upon slight opening of the valve the quick release of gas occurred and the shock forces were again experienced. There- fore, we solved the problem by installing the recirculating system, which eliminated the gas build-up at the valve interface. It became apparent last year that, to meet all our program commit- ments and milestones, we had to develop management systems which FIGURE D-21.-Liquid oxygen line failure. PAGENO="1143" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1139 would provide KSC with insight into the status of activities and the ability to identify problems before they became serious. This chart- figure D-22-is one of these management systems. We are pulling together information from the program control rooms established at LC-39, LC-37, and the spacecraft room, into a central Apollo Program Management Center. These program control rooms were originally designed to do the planning that is necessary for activation. With the transition from activation to operations, these program control rooms are being used for the planning necessary for the operations management of these areas. At the Apollo Program Management Center, program and center management is provided with up-to-the-minute data on site activa- tion progress, identification of current and potential problems, sched- ule impacts, and factors upon which to base future planning. This photograph-figure D-23-shows a segment of the program control room at LC-39. You can see on the display boards examples of the charts and systems under analysis. Finally, relative to this management system, I would like to show you one of the techniques, PERT, that is used to plan an effort as large as LC-39. Figure D-24 is an example of a PERT trend chart (prepared on a biweekly basis), for pad A, the crawlerway, and the crawler-transporter. APOLLO PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CENTER PROVIDES PROGRAM VISIBILITY & CONTROL 1. SCHEDULE - ANALYSIS & REVIEWS - PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION - CORRECTIVE ACTION 2. PROGRAM PLANS - ASSESSMENTS - DECISIONS FIGURE D-22 PAGENO="1144" 1140 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 11-23.-Program control room at launch complex 39. SITE ACTIVATION PERT TRENDS BY FAC. 500F- 1 501 FIRST FLOW FACILITY PAD A, CM & CT REP. DATE 1966 1967 oh IF_IM AIM_liii IA_I_sb IN D J iF MbA_hM_Ji 10 - 0 : COMPLETE FIGURE D-24 PAGENO="1145" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1141 When we started this chart, the availability of these particular facilities was 19 weeks behind schedule. By analyzing the various things that seemed to be out-of-line timewise, working on them as individual items, or planning around them, we brought the avail- ability up to the scheduled time by January. In April we realized suddenly that a certain requirement for this particular facility was 20 weeks behind schedule. This requirement happened to be the use of the facility in September for the 500 F operation. The General Electric Co. was supposed to furnish a hazard monitoring system; that is, a monitoring system that would tell us if any hydrogen was leaking for a hydrogen operation neces- sary in August. We got the General Electric Co. to furnish a part of that system which would be useful for this particular operation on time. We therefore brought the facility back to a time when it could be completed and usable on schedule. This is what we refer to as a work-around. The whole hazard monitoring system wasn't going to be furnished, but that part that was necessary for that particular task was ready. This PERT technique is used quite a bit within the Apollo program to give us the program visibility needed to exert our efforts in proper priority to stay on schedule. Another management problem is the interrelation of configuration management logistics and data management as reflected in figure D-25. These things are all mutually dependent because, without good data management or configuration management, you don't have good logis- tics, and vice versa, There are policy directives from headquarters, but they are general in nature, so we have had to fit these systems to our program require- ments. We started local training programs to top and middle management and operational supervisors. We integrated the three systems that are mentioned and have benefited by eliminating duplication and having a method of measuring accomplishments. `I have shown here just one chart (fig. D-26) which shows one of these `measures of accomplish- ment. We have always to consider changes in our hardware that arc neces- sitated by changes in flight hardware. This chart illustrates inter- face revision notices resulting from such hardware changes. In the past 15 months we have spent, approximately $31.4 million for equip- ment changes. At the same time we have avoided what would have been an additional $11 million in cost. We do not know whether such a savings would have been possible without this formal system. How- ever, we know today that because of conscientious utilization of con- figuration management disciplines our personnel have avoided in- curring over $11 million of officially requested changes. In summary (fig. D-27), I would like to say that we have met our goals through the past year, and w~ have met milestones within the program needs. We have established management systems and controls which I hope are quite effective. We are ready to go into the new phase which I believe was dramatically illustrated by the chart showing the C. of F. and R. & D. planning. PAGENO="1146" * ELIMINATING DUPLICATION * MEASURE ACCOMPLISHMENTS FIGURE D-2~ That's all. Chairman TEAGUE:. Questions, please? Mr. SHINKLE. Now, gentlemen, I would like to turn over to Mr. Hock who will brief you on the Center's Apollo Applications program. Mr. HooK. Mr. Chairmau, gentlemen, you have just been through a rather detailed report on the Apollo program (fig. E-1). I want to give you a broad view of the activities that we foresee for the future of Kennedy Space Center. Some of you were a.t Marshall Space Flight Center some time back and got a rather detailed view of the Apollo Applications program. For the sake of those who did not, I am going to hurry through a description of the mission shown graph- ically in the next slide (fig. E-2). The spacecraft is launched with an uprated Saturn I carrying an Apollo command and service module and a camera system into a low earth orbit where it will perform a photography mission for about 5 days. Chairman TEAGUE.. Kurt, we have already seen this. We saw it at Huntsville, we saw it at Doug]as, and North American. 1142 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION APOLLO MANAGEMENT SYSTEM LOGISTICS CONFIGURATION ~. ,... DATA MANAGEMENT MANAGEMENT * CUSTOMFITTOKSC * LOCAL TRAINING PROGRAM * INTEGRATION OF SYSTEMS PAGENO="1147" z 0 -J -J 0 0 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION J~HN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT * MET OUR MAJOR GOALS * MET MILESTONES WITHIN PROGRAM NEEDS * ESTABLISHED MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND CONTROLS 1143 KSC IS PREPARED FOR ITS SHIFT IN MAJOR EMPHASIS FROM SITE ACTIVATION TO LAUNCH OPERATION AND THE OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF ITS LAUNCH SITE. FIGURE I)-27 APPROVED DISAPPROVED FIGURE D-26 SUMMARY PAGENO="1148" 1144 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE E-i 1968 AAP MISSION PROFILE TIME FIGURE E-2 PAGENO="1149" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1145 Mr. HOCK. We will rush through, then. Slide No. 6 (fig. E-3), please, on the screen. Our role in this program is to accept the Apollo hardware, just as it has been described today by Messrs. Petrone and Shinkle. We will perform modifications ~tnd checkouts of that hardware in the existing Apollo facilities. We will perform modifications of Apollo hardware to the AAP configuration in existing facilities such as the operation and checkout building in the VAB, where the S-IVB stage will be converted to the workshop configuration. The next slide (fig. E-4) indicates the new activity that we fore- see at the Center for the AAP peculiar hardware. The airlock module that you have heard about, and the Apollo telescope mount will under- go integration with the launch vehicle and checkout facilities. We expect to perform checkout and modification of the AAP hard- ware in the existing facilities such as these you see here in the fore- ground and the operation and checkout building shown in the back- ground (fig. E-5). That will require, of course, that we perform some careful scheduling to insure we don't interfere with the ongoing Saturn V Apollo program. The next (fig. E-6) is an artist's picture of the airlock module `being transferred from the operation and checkout building to the vehicle assembly `building for integration with the launch vehicle. Looking even further into the future and following the program that Dr. von Braun talked to you about at Huntsville, we are planning for the launch of lunar exploration vehicles and Voyager in the 1973 FIGURE E-3 PAGENO="1150" 1146 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURF~ E-4 FIGUB~ E-5 PAGENO="1151" 1908 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1147 time period. Both of these are launched with Saturn V launch vehicles, and our principal problems are concerned with handling of new spacecraft which are considerably different from those we are now geared for. Space stations may also be flown during this time period. We also are considering planetary missions using uprated Saturn V launch vehicles in the 1975 time period. Finally, nuclear rocket vehicles can be launched from the existing site with only limited facility modifications. Very quickly, sir, that's it. Dr. Dir~&xs. Gentlemen, the message that we want to bring out is twofold. One is that the new organization of the Kennedy Space Center was made for a multiprogram application. We are establish- ing our Apollo Applications program organization and will establish a Voyager program office, if and when the program should be ap- proved, such that the new elements can be integrated into the total organization in the most effective way that we can conceive. The second message is this-with the facilities we have I think we can accommodate the new hardware by early design inputs into the configurations as they emerge; that with minor-hopefully, minor changes we can make the maximum use of existing facilities. Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, if you would like, we could look at General Miller's presentation and have lunch, and at lunch, we could talk about the Visitor Information Center. I would like to introduce General Miller, who is in charge of our resources management office. FIGum~ E-6 PAGENO="1152" 1148 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Mr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, the speakers. who came before me have explained in some detail the programs and funding levels proposed for the "Research and development" appro- priation and the "Construction of facilities" appropriation. My pur- pose is to speak to the third KSC appropriation, the "Administrative operations" appropriation and the principal activities it supports. This chart (fig. F-i) is now in your hands, gentlemen. It was the last chart used by Dr. Debus. It outlines briefly the dollar value of the NASA effort managed here. The top line shows the total of the research and development appropriation applied at KSC. The next summary line relates to the construction of facilities appropriation to which General Shinkle has already spoken. The bottom summary line is labeled administrative operations. This appropriation request totals $99.6 million for fiscal year i968, or about 20 percent of the total dollar value represented on this chart. Since civil service manpower is one of the main programs financed by this appropriation, I would like to speak to it first. This is similar to Mr. Siepert's chart (fig. F-2). It shows the proposed distribu- tion of civil service manpower by organization in fiscal year i968. Our fiscal year 1967-68 program indicates 2,785 permanent and tem- porary spaces. They will be distributed as shown. The big authori- zations are to the operating organizations, as shown by the blocks on the bottom line of the chart. You will note that the director of launch operations, in total, has 925 spaces, about one-third of the KSC total. The director of technical support and the director of design engineer- ing together have another third of the total resources. The spaces as- JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER ACTUAL AUTHORIZED PROPOSED FY 1966 FY 1967 FY 1968 [~~EARCH AND DEVELOPMEN~j 6 OFFICE OF MANNED SPACE FLIOHT ~j~Q7 JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 128, 859 224, 050 232, 200 GEOROE C. MARSHALL SPACE FLT CTR 6,261 61, 982 69, 689 MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 34, 138 (EST) 51, 275 (EST) 45, 880 (EST) OFFICE OF SPACE SCIENCE & APPLICATIONS JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 4,647 3,987 3,332 OTHER CENTERS 40,616 ~EST) 40, 015 (EST) 40, 000 (EST) OFFICE OF ADVANCED RESEARCH & TECHNOLOGY 215 -0- 100 JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 193 -0- - 100 OTHER CENTERS 22 -0- I~CONSTRUCTION OF FACÜ~1~ OFFICE OF MANNED SPACE FLIOHT 6,030 34, 021 22, 895 OFFICE OF SPACE SCIENCE & APPLICATIONS 887 1,737 2,290 FADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIO~] 99,575 FIGURE F-i PAGENO="1153" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1149 signed to the director of installation support and the director of administration comprise about one-fourth of the total, and the remainder is distributed in the small organizations at the top. The Apollo Program Manager has 104, and Apollo Applications will have 40. Our total spaces include 65 temporary spaces, of which two- thirds are in the cooperative program and one-third is in the Youth Opportunity campaign. This chart (fig. F-3) shows how our civil service manpower is dis- tributed by product. It is a graphic portrayal of the personnel tabulation shown in the 1968 budget book. The top block, the cross hatched one, as you can read the legend, in- creases slightly in fiscal ye~tr 1968 due to increased manpower in the Apollo Applications program. The white block in the center represents the strength assigned to the Apollo program. There is no applicable change between 1967 and 1908. The bottom block shows manpower alined to support operations. The proportion between 1967 and 1968 is also unchanged. Nearly half of this support block is identified as research and development support. The next chart (fig. F-4) shows the present distribution of the civil service work force based on the skills they possess. Please note that since 1964, as civil service manpower has increased, substantially all of the increase has been in the top layer, the professional engineering and scientific categories. In this group we have currently 45 percent of our manpower, and with the engineering technicians in the layer just below, we have 61 percent of the total KSC manpower. JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, NASA AS OF JUNE 30, 1968 DIRECTOR TOTAL CIVIL SERVICE 2,785 __________________________________ CS4 DEPUTY DIRECTOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR CENTER CENTER MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS ______ ~ECUTIV~J CS-9 ________________________ I DIRECTOR r~PUBLIC J [ QUALITY AFFAIRS ASSURANC~J _______________ CS-18 CS-32 CHIEF COUNSEL CS- 12 FIGURE F-2 76-26~ O-&7-pt. 2--73 PAGENO="1154" 1150 2800 2600 2400 2200 2000 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0! i 968 NASA AUTHORIZATION JOHN F KENNEDY SPACE CENTER PROGRAM DISTRIBUTION OF MANPOWER ~ GEMINI ULO ADVANCED MISSIONS ~ GEMINI CONCLUDED FY66 1111:1111 APOLLO SUPPORT 6 FIGUOUS F-3 JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER CIVIL SERVICE DISTRIBUTION BY CLASS FY-1968 PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERING & SCIENTIFIC 3000 2750 2500 2250 2000 1750 1500 1250 1000 750 ENGINEERING TECHNICIANS __________ 1_ I BUSINESS PROFESSIONAL 500 250 FY64 11111 ~~~iii J CLERICAL FY65 FY-66 FY67 FY-68 FIGURE F-4 FY-69 PAGENO="1155" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1151 The layer marked business/professional is about 18 percent of our total, and this represents professional types in all disciplines other than engineering and scientific, so that, in total, our professional people amount to 63 percent of the Center authorization. At this point I want to speak to the KSC manpower management program and discuss the validation of manpower requirements. Until recently manpower resources were allocated by Dr. Debus personally after each director had presented his requirements. This process generally took several days. This method is excellent in some respects and is particulaly useful to a small organization, but large establishments are such that it requires quite a lot of time when detailed inquiries are necessary. We are faced with the need to develop a better method of validating our manpower requirements because our civil service program has leveled out, and in addition we need to validate the effectiveness of the distribution of the manpower spaces we have made in the new KSC organization. Considering these factors, the staff recommended, and Dr. Debus approved, a manpower validation program based on making surveys in depth, and we have now moved into that program. A small but competent professional staff has been authorized and has now been hired. The first survey of a major organizational element is just *about completed. We are confident this method will improve the ef- fectiveness of KSC manpower management. This chart (fig. F-5) portrays the cost of our civil service manpower program in millions of dollars. Compensation shown on the top line includes all pay items such as regular pay, overtime pay, holiday pay, shift differential pay, and others. The items included in the personnel benefits are self-explanatory. The fiscal year 1968 increase in compensation is caused by three fac- tors, an increase in the average man-years of employment from 2,591 in fiscal year 1967 to 2,683 in fiscal year 1968, in-grade step increases as authorized by law, and a pay increase averaging 6 percent for our professional scientific and engineering people. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER PERSONNEL COSTS (IN MILLIONS) ACTUAL ESTIMATED PROPOSED FY66 FY67 FY68 PERSONNEL COMPENSATION $27.8 830.9 S32.8 PERSONNEL BENEFITS 1.8 2.3 2.4 CONTRIBUTION RETIREMENT FUND CONTRIBUTION EMPLOYEE LIFE INSURANCE CONTRIBUTION EMPLOYEE HEALTH INSURANCE INCENTIVE AWARDS FIGURE F-5 PAGENO="1156" 1152 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION In response to an earlier question about overtime, I would say now- I do not have a chart-our overtime program for fiscal year 1968 is the same as 1967. It is a level program for a total of $2,180,000. This chart (fig. F-6) speaks to our temporary duty travel program The program is financed by this appropriation and is important to the accomplishment of KSC responsibilities. This chart shows that our travel program by dollars per fiscal year is unchanged for fiscal year 1968 at $1.1 million. To give you an idea of where. this travel is accomplished I have added an entry at the bottom called travel destination. You will note that 63 percent of our travel is to other NASA organizations, 19 percent to contractor facilities and 18 percent to others. This is based on a sample of 800 trips taken over the past 2 months. I think it reflects the interdependence of the NASA centers and the NASA contractor effort. It is also an expression of the highly technical nature of our business. At this point I want to recall a chart-figure F-7-used earlier by Dr. Debus, which shows the principal KSC responsibilities. I direct your attention to statement No. 5, which reads, "Furnish on-site tech- nical and administrative support for all NASA programs. This support is furnished to our civil service manned functions and the contractors at KSC and the Cape. The administrative operations appropriation has a major role in meeting this responsibility. It funds the support which is commonly KENNEDY SPACE CENTER TEMPORARY DUTY TRAVEL PROGRAM COST OF TRAVEL (IN MILLIONS) ACTUAL ESTIMATED PROPOSED FY66 FY67 FY68 Sn Si] ANNUAL COST DESTINATION OF TRAVEL NASA PERCENTAGE OF TRIPS MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 63% WESTERN TEST RANGE NASA HEADQUARTERS CONTRACTOR FACILITIES 19% OTHER 18% FIGURE F-6 PAGENO="1157" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATIO* 1153 PRINCIPAL KSC RESPONSI~ILITIES 1. PREPARE, CHECKOUT, AND LAUNCH ASSIGNED NA~A SPACE VEHICLES. 2. ASSURE FLIGHT HARDWARE CONFIGURATION 4NTROL BY DEVELOPMENT CENTERS. DEVELOP NEW LAUNCHING CONCEPTS AND PR~VIDE LAUNCH REQUIREMENTS AFFECTING LAUNCH VEHICLE A~D S/C DESIGN. 4. DESIGN, INSTALL, AND OPERATE LAUNCH FACILITIES, INCLUDING GSE. 5. FURNISH ON-SITE TECHNICAL AND ADMINISTRA IVE SUPPORT FOR ALL NASA PROGRAMS. 6. PROVIDE NASA A SINGLE CHANNEL FOR OBTA NING LAUNCH SUPPORT FROM THE EASTERN TEST RANGE. 7. ASSURE GROUND SAFETY COMPLIANCE FOR AL~ NASA MISSIONS. FIGURE F-7 classed as institutional, sometimes called admini~trative and base sup- port. In contrast, the research and developmenl~ `appropriation funds support activity commonly classed as technical. First, to give you an idea of the range of functions performed to meet this responsibility, I will list some types o~ technical support we supply. On this chart-figure F-8-you will notice such technical items as chemical laboratory support, machine ~hop, and other types of technical shop support. Items like propell~tnts and communica- tions are obviously directly essential to launch' operations and tests. These facilities and services are funded by KS'C ~ontracts and are paid for by research and development funds. Representative WA060NNER. How much mor~ey are you spending for hurricane protection? Mr. MILLER. Pardon me? Representative WA000NNER. How much mor~ey are you spending for hurricane protection? Dr. DEBUS. That's mostly on facilities. It cc~st much more if they are hurricane proof. Mr. MILLER. I can't identify the specific dol~ars, but obviously it varies. When a hurricane warning comes we sari4bag, tie down things and, of course, if we have no hurricane alert *e don't provide this service. Dr. DEBUS. We move a lot of things. We took 500 F back `because the hurricane was brewing. The alarm came at 1 p.m. and it was secured by 9 or 10 p.m. back in the Vehicle Assembly Building. Mr. MILLER. It could be very expensive, and, if it were not `done, it might be even more expensive. Mr. SIEPERT. As far as `the staff is concerned with `this, `there are hundreds involved if there is an actual threat, but, in terms of a con- tinuing planning job on it, we focus on one contractor a full-time re- sponsibility, really, on one man to keep constantly thinking of `this, PAGENO="1158" 1154 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION KENNEDY SPACE CENTER SUPPORT SERVICES (FUNDED BY RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT) CHEMICAL ANALYSIS MATERIALS TEST & CALIBRATION MACHINE SHOP GEOPHYSICAL ELECTRICAL SHOP PROPELLANTS ELECTRONICS SHOP ELECTRICAL INTERFERENCE MEASUREMENT MECHANICAL SHOP TRACKING HURRICANE PROTECTION TELEMETRY COMMUNICATIONS QUALITY INSTRUMENTATION DATA PROCESSING - SCIENTIFIC FIGURE F-8 but each organization has the part time commitment of an individual who works specifically on that. Mr. MILLER. The next chart-figure F-9- lists other support serv- ices These are services of i somewhat less technical nature but never theless essential. The title of this chart is somewhat self-explanatory, but I want to cite some examples which stress the importance of these services The first listed service, utilities operation and maintenance, takes care of, among other things, the major electrical grid installed here on the KSC. This grid consists of 85 miles of underground cable, 35 miles of aerial cable, and 326 individual substations `md switching centers as `m part of the complex The electricity it supplies is used to operate, for example, all the air conditioning equipment in our cleanrooms It operates the cranes and hoists which you will see lifting the elements in the Vehicle Assembly Building and elsewhere It powers our shops `mnd our numerous other uses for electricity Photographic service is another good example of an essential serv ice. Based on an analysis of units produced in the first half of fiscal year 1967, 66 percent of the motion picture footage, So percent of the still photography, and ~8 percent of the microfilm production was in direct support of research and deve]opment requirements With respect to supply operations, which is listed at the bottom of the chart, and on the same 6-month sampling basis, 96 percent of the PAGENO="1159" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1155 issues were made to research and development oriented activities. All of these support services are provided by KSC contract and are paid for by the administrative operations funds. The third group is purchased by KSC from other Government agen- cies, as the next chart (fig. F-lO) shows. The services provided by the Air Force are principally related to Eastern and Western Test Range support. (Please note the footnote.) We have considerable technical support from the Air Force, too. With respect to vehicle service provided by GSA, for example, `72 percent of the vehicles operated, omitting the tour vehicles, are direedy assigned and supported by the research and development activities. These services are all obtained by cross-servicing arrangements with the other departments and paid for by administrative operations funds. The fourth group of services (fig. F-li) is purchased through the KSC Procurement and Contracting Office. Here I want to cite some examples of support being supplied from our fiscal year 1967 funds. Our electricity used, for instance, runs about 20 million kilowatt-hours per month. This is equivalent to con- sumption by a city of something like 60,000 people. It will cost us about $4.2 million this year. Gas will cost about $200,000, and water about $64,000. With respect to supplies and materials, our costs will KENNEDY SPACE CENTER SUPPORT SERVICES (FUNDED BY ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS) UTILITIES OPERATION & MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE & REPAIR PHOTOGRAPHY ENGINEERING SERVICES REPRODUCTION GRAPHICS FIRE PROTECTION PUBLICATIONS SECURITY & POLICE MAIL SERVICE SAFETY ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH HURRICANE PROTECTION INSECT & RODENT CONTROL TRANSPORTATION REFUSE COLLECTION QUALITY TRAINING SUPPLY OPERATIONS DATA PROCESSING - BUSINESS FIGURE F-9 PAGENO="1160" 1156 1968 NASA AIJTHOIUZATION KENNEDY SPACE CENTER SUPPORT SERVICES PROVIDED BY OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES (FUNDED BY ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS) US AIR FORCE * MAINTENANCE, REPAIR AND OPERATION OF FACILITIES SECURITY & POLICE ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH SUPPLY SERVICE TRANSPORTATION CONTRACTOR PRICE ANALYSIS GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATRDN VEHICLES AND TRANSPORTATION SERVICES COMMUNICATION - FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICE DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY AUDIT SERVICES DEFENSE CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION SERVICE CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION *Several Technical Services Funded by Research & Development Appropriation are also provided. FIGURE F-iD be about $2.5 million this year. All of these services are paid for by the administrative operations funds. This chart (fig. F-19) summarizes the proposed KSC funding of requirements in the administrative operations appropriation for fiscal year 1968. They reflect our forecast made in December of greater sup- port requirements for maintenance, repair, and operation facilities, added requirements for security and fire protection, and for supplies, materials, utilities, and communications to support them. One-third of the increase is attributable to personnel costs such as increased man-years of civil service employment, in-step wage in- creases, and a pay increase for professional engineers and scientific personnel. That concludes my presentation, Mr. Chairman. Chairman T~AGUE. Yes, sir. Thank you, sir. IRepresentative WAEIOONNER. I think it would be safe for me to say that it was an oversimplification when you started out by saying that money was the chief commodity in this phase of the operation, was it not? Dr. DEBUS. We will have lunch at this time, and Mr. Siepert will talk about the Visitor Information Center. PAGENO="1161" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION .1157 KENNEDY SPACE CENTER OTHER SUPPORT (FUNDED BY ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS) UTILITIES PURCHASED SUPPLIES & MATERIALS RENTALS COMMUN ICATIONS EQU IPMENT ALTERATION, REPAIR & MINOR CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES FIGUIU~ F-il KENNEDY SPACE CENTER SUMMARY OF FY 1968 ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS (IN MILLIONS) FY 1966 FY 1967 FY 1968 PERSONNEL COSTS AND BENEFITS $29.8 $33.6 $35.5 TRAVEL PROGRAM .8 1.1 1.1 INSTALLATION OPERATION 51.3 58.0 63.0 TOTALS $81 .9 $92.7 $99.6 FIGURE F-12 PAGENO="1162" 1158 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION Mr SIEPERT Mr Chairman, the Kennedy Space Center believes the committee will be interested in `t progress report on the plans for handling the general public in their desire to see our facilities while they are in operation There is no budget request before you for new money to construct a visitors' facility. What I am going to describe to you is a project that is within currently available appropriations and in accordance with a previous authorization by the Congress to provide ~ isitoi informtion facilities here at Merritt Island. We want first to give you an idea of the two locations we are dis. cussing. Here (fig. G-1) is the familiar outline of Cape Kennedy. You are here at the present time, in the Merritt Island industrial area. Over here to the west is the Florida mainland, with route U.S. 1 going north and south Immediately east of U S 1 on the NASA Causeway and directly in front of our KSC gate No 3 is the site where ~ e presently operate a temporary bus tour terminal There is ilso t small space exhibits building of 2,100 square feet where dis plays are iv'ulible for visitors to inspect free of charge The public tours, which began last July, stirt from this point and go across the NASA Causeway over the Indian River, then visit the cape, and finally tour complex 39. The total trip occupies about 21/2 hours and covers nearly 60 miles. It is conducted by well-trained TWA guides who drive leased, 37-passenger buses. The buses are equipped with sound systems for the escort's use with his own narra- tive plus appropriate tape recorded documentary These tours have LOCATION OF VISITOR INFORMATION CENTER D~TON~ & ~ N FxGuIu~i G-1 PAGENO="1163" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1159 become an outstanding public attraction. The are a superb comple- ment to the Visitor Information Center which is now under con- struction. The Visitor Information Center (VIC) project has been located at this site, (indicating) which is about a mile and a half to the west of the Merritt Island industrial area. This means that visitors in the future will be driving their own autos into the Kennedy Space Center, parking here on Merritt Island, and seeing selected space exhibits and orientation films without charge. If they choose to do so, they can take escorted bus tours from this site. This more central location permits us to do a more efficient operation, and we believe it is im- portant for the people to feel they have actually visited inside the Kennedy Space Center, whether or not they choose to take the tour. Here is an aerial view of the present temporary location on the main- land (fig. G-2). Just beyond is the KSC security control gate No. 3 through which the tour buses will pass. We built only temporary structures and portable sanitary utilities here: The exhibit structure is a small Butler-type building. Nearby, are chemical toilet facilities mounted on movable skids. There are two trailers with a roofed-over space in between which is used by the tours contractor, Trans World Airlines, to handle ticket sales, briefing of guides, and tour management. Outside, is a Mercury-Redstone rocket in the configuration Alan Shepard and Gus Grissom used for their two suborbital flights. FIGURE G-2. Aerial View of Temporary Visitor Information Center. PAGENO="1164" 1160 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION By this coming summer, the present improvised facility will be completely inadequate to handle the crowds who will come to see KSC. These facilities were put up hurriedly in order to meet great pressures to start public tours without waiting some 18 mcffths before a permanent center could be made ready. The idea was that we would use it for a year or two until we had acquired `some tour experience plus a permanent visitor information center. Con- currently, design work had been undertaken by Welton Becket Asso- ciates of New York City. However, whe.n the permanent design work was finally completed last fall, it was evident that the cost of con- structing and equipping that design was substantially above that which the architect had originally programed. The estimated price had risen so much-to an estimated $2,487,000-that it appeared use- less to proceed with the full construction, at least with the limited re- sources we had available. So, we have proceeded with an alternative approach which gives most of what we need, without raising the costs beyond our current availability of $1,122,000. Figure G-3 shows a proposed temporary facility to be erected on the permanent visitor information center site. This facility is to be placed midway between the permanent~ visitor information center location and the parking lots in the rear. Under this plan, the site can be substantially developed with utilities, proper grade, adequate roadways, full electrical and sewer connections, and other improve- ments in line with the master site plan which was a part of the perma- nent visitor information center design by Welton Becket Associates. We are installing in the present program all site development features which would continue to be used in any subsequent permanent opera- Fiaum~ G-3. Proposed visitor information center at Kennedy Space Center PAGENO="1165" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1161 tion. At any later time when our experience indicates to the Congress that there should be more adequate tourist facilities, we can erect the permanent facility in the area north of the temporary structures; at no point would we need to disrupt the tours in order to accomplish the permanent construction. Dr. D1~BUS. But we cannot accomplish this within the present allo- cation of funds. Mr. SIEPERT. That's right. Dr. DEBTJ5. Not the permanent facili~ty. Mr. SIEPERT. We can prepare the total site and build the temporary buildings for $1,096,000. We appreciate that the committee will want to know how these temporary buildings compare with the permanent construction which was designed for us by Welton Becket Associates of New York City. This-figure G-4-is a model of the winning Becket design which was chosen as superior to four other designs submitted by competing architects. We will retain the basic site plan intact. The water area or moat is needed for land excavation to build up the proper grade. The full moat, however, will not be dredged on all sides unless we later proceed with the permanent design. Nor would the stone curb- ing around this water area be installed at this time. The temporary exhibit structure is actually being located to the south of the building site of the permanent visitor information center. FIGURE 0-4.-The design proposed by Weiton Becket was selected of five com- peting designs proposed by nationally known architects. PAGENO="1166" 1162 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Chairman TEAGrE. How much will I his one cost? Mr. SIEPERT. This one will cost. $1,096,000. Chairman TEAGUE. 1 am talking about. this one, up here. Mr. SIEPERT. Oh, I'm sorry, sir. The total cost. of the Becket- designed facility, if constructed on its present scale, would be $2,487,000. However, our recent experienc.e with public tours has demonstrated that we require more access roads and more parking spaces than the 250 spaces which the original Becket. design would provide. To overcome this with better access roads and 800 rather than 500 spaces, the adjusted total cost would be $2,700,000. Mr. WINN. I can't. tell from here, is that. a one or two-story building? Mr. SIEPERT. rfhe permnanemit VIC is actually a high-ceiling, single- st.ory poured-concrete structure. It would be built on a modular base with, I believe, 16-foot floor-to-ceiling clearance. The temporary iriforinatiou center is planned as a prefabricated metal structure. It is adequate in size and layout to take care of our visitor load to the same extent as would the permanent Becket desigmi. The struct.ure on the left has two small theaters with benches for 250 people each and capable of showing orientation films on the space program. It also has space for some exhibits. In the building on the right are the main exhibits and visitors' services for our tour ticket sales, restrooms, vending machines, and souvenir art.icles. Finally, at the far right, is the bus loading shelter. Aithougli these are "prefabs," they will be quite satisfactory, from a deterioration standpoint, for the n~t 4 to 5 years. By that time, it sl1ould be evident the extent t.o which this area does become a permanent tourist. attraction as a national historical site and operational spaceport. The National Park Service has told us to plan on as many as 3 million visitors a year. If it reaches 3 million, this will not be an ade- quate facility, but it is adequa.te, we believe, to handle comfortably in excess of a million people a year. Mr. WINN. What does it run now? Mr. SIEPERT. The current rate we have had since July on the public tours would be about a half million visit.ors annually who actually do take the tour. Mr. WINN. Yes. Mr. SIEPERT. There has been a gradual buildup to date; some 230,- 000 people have made the tours since t.he end of July. However, that is only a portion of those who would come through a visitor informa- tion center- Mr. WINN. I realize that. Mr. SIEPERT (continuing). Which is free to them. The National Park Service estimates that only 50 perc.ent of t.hose who would come to such a visitor and exhibit center would, in fact, take the tours. The other half, for rea.sons of time and money, will be quit.e satisfied if t.hey can see dramatic exhibits and brief orientation films of what NASA is doing at this launch sit.e. So if nearly 250,000 persons have already visited for the tours alone, the total VIC load by next sum- iner will be at an annual rate of at least 1 million visitors. Dr. DEBUS. We have registered visitors by a sampling technique which covers about 50 States, haven't we? PAGENO="1167" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1163 Mr. SIEPERT. Figure G-5 shows visitors by major geographical regions. Chairman TEAGTJL If I understand what you are saying correctly, we are going to go ahead `with a million dollar temporary facility? Mr. SIEPERT. We have underway a construction project under which $613,000 will be invested in improvements that are directly usable now, as well as later, for the permanent site. We are going to develop the permanent site with all the grading, roads, utilities, and most of the parking needed for a permanent VIC' operation. That is half the cost right there. In addition, `the present contract includes $243,000 for the structures. These are temporary, but they are reusable. If at any point, it is decided by the Congress to replace them with permanent construction, these pref abs will have a salvage value when placed somewhere else on Merritt Island for warehousing, office, or shops space. The recovery value would be in the neighborhood of $150,000. The interior finishing and outfitting of the exhibit, projection space, and tourist accommodations will be a separate contract. The esti- mated cost is $240,000, and much of this would probably not be sal- vagable if the temporary VIC were abandoned. We have at the present time a fixed price contract for work which started about 2 weeks ago. The contractor is Houdaille-Duval of Jacksonville, Fla. They bid for the first two phases that I men- tioned: site grading, utilities and road development, and the prefab structures. Their bid was $838,550. The construction is on an ac- celerated basis so that we can move into these facilities in June 1967, at the start of the major influx of summer visitors. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER NASA TOURS MONTHLY VISITORS FY 67 IN THOUSANDS 70 60 TOTAL 231,478 50 40 ~I iiilii ~-f ,- ,-,-, ,-, [" ~ TOTAL ~JUL 18579 AUG 59302 SEP 16813 OCT 19095 NOV [DEC 24307 37535 JAN 29016 "PEB MAR APR [MAY 26031 JUN~'1 ~j `7 DAYS ONLY ** 20 DAYS ONLY FIGURE G-5 PAGENO="1168" 1164 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION There is one other comparison to explain: Did we select a less-ade- quate facility in terms of space and function when we shifted to a more economical type of construction? The Beckett design (fig. G-4) is a permanent and esthetically pleasing type of construction. It's beautifully done, as you see. But the actual space in that build- ing is 20,500 square feet of net space. The comparable space in the alternate or prefabricated structures is 20,800 net square feet, so we are bible functionally to do at least as good a job as we could with the other building. I think the committee might like to see how the tour volume fluctu- ates by months. A high-quality tour business depends upon precisely trained escorts who cannot easily be dropped or hired depending on sudden fluctuations in volume. Tourists, however, accept Florida's welcome mat on a seasonal basis. July and August are peak months. As soon as Labor Day arrives, the bottom drops out temporarily. Then it builds in December, drops back a little in January, and then builds up steadily until Easter. It will drop drastically just after Easter and then rebuild rapidly as soon as the children are out of school and the families visit Florida. We have quite a seasonal operation here. These people come from all over the United States and the world. We have no practicable way to identify the origin of everyone who comes in. We obtain statistics by analyzing the voluntary registration book. One-third of all the people who take the tour make it a point to register. That's rather interesting, because most of them don't register before they tour. They could. They make the tour first and, before returning to their cars, voluntarily go into the Exhibits Building, evi- dently to put into focus what they have seen here. There we have a guest book available, and about one-third sign it on their own initiative. This sample shows us (fig. G-6) that in the past 7 months, ap- proximately 31 percent are coming from the State of Florida, com- pared to 25 percent from the Midwest and 15 percent from the Mid- Atlantic States. It would be expected that Florida would be the best represented, particularly in the initial phase when our families have not previously had the opportunity to see where their fathers work. Florida tourist statistics show that, as far as visitor volume is con- cerned, the largest number of out-of-State tourists come from New York; the second largest is Illinois. But, they come from every State. Mr. WA000NNER. They may not be tourists; just be people wising up, looking for a better place to live. Mr. SIEPERT. We are happy to have them come, in view of the present weather up North. They are what you might call welcome snow- birds. Mr. WINN. It may be because people from the Midwest are well aware of the space program, too. Mr. SIEPERT. We hope so. I also have the actual numbers from each State. It impresses us that so many come from places quite far away, particularly the representation from Texas and California is surpris- ing. Perhaps the fact that the aerospace industry is heavily located there means they come to visit old friends who now work in launch services at the cape and Merritt Island, and so they come to see for themselves. We have also had many visitors from over 50 nations. PAGENO="1169" PERCENT 40 30 20 25 20 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION KENNEDY SPACE CENTER NASA TOURS VISITORS BY GEOGRAPNICAL ORIGIN BASED UPON VOLUNTARY GUEST BOOK REGISTRAT ION (APPROXIMATELY ONE-THIRD OF TOTAL ATTENDEES) FIGURE G-6 1165 AS OF FEBRUARY, 967 The comments that we have received are frankly loaded with praise. The appreciation of people who now have a chance to see launch sites in operation, where history is in the making each week-it just over- whelms them. Quite frankly, instead of sampling so much favorable comments, we try to track down every complaint. For example, our bathroom facilities are quite primitive at this out- post site near U.s. 1. Our drinking water is bottled; and our buses are noisy, because they are well-worn Greyhound-type buses which were acquired on short notice. There are occasional complaints about these creature comforts, and these can be corrected with the new facil- ities. However, on the substance of the tour itself, it is very gratify- ing to see the kind of grateful pilgrimage people make to come down to see what this new space age is all about. Mr. WAGGONNER. What do you charge for a tour? Mr. SIEPERT. The price for-the tour is $2.50 for an adult, and we have a youth rate of $1.25, and a child's rate, below 12 years of age, of 50 cents. This is for a tour that lasts between 21/4 and 2½ hours, and covers, as I indicated, both the Apollo facilities on Merritt Island and the Cape Kennedy launching sites. They go up ICBM row, see the Air Force Space Museum's collection of ballistic missiles, and stop off at the sites of the first space flight of Explorer I and the Mercury- Redstone manned launches. This is one of the reasons we want to re-create and re-equip pad 56 as it was when Shepard flew from there. Chairman Tiwrni~. What about groups? Boy Scouts? Mr. SIEPERT. We have developed a special educational lecture pro- gram for Boy Scouts and other organized youth groups. They make the tour at a special group rate of $1 per student. In addition, we use FLORIDA MID V MID SOUTH SOUTH NORTH ATLANTIC CENTRAL EAST WEST STATES VCITORS 23,7U0 1U,U7U 11640 7,033 5,513 3,444 3,434 1,772 408 PERCENT 31.3 249 15 3 9.3 7 3 4 5 4.5 2.3 6 76-265 0-67-pt. 2-74 PAGENO="1170" 1166 196.8 NASA AUTHORIZATION our own civil service people and some LTV contractor staff to give special space lectures in our auditorium to such school age groups. By advance registration, these groups are beginning to make trips from all over Florida and the nearby Southeastern States. Mr. Gordon Harris, the public affairs officer, can probably tell us the maxi- mum number of students we have had on one day. Mr. HARRIS. About 550 in these groups. Mr. SIEPERT. The special lecture lasts about 40 minutes and displays various launch vehicle and spacecraft models, and explains their development and the mechanics which govern their flight into space. These lectures are well received. It is, however, as the contractor points out to us, what would be called a loss leader, because this special program idles vehicle equipment and bus escorts while the lecture is presented But we feel these special arrangements for student age groups are something we ought to do, and do well Mr WA000NNER In consolidating the support services, one of the proposals was for reducing the number of contracts from seven to four You isolated two areas One was transportation for tours, you were going to detach yourself from this, and go to a separate contractor. If the Government is going to spend this money and going to charge a reasonable fee for the tours, we are not going to provide the facilities and give somebody a contract to get fat, also? Mr. SIEPERT. Our present tour experience gives us a good base for gaging what kind of money a concessionaire will make. Mr. WAGGONNER. You are going to monitor the control and not let him charge what he likes ~ Mr SIEPERT We control or approve his fee scales, the tour routes, the accuracy of the tour commentaries, and the prices of any products, services, or souvenirs that we approve for sale. We feel this is essen- tial in order that NASA can indeed retain responsibility ~for the char acter and quality of the tours. Mr. PARKER. But the contractor will have to furnish the buses, where the Government is now going in. Mr SIEPERT This is a significant capital investment The buses to do this 1ob may rim into several millions of dollars That's why we had the General Services Administration initially lease buses on a short term contract No operator could take the risk to buy buses for an uncertain and short term operation Mr WA000NNER The attitude prevalent is that it is the taxpayer's dollars, they should be able to see your installation for nothing ~ Mr. SIEPERT. Some people feel this way. We do not really believe that it is national policy, with respect to free admittance to national parks and other historicai places. Mr. WAGOONNER. There is now. It's in the law. Mr. PETRONE. In the tours we have arranged you can drive your own car. Mr WA000NNER We are rid of that policy We have a set fee estab lished by Congress for national parks in those areas now Mr. SIEPERT. But there is a fee? Mr. WAGGONNER. Right. Two years old. PAGENO="1171" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1167 Mr. SIEPERT. We have straddled this point for those folks who be- lieve they should not spend money to see such a tour. Every Sunday these facilities are open and you may drive through in your own car without charge. You may not stop, because we can't control the oper- ation that well. Visitors are given some explanatory literature, drive around, and get an idea of the general layout. Mr. WINN. What do you give to them? Mr. SIEPERT. To take away? Mr. WINN. Yes. What do they take home as a souvenir? Mr. SIEPERT. They receive a very brief pamphlet at the gate. From our standpoint, this is quite inadequate, and will be improved once a new concessionaire contractor is operating on a sound economic basis. Mr. WINN. Do these educational groups receive anything besides that? Mr. SIEPERT. Mr. Harris, the Director of Public Affairs? Do they give them anything there? Mr. HARRIS. Just the same, again. Mr. WINN. I think, this is my personal opinion, that if you are going to specialize in education groups you should give them some- thing to take home that is of educational benefit, and not a picture or brochure. Mr. SIEPERT. One suggestion which I might mention, is one of the many ideas that died. We considered this about a year and a half ago. It was suggested that we give these youngsters a paper cutout for assembly into a Saturn V rocket. It was a beautiful cutout. When we put it out for experimentation in certain classrooms, we found it was too frustrating to complete its assembly. Mr. WINN. That's a gimmick. I'm talking about something edu- cational. Mr. SIEPERT. That's the conclusion we reached. It was a gimmick. Mr. WAEKIONNER. I am talking about something that they could study in their classes. This is a gimmick. Mr. HARRIS. We have developed it for the schools. Mr. WAGGONNER. I See. Mr. HARRIS. We have material for the schools to use and special material designed to meet the needs of advanced educational activities. Mr. SIEPERT. There are extensive educational kits, but your sugges- tion is a good one. Why don't we produce a specific piece of material for certain age groups? Mr. WINN. You will have to do it with certain age groups. What are your age groups on the tour? What are their ages? Mr. HARRIS. We take them from babies up. As far as the school is concerned, we start with kindergarten and run on up. Mr. SIEPERT. Would you have any judgment as to what proportion of youngsters, Mr. Harris? Mr. HARRIS. No, I do not have the figures. Most of them fall in the group from the seventh grade to the 12th grade. Mr. SIEPERT. Well, that is t.he picture, and we believe that after this concessionaire competition, we will have a good, sound contract; any doubts as to whether we can control what the contractor does have been resolved w this particular experience. PAGENO="1172" 1168 196.8 NASA AUTHORIZATION Mr. WAGGONNER. You are not going to let the contractor have the souvenir concession? Mr. SIEPERT. Everything he sells must be approved by us. At the present time, the average revenue per participant is $2.57 per person, including tour costs. Mr. WINN. Haven't I seen in the papers somewhere that some of these vendors have set up on the highway, with merchandise, selling souvenirs outside? Mr. SIEPERT. There are none, let us say, hawking goods directly outside the gate. None of that area has been commercially built up, but all of the community drugstores and motels have various kinds of souvenirs about the spaceport. Chairman TEAGTJE. What comments do you hear about the cost of the tours by people who go through them? Mr. SIE~P~nT. You can hardly pick out that type of complaint in the noise of it. There are a very few folks who complain on whether the tour was worth the cost; or the other question arises: "I shouldn't have to pay to see what I, as a taxpayer, have already invested in." You might get that complaint, but TWA tells us this frequency is less than one out of every thousand visitors. Mr. Chairman, one of the complaints we have heard more frequently than others is that they do not feel that they should pay for the use of a toilet. We had authorized the contractor to put in coin-operated facilities, but both we and the contractor now agree tha.t the revenue does not pay for the upkeep of the restrooms. We are eliminating the complaints by closing the coin boxes. Mr. PARKER. That has been done. Mr. SEIPFLRT. And so, the toilet facilities in the new project will not be on a pay basis. Mr. WAGGONNER. Don't let the initial proceeding for your trans- portation and concession contracts, and so forth, be so long that you can't adjust them as the program builds, develops, and improves. Mr. SIEPERT. We have developed, in our procurement plan, which is now in Washington for review and approval, a priority on the uses of any revenue which the concessionaire collects. The priorities on revenue use would be as follows: First, out-of- pocket direct costs; second, when revenues exceed direct expenses, a preagreed minimum fee; third, expenditures to improve the quality of the tours and services to the visitors; fourth, a reduction, whenever possible, in the tour fees charged the public. And fifth, contractual provisions to transfer any surplus to mis- cellaneous receipts to the Treasury. We do not feel that the public's opportunity to see the national spaceport should be set up as a money-raising venture for the Federal Government. Nor should the operating costs of such tours be sub- sidized by continuing appropriations, when reasonable fees can make this function self-sustaining. We will make certain that there are definite limitations on the profit the concessionaire may make, but do believe that if he does a good job, he is entitled to a fair return for his efforts. Mr. WINN. For the length of time, particularly on `buses and guides, you have to sigi~ a pretty good contract for the buses. PAGENO="1173" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1169 Mr. SIEPERT. This is an important consideration. The contract will be set up for a ri-year-minimum term, renewable or extendable annually up to a total period of 10 years, so he is assured time for reasonable amortization of his vehicle equipment. Chairman TEAGUE. I get the impression you people are fairly well satisfied with your construction plan and everything. Mr. SIEPERT. Yes, we are. It was our judgment that it would be in- advisable to request the additional funding for permanent visitor in- formation center at this time, because it was considerably more money than we think is necessary at; this time in order to properly handle public visitors in the next few years. This plan will give us the ex- perience on which we should be able to come forward at the proper time with any necessary refinements or changes which should be included in permanent visitor information center. Mr. WINN. Maybe I missed it. I think you gave the square footage of the temporary building. Mr. SIEFERT. 20,800 square feet. Mr. WINN. Each building? Mr. SIEPERT. No. This is the total usable space. Mr. WINX. Total, 20,800? Mr. SIEPERT. That's right. Mr. WINN. How much money did you say? Mr. SIEPERT. The building itself? The building is $243,000. Chairman TEAGUE. Dr. Debus, is there any kind of proposal for a memorial for astronauts? I sure wish you people would do something about a museum down here, as a memorial. Dr. DEBUS. Well, some proposals already have been offered on behalf of the astronauts' families. I think Mr. Webb at the present time does not want to press any particular approach-let it rest several months- and whatever the memorial is going to be, whether it might be in Houston, here, or any other place, he wishes the families to have a say in that. And so, NASA is collecting any ideas, presently looking forward to a time for decision. Chairman TEAGUE. My guess is, unless Congress does something, we won't do anything. I haven't heard anything that appeals to me as much as a museum down here, that you can add to as the years go by, in line with the history which is made through our progress in space. Thank you very much, Kurt, and all you good people. Hearing adjourned at 1:45 p.m. PAGENO="1174" CONTRACTOR BRIEFINGS FOR CONGRESSMAN OLIN E. TEAGUE, CHAIRMAN, AND THE HOUSE STJBCOMMIT- TEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT JOHN F KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FEBRUARY 25, 19~37 INTRODUCTION A series of presentations were made to Mr Teague and other members of the Subcommittee on the morning of February 25 These presentations were made during visits to some of the work areas in the Vehicle Assembly Building at Launch Complex 39. Dr. Kurt H. Debu:s, the Center Director, and other mem- bers of his staff accompanied Mr. Peague on these visits. Attached is a short summary of each presentation with appropriate charts and photographs. The following presentations were made: Douglas Aircraft Company Mr K J Young Deputy Senior Director of Florida Test Center. Bendix Mr F W Vaughn General Manager Launch Support Division TWA Mr R W Wilson Staff Vice President and KSC Project Manager RCA: Mr. Edward Sears, Project Manager of KSC Communications Project Each presentation was followed by a question and answer period. Subjects discussed during these periods included: a. Manpower including source, attrition, training, morale and capabilities. b. Amount of subcontract work and the relationship to small businesses. c. Interfaces with government personnel and with other contractors. d Relationship of KSC contractor element with their parent corporation 1170 PAGENO="1175" BRIEFING FOR CONGRESSMAN OLIN E. TEAGUE, CHAIR- MAN, AND THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FEBRUARY 25,1967 Br K. J. YOUNG, DEPUTY SENIOR DIRECTOR OF FLORIDA TEST CENTER, DOUGLAS A111c1w3'r Co. Douglas mission at the Kennedy Space Center is checkout and launch of the SIVB stage on the Saturn Uprated lB and Saturn V vehicles. This is accom- plished In conjunction with NASA and the industry team illustrated on the chart. Checkout and launch at the Kennedy Space Center on a typical stage is accom- plished in three phases: (1) a short period in the low bay position, (2) a rela- tively long period in high bay on the mobile launcher, and (3) a final period of activity at the launch pad. The stage is erected in low bay directly after arrival from the Sacramento Test Center where the stage was static fired. In this posi- tion, receiving inspection and initial preparation for testing is performed. After completion of low bay activity, stacking of the stages occurs in the high bay. Sly, SIVB and Ill are erected and subsystem testing of the individual stages begins. Final modifications resulting from recent design or flight data are accomplished during this period. It is at this time in the high bay that the various stages of the launch vehicle and their respective GSE and softwave have their first opportunity to func- tionally, physically, and procedurally interface. Integrated vehicle tests are conducted to simulate prelaunch and flight sequences within the earth defined en- vironmental and operational limits. At the launch pad, final installation of ord- nance devices occurs in conjunction with various propellant loading operations. Flight readiness testing simulating mission sequence is again accomplished prior to entering into launch countdowns to assure successful accomplishment has been o~tained of all previous preparations, arming and checkout operations. This chart depicts actual headcount of Douglas personnel at the Kennedy Space Center versus headcount projected against the 4D Contract Schedule. Difference in levels has been heavily influenced by Saturn/Apollo schedule changes. Staffing of personnel has been restricted to usage requirements by Douglas management direction to avoid personnel being added to the program prior to need. This chart indicates manufacturing personnel are being primarily hired with- in the Kennedy Space Center area. Engineering, however, places emphasis on obtaining personnel from other Douglas locations to assure prior technical development and design familiarity before operational involvement. Experience from Saturn I, Thor-Delta and other non-Douglas programs in the area is a significant contribution to the SIVB team. 1171 PAGENO="1176" 1172 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION CHART 1.-Uprated lB and Saturn V vehicle. ~Q~-IUPI?ATED_IB*e~ATURW V VEHICLE 4Pj~IIi~/~'AT1*WV TFcYO~'t~4a~,4i,,, 11o~°rN4Mu/eIz'M'/Ir/~w ~`N A~ø1~14~'/C~W e~'h~ar#'14O/J~',/ ~ A~ ~ae~~'~,aug/ys,9raM647m4v4aD 5/~- ? e6151 lDaa tI/'~Vi~ P2,96e4IM /10645 p4'Dr,,~Q#4'6? flexesgtS t4~caWft1144WSUPCr4'1c6e TI/I 512 SrI/SI Nom44k~'~'4A1 TW4 ftUAIAl4N 1/1911(52 `~9I5Ve, ,195~ 15155- C455555,a055/514%w,SeiZ'I/Ie 551/5555/ ~F ~117iDL~ 45~ 4591/55) 964/MM4IJ 649 ,ss,s~viz'~ /5/I 1,M ~4T/OU (55/1(11/) (IPP4T(D 4Pa1t~/~47U2N Daa~c~A94/zaI#7~'a 1/v/Ira'1155 aL'ISv 5155551/St 455-s/4r5~V//- ~a'1o,se g9T1&~ss gAla/Il A/Sao-gArtlS,J.v - I ~ ,~ s,~ ~ rip//I P6064'AIA AapeIrID/S 1547 11/91/5117(1/ 51101(11 4/0/IT/I 551(6511516 45161/1/4/I - 1/451*5-s. 621*55151155541/ S/Itt 1/1716647/06 6504755 5511/91/5 iast iisfls/sii*o,se esavs*~ SIMS 1/Lit, 4555/1/4 W525 I'IIW (94'/P4l1(/1910 IFI/D/% `(el/TI.' 15I541ft,,si/es P41/11/17/S 11/h/I. FED(P4~ (1k'4~eio e~iP 974*0151 IZ57tI1/I14/T1r/5I/041/5~47/41/ 50 Mc6Zt~$eA~w~e/I~R 91/5517755 57165 61 55551555a'N*755 I ~-~i:~ P4tt/C44/W4ft~D4/Zw4y 7471/55P/I1/5591/SPS/~/Tl4c/55- p,e6,1,w66'. 041/1/4,5101/ ga~~ inc. ~ AI/11111/4th16 5 o7/LV1,2~ /1J/1/4i4(1 $45154~ w55es `iv TYP/eAl «=~ 81 vFH/ePt~~%r'rF,~ 7 vi4'c~ 5W : A5~J1/(4'557 / upa/Ieviv ~ `55 - `-1 65 64 1' VS 591/1*5/ ~- _I 64 CT//i PA' a 5/ 15 14*~t7t fSlItV/t1//45V4,t5 1(07/h/I + CHART 2.-Typical SI YB-V vehicle flow at the Florida Test Center. PAGENO="1177" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1173 --- - *1~~~ iii~ -~ *1 ii . ii ---- 1111 - i -- ~; -- ~i --- iii - ii - ~ CHARP 3.-SIVB KSC staffing profile. STAF~tN6 PLA~SI'~ QOU6LA~ PEiR~ONNE(. Al VENN1~DY ~PACE C~NT~R ARE 80111 IOeAUY IIIRO AN~ TRANSIRPD EROM OTHER QOU6LAS~ (0CA11ON~ MANUFACTURUJG EN1~3~UEE~WG PE~CUPJt L PEJ~5OPJ~ EL LOtAL 11(R~V 19~ LOtAL WRt~ wrn~ M~It( UPERItNtP~ 0STAIW~D wini OTHER eoN~eToRs~~ 45~ t~TVPN I UPEP' HAVIH$ THOQI*LTA UPEQIEI1~ 60 ~ ~ -~ I ~ I((~C ~TA F Ft NG PI~OI~I I.E IYII DI1~E~CT PE2SOPsiWEL k~?C ONLY FY66 FY6T FY69 FY6~ P470 `~ ~ ~ 34 234 1Z34 ~34 I ___ ~4P'~:HEPuL~ PRO~&~ThD TOTAL HEAD COUNT CHART 4.-Staffing plan. PAGENO="1178" BRIEFING FOR CONGRESSMAN OLIN E. TEAGUE, CHAIR- MAN, AND THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT JOHN F KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FEBRUARY 25, 1967 B~ F. W. VAUGHN, GENERAL MANAGER, LAUNCH SUPPORT DIVISION, THE BENDIX CORP. The Launch Support Division of The Bendix Corporation, under Contract NAS1O-160() provides mission launch support services to all NASA programs at the Kennedy Space Center Tins division in its third contract year is pres ently staffed with over 2,000 engineering and technical personnel who are widely dispersed at KSC due to the complex operations of various systems and facilities of test checkout and launch The key activities or functions under Bendix' responsibility are: Technical Shops.-This department provides spacecraft and stage contractors with technical support services by operation of the following major shops: Ma- chine Mechanical Repair Electronic Electrical Paint Pneumatic Wire Cable and Heavy Equipment. 1174 FIGrRE :1~ PAGENO="1179" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1175 Propellant Systems Compon~ents Laboratory.-This depattment handles sam- pling and analysis of propellants and gases, in-place field cleaning and coin- ponent cleaning of propellant system hardware, and non-destructive testing of equipment and materials. Propellant, Life Support and Ordnance.-The task of transferring, storage, and delivery of cryogenic and hypergolic fluids is an operation performed by this department and also maintaining the integrity of the spacecraft gas and propellant lines at the launch pad. This organization receives, stores, and delivers ordnance items, and provides life support equipment for all KSO per- sonnel requiring splash suits, self contained atmospheric protective ensembles used in the presence of toxic fuels, and provides maintenance, testing, and refill- ing of portable astronaut ventilators. FIGURE 2 PAGENO="1180" 1176 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 3 PAGENO="1181" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1177 FIGURE 4 PAGENO="1182" 1178 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 5 PAGENO="1183" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1179 ~ystem8 &~fety ~upport.--Thts element insures safety of test operations at KSC and assures ~omp1iance with Safety Directives by surveillance of activities involving Saturn lB and Saturn V vehicles, manned spacecraft, and propellant! ordnance operations. Industria' Operation$.-This department provides site management of space- craft checkout facilities, operates and maintains technical aystems consisting of access doors, bridge cranes/hoists, cryogenics and high pressure gas systems, altitude chambers, and furnishes miscellaneous mechanical/electrical support in the Manned Spacecraft Operations, Sy~tem Test, Hypergolic, Cryogenics, Pyrotechnics Installation, and Flight Crew Training Buildings. FIGURE 6 PAGENO="1184" 1180 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURJ~ 7 PAGENO="1185" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1181 Fiounu 8 E~ig1~ Pressure Gas Support.-This organization operates and maintains con- verter compressor facilities at Complexes 39, 37 and 34 for gaseons nitrogen, & helium used for purge, pressurization and environmental control of launch facilities and vehicles. Additionally, they maintain and operate portable com- pressors, pressurized K-bottles and tube banks used throughout the center, and assure the integrity of numerous high pressure pneumatic systems. Complea, 39.-This department provides site management in the Saturn V checkout and launch facilities, operates and maintains bridge cranes, hoists, 28V/400 cycle DC power, cathodic and lightning protection, air conditioning at pad terminal connection rooms, hydraulic controls, compressed air, access doors and vehicle access platforms, firex and industrial water systems, foam genera- tion equipment, flame deflectors, diesel pumps and generators. The facilities 76-265 O-67-~pt. 2-75 PAGENO="1186" 1 182 i o 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION involved tor these functions are the Vehicle Assembly Building, Launch Con~ trol Center, Mobile Service Structure, Complex 39, Pads A and B, Mobile Launch- em, Crowler Transporters, Water Pump Stations, and Mobile Refrigeration Units. The division also has Engineering Services, Reliability and Quality Assurance personnel for system analysis and configuration control in the assigned areas. Bendix provides logistic support of mission peculiar equipment spares for the systems under its control. ~er. `~ ~; hiV ~ ~ ~ ~ # ~ ~ £ ~ ~ ~ a!~*kkEr~41~4~ ~ ~ ~*Et ~ ~1**aL~4~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a ~ ~ ` ~: ~ ~ ~~if ~ , ~`t'p: x ~ y~ ~` ~4 ~t, ` t% ~ 7 j4;4 ~ ~Q%~ jag~ s::: `PNISS . ~ ; I e ~ ~ :~&~p~ :t~~~'~4 i~ 4;~II~ ~ I ~ ~ rite ,nM C a 4fl ;` ~ ~ : ~ ~ *~ ~ :~ ~ ~`rãL , )d~ ij e ~ t ~ p ~ I ~ h~ ii ;4 ~I iA~4 kI ~ ~IJy4It%~ ~ ~r ~ ?~ - ~ ` ~ ~ ~ ~ I' ~ ~ ~ ~ s ~ `itS ~Ie4*P~v s~tt ~< >~ ~ > r ffç' ç~ra~ :1'~ R~ c~n~~Jk ~ 4 ~ ~4 ~ ~ ~ & .*~fr4I& ~ ~ L~ ?" ~ 4 ~ ~ ti~i ~ ~ a, ~ 4 E~kb$ ~ $~ :~:J'W~ ;*4~it~:;~i St:: çS~ ~ ~. I :~T:~~:*~ i~,I ~ ~ * ~ ~ ~ ,` IIr~'4 4M~r ~4~P ~ ~ ~ * ~ I ~ s~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ; ~ , ~ ~ ~ ~ £~ ~ ~ ~ ` t ~ ~ ~ 3 + ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ iIt~:~~c~' ~ ~ *~;~anti:t;~t ~ : . ~ ~a'aesp ;~ ~:a ~ ~t ~ I. ~ : FIGUnE 9 PAGENO="1187" 1968 NASA AtTTHORIZATION 1183 FIGURE 10 PAGENO="1188" BRIEFING FOR CONGRESSMAN OLIN E. TEAGUE, CHAIR- MAN, AND THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FEBRUARY 25, 1967 B~ R. W. WILSON, STAFF VICE PRESIDENT AND KSC PROJECT MAN- AGER, TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., KENNEDY SPACE CENTER MISSION HIGHLIGHTS GENERAL MANAGEMENT The Project Manager, a TWA Vice President, is responsible for total TWA performance at Kennedy Space Center. He is supported locally by an Adminis- trative Support Staff composed of Industrial Relations; Finance & Accounting; and Contract Administration. Industrial Relations is responsible for the direction of the following: Labor Relations, Employment, Personnel Services, Community Relations, Training and Wage & Salary Administration. Finance ~ Accounting is responsible for the direction of the following: Gen- eral Accounting, Financial Planning and Control, Payroll, Business Systems and Internal Audit. Contract Administs-ation is responsible for the administration of the prime contract and for administering all TWA subcontracts and for TWA purchases. OPERATIONS SUPPORT This department is responsible for coordinating the efforts of launch-related TWA personnel, assuring the advance identification of all launch support re- quirements, the effective and timely response to such requirements and the precise scheduling and reporting required for overall integration of TWA effort into the launch operation. Quality Assurance, safety and management engineering are also functions of the department. MAINTENANCE & OPERATIONS The M & 0 Department maintains and operates all buildings, ground, facilities, facility equipment, utilities, mobile equipment (other than equipment niaintalned by Technical Support contractors), and provides other primary and secondary launch support services related to centralized functions. Included are: Mail, Postal & Courier service Plant Engineering Central Shops (Electrical, Plumbing, Carpenter, Welding, Sheetmetal, Machine, Paint) Building Maintenance Relocation and Modifications Janitorial and Special Cleaning Heavy Mobile Equipment Maintenance & Operations, (cranes, generators, trac- tors, etc.) 1184 PAGENO="1189" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1185 FIGURE 1.-TWA Heavy Equipment area showing a portion of the 1,000 vehicles used in various KSC Base Maintenance support mission. PAGENO="1190" 1186 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION Roads, Grounds and Land Maintenance Sanitation and Pest Control Canals and Waterway Maintenance Mechanical Utilities (Air Conditioning, Heat Plants, Water & Sewage Systems) Electrical Power Distribution FIRE PROTECTION Fire Protection Services include launch facility and systems inspection fire prevention programs rescue (including astronaut and missile recovery) and hazard monitoring functions In addition to normal structural application these services and functions are incorporated into launch operations procedures and are an integral part of fueling and fuel transfer operations liquid oxygen and other hazardous material handling operations and all general launch and test activities where fire potential exists. SUPPLY OPERATIONS TWA provides and operates the centralized supply function which suppoi ts NASA and all contractors at KSC Included is material handling (receipt stor `ige and delivery) warehousing operations transportation cataloging material management and logistics planning for all Government furnished materials used at KSC. SECURITY TWA provides launch area security and launch operations traffic control to- gether with all other security and police functions at the Kennedy Space Center. This includes safeguarding of classified information, badging, area control, traffic control plant protection guide and escort service and contraband control FIGURE 3 -A portion of the fire and rescue equipment used at KSC This mission is subcontracted by TWA to The Wackenhut Corporation. PAGENO="1191" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1187 The Occupational Health Program Is geared to provide a wide spectrum of special physical examinations, laboratory tests and medical treatment of con- tractor and Government personnel involved in launch activities, e.g., propellant and fuel handlers, altitude chamber workers, solderers and welders, aircraft flight crews, etc. In addition, the Environmental Health Engineering Section performs field surveys and laboratory evaluations of KSC operational health hazards such as exposures to toxic solvents and proprietary chemicals, noise, radiation, oxygen deficient atmospheres, explosive mixtures and the spacecraft drinking water systems. NASA Touns TWA in behalf of NASA operates guided daily bus tours of the Kennedy Space Center facilities and the Cape Kennedy launch areas. An average of 1500 people per day representing a majority of our states are taking the tour. Public reaction has been overwhelmingly favorable with the volume of participation forecast to Increase sharply as information on the tours availability spreads. In addition, TWA maintains space exhibits, models and graphic displays and 1)rovides supporting food, restroom and appropriate souvenir and sundry services. The objective of the KSC Tours is to familiarize the public with the achieve- ments and goals of their National Space Program. Since July 1967, over 200,000 individuals have toured the Kennedy Space Center. FIGuRE 4.-One of the more than 10,365 examinations performed annually by the TWA operated KSC Occupational Health Facility. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAM PAGENO="1192" BRIEFING FOR CONGRESSMAN OLIN E. TEAGUE, CHAIRMAN, AND THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT .JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FEBRUARY 25, 196~T B~ EDWARD SEARS, PROJECT MANAGER OF KSC COMMUNICATIONS PROJECT, RCA SUMMARY OF BRIEFING Presented to: Manned Space Flight Sub-Committee of the Committee on Aero- nautical and Space Science. Place: Communications Control Room, Launch Control Center, John F. Kennedy Space Center. Mr. Sears explained that RCA's responsibilities as a Mission Support Con- tractor at KSC under Contract NAS1O-1052 include operation and maintenance; planning, and engineering assistance to the design agency for ground communi- cations systems at KSC and at NASA operated facilities at Cape Kennedy. The RCA Project at KSC is a member of the Field Projects branch of the RCA Government Services Division. In reference to the NASA KSC organiza- tion, the Project is responsible to the Director of Technical Support for contract performance. The Project was formed in January 1964 and now has a strength of approximately 500 personnel. The Project is responsible for those communications systems used in direct support of tests and launches and indirect support systems. Direct support systems include Operational Intercommunication Systems (OIS) used to co- ordinate critical operations and Operational Television (OTV) used to monitor hazardous operations. The direct support systems are identified in the Apollo Ground Support Equipment Criticality list as Category II systems. This means that a failure in these systems could result in damage to the space vehicle and/or launch complex, or rescheduling of the test or launch date. Indirect- support systems are administrative intercommunications, public address and paging, and mobile radio, to name a few. Due to the vastness of KSC, the systems are quite far flung. It was stressed by Mr. Sears that, due to the division of work among con- tractors at KSC, coordination of efforts is of the utmost importance. Since no one contractor can perform independent of the others, responsiveness and cooperation form the key to successful attainment of the objectives. To gain the needed coordination, all test and launch support is identified and programed in advance so that all contractors know excatly what they are to provide. For each test and launch, the RCA Project reviews all communications sup- port requirements submitted by user activities and determines whether existing resources are capable of providing the support. For those cases where resources are not adequate, coordination with user activity is accomplished to develop alternate methods of support or the requirements are submitted to the design agency, who provides for the needed modification or expansion of facilities. Following review of support requirements, the Project submits documentation through channels to the Test Support Management Office of the Technical Sup- port Directorate committing the necessary resources and thereby assuring ade- quate provision of support. Prior to the test or launch, the Project establishes the proper system con- figurations (in accordance with the support commitments described in previous paragraph) and validates the system to ensure operating parameters are met. Once validated, the systems are protected to ensure that no action is taken that could interrupt operation of communications needed for critical operations. 1188 PAGENO="1193" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1189 During test and launch operations, Project personnel man stations to assist user activities in operation of communications and to effect Immediate correc- tive action in the event of trouble To provide maximum support to the Test Conductor, single point communications control Is exercised. The Communica- tions Control point keeps the Test Conductor advised on the status of communi- cations and coordinates to provide rapid response to new or changed support requirements. ATTACHMENTS TO SUMMARY OF BRIEFING RCA RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER CONTRACT NAS1O-1052 * OPERATE AND MAINTAIN GROUND COMMUNICATIONS AT KSC AND NASA OPERATED FACILITIES AT CAPE KENNEDY. * PERFORM COMMUNICATION PLANNING TO ASSURE DEVELOPMENT OF AN OVERALL INTEGRATED COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM THAT MEETS KSC'S PRESENT AND FUTURE NEEDS. PROVIDE ENGINEERING SERVICES FOR THE MINOR INSTALLATIONS, REARRANGEMENTS, AND MODIFICATIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO MEET TEST AND LAUNCH SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS. RCA Responsibilities under Contract NAS1O-1052 I * I Director 1 1 Director Information I I Support L Sy*tems Operations Relationship of RCA KSC Communications Project to NASA KSC Organization PAGENO="1194" 1190 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION TYPES OF COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS USED AT KSC DIRECT MISSION SUPPORT INDIRECT MISSION SUPPORT OPERATIONAL INTERCOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM(OIS) ADMINISTRATIVE TELEPHONE OPERATIONAL TELEVISION (OTV) ADMINISTRATIVE INTERCOM POINT-TO-POINT TELEPHONE MOBILE RADIO CABLE PLANT AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT PUBLIC ADDRESS(PA)AND PACING OFF-SITE INTERFACES TELETYPE TEST AND SWITCHING CENTER FACSIMILE COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL RECORDING BROADCAST VAN NEWS CENTER TELEVISION FOR SECURITY AND VISITOR INFORMATION CENTER Types of KSC Communications Systems TYPICAL USES CI DIRECT SUPPORT CCI*RJNICATICN SYSTEMS 2!L COMMUNICATIONS DURING: MONITOR TANKING OPERATIONS UNLOADING OP NEWLY ARRIVED VEHICLE MONITOR ENGINE START AND HARDWARE MONITOR CRITICAL CLEARANCES DURING * STACKING IN VAB LAUNCH * CHECKOUT OPERATIONS IN VAR MONITOR PAD PERIMETER FOR SAFETY AND SECURITY * TRANSFER TO PAD MONITOR HYPERGOLIC AND CRYOGENIC * CHECKOUT AT PAD STORAGE AREAS * COUNTDOWN, LAUNCH AND POST LAUNCN RECORD SIGNIFICANT EVENTS FOR OPERATIONS ANALYSIS AND TRAINING PURPOSES * SCAPE SUIT OPERATIONS PROVIDE LIVE PICTURES FOR RELEASE TO NEWS MEDIA Typical uses of KSC Communications Systems COORDINATION OF OPERATIONS CONTRACTORS WORK IN INTEGRATED SUPPORT TEAMS * RESPONSIVENESS AND COOPERATION IS KSC MOTTO. * TEST AND LAUNCH SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS ARE IDENTIFIED AND PROGRAMMED IN ADVANCE OF NEED SO THAT EACH CONTRACTOR KNOWS WHAT IS EXPECTED OF HIM. MAJOR TEST AND LAUNCHES ARE SIMULATED FIRST TO CHECKOUT EQUIPMENT, AS WELL AS ENSURING THAT SUPPORT PROGRAMMED IS ADEQUATE. Coordination of Operation PAGENO="1195" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1191 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR LAUNCH SUPPORT 1. REVIEW COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS AND SUBMIT INPUTS TO KSC SUPPORT DIRECTIVE. 2. CONFIGURE COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS IN ACCORD WITH PUBLISHED SUPPORT DIRECTIVE. 3. VALIDATE SYSTEMS TO ENSURE SATISFACTORY OPERATION. 4. PROTECT SYSTEMS UNTIL SUPPORT IS COMPLETED TO ENSURE CRITICAL CIRCUITS ARE NOT DISTURBED. 5. PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO USER ACTIVITIES IN PROPER USE OF SYSTEMS. 6. TAKE IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION SHOULD A MALFUNCTION OCCUR. 7. BE PREPARED TO MEET ADDITIONAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS AS REQUESTED BY TEST CONDUCTOR. Sequence of Events for Test and Launch Support PAGENO="1196" PRESENTATION TO THE CONGRESSIONAL STJBCOMMIT- TEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT BY THE JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, NASA, FEBRUARY 24, 1967 INDEX TO COMPILED INFORMATION IN REPLY TO INQUIRIES I. Programs and Projects: (a) Fiscal: (1) 1968 budget allocation by major programs with consistent comparable budget for fiscal years 1965, 1966, and 1967, including current total cost to completion estimates for each major program. (2) Analysis of fiscal year 1967-68 budget realineinent by pro- grams. (3) Actual versus planned expenditure by programs for fiscal years 1965, 1906, and 1967 (to date). (4) Budget requested by Center. for fiscal year 1968, amount reduced and final budget. (5) "No-year" funds carryover by programs for fiscal years 1964, 1965, and 1966. (6) List of research and development contracts in order of dollar value currently in force. (7) List of construction contracts with estimated completion date and total costs. (b) Procurement for research and development: (1) Number of procurement plans submitted to Center director (less than $5 million). (2) Number submitted to NASA Headquarters (more than $5 million). (3) Exceptions to (1) and (2) above. (c) Contracts (calendar year 1966): (1) Number of competitive participants in each R. & D. negoti- ated contract. (2) Fixed price contracts converted to CPIF. (3) Contracts scheduled to be converted to CPIF. (4) Contracts to a review board to determine final fee. (5) Contracts renegotiated. (6) Organization identification of cc~ntract approval authority (organization level and type of authority). (7) Percentage of contracts to small businesses. (d) Facilities: (1) Status of facility planning, design and construction for fiscal years 1965, 1966, 1967, and 1968. (2) Listing of cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts entered into for facility management, services and construction. (3) Estimated future construction fund requirements for facili- ties and general description of probable work. II. Management: (a) Changes in organization chart from 1966 with identification of mission relationship of each major subarea. (b) Number and cost of contracts administered by other Government agencies identified in 0-4100,000, $100,000-$500,000, and over $500,000 contract value groupings. (c) Percent of overtime of total time on individual projects or pro- grams over $50,000. (d) Average annual cost of each direct Center employee, with com- parison to previous year. (e) Listing of each support contract pertaining to KSC. 1192 PAGENO="1197" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION BUDGET SUMMARY, FISCAL YEARS 1965-68 1193 REQUEST 1(a) (1).-1968 budget allocation~s by major Manned ~pa~ce Flight programs with eonsistent comparable budgets for fiscal years 1965-67 [In thousands of dollars] ___________ 1965 1966 1967 1968 Research and development: Manned Spaceflight I. Apollo (1) Saturn L. (2) Uprated Saturn I (3) Saturn V (4) Launch operations and instrumen- tation (5) Space operations (6) Supporting development II. Apollo Applications III. Advanced missions Construction of facilities: Manned Spacefflght... Administrative operations I. Personnel costs II. Operation of installation Total 56,110 - 128,859 224,050 232,200 55, 610 - 128, 109 223,450 228,500 5,130 6, 625 12, 018 29,917 (1) 1,920 0 25, 786 28,386 65, 573 7,255 1,109 0 36,800 83,800 92,600 9,000 1,250 0 26,300 88,800 100,700 10,200 - 2,500 0 - 500 250 500 250 350 3,300 400 85,004 52, 416 6,030 81,952 34,021 92,658 22, 595 99,575 21, 462 30,954 29,848 52,104 - 33,579 59,079 - 35, 476 64,099 - 193, 570 216, 841 350,729 354,370 1 Funded by MSC. ANALYSIS OF FISCAL YEAR 1967-68 BUDGET REALINEMENT BY PROGRAM REQUEST 1(a) (2) .-Analysis of fiscal years 1967-~-68 budget realinement by programs In both fiscal year 1966 and fiscal year 1967 the Apollo Applications activity was authorized as part of the Apollo program. In fiscal year 1967 funds were budgeted for Apollo Applications project definition. This activity has been combined into the Apollo Applications program. ACTUAL VERSUS PLANNED MANNED SPACE FLIGHT OBLIGATIbNS (R. & D. AND ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS), FISCAL YEARS 1965-67 REQUEST 1(a) (3) .-Actual versus planned ewpenditvre by programs for fiscal years 1965-67 (to date) [In thousands of dollars] _________________ _________________ 1965 1966 1967 Planned Actual Planned Actual Planned Actual (through Dec. 31, 1966) Research and development: Manned spaceflight I. Apollo (1) Saturn I (2) Uprated Saturn I (3) Saturn V (4) Launch operations and in- strumentation (5) Space operations (6) Supporting developmenL - -- II. Apollo Applications III. Advanced missions Administrative operations I. Personnel costs II. Operation of installation Total 56,110 56,798 121,109 128,859 224,050 116,474 55,610 56,329 120,509 128,109 223,450 116,474 5,130 6,625 12, 018 29,917 1,920 5,130 6,625 12,018 30, 636 (1) 1,920 300 25, 700 32, 620 52, 080 9,000 809 0 25, 786 28,386 65, 573 7, 255 1, 109 0 36, 800 83,800 92,600 9,000 1, 250 0 24, 431 46,055 41, 774 3,929 285 0 500 0 469 0 600 250 500 250 350 0 0 52,416 52,416 79, 723 81,952 92,658 50, 390 - 21,462 30,954 108, 526 21,462 30,954 109, 214 30,476 49, 247 200, 832 29,848 52, 104 210,811 33, 579 59,079 316,708 15,995 - 34,395 166, 864 1 Funded by MSC. PAGENO="1198" STATUS OF FISCAL YEAR 1968 MANNED SPACE FLIGHT C. OF F. BUDGET AS OF JAN. 1, 1967 [In thousands of dollars] 1194 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION STATUS OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHT FiscAl4 YEAR 1968 BUDGET, R. & P. REQUEST I (a) (4) .-Budget requested by Center for fiscal year 1968, amount reduced and final budget [In thousands of dollars] Requested Amount reduced Final 246,800 Research and development: Manned spaceflight 1. Apollo (1) Uprated Saturn I (2) Saturn V (3) Launch operations and instrumentation (4) Space operations (5) Supporting development II. Apollo applications III. Advanced missions Administrative operations I. Personnel costs II. Operation of Installation Total -14, 600 232,200 242, 500 (26,300) (93,800) (108, 700) (11,200) (2,500) 3,300 1,000 -14, 000 0 (-5,000) (-8,000) (-1,000) 0 0 -600 228, 500 (26,300) (88,800) (100, 700) (10,200) (2, 500) 3,300 400 135, 612 -36,037 99, 575 36,150 99,462 -674 -35,363 - 35,476 64, 099 382,412 -50,637 331, 775 KSC budget request Project title Manned space flight Launch complex 39 Maintenance staging and heavy equipment building Propellant servicing area Utility installations - Addition to plant maintenance facility Launch equipment shop additions Launch complex 39 operatIonal spares building Addition to base operations building Launch complex 39 support building Alteration and rehabilitation of launch complex 34/37 Gaseous helium storage and loading station Amount Final reduced budget -30,497 22, 595 53,092 20,000 1,865 2,875 6,395 1,500 922 500 3, 391 381 14, 585 678 -3,340 -1,865 -2,875 -6,185 -1,500 -922 -500 -3,391 -381 -8,860 -678 16,660 0 0 210 0 0 8 0 5,725 0 FUNDS CARRYOVER., FISCAL YEARS 1964-66 REQUEST 1(a) (5) .-No-year funds carryover by programs for fiscal years 1964-66 [In thousands of dollars] 1964 1965 1966 Available appro- priatlons Carry- over Available Carry- appro- over priations Available appro- priations Carry- over 55,058 30 56,798 115 128,859 2,789 54, 646 30 56,329 114 128,109 2,539 7,843 6,902 9,788 27,992 (1) 2,121 0 1 0 17 (1) 12 5,130 6,625 12,018 30,636 (1) 1,920 2 21 1 90 (1) 0 0 25,786 28,386 65, 573 7,255 1,109 0 1,114 61 1,270 68 26 412 0 250 469~ 1 500 0 250 Research and development 1. Apollo (1) Saturn I (2) Uprated Saturn I (3) Saturn V (4) Launch operation and in- strumentation (5) Space operations (6) Supporting development - - - II. Apollo Applications III. Advanced missions 1 Funded by MSC. PAGENO="1199" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION CURRENT R. & P. CONTRACTS 1195 REQUEST 1(a) (6). List of ft. ~ D. contracts in order of dollar value currently in force Contractor Description Amount Boeing Co Chrysler Corp General Electric Co Bendix Corp IBM Bechtel Corp Federal Electric Co Radio Corp. of America Dow Co North American Aviation Beech Aircraft Corp Douglas Aircraft Wyle Laboratories, Inc Hayes International Corp The Boeing Corp Martin Marietta Corp., Denver Beech Aircraft Corp IBM Corp. Federal Systems International Harvester Co Lockheed Missile & Space Corp Martin Marietta Corp., Denver Do The Boeing Co Lockheed Aircraft Georgia Co TRW Space Technical Laboratories Air Products & Chemicals Thiokol Chemical Corp Martin Marietta Corp Lockheed Missiles & Space Corp Collins Radio Co., design, manufacture, and install closed-loop radio frequency carrier operational intercommunication system for 0. & C. building and LC-39. Pacific Crane & Rigging, install GFE over $1,000,000 value. Akwa-Downey Construction Co., outfitting assembly bay No.2 LC-39, VAB. General Dynamics, Convair Division, opera- tional TV system for LC-39. Gulton Industries, data transmission system Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., Perini Corp. (joint venture), propellant systems com- ponent laboratory complex. Zero Manufacturing Co., furnish and install interference shielded radio frequency modu- lar enclosures for LC-39 and MILA General Electric Co., wideband transmission links. Heyl & Patterson, install flame deflectors Otis Elevator Co., elevators for towers A and B, RB No.2, VAB, LC-39. 1 1968. Saturn V S-IC Stage support Operations and maintenance support, Uprated Saturn I. Apollo integration reliability and checkout Launch operations support Launch support sources for Apollo-Saturn program. Specialized launch complex support Instrumentation repair and calibration NASA communications support Facility planning support Launch support services for Apollo-Saturn program. Cryogenics Saturn S-IVB Stage launch support Reliability testing of Saturn ground support equipment components. Development of high pressure pneumatic pIping. LH2 loading system test program Study on SPREE, pt. II, phase II Engineering services and studies of cryogenic systems and criteria. Study concerning transmitting information by optical electron. Design study of high-pressure low-flow-rate flexible connector systems. Study concerning space checkout and launch equipment (scale). Study determine detrimental effects solid pro- pellant rocket. Study of contamination sensors Study concerning electromagnetic compatibility of launch vehicles. Saturn V Q-ball cover removal system Study neutralization suppresiion technique toxic and thermal hazards. Design study of a helium recovery system for MILA. Design study of flexible connector systems Gemini activation Design study of high-pressure large-flow-rate flexible connector systems. $55, 277,268 45,648,318 39,779,597 27,486, 130 22,127,000 15,207, 155 10,550, 125 7,524, 626 5,779,078 3,620,037 787,071 644, 725 274,435 266, 662 257, 295 228,641 225,743 165,183 159,717 158,047 111,796 96,664 93,680 87,844 82,363 56,568 52,867 50, 537 29,900 CURRENT CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS REQUEST 1(a) (7) .-List of construction contracts witk estimated completion date and total costs Contractor Location Completion month, 1967 Amount Dallas, Tex October Titusville, Fla Milwaukee, Wis Fort Worth, Tex Albuquerque, N. Mex Stanton, Calif August April' February November June Burbank, Calif March $10,951,526 14, 188,000 6, 592,295 2,688,318 2, 659,000 2,845,838 2,265,926 1,572,935 1,464,945 1, 129,338 Lynchburg, Va Pittsburgh, Pa Atlanta, Ga January April December PAGENO="1200" 1196 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION Akwa-Downey Construction Co., flight crew training building additions. Kahn & Co., distribution panels and asso- ciated hardware. 3. Carner Co., LM activation, 0. & C. build- ing. I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co., LC-39A, redun- dant power phase II (lots 1 and 3) supply contract. Remler, communications equipment Akwa-Downey Construction Co., addition to central dispensary. MevA Corp., redundant power modifications, LC-37. American Scientific Corp., operations inter- communication system audio equipment. Smith & Sapp Construction Co., GN-2 air pressure system and air conditioning plat- form 3 and 4, MSS LC-39. Houdaille-Duval-Wright Co., crawlerway surfacing, audio-video cables, and miscel- laneous work, pad B, LC-39. Smith & Sapp Construction Co., additions and modifications to air conditioning sys- tem, CIF. Smith & Sapp Construction Co., construction of utility installations. Akwa-Downey Construction Co., redundant Industrial power for launch complexes 34 and 37. Sperry Rand Corp., LC-39 color TV system. Fire Detection Service, Inc., standby water chilling units, redundant remote air supply and EMC van parking LC-39, pads A and B. Fidelity Sound Inc., LC-39 paging system modifications and additions. The Cosmodyne Corp., Apollo spacecraft and ground support equipment fluid distribu- tion system VAB, high bays 1 and 3. Climate Conditioning Corp., miscellaneous access platforms and ladders, VAB, LC-39. Echo & Umholtz, central instrumentation facility alternate power. Behe & Umholtz, miscellaneous exterior elec- trical alterations. Unit Electric Control Inc., LC-39, pad A, redundant power phase II. Voight Construction Co., modifications to VAB jib crane trusses and paint storage building plumbing; additions to VAB snack bar and 10,000 gallon water tank. Construction Services, construction of 0. & C. building calibrations laboratory. Akwa-Downey Construction Co., operational intercommunications system cabling con- versions, 0. & C. building. General Electric Co., 15-Ky-a, power capaci- tors for 69-ky. substation. Holloway Corp., instrumentation communi- cation cables LC-39, MSS fuel and oxidizer transfer areas. General Electric Co., additions to LC-39 in- dustrial watersystem control console. Frank A. Kennedy, Inc., extension of addi- tional 2 lanes, Kennedy Parkway, South. Holloway Corp., LC-39 temperature and humidity alarm system, LCC; acoustical, lighting and air-conditioning modifications, VAB. REQUEST I(a~) (7) .-List of construction oontrc&cts `with estimated completion date and total costs-Oontinued Contractor Location Completion month, 1967 Amount Milwaukee, Wis Withers Field, Conn - - Gardena, Ga Winter Park, Fla San Francisco, Calif.. - Milwaukee, Wis Titusville, Fla Alexandria, Va November May January June October August May March Orlando, Fla do Jacksonville, Fla May Orlando, Fla February do - do Milwaukee, Wis March Salt Lake City, Utah. February Spokane, Wash January $886, 882 848, 709 838, 716 525, 601 504, 000 450, 610 443, 000 429, 049 404, 163 387, 000 364, 599 295, 579 189, 666 181, 000 172,210 126, 128 123,970 119, 500 114, 347 99, 500 76, 467 71,576 65, 456 62, 769 52,948 44,928 38,617 30, 750 12, 981 Titusville, Fla Cocoa Beach, Fla Stanton, Calif Orlando, Fla ~~do do Chuluota, Fla do March May January March May February Merritt Island, Fla...... January Milwaukee, Wis do Lynchburg, Va Titusville, Fla Lynchburg, Va Cocoa Beach, Fla Titusville, Fla do do March January do PAGENO="1201" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1197 REQUEST I (b) (1) .-Nuniber of procurement plans submitted to Center director (less than $5,000,000) REQUEST 1(b) (2) .-Number submitted to NA$A Headquarters (more than $5,000,000) REQUEST 1(b) (3) -Exceptions to (1) and (2) above Number of procurement plans submitted to Center Director (under $5,000,000) 1 Number of procurement plans submitted to NASA Headquarters (over $5,000,000) 8 Exceptions to above' 23 1 If the procurement plan does not exceed $1,000,000, It is approved by the KSC Pro- curement Officer after concurrence by the chief of the cognizant technical division. NUMBER or COMPETITIVE PARTICIPANTS IN EACH R. & D. CONTRACT NEGOTIATED IN CALENDAR YEAR 1960 REQUEST 1(c) (1).-Number of competitive participants in each fl. c~ D. negotiated contract Contractor Firms solicited Competitive participants George Washington University (NAB 10-3347) Grove Valve Regulators (NAB 10-3531) University of South Florida (NAS 10-3589) Georgia Institute of Technology (NAS 10-3809) Infotran, Inc. (NAS 10-3870) Georgia Institute of Technology (NAS 10-3895) Hobart Brothers Co. (NAB 10-3928) Yankee Walter Corp. (NAB 10-3361) Greiner, 3. E. (NAS 10-2749) TRW (NAB 10-3678) ITT Research Institute (NAB 10-3755) 1 1 1 1 66 1 26 8 1 1 1 REQUEST I (c) (2).-Fixed price contracts converted to CPIF Fixed price contracts converted to CPIF : None. REQUEST I (c) (3) .-Contracts scheduled to be converted to CPIF Contracts scheduled to be converted to CPIF: None. REQUEST I (c) (4) .-Contracts to a review board to determine final f cc Contracts to a review board to determine final fee: None. REQUEST I (c) (5) .-Contracts renegotiated Contracts renegotiated: None. 1 1 2 7 2 1 76-265 0-67--pt. 2-76 PAGENO="1202" 1198 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION REQUEST I (o) (6) .-O rgan zat~o~ ilentification of contract approval authority (organization level anl type of authority) ORIGINATES REQUIREMENTS KSC CONTRACT AUTHORIZATION FLOW CHART -----L REQUESTOR ~ DIRECTORATE REQUIREMENT & RESOURCES OFFICES CERTIFIES AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS REVIEWS FOR NEED & PROGRAM COMPATABILI- -- TY, ASSURES AVAILABIL- ITY OF FUND AUTHORI- ZATION ___J ACCOUNTING L OFFICE I DEVELOPS PROCUREMENT I PLANS, REQUESTS FOR PRO- PROCUREMENT I POSALS & BIDS, DETERMINES OFFICE r" TYPE OF CONTRACT, NEGO- J TIATES, AND DRAFTS CON- TRACTS OR AWARDS TYPE OF CONTRACTS SUPPLIES - 1~.J MATERIALS ~ACT REVIEI I CONTRACT AND BRANCH LEGAL REVIEW OVER $500K PAGENO="1203" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION REQUEST I (c) (7) .-Percentage of contracts to snvaU businesses FISCAL YEAR 1966 1199 NUMBER OF ACTIONS NET VALUE OF AWARDS ACTIONS THOUSANDS TOTAL 26,659 TOTAL $206,658 SMALL BUSINESS 18,394 SMALL BUSINESS 28,895 LARGE BUSINESS 8,265 LARGE BUSINESS 177,763 PAGENO="1204" 1200 19 68 NASA AUTHORIZATION REQUEST I (d) (1) .-~tatus of facility pkz~nning, design, and construction for fiscai years 1965, 1966, 1967, and 1968 STATUS FY-65 MANNED SPACE FLIGHT C OF F DOLLARS IN MILLIONS 200 150 100 50 liii 1. PROGRAM PLAN 85.0 2. UNDER DESIGN OR DESIGN COMPLETED 3. UNDER CONTRACT OR OUT FOR BID 4. IN PLACE (COST) 84.0 82.7 62.3 PAGENO="1205" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1201 STATUS FY-66 MANNED SPACE FLIGHT C of F 200 150 - DOLLARS IN MILLIONS 100 50 R .~ 1 2 3 4 1 PROGRAM PLAN 6.0 2. UNDER DESIGN OR DESIGN COMPLETED 2.4 3. UNDER CONTRACT OR OUT FOR BID 2.3 4. IN PLACE (COST) .4 PAGENO="1206" 1202 1 9,68 NASA AUTHORIZATION STATUS FY-Gi MANNED SPACE FLIGHT C of F 200 150 __________--.---.-. DOLLARS IN MILLIONS 100 1. PROGRAM PLAN 34.0 2. UNDER DESIGN OR DESIGN COMPLETED 16.9 3. UNDER CONTRACT OR OUT FOR BID 16.1 4. IN PLACE (COST) 0 PAGENO="1207" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION STATUS FY 68 MANNED SPACE FLIGHT C of F 200 150 DOLLARS IN MILLIONS 100 50~ 1. PROGRAM PLAN 2. UNDER DESIGN OR DESIGN COMPLETED 3. UNDER CONTRACT OR OUT FOR BID 4 IN PLACE (COST) 1203 I 2 3. 4 22.6 0 0 0 PAGENO="1208" 1204 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION ACTIVE COST-PLUS-FIXED-FEE CONTRACTS RELATED TO FACILITIES REQUEST I (d) (2) .-Listing of cost-plus-ficced-fee contracts entered into for facility management, services, and construction Contractor General Electric Corp.: Apollo integration reliability and Amount checkout $21, 681, 646 Catalytic Construction Co.: Installation and management of pro- pellant servicing system 43, 364, 715 Bechtel Corp.: Installation and maintennace of NASA LC and facilities 1,834,650 Dow Chemical Co.: Facilities engineering support 818, 527 Reynolds, Smith & Hill: Title II services for LUTs 1, 2, and 3,__. 1, 629, 474 Northrup Corp.: Install operational intercommunication system LC- 34and37 1,611,658 Northrup Corp. Space Laboratories: Expansion and revision of op- erational intercommunication system, LC-37B~_ 733, 906 Boeing Aircraft Co.: Liquid hydrogen loading system test program 257,295 Beech Aircraft Corp.: Engineering services and studies of cryogenic systems and criteria 843, 222 ESTIMATED FUTURE CONSTRUCTION FUND REQUIREMENT REQUEST I (d) (3) .-Estimated future construction fund requirements for facili- ties, and general description of probable work LAUNCH COMPLEX 39 It is estimated that $5 to $10 million will be required annually to meet tech- nical modifications dictated by specific test requirements. ALTERATION AND REHABILITATION OF LC-3 4 AND LC-3 7 Future requirements will be dependent upon the extent of follow-on and fu- ture programs. An estimated yearly expenditure of between $1 and $2 million will be required to safeguard the current investment. UTILITY INSTALLATIONS It is anticipated that additional funds will be required for utilities and Cen- ter development to support any future construction program. PAGENO="1209" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1205 REQUEST II (a) .-Uhctnge8 in organization chart from 1~966 with identification of mission re'ationship of each major subarea N*TI**L $~N~P~C~ API SPACE ASIIIISTIAT(IA JOHN F. KENNE~JPACE CENTER ~, ~ ~o, iur PAGENO="1210" 1206 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION By the beginning ef 1966 it became apparent that certain organizational prob- [ems required solution. KSO was in transition from a small Civil Service team to a large industrial complex that was Civil Service managed and contractor operated. New interfaces between expanding Government and contractor func- tions, integration of launch responsibility for manned and unmanned launch operations, and increased activity within the Apollo/Saturn and Apollo Ap- plications programs demanded a review of Center management and structure. To meet this need, the Center initiated two separate but parallel studies one conducted by a management consultant firm and the other conducted by KSC management personnel under the direction of the KSC Deputy Director. The result of this process was a major realinement of the internal, management structure and the addition of needed functional elements. Operational and organizational concepts were developed for dealing with major problem areas. Key managerial processes were identified and developed, or strengthened. The organization was approved by the Administrator, April 27, 1966. The first of the implementing steps began immediately thereafter. The current organiza- tion, properly staffed with technical, scientific, and managerial capability, meets current KSC management requirements. To assist the Center Director in his responsibility for managing and con- trolling the total KSC activity, his immediate resources were strengthened by the addition of a second Deputy Director and a small executive staff. Mr. A. F. Siepert, Center Deputy Director, will remain in this role until the position of Deputy Director, Center Operations, can be filled. He will then be- come Deputy Director, Center Management. The Director of the Executive Staff was established to provide for executive communication processes and management status and review functions. Mr. Walter P. Murphy was appointed to this position. Other key management changes included transferring Mr. Rocco Petrone from Apollo Program Manager to the position of Director of Launch Operations. Management of launch operations includes Dr. Hans Gruene, Director Launch Vehicle Operations, Mr. John Williams, Director Spacecraft Operations, and Mr. R. H. Gray, Director Unmanned Launch Operations. Mr. rohn Shinkle moved up from the deputy position to become the Apollo Program Manager. The Apollo Program Office has been relieved of any Center staff or resource functions which are not directly a part of Apollo Program management. The majority of these functions have been transferred to the Director of Administration. Mr. George Van Staden has been reassigned from the Assistant Center Di- rector for Administration `to Director of Administration. He was relieved of base support and associated contractor operations to permit more concentration on development and execution of key managerial systems required to manage the Center within the approved organizational framework. The Director of Administration was given responsibility for Center resources management, in- cluding funds, manpower and allocation of physical space. Concurrently, the management of resources was strengthened by establishing specifically identi- fied, small functional offices co-located with each of `the Director~, and a central office These resources elements work directly with requirements personnel to relate requirements to resources and provide visibility and tracking of the resources applied. The wisdom of this concept has already been demonstrated in the few months it has been in operation The Director of Administration is assisted in this effort by Mr. Frederic H. Miller, who has been assigned as Deputy Director of Administration and Chief, Resources Management. Those administrative and base support functions no longer assigned to the Director of Administration are now the responsibility of the Director of Installation Support. The new Director of Installation Support is Mr. Keith O'Keefe. He is assisted by his Deputy, Mr. C. C. Parker. The Directorate is responsible for the general operation and maintenance of the total installation. This includes such func- tions as photographic support, documentation, quality control, safety, mainte- nance of equipment, buildings and grounds, and other Center-wide services. Many of the functions relate directly to the support of research and development and are essential to the mission of the Center. The newly created Directorate of Technical Support consolidated all functions necessary to provide technical support for launch operations and the KSC infor- mation and data systems. This centralization of supporting functions also provides an effective interface for negotiating and scheduling NASA/ETR sup- port requirements. Mr. Ray Clark, formerly Assistant Center Director for Support Operations, is Director of Technical Support. He is assisted by Mr. PAGENO="1211" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1207 Karl Sendler as Director Information Systems, and Mr. Robert Gorman as Director Support Operations. Functions formerly assigned to the Assistant Center Director for Engineering Development have been realined under the Director of Design Engineering. This organization, with minor exceptions, is responsible for the design, develop- ment, fabrication, installation, modification, and major refurbishment of all KSC provisioned equipment and facilities. Mr. G. Merritt Preston, former Deputy Director of Launch Operations, was named Director of Design Engineer- *ing in February. Mr. A. H. Bagnulo, Deputy Director of Design Engineering since its establishment, is entering private industry and has been replaced by Mr. Grady Williams. Prior to this assignment, Mr. Williams was Electrical/ Electronic Engineering Manager for the Directorate. The Apollo Applications program has reached the point where it requires the exclusive attention of a small KSO group. `Accordingly, the Center recom- mended to NASA Headquarters establishment of an Apollo Applications Pro- gram Management Office, patterned after the Apollo Program Management Of- fice. The proposed organization includes the establishment of three new offices under the AAP Manager, plus the joint use of three of the existing Apollo offices, in which management functions are so closely related to the two programs that separation is impractical or could adversely affect the management of both programs. These latter functions are Systems Engineering, Reliability and Quality Assurance, and Operations Support. `Following initial establishment, the phase-over from the Apollo Program Management Office to Apollo Applica- tions program Management Office will be accomplished incrementally, over a period of several years, as the Apollo program reaches a successful conclusion. The organization structure of the Center possesses the multiprogram capability necessary to accommodate a Voyager Program office if directed. CONTRACTS ADMINISTERED BY OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCiES REQUEST 11(b) .-Nnn~ber and cost of centracts administered by other Govern- ment agencies identified In $0 to $100,000 to $500,000 and over $500,000 contract valne gronpings Agency Nun'- her $0 to $100,000 Num- ber $100,000 to ssoo,ooo Nun'- her Over $500,000 Num- ber Total cost (value of contracts) DCAA DCAS Corps of Engineers, Canaveral Other, Corps of Engineers USAF-ETR Other, Air Force - -- Army Navy Bureau of Standards Department of Commerce Bureau of Mines GSA Total 21 99 152 4 21 4 5 5 2 1 4 $841, 149 3,993,982 5, 491,000 213,000 640,000 178, 664 7,000 190,884 24,000 60,000 70,000 39 49 74 1 17 5 3 2 1 1 $9, 576, 730 10,860,785 18, 172, 000 110,000 3,633,000 1, 196, 785 382,000 600,000 165, 000 248,000 44 29 72 2 22 4 2 $458, 317,581 137,546,848 370,376,000 48, 660,000 52,988,000 6, 761,000 1,562, 000 104 177 298 7 60 13 8 7 3 1 6 1 $468, 735,460 152,401,615 394,039,000 ~ 48,983,000 57,261,000 5, 136,449 389,000 790,884 189,000 60,000 1,632,000 248,000 318 11, 709, 679 192 44,944,300 175 1,076,211,429 685 1, 132,865,408 N0TE.-"Admi&stered" is defined as that delegation to other Government agencies to perform field services such as auditing, property administration, production surveillance, and quality assurance functions. Corps of Engineers contracts are administered entirely by that organization. PERCENT or OVERTIME ON INDIVIDUAL PROGRAMS (PROGRAMS OVER $50,000) REQUEST 11(c) .-Pcrcent of overtime of total time on individual projects or programs over $50,000 Program area Fiscal year 1966 1st 6 months of fiscal year 1967 I. Apollo II. Advanced missions 11.2 4.7 7.8 1.0 NoTE-Represents civil service personnel only. PAGENO="1212" 1208 1968 NASA KUTHORIZATION REQUEST 11(d) .-Average awaual cost of each direct center cm~ployee with comparison to previous year Fiscal year (1967) Fiscal year (1968) Average annual salary $10,880 $11, 080 KSC SUPPORT CONTRACTS REQUEST II (e) .-Listing of each support contract pertaining to K&Y 1. Bechtel Corp., 220 Bush Street, San Francisco, Calf. (as of Dec. 31, 1966): Annual estimated cost - $6,862,783 (actual). Expiration date of current contract . June 30, 1967. Number of personnel employed 300. Negotiated overtime (annual) (i). Amount of subcontracts (annual) $139, 070 (actual). 1 All overtime authorized by Individual work order as required. Function: This contract provides specialized installation, modification, rnainte- nance, and repair of launch complex facilities, including high-pressure gas, fuel lines and controls, electrical controls, interlocks, electronic measuring and record- ing installations, and mechanical and hydraulic installations. 2. The Bendix Corp., Fisher Building, Detroit, Mich. 48202 (as of Dec. 31, 1966): Annual estimated cost - $23,713,000. Expiration date of current contract - Oct. 1, 1967. Number of personnel employed 2,100 (average). Negotiated overtime (annual) 10%. Amount of subcontracts (annual) $700,000. Function: The contractor manages, operates, and provides direct support for the following launch operations activities: Engineering, reliability and quality assurance, Launch Complex 39, industrial complexes, high-pressure gas facilities, Propellant Systems Components Laboratory, propellants, life support and ord- iiance, technical shops, and systems safety. 3. Dow Chemical Co., Midland, Mich. 48640 (as of Dec. 31, 1966): Annual estimated cost . $4,200,705. Expiration date of current contract June 30, 1967. Number of personnel employed 270. Negotiated overtime (annual) 10%. Amount of subcontracts (annual) $350,000. Function: This contract provides KSC with the following services: Perform- ance of planning; estimating; development and preparation of functional re- quirements and design criteria; engineering studies; preparation of designs f a- cility record documents; preparation of documentation which includes interface control documents, configuration control drawings, cabling documentation, op- eration and maintenance manuals; facility activation; review of plans and spec- ifications; and preparation and review of PERT networks. 4. Federal Electric Corp., 621-671 Industrial Avenue, Paramus, N.J. 07652 (as of Dec. 31, 1966): Annual estimated cost - - $5,243,000. Expiration date of current contract June 30, 1967. Number of personnel employed 535. Negotiated overtime (annual) 8%. Amount of subcontracts (annual) None. Function: This contract provides KSC with the following services: Repair and calibration of measuring instruments; operation and maintenance of special timing systems, main telemetry station, special tracking equipment and facility and environmental measurement systems; preparation of the KSC reference PAGENO="1213" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1209 standards and the transfer of the accuracy to the working standards for electro- magnetic .compatibility equipment; operation of computer facilities, data trans- mission, data storage and retrieval and data display equipment; and documenta- tion of all system or subsystem installations or changes to existing installations. 5. General Electric Co., 570 Lexington Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022 (as of Dec. 31, 1966): Annual estimated cost . $28,000, 000. Expiration date of current contract - Sept. 30, 1967. Number of personnel employed - 900. Negotiated overtime (annual) (1). Amount of subcontracts (annual) - $750, 000. i All overtime work Is on an "emergency" basis and is not recorded. Function: This contract provides KSC with verification and operational inte- gration, operative engineering, ground systems engineering, and test operations engineering. 6. LTV Contract, LTV, P.O. Box 5907, Dallas, Tex. (as of Dec. 31, 1966): Annual estimated cost $9, 779,838. Expiration date of current contract - Dec. 31, 1967. Number of personnel employed - 893 (average). Negotiated overtime (annual) 10 percent. Amount of subcontracts (annual) - $6,754,071. Function: Thi~ contract provides KSO with the following services: printing, reproduction, publication, photography, graphics, data processing, and documentation. 7. Radio Corp. of America, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10020 (as of Dec. 31, 1966) Annual estimated cost $4, 376,697. Expiration date of current contract - rune 30, 1967. Number of personnel employed 511. Negotiated overtime (annual) 7.5 percent. Amount of subcontracts (annual) None. Function : This contract provides personnel for the planning, maintenance, and operation of the NASA-KSC communication system. This includes establishing integrated plans and implementation programs for new communications systems; communication billing verification; installation and maintenance of administra- tive and operational intercommunication systems; performing prevention and organizational corrective maintenance on all cable systems on KSC; operation and maintenance of electronic communications systems and switching equip- ment; coordination relative to communications responsibilities on launch complex 39 and other mission facility areas. 8. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 605 Third Avenue, New York City, N.Y. (as of Dec. 31, 1966): Annual estimated cost $19, 135,000. Expiration date of current contract - Dec. 31, 1967. Number of personnel employed - 2, 754. Negotiated overtime (annual) 7.7 percent. Amount of subcontracts (annual) $4, 865,208. Function: This contract provides KSC with the following support: mainte- nance and operation of administrative buildings; warehousing and supply opera- tions; medical, security, and fire protection services. PAGENO="1214" PAGENO="1215" APPENDIX H HEARINGS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, MANNED `SPACE FLIGHT CENTER, HOUSTON, TEX., MARCH 3, 1967 PRESENTATION BY MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER I. Welcome Dr. Gilruth. II. Summary review of MSO operations Mr. Low. III. Budget requirements summary Mr. Hjornevik. IV. Extravehicular activity Lieutenant Col. Aldrin. V. Space medicine Dr. Berry. VI. Apollo Applications - Mr. Thompson. VII. Space science and applications Mr. Piland. Meeting of the Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight of the Com- mittee on Science and Astronautics of the united States of America, House of Representatives, held on the 3d day of March 1967, com- mencing at 9 a.m., in the city of Houston, Tex., at the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, building 2, room 966, Congressman Olin Teague (chairman, Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight) presiding. There were present at that time and, place the following members of the Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight: Congressman Olin E. Teague, Chairman. Congressman Robert C. Eckhardt. Congressman James G. Fulton. Congressman Guy Vander Jagt. Congressman Jerry L. Pettis. Congressman John E. Hunt. Congressman Joe D. Waggonner, Jr. Congressman J. Edward Roush. Congressman Earle Cabell. And also present were the following committee staff members: Mr. Jim Wilson. Mr. Peter Gerardi. Col. Richard Dennin, USAF (invited by Congressman Teague). And also present, the following NASA Headquarters personnel: Mr. Robert F. Freitag. Mr. Jack V. Cramer. And also present on behalf of the NASA Manned Spacecraft Cen- ter were- Dr. Robert R. Gilruth, Director. Mr. George M. Low, Deputy Director. Mr. Paul E. Purser, Special Assistant to the Director. Mr. Julian M. West, Special Assistant for Long-Range Plan- ning. Dr. William A. Lee, Assistant Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program Office. 1211 PAGENO="1216" 1212 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Mr. Robert F. Thompson, Assistant Manager, Apollo Applica- tions Program Office. Dr. Wilmot N. Hess, Director of Science and Applications. Mr. Robert 0. Piland, Deputy Director of Science and Appli- cations. Dr. Charles A. Berry, Director of Medical Research and Oper- ations. Dr. Donald K. Slayton, Director of Flight Crew Opreations. Dr. Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., Director of Flight Operatio~is. Mr. Wesley L. Hjornevik, Director of Administration. Lt. Colonel Edwin E. Aldrin, Astronaut. Mr. Philip P. Hamburger, Assistant for Congressional Rela- tions. And also present was Mr. W. V. Reed, official court reporter, Houston, Tex. PAGENO="1217" OPENING REMARKS Dr. GTLRTJTH. Gentlemen, welcome from all of us to the Manned Spacecraft Center. We want to tell you how much we all appreciate your visit and your interest in coming down here to see many of these things firsthand. We all know how busy you are and how hard it is for you to get away and I am certain that we all are sorry that the travel situation was so difficult last night. What we have prepared here for you today is an agenda of activi- ties which, I believe, will make the maximum use of your time. After a brief session this morning in this room we will visit facilities and activities out in the Center, and this afternoon we will have a series of presentations ending with an inspection of the Lunar Landing Research Vehicle at Elhngton Field. I remember well one of your visits when we inspected with you the Gemini II spacecraft which had just been returned from its final qualification out over the Atlantic. Since that time we have flown 10 manned flights and completed the Gemini program. We have accomplished rendezvous, docking, and over 12 hours of extravehicular activity. Also, we have made con- sistent, controlled landings; and major rocket burns in space after rendezvous, to propel our spacecraft to a new record altitude of 851 statute miles. Several of you have been with us here during the flights in this program. In Apollo, we have made two unmanned Saturn I flights with space- craft, both of which were successful, and have been conducting an in- tense ground test program. As you all know, the recent spacecraft fire at Cape Kennedy has caused the suspension of manned flight ac- tivity pending the findings of the investigation board, and imple- mentation of their recommendations. Among many other things we will show you here today is some re- search on materials in support of the Board aimed toward reducing the fire hazard. We all hope that this spacecraft accident, as in air- craft accidents, will produce findings that will make flying more safe in the future. Now, George Low, the Deputy Director of this Center, will start our program by giving you an overview of activities and facilities here at the Center. Mr. Low. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is always a real pleasure to have you here with us and to have this opportunity to tell you what our accomplishments have been and what we intend to do in the coming year. I thought the best way of starting on this pictorial tour of the Center was to show an aerial photograph recently taken at the Manned 1213 76~-Ze5 0-67-pt. 2-~77 PAGENO="1218" 1214 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Spacecraft Center and indicating with it our principal activities (slide 1) One of our major iesponsibihties is Project M'tnagement As you know, we managed the Gemini program; we are managing the spacecraft portion of Apollo; we have assigned to us a portion of the Apollo Applications program; and we are looking toward future programs, as well. Second, we have a large activity concerned with what we call re- search, development, test, `md evalu'mtion In fact, most of our large facilities, and I will tell you more about them in a minute, are de signed to carry out this function Third, ~s e have an `i~re'm we call Flight Ci e~m Activities, since ~ e `u e responsible he~ ~ for the selection and training of `iii of the `mstron'tuts A fourth area is Medical Research `mnd Operations Flight Operations is the fifth, `mil of our manned flights `mre conducted `mnd carried out from the Mission Control Center loc'tted I indicating] `tt this point on the `merril photograph The newest are'm is Space Sciences and Apphc'thons, `i foc'ml point for the Space Sciences done in manned space flight Our organization chart Ms been almost the same for sever'tl years (slide 2) In fact, in preparing for your visit, I dug out `m ch'mrt 2 years old, looked at the names on it, looked at the org'mniz'mtion itself and I found that the changes have been minim'tl In discussions ~m ith some of you 2 years ago, I told you that our organization had matui ed, that we had grown from a Center which had been a small group manag- SLIDS 1 PAGENO="1219" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1215 NASA.S.67-1453 NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER HOUSTONJ, TEXAS DIRECTOR: ROBERT R GILRUTH DEPUJY DIRECTOR: GEORGE M LOW SPECIAL ASSISTANT: PAUL E PURSER LONG RANGE PLANNING: JULIAN WEST PUBLIC AFPAIRS FLIGHT SAFETY LEGAL NASA AUD~ NASA INSPECTOR P P HANEY F J BAILEY, i~J J W OULD L B H VOIGT J G L McAVOV _________ 1 I APOLLO SPACECRAFT APOLLO APPLICATIONS PROGRAM PROGRAM MGR:(VACANT) L JOSEPH P SHEA ASST: R F THOMPSON _____________ I I DIR OF ENGR AND DEV f DIR OF PLIGHT CREW OPS~ DIR OF MEDICAL RESEARCH DIR OF ADMINISTRA1TON MAXIME A FAGET [~ALD K SLAYTON [ CHARLES A BERRY, MD WESLEY I HJORNEVIK [ DIR OF SCIENCE DIR OF FLIGHT OPS I CHRISTOPHER C KRAFT WHITE SANDS TEST PACILI1Y MARTIN I RAINES SLIDE 2 ing Project Mercury, to a large research, development, and operations Center which could handle Gemini, Apollo, and future programs. In looking back at our previous chart and comparing it with today's organization, what I told you then has proved to be correct and the changes have been minimal. There have, however, been three signifi- cant additions to our chart. First, we have added a man to head an Office of Long-Range Plan- ning in the Office of the Director.. This is Mr. Julian West who is a former executive director of the Bell Telephone Laboratories. Julian is sitting over here [indicating]. There was no Apollo Applications program 2 years ago. We have now an Apollo Applications Program Office, managed by Robert F. Thompson. Bob, would you raise your hand ~ Bob ha~ been with this Center from the very beginning, and used to manage the recovery operations in our Flight Operations Directorate. `Our newest addition is the Directorate of Science and Applications. This was added to our chart just a few weeks ago. It is headed by Dr. Wilmot N. Hess-Bill-was the Director for Theoretical Studies at the `Goddard Space Flight `Center. We are tremendously pleased to have him with us to take on this important new aspect of our activity, to bring scientific `activity and space applications programs into manned space flight. The rest of the names and faces are all the same except that the Gemini Program `Office no longer appears on the chart. Mr. Mathews, who was head of the Gemini Program `Office, is now heading the Head- quarters Apollo Applications Office. All of the people in Mr. Mathews' office have been transferred to the various other activities at the Center, PAGENO="1220" 1216 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION most of them into Apollo and into Apollo Applications.. For example, Mr. Kleinknecht, who was Mr. Mathews' Deputy, is now one of Dr. Shea's Deputies in Apollo. Let me, while I have the chart, introduce also the rest of the people in this room and the rest of the people on the chart. Special Assistant to Dr. Gilruth is Paul Purser. Dr. Shea, the Apollo Manager, unfortunately, was not able to be with us. I believe he called you, Mr. Chairman, and told you that he could not be with us. Dr. Faget, our Chief Engineer and Director of Engineering and Development is working on the review board for the Apollo 204 acci- dent and is at Cape Kennedy. Donald K. (Deke) Slayton who heads our Flight Crew Operations is at the end of the table {indicating]. ~r. Berry, Director of Medical Research and Operations. Wesley L. Hjornevik, our Director of Administration. Chris Kraft, who is the Director of Flight Operations. We also have an activity at the White Sands Missile Range, our White Sands Test Facility, where we do the propulsion testing of the spacecraft engines in the Apollo program. This testing must be done at a remote site so we have a station at White Sands Missile Range headed by Martin L. Raines to take care of this effort. Dr. Gilruth has mentioned our Gemini program activities (slide 3) Gemini was completed a month ago with a final conference. NASA-S-67 -1447 PROGRAM ACTIVITIES * GEMINI * APOLLO * APOLLO APPLICATIONS * FUTURE PROGRAMS SLIDE 3 PAGENO="1221" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1217 We had planned to have on the program today a description of our responsibilities in the Apollo program. As you know, we manage the development of th~ Command and Service Modules, the Lunar Module, and essentially all that is on top of the launch vehicle. Because of the limitation of time, we will not discuss Apollo here today, since you have already visited our prime contractors. In Apollo applications we have several activities which will be dis- cussed this afternoon by Mr. Thompson. In the area of future programs, we have active study programs on space stations, on manned planetary flights and on lunar exploration beyond the Apollo program. Let me say a word about the makeup of our staff (slide 4). Our fiscal year 1968 civil service complement will be 4,634 people. It is interesting to look at the breakdown of people by major categories. You will notice that 57 percent of our people, 2,650, are professional engineers, scientists, and medical people. Fifty-seven percent is almost half again as high as the NASA average in that category. We have at this Center, the highest percentage, the highest ratio, of pro- fessional scientists, engineers, and medical people of any other NASA organization. And I think this, perhaps better than anything, ex- plains the kind of organization we are. We conceive, we design, we develop our spacecraft, but then we turn them over to our contractors to build. Ninety percent of the money that flows through the Center goes to our contractors. The second function we perform, once our contractors are working on these spacecraft, is test and evaluation. Most of our facilities, as NASA-S-67-1446 CIVIL SERVICE MANPOWER PROFILE (BY PROFESSION) NUMBER PROFESSIONAL SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING AND MEDICAL 2650 57% PROFESSIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE 553 12 % SUPPORTING TECHNICIAN 371 8% CLERICAL 871 19% WAGE BOARD 189 4% 4634 100% SIIDE 4 PAGENO="1222" 1218 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION I pointed out before, were built to perform this function. We bring in the subsystems, the components, `tnd complete spacecraft, and our engineers `md technicians test them here on the ground before we fly them in space to learn as much as possible about the behavior and the performance of these systems before we fly them Twenty fl~ e percent of our people are involved in this research de velopment, test, and evalu'mtion function (slide 5) You will note only 9 percent are involved in actual program man- agement. Another 25 percent, 1,159 people, are involved in operations These people `mre largely Chris Kraft's people who do the flight operations and Deke Slayton's people who take care of the flight crew training and the astronaut operations Although Medical Research and Operations is one of our most im portant functions, taking care of the men during space flight, Dr Berry has managed to do this with `rn extremely small staff He will cover, later this afternoon, many of the things we have le'trned in the Gemini program Space Science and Experiments is a new function, but by 1968 we intend to have 300 people devoted to this effort, 6 percent of our staff Administration and Center support, as a sum total, takes care of 33 percent of our staff. In addition to the civil service people on board here, we are sup- ported by a number of contractors shown here in various categories (slide 6) We have Technical Support Services, these are the people NASA-S-67-1 448 CIVIL SERVICE MANPOWER PROFILE (BY DISCIPLINE) NUMBER PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 430 9% RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, TEST, H53 25% AND EVALUATION OPERATIONS 1159 25% MEDICAL RESEARCH AND OPERATIONS 80 2% SPACE SCIENCE AND EXPERIMENTS 300 6% ADMINISTRATION (CENTER SUPPORT) 1512 33% 4634 100% SLIDE 5 PAGENO="1223" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1219 that run the machinery in our technical facilities, support us in elec- tronics, in computer services, and so on. The Administrative Support Services contractors include the guard services, the janitorial services, fire services, and so on. Mission support contractors are primarily in support of our Flight Operations activity; the people who program the computers there, and who run the equipment during the mission. But, keep in mind that these are not the people who operate the mission; they merely provide behind-the-scenes support. Chris Kraft, and his civil service staff, are the people that make the decisions, as he will tell you this morning when you see the Mission Control Center. At White Sands Test Facility, we have similar support contractors. rrhe total number is more than 6,600 support contractors located here and at White Sands. Now, about the facilities (slide 7). This is a chart showing the facilities that were in being and operational 2 years ago. Now, I will not cover this in detail but if you examine the chart, you will no- tice that we had a large proportion of our office space and general purpose laboratories, but very few of our special test facilities were in being then. In fact, the only one I see on this chart is the thermo- chemical test area, the area where we do propulsion and fuel cell testing. Most of the other facilities are general purpose laboratories and office space. In the past 2 years (slide 8) we have put into operation all of our major test facilities and again, I will not cover the whole chart. The NASA-S-67-1 449 MSC SUPPORT CONTRACTOR MANPOWER FY67 FY68 TECHNICAL SUPPORT 2762 2836 ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT 1117 1081 MISSION SUPPORT 2127 2158 * WHITE SANDS TEST FACILITY SUPPORI 668 653 TOTALS 6674 6728 SLID1~ 6 PAGENO="1224" MSC MAJOR FACILITIES (OPERATIONAL AS OF MARCH 1965) OFFICE SPACE 418,658 SQ FT GENERAL PURPOSE LABORATORY 665,311 SQ FT NASA.S.67~45O MSC MAJOR FAC ILITIES (OPERATIONAL SINCE MARCH 1965) OFFICE SPACE 251,925 SQ FT GENERAL PURPOSE LABORATORY 629,838 SQ FT PURPOSE OPERATIONAL VIBRATION AND ACOUSTIC TEST FACILITY MISSION CONTROL CENTER GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION OFFICE AND LABORATORY PRINTING AND REPRODUCTION FACILITY RADIATION AND FIELDS ACCELERATION LABORATORY SESL CONTRACTOR SUPPORT FACILITY LOGISTICS SUPPORT WAREHOUSE SOLAR TELESCOPE FACILITY SPACE ENVIRONMENT SIMULATION LABORATORY ANECHOIC CHAMBER TEST FACILITY ANTENNA TEST RANGE LUNAR MISSION AND SPACE EXPLORATION FACILITY CREW SYSTEMS LABORATORY RADAR BORESIGHT RANGE PROJECT ENGINEERING FACILITY FLIGHT ACCELERATION FACILITY ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS COMPATIBILITY FACILITY ULTRA HIGH VACUUM FACILITY 1220 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION NASA.S-67-145~ PURPOSE TRANSLATION AND DOCKING SIMULATION FACILITY CENTRAL DATA OFFICE SUPPORT SHOP AND WAREHOUSE GARAGE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT OFFICE CENTRAL CAFETERIA TECHNICAL AND ENGINEERING SERVICES LIFE SYSTEMS LABORATORY TECHNICAL SERVICES SHOP PROJECT MANAGEMENT FLIGHT OPERATIONS OFFICE INSTRUMENTATION AND ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS LABORATORY AUDITORIUM PROPULSION AND GUIDANCE OFFICES STRUCTURES AND MECHANICS OFFICE AND LABORATORY THERMOCHEMICAL TEST AREA MISSION SIMULATION AND TRAINING FACILITIES SLIDE 7 OPE RATIONAL 9/21/63 12/3/63 12/5/63 12/5/63 12/5/63 1/31/64 2/28/64 2/29/64 3/3/64 3/10/64 3/10/64 3/10/64 3/30/64 3/30/64 4/6/64 9/14/64 2/3/65 3/18/ 65 6/3/65 6/16/65 7/20/6 5 7/27/6 5 10/8/65 11/5/65 11/8/65 12/10/65 1/1/66 3/1/66 3/23/66 4/1 6j66 4/27/66 5/4/66 5/15/66 6/1/66 9/1/66 SLIDE 8 PAGENO="1225" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1221 Vibration and Acoustic Test Facility [indicating] went into opera- tion in March 1965; the Mission Control Center was operational for Gemini IV; our Space Environment Simulation Laboratory, the large vacuum chambers, went into operation late in 1965. The Flight Acceleration Facility, or centrifuge, early in 1966; and so on down the line. In the limited time you have here today, it is impossible for us to show all that we are doing within each facility. It would take more than a week to go through each one of the buildings and tell you all that we are doing. So I have then selected a number of pictures to show you the kind of work that is going on around the Center. As soon as I have finished here, we will take you around and show you some of the facilities. Our biggest development facility is in this building (slide 9); it is the Space Environment Simulation Laboratory. Essentially, it con- tains two very large vacuum chambers, vacuum chambers that not only give us the vacuum of space but also the temperature of space. The solar simulator, a bank of carbon arc lamps, duplicates the radia- tion the spacecraft receives from the Sun, and the liquid nitrogen cooled walls duplicate the coldness of space. The bottom surface can be heated and cooled to simulate the lunar surface. The large chamber, which stands about 120 feet tall and 60 feet in diameter, was built here rather than at a contractor plant, so that it can be used not only in the Apollo program but may also be used in future pro- grams at this Government location. Had it been built at a contractor plant, it could have been less available for future programs and that SLIDE 9 PAGENO="1226" 1222 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION contractor would have been in a better position to bid on the next program that came along than his competitors. As I mentioned before, the facility went into operation late in 1965, and during 1966 we ran two manned tests of the complete Apollo spacecraft in this facility. This is a picture (slide 10) taken just before one of the tests; it was an 8-day test with three men in the spacecraft during which time we tested the reaction of the Apollo spacecraft to the thermal and vacuum environment of space. We had a second test, lasting 6 days, later on last year. We also performed a much smaller scale test in the vacuum cham- ber, to test and qualify the spacesuit assembly for the Apollo program (slide 11). Here [indicating] you see a man in the chamber in a cagelike device which, with heating elements, simulates the direct and reflected heat he might get if he were standing on the Moon in a lunar crater. This was a manned test to develop the spacesuit and the portable life support system which he carries on his back. Another facility is the Vibration and Acoustic Test Facility (slide 12). In this facility we can subject full-scale spacecraft, as indicated here (slide 13), to the acoustic noise environment while the space- craft travels through the atmosphere during the launch operation. And here you see (slide 14) an Apollo Lunar Module, LM Test Article No. 3, in our Vibration Laboratory undergoing all of the vibra- tions that it will undergo during the launch on a Saturn V launch vehicle. SLIDE 10 PAGENO="1227" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1223 SLIDE 11 PAGENO="1228" 1224 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION SLIDE 12 SLIDE 13 PAGENO="1229" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1225 The Antenna Range (slide 15) is located here on the aerial photo- graph [indicating]. In this building we can test the antennas used on our spacecraft (slide 16) to get the distribution and patterns of the radiation from the antennas. We can also use this antenna range to measure all of the emanating radiation from the antennas of the Apollo spacecraft (slide 17) so that we can determine the optimum positions and the optimum direction, for communicating from the spacecraft to get the best communications. We can do this here on Earth long before we fly, so that by the time we fly, we will have the answers to these questions. Congressman FULTON. How big is the range, George ~ Mr. Low. It is 3,000 feet. From the view pictured there is an optical illusion. If you look at it from this end [indicating], it looks extremely long because these arrows are pointed. Looking at it from the other end, it looks much shorter than it actually is; but, it is three- fifths of a mile long. We use the range also from this point (slide 18) [indicating] as a radar boresight range. We can align the radar in the Lunar Module with the same target at the end of the range as is used in the antenna pattern testing. Now in some of our other laboratories we test, not the complete spacecraft, but the subsystems. Here you see a test (slide 19) of the Apollo Guidance System. This (slide 20) is a test of the docking probe which will connect the Command and Service Module to the Lunar Module when the two rendezvous in lunar orbit. This (slide 21) [indicating] is the mechanism that is on the Command Module. SLIDE 14 PAGENO="1230" 1226 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION SLIDE 15 SLIDE 16 PAGENO="1231" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1227 SLIDE 17 PAGENO="1232" 1228 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION SLIDE 18 PAGENO="1233" 1229 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION SLIDF~ 19 SLIDE 20 76-~265 0-67-pt. 2-78 PAGENO="1234" 1230 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Here you see the device that will `be on the Lunar Module and these can be tested over and over again on this test rig in one of our lab- oratories. This is a little more difficult to see (slide 22), but this is a scale model of the landing stage of the Lunar Module. By dropping it on this table and taking high-speed motion pictures we can get the dynamics of the landing of the Lunar Module. Here (slide 23) we developed the instrumentation that is used in the early Apollo spacecraft, the instrumentation that will measure the thermal environment, the pressures, and all of the other things we need to measure in flight. Here is another electronic facility (slide 24). In these cabinets [indicating] are housed du~ilicates of the equipment at our remote tracking stations. In here [indicating], in other racks are duplicates of the equipment in the spacecraft. In this facility we can test the compatibility of the spacecraft and the ground equipment, again, before flight. Our Thermochemical Test Area (slide. 25) is located here on the aerial photograph. In this area we have areas for the testing of fuel cells and small reaction motors of the many pyrotechnic, or explosive, devices used in the spacecraft. In one of these facilities [indicating] we ran the Apollo fuel cells (slide 26) for many hours in a complete test and evaluation program. And more recently, in this facility, we have set up a full-scale Apollo boilerplate spacecraft (slide 97) which is now being instrumented and outfitted to try to duplicate in a lab- oratory environment the fire that occurred in the Apollo 204 space- craft a month ago. SLIDE 21 PAGENO="1235" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1231 SLIDE 22 PAGENO="1236" 1232 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION SLIDE 23 SLIDE 24 PAGENO="1237" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1233 The flight Acceleration Facility, or (~ us the high acceleration loads of launch of reentry. Inside the gondola (slide 29) a dummy in an Apollo spacecr~' spacesuit development program. tems development and for training o~ rec- ~-- environment. gun , ~s short tod of ~ A c t kind c : simulation of exi ~avehict carried out with this six-degree-of-freedom device (slide which suspends the astronaut above a mockup of the Gemini spacecra~ and the Agena. This is training for an experiment that was conducted during extra- vehicular activity and on what we have learned. Here (slide 32) is a picture of the Apollo Mission Simulator which you will see in just a little while. This (slide 33) is a picture of an astronaut on a field trip to study geology, which is first studied in the classroom and later in the field using the equipment that will be used on the surface of the Moon. At Ellington Air Force Base, we have the Flight Operations part of Deke Slayton's activity (slide 34). Here you see the T-38 aircraft for astronaut proficiency flying; and our Earth resources aircraft, a Convair and an Electra, which are equipped with scientific instru- PAGENO="1238" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1234 SLIDE 26 PAGENO="1239" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION SLIDE 27 1235 SLIDE 28 PAGENO="1240" 1236 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION SLIDE 29 PAGENO="1241" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1237 NASA~5~66~ 12876 DEC 30 ASTRC~ AliT Tr SLIDE 30 SLIDE 31 PAGENO="1242" SLIDF~ 32 ments that can measure the earth in various ranges of the spectrum. The same instruments may later be used in space as part~ of our Earth resources remote sensor program. At Ellington also, we are just started testing on this Lunar Landing Research Vehicle (slide 35). This flight was made at NASA's Flight Research Center in California, where it was first developed. We moved the vehicle here recently, and you will see it at Ellington this afternoon. It has not yet flown here at Houston unless. Dr. SLAYTON. It flew at 8 o'clock this morning, for the first time here. Mr. Low. It flew at 8 this morning. How was the flight? Dr. SLAYTON. It was fine. Mr. Low. Flight Operations (slide 36), Chris Kraft~s operation. This is the Mission Control Center during an actual Gemini mission. I will not talk about this now because Chris will fake you through the Mission Control Center later on this morning. The Flight Operations activity includes not only the running of the mission and preparmg for it, but also preparing for the recovery ac- tivities. Here (slide 37) you see Astronaut Dave Scott with some of the equipment that was developed in our laboratories the water tank is located in one of our buildings here. Medical Research and Operations is the next area that I mentiomied before (slide 38). These [indicating] are the various discipline areas that Dr. Berry has to look at to gain a better understanding of the effects of space flight on man for longer and longer durations. 1238 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION PAGENO="1243" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1239 SLIDE 33 PAGENO="1244" 1240 1968 NASA AtJTHORIZATION SLIDE 34 SLIDE 35 PAGENO="1245" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1241 SLIDE 36 SLIDE 37 PAGENO="1246" 1242 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Here (slide 39) you see a typical test to determine the metabolic load caused by wearing a spac~suit. Beyond medical research into medical operations, we have medical monitors (slide 40) in all of our test facilitie~ when we conduct manned tests in the vacuum chambers, on the Centrifuge, in all the facili- ties in fact, that do use men. During mission operations (slide 41) Dr. Berry and his people monitor the medical data in real-time during the flight.. After the flight (slide 42) they then determine the effects of space flight in detail. Dr. Berry will cover that this afternoon. The newest directorate, as I mentioned, is Science and Applications (slide 43) under Dr. Hess. The major areas covered by this directorate include lunar exploration, the scientific exploration of the Moon, in Apollo and in future programs; and investigations in Earth Sciences and Applications to learn what man can contribute to a better deter- mination of the Earth's weather, and to study the Earth's natural re- sources, including water, air, and land resources. The directorate is also responsible for space physics, to gain knowl- edge which enables us to design our spacecraft to fly in the radiation and the micrometeoroid environment of space. The directorate also has responsibility for experiments, has conducted many experiments in Gemini, and will conduct many more in Apollo and Apollo Appli- cations. Also, this directorate supports Deke Slayton's directorate in the scientific training of our astronauts. This (slide 44) is a solar telescope located here at Houston. Its purpose is to develop methods to help us predict the space weather, including radiation effects, just as today our meteorologists are pre- dicting the Earth's weather. SLIDE 38 PAGENO="1247" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1243 SLIDE 89 PAGENO="1248" 1244 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION NASA SLIDE 40 SLIDE 41 PAGENO="1249" 1968 NASA AUTHOXUZATION 1245 SLIDE 42 76-265 O-67-pt. 2---79 PAGENO="1250" 1246 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION NASA -S-67 -1445 SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS DIRECTORATE * LUNAR EXPLORATION * LUNAR RECEIVING LABORATORY * EARTH SCIENCES AND APPLICATIONS * MANNED METEOROLOGY * NATURAL RESOURCES SURVEY * SPACE PHYSICS * EXPERIMENTS * SCIENTIFIC TRAINING OF ASTRONAUTS SLIDE 43 We are studying and analyzing (slide 45) the Lunar Orbiter pic- tures in an effort to select the landing site for the Apollo lunar land- ings. Also, we are developing the experimental hardware which will be left on tile Moon in tile Apollo missions. This (slide 46) is the so- called ALSEP, Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package, that will be placed on the lunar surface in the Apollo missions. Our newest facility is tue Lunar Receiving Laboratory (slide 47), which will test and analyze the lunar samples when they are brought back by the astronauts from the Moon in Apollo. My last series of slides show pictures taken in Gemini. Most of these pictures were taken in Gemini-XI during the flight to the alti- tude record of 851 miles. In Gemini we took 2,400 pictures of this kmcl. Tiley indicate to us how pictures like this can be used to gain a better understanding of the Earth's natural resources; and with this understanding, perhaps, we will have a better ability to manage these resources in tile years to come. The first photograph (slide 48) was taken just west of the Red Sea. You see 2,000 miles of tile Nile River iii one picture. It. was taken with a Hasselblad camera at an altitude of about 200 miles. Moving a little farther east., this (slide 49) is the northern end of the Red Sea, going into the Gulf of Suez. Tile Suez Canal is ilere. The Gulf of Aqaba, the Dead Sea, amid the Sea of Galilee caii also be seen. Bagdad is here, the Sinai Peninsula here. Here is an interest- ing feature. Just before tile mcii passed over this point in Gemini XI, an oil pipeiimie burst and a fire started. Although they did iiot see it PAGENO="1251" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1247 s~f' SLIDE 44 SLIDE 4.5 PAGENO="1252" 1248 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION SLIDE 46 SLIDE 47 PAGENO="1253" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1249 NASA S-66-~44*64 SLIDE 48 at that time, we determined later that this is the fire, the smoke, and the shadow from the smoke of that pipeline fire. These two pictures (slides 50 and 51) of the same geographic area compare the kind of view our astronauts get with the pictures that we get today from our operational weather satellites in the unmanned program. Again, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Suez, part of the Nile, taken this time from Gemini XII with a hand-held, fairly ordinary kind of camera; and exactly the same area taken with one of the early unmanned weather satellites from a higher altitude. You can see a tremendous difference in the clarity and definition of the Earth's fea- tures, when seen in color, and at lower altitudes, as compared to the televised picture taken by an unmanned satellite. Moving farther `east, this (slide 52) is the southern end of the Red Sea, moving into the Gulf of Aden. The city of Aden is right here, the Indian Ocean opening up over here. On the next picture (slide 53) all of the subcontinent of India is shown in one photograph. India is here, and this is Ceylon; this is Adam's Bridge, leading from India to Ceylon. There is a very inter- PAGENO="1254" 1250 NAM 8.86~M8~O 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION SLIDE 49 esting cloud pattern; you see clouds over the continent, clouds over the sea,- and almost no clouds for a fairly wide strip around the coast, Once we had this picture, the same pattern was noted on the unmanned Tiros picture. But until the weather people looked at this one and very obviously saw this effect, it was not evident øn the b]ack-and- white picture televised back from the unmanned satellite. This picture (slide 54) was taken from t.he highest point that man has ever been, over Australia, looking down from an altitude of 851 statute miles. ~ou see more than 2,000 miles of the coast of Australia, from Perth to Darwin. The curvature of the horizon is about real. It is slightly exaggerated, because of the lens, but not. very much. The sky here is dark. The light streak is a reflection from the Sun, which is moving down toward the west.. In my last photograph (slide 55) taken just a little later you see the terminator, the difference between clay and night on the Earth. It is still daylight where the spacecraft is, because it is so much higher. The altitude is still nearly the same. The Sun is just. a ]ittie lower, and its reflection is more pronounced. PAGENO="1255" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1251 SLIDE 50 This was a very quick tour through the Center with pictures. We would like to take you now on an actual tour and show you some of the facilities. (Recess for tour: On the tour the following facilities were visited: Astronaut Training Facility, Lunar Mission and Space Exploration Facility, Mission Control Center, and the Materials Testing Labora- tory.) Mr. Low. Mr. Chairman, we have also prepared a book answering your questions. We will give a copy to Mr. Wilson and send the rest to Washington. Before introducing Colonel Aidrin, I would like to cover one item that I forgot to mention this morning concerning visitors to MSC. In the course of a year we have 650,000 visitors to the Center, nearly twice as many as any other NASA center. We have an open house every Sunday. Three years ago we decided to open the Center up for four Sundays in a row, but since people kept on coming, we continued the practice. We now average about 10,000 people every Sunday. During the open house we show displays in the auditorium, including PAGENO="1256" 1252 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION spacecraft hardware, and we show films every half hour. Visitors can then go on and drive through the Center for a visual inspection. I think it has made a great impact on the people here in this area, and demonstrates the tremendous public interest in the space program. We do not have nearly enough space to accommodate the number of people who visit us. Congressman TEAGUE. How do they know where to go, George? Do you put up anything on the weekend that is not up now to identify buildings? Mr. Low. Yes, we do. We display signs giving directions to the auditorium and for the drive-through tour, but we do not have any guided tours. We do not provide any people for this effort, except the projectionist in the auditorium and a few extra guards. Congressman FULTON. Actually, I think Tiger suggested a Visitors' Center at Cape Kennedy, and they are doing it. Mr. Low. The time will come here, Mr. Fulton, when we will prob- ably have to do something also, because we are getting very much overcrowded in the space we have. SLIDE 51 PAGENO="1257" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1253 SLIDE 52 I would like to introduce Colonel Aidrin, who was pilot in Gemini XII to speak on the subject of extravehicular activity. Congressman TEAGUE. George, while Buzz is getting up there, why not let Wes submit his information for the record, in case we have to cut something out? We will go over it again, Wes, with the people in Washington. Does that suit you? Mr. HJORNEVIK. Yes. Congressman TEAGUE. Does anyone have any objections? (No response.) MR. H~roRNEvIK's PRESENTATION TO THE TEAGIJE COMMITTEE Mr. Chairman, my purpose is to review briefly for you the budget for the Manned Spacecraft Center for Research and Development, Administrative Operations, and Construction of Facilities, required to support the program you have been hearing about for fiscal year 1968. Tn total, we require $1,492 million for fiscal year 1968. As you can see on the first chart (fig. 1), completion of Gemini in fiscal year PAGENO="1258" 1254 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION SLIDE 53 PAGENO="1259" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1255 SLIDE 55 1967 eliminates this program as a funding requirement for fiscal year 1968. Apollo is clearly past its peak spending period in fiscal year 1968 and shows a decline in excess of $200 million. It should be re- membered that these numbers do not take account of any possible impact as a result of the recent 204 accident. The follow-on pro- gram to Apoiio, known as Apollo Applications, has its first large funding requirement in fiscal year 1968. The requirements for MSC's responsibility, which include the airlock, modifications to the Com- mand and Service Modules and to the Lunar Module, and the assigned scientific effort, total $228 million. MSC's R.. & P. requirements then decline slightly from $1 ,407,600,00() to $1,392 million. Our Adininis- trative Operations requirements increase by $2,600,000, which I shall discuss in more detail later, and the Construction of Facilities budget decreases from $9,100,000 to $2,400,000. The next slide (fig. 2) shows our AO budget in more detail. As you can see (fig. 2A), the total number of authorized permanent posi- tions remains the same; however, the number of man-years increases by 91. This is because we have beei~ on an increasing staffing curve. Cost of this increase in man-years, together with periodic step in- PAGENO="1260" 1256 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION NASA-S-67-1 337 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT GEMINI 21.6 0 APOLLO SPACECRAFT 1028.9 MISSION SUPPORT 131.5 APOLLO APPLICATIONS 228.2 ADVANCED MISSIONS 3.4 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TOTAL 1392.0 ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS 97.6 CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES _______ _______ TOTAL FY 1968 ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS BUDGET (DOLLARS IN THOUSANDS) NUMBER OF PERMANENT POSITIONS. YEA REND NUMBER OF MAN-YEARS (PERMANENT POSITIONS) PERSONNEL AND RELATED COSTS ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS COST EXCLUSIVE OF PERSONNEL AND RELATED COSTS _______ ________ TOTAL ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS FIGURE 2 MSC MANNED SPACE FLIGHT BUDGET FY 1967 FY 1968 1243.6 106.5 32.6 3.3 1407.6 95.0 9.1 1511.7 NASA-S-67~1 435 FIGURE 1 2.4 1492.0 FY 1967 4634 4468 $59,287 BUDGET FY 1968 4634 4559 $60,623 35,702 _37,Oi $94,989 $97,636 PAGENO="1261" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1257 NASA -S.67- 1439 PERSONNEL COST AND ADMINISTRATION RISE IN PERSONNEL COST FROM FY 1967 TO FY 1968 OF $1,336,000.00 IS DUE TO * INCREASE IN 91 AVERAGE MAN-YEARS * PSI'S * PROMOTIONS PHASEDOWN OF GEMINI PROGRAM OFFICE PERSONNEL FIGURE 2A creases and promotions, is estimated at $1,336,000 (fig. 3) - The budget provides for oniy two cost increases in areas other than personal services: $1 million is the estimated increase in MSC's share of the operating cost of Ellington Air Force Base, brought about by the pro~osed transfer of this base from the Air Force to the Texas Air National Guard; and $568,000 is the estimated increase for main- tenance and operation costs at White Sands. The latter number does not represent an increase in White Sands costs, which are actually declining, but rather is a result of a funding peculiarity. In fiscal yea~r 1966, 16 months of operating costs were funded, and in fiscal year 1967 only 8 months were funded. The requirement for fiscal year 1968, of course, reflects a full 12 months' operation. These two in- creases are offset by $257,000 of minor decreases. A certain amount of arbitrariness is probably necessary in any budgetary process. However, the budget process for fiscal year 1968 reflected a degree of arbitrariness which is of great concern to us at MSC. I have described what the budget reflects; however, this budget does not meet our minimum requirements. For example, with new facilities coming on the line for part of fiscal year 1967 and in fiscal* year 1968, our minimum utilities costs will increase by $700,000. Yet, the budget reflects a reduction of $50,000. Similarly, this budget does not reflect the cost of the recent Civil Service Commission adjust- ments in engineering salaries which will cost an estimated $500,000 in fiscal year 1968. As I am sure you are aware, the AO budget covers many support activities other than civil service salaries (fig. 4). In our case at MSC, many activities, such as maintenance and operation of facilities PAGENO="1262" 1258 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION NASA .$.671440 MAJOR CHANGES IN ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS COSTS FY 1967 BUDGET VERSUS FY 1968 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET (OTHER THAN PERSONNEL RELATED COSTS) (DOLLARS IN THOUSANDS) BUDGET FY 1967 FY 1968 ~ * ALL OTHER THAN PERSONNEL $35,702 $37,013 $1311 RELATED COSTS MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION +568 OF WHITE SANDS * ELLINGTON AIR FORCE BASE +1000 TENANCY * OTHER ADJUSTMENTS -257 FIGuRE 3 NASA-S-67.1436 ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS MAJOR CATEGORIES OF SERVICE MANPOWER 1967 1968 MAINTENANCE & OPERATION 811 777 OF FACILITIES, MSC TECHNICAL WRITING, GRAPHICS, 400 349 LOGISTICS, PHOTOGRAPHIC SERVICES, CLOSED CIRCUIT TV, ETC MAINTENANCE & OPERATION 178 168 OF FACILITIES, WSTF COMPUTER PROGRAMMING 128 128 & OPERATION SUPPORT _______ _______ TOTALS 1517 1422 FIGURE 4 * PAGENO="1263" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1259 (many of which you have seen today), computer programing and operation, technical writing, logistic support, and many others, are provided by industrial support contractors. Over the past 2 years we have worked very hard to keep this kind of supporting effort to the minimum possible level. As the next chart shows (fig. 5), we decreased the manpower in these activities from 1,659 to 1,517 in fiscal year 1967, and this in spite of substantially increasing workloads. This reduction effort has required the compromising of what would normally be considered sound practice. For example, when special manned tests are run in the chambers or in the centrifuge or in one or the other of the main facilities, the operators rightly demand guard service to control access to the facility. We can do this only by vacating one of our standard posts. We have severely reduced our janitorial services, lengthened the time between waxing, and other- wise decreased standards, including a requirement that everyone clean his own desk and empty his own ashtray. As can be seen on the next slide (fig. 6), existing union agreements with employees of these contractors will result in a wage escalation of 3 to 4 percent in fiscal year 1968. In addition, the total floor space increase of new facilities coming on the line will amount to 204,000 square feet or 6 percent in the area now requiring maintenance and operation and janitorial and guard services. NASA.S-67-~44~ CONTRACT SUPPORT ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS MANPOWER 2000 FY 67 FY 68 1800 1659 1600 `- ~517 1422 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 ___________ FIGURE 5 PAGENO="1264" 1260 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION NASA-S.67-1 437 ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS COST INCREASE FACTORS WAGE ESCALATION 3% TO 4% FLOOR SPACE INCREASE - MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 6% (204,000 SQUARE FEET) COST ESCALATION OF SUPPLIES, MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT 3% NET REDUCTION - CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL 6% FIGURE 6 In spite of this, the budget projects an identical number of dollars in fiscal year 1968 as in fiscal year 1967. The manpower curve you just saw reflects a decrease in fiscal year 1968 from 1,517 to 1,422 in support contractor employees. This is a reduction of about 6 percent, at the same time the workload is increasing by about 6 percent. This manpower number is a derived number of what the budget will sup- port and is below what this center regards as a minimum prudent level of maintenance and operations expenditures to protect a very large Government investment. It is our belief that a minimum budget which would cover cost increases, that is, increased wages as required by union agreements, increased utility costs, and increased cost of materials, but that would require that the increased workload be absorbed by present manning, would be $2,200,000 more than the budget presented to Congress. My last slide (fig. 7) relates to the facilities budget. Our request is for $2,400,000 and covers two kinds of items. The first relates to the very large-scale environmental testing laboratory. rfw~o modifi- cations are required in this facility. The first grows out of our operational experience to date. The original plan provided a siugle manlock at the 31-foot level to provide medical monitoring and rescue capability for manned operations. Our experience to date has demon- strated that this should be a double manlock in order to provide adequate ingress-egress and crew relief access. The second relates PAGENO="1265" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1261 to the large-scale solar simulation system which by fiscal year 1968 will have over 1,500 hours of operating time. This is the estimated life of the system, and it will require more or less complete rehabili- tating, refurbishing, and replacement. The second area relates to center support facilities and costs of two items. The first is an access road from the rear of the site to the new, currently-under-construction Bay Area Boulevard which will provide a badly needed relief to NASA Road 1, which is currently very, very badly overloaded during rush hours. The second will permit an upgrading of our sewage treatment facilities to insure that this center in no way contributes to an already very serious local water pollution problem. NASA-S-67-~317 MSC CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES APPROPRIATION (DOLLARS IN THOUSANDS) BUDGET ESTIMATES FY 1968 PROJECT ESTIMATE MODIFICATIONS TO ENVIRONMENTAL $1,900 TESTING LABORATORY CENTER SUPPORT FACILITIES 525 TOTAL $2,425 FIGURE 7 ~76-265 0-67--pt. 2-80 PAGENO="1266" PR1~SENTATION OF LT COL EDWIN E ALDRIN EXTRAVEHICULAP ACTIVITY Congressman Teague, members of the Subcommittee for Manned Space Flight, Dr Gilruth, my briefing this afternoon will concern itself primarily with a summary of the Gemini EVA experiences, some conclusions we can draw from these experiences, and the status we find ourselves in, in regard to EVA at the present time. I think you will find in the latest issue of Aviation Week some sum- maries that come very close to some of my remarks In essence, they managed to scoop me very nicely, of course, they didn't dwell on `md emphasize perhaps, Gemini 12 as much as I might do this `ifternoon The development of our present EVA capability has been char acterized by an iterative or step by step, building block, process, you might say The novel characteristics of extravehicular `ictivity en vironment in space and the lack of any comparable prior experience has made, many times, intuition or the normal design appro'tches oc casionally inadequate, and actually we have been forced to `in experi mental, trial and ex ror, type of a step by step process We feel that the flight experience we have accumulated up to no~ has led to a reasonably good appreciation of the problems that we face for extravehicular activity The objectives of Gemini EVA (fig 1) were to develop a basic EVA capability, to use EVA to increase the basic capability of the spacecraft, and to develop opem ational tech niques and evaluate advanced equipment in support of EVA for future programs To the first of these, certainly we have demonstrated that man can operate outside the spacecraft For the second obiective, we have retrieved equipment from outside the spacecraft, we h'tve moved back into the adapter section and performed various tasks there; we have conducted experiments (what we call a standup EVA or open hatch environments), and we have `mttached vehicles together ~m ith tethers to extend the capabilities of these spacecraft On the last objective, as we have piogressed through the Gemini program, we found that we wanted to shift our emphasis somewh'it more from transport type of devices to the b'isic underst'tnding of work productivity of the EVA pilot We have established the need for body restraints in conducting EVA work, we have evaluated to some degree v'irious m'tneuvering devices, we believe we have an underst'tnding of the worklo'id ctpabihties of m pilot outside the spacecraft, and, certainly, we h'mve g'uned `i bettei understanding of simul'mtion requirements th'it `ire needed In reviewing the Gemini flights (fig 2), v~e find that ~e have actually performed EVA on five flights, ~e have trained foi six We now have four pilots who have experienced EVA, and ~ e h'tve eight who are intimately familiar with the EVA problems bec'iuse of their work either `is comm'tnd pilots or on b'tckup crew s 1262 PAGENO="1267" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1263 OBJECTIVES OF GEMINI EVA. * DE VE LOP BASIC EVA CAPABILITY * USE EVA TO INCREASE THE BASIC CAPABILITY OF THE SPACECRAFT * DEVELOP OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES AND EVALUATE ADVANCED EQUIPMENT IN SUPPORT OF EVA FOR FUTURE PROGRAMS FIGURE 1 NASA-S.66- ~2O62 SUMMARY OF GEMINI EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITIES STATISTICS GEMINI MISSION LV vm [X-A X XI XII LIFE SUP SYSTEM VCM ELSS ESP ELSS AMU ELSS ELSS ELSS UMBLTH, 25 25 25 50 30 25 MANEUVER. HHMU HHMU AMU HHMU HHMU -- UMB EVA, HR:MIN 036 -- 2:07 0:39 0:33 2:06 STANDUP, HR:MIN -- ~ -- 0:50 2:10 3:24 TOTAL EVA, HR:MIN 036 * -~ 2:07 1:29 2:43. 5:30 FIGURE 2 We have accumulated a total of 6 hours umbilical EVA time, and a little over 6 hours of standup EVA mode with the open hatch, for a total of slightly over 12 hours. (I might add, at this point, that in training for these 12 hours we have devoted somewhere in the neigh- borhood of 1,300 hours training for this EVA flight experience.) Our first EVA experience was in Gemini IV. The posture that the pilot has here (fig. 3), Astronaut White, is that of a neutral position of the suit. When he moves his arms or legs or body away from this neutral attitude he has to exert forces somewhat against the suit. This flight was conducted as an evaluation of a hand-held maneuver- ing unit. We used ventilation control module, supplied by oxygen from the spacecraft, to maintain the suit pressure and create a ven- tilated condition within his suit. PAGENO="1268" 1264 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION The hand-held maneuvering unit, the Model 1 that I have here, has two tractor jets and one pusher jet and is actuated by depressing two different triggers. This particular hand-held maneuvering unit, or IIHMU, carried its own oxygen supply with it. The model that I have here, which was used on other flights, had an external supply of propellant connected to it. In evaluating the hand-held maneuvering unit, we came to the con- clusion that it does have a tentative utility in being able to transport the pilot from one place to another. The umbiNcal itself is very use- ful as a limiting or distance-limiting device, but not for maneuvering or controllin~g attitude in space. We found as a result of Gemini IV that a pilot does not become disoriented when he is placed out away from the spacecraft. Perhaps, as a result of the lack of work tasks that were assigned the pilot on Gemini IV, we were not able to get a taste of some of the problems that were going to be in store for us in the future in some of our EVA efforts; and perhaps we were a little misled by the relative ease of this flight. In the time between Gemini IV and Gemini VIII, we worked rather hard to develop an improved environmental life-support system, or chest pack. We developed a back pack which would supply its own oxygen source. This back pack was mounted in the adapter. The task was to move from the spacecraft back to the adapter and to don this back pack. It had connections into the chest pack and, also, sup- plied maneuvering gas to the hand-held maneuvering unit (fig. 4). FIGURE 3 PAGENO="1269" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1265 FIGURE 4 Gemini VIII did not exercise this equipment because it was ter- minated early-due to a thruster problem. It did give us our first taste of developing rather complicated pieces of equipment, working pro- cedures, and training techniques. We found, as a result of this ex- perience, that an extremely large amount of crew training time was necessary to develop the EVA capability. The process generally went like this: We exposed the crewmembers to zero-G in the KC 135, in its parabolic maneuvers, with 2 G's being pulled at the bottom in a period of about 25 seconds of zero-G. Based upon the results of these flights, we then refined our procedures and returned back to the zero-G aircraft. We found that when the pilot was working outside the spacecraft we had to develop very, very close coordination between the two crewmembers. On the Gemini IX flight we used the same environmental life support system and, also, evaluated the astronaut maneuvering unit. A 25-foot umbilical was used again, and the maneuvering device was the Astro- naut Maneuvering Unit. Early in the first dayside pass the astronaut exited the spacecraft and attempted to make use of velcro pads, like 1 have here, to transport himself along the surface of the spacecraft. We found that this was not a feasible way of doing it. The pads either came off the hand or they managed to tear loose from their attachment point. Again, we found that the umbilical was not very useful as an orienta- tion device once the pilot let go of ih~ spacecraft. He was unable to do much other than just pull himself back in, and he was not assured from which direction he would come back in. PAGENO="1270" 1266 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION This slide (fig. 5) shows the provisions for the Astronaut Maneuver- ing Unit in the back, the adapter section of the spacecraft. We had hand bars to facilitate his maneuvering around. We attached mirrors on these and had lighting. The AMU was mounted in this position. It had two control arms, an attitude controller, and a translation controller. As part of the preparation process, these controller arms had to be pulled down and extended into the outward position, here. Then a series of connections had to be prepared to allow the oxygen supply, which was in the back pack, to be readily acceptable for connection into the chest pack. We also had communications, a UHF communications set in the back pack. This bag that was on the seat, or the "duck bill" of the AMU, con- tamed the 125-foot tether. We had three different hooks that had to be hooked up to the existing umbilical and to the connections where the umbilical came into the suit. We found, in some of our early training, that a bar alone, as a foot restraint, was not adequate, that the subject tended to float up as he was performing some of these tasks, like pulling down on this arm, so we installed these stirrups thinking that this would enable us to provide a sufficient restraint. In actual flight we discovered that the stirrups were inadequate, that the feet would tend to slide out of the stirrups; and as a result, we further refined our design and came up with a foot restraint over here, that you will see later. The large amount of overexertion, caused by some of these tasks back in the adapter, created a fogging problem on the visor, and we were unable to complete the evaluation of the AMU. The EVA was terminated at that point. FIGuRE 5 PAGENO="1271" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1267 From this flight one of the major lessons we learned was the value of proper body positioning and restraining in order to perform work tasks. As a resultq we developed improved foot restraints. We also learned that we had to coat the inside of the visor with an antifog compound. In the words of the pilot, after the flight, he said, "Make everything simple," meaning sufficiently large for easy operation-every little task that you have to do make as simple as you possibly can. We further learned, as a result of this flight, that the underwater simulation studies would be quite valuable not only in working out procedures but, also, in actual conduct of training for `the crew- members. After this flight the pilot went through his entire sequence of train- ing in an underwater facility, and we found that many of the difficul- ties he had experienced in flight were very closely duplicated. We then went on to look into the procedures that were being em- ployed on Gemini X and XI. However, because of the time schedule, we were unable to conduct actual crew training for these flights in the underwater facility. In Gemini X we conducted our first standup EVA. This came first in the flight. The standup EVA, or open hatch period, was primarily to conduct night photography with a camera mounted on the hatch sill. These were ultraviolet pictures. We found, as we were coming into daylight on this flight, that we had an eye irritation problem. We attributed this eye watering problem to the effect produced by two suit compressors which were used to increase airflow into the helmet. The umbilical EVA was conducted in conjunction with a rendezvous with a Gemini VIII Agena that had been in orbit for 5 months. The purpose of this was to recover an experiment package that was on the Gemini VIII A~ena. You see the 50-foot umbilical that was used in this flight, in this slide (fig. 6), along with the ELSS,. the hand-held maneuvering unit. In this particular case we supplied nitrogen to the hand-held maneuvering unit through a connection aft of the space- craft hatch. You can get some idea of the size and bulk of this by comparing the 25-foot umbilical that we 1~ave over here with this double umbilical that not only had' an oxygen line* and electrical cothmunications but also a nitrogen line, We found in transporting from the Gemini spacecraft over to the Agena that the pilot was not able to hold on to the docking cone on the Agena because there were not enough handholds positioned there for him. As a result, he had to return'to the spacecraft and then transport himself once more to the Agena. In spite of this problem, however, he did successfully recover the. experiment package. On ingress back into the Gemini spacecraft the pilot had a certain amount of difficulty, becoming eutangled with the large amount of umbilical that we had. We concluded that this length of umbilical was )ust too long and too bulky to be used in the Gemini spacecraft On Gemini XII, the equipment used u as essentially the same as that on Gemini X, with the exception that we had shortened the um- bilical clown to 30 feet. One of the objectives in this umbilical EVA was to attach a tether to the docked Agena vehicle. We also had planned a handtool evaluation On the aft portion of the spacecraft. (fig. 7.) PAGENO="1272" 1268 1968 NASA AUTELORIZATION FIGURE 6 FIGURE 7 PAGENO="1273" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1269 The pilot was also to maneuver back to the adapter section and recover some film from an Apollo Sun type photography experiment. He would also pick up the hand-held maneuvering unit at that point and proceed to further evaluate its use. We found rather early in this flight that the pilot was experi- encing a fatigue problem, and, after the flight, we discovered he had problems installing his visor, while in a pressurized suit condition, before exiting the spacecraft. He further commented that the zero-G airplane simulations had led him to believe that by straddling the nose of the spacecraft and forcing his feet in and around the docking cone he would be able to hold himself in this position long enough to install the tether that attached the Agena target vehicle to the docking bar on the Gemini spacecraft. However, he found that he was continually slipping off and sliding up. As a result, the zero-G aircraft simulations did not prove to be valid. Because of the fatigue problem, in completing this task and also installing the camera, the crew elected to terminate the umbilical EVA at that point. On the next day, we conducted a standup EVA during this flight for 2 night passes, taking pictures of the stars on 2 successive night passes, and we found that the pilot was able to conduct this EVA with very little trouble at all. The lessons that we learned on Gemini XI were that the lack of body positioning or the lack of restraint system caused very high physical exertion when he was trying to perform something with his hands and could not hold on. We also discovered the inadequacy of the zero-G airplane as a complete simulation device for EVA. We found that we needed to provide a time period early in the EVA for the pilot to acclimate himself, or become familiar with the en- vironment. We also needed to analyze further the work-rest cycle and establish some means of simulation to determine what his workload would be at various times during the mission. The rather high workloads that were experienced during this mission created such a heat problem that the environmental life support system was unable to recover him and cool him down for him to proceed. As a result of the experiences on Gemini XI, we modified the flight plan for Gemini XII. We dropped the evaluation of this Astronaut Maneuvering Unit in favor of a continued evaluation of various types of body restraint systems and the associated workloads that are required for a series of representative tasks. We also elected to con- duct the standup EVA first to that I would have an opportunity to become familiar with the problems that I might see during the um- bilical EVA. Initially, I had a period where I was motionless, and then I pushed against the hatch in an attempt to find out the effect of various forces and the amount of body motion that would result from these. I performed tasks during the standup EVA such as installing a 16- millimeter camera behind the hatch. This task was also going to be performed during the umbilical EVA since we wanted to compare PAGENO="1274" 1270 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION * the results of installing this camera under the two different condi- tions. Again, during the standiip EVA night photography pictures were taken of the stars, using ultraviolet film. This slide shows the installation of the portable or telescoping hand- rail that formed a handrail going between the Gemini spacecraft and the Agena. This telescoping handrail deployed ~fl this fashion, lock- ing as it went out. We put a ring on the end of it so that I could make use of waist tethers which would give me a body restraint condition. This slide shows where the handrail connects into the clocking cone of the spacecraft (fig. 8). It also shows the position of the docking bar in the docking cone. We made modifications in the tether attach- ment point. One of the early objectives during the umbilical EVA was to connect the tether, which was attached to the Agena space- craft, by looping this cable over the docking bar and pulling this up tight and then placing an extension grip above this to force the tether clown further on the clockii~g bar. During the first part of the umbilical EVA, after attaching the tether, I took several steps to prepare the work station which we had installed on the back part of the clocking cone. I made use of the tether connection rings so that I hooked the two tethers on these, which would enable my body to remain essentially stationary and enable me to perform work with my hands without worrying about the attitude my body might take. We see here various pip pins (fig. 9), which served as hand holds when connected into places on the Agena. It also served as additional rings that the tethers could be hooked to. I FIGURE 8 PAGENO="1275" FIuuR~ 9 This is a wrench, an Apollo-type wrench, which was evaluated at various torque levels on this bolt. We had two different types of fluid and electrical connectors, and the task was to connect and disconnect these while in various body positions and with different restraint systems. You see over here the waist tethers, as they are connected onto the parachute harness. We had a provision to shorten the tethers. The tether hook would be engaged into this pit pin, which was placed into the side of the Agena. We found in some of our early training that these pins had a ten- dency t.o turn or rotate, so we developed a star fitting which would enable me to place this in different attitudes. And, once it was in this position it would not twist or rotate. At this point I might like to mention how the environmental life support system, or chest pack, was connected to the parachute harness. These two velcro straps were attached at these points. The oxygen was supplied into the suit through a Y connector fitting. The rea- son for the Y connector fitting was for emergency ingress, where we were unable to repressurize the cabin, we could hook up the space- craft oxygen hoses to these connections here and disconnect the hoses at this point and dispose of the chest pack. We found that we could not stow the chest pack in a hard suit condi- tion in the event we were unable to repressurize the spacecraft. These two oxygen hoses, the inlet and outlet, were connected to the suit at these points. The upper restraint was connected up here, and the lower restraint system was connected down at this point. The 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1271 PAGENO="1276" 1272 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION umbilical, itself, was attached to the spacecraft with a hook which provided its tether restraint system and electrical connections and an oxygen outlet. The oxygen entered the chest pack at this point. We had a pro- vision below this for connection of the astronaut maneuvering unit oxygen supply system. The electrical connection entered the chest pack at this point. It also went into the suit to provide communica- tions at this point here. We placed velcro on the front of the chest pack so that various devices, such as these portable hand holds, could be taken from the adapter section up to the nose of the spacecraft, by attaching them to the chest pack. I did this by hooking t.he waist tether on these rings, which provided a convenient storage point for the tethers. This slide (fig. 10) shows the provisions for connecting the pip pins into the side of the Agena. I placed my body essentially in this direction here, having a waist tether on either side. I evaluated the use of hand holds and some of these receptacles for the pip pins which did not have the star fitting, and the hand hold was free to rotate. I also compared the use of these which did have the star fitting. These velcro strips here were used with the portable hand holds. Provisions in the adapter portion of the spacecraft are shown in this slide. You. see that we have the same hand bars that we had with the AMTJ. We placed the early designed foot restraint down here on the side o~ the spacecraft. This framework section, here, actually left the spacecraft before I got back to it. That was at the FIGuRE 10 PAGENO="1277" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1273 time that these bars were extended outward. We have a mockup of this same relationship between the foot restraints and the adapter work station. Some of the items that we had in the adapter were these pen lights which could be used to supply illumination during darkness in the event that the two spacecraft lights were not working. All the tasks that were conducted back here were done during the darkness period. These are the portable hand holds that were taken from the adapter back up to the nose section of the Agena. In the pouch there was a torque wrench which could read out various torque levels. By having my feet in here to give me a torque point, I could establish certain torque levels at cardinal positions of the torque wrench in both directions. There was also a set of cutters, and I performed a cutting operation on these wires. We had electrical connectors of three different types and configura- tion, a fluid connector, and various sizes of hooks and rings. There was this small type of hook that we had on Gemini IX that gave Astronaut Cernan the difficulty in connecting this small hook to this ring. We also had rather simple tasks of connecting the velcro strips to see what effect this had while using the foot restraints, and also when the waist tethers were connected to the work station without using the foot restraints. I found that without the foot restraints and with just the waist tethers connected I did have a tendency generally to drift upward, which was merely because I was operating my hands along in this position. I would just kind of drift upward, but this was not of much concern because I knew that I was only going so far and these would stop me from going any farther. This film sequence is taken under water, and it shows entering the foot restraints by cocking the foot sideways and then twisting it to provide a complete restraint. I found that the underwater simulations gave a very excellent reproduction of the situation that I found in orbit. During the entire EVA portion of the mission, it seemed to me that somehow I had been there before; and I think this was because of some of this under- water work. You see the mobility that a person has, making use of these foot restraints. This section of the film was actually taken in flight2 and it shows me connecting one of the waist tethers with the pit pins to the side of the Agena. I found that the dynamics in space were surprisingly well reproduced in an underwater simulation. You would think that the viscous effects of the water would tend to kind of damp out the mission. In one case with two waist tethers connected I kicked my feet against the Agena; I started a gradual oscillation. This oscillation was not appreciably faster in space than I was able to produce under water. The conclusions that we can gather from our experience on extra- vehicular activity in Gemini are that there are several factors that are necessary for successful EVA (fig. 11). One is that we have a proper body restraint system that will enable a person to operate with his hands without having to hold on. We need some type of PAGENO="1278" 1274 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION NASA.S-66.12044 GEMINI EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY CONCLUSIONS * KEY FACTORS FOR SUCCESSFUL EVA * BODY RESTRAINTS * TASK SEQUENCE * WORKLOAD CONTROL * VALID SIMULATIONS * THOROUGH TRAINING * SPACESUIT MOBILITY IS LIMITING FACTOR * GASEOUS COOLING SYSTEM UNDESIRABLE FOR HIGH WORKLOADS * UNDERWATER SIMULATION IS HIGH FIDELITY DUPLICATION OF ZERO-g * LOOSE EQUIPMENT MUST BE SECURED * HHMU PROMISING - NEED FURTHER EVALUATION FIGuRE 11 iestraint system whenever the task to be performed is a two handed, or even a one handed task In general we found that the foot re straints were superior to the waist tethers but the waist tethers pro vided a greater flexibility in their attachment points We found that task sequence was extremely important for a successive EVA It w `is highly advisable to have a brief period of familiarization for the pilot to get used to the EVA situation We wanted to start out with simple tasks and allow plenty of time between these time periods Workload control, w e found to be very import'tnt In order to establish a workload control we had to have simulations that would let us establish a time line, and we could examine the workload that was needed during this time line and intersperse frequent rest periods We found thorough trainrng for the crewmembers was extremely important to provide them the necessary equipment famili'trization, to let them work out the procedures, and to establish the checklists that were used, both in the EVA preparation and also during the hard suit operation We found that space suit mobility w'is `i rather limiting factoi in the imount of work `i person can perform We, as you h'tve `ust seen, have taken steps to insure that we have greater suit mobility in the Apollo program The g'tseous cooling system, we found, is generally undesirable foi rather high workloads, so we have gone to t liquid cooled garment for the Apollo suit. The underwater simulation gives us a high fidelity duplication of the zero-G situation. One of the more difficult things to attain in under- PAGENO="1279" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1275 water simulations is an attitude buoyancy, neutrality. In other words, it is rather easy to get the subject in the suit so that he is not moving up or down, but it is rather difficult, since he moves in the suit, to estab- lish a complete degree of attitude freedom. In general we found the tasks that can be performed in underwater simulation. We have a reasonable expectation that they will meet with success when conducted in orbit. We also found that loose equipment must be secured. We had several instances of losing items of equipment because they were not tethered. The hand-held maneuvering unit, we concluded, is promising, but needs further development. The status of our present EVA capability is that we have proven through Gemini that EVA is practical. The lessons that we have learned in Gemini will benefit us in inter- vehicular operations, that is, operations inside the spacecraft, such as removing the docking probe, and transferring through the tunnel between the Command Module and the LM. We certainly are going to need several restraint systems in order to do this. The lessons we have learned in Gemini will come in very handy as we go into space station operation-first, inside the spacecraft con- necting the airlock to the SIVB; second, for the amount of work to be performed within the workshop; and, third, in conducting various EVA tasks, such as recovering experiments from outside the space- craft. The lessons that we have learned in Gemini will also assist us in future EVA design concepts; life support systems, such as the port- able life support system to be used on the lunar surface; and also several simple umbilical-type operations or simple umbilical or chest pack designs for umbilical operations in use with Apollo Applications. Transport methods that have been developed in Gemini will cer- tainly find use in Apollo along with additional type of transport sys- tems, such as expending booms with hooks on them from one space- craft to the other, which will enable us to transport in emergency con- ditions from one vehicle to another (fig. 13). In lunar surface operations, certainly all of the experience we have gathered so far in Gemini will come in to play. We are in the process now of fixing this experience onto the 1/6-G environment. We will make use of the underwater facility by weighting the individual so that he is in a condition of 1/e G,and we will also make use of overhead suspension devices. The effects of suit mobility and the back pack operations will cer- tainly determine just how successful we will be in conducting experi~ ments and exploring the lunar surface. In summary, we feel that the entire Gemini EVA effort has afforded us a valuable understanding of the problems of EVA and given us a firm foundation from which to embark on a wide variety of EVA tasks. Thank you. Congressman TEAGTJE. Any questions? Congressman PETTI5. This is probably a silly question, but why couldn't you use the magnetic idea for keeping close to the vehicle in- stead of this velcro, and the ether things, not so much that you couldn't resist it easily, but would this create problems in the ship itself? PAGENO="1280" 1276 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION STATUS OF PRESENT EVA CAPAB IL I TY * EVA PROVED PRACTICAL IN GEMINI `GEMINI EVA LESSONS WILL BENEFIT `INTRAVEHICULAR OPERATIONS * APOLLO LUNAR MISSIONS `SPACE STATION OPERATIONS `FUTURE EVA DESIGN CONCEPTS `LIFE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT `TRANSPORT METHODS * LUNAR SURFACE OPERATIONS FIGURE i2 NASA S-872522~ FIGURE 18 PAGENO="1281" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1277 Colonel ALDRIN. I think that- Congressman Psms. If your gloves had a magnet, you know what I mean, if you had some attraction toward it created by a magnetic field? Colonel ALDRIN. In general, you have to move along. I think the vel- cro that we have used on the hand grips has demonstrated that this is useful. We haven't actually experimented with magnetic devices. In using such a device I think we would find we would want to be able to turn them on and turn them off and this would result in a rather compli- cated device. Mr. Low. Let me kind of add something, Buzz, there is little, if any iron in the spacecraft. It would have to touch iron, in the first place, so that the magnets would stick to something. Congressman PETTIS. It won't operate with the aluminum alloys? Mr. Low. No; it will not. Dr. GILRUTH. It is either titanium or aluminum, and they are antimagnetic. Mr. Low. Second, if we did that we might have a question of elec- tromagnet interference. Congressman R0U5H. Is there any control maneuverability at all without the restraints and without the hand held maneuvering unit? Supposing you were just free in space without the tether? Could you, by kicking your feet, control movement by pushing your hands? Col. ALDRIN. I think it is possible that some gradual changes could be exerted in the attitude by waving an arm around and then bringing it in and waving it out, but certainly this wouldn't be a very practical means of controling attitude. Dr. GILRUTH. You can control attitude by being a skilled, trained type acrobat, or highly trained in this, but you can't translate, you can't vary your translation. I think this is the distinction. Congressman ECKIIARDT. Is there any possibility that some type of gyroscopic stability could be established for the man himself? Dr. GILRUTH. Yes. This is one of the things, I think, that we are very curious about, and one of the things we learned is that the man, as Colonel Aidrin said, doesn't tend to get disoriented. You don't really need a device to keep you stable as long as you are near a place where you can attach to with a tether, or something like this. Now, if you are out free of the spacecraft and had to apply movements of some kind, you would need a gyroscope, or something like that, to help you hold your attitude. Congressman ECKIIARDT. For instance, carry it about. Colonel ALDRIN. I think you would need some system of propul- sion to give you a translating capability. Now, once you have this, you just make use of these jets to give you attitude control at the same time. The hand held maneuvering unit does it, it allows you to trans- late by moving the jets away from the center of gravity, you are able to effect changes in your body position. It takes a considerable amoutit of training to be able to manipulate this properly. Congressman FULTON. On the gyroscope would it have a tendency to remain in straight flight as opposed, or correlated to an elliptical orbit? Would it have any effect on the orbiting characteristics? Congressman ECKIIAEDT. I was not talking about with respect to the vehicle itself. `T&-265 0-67-pt. 2--Si PAGENO="1282" 1278 1968 NASA AtITHORIZATION ~Jongressrnan FULTON. I am asking. Colonel ALDRIN. 1 think, in general, the elliptical effects of an orbit are long-term effects in comparison to the type maneuvering that is re- quired. Congressman ECKIIARDT. Your gyro would have no effect on the orbit? Dr. SLAYTON. The AMIJ was a gyro stabilized unit. Congressman ECKI-lAlinT. I didn't hear you, sir. Dr. SLAYTON. The AMTJ that we proposed to fly in GT 9 was gyro stabilized, but it was purely for the purpose of maintaining an atti- tude. And to translate, there again, you iieed a thruster of some kind. Congressman FULTON. When you said you ditched the pack, do you mean you threw it out of the hatch? You couldn't stow the pack, you had said, in the capsule. You mean you just threw it out of the hatch, or what did you do? Colonel ALDRIN. I think at the time I was referring to an emergency ingress situation where you could not repressurize. Congressman FULTON. I see. Colonel ALDRIN. Then you would disconnect from this, open the hatch, and throw this away. Normally the chest pack was stowed and then, perhaps, jettisoned on a subsequent EVA during a standup operation when conditions were safer. The back packs, both the life support system that was to be used on Gemini VIII and also the Astronaut Maneuvering TJnit were to be jettisoned after their use. Congressman TEAGUE. Why didn't you use the maneuvering unit you intended to on XII? Dr. GILRUTH. You recal], on Xi we weren't able to do all the tasks we had hoped to do, and we thought we would be further ahead at the end of the program if we laid out a series of tasks with increasing difficulty and that were designed to show the limits of a man's capa- bility in a series of well defined tasks than it would be to try agam for the third time to do the AMTJ with the possibility that we might not succeed and we would still end the Gemini program without. hav- ing defined where man's limits were. Colonel ALDRIN. I would like to add something there. I don't think there was anyone that wanted to try the AMU any- more than I did, and I wasn't too happy initially with this change. However, looking back on things, I think we have learned more about controlling the person's body and being able to perform useful tasks that had a direct application to some of the things that. we are going to be doing in the very near future. The AMU was a rather sophisti- cated transportation system, and we have not really established a need for that type of system. It was a very interesting type of experiment, but I don't believe we have a need within the near future, within NASA for that type transport device. Congressman TEAGUE. Any other questions? Thank you, Buzz. Mr. Low. Next will be Dr. Charles A.. Berry, Director of Medical Research and Operations, on Space Medicine. PAGENO="1283" PRESENTATION OP DR. CHARLES A. BERRY, DIRECTOR OF MEDICAL RESEARCH AND `OPERATIONS, SPACE MEDICINE Chairman Teague, and committee, we thought back this morning to your last meeting here. We had this much (Mercury Flights) (fig. 1) in the way of exposures in order to learn something about the medical effects on man up to that point in time. Now, I am sure most of you can remember that people in the bio- medical community had some grave concerns about whether man could perform in a space flight environment. Not only that, but they had concern about whether he could even survive in it, and since you were here we have completed this number of hours that you see here (Gem- ini flights) (figs. ~ & 3). In particular, from the long term medical point of view, we have been interested in these three flights, which gave us some of the long term data, this being the longest we have had to date, and, then, the EVA information which Buzz has already started to give you. NOw, there were a lot of predications that were made by people about the environments, and about what was going to happen to man, NASA-S.66-1 2064 MERCURY MANNED FLIGHTS TABLE I FLIGHT CREW LAUNICH HRS MIN MR-3 SHEPARD 5-5-61 15 MR-4 GRISSOM 7.21-61 15 MA-6 GLENN 2-20-62 4 56 MA-7 CARPENTER 5-24-62 4 56 MA-8 SCHIRRA 10-3-63 9 14 MA-9 COOPER 5-15-63 34 20 FIGuRE 1 1279 PAGENO="1284" 1280 1968 NASA AUThORIZATION NASA -S-66-12067 GEMINI MANNED FLIGHTS PART I FLIGHT CREW LAUNCH DAYS HR&MIN ifi GRISSOM YOUNG 3-23-65 4 : 52 1~ MC DIVITT WHITE 6-3-65 4 0: 56 ~ COOPER CONRAD 8-21-65 7 22: 56 VIE BORMAN LO V ELI 12-4-65 13 18 : 35 V1-A . SCHIRRA STAFFORD 12-15-65 1 1 : 53 VIlE ARMSTRONG SCOTT 3-16-66 10: 41 FIGURE 2 NASA-S -66-12068 GEMINI MANNED FLIGHTS PART Ii FLIGHT -_CREW IX-A STAFFORD CERNAN LAUNCH 6-3-66 3 1:04 X YOUNG COLLINS 7-18-66 2 22:46 XI CONRAD GORDON 9-12-66 2 23: 17 XII LOVELL ALDRIN 11-11-66 3 22:37 FIGURE 3 PAGENO="1285" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1281 and I have tried to summarize some of these in these first slides. (figs. 4 and 5). We can look here at the space flight environment, and you see on the left side the things that were predicted to be severe problems as far as environment was concerned, and then you can see on the right what we actually have observed. For instance, the meteorite density has not been a particular prob- lem, as far as man has been concerned, thus far. We have been able to maintain pressure within the spacecraft and have not inadvertently lost any spacecraft pressure except when we wanted to do it for EVA operations, and things of that sort, nor have we inadvertently lost any suit pressure. There were predictions that the 100 percent oxygen environment would be a toxic one for us, in that we would have problems develop from exposing man for the periods of time we are talking about. We have not seen anything of significance here. We will mention a few of what we call nuisance effects as we go along. The cabin temperatures have been maintained with some minimal variation around the comfort zone, an occasional cold time or a hot time, depending on whether they were wearing the EVA suits, in particular, but this has been, in general, comfortable. We have not seen any significant radiation levels as yet, realizing that we haven't really gotten into the Van Allen Belt areas, with the exception of just one flight where we just brushed this area. Isolation was predicted as a real problem. We have seen none of that. NASA - 5-66-1 2 2 SPACE FLIGHT ENVIRONMENT TABLE I PREDI~1~P OBSERVED o MICROMETEORITE DENSITY S LOW MICROMETEORITE o LOSS OF CABIN DENSITY PRESSURE - VACUUM.____S 5 PSI EXCEPT DURING EVA O LOSS OF SUIT PRESSURE VACUUM ~___~ S SPACE SUIT WEAR UNPRES- SURIZED (PRESSURISED ON EVA FLTS) o TOXIC ATMOSPHERE ~ 100% OXYGEN o CABIN AND SUIT TEMPERATURE S MINIMAL VARIATION ABOUT COMFORT ZONE O RADIATION LEVELS S INSIGNIFICANT RADIATION LEVELS FIGuRE 4 PAGENO="1286" 1282 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION NASA-S-66-12113 SPACE FLIGHT ENVIRONMENT TABLE II PREDICTED OBSERVED O ISOLATION S NONE O PHYSICAL CONFINEMENT ~ PHYSICAL RESTRAINT O WEIGHTLESSNESS ~.P WEIGHTLESSNESS O g LOADS S g LOADS - NO PROBLEM WITH PERFORMANCE o VIBRATION * MINIMAL VIBRATION o SEVERE GLARE ~ VARYING ILLUMINATION o J WORK LOAD FIGURE 5 Physical confinement, we have had some physical restraint, but we haven't had any serious effects from physical confinement. We will mention what we think this has had an effect on as far as the cardiovascular system is concerned in a moment The weightlessness was predicted to cause a lot of difficulties. We have seen some effects, again not nearly as much as predicted, and we will go into those The g loads have been no problem Vibration has been no problem We have had some glaie The one problem, you note here, that wasn't predicted to be a prob- lem, and did turn out to be one, was the workloads that we observed during extravehicular activity Now, with this environment, then, we realize that every time we send a man into space we expose him to a number of stresses You can't just send him there and look at a single one of these things in isolation Therefore, there were a lot of things predicted, and many of them were predicted to be limited as far as man was concerned (fig. 6). Dysbarism was predicted, and rightfully so We prevented this by denitrogenating our crews preflight by the use of 100 percent oxygen environment, so we see none here, as you can see. Congressman CABELL. Define it, please. Dr. BERRY. Okay. This is the effect on the body from reducing the barometric pressure around us, the barometric pressure, and the common symptom that would result here is what you would know as bends PAGENO="1287" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1283 NASA.S.66-1 2120 HUMAN RESPONSE TO SPACEFLIGHT TABLE I PREDICTED OBSERVED * DYSBARISM NONE * DISRUPTION OF CIRCADIAN RHYTHMS - NONE * DECREASED g TOLERANCE NONE * SKIN INFECTIONS AND DRYNESS, INC BREAKDOWN DANDRUFF * SLEEPINESS AND SLEEPLESSNESS INTERFERENCE (MINOR) * REDUCED VISUAL ACUITY NONE * EYE IRRITATION * NASAL STUFFINESS AND HOARSENESS * DISORIENTATION AND MOTION SICKNESS ~NONE * PULMONARY ATELECTASIS _NONE FIGuRE 6 Now, circadian rhythm, this means that the body has a number of rhythms, almost all of the systems are supposed to have an inherent biological rhythm related to light and dark, day and night, and this sort of thing, and it was felt that space flight would certainly be a problem here. We have programed it. I will show you some pulse rate determinations which confirm that particular finding. We have seen no decreased g-tolerance after exposure to the environ- ment. We have seen no skin infections or skin breakdown. We have had some minimal dryness and dandruff on some of the long duration flights. We have had neither of these as really significant symptoms. We have had some minor interference with sleep, and we ha~ve altered sleep cycles, and we have had some minor fatigue. We have seen no reduction, no change in visual acuity in a space flight environment. There were two that were not predicted here. We did have some eye irritation, we did have some nasal stuffiness and hoarseness, and we think that both of these are related to the use-these are some of the nuisance effects I talked about with a 100 percent oxygen environment. Disorientation and motion sickness, had been one of the big predic- tions, and, as Buzz said, we saw none of this even in the extravehicular situation where the man had no particular tie to a vehicle, and we have seen none inside the spacecraft. PAGENO="1288" 1284 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Now, pulmonary atlectasis, means a collapse of the little air sacs inside the lungs, and this was predicted, particularly as you got a g-load following the use of the 100 percent oxygen within our environ- ment, but we have seen none resulting from our missions. We have had some high heart rates, and we will talk about those. We have had no arrhythmas, no abnormal rhythms of the heart. We have seen no high blood pressure, no low blood pressure, with the exception of the postifight findings, which we are going to talk about. We have had no actual fainting in the postflight situation. We have had Some changes. If you stimulate, try and ask the sys- tem to respond to a given stress by using a tilt table, and we will look at that in a moment. We have not seen any delay in the reaction of the heart muscularly to an electrical stimulus. This is one of the things that the Russians have repeatedly reported, which we have not seen. There has been no reduced heart and blood vessel response to exer- cise. Here, we have noted there has been an increase in white blood cell count postflight that has lasted for about 24 hours. We feel that this is a stress response. We have had some changes in blood volume, which we are going to talk about, and some changes in plasma volume, this being moderate, and this just minimal. We had not predicted a decrease in the red cells, we have seen this, and will talk about that more in a moment. We have seen some very minimal dehydration. Now, we have had some variable weight loss, some minimal cal- cium loss, and we have had some varying caloric intake. There has been no particular loss of appetite that could consider to be patho- logical in any sense. We have had no nausea, no kidney stones, no urinary problems of any sort, no muscular problems. We have had some reduced exercise capacity postflight, which could probably have been predicted in retrospect, as we think back about it, it could have been. We have had none of the mental aberrations that had been pre- dicted. People talked about isolation producing all sorts of things, being cut off from the Earth you were going to hallucinate, you were going to have space euphoria, some impaired psychomotor perform- ance-none of these occurred. We have never used sedatives in flight. We have used some stimulants on occasion. We have had no infectious disease develop in flight, and we have had some very minimal fatigue. Now, I think the thing that is interesting here, is if you add up all of the nuns, and we could put all the nuns on one side and all the priests on the other side, I think you would find out that we have a lot more nuns than we do priests, and, therefore, this shows that things have ended up considerably different than was predicted, and PAGENO="1289" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1285 NASA-S-66-1 2121 HUMAN RESPONSE TO SPACEFLIGHT TABLE U PREDICTED OBSERVED * HIGH HEART RATES _LAUNCH, ENTRY, EVA * CARDIAC ARRHYTHMIAS NONE * HIGH BLOOD PRESSURE - NONE * LOW BLOOD PRESSURE _NONE * FAINTING POSTFLIGHT NONE * ELECTROMECHANICAL DELAY IN CARDIAC CYCLE. - NONE * REDUCED CV RESPONSE TO EXERCISE - NONE * -- ABSOLUTE NEUTROPHILIA * REDUCED BLOOD VOLUME MODERATE * REDUCED PLASMA VOLUME_ MINIMAL * .DECREASED RED CELL MASS * DEHYDRATION MINIMAL FIGURE 7 NASA-S-66-1 2122 HUMAN RESPONSE TO SPACEFLIGHT TABLE III PREDICTED OBSERVED * WEIGHT LOS&. VARIABLE * BONE DEMINERALIZATION___MINIMAL CALCIUM LOSS * LOSS OF APPETITE VARYING CALORIC INTAKE * NAUSEA NONE * RENAL STONES. NONE * URINARY RETENTIoN.. ..NONE * DIURESIS .NONE * MUSCULAR INCOORDINATION~NONE * MUSCULAR ATROPHY NONE * .REDUCED EXERCISE CAPACITY FIGuRE 8 PAGENO="1290" 1286 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION NASA-S-66-1 2123 HUMAN RESPONSE TO SPACEFLIGHT TABLE iv: PREDICTED OBSERVED * HALLUCINATIONS - NONE * EUPHORIA NONE * IMPAIRED PSYCHOMOTOR PERFORMANCE__. NONE * SEDATIVE NEED__ .NONE * STIMULANT NEED_ - PRE-ENTRY 0CC * INFECTIOUS DISEASE. - NONE * FATIGUE. MINIMAL FIGURE 9 NASA-S-66-1 2124 MEDICAL OBJECTIVES IN MANNED SPACEFLIGHT PROVIDE MEDICAL SUPPORT ENSURING SAFE FLYING TO DETERMINE * DURATION OF SPACEFLIGHT EXPOSURE WITHOUT PHYSIOLOGIC OR PERFORMANCE DECREMENT? * CAUSE OF OBSERVED CHANGES? * NEED FOR PREVENTITIVE OR TREATMENT MEASURES? * WHAT IS BEST MEASURE? FIGURE 10 PAGENO="1291" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1287 that the environment has been better for man than we had thought that it might be, and man has responded better. What has been the object of our medical program in space flight thus far? (fig. 10). We can see on this slide that the first thing is to try to determine the duration of space flight exposure that man can undergo without any physiological or performance decrement, and that is the primary thing that we have to aim at. Now, once we get some of our activity done in this area we can then look at what caused any changes that were observed, and then are there any things that we need to do to prevent these changes, and if we need to treat them, what is the best thing to treat them with. I told you that we could look at a tracing of the heart rate (fig. 11) that would show this light and darkness variation. This black line represents the nighttime at Cape Kennedy, and these cross-hatched areas the sleep period that we feel the crews got. This is during the first 192 hours of the 14-day flight for one of the crew members, and you will note here, the mean, and the low heart rate. This is prelaunch, this is at launch time, and, then, these are the variations that occur as the days went on. These are 4-hour heart rates, compiled for 4-hour intervals. You will note this variation that goes with a drop in the heart rate during the period of nighttime at Cape Kennedy and the sleep period. Now, this is man's normal variation, and this goes on not only for heart rate, but for a number of other body functions and hormone functions, too, and this. was the thing that we maintained in this state NASA-S-66-1 931 GEMINI ~ PHYSIOLOGIC AL MEASUREMENTS PILOT -CAPE DAY- NIGHT D-~-- HIGH 160 SLEEP o MEAN ~ LOW 120~ HEART RATE : I I I 4 32 64 96 128 160 192 G.E.T., HRS FIGuRE 11 PAGENO="1292" 1288 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION by keeping the men on a schedule which was the same as their sched- ule at the Cape. We have modified this on occasion because of some differences in launch times. We tried to alter their sleep periods for a period of a week to 10 days, sometimes 2 weeks prior to flight, and this worked out very well for us. Gravity has been expected, as we say, to produce a number of ef- fects due to its increase at launch and at reentry, and due to the lack of it while you are in flight, and I would like to try and quickly go through those things where we have seen some positive changes, then. I mentioned that the only thing that we had really seen in the skin had been some dryness and dandruff. We have not seen anything in the way of real infections or breakdown. Now, the central nervous system has shown no abnormalities of any note, and I would like to particularly emphasize to you the lack of any altered vestibular function. Man has been able to maintain his balance very well, and I think this is very important in view of the difference here between ourselves and the Russians, because this is one of the big areas where we differ. In order to clear the record, I would like to make it very clear to all of you that while we have had two of our original Mercury astro- nauts who have developed some vestibular symptoms, some involve- ment of the inner ear and the vestibular system, in neither case has it had anything that is an important thing for all of us to remember. Now, as far as the eyes, ears, nose, and throat are concerned, we have mentioned to you that there has been some minimal eye irritation. In one instance it was due to some lithium hydroxide, which got into the suit circuit, and we have also had some minimal conjunctival in- jection, we feel, due to our oxygen. We have had this nasal stuffiness due to the use of the oxygen. Now, the cardiovascular system was one of the first systems where we noted some things happening as far as the space flight was con- cerned, and, so, it has been examined by a number of methods, which you can see here. This is one of our people with the sens~rs in place. We use these sensors to get two leads of electrocardiogram, and this same cross chest pair gives us respiration. This is the phonocardiogram in place, here, the oral thermistor, here, which he would ordinarily keep in his helmet, and which would be used for taking body temperatures. This is a blood pressure cuff. There is a microphone under this cuff. This is a tracing of the phonocardiogram; here is a phonocardio- gram, the two heart.sounds, and here is an electrocardiogram, below it. This is the tilt table that we use with a standard 70 degree tilt, which you can see here, as a means of stressing the cardiovascular system. We always say we are using a Texas tilt table because we standardize our technique, to use a saddle on it, here, as a means of supporting the man on the tilt table, and it gives us a standard, reproducible tech- nique. This is a bicyclular ergometer, which the man is using, which was scheduled for use in the Apollo program. This has not been used in PAGENO="1293" 1968 NASA AUThORIZATION 1289 flight, as yet. We do use a bicycle ergometer, not of this same type, exactly, in the laboratory preflight and postflight. This is the tiny phonocardiogram microphone and this is an ex- erciser that was used in flight. Over here you see the peak heart rates (fig. 12). It was pre- dicted there would be very high heart rates which man would not be able to withstand. You can see the heart rates for each of the crew- men at the time of launch and reentry, and these were the time of highest heart rate, with the exception of the extravehicular activity, where we equaled some of these highest rates up in the 180 area you see here. You see that these vary greatly and there are some dif- ferences depending on whether an individual has flown once or twice, but, then, the changes may be modified by whether he is the command pilot or not, also. Some other cardiovascular effects relate to this tilt table that we just saw. This is typical tilt table response (fig. 13). This is a means of determining whether the heart has changed in its capability to re- spond to a particular stress, in this instance being a tilt table which does pool some blood in the lower extremities, and if space flight has caused some pooling in the extremities you would expect to see a dif- ference. Here, you see the blood pressure. This is the systolic blood pressure, the upper one-when you are told your blood pressure is 110/~'0, this is the 110, the systolic one. Here is the diastolic pressure across here. NASA-S-66-11901 GEMINI PEAK HEART RATES, BEATS/MIN GEMINI MISSION LAUNCH REENTRY III 152-120 165-130 I~ 148-128 140-125 148-155 170-178 ME-A 125-150 125-140 ~JI 152-125 180-134 1111 138-120 130-90 11-A 142-120 160-126 X. 120-125 110-90 XE 166-154 120-117 XII 136-110 142-137 FIGURE 12 PAGENO="1294" 1290 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION NASA S 66 fl932 BEGIN - END HEART RATE 90 ~ ~ ~ _____ POSTFLIGHT _______ GEMINI 50 VII BLOOD 110 TILT PRESSURE 90 DATA 70 12 LEG 8 VOUE CC/100 CC ~ -~--~ ~ I I 0 4 8 12 16 20 24 MINUTES FIGuRE 13 Now, these are the preflight pressures, and this is during the. tilt period here, this is pretilt 5 minutes and postflight 5 minutes Here is the heart rate, the same thing-this is the one that was done before the flight Here is a strain gage placed ai ound the cilf, `md you can see, here, that there is some pooling that occurs during the preflight tilt You see some increase in leg volume occurring in the tilted period Now, here is ~m hat h'tppens postflight There is `~n increase in leg volume, there is a marked drop in blood pressure, which you can see here, and there is an increase in heart rate, which you can see here Now, the most important variable here has been heart rate, for us It is the one that is the most reliable thing to follow for response, and we have taken the delta, the change between the preflight and the first and the second postflight tilt in heart rate and plotted them in a man ner which you can see on the next slide (fig 14) These are the results from all of the Gemini missions, and you can see, here, starting out with a three orbit mission on your Gemini III, going up, you will see that v~ e have a cluster in here at around the 3 and 4 day period, because during that time, that is where a lot of our missions fell, as you know, in the latter part of the program By plotting the first and second tilt deltas, here, as we went out to 4 days and then to 8 days, we found that this was an ever-increasing trend and looked to be almost linear in nature. Projected, it would be way out here, somewhere. In actuality, at 14 days we found that this is what we saw, which was very much more like what you would see at, say, the 3- or 4-day period, rather than what we had seen with the increase at the 8 day period PAGENO="1295" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1291 NASA.S-66-1 2104 HEART RATE TILT RESPONSE COMPARED WITH MISSION DURATION 0 CP 1ST TILT * CP 2ND TILT 1~ POSTFLIGHT 100 VS PREFLIGHT 80 PERCENT 60 40 1-i 0 14 16 FIGVRE 14 Now, there are a lot of things that account for this, like being out of the suits for awhile, having a better diet, better exercise, having a longer period of time to adapt to the environment, and all these things are active in each of these series of changes that you are going to note. Now, we have also nQted some changes in blood volume, and in the Gemini IV flight we tried to measure just plasma volume, the liquid portion of the blood (fig. 15). We do this by a radioisotope technique, and we did not directly measure red cell mass, we calculated it by packing the red cells and just calculating the red cell mass. Still we found that there was a decrease in red cell mass, this line represent- ing a zero point, and anythin.g below this line representing a decrease in the total blood volume, the red cell mass, and anything above it an increase, and, here, it goes to a plus or minus 20 percent. These actual figures, in here, represent actual cc's of loss. The important thing to get from the slide is that there was some loss in plasma volume, some loss in red cell mass, and some loss of total blood volume on the 4-day flight. Now, we had not expected to see any loss in red cell mass, and this was an interesting thing to us, and we, therefore, decided we had better directly measure it with the radioiosotope technique. We tagged the cells and we saw that we did, indeed, lose red cell mass, in fact the loss increased from 4 to 8 days, and, again, it looked like we had an increasing trend. When we went to the 14-day flight we again see this same thing happen to us. It is not continuing to in- crease. The red cell mass loss is not continuing to go up as* flight 0 P 1ST TILT * P 2ND TILT 20 8 U 2 4 6 8 10 12 MISSION DURATION, DAYS PAGENO="1296" 1292 1968 NASA ATJTHOIflZATION NASA-S-66-1 1896 GEMINI BLOOD VOLUME STUDIES 20 0 -20 -`~~ duration increases. We kept the same blood volume, no change in blood volume, by increasing the liquid portion of the blood almost an equal amount of the amount of red cell mass that we lost. The cause of this phenomenon is still under investigat.ion. We are looking at it in chamber studies. We need to look at it, of course, more in flight, and some very interesting things are coming out o.f this that will apply to medicine in general, as to what really happens to a red blood cell in this sort of environment. Apparently there is some involvement from both the weightlessness environment or factors in the weightlessness environment as well as, most important, our 100 percent oxygen invironment. I would like to just hastily jump over the biochemical findings be- cause I don't think the details here are important, and we are short on time. We have looked at a number of profiles, and we looked at the pro- file that tells us about water and the electrolyte balance, and in doing this we looked at sodium (fig. 16), and we find a decrease in sodium and a decrease in potassium (fig. 17) during the flight time itself, and this goes along with some hormonal changes, which affect your ability to retain sodium. We also have looked at a profile which tells us about stress, and we see, here, that we get a very large drop during flight of these 17 hydroxysteroids and then a marked increase here directly after flight, and then it tails off. Whether this is related to the reentry, we are not sure. T'TAL ~OD GEMINI W PLASMA RED CELL VOLUME MASS El CP 20 GEMINI V 0 -20 20 - GEMINI VII 0 - -20 - -~7-592 +419 +24 NO SIG ~ CHANGE -44 FIGURE 15 ~-398 PAGENO="1297" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1293 N ASA - S-66 12 16 PROJECT GEMINI BIOCHEMISTRIES GEMINI ~I[ CP URINE SODIUM AND ALDOSTERONE 250 -URINE SODIUM ALDOSTERONE 200 SODIUM mEq/ 150 - 24 HRS 100 100 50 , ~50 ALDO- I STERONE 0 1 0 ~g/24 HRS PREFLIGHT INFLIGHT POSTFLIGHT FIGURE 16 NASA - S - 66-1 2 11 4 PROJECT GEMINI BIOCHEMISTRIES GEMINI VII CP 150 - URINE POTASSIUM 10o~-~ mEq/24 HRS 50 U PREFLIGHT INFLIGHT POSTFLIGHT FIGURE 17 `~&-265 O-67-pt. 2-82 PAGENO="1298" 1294 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION NASA- S-66-12 115 PROJECT GEMINI BlOC HEMISTRIES GEMINI VIII CP URINE 17 - HYDROXYCORTICOSTEROIDS 12.5 - 10.0 7.5 mg/24 HRS 5.0 - PREFLIGHT INFLIGHT POSTFLIGHT FIGURE 18 Another one we have looked at, a third profile (fig. 19), involves look- ing at metabolism and bone metabolism, in particular. This is a sub- stance, plasma hydroxyproline, which is involved with the matrix of the bone, and you can see, here, that, again, there is an increase in its excretion postflight. Here are two preflight examinati~ns. There was an increase postflight, and, therefore, this goes along with some loss in bone matrix, which we can determine by another method, which you will see in just a moment. We have been interested in maintaining an adequate diet in flight, and this is the type of foods (figs. 20 and 21) that have been provided as a typical diet rundown for the days that you see listed here during the 14-day flight. These are freeze dehydrated foods, about 50 per- cent of them. They need to be hydrated, like the grapefruit drink, chicken and gravy, and applesauce. The peanut cubes and beef sand- wiches need to be hydrated, too, but with saliva. The beef sandwiches and peanut cubes in this particular menu are bite sized which are compressed, high density, and do not need to be hydrated except with saliva. Congressman TEAGUE. Did they eat all their food ~ Dr. BERRY. We are going to show you that right now, sir. Here is the 4-day flight- (fig. 22), and here is what was provided onboard, this solid line across here-. It was 2,550 calories. You can see the variations that occur in caloric intake for each individual by the bars. You see, here, an average line for each of the crewmen. PAGENO="1299" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1295 NASA.S-66-1 2070 GEMINI VTII PROJECT GEMINI BIOCHEMISTRIES BOUND PLASMA HYDROXYPROLINE 0.21 I __ P 0.17 P M/ML 0.13 0 ~`l/DAYS'l'~R+O FLIGHT FIGuRE 19 NASA.S-66-11933 TYPICAL GEMINI MENU PART I DAYS 2, 6, 10 & 14 MEAL A CALORIES GRAPEFRUIT DRINK 83 CHICKEN AND GRAVY 92 BEEF SANDWICHES 268 APPLESAUCE 165 PEANUT CUBES 297 905 FIGURE 20 PAGENO="1300" 1296 NASA-S-66-11934 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION TYPICAL GEMINI MENU PART II DAYS 2, 6, 10 & 14 MEAL B CALORIES ORANGE-GRAPEFRUIT DRINK 83 BEEF POT ROAST 119 BACON AND EGG BITES 206 CHOCOLATE PUDDING 307 STRAWBERRY CEREAL CUBES 114 MEAL C 829 POTATO SOUP 220 SHRIMP COCKTAIL 119 DATE FRUITCAKE 262 ORANGE DRINK 684 TOTAL CALORIES 2418 FIGURE 21 GEMINI LV CALORIC INTAKE 1 2 3 4 MISSION, DURATION, DAYS -PROVIDED ON BOARD (2550) METABOLIC RATE BASED ON CO2 OUTPUT (2410) NA SA-S-66-1 1926 2700 2400 2100 CALORIES 1800 1500 1200 ~ MC DIVITT (2066) * WHITE (2230) 0 FIGuRE 22 PAGENO="1301" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1297 This dotted line represents what we think the metabolic rate was based upon their carbon dioxide output, which was measured by look- ing at the lithium hydroxide cannister. So, you see, here, they were provided this much, they only took in about this much, but it is not too far off. It varied somewhere around the 2,100 to 2,200 calorie area here, you can see, 2,230 and 2,066. Now, this was on the 4-day flight. These were a couple of chow hounds, really, and we decided we had better provide some more food than we had planned on the 8-day flight, and we went up to some 2,800 calories, 2,755, actually, that was provided onboard (fig. 23). Now, the intakes recorded on this flight. The caloric intake is clear down here around a thousand calories per man per day, 1,075 to 915, This is the lowest caloric intake that we have seen on a flight, and here is what we- Congressman TEAIUE. That was their difference according to days? Dr. BERRY. This was on the 8-day flight, and it has been our lowest caloric intake. Now, this left us in a quandary, about what kind of food to provide for the 14-day flight, and we ended up providing 233 calories per man per day (fig. 24). Here is what we thought their metabolic rate would require. Here is what they actually took in, and you see it is a little more even across here with the bars, because they had been on a very tightly controlled diet for 14 days preflight, and were controlled for a period of time postflight.. NASA.S-66-~21O7 GEMINI ~ CALORIC INTAKE 2800 ~ COOPER (1075) PROVIDED ON 2400 BOARD (2755) ~ CONRAD (915) METABOLIC RATE FROM CO2 OUTPUT (2010) 2000 CALORIES 1600 1200 800~ IIH 400 ~I ~I ~ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 MISSION DURATION, DAYS FIGuRE 23 PAGENO="1302" 1298 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION NASA-66-12106 GEMINI YJI CALORIC INTAKE 2600 2300 2000 CA LO R ES 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 MISSION DURATION, DAYS _~BORMAN (1774) - PROVIDED ON BOARD (2333) METABOLIC RATE FROM CO2 *LOVELL (1804) OUTPUT (2219) FIGuRE 24 Now, we have got a lot to learn, still, about this business with caloric intake. The people on the 8-ciay flight just didn't feel hungry, and some of the effects that we saw we feel may be related to that. In fact, if you notice, almost every effect was worse on the 8-day flight, so far. If you look at. anything, whether it is the blood, the tilt studies, or whatnot, all of these things were worse on the 8-day flight. Congressman EOKHARDT. How do you account for that drop after about the second, third, or fourth day? That seems to have been true both on the 4 and on the 8. Dr. BERRY. I think that some of this gets to be the sameness of the food, for one thing, and then I think it varies terrifically with activity. Tt varies with their interest in the actual food itself. It is food which is not like the sort of thing you eat here all the time, and, even though it can be palatable and sort of fun to eat around the table here, when you have to eat it for three meals a day for a period of several days, it is not exactly the same at all. I think there is some loss of interest in food that way, and things get pretty exciting in the space flight en- vironment., and I think they get so tied up with things they would just as soon they do something else as eat.. That is true with water intake, also. Now, this is a listing of weight losses (fig. 25) and the important fact that we want you to note here is that we have had weight losses on all the flights with the one exception, where a man didn't lose any, on Gemini XI. Now, this one was not availab]e due to the landing that occurred over near Okinawa, and being tossed around on the destroyer we couldn't get a weight to compare with preflight weight. PAGENO="1303" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1299 NASA-S-66-1 2069 ASTRONAUT WEIGHT LOSS TO NEAREST HALF POUND MISSION FLIGHT COMMAND PILOT PILOT ifi 3 3.5 t~ 4.5 8.5 7.5 8.5 VI-A 2.5 8 ~IE 10 6 ~IE[ NOT AVAIL NOT AVAIL ]X-A 5 13.5 1 3 3 XI 2.5 0 111 6.5 7 FIGURE 25 The thing to note here is that this weight loss does not increase with increasing flight duration. You can't relate the amount of weight loss to the amount of flight duration. This bears on our metabolic studies and also on our studies with water intake. We have to do a lot more when we have some oppor- tunity to measure these very accurately in some later programs. Now, we have had some drugs used on flight, as I'm sure you know. All of these have been from the kit which was carried, and the crew has been pretested. We have had no particular difficulty with the use of these drugs, and we have-they have been taken as prescribed arid have produced the desired results. There have been no changes in man's response to taking the drug in the flight environment. We have not had any inflight disease develop, as such, though we have had some scares develop in the preflight periods where the crews, during the immediate preflight period did develop some viral-like diseases. We still do not feel that we can actually quarantine the crews at this time. Even looking ahead to the longer missions, we think that is going to be a difficult thing to try and do because of the tasks that they have to do, and we are trying to look at ways to do without that sort of activity and still prevent them from develop- ing inflight disease. Now, if we review the findings that we have had I think we can certainly say that we feel' happy in saying the plan of orderly doubling man's flight `duration was a successful one, and we certainly see no reason to alter it as we look at future flight programs. PAGENO="1304" 1300 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION I would like to go quickly with you through the EVA things, and to add to what Buzz said. We will show you the heart rate that went along with these activities that he was talking about. Oh, we have to finish up bones first, I am sorry. The one area we didn't finish up with was what happened to the calcium in the bones, and we looked at the heel bone, which you see, here (fig. 26), and at the small finger (fig. 27). This was by an X-ray technique, and was confirmed by a detailed metabolic study in the 14- day flight. You see here, the loss in density-this is of the osicalcis, the heel bone, in the 4-day flight for the two individuals, for the com- mand pilot, here, for the pilot, and, then, here for some bed rest pa- tients in a study at Texas Women's University for the same period of time, for 4 days, and note the intake of calcium, here, 6 to 7 hundred milligrams a day. Here is for the 8-day period, and notice, again, we are getting an increasing trend and, then, here is what happened at 14 days. Now, again, look at the calcium intake due to the very low caloric intake on that flight, remember, a thousand calories on that 8-day flight, and they had only 300 milligrams of calcium, and this probably accounts for some of this effect, and, here, they had a gram of calcium a day that they took in, in their diet. They were not given any extra calcium, no calcium pills, or anything of the sort. Congressman WAGGONNER. You say studies at Texas Women's Uni- versity, you weren't comparing male and female, now? Dr. BERRY. No. No, we were not. Congressman CABELL. Mr. Waggonner, I will have you to know that a very fine lady developed the technique for that, and we have that kind of brain power in Texas. Dr. BERRY. Yes, sir; you certainly do. Dr. Pauline Mack is avery- Congressman WAGGONNER. Everybody has something to brag about. Dr. BERRY. This is for the small finger. I think the very interesting thing here is that this is a nonweight-bearing bone, of course, and we thought that it could be used as a control, and interestingly enough, in density of that bone than we did of the heèlbone, which is a weight you see that we had, again, the same thing, in fact a little bit more loss bearing bone, but, again, the same trend, up at 8 days and back down. So, we can't tell you-this is an interesting phenomenon, and is some- thing that needs to be looked at more, but as to why this is happening, we are unable to say at the present time. Congressman ECKHARDT. Well, can that calcium intake explain it? Dr. BERRY. It can be a factor. It certainly is a factor in it. We don't think that it is the total explanation of why this is happening. Now, weightlessness should produce loss in the calcium in the bone. We expect it to do this over a period of time, really it is more pro- longed periods of time. The thing that I think we are going to see is that by exercise you can prevent this, and certainly if you gave calcium doses I think you could prevent it even more, and we want to find out how much of a problem, if any, it is before we determine if we want to treat it in any way by the giving of calcium. PAGENO="1305" NASA-S-66-1 2063 CHANGE IN Os CA LC IS DENSITY (PERCENT) -20 -16 -12 -8 -4 0 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION LOSS OF BONE DENSITY ON GEMINI MISSIONS PART U FIGURE 26 1301 $ COMMAND PILOT ~ PILOT ~ BED REST SUBJECT G -~1I 14 DAYS 1000 mg Ca Now, this, again, is the Gemini IV (fig. 28). This was Ed White, and Ed in the condition that he was, physically, gave us some heart rates which went like this. Here was the "go" for EVA, and you can see here, this solid line indicating the heart rate and this is respiratory rate, here, the dotted line. 4 DAYS 8 DAYS 600 TO 700 300 mgCa mgCa NASA-S-66-1 2065 GEMINI CHANGE BONE DENSITOMETRY STUDY IN DENSITY OF HAND PHALANX 5-2 -24 -20 - -16 -12 -8 -4 CHANGE IN DENSITY OF HAND PHALANX 5-2 U COMMAND PILOT ~ PILOT 1111111 BED REST SUBJECT 0 - 4 DAYS 14 = DAYS 8 DAYS 600 TO 700 300 1000 mg Ca mg Ca mg Ca FIGURE 27 PAGENO="1306" 40 150 RESPIRA-3° lION RATE, 20 BREATHS! MIN 10 0 FIGURE 28 You see, they almost track. You will see that he got a heart rate up here in the early part of the EVA at about 140, 150, 160, and then he is running along here around in the 150 area, and, then, at the closing of the hatch he got his heart rate up in the 180's, but that was when he was working very hard clos- ing the hatch. Now, knowing his condition he had no trouble with this EVA at all. It was a lot of fun actually, doing the activities out there, and, as has been told by Buzz, he didn't have any particular tasks where he had to stay in one place, but we were concerned about the magnitude of these heart rates. Was it going to signify that we were going to have rates of 180 with work for any sustained period of time. The next experience we had was on Gemini IX, and you have heard what the activities were, and, again, you can see (fig. 29), we had some heart rates here that climbed up to the 160 area at the opening of the hatch. They varied along here, they got down as low as 110 here for one period during the time-he is back here at the adaptor, and, remember, he was going to put on the AMTJ. He did t.hat, and you notice when he is on the AMIT we do not have any data for that one brief period. Now, here, he had some fogging of the visor, and so, you know, that he never did go ahead and use the AMU, he caine back into the spacecraft, and you can see that all those heart rates ranged along here-here is the 180 mark, and you can see that he had 180 here, and 180 over here in closing the hatch again. Now, we then went to an experience with Gemini X (fig. 30), and you have heard what that mission involved, and Mike Collins, had a 1302 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION N ASA - S -66-11917 GEMINI IV UMBILICAL EVA 190 HEART RATE, BEATS/MIN 170 - HEART RATE RESPIRATION RATE CLOSING HATCH ~-OPEN HATCH 1-GO FOR ~ EVA 130 - 110 * 90 * 70 ~C LOS ED HATCH INGRESS-1 I EGRESS-I I I I 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 ELAPSED TIME, MIN 80 90 PAGENO="1307" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1303 NASA-S-66-~ 2090 GEMINI IX-A UMBILICAL EVA HEART RATE, B EATS! MIN 50 30 10 CHK AMU RETURN CABIN-i -~ 1-VISOR REPTD FOGGED MOVE TO INGRESS DEPLOY [ADAPTER F CLOSE 200 [ HAND- RAILS [HATCH UMBILICAL EVA RESPIRATION RATE, BREATHS! MIN 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 ELAPSED TIME, MIN 180 160 140 120 100 80 180 160 140 - 120 FIGURE 29 GEMINI X NASA-S-66-11996 RESPIRATION RATE, BREATHS /MIN HEART RATE BEAT~ /MIN 40 100 30 20 80 10 0 60 EGRESS r501° EXP RETRIEVED [ EVA TERMINATED S012 EXP FHATCH [ RETRIEVED PLT TRAN- SLATES TO , I I I I 0 10 20 30 40 ELAPSED TIME, MIN 50 FIGuRE 30 PAGENO="1308" 1304 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION high rate. Notice here, that the bulk of the EVA time was down around 140, as far as his heart rate is concerned during the EVA activity. And, so, we have had thus far, two that have looked to be fairly easy, one that looked to be a little more difficult, and here, again, ho peaks up at the time that he does close the hatch. Then, we went to Gemini XI (fig. 31), and Dick Gordon went out to put the tether on, and you remember what happened at that par- ticular time. He moved to the nose of the spacecraft here, he con- nected the tether, and then he was completely tired and went back to the spacecraft. He ran his heart rate, here, around this 180 period, for these three peaks at that period of time, and, then, you can see, over here, that he came back into the spacecraft. Now, this left us with a decision about this AMTJ. We decided that we were going to try and modify the activity and determine a little bit more about what man's capability was. In order to help us do this, we had started, during the EVA, to determine what workload man could do, and to determine this ahead of time. We used a bicycle ergometer, and you can, in the laboratory, make a plot like this (fig. 32) which will help you plot his heart rate versus B.t.u.'s output per hour, and thus you can figure out how much energy he is expending in doing a given task, if you can relate it to his heart rate. Now, the difficulty that exists in a space flight situa- tion is that you can't duplicate it exactly, because there are some other factors involved. You are in a new situation, and there are some other NASA -S-66-11842 GEMINI Xi UMBILICAL EVA MOVE TO NOSE OF SC TETHER CONNECTED CAMERA MOUNTED-~1 [RETURN TO COCKPIT 190 - I ~INGRESS OPEN I HEART IHATCH RATE BEATS /M IN RESPIRA-4° TION RATE 20 BREATHS /MIN 0 60 ELAPSED TIME, MIN FIGURE 31 PAGENO="1309" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1305 things which will tend to raise heart rate, but particularly if you are up at the higher heart rate level it is a fairly accurate method. We don't mean to imply, however, that you can say that every time a man's-if you have this graph and it looks like his rate is 140, that he is doing, say, 2,200 B.t.u.'s output. Here are the plots of some typical activities that you might com- pare, in looking over here at B.t.u.'s per hour (fig. 33). We feel safe in doing this, I think, as far as Apollo is concerned. We need to confirm it there, and we now need to look forward to laboratories where you can get information that will tell you more about why these things are happening, and look at some of these basic mechanisms, like, particularly, some of the basic biochemical things. Congressman TEAGUE. Okay. Thank you, Chuck. Any questions? Congressman ECKHARDT. How would this compare, for instance, with the sudden invigorating sort of action like a man running to make a high jump or a pole vault where lie is both involved emotion- ally, to a certain extent, and also engaged in sudden physical activity of other than just the ordinary routine work nature? Dr. BERRY. Well, that is a small-it would compare, yes, it would compare. I think the important thing to realize here is one of the things that Buzz said. If you do not tie yourself to the place where you are work- ing, you are constantly utilizing muscles to maintain your position, and you tend to fight one muscle against the other, and he stated that he NASA-S-66-fl916 GEMINI IX-A-XII PREFLIGHT ERGOMETRY 200 180 160 HEART RATE 140 G-JX-A 120 G-X G-XJ G-XIH 100 80 I 500 1500 2500 4500 BTU/HR / 0 0 3500 FIGTJRE 32 PAGENO="1310" ACTIVITY KCAL/HR BTU/HR SLEEPING 72 280 TENNIS 378 1500 BASEBALL (PITCHING) 390 1550 SOCCER 490 1980 BASKETBALL 684 2720 WRESTLING 780 3100 WALKING 1 MILE IN 30 MINUTES 170 670 1 MILE IN 17 MINUTES 290 1150 RUNNING 1 MILE IN 10 5 MINUTES 720 2880 1 MILE IN 8 5 MINUTES 870 3480 FIGURE 33 was far better off with his foot restraints, and obviously that's true, because this way you are not using these big muscles in your legs. Anything that will tend to stabilize you at the place where you are to work so that you don't have to worry about trying to kick your- self around, because every time you do that, that causes another motion you have to fight, so pretty soon you have got every muscle in your body fighting. So, it is a very costly thing if you don't plan the ac- tivity where you can be tied down. Congressman ECKHARDT. What I was getting at is whether or not there was a certain stimulus, for instance a man is excited or a man is called upon to make an output of energy suddenly, sort. of an adrenal gland function ~ Dr. BERRY. We are sure that there is some of this. I don't think that any of the crewmen would say that there isn't a certain amount of excitement that goes with the extravehicular activity, as with any ac- tivity like this. However, I think the amazing thing is that all of our crewmen have been very task-oriented, they know the tasks that they have to do here right away, they have this all planned out, ~just how they will go about it. They have done it many times in training, and the more times they have done it in training the more routine it is for them to do that particular task, and they don't really think about, "Gee, I am suddenly out in space." I mean, they don't get that particular adrenal- Congressman ECKHARDT. I wasn't thinking of that, but this would be the same thing that a high jumper or pole vaulter would feel. He has gone through training, but he is going to meet a task- 1306 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION NASA S 66 12091 APPROXIMATE ENERGY COST OF ACTIVITIES PAGENO="1311" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1307 Dr. BERRY. That's right. Congressman ECKHARDT. And he knows he is. Dr. BERRY. That's right. Now, he gets some increase in rate, a pole vaulter, if he is well trained, or a man who is running a race, a trackman, for instance. He is trained to a point where his heart rate stays low. Mr. Low. Could I suggest that Dr. Berry sit with some of these gentlemen on the way out to Ellington to answer some of their questions? Congressman VANDER JAGT. Could I just ask one question, Doctor, that I have often thought of? Dr. BERRY. Yes. Congressman VANDER JAGT. `I notice you made some reference to a deficiency in the inner ear chamber. We all know that Colonel Glenn had this equilibrium problem. Would you care to comment on that? Dr. BERRY. Yes. Congressman VANDER YAGT. Does the high altitude or do the flights into outer space- Dr. BERRY. No, sir; and that is exactly why I said we have had two people, Colonel Glenn and Captain Shephard, who have both had an inner ear problem, and in neither of these instances is it related to space flight. Colonel Glenn's was due to a fall, and the other was due to infection. They are neither related to space flight in any way at all, and, so, we feel that space flight has had no effect there. Congressman TEAGUE. Ed, you and Jerry, and Guy, if we put in the record Wes Hjornevik's presentation on Apollo Applications, and cover Space Science and Applications, and we can still see Ellington, but we will leave about 30 minutes late. Have you any questions, Jerry? Congressman PETTIS. I was going to say, half facetiously, will space travel result in some extra business for proctologists? How about the bowel action sitting there? Dr. BERRY. Well, amazingly enough, the GI' tract has functioned very normally thus far in space flight. We haven't studied this in detail except to follow bowel activity as far as bowel movements are concerned, and this has been very normal. Congressman PETTIS. I might make an observation, I notice that most of the men sitting here who are attorneys are busy getting your name down correctly, hoping that some time in later life they may be able to use you as an expert in the field of related activity in compen- sation of accidents. Congressman TEAGUE. Most of us have had Apollo Applications at Huntsville, North American, Douglas, and Kennedy, and we are going to get another one before the full committee, so I think you can put that in the record. Mr. Low. And you want us to go ahead with Space Sciences and Applications? Congressman TEAGUE. Yes. Mr. Low. Since Dr. Hess has only been with us about 2 weeks, and is still holding down a job at Goddard this week, in addition to the job here, he has asked his deputy, Mr. Robert 0. Piland, to niake his presentation at this time. PAGENO="1312" PRESENTATION OF ROBERT F. THOMPSON. APOLLO APPLICATIONS PROGRAM Due to time limitation, the Apollo Applications program briefing was not presented during the hearings of March 3, 1967. The discus- sion prepared for that date is submitted herein for the record. The purpose of this briefing is to discuss some of the activity under- way at the Manned Spacecraft Center in support of the Apollo Ap- plications program. This center has successfully demonstrated the capability of managing major elements of the overall Manned Space Flight program and it is planned that the Manned Spacecraft Center will continue to fulfill these responsibilities as we move forward into the Apollo Applications program. Program elements assigned to the MSC for implementation are listed on figure 1. The general listing closely parallels our basic center organization and you have heard detailed discussions in each of these areas here today. The specific list- ing indicates areas of new or expanded activity as a result of the Apollo Applications program. In these areas, modifications to exist- ing flight systems or new developments must be undertaken in order to fulfill the established~rogram objectives. NA$A-S-67-1418 APOLLO APPLICATIONS PROGRAM MSC RESPONSIBILITIES GENERAL * DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF MANNED SPACECRAFT * ASTRONAUT ACTIVITIES * DIRECTION AND CONTROL OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHTS * MEDICAL RESEARCH AND OPERATIONS * SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS AAP SPECIFIC * REENTRY VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT * LIFE SUPPORT MODULES * EXPERIMENT MODULES - LUNAR SURFACE SCIENCE MANNED METEOROLOGICAL EXPERIMENTS - EARTH RESOURCES SURVEY FIGuRE 1 1308 PAGENO="1313" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1309 In hearings at other locations, you have received briefings on Apollo Applications, its objectives, and the plan to utilize the technology and hardware base developed to date in our Manned Space Flight pro- gram. Initial planning has now advanced to the point where we can discuss briefly some of the typical tasks that are being undertaken at this center pending program approval. These typical tasks can best be discussed within the context of our planning for the first four AAP flights. These flights are depicted in mission profile form on figures 2 and 3. They are to be conducted in earth orbit at altitudes from 120 nautical miles to 260 nautical miles as shown. The four flights group conveniently into two missions, one of 28-days duration and the second having a mission duration of 56-days and for our purposes here today we will discuss the two missions separately. The AAP-1 flight (fig. `2) will contain a three-man crew and is currently planned for an initial flight period of from 3 to 5 days of independent operation with the lunar mapping and survey module at approximately 120 nautical miles orbital altitude. The spacecraft and experiment module (LM&SS) from AAP-1 will then rendezvous and dock with the unmanned vehi- cle launched on AAP-2 for the remainder of the AAP-½ mission. The objectives of this mission are summarized in figure 4. The APP- ½ flight will be flown open-ended with the capability of extending our mission flight duration up to 28 days. If fully successful, this would MAR 67 AAP MISSION PROFILES ALTITUDE N MI 300 ~0 250 200 150 100 g~-~CSM - /J~.LMSS V AIRLOCK/MDA AAP1 AAP2 SUN PANELS 50 GRAVITY STABILIZED GRADIENT FIGURE 2 C... RETURN PERIOD 76-265 O-67---.pt. 2-83 PAGENO="1314" 1310 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION doixble the flight time of the longest mission flown in the Gemini pro- gram and also double the longest mission duration currently planned in Apollo. This significant increase in mission duration ~% ill provide essential information on the physiological behavior of man during long periods of orbital flight It is interesting to note that all major space flight goals beyond Apollo require significantly longer flight time than the basic 14 day capability that now exists Therefore, ~ e consider the development of the capability to fly longer and longei duration mis sions as vital to our future as a space fairing n'ttion In addition to studying mans physiological behavior, we must also develop the sys- tems necessary for longer flights, and provide better living conditions for the flight crews during these longer flight periods. Thus, ad- vances in spacecraft habitability are most important to our progress. The vehicle summary shown on figure 4 is an indication of the re- quirement for new resources in order to accomplish these AAP-1/2 objectives Relatively significant modifications are required to ye hide modules (CSM, M&SS and S-IVB) developed within Apollo and in addition some ne~ development is required It is import'tnt to note, however, that the modifications to Apollo modules represent only a small fraction of their initial development cost and do provide for significant improvements in operating capability, thus capitaliz- ing on our investment to date. These improvements in vehicle capa- bility will allow us to operate open ended for longer flight times, and to utilize basic Apollo vehicles in new and unique modes. The significant new development necessary for the AAP-1/2 mis- sion is the airlock/multiple docking adapter The airlock develop ment will be the responsibility of the Manned Spacecraft Center and this module is discussed in further detail I ~ ould like to emphasize that a comprehensive briefing on our total Apollo Applications plan ning is beyond the scope of this discussion and w e have selected one or two items for discussion in some detail in order to convey a feel- rng for the activity involved The airlock, depicted on figures 5 and 6, has the following purpose It provides additional expendables for extending the mission duration up to 28 days In combination with the multiple docking adapter, the airlock provides the c'~pability of effectively clustering several vehicle modules together into a configura- tion suitable for long term habitation and experimentation. In this clustered configuration, access bet~ een modules and to the outside of the vehicle is provided This capability significantly enhances our orbital usage of Apollo vehicles such `is the CSM and the S-IVB This clustered vehicle becomes an `irrangement wherein the flight crews can live `md ~s ork effectively for long periods of time Ap proximately 25 very useful experiments have been proposed for this first AAP mission They group conveniently into engineering, scien tific, and medical disciplines and `m majority of these experiments ef fectively utilize the large volume and long flight time provided by this grouping of vehicles. Additional (to CSM) subsystems, required to make the airlock, MDA, and S-IVB tank habitable, are provided by the airlock. We plan to incorporate solar panels on the airlock as a part of the electrical power system. They have not been used PAGENO="1315" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1311 ~*S~5o?1~27 MAR67 AAP MISSION PROFILES SUN~ ALTITUDE CSMAND / 100 RESUPPLY-~ ~~LM/ATM 50 AAP 3 AAP 4 EARTH CM RETURN ~LQUIESCENT...f4 56 DAYS______________ 0 FIGURE 3 in our Manned Space Flight program to date due to~ unfavorable weight penalties for short duration missions. However, solar panels become a leading candidate for generating electrical power for longer missions and are a specific example of the type of systems develop- ment that must be carried forward if we are to expand our Manned Space Flight capabilities. In our plans for the development of the airlock, we intend to utilize the systems technology and in many cases the actual hardware from the recently completed Gemini program. Although t.he airlock repre- sents a new application for these Gemini systems, by careful attention to program concept and specification, we have been able to effectively capitalize on our previous investments. At the completion of the AAP-1/2 orbital period (fig. 2)2 the three- man crew will r~turn to earth in the command and service module (CSM). The S-IVB workshop,. the airlock, the multiple docking adapter, and the M. & S.S. experiments module (see fig. 5), will re- main "stored" in orbit for subsequent revisitation and reuse. An altitude in excess of 250 nautical miles is sufficient to insure a lifetime in excess of 1 year thus following the quiescent period (several months) indicated between mission 1/2 and 3/4 the workshop will be available for reuse. We will, of course, have ground monitoring of the cluster during this orbital storage period and know the vehicle status prior to the launch of AAP-3. PAGENO="1316" 1312 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION NASA.S-67 .1417 AAP1 - AAP2 CONFIGURATION OBJECTIVES * 28 DAY EARTH ORBITAL FLIGHT - PHYSIOLOGICAL - SYSTEMS HABITABILITY * INITIAL EARTH RESOURCES VEHICLE SUMMARY * CSM - MODS (RCS - DEORBIT) * AIRLOCK / MDA NEW DEVELOPMENT * M&SS MODS * SWB STAGE - MINOR MODS FIGURE 4 NASA-S-67-1424 AIRLOCK CONFIGURATION PURPOSE * CARRY ADDITIONAL EXPENDABLES * INTER FACE WITH MDA (EXPERIMENTS CARRIER) * CREW ACCESS TO WORKSHOP AND TO OUTSIDE * MAJOR SUBSYSTEMS - ENVIRONMENTAL - INSTRUMENTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS * SOLAR ELECTRICAL POWER FOR BETWEEN MISSION MONITORING STATUS * NEW MODULE - (GEMINI EQUIPMENT) * UNDER MSC CONTRACT WITH MAC FIGURE 5 PAGENO="1317" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1313 I would now like to turn our discussions to the second AAP mission where we combine the AAP-3 and AAP-4 flights. The profile for this mission is shown on figure 3 and the mission objectives are sum- marized on figure 7. This mission will also be flown by a three-man crew launched by the basic Apollo CSM on AAP-3. AAP-4 is launched soon (within about 1 day) after AAP-3 and will contain a payload combining the ascent stage of an Apollo Lunar Module (LM) with a newly developed Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM). This new experiment module will contain several instruments developed to gather information from the Sun while above the Earth's atmosphere and should provide for significant advances in our knowledge of solar activity. After launch, the CSM and the LM/ATM rendezvous and then conduct a second rendezvous with the workshop left in orbit from the AAP-1/2 mission (fig. 3). The various vehicles are "clustered" as shown and the station is flown in a Sun-oriented attitude in order to carry out the solar astronomy objective. Reuse of the orbital workshop provides for vehicle volume and a configuration arrange- ment wherein an open-ended mission duration of up to 56 days can be selected as a significant "next step" objective providing sufficient time to effectively utilize the solar telescope (ATM). This significant increase in flight time and the new objectives will again require both modifications to basic Apollo system and new developments (fig. 7). Here again, and in keeping with our time constraints, I plan to select one isolated area for further discussion so that you can get a feel in depth for some of the required AAP activity. In conducting a mission of approximately 2 months duration, we must significantly improve our capability for providing supplies. One fundamental "supply" or "expendable" commodity is the various gases that are required to support a manned spacecraft. Our gas requirements for a 56-day mission are listed on figure 8. These ele- ments all have a very low boiling temperature and they are used during the mission in a gaseous state. However, we can, by cooling these elements to very low temperatures, change them from a gaseous state to a liquid state and carry the necessary quantities at signifi- cantly lower overall system weights. Let's take one of our typical gas requirements `and see what this weight tradeoff is for a 56-day mission and then examine what modification to existing systems might be required. Oxygen is, of course, the most critical of our gas requirements and a summary of this expendable for 56 days of operation in the AAP- 3/4 configuration is shown on figure 9. We see here that a total of 3,495 pounds of oxygen are required for creating a part of the vehicle atmosphere and for generating electrical power. (The OSM fuel cells are used to convert oxygen and hydrogen to electrical power and water.) Now, in performing a weight tradeoff for this amount of oxygen we see that it would require about 3,500 pounds of dry steam weight (tanks, valves, etc.) if we carried the oxygen in a gaseous state and only 960 pounds of dry system weight if we cool the oxygen to a temperature below the boiling point (i.e., cryogeni- cally). This 2,450-pound weight saving is very significant. There- fore, we are planning to utilize cryogenic storage for oxygen on our PAGENO="1318" 1314 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION NASA-S-67-1416 AIRLOCK CONFIGURATION I ~ AIRLOCK -~ MDA ~. : M&SS %%I ~ CSM `~ I I I ~ -- ~ FIGuRE 6 NASA-S-67-~423 AAP 3 - AAP 4 CONFIGURATION OBJECTIV ES * 56 DAY EARTH ORBITAL FLIGHT - PHYSIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS - HABITABILITY * SOLAR ASTRONOMY VEHICLE SUMMARY * CSM - MODS (RCS - DEORBIT - CRYOS) * LM - ASCENT STAGE - MODS (ECS) * ATM - NEW DEVELOPMENT (MSFC) FIGuRE 7 PAGENO="1319" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1315 NASA S 67 1425 56 DAY MISSION GAS STORAGE SYSTEMS * ~AS REQUIREMENTS - OXYGEN - HYDROGEN NITROGEN - HELIUM * LONG DURATION WEIGHT TRADE-OFFS CRYOGENIC STORAGE VS HIGH PRESSURE GAS STORAGE FIGUEE 8 NASA-S-67-1 420 56 DAY MISSION OXYGEN SUMMARY MISSION REQUIREMENT * CLUSTER REPRESSURIZATION 376 * METABOLIC 2 LB/DAY/MAN 336 * LEAKAGE 15 1 LB/DAY/CLUSTER 846 * ELECTRICAL 2 2 KW 1937 TOTAL 3495 LBS WEIGHT TRADEOFF * HIGH PRESSURE GAS TANKS 3500 LBS * CRYOGENIC (THREE 41 5 INCHES 0 D TANKS) 960 LBS FIGURE 9 PAGENO="1320" 1316 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION AAP missions. Incidentally, cryo storage of oxygen has been utilized in all of our manned space flight programs to date, however, mission duration has a significant impact on storage system requirement. In order to liquefy oxygen, it must be cooled to below about minus 3ØØO F. (the effect of pressure will not be discussed here). As heat leaks into the storage system, the oxygen will begin to "boil off" or convert from a liquid to a gaseous state with an attendant buildup in pressure. Therefore, the thermal and pressure characteristics of the oxygen cryogenic storage system must conform to the. planned mission usage. A cryogenic storage system summary for oxygen is shown in figure 10. The current Apollo bottles (the best available) cannot meet our mission requirements and new bottles must be devel- oped. (See fig. 11). The current Apollo bottles hold about 300 pounds each; therefore it would require a total of 12 to meet our 3,500-pound requirement. The size (26-inch diameter) and thermal performance of these bottles are proper for the missions to be flown in Apollo. However, as shown on figure 10, we could not provide adequate oxygen for 56 days even if it were practical to use oxygen that matched this minimum boiloff rate. The new development AAP bottle will take advantage of two factors that improve thermal performance in meeting the oxygen system requirements (fig. 11). In the first place, we will make each individual bottle larger thereby improving thermal performance. The ratio of the mass of the liquid to the sur- face area through which heat can leak into the liquid (a significant system parameter) favors the larger bottle. Secondly, we will utilize some new techniques that will improve the thermal insulation between NASA -S.67 -1551 56 DAY MISSION OXYGEN SUMMARY -CRYOGENIC STORAGE CURRENT APOLLO 02 BOTTLES ~3OO LBS PER BOTTLE 12 BOTTLES REQUIRED 4000 3000 02 REMAINING, LBS 2000 1000 NEW AAP DEVELOPMENT 02 BOTTLES ~1200 LBS PER BOTTLE 3 BOTTLES REQUIRED 0 10 20 30 40 0 30 60 90 120 MISSION TIME, MISSION TIME, DAYS DAYS FIGURE 10 PAGENO="1321" 1908 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1317 NA$A-S-67-1 550 56 DAY MISSION CRYOGENIC BOTTLE CONFIGURATION - OXYGEN BLOCK II APOLLO NEW AAP DEVELOPMENT 26IN.DIAMETER 41.5 IN. DIA MAX. CAP~3OO LBS CAP ~12OO LBS MIN DRY WT ~1OO LBS DRY WI ~32O LBS LOAD BEARING INSULATION FIBERGLAS * SIZE - MASS TO SURFACE RATIO DEXIGLASS PAPER * IMPROVED INSULATION ALUMINUM FOIL FIGURE 11 the inner pressure vessel and the outer shell of the bottle. These new techniques of reducing the amount of heat that is radiated or con- ducted into the cold liquid from the outside have evolved from our supporting development work that has been conducted in parallel with our mainstream manned flight programs. As shown in figure 10, three of these new bottles are expected to meet our planned oxygen use rate for the 56-day mission and they have been sized to fit the existing Apollo CSM. The improved thermal performance of the AAP bottle is shown by comparing the two minimum use rate curves. This oxygen system discussion has indicated to you an example of the type of activity necessary to adopt the basic Apollo hardware to our Apollo Applications program. The discussion here today has attempted to convey to you a "feel" for what `is implied in utilizing the basic Apollo technology and hard- ware in the Apollo Applications program. We have discussed both modifications to existing systems and new developments. This addi- tional activity is "in itself" a very significant undertaking. For ex- ample, the increases in flight duration discussed are very advanced steps which must be undertaken very carefully, hence the "open- ended" or "see how it goes" philosophy. Also, the systems engineering changes will "in detail" be very difficult and require significant ad- vancement. However, when we evaluate the additional program ef- fort required against the very significant improvement in flight capa- bility and hardware utilization, then opportunity of capitalizing on our investment is very encouraging. An Apollo Applications pro- gram funding requirement summary for fiscal year 1968 is presented in figure 12. IMPROVED THERMAL PERFORMANCE PAGENO="1322" 1318 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION NA$A~$~67J 414 AAP MSC FUNDING REQ - FY 1968 (DOLLARS IN MILLIONS) NASA TOTAL 454 7 MSC TOTAL 228 2 VEHICLES 134 6 EXPERIMENTS 79 6 MISSION OPERS 14.0 FIGURE 12 PAGENO="1323" PRESENTATION or ROBERT 0 PILAND, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS, SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS DIRECTORATE Since we have been in the space business, a majority of our efforts have necessarily been directed toward developing spacecraft and asso- ciated operations However, throughout this period we h~ve looked forward to the time when we could exploit these capabilities, both for basic scientific investigations and for applications Even in Mercury, the last mission or so, we had a few simple, but very meaningful experiments. The Gemini spacecraft was not designed ~s ith a predetermined and basic capability to carry experiments Nevertheless, as secondary ob jectives, we were able to carry quite a few experiments, some of the results of which I will show you today In Apollo, from the very beginning there ~ as `t science program in tended for Apollo and a defined capability built ii~to the spacecraft to support the scientific activities. In the Apollo Applications pro- gram we hope to exploit this capability to an even greater extent. In talking about the uses of space flight for scientific purposes, I recall a publication that was issued shortly after our space program started, which I think very worthwhile in putting science and space in perspective. It noted that the satellite, being high above the Earth, offers us three things One, it permits you to look "down" and see the Earth as you have never seen it before, in other words, you can stand back and get a big look `it it Another thing you can do is to sample the environment in which you are located, which we had never been able to do before Thirdly, you can look "out" at the stars and not be hindered by the atmosphere which blankets the Earth. Obviously, those three advantages are equally available to us in either the unmanned or manned satellites. I would like to comment about three `tdditional items that our manned spacecraft program gives us One, ~ e have our crews, and our crews have visual capability, they have selective capability, and they have the ability to improvise They also have the `ibility to do certain functions which could be automated, but which are much sim pler when done by the crew A second `tdvantage is that manned spacecraft are inherently rela tively large, and, therefore, ~i ithout significant penalty you can afford to carry a substantial amount of scientific equipment I will point this out with Gemini, specifically The third thing is that a manned space craft clearly is designed and built to reenter This is very important to many scientific investigations since it gives us the ability to bring back samples This, of course, includes lunar samples, but there are many items which we want to expose to space environment, and then return them to Earth to study them in detail. Many of the experi- ments we want to do involve the use of film. Photography is a very 1319 PAGENO="1324" 1320 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION basic method of gathering large quantities of information. Film must necessarily be returned, so here again, our reentry capability is very important. With that background I would like to talk about the Gemini, Apollo, and Apollo Applications experiments programs. Although `Gemini wasn't planned to include an extensive experi- ment' activity, we flew 111 experiments in the program, and these 111 experiments weighed on the order of 1,500 pounds, or about 150 pounds average per flight. We were able to add these experiments without sig- nificantly affecting the basic mission of the Gemini program. Where did these experiments come from? They come from many sources. We do not develop all of these experiments inhouse (fig. 1). Our 17 scientific experiments, which we flew several times each, came from universities, laboratories, industry, and Government centers, in- cluding the Universities of Minnesota, Northwestern, `California, and others. Our technological and engineering experiments came mainly from our NASA centers and the Department of Defense. We flew 15 experiments for the Department of Defense. Then Dr. Berry and' other `medical people, both here and elsewhere, such as Dr. Mack at Texas Women's University, flew eight medical ex- periments, each several times. In addition, to the Gemini carrying 1,500 pounds of experiments for us, some 22 percent of the inflight crew time was used in conducting experiments. I might mention that of those 111 experiments we had planned, some 90 of them were carried out successfully. `Those that weren't completed were due to spacecraft or experiment hardware problems. Now, just a few slides to show you what kind of equipment we used to perform these experiments. The simplest equipment we used were rather simple cameras shown here (fig. 2). This morning George Low mentioned the Hasseiblad camera. The Hasselblad was a workhorse, but here was another camera we used, a Maurer camera, which we could adapt with various lenses to do simple astronomy experiments. Another type of experiment we did was to explore the combined effects of radiation and zero "g" on blood cells. Shown here (fig. 3) is our small package which was activated by the astronaut to subject blood cells to calibrated radiation levels while at zero "g". The blood cells were returned to Earth for comparison with ground controls. These are both fairly simple experiments, as far as incorporating them into the spacecraft. I might show you our most complex hardware experiment that we worked into the Gemini program. It was a radiometry experiment, and it was conducted for the Department of Defense. We had to in- stall three sensors, shown here (fig. 4) into the spacecraft, and these sensors were responsive to radiation at various wavelengths. They were designed to measure and record that radiant energy that is emitted from various types of vegetation, land masses, oceans, other spacecraft, the Moon, stars, and so forth. In addition to the sensors we had to have controls optical sights through which the pilot could acquire and point to the various tar- gets he wanted to see; recorder electronics; thermal control, et cetera; PAGENO="1325" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1321 NASA.S-66-U9~5 EXPERIMENT PROGRAM SUMMARY SPONSORING NO. OF TOTAL EXP AGENCY EXPERIMENTS MISSIONS * SCIENTIFIC * OSSA(S) 17 47 * TECHNOLOGICAL * OART (1) 2 2 * OMSF (MSC) 10 18 * DOD (D) 15' 26 * MEDICAL * MEDICAL (M) 8 18 TOTALS 52 111 FIGuRE 1 FIGURE 2 PAGENO="1326" 1322 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 3 NASA-66-1 1874 LOCATION OF RADIOMETRY EXPERIMENT D004 AND D007 EQUIPMENT OPTICAL SIGHT SPECTROMETER/INTERFEROMETER STOWAGE (CRYOGENIC COOLED~ ECS MODULE-\. 1' SPECTROMETER/INTERFEROMETER FIGURE 4 PAGENO="1327" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1323 and this equipment all added up to some 170 pounds for one experiment. Shown here (fig. 5) are the sensors in their deployed condition and the pilot pointing at one of the objects for which we were measuring and recording radiant energies. So much for the equipment; I would now like to show you some of the results of the experiments. The many experiments we conducted last year are being analyzed this year, and I would expect it would take another year to fully realize the gains we have obtained from the Gemini experiments. We do have some results available now which are mostly photographic, but I think you will find them very interesting. For the geographers, a most interesting picture, which I suspect most of you have probably seen, is the Nile Delta, shown here (fig. 6). This area supports some 25 million people. It is the area that the Nile, with its two branches along here, essentially makes liveable. You can see the difference between the coloring of the vegetation in the deserts, and also. the Gulf of Suez, the Red Sea, the Dead Sea, and many other areas of interest on a very broad scale. Now, here appear the Red Sea, the Gulf of Suez (fig. 7). This is another picture of the same area taken at a different time. Mr. Low showed you this photograph earlier today (fig. 8). It has considerable geological interest to the people who study such things as continental drift. When they get far away and have this sort of perspective of the entire area, they can better examine the theories that say this area is moving away from Africa. FIGURE 5 PAGENO="1328" 1324 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION This next one is a little closer to home. On many missions we had tried to get an orbital picture of the Houston area. On one of the later missions we did. This is Houston (fig. 9); the Gulf Freeway; the Manned Spacecraft Center; and the Astrodome; but after noting those very interesting features, we started seeing other things in the pictures. You can see the sediment pattern where Galveston Bay enters the Gulf of Mexico; also, you can see similar patterns at Sabine and Cal- casieu Pass. You can possibly detect the polluted waters in Galveston Bay, as they are very clearly distinguished by the light and dark areas. Of even more potential interest are these currents detectable out here. The Bureau of Commercial Fisheries at Galveston tells us that these currents influence the movements and location of our larval shrimp. In this picture, and a little harder to see, is our gulf coast, extending along here. FIGURE 6 PAGENO="1329" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1325 This is the Houston-Pasadena area, and what we are seeing here is some air pollution. What is apparent is that the lower air currents move it in this direction, and then, at higher altitudes, it is carried toward and spreads all over the gulf area here. With more detailed studies you can see these recurring patterns in other areas at lower and higher altitudes and effectively trace the path of our polluted air. Next is a photograph of the Midland-Odessa area (fig. 10). We are not sure of its value, but we found it quite interesting. We could not immediately explain the dark area; there was no obvious explana- tion. The meteorologists then started checking the recent rainfall, and it was found that there was a direct relation between the shading here, in this area, and the previous 24-hour rainfall. The hydrol- ogists and geologists find considerable interest in this next picture. Here we have the Colorado River emptying into the Gulf of Cali- fornia (fig. 11). This is the Great Sonora Desert on the right, and Baja California on the left. Easily detected is the old channel of the Colorado River, which, due to various irrigation activities up- stream, has dried up. Of particular interest are these patterns across here. At first we thought they were due to the water motion, or turbidity currents. Later, working with the Naval Oceanographic Office, we established that the shading there is directly relative to the topography of the river bottom. Thus, we have another way of locating and mapping changes of this type as they occur. FIGURE 7 76-265 0-67-pt. 2--84 PAGENO="1330" 1326 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 8 Tfhis is in the area of the Bahamas (fig. 12), and is a feature that oceanographers study extensively. It is known as the "Tongue of the Ocean" and is some 8,000 feet deep. This whole area is under water, showing what are essentially canyons caused by the eroding effect of currents `md tides This is very shal1o~ here, dropping steeply to, as I said, some 8,000 feet here. It is particularly interest- ing to study `mre'ms as this before `mnd `mfter hurric'ines to note the effects that these storm systems have on the ocean bottom. The weatherman would label this a typhoon some 500 miles wide, as seen out over the Pacific during one of the earlier Gemini missions (fig. 13). I think you have probably seen this photograph in the papers reflecting the active role the crew played ii1~ the tracking and reporting on this storm as both the storm and the mission were in progress. You saw this photograph this morning, showing the Indian sub- continent (fig. 14). Mr. Low called attention to this area along the coast where no clouds appear. Subsequent studies have already re- vealed what some of the possible reasons for that might be. Cooler PAGENO="1331" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1327 FIGURE 9 water welling up along the coast is one possibility. This might be caused by northwest winds driving the water to the southwest with the coriolis force tending to deflect the surface water away from land. Here we see a cloud pattern off the coast of California (fig. 15), and this, specifically, is Guadalupe Island, which rises some 3,000 or 4,000 feet high. As you can see, it is affecting the cloud patterns and, particularly, you see a vortex forming. Anywhere the meteorologists see a vortex forming, they are particularly interested because vortexes are associated with hurricanes. That type of photograph is one that the astronauts will see and selectively photograph from the altitudes which we are working at. It would not be seen with the higher flying Tiros and other weather satellites. The next photograph is a bit different. I)uring some of the Mer- cury missions, questions were raised about what an astronaut could see from space. An attempt was made to quantitatively predict and, during flight, to determine what he should and could see and to compare the two. PAGENO="1332" 1328 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 10 Near Laredo we laid out this series of patterns, which were 2,000 by 2,000 feet. We put the bars in here, and as you go across and down, these bars get progressively smaller (fig. 16). The length varied from about 600 to 150 feet. You can see how small they are in the last square. The idea was for the astronauts, in passing over this site, to read these patterns, the direction, and so forth, to see how many of them could be read, which was done very well. The astronauts were able to read down into this square, which, for the lighting conditions, the window conditions, and the many other variables, was consistent with what would have been expected. This photograph, incidentally, was taken from an airplane. This next picture is more nearly what it looked like from the spacecraft itself. I can see it from here, but I doubt if you can see the patterns from where you are; they are right there. So much for looking down at the Earth. We might look at one experiment which sampled the environment in space. Colonel Aidrin referred to this earlier. This is a micro- meteorite package recovered from the Agena which had been placed there 4 months previously (fig. 17). On it there were special little PAGENO="1333" 968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1329 FIGURE 11 stainless steel plates, and what we were trying to do was to investigate and, hopefully, collect micrometeorites. We were particularly trying to capture some of those micrometeorites which do not reach Earth. Since they burn up on entering the atmosphere, we never get a chance to see or analyze them; so we collected them above the atmosphere where they were available. This is one of the resulting craters (fig. 18). Although it looks rather large here, actually, it is only 200 microns wide, or 200 mil- lionths of an inch. This picture was taken under microscope and it is still being studied. We even think we have some of the material from the micrometeorite that caused the crater. It will be interesting to determine what it is; whether it is Earth-like material or not. We sampled the surrounding environment. Now here are some very preliminary pictures from looking "up" and "out." The astronomers are very interested in these types of things; they are called dim lio'ht phenomena, the zodiacal light, the air glow layer, the twilight, an~ the Gegensehein. PAGENO="1334" 1330 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGUEE 12 This is the zodiacal light (fig. 1~), and what it is, is a band of particles that are moving around the Sun and the Earth. It is not completely understood where they came from or where they are go- ing They seem to be in constant supply, ~hereas their weight and such, would indicate that they should be going away One of the theories is that they come from the asteroid belt or the comets and `t measurement, such as this, when analyzed will help to determine more what they are made of You can see the zodiacal light on the ground occasionally, if you go up to a quiet spot away from city lights, and so forth This is one of the few pictures that exists, as such The air glow layer is also shown here The air glow is about 100 kilometers above the Earth, very hard to see from the ground There are layers of oxygen and sodium, and it is not completely understood where it comes from. They think it may have a relation to our weather. For example, they have found differences in New Mexico from sounding rockets fired at different times of the year. Our particular experiment was trying to make pictures worldwide to see how it varied around the world. PAGENO="1335" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1331 FIGURE 18 Going on from dim light phenomena to stars, we mentioned earlier that you cairnot see stars on the ground the same way you can see them in space Foi example, here is `t photograph or spectrograph from the Earth's surface of `t typical star, and, you see, you get to here `rnd you don't get `tnything else You hive gotten what you call in `itmospheric cutoff, simply because the ultr'tviolet light that is coming from the st'us c'tn t get through the atmosphere These marks here indicate wh Lt `ire the constituents of the stars This upper photo graph w'ts made fiom Gemini XI, and, as you can see, it is extended further out With these lines, ~s e find other constituents of the star that we have nevei been able to measure before, such as iron, magrie sium, and other consitituents (fig 20) Not this particular star, but other stars we find have been somewli tt u rongly classified, and, so, we have a po~ erful tool here to further study our stars That is i ~ ci y quick rundoisn on some of the preliminary Gemini iesults As I mentioned, our investigators in many parts of the coun tr~ `ire `inalyzing these data and I suspect it will be another year be fore ~ e fully re'tp all the benefits from our Gemini experiments PAGENO="1336" 1332 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 14 Moving on to Apollo: Apollo's major contribution to science obvi- ously will be in its exploration of the Moon. Now, I am sure you have heard questions about the Moon such as "Where did it come from? Did it break off from the Earth? Was it captured by the Earth? What can it tell us about the Earth?" Some of the things that we do in Apollo we hope will be able to at least partially answer these questions. For example, if it came from the Earth we should be able to find out something about the history of the Earth. The Earth has been distorted in its surface by transport of water. Water erosion has so changed the face of the Earth that we are limited in what we can learn about the early history of the Earth, but the Moon does not have this water and, so, conceivably, it can tell us some- thing about what the early history of the Earth was like. Now, taking questions like that, basic questions, a group of lunar scientists several years ago set out some objectives (fig. 21) that we would like to achieve in studying the Moon; namely, the structure and the processes, what is going on in the interior of the Moon, the com- position and the structure of the surface of the Moon, and what are the processes modifying this structure. Is it volcanoes, micrometeor- ites, meteoroids, and so forth, and, then, we would like to establish the history of how it go~ that way. Now, the next few slides will show you some of the experiments we are planning, which, in turn, will help to answer those kinds of ques- tions. PAGENO="1337" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1333 FIGURE 15 On the lunar surface here are the things we will ask the astronaut to do. Obviously he will make observations (fig. 22), and this is something we don't want to overlook. Just being there, and what he sees, will be a tremendous amount of information that we do not have now. Sample collection is probably the most important of our more formal scientific activities. We will bring samples back, and then we can address some of these basic questions in ma.ny of these fields. The second thing the astronaut will do is deploy an experiment pack- age, to leave on the surface, which will make certain geophysical meas- urements for a year after we depart, and some of these experiments should tell us what some of the things are going on inside the Moon. And, then, the third, he can start to study the geologic structure that he sees on the lunar surface. We have built into the spacecraft certain capabilities to carry these scientific equipments (fig. 23). For example, we can carry to the lunar surface 250 pounds of scientific equipment. We can return some 80 pounds of lunar samples and film. PAGENO="1338" 1334 1968 NASA AUTHO~UZATION FIGURE 16 FIaUBE 17 PAGENO="1339" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1335 NA$A~$~6ó~12O36 FIGURE 18 FIGURE 19 PAGENO="1340" 1336 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION FIGURE 20 NASA.S.66-5194 JUN SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVES BY CATEGORY * INVESTIGATE THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESSES OF THE LUNAR INTERIOR * DETERMINE THE COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE OF THE SURFACE OF THE MOON AND THE PROCESSES MODIFYING THE SURFACE * ESTABLISH THE HISTORY OR EVOLUTIONARY SEQUENCE OF EVENTS BY WHICH THE MOON HAS ARRIVED AT ITS PRESENT CONFIGURATION NOTE: FROM A MEETING SPONSORED BY THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, SPACE SCIENCES BOARD, AT WOODS HOLE, MASSACHUSETTS, IN THE SUMMER OF 1965 FIGURE 21 PAGENO="1341" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1337 NASA-S-66.5197 JUN PRIORITY ACTIVITIES * OBSERVATIONS PROVIDE QUALITATIVE DESCRIPTION OF LUNAR SURFACE FEATURES * SAMPLE COLLECTION TO PERMIT POST-MISSION ANALYSIS ADDRESSING BASIC QUESTIONS IN THE FIELDS OF GEOCHEMISTRY, PETROLOGY, GEOLOGY, AND BIOSCIENCE * DEPLOYMENT OF LUNAR SURFACE EXPERIMENTS PACKAGE TO OBTAIN CONTINUED MEASUREMENT OF GEOPHYSICAL PARAMETERS FOR ONE YEAR AFTER LM DEPARTURE * FIELD GEOLOGY TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON POSSIBLE GEOLOGIC STRUCTURE AS IT MAY BE REVEALED BY SURFACE FEATURES AND FORMATIONS FIGURE 22 NASA-S.66.5204 JUN BASIC CRITERIA FROM SPACECRAFT/MISSION * WEIGHT ALLOCATION 250/80 * STOWAGE PROVISION LM STRUCTURE * EMU PERFORMANCE OPERATING TIME, METABOLIC LOADS, MOBILITY, DEXTERITY, VISIBILITY, THERMAL CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS * SITE SELECTION OPERATIONAL PRIORITY * LUNAR SURFACE STAY DISTRIBUTION, DURATION & NUMBER OF CREWMEN FOR EXTRA-VEHICULAR EXCURSIONS FIGURE 23 PAGENO="1342" 1338 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION We carry our scientific equipment in these bays of the LM descent~ stage (fig. 24), some 15 cubic feet, and, we return these samples in the ascent stage-the descent stage stays on the lunar surface. As far as what we ask the astronaut to do, it is determined by his capability in the suit and at one-sixth g. There are limitations of operating time, the metabolic loads, the jobs we put on him, his mobility, his dexterity, what he can see, ther- mal control, maintaining communications. We have to keep what we ask him to do within these constraints. As far as site selection for initial missions, scientifically, we would ask for no particular site. Any site will be so much greater than what is available now that it is quite satisfactory. As far as lunar surface stay time, the longer he stays the more he can do, and the number of crewmen on a particular excursion also en- hances the ability to carry out some of the geologic work. Now, the equipments-this is the package of scientific equipments that fit into those two bays on the Lunar Module that I showed you (fig. 25). This is about 250 pounds. Over here is basically the in- struments that we will leave on the surface. Carried in here, are the geology tools he will use on the surface. Now, he will take this package and deploy it so that it looks like this (fig. 26). This is the central station, where we have a data sys- tem which will transmit our information back to Earth, an antenna, a power supply, and, then four experiments; a seismometer, which will give us information on the internal movements of the Moon, if there LUNAR STOWAGE NASA.S.64.3809 SCIENTIFIC EQUIPMENT ...-ASCENT STOWAGE 2 Cu FT `~-DESCENT j ~ STOWAGE UFT c~S MODULE FIGURE 24 PAGENO="1343" NASA-S66-5213 JUN EXPERIMENT 1 968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1339 FIGU~ ~5 ARRAY A' D&LQYED DATA SUBSYSTEM SUPRA ~I.rr~A~ION OR ..NETOMETER FIGURE 26 PAGENO="1344" 1340 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION are any; several radiation experiments to measure the particles on the lunar surface, and then a magnetometer to study whether the Moon has a magnetic field or not. Here are some of the geological tools he will use on the surface (fig. 27), and I think you saw some of these in an earlier tour today. Here are the smaller tools, and his tool carrier. We are trying to build a biological sampling device which will bring back a sterile sample from beneath the lunar surface that has been un- touched by man, a camera, drive tubes, possibly a weighing scale, and, the all important sample boxes. These boxes, he will put the lunar samples in, seal them and carry them back to the LM. We have two boxes, two identical boxes, and each will weigh, when loaded, about 40 pounds apiece. This is the scientific package that will be left on the Moon's surface. Incidentally, this is being built for us by Bendix of Michigan, the cen- tral station. Various experimenters are providing the individual ex- periments. Here is the astronaut with the sample box (fig. 28), in a separate operation, and a tool, getting a sample from beneath the lunar surface. After he has filled his boxes, returned them to the LM and returned to earth, we will then take a look at what we do with the samples next (fig. 29). From the aircraft carrier in the recovery zone, the lunar samples, data film and tapes, and certain biospecimens, will be flown back to the Lunar Receiving Laboratory at Houston. H SAMPLING TUBE N ASA-$-66 6804 JUN SAMPLING TOOLS WEIGHING SCALE SAMPLE RETURN CONTAINERS FIGURE 27 PAGENO="1345" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1341 FIGURE 28 NASA-S.66.5146 JUN 8 TRANSPORTATION TO AND FROM LRL AIRCRAFT CARRIER IN RECOVERY ZONE NEAREST LAND BASE WITH RUNWAYS SPECIMENS SURFACE OR AIR TRANSPORT MORE THAN 50 UNIVERSITIES RETURNED FOR SEALED SPACECRAFT AND I.ABS ALL OVER WORLD STORAGE AND/OR REDISTRIBUTION FIGURE 29 76-265 0-67-pt. 2-85 PAGENO="1346" 1342 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION The astronauts will go to the nearest land base and come back by airplane, and the spacecraft itself will come back by surface or air transportation. All will come to the Lunar Receiving Laboratory. I would like to spend the next few slides telling about some of the things that will go on in the Lunar Receiving Laboratory. The requirements for the lab (fig. 30) are to receive and catalog returned lunar samples; make a preliminary examination of them and then package them for subsequent distribution to the scientific com- munity. It is suspected that over a hundred of these samples will be sent out to all parts of the country to various investigators to do analyses and experiments on these lunar samples. Certain experiments are highly time dependent, and, therefore, we will carry them out in the lab while the samples are still under quarantine. A most important function of the lab is to provide for the biological isolation of the lunar samples while evaluating their possible effects on the Earth. Another is to provide for the quarantine of the astronauts, the medi- cal support team, other personnel, and fOr decontamination or isola- tion of the equipment used to transport these personnel. Here is a photograph of the facility-you saw one this morning- the facility is on schedule, the construction will be completed in July for occupancy as planned. This picture was taken December 12, and it has progressed considerably since then. NASA~S~66.7662 AUG 3 REQU IREMENTS FOR LUNAR RECEIVING LABORATORY (LRL) * TO SERVE AS A RECEIVING AND CATALOGING STATION FOR THE RETURNED LUNAR SAMPLES * TO PROVIDE FOR PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF THE LUNAR SAMPLES AND FOR SUBSEQUENT DISTRIBUTION TO THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY * TO PERFORM HIGHLY TIME DEPENDENT EXPERIMENTS WHILE THE SAMPLES ARE UNDER QUARANTINE * TO PROVIDE FOR BIOLOGICAL ISOLATION OF THE LUNAR SAMPLES WHILE EVALUATING THEIR POSSIBLE EFFECT UPON THE TERRESTRIAL BIOSPHERE * TO PROVIDE FOR QUARANTINE OF THE APOLLO ASTRONAUTS, ASTRONAUT MEDICAL TEAM, AND ASSOCIATED PERSONNEL AND FOR DECONTAMINATION OR ISOLATION OF THE EQUIPMENT USED TO TRANSPORT THESE PERSONNEL TO THE LRL FIGuRE 30 PAGENO="1347" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1343 This is the layout of the laboratory (fig. 31). It is divided into several major parts. We ~might start, here, with the spacecraft loca- tion. The green area is where the crew lives during this quarantine period. This is the sample laboratory area here and here is the vac- uum system, and the Physical Science Laboratory and the Biological Laboratory. This is a specialized laboratory to do low level radiation counting, which you have to do within a short period after return to Earth. These offices here are administrative and support areas. Now, the next slides show what happens here. Here are our sample boxes, that we bring back to the lab (fig. 32). The first thing you will do is take a sample of the gas, if any, that is in the box; then we will take specially collected biological samples, the sterile samples I mentioned to you, and they will be sent to the biology labs for various tests to see if we have gotten any possible problems there. Certain of the samples will be kept under very high vacuum in sealed cans. After preliminary examination, and pack- aging, they will be shipped out to principal investigators. The largest ntimber of samples will go here. Some will be tapped off for gas analysis work, then preliminary examination, and from this you will take off pieces for further biological tests and for pre- liminary geochemical and mineralogical tests. Certain samples will go to the low level counting laboratory. Then these 50 or 100 outside investigators will receive samples. We would intend to save the order of 40 percent, or so, of the sam- ples for future use, and other purposes. FIGURE 31 PAGENO="1348" 1344 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION The sample boxes come in here and are introduced into this vacuum system here, and through arrangements of gloves and mechanical manipulators the boxes are opened and the samples removed. Then they are moved down to the Physical Chemistry Laboratory, others down to the Biological Laboratory. This is the Gas Analysis Laboratory located here (fig. 33), and then, down below ground, is the Radiation Counting Laboratory with its large shields, because you are trying to count radiation of a very low level here, and you don't want the normal background affecting your counting (fig. 34). So much for a rapid runthrough on the lunar surface science program. Looking beyond this, we here at this center, have three major areas of interest in the Applications program. One is extended lunar investigation. I showed you a number of instruments that we would like to put out on Apollo. There are additional instruments under development. For example, a ~1evice that when placed on the lunar surface could tell you the constituents' of the very minute amount of lunar atmos- phere that is there. We want to go to different locations, for example, a seismometer to measure the motion going on inside the Moon. We want them lo- cated at several places so you can essentially triangulate and find the source of the particular motion. You would like to be able to go farther away from the spacecraft to visit some of the more interesting geological places and to study them longer. We would like to, through a combination of different spacecraft location and additional mobility, to study some of the par- ticular craters there. NASA.S66.809 JAN 25 LUNAR SAMPLE RECEIVING LABORATORY GENERAL FUNCTIONS AND SAMPLE FLOW SUBDIVIDE, VARIOUS REPACKAGE IN BIOLOGICAL TESTS, ULTRA HIGH VACUUM, ~., SEARCH FOR SHIP TO PRINCIPAL \ LUNAR PATHOGENS INVESTIGATORS PRELIMINARY ~N, EXAMINATION TORRI SPECIALLY COLLECTED ULTRA BIOLOGICAL SAMPLES HIGH VACUUM -50) SAMPLES (2) BIOLOGICAL ~ TEMPORARY LOW `t GENERAL STORAGE LEVEL \ SAMPLES INVESTIGATORS ((06 TORR) RADIATION IN SEALED BAGS 1 ~N~~//'~ENINGO INvEsTIGA:i::~ FOR GEOCHEMICAL A 2 BOXES AN~WS PERMANENT TESTS -50 POUND~ OF RETENTION SAMPLES GENERATION GAS ANALYSIS EXPERIMENTS FIGURE 32 PAGENO="1349" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1345 FIGuRE 33 FIGuRE 34 PAGENO="1350" 1346 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION There are the things we are studying. At the same time we are studying the advanced capabilities of our spacecraft. These will have to come together in some detail to determine an optimum program. I would like to say a few words about our two newest areas of in- terest, which we have gotten into very recently. One is the area of manned meteorology. Our meteorological work to date in unmanned satellites is mainly photography, and this provides a very significant amount of information. In addition to pictures, it would be very desirable to measure such things as pressure and temperature and moisture in the air over large portions of the Earth at nearly the same time so as to give a more defi- nite understanding of the weather. There are proposals which we are now studying as a meteorological payload for a manned spacecraft. One of the ideas here is to test flight experimental instrumentation with the idea that we could test several different types, in an engineering fashion, and from those determine the best instrument which in turn might be miniaturized and flown on unmanned satellites. We would like, obviously, to use man's ability to direct sensors to particular areas of interest, and I think we have already seen this dem- onstrated in the Gemini program. We would like to take a number of sensors for simultaneous observa- tion measuring various parameters, so as to get a~better understand- ing of the weather mechanisms. Instruments which may contribute to the detection of air pollution- this is a specific device which can give you an indication of the den- sity of the particles in the atmosphere. I have already mentioned the ability to measure temperature, and other things, and these are mainly through these IR temperature sen- sors. They are infrared devices, and will enable us to measure tem- peratures around the Earth. One particular device here, a radiometer will offer us the unique advantage of being able to see through the clouds. While the weather- man likes clouds, he would also like to be able to see through them sometimes and measure density, temperatures under the clouds. As we have mentioned earlier, this large package of instruments takes advantage of the increased payload capacity and volume pro- vided by the AAP missions. Now, this next slide (fig. 35) is a pictorial of these several instru- ments that we are studying. One of our jobs, obviously, is to in- tegrate these separate instruments into a package. That package of instruments would weigh on the order of 2,400 pounds. Our last area I would just like to mention is the Earth resources survey program. I suspect you have heard soiiiething about this. The idea is that satellites would allow us to map large areas of the world, and in mapping I am not talking about conventional maps, but to determine what is there in the way of land, land usage, water, water movement, so forth; to not only determine it one time, but to determine it re- peatedly, to determine its changes, and anticipate what is going to happen. PAGENO="1351" 1908 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1347 l~'1(UJRE 35 Now, this is a very big area, it is going to take a lot of study to determine what are the specific things to be done in that area. I think the Gemini pictures give you some idea of the things we might be getting into. We have two airplanes at MSC which we are flying with a rather complex instrumentatjon. I have got a few slides here to show you some of the specific things you might be able to do. Mr. Low. Caii you try to finish up in just a few minutes? Mr. PILAND. Yes. No more than 3 minutes. Here is a radiometer located here, in the front of the airplane. The unique thing about it is that it measures at wavelengths which penetrate through clouds. This is an infrared device, and this is a mapping camera here. Now, I would just like to take those two instruments and show you some examples of the things you might be able to do. This photograph was taken with this infrared device, and there was a field of oats on the surface here. What it shows is this fault line `out in California. The significant thing is that it indicates the temperature on this side of the fault is several degrees cooler. What that indicates is that there is water on that side of the fault and there is no water on this side of the fault. It gives you some indication of the water resources. This is anqther infrared picture, and, of course, this is the Gulf Stream. This is up off Cape Hatteras, and this is the coastline toward PAGENO="1352" 1348 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION the left of the slide. These are the inshore waters. This is the edge of the Gulf Stream here with some `7 degrees temperature change from the inshore waters. The Gulf Stream extends on for some number of miles to the other side. This temperature is related to the cur- rents, and if you know where the temperatures are, you know where your currents are flowing, and you know where to run your ships. This is a picture of Cascade Glacier. This is a site that has been studied for many years by people studying glaciers and their impact on water resources in general. What they do here is fly over her regu- larly, the glacier melts in some seasons and goes into this lake, or pond, here, and then into the Cascade River. By repeated monitor- ing of this glacier, we can find out what it is doing over the years. One of the most interesting, but still to be defined areas, is agri- culture. This is an infrared photograph taken down at the Weslaco Agricultural Station down in south Texas. What they do down there is plant crops in these different areas, then they infect some of the crops, they retard growth in some, and with these pictures, we try to see what is the effect. For example, here is a field that started out at the same time. This is a diseased area here, and this is a healthy area here. These are spot examples of possible potential things you could do here. I would be very cautious to say a lot more work needs to go on to decide what it is we can do and what it is that is exactly worth- while doing in this program. Thank you. Congressman TEAGUE. Thank you, sir. Bob, it has been a good day. Dr. GILRUTH. We sure appreciate you coming down. Congressman TEAGUE. Thank you, sir. PAGENO="1353" NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION MARCH 1967 PRESENTATION TO TIlE SUBOOMMIrrEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, COM- MITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER, HOUSTON, TEX. 1340 PAGENO="1354" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1350 PAGENO="1355" 1968 NASA ATJTHORIZATION 1351 VIII DATA FOR SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHj INDEX I. MANAGEMENT. A. Organization chart with identification of mission relationships of each major sub- area, indicating changes from 1966. B. List of all projects or programs over $50,000 with identification of mission relation- ships and cognizant Headquarters authority. C. Number and cost of contracts administered by other government agencies, with agencies identified in $0 - $100,000"; "$100,000 - $500,000'; and "Over $500,000" groupings. D, Percent of overtime of total time on individual projects or programs over $50,000. E. Average annual cost of each MSC direct center employee with comparison to previous year. F. Listing of each support contract pertaining to the facility with pertinent data. II. FISCAL A. 1968 budget allocations by major program with consistent comparable budget for Fiscal Years 1965, 1966, and 1967. B. Analysis of Fiscal Year 1967 - 1968 budget realignments by programs. C. Actual versus planned obligation by programs for Fiscal Years 1965, 1966, and 1967 (first half) 0. `No-year' funds carry-over by programs for Fiscal Years 196k, 1965, 1966 and 1967 (first half) E. Budget requested by Center for Fiscal Year 1968, amount reduced and final budget. F. List of R&D contracts in order of dollar value currently in force. G. List of conOtruction contracts with estimated completion date and total costs. III. PROCUREMENT FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. A. Number of procurement plans submitted to Center Director B. Number submitted to NASA Headquarters C. Exceptions to (A) and (B) above. IV. CONTRACTS (CALENDARY YEAR 1966). A. Number of competitive participants in each R&D negotiated contract. B. Fixed-price contracts converted to CPIF. C. Contracts scheduled to be converted to CPIF. 0. C,ontracts to a review board to determine final f me. E. Organization identification of contract approval authority (organization level and type of authority). F. Contracts renegotiated. G. Percentage of contracts to small business. V. FACILITIES, A, Furnish information to show the status of facility planning, design and construction for Fiscal Years 1962, 1963, 196k, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, and future years when incrementally funded. B. Furnish a listing of cost-plus-fixed-fee and Cost-Plus-Award-Fee contracts entered into for facility, mañdgement, Services, and construction. C. An estimate of future construction fund requirements for facility together with a general description of probable work. PAGENO="1356" 1352 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION I. MANAGEMENT A. Organization chart with identification of mission relationships of each major sub-area, indicating changes from 1966. 1. Medical Research and Operations Directorate established at MSC. 2. Science and Applications Directorate established at MSC. 3. Apollo Applications Program Office established at MSC. L~. Special Assistant for Long-Range Planning placed on chart in MSC Director's block. 5. The major operating elements were redesignated from "Assistant Director for" to "Director of." PAGENO="1357" MAR1~IED SPACECRAFT CENTER Houston, Texas DIRECTOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR SPECIAL ASSISTANT SPECIAL ASST FOR WNG RANGE PLANNING a a ~ NASA REGIONAL INSPECTOR a__a. a. w 0 0 PAGENO="1358" 1354 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MSC ORGANIZATION CHANGES SINCE THE 1966 PRESENTATION The Medical Research and Operations Directorate was established combining the functions of the Chief of Center Medical Programs and the Center Medical Office with the biomedical research functions of the Crew Systems Division, Engineering and Development Directorate The office of the Chief of Center Medical Programs and the Center Medical Office were abolished with this change The Science and Applications Directorate was established combining the functions of the Spate Science Division and the Experiments Program Office, both of which were in the Engineering and Development Directorate The Space Science Division and Experiments Program Office were abolished with this change The Apollo Applications Program Office was established because of the increasing level of activity in this subject matter area This organiza- tion staffing will be timed to coincide with the Gemini Program Office phase-out. The Special Assistant for Long Range Plann~ng was placed on the chart within the MSC Director s immediate office This action was taken to provide a focal point for advanced planning acticities All of the major operating elements of the Center were changed from `Assistant Director for to `Director of to eliminate an element of con- fusion in dealings with persons outside the Center organization who feel they are dealing with an assistant of an operating element when, in fact, they are dealing with the Director of the element MISSION OF MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER The Manned Spacecraft Center has as its primary mission the development of spacecraft for Manned Space Flight programs and the conduct of manned flight operations The Center is now carrying out major space research and exploration projects Apollo - A series of flight missions using an entirely new three-man spacecraft of modular concept capable of space flight in earth and lunar orbits to culminate in a manned lunar landing using a lunar module, and return ~f.QU0 Applications Program - A series of flight missions using Apollo developed hardware directed at fuller development of manned flight capabilities in terms of long duration flights and extended operations in space for technological scientific and applied studies The Center's mission further embraces an engineering development and operations capability to support these projects and to generate the know- ledge required to advance the technology of space and manned spacecraft development Engineering and development efforts focus on the conception and implementation of a program of applied research and development in the area of space research, space physics, life systems, and test and evaluation. PAGENO="1359" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1355 PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE Responsible for planning, organizing, and directing public affairs activities. This includes disseminating information concerning the activities of the Center through news media and other appropriate means, advising the Director on public affairs matters, and coordinating contacts of news media representa- tives or other non-program affiliated persons in tne public realM with MSC personnel. FLIGHT SAFETY OFFICE Responsible for establishing overall policies relating to flight safety, reliability and quality assurance programs for the Center; conceiving and formulating Center-wide spacecraft mandatory design standards; reviewing and assessing the implementation of the policies and standards; searching for and recommending solutions to potentially critical problems; providing assistance to Center elements on reliability, design, and operational con- cepts and problems relating to mission success and crew safety; and for assuring r~liability and quality of flight and flight-type items, and mission-related ground support equipment manufactured or tested at the Center. LEGAL OFFICE Provides the official point in NSC for determining legal sufficiency and effect, and has general responsibility for providing legal advice and assist- ance. Additionally, the Legal Office has responsibility for handling matters pertaining to patents, data, copyrights and trademarks. NASA REGIONAL AUDIT OFFICE Directly responsible to the Audit Division, NASA Headquarters, and indirectly responsible to the Director, NBC for providing audit services. These services encompass the conduct of independent reviews and appraisals of NASA and NBC programs and activities, including contractor operations, and the establish- ment of criteria and objectives for use by military audit agencies providing service to NASA. NASA REGIONAL INSPECTOR Reports administratively to the Inspections Division, NASA Headquarters, and responds directly to the Director, NBC. The Inspections Division establishes and conducts a comprehensive program to prevent and detect unethical or illegal conduct on the part of NASA employees and NASA contractors. GEMINI PROGRAM OFFICE (Program Phase-out Coordinator) Responsible for completion of and phase-out of all remaining activity connected with the successfully completed Gemini Program. APOLLO SPACECRAFT PROGRAM OFFICE Responsible for the overall planning, coordination, and directinn of all aspects of the Apollo Spacecraft Program through the supervision of industrial contractors and the direction and coordination of other elements of NBC or NASA which are assigned parts of the program. PAGENO="1360" 1356 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION APOLLO APPLICATIONS PROGRAM OFFICE Responsible for the over-all planning, coordination, and direction of the Apollo Applications Program (AAP) elements assigned to the Manned Spacecraft Center through the supervision of industrial contractors and by the planning and control of resources and schedules. Acts as the Center's focal point for all MSC and other NASA elements involved in this progratn. DIRECTOR OF ENGINEERING AND DEVELOPMENT Responsible for the technical support in depth for the Apollo and Apollo Appli- cations Program& through the direction of assigned system and subsystem work of the respective program contractors, and through extensive in-house test and evaluation programs which aTh a part of the program development milestones. The Directorate also provides Center long-range planning support, directs the Center's supporting reseamh technology programs, and conducts the required advanced studies necessary for progressing manned space flight as an outgrowth of current programs. DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS Responsible for the planning and implementation of MSC.programs in the area of spade science and its applications, for acting as a focal point for all MSC elements involved in these programs, and for acting as the Center's point-of- contact with the scientific community in this state-of-the-art. DIRECTOR OF MEDICAL RESEARCH AND OPERATIONS Responsible for planning, implementing, and continually evaluating the Center's medical effort, and serving as the medical spokesman and the Center's primary `~int-of-contact with the medical community. DIRECTOR OF FLIGHT CREW OPERATIONS Responsible for the overall program of flight cre~i selection, training and mission performance, and for technological and engineering support to develop- ment of flight hardware and scientific space experiments. DIRECTOR OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS Responsible for operational mission planning and for the overall direction and management of flight control activities associated with real-time mission progress assessment, providing direction and support to the flight crew, and implementing ground-based decision-making functions for all NRC space flight missions. DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION Responsible for providing all administrative and technical service support for the Center, and serves as the principal advisor to the Center on adinin- istrative and management problems. WHITE SANDS TEST FACILITY Conducts or directs developmental and operational tests with emphasis on propulsion testing. Provides common purpose laboratories, facilities, instrumentation, and other engineering and support services for conducting tests. Test projects are conducted within the scope of test directives originated by NRC program offices or technical divisions. PAGENO="1361" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1357 1. MANAGEMENT B. List of all projects or programs over $50,000 with identification of mission relationships and cognizant Headquarters authority. 76-265 0 - 67 - pt 2 - 86 PAGENO="1362" Program/Project Research & Development AR~LtO Spacecraft C&SM IM C&1~ IRC Support Mission Support Operations Mission Control Space Operations Supporting Dev }`IISSION RELATIONSHIPS AND COGNIZANT MANNED SPACECRAFI CENTER AND HEADQUARTERS OFTICE (Programs over $50,000) FY 67 Plan (in millions) FY 68 Budget (in millions) Mission Relationship Headquarters Org~nization l~35O.i 1,i6O.~4 Apollo Manned Space Flight l,21~3.6 ~p~28.9 Apollo Manned Space Flight 560 14 1490 0 Apollo Manned Space Flight 146~ 8 369 7 Apollo Manned Space Flight 76 6 55 14 Apollo Manned Space Flight 30 0 23 2 Apollo Manned Space Flight llO.8 90.6 Apollo Manned Space Flight 106 5 131 5 Apollo Manned Space Flight 914 7 117 5 Apollo Manned Space Flight (142.6) (61.5) Apollo Manned Space Flight (52.1) (56.0) Apollo Manned Space Flight ll.8 114.0 Apollo Manned Space Flight 00 0 0 z PAGENO="1363" MISSION RELATIONSHIPS AND COGNIZANT MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER AND HEADQUARTERS OFFICE (Con't) (Programs over $50,000) Program/Project FY 67 Plan Research & Development (Con't) (in millions) FY 68 Budget (in millions) Mission Relationship Headquarters Organiza1~ion APOLLO APPLICATIONS Space Vehicles Experiments Mission Support ADVANCED MISSIONS GEMINI Total MSC MSF R&D Construction of Facilities Administrative Operations 32.6 iI~. 6 16.8 1.2 3.3 21.6 1,1i07 .6 9.1 95.0 228.2 131~.6 79.6 11LO 3.I~ AU Missions All Missions Manned Space Flight Manned Space Flight Manned Space Flight Manned Space Flight Manned Space Flight Manned Space Flight Manned Space Flight Manned Space Flight Manned Space Flight PAP PAP PAP PAP Gemini 0 1-4 1,392.0 2J~ 97.6 PAGENO="1364" 1360 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1. ANAGEMENT C. Number and Cost of Contracts administered by other Government agencies, with agencies identified in $ 0 - $100,000; $ 100,000 - $ 500,000 and Over $ 500,000 Groupings. PAGENO="1365" MSC CONTRACTS ADMINISTEHED BY OTHER GOVEI~NENT AGENCIES Number of `~--~ & Boiler Value of nfre-+.e - 100,000 No. ~iOO,OO0 - 500.000 ~jQ1~ Over ~5OO.OOO 169,000 3 912,604 7 245,008,735 12 246,090,339 Total ~ Dollar Value Air Force Navy Defense Contract Administration Services Defense Contract Number of Type of Contract Contracts Administration 20 Complete Contract Administration Property Administration Quality Assurance 44 Complete Contract Administration Property Administration Quality Assurance 241 Complete Contract Administration Property Administration Quality Assurance 2 0 2 0 10 7 7 0 16 18 21 30 0 2 805,448 177,593 4 1,127,488 0 0 0 2 439,780 0 0 481,666 5 1,806,116 5 11,824,079 432,709 10 2,717,280 4 46,919,852 432,709 9 2,173,941 6 2,214,569,852 0 1 276,282 1 553,000 1,053,828 47 10,830,516 34 534,545,505 909,012 19 5,018,225 5 3,065,826 1,070,830 23 6,548,164 29 473,582,400 1,084,516 29 8,039,923 12 39,447,868 3 2,471,748 6 1,305,081 2 439,780 20 14,111,861 21 50,069,841 22 2,217,176,502 2 829,282 97 546,429,849 42 8,993,063 73 481,201,394 71 48,572,307 5,490,890,341 Audit Agency 236 Audit 64 3,476,308 90 22,330,006 82 5,465,084,027 236 PAGENO="1366" 1362 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1. MANAGEMENT D. Percent of Overtime of Total Time on Individual Projects or Programs over $ 50,000. PAGENO="1367" (Manhours inThousandsT Malor Programs Over $50,000 Total Manhours Overtime Manhours Percent Overtime to Total GEM~ $pacecraf~ ji~_ .__i. Launch VeMcles 22 - Atlas Agena 7 GLV 15 - Gemini Support 288 22 APOLLO ____ 122 L~.6 ~pacec raft 6k k.1 Command & Service Module 119 3.k Lunar Module 160 5 3.1 Guidance & Navigation 27 - Integration, Reliability, and Checkout 32 1 3.1 Spacecraft Support 1,563 54 3.5 Z Mission_Support .LLQ~ Operations l,0L48 57 5.4 Mission Control 216 9 4.2 Apollo Space Operations 832 48 5.8 Support Developments 42 1 2.4 APOLLO APPLICATIONS 102 2 2.0 ADVANCED M I SS IONS 88 2 2.3 PAGENO="1368" 1364 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION I. MANAGEMENT E. Average Annual Cost of MSC Direct Center Employee with Comparison to Previous Ye AVERAGE ANNUAL COST OF MSC CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES WITH COMPARISON TO PREVIOUS YEAR FY 1967 F'! 1968 Total Permanent Civil Service Employees L~,631~ ~,631~ Average GS Annual Salary $10,878 $11,127 PAGENO="1369" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1365 I. MANAGEMENT F. A listing of each support contract pertaining to the facility, together with: The annual estimated cost and duration of the current contract. Name and corporate address of contractor. Nurriber of personnel employed by contractor under support contract. Functions performed by contractor under support contract. Amount of overtime involved annually. Amount of subcontracts placed annually by support contractor. PAGENO="1370" Fixed Price Laboratory for Electronics, NAS 9-5291 1075 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston, Massachusetts Functions Performed: Specialized technical support for the electrical and electronic systems installed on NASA-MSC Convair CV-21~0 aircraft. $36,925 October 2, 1966, to September 30, 1967 one twelve-month option Fixed Price Northrop Corporation, NAS 9-1~766 3901 West Broadway, Hawthorne, California Functions Performed Specialized technical support, instniction, trouble shooting for NAB MSC-T-38 aircraft. $1~l, 500 July 1, 1966, to June 30, 1967 with one year option 1 None None CPFF The M & T Company, NAS 9-3191 2 Penn Center Plaza, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102 Functions Performed Protective Security and Visitor Control The Contractor provides a professional metropolitan type police force and readily available and professionally trained visitor control capability. Annual Estimated Cost $51~2,Ooo Contract Duration July 1, 1966, to June 30, 1967 with one one-year option Number of Employees: 75 Annual Overtime: (k.6%) Annual Subcontracts: None 1366 168 NASA AtTHORIZATION Annual Estimated Cost: Contract Duration: Number of Employees: Annual Overtime: Annual Subcontracts: 1 None None Annual Estimated Cost: Contract Duration: Number of Employees: Annual Overtime: Annual Subcontracts: PAGENO="1371" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1367 CPFF Tracerlab, Division of Laboratory for Electronics, Inc., NAS 9-5117 Laboratory for Electronics, Inc., 1601 Trapelo Road, Waltham, Mass., 02151# Functions Performed: Health Physics arid `R~diation Protection Services. Services to provide support t~ the Radiation Safety Officer, MSC. Specifically, to provide Film Badge and Leak Test Services, calibration of instruments, waste disposal, and health physics services, su2h as analysis of blood, feces, and/or urine samples. Annual Estimated Cost: $130,000 Contract Duration: August 1, 1966, to March 31, 1967 Number of Employees: 5 Annual Overtime: None Annual Subcontracts: None Univac, Division of Sperry Rand Corporation, NAS 9-61~O2 2121 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W., Washington 25, D.C. Functions Performed: Communications Processor Support Services Program. Operate and provide engineering support for communications processor. Annual Estimated Cost: $8l~O, 000 Contract Duration: June 1, 1966, to May 31, 1967 with one one-year option Number of Employees: 67 Annual Overtime: (5.0%) Annual Subcontracts: None A-V Corporation, NAS 9-5lii3 2518 North Boulevard, Houston, Texas 77006 Functions Performed: Photographic and Audio-Visual Services. Technical and scientific film laboratory processing, technical photography, and scientific film library services in support of the Photographic Technology Laboratory. Complete motion picture and documentary film production, film library, and related audio-visual services support. Annual Estimated Cost: $1,552,000 Contract Duration: August 1, 1966, to June 30, 1967 with one one-year option Number of Employees: 129 Annual Overtime: (2.88%) Annual Subcontracts: None PAGENO="1372" 1368 CPAF 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION Dynalectron Corporation, NAS 9-6)452 2233 Wisconsin Avenue N.W., Washington, D.C. Functions Performed: Provide maintenance and maintenance supply support for MSC aircraft. Twenty-six aircraft involved. Annual Estimated Cost: Contract Duration: Number of Employees: Annual Overtime: Annual Subcontracts: $2 188 000 November 1, 1966, to October 31, 1967 with one one-year option 200 (5~0%) None CPAF Federal Electric Corporation, NAS 9-5208 A Subsidiary of International Telephone & Telegraph Industrial Park, Paramus, New Jersey 07652 Functions Performed: Provides management labor, materials, tools, equipment, and services, except as provided by the Government, to furnish moving and hauling, warehouse and storage service, technical editing, writing, report preparation, and document retrieval, nicrofilning, microreproduction and ancillary services, graphic art services, identification, cataloging, standardization, logistical reference library service, and warehouse storage and issue, and publications and forms distribution. Annual Estimated Cost: Contract Duration: Number of Employees: Annual Overtime: Annual Subcontracts: CPAF $3,3k5,000 September 1, 1966, to August 31, 1967 with one one-year option )488 (1.09%) 2 - $773,000 Graham Engineering, NAS 9-1383 P. 0. Box 600, Ellington AFB, Texas 77030 Functions Performed: Facilities Support Program. The mission is to provide a facilities support program including control and operations of all utilities systems and plants; operate, maintain, repair, alter, and perform minor construction for facilities, road and grounds; furnish rigging and test equipment assemble support; and provide equipment maintenance and modification. Annual Estimated Cost: Contract Duration: Number of Employees: Annual Overtime: Annual Subcontracts: $6,305,000 July 1, 1966, to June 30, 1967 Li59 Li. 57% - $555,000 PAGENO="1373" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1369 Houston Fire & Safety Company, NAS 9-2011 P. 0. Box 9)452, Houston, Texas 77011 Functions Performed: Fire fighting, safety engineering, and emergency ambulance support program. The mission is to manage, control, and operate the MSC Fire Department by furnishing complete fire protection service, provide complete safety engineering program, and maintain, operate, and control emergency ambulance service. Annual Estimated Cost: $716,000 Contract Duration: July 1, 1966 to June 30, 1967 Number of Employees: 81 Annual Overtime: 9k% Annual Subcontracts: None CPAF Kelsey-Seybold Clinic, NAS 9-6568 662)4 Fannin, Houston, Texas 77025 Functions Performed: Medical Support Services in occupational medicine and environmental hygiene areas. Annual Estimated Cost: $39L~,OOO Contract Duration: October 1, 1966, to September 30, 1967 with two one-year options Number of Employees: 32 Annual Overtime: k.3% Annual Subcontracts: 2 - $209,000 Kiate Holt Company, NAS 9-50)45 P.O. Box 57661, Webster, Texas 77598 Functions Performed: Center Custodial Services. The services called for are in certain areas more sophisticated than the routine janitorial service. The normal janitor services are for routine waxing and clean- ing to clean room procedures, dust free computer areas, and sub-flooring cleaning. Annual Estimated Cost: $932,000 Contract Duration: July 1, 1966, to June 30, 1967 one one-year option Number of Employees: 198 Annual Overtime: .33% Annual Subcontracts: None PAGENO="1374" 1370 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION CPAF Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, NAS 9-2915 Contracts Department, Department 6811, Burbank, California 91503 Functions Performed: Engineering Design, Drafting Services, and Architect-Engineering Services. Contractor furnishes engineering and drafting services for the study, design, development, and technical documentation of experimental test and lab support equipment, systems, and sub-systems; facilities, buildings, utilities and grounds; and prepares and accomplishes feasibility and economic studies, technical analysis, reports and evaluations, and prepares plans, layouts, engineering drawings, specifications, and reproductions. Annual Estimated Cost: $1,873,000 Contract Duration: July 1, 1966, to June 30, 1967 with one one-year option Number of Employees: l1~0 Annual Overtime: 5.07% Annual Subcontracts: None CPAF LTV Aerospace Corporation, LW Range Systems Division, NAS 9-5393 1600 Pacific Avenue, Dallas, Texas Functions Performed: Provide maintenance and operation support for special laboratory equipment located at WSTF. Laboratories covered are: Data reduction, Materials and processes, Physical measurements, Multi-system maintenance, and Electrical measurements. Annual Estimated Cost: $2,631 ,000 Contract Duration: December 1, 1966, to November 30, 1967 with one one-year option Number of Employees: 22k Annual Overtime: 5.0% Annual Subcontracts: 1 - $761~,OOO CPAF LIV Aerospace Corporation, LIV Range Systems Division, NAS 9-6690 1600 Pacific Avenue, Dallas, Texas 75201 Functions Performed: Exhibit, Visitor Orientation and Educational services. Annual Estimated Cost: $179,000 Contract Duration: December 1, 1966, to June 30, 1967 with two one-year options Number of Employees: 31 Annual Overtime: 6.0% Annual Subcontracts: None PAGENO="1375" 19 OS NASA AUTHORIZATION 1371 CPAF Medley Electronics Company, NAS 9-6236 International Airport, Brownsville, Texas 78520 Functions Performed: Central Electronic Shop Support. Central support for overhaul, repair, and fabrication of electronic and instrumentation systems, general cable fabrication for assembly and testing of space hardware and systems. $350,000 July 1, 1966, to June 30, 1967 with two one-year options 56 .03% None Security Guard Services, Inc., NAS 9-5192 1013 El Paso National Bank Building, El Paso, Texas Functions Performed: Provides security services, i.e., safeguarding of classified material, control of identification badges, and traffic control. Annual Estimated Cost: $152,000 Contract Duration: September 1, 1966, to August 31, 1967 one one-year option Number of Employees: 25 Annual Overtime: 3.8% Annual Subcontracts: None Taft Broadcasting Company, HAS 9-5026 1~8o8 San Felipe Road, Houston, Texas 77027 Functions Performed: Closed-Circuit TV. Contract is for the maintenance, installation, operation, and engineering services necessary to support the MSC's closed circuit television systems. Annual Estimated Cost: $509,000 Contract Duration: July 1, 1966, to June 30, 1967 one one-year option Number of Employees: 27 Annual Overtime: 9.8% Annual Subcontracts: None Annual Estimated Cost: Contract Duration: Number of Employees: Annual Overtime: Annual Subcontracts: CPAF PAGENO="1376" 1372 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION CPAF The ZIA Company, NAS 9-61~67 Las Cruces, New Mexico Functions Performed: Provide maintenance and operational support for activities at the White Sands Test Facility. Functions include custodial, fire protection, maintenance and repair of real property and equipment, reproduction and other similar services. Annual Estimated Cost: $5,351,000 Contract Duration: November 1, 1966, to October 31, 1967 with two one-year options Number of Employees: k19 Annual Overtime: 6.0% Annual Subcontracts: None CPI/AF Brown & Root - Northrop (a joint venture), NAS 9-3806 16811 El Camino Real, Houston, Texas 77058 Functions Performed: Provide for operational support of various laboratories and test facilities as well as provide preventive and reparative maintenance of electronic and mechanical shop equipment at MSC. Annual Estimated Cost: $11,k79,000 Contract Duration: December 1, 1966, to November 30, 1967 Number of Employees: 695 Annual Overtime: 10.1% Annual Subcontracts: 15 - $1,500,000 CPI/AF Link Group, General Precision, Inc., NAS 9-6335 50 Prospect Avenue, Tarrytown, New York Functions Performed: Provide maintenance, repair and incorporate modifications in the MSC Simulator Complex (SIMC0M) at Iv~C~Houstom and KSC-Cape Kennedy. Annual Estimated Cost: $5,700,523 Contract Duration: September 1, 1966, to August 31, 1967 two one-year options Number of Employees: 1~1~5 Annual Overtime: 11 .7% Annual Subcontracts: None PAGENO="1377" 10 OS NASA AUTHORIZATION 1373 CPI/AF Lockheed Electronics Company, A Division of Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, NAS 9-5191 P.O. Box 551, Burbank, California 91503 Functions Performed: Operational support of certain engineering and development laboratories at MSC. The laboratories are located in the following Divisions: IESD, ISD, G&C, and ASTD. Annual Estimated Cost: $8,521,000 Contract Diration: September 1, 1966, to August 31, 1967 with three one-year options Number of Employees: 551 Annual Overtime: 5 ~0% Annual Subcontracts: 3 - $l,3714,000 Lockheed Electronics Company, A Division of Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, NAS 9~53814 P.O. Box 551, Burbank, California 91503 Functions Performed: Provide computer programming, computer operations, and data reduction support for MSC. Annual Estimated Cost: $8,k11,000 Contract IXiration: November 1, 1966, to October 31, 1967 with one one-year option Number of Employees: 712 Annual Overtime: 8.0% Annual Subcontracts: None 76-265 0 - 67 - pt. 2 - 87 PAGENO="1378" 1374 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION II. FISCAL A. 1968 budget allocations by major programs with consistent comparable budget for 1965, 1966, and 1967. B Analysis of Fiscal Year 1967 1968 budget realignments by programs Apollo Applications is shown as a separate program line item in FY 1968. In FY 1966 and FY 1967 Apollo Applications was authorized in the Apollo Program and Office of Space Sciences line items PAGENO="1379" MSC FY l9oo BUuu~i ~iiruiir.~ Program/Pro ject/System (In Millions of Dollars) APOLLO Spacecraft Comarid S Service Module Lunar Module Guidance & Navigation Integration Reliability & C/O Spacecraft Support Mission Support Operations Mission Control Apollo Space Operations Supporting Development FY 1965 1,009.8 577.8 242.6 81.0 214.8 83.6 91.1 66.8 (37.1) (29.7) 214.3 0 0 0 0 9.6 ~08.l FY l9~6 1,279.k 1,228.8 612.8 357.6 137.2 32.3 88.9 50.6 140. 1 (9.5) (30.6) 10.5 28. 1 7.5 18.6 2.0 1.9 i9~9 FY 1967 1,350.1 l~24~3~6 560.4 1465.8 76.6 30.0 110.8 106.5 94.7 (42.6) (52. 1) 11.8 32.6 14.6 16.9 1.1 3.3 21.6 APOLLO APPLICATIONS Space Vehicles Experiments Missions Support ADVANCED MISSIONS GEMI NI TOTAL MANNED SPACE FLIGHT PROGRAM R&D FY 1968 1,160.4 .028.9 1490.0 369.7 23.2 90.6 - l31.~ 117.5 (61.5) (56.0) 14.0 0 228.2 134.6 79.6 14.0 3.4 I~. C~. C;' 1,418.6 1,506.3 1,407.6 1,392.0 PAGENO="1380" 1376 196 S NASA AUTHORIZATION MSC FY 1968 BUDGET ESTIMATES (in millions of dollars) Program FY ~5 FY 66 FY ~7 FY 68 CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES k.2 ~j 2.L MSC Locations 20.1 k.2 9.1 2.'4 Various Locations 0 0 0 0 ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS .2L~j fi~I~ ~Q .2.Z.~ Personnel Costs 5L2 51.7 59.3 60.6 Operations of Installation k0~O 314.8 35.7 37.0 PAGENO="1381" 1008 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1377 II. FISCAL Actual versus planned obligation by programs for Fiscal Years 1965, 1966, and 1967 (first half). "No-Year" funds carry-over by programs for Fiscal Years 1965, 1966, and 1967 (first half). PAGENO="1382" RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT MSC COMPARISON OF PLANNED AND ACTUAL OBLIGATIONS (In Millions of Dollars) FY 1965 FY 1966 First_Half FY 1967 Through Dec. 31, 1966 Planned Actual Carryover Planned Actual Carryover Planned Actual APOLLO 1,110.2 1,109.4 0.8 1,282.7 1,282.3 O.k 911.8 918.9 APOLLO APPLICATIONS - - 22.0 21.6 o.k 4.6 4.6 ADVANCED MISSIONS 9 4 9 0 0 4 2 1 7 1 4 - - GEMINI _______ 3Q7j Ok 196 9 196 5 Ok 106 106 TOTAL MSF R&D 1,427.7 1,426.1 1.6 1,503.7 1,501.1 2.6 927.0 934.1 I. PAGENO="1383" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1379 II. FISCAL Budget requested by Center for Fiscal Year 1968, amount reduced, and final budget. PAGENO="1384" MSC MANNED SPACE FLiGHT FY 1968 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BUDGET RECAP (In Millions of Dollars) MSC FY 1968 _____ Bud~qet Request ____________ ______ 1,201.0 _____ 1, 049.5 151.5 __________________ 323.6 _____ _______________ 8.0 _____ 8.0 R&D APOLLO Spacec raft Mission Support APOLLO APPLI CATI ONS ADVANCED MISSIONS Advanced Studies TOTAL R&D Headquarters Adjus tment~ -40.6 -20.6 -20.0 -95.4 -4.6 -4.6 -140.6 Final ~et 1,160.4 1,028.9 131 .5 228.2 3.4 ~532.6 1,392.0 PAGENO="1385" MSC ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS AND CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITILS 1Y I9bö t~UtAitI ~tt~.ur~i r~rrr (in millIons of dollars) MSC FY 1968 Final Bu4qet Request Reductions Budget CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES 18.k -16.0 2.1+ Automatic Checkout System Experimental Facility 1.8 1.8 0 ~ Center Support Facilities 2.0 - 1.5 .5 ~ Flight Medicine and Health Support Facility 1.6 1.6 0 ~. Program Off ice Building 2.7 2.7 0 ~ Modifications to the Environmental Testing Lab 2.7 - .8 1.9 ~ Spacecraft Recovery Environment Test Facility 2.3 - 2.3 0 Systems Laboratory, Thermochemical Test Area .5 .5 0 ~ Additions to Auditorium Facility .6 - .6 0 ~ Addition to Flight Crew Training Facility .9 - .9 0 Rehabilitation and Expansion of the Heating and 3.3 - 3.3 0 Cooling Systems - Industrial Plant, Downey, Calif. ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS ____ -114,7 97.6 614.9 - 14,3 60.6 ~ I. Personnel Costs Other Costs 1~7.14 -10.1+ 37.0 PAGENO="1386" 1382 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION II. FISCAL F List of R&D Contracts in Order of Dollar Value Currently in Force PAGENO="1387" Contract Number Contractor Dover 1383 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION ACTIVE MSC R&D CONTRACTS. - *50.000 & OVER AS OF DECRWBER 31. 1966 NAS 9-150 North American Aviation NAN 9-1100 Grumman Aircraft Engr Corp NAS 9-170 McDonnell Co NAN 9-497 General Motors Corp "~ NAS 5-59 McDonnell Co NAS 9-996 International Bus Mach NANw-4l0 General Electric NAN 9-1261 Philco Corp NAS 9-4810 TRW Inc NAS 9-3535 United Aircraft Corp NAN 9-3806 Brown & Root Northrop NAN 9-498 Raytheon Corp NAS 9-5829 Bendix Corp NAN 9-1484 North American Aviation NAN 9-492 General Dynamics NAN 9-2426 Control Data Corp NAN 9-6100 International Latex NAN 9-499 Kollsman Instrument NAN 9-4412 McDonnell Co NAN 9-3548 Westinghouse Electric NAN 9-2938 TRW Inc NAS 9-3426 General Motors Corp NAN 9-723 United Aircraft Corp NAN 9-1396 David Clark Co NAS 9-5017 North American Aviation NAN 9-167 North American Aviation NAS 9-469 General Motors Corp. NAN 9-4983 Grununan Aircraft Engr Corp NAN 9-2412 Garrett Corp NAN 9-2915 Lockheed Aircraft Corp NAN 9-2847 Sperry Rand Corp NAS 9-2125 Lockheed Aircraft Corp NAN 9-4177 Wolf Research and Dcv NAN 9-4.435 Bissett Berman NAN 9-4300 American Machine NAN 9-456 Aerojet Gen Co NAN 9-5834 Allis Chalmers Mfg Co NAN 9-5332 International Latex Location Downey Calif Bethpage NY St Louis Mo Milwaukee Wis St Louis Mo Houston Tex Houston Tax Houston Tex Houston Tax Windsor Locks Cocci Houston Tax Bedford Mass Ann Arbor Mich Compton Calif San Diego Calif Minneapolis Mica Dover Del Syosset NY St Louis Mo Baltimore MD Redondo Beach Calif Milwaukee Wis Windsor Locks Coca Worcester Mass Downay Calif Downey Calif Milwaukee Wis Bethpage NY Los Angeles Calif Houston Tax Great Neck NY Houston Tax Houston Tax Santa Monica Calif York Pa Sacramento Calif Negotiated Contract Amount 2,410,792,000 1,417,740,000 750,000,000 327,358,727 150,508,000 141,986,856 112,722,180 79,934,494 54,803,364 34,337,023 23,810,592 23,461,500 22,990,000 22,511,667 19,026,951 18,161,736 14,173,158 13,436,682 12,470,000 7,700,000 7,354,487 7,324,897 6,708,207 6,681,026 6,161,524 5,920,335 4,305,492 3,939,944 3,765,167 3,700,437 2,673,646 2,584,790 2,346,694 2,247,548 2,122,224 2,005,315. Milwaukee Wis 2,000,494 Del 1989149 PAGENO="1388" 1384 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION ACTIVE MSC R&D CONTRACTS - $5O~O AS OF DECEMBER 31. 1966 Location Negotiated State Contract Amount West Long Beach Calif 1,927,818 Downey Calif 1,923,017 Los Angeles Calif 1,868,010 Great Neck NY 1,850,951 Ithaca NY 1,619,319 Houston Tex 1,607,815 Syosset NY 1,481,061 Binghamton NY 1,463,260 Santa Monica Calif 1,409,161 Baltimore MD 1,397,000 Sacramento Calif 1,373,338 Culver City Calif 1,347,000 Scottsdale Aria 1,338,135 Windsor Locks Coon 1,165,316 Redondo Beach Calif 1,107,987 Sunn3rva].e Calif 1,040,924 Beverly Hills Calif 960,352 Sacramento Calif 927,903 Houston Tex 870,000 Oakland Calif 860,000 Van Nuys Calif 844,914 Van Nuys Calif 790,300 Houston Tex 776,285 Falls Church Va 757,422 Beverly Hills Calif 748,180 Houston Tex 692,000 St Joseph Mo 681,549 Westbury NY 676,577 Dallas Tex 675,048 Norwalk Coon 673,220 Houston Tax 630,168 Van Buys Calif 630,000 El Segundo Calif 626,847 Falls Church Va 604,550 Seattle Wash 592,500 Dallas Tax 586,715 Los Angeles Calif 582,032 Goleta Calif 563,000 Contract Number Contractor NAB 9-4351 Electronic Associates NAB 9-539 North American Aviation NAB 9-3541 Garrett Corp NAB 9-455 Sperry Rand Corp NAB 9-1375 General Electric NAB 9-6173 Philco Corp NAB 9-2632 Kollsman Instrument NAB 9-2575 General Precision NAB 9-2817 Bissett Berman NAB 9-6587 Martin Marietta NAB 9-2488 Aerojet General NAB 9-6439 Hughes Aircraft Co NAB 9-2563 Motorola Inc NAB 9-2820 United Aircraft Corp NAB 9-256 TRW Inc NAB 9-3197 Lockheed Aircraft Corp NAB 9-494]. Litton Industries NAB 9-4808 Aerojet General NAB 9-4956 Philco Corp HAS 9-5435 Rocker Co NAB 9-857 Marquardt Corp NAB 9-5119 Marquardt Corp NAB 9-4158 Lockheed Aircraft Corp NAB 9-2518 Melpar Inc NAB 9-1278 Litton Industries NAB 9-2529 Philco Corp NAB 9-3825 Whirlpool Corp NAB 9-4036 Analytical Mechanics Assoc NAB 9-3414 Ling Temco Vought NAB 9-2255 Perkin Elmer Corp NAB 9-2913 Philco Corp NAB 9-5431 Bpaoelabs Inc NAB 9-5689 Space Ordnance Bys NAB 9-4687 Melpar Inc NAB 9-3747 Boeing Co NAB 9-2772 Ling Temco Vought NAB 9-1244 Garrett Corp NAB 9-3081 General Motors Corp PAGENO="1389" ACTIVE MSC R&D CONTR&CTS - ~5O.OOO & OVER AS OF DECRWEER 31. 1966 19~8 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1385 Contract Number contractor Location Q~j~ Negotiated Contract Amount NAN 9-5088 Northrop Corp Newbury Park Calif 561,283 NAS 9-576 Ling Temco Vought Dallas Tex 551,419 NAN 9-1461 Texas Inst for Rehabilit Houston Tex 531,454 NAS 9-1043 Garrett Corp Los Angeles Calif 525,054 NAS 9-4820 TRW Inc Cleveland Ohio 511,850 NAS 9-4047 Kinelogic Corp Pasadena Calif 508,500 HAS 9-4496 United Aircraft Corp East Hartford Coon 505,488 HAS 9-5183 TRW Inc Redondc Beach Calif 500,000 HAS 9-2635 Columbia Broadcasting Stamford Coon 499,226 HAS 9-3660 Gulton Industries Hawthorne Calif 484,470 NAS 9-5910 Aircraft Armament Cockeysville Md 455,000 HAS 9-3688 Garrett Corp Los Angeles Calif 451,933 HAS 9-5334 Electro Optical Pasadena Calif 451,000 HAS 9-3131 Razdow Labs Inc Newark NJ 444,673 HAS 9-6088 Yardney Electric Hew York NY 444,564 NAN 9-4.476 United Aircraft Corp East Hartford Coon 443,387 HAS 9-5491 Bendix Corp Davenport Iowa 426,188 HAS 9-4653 HAS 9-5288 HAS 9-5425 HAS 9-3895 HAS 9-4059 HAS 9-3521 HAS 9-3497 HAS 9-3153 HAS 9-5494 HAS 9-5174 HAS 9-2978 HAS 9-5484 HAS 9-2638 HAS 9-1467 HAS 9-1034 HAS 9-4552 HAS 9-6287 NAB 9-5266 NASw-ll34 NASw-llNS Sperry Rand Corp Lockheed Aircraft Corp Varian Associates Mac Laren Fabrication Co Micro Systems Martin Marietta Weber Aircraft Cutler Hammer Inc Aerojet General Lockheed Aircraft Corp Bendix Corp Beech Aircraft Corp Gulton Industries Bell Aerosystems Martin Marietta North American Aviation General Dynamics Radio Corp of America Space General Corp Phibco Corp Houston Sunnyvale Palo Alto Long Island Pasadena Denver Burbank New York Sacramento Sunnyvale Davenport Boulder Hawthorne Buffalo Baltimore Downey Fort Worth Princeton El Mønte Newport Beach Tax Calif Calif NY Celif Cob Calif NY Calif Calif Iowa Cob Calif NY MD Calif Vex NJ Calif Calif 412,350 399,917 398,948 396,089 391,950 390,613 372,784 371,959 349,672 349,400 348,215 345,421 343,061 335,903 320,012 314,000 311,780 298,150 297,643 295,668 PAGENO="1390" 1386 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION ACTIVE MSC R&D CONTRACTS - $50.ÔOO & ovsrt AS OF DEC~~R 31. 1966 Location Negotiated Contract Number Contractor Contract Amount NAS 9-3910 Beckman Instrument Fullerton Calif 286,115 NAB 9-4746 LW Aerospace Corp Dallas Tex 284,839 NAS 9-3827 United Aircraft Corp Southampton Pa 284,809 NAS 9-5101 United Aircraft Corp East Hartford Coon 276,282 NAB 9-4518 TRW Inc Redondo Beach Calif 275,020 NASr-76 Beckman Instrument Fullerton Calif 268,273 HAS 9-4629 Radio Corp of America Camden NJ 268,000 NAS 9-5199 Cook Electric Norton Grove Ill 267,225 NAB 9-5235 Philco Corp Palo Alto Calif 264,94]. NAB 9-5060 Melpar Inc Falls Church Va 263,336 NAB 9-2890 Gulton Industries Hawthorne Calif 262,099 NAB 9-5250 Arde Inc Paramus NJ 256,909 NAS 9-3493 Emerson Electric St Louis Mo 256,791 NAB 9-1370 lIT Research Inst Chicago Ill 254,964 NAB 9-1724 Lear Siegler Inc Santa Monica Calif 250,933 NAB 9-'3581 lIT Research Inst Chicago Ill 250,000 HAS 9-6003 Marquardt Corp Van Nuys Calif 249,000 NAB 9-6464 North American Aviation Downey Calif 246 500 NAB 9-1757 Bperry Rand Corp Phoenix Ariz 242,280 NAB 9-5872 Litton Industries Woodland Hills Calif 239,750 NAB 9 5617 Rocket Research Seattle Wash 236 500 NAB 9 3904 Arde Portland Inc Paramus NJ 232 506 HAS 9 2527 Analytical Mechanics Ass Uniondale NV 232 251 NAB 9 2860 Pi neer Parachute Manche tar NH 225 008 NAB 9-3625 AVCO Corp Thisa Okia 223,530 NAB 9-2055 Aerojet General Downey Calif 220,155 NAB 9-5482 Electro Optical Pasadena Calif 220,104 NAB 9-3656 Gulton Industries Hawthorne Calif 219,800 NAB 9 3826 Eastman Kodak Co Rochester NY 217 497 NAB 9 4776 LW Aerospace Corp Dallas Tex 217 400 NAB 9 3710 Comput r Sciences Houston Tex 213 236 NAB 9-2990 TRW Inc Redondo Beach Calif 212,519 NAB 9-1772 Thiokol Chemical Elkton Md 205,487 NASw-415 Solid State Radiation Los Angeles Calif 205,166 NAB 9-6470 Boeing Co Seattle Wash 203,300 NAB 9-5087 Pioneer Parachute Manchester NH 202,338 PAGENO="1391" ACTIVE MSC R&D CONTRACTS - ~5O~OOO & OVER AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1966 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1387 Location Negotiated Contract Number Contractor Qjj~ Contract Amount NAS 9-3415 Lockheed Aircraft Corp Sunnyvale Calif 199,950 NAB 9-858 AVCO Corp Everett Mass 197,940 NAB 9-4830 Grad Has Cent Sou Dallas Tax 196,890 NAS 9-3329 Martin Marietta Baltimore MD 194,663 NAB 9-5151 Conic Corp San Diego Calif 194,415 NAB 9-4599 Itek Corp Palo Alto Calif 194,140 NAB 9-3947 Honeywell Inc W Covina Calif 193,171 NAB 9-5142 Beckman Instrument Fullerton Calif 192,812 NAB 9-5981 Aero Bvc Corp Philadelphia Pa 189,300 NAB 9-4550 TRW Inc Redondo Beach Calif 186,000 NAB 9-4283 Noneywell Inc Minneapolis Minn 185,047 NAB 9-5343 Bpacelabs Inc Van Nuys Calif 185,000 NAB 9-5888 AVCO Corp Tulsa Okla 182,000 NAB 9-5049 Bystron Donner Co Concord Calif 181,170 NAB 9-4501 United Aircraft Windsor Locks Coon 176,004 NAB 9-5821 Texas Inst for Rehabilit Houston Tex 175,331 NAB 9-3915 Belock Instruments College Point NY 174,000 NABr-92 Republic Aviation Farmingdale NY 172,659 NAB 9-1587 Lockheed Aircraft Corp Sunnyvale Calif 172,601 NAB 9-1065 Garrett Corp Los Angeles Calif 172,055 NAB 9-2883 Melpar Inc Falls Church Va 168,811 NAB 9-4358 TRW Inc Redondo Beach Calif 165,000 NAB 9-4829 Thiokol Chemical Elkton Md 164,618 NAB 9-4543 Theatre Network TV New York NY l6i,200 NAB 9-1263 Dynamics Research Corp Btoneham Mass 164,133 NAB 9-4567 Atkins and Merrill Budbury Mass 162,110 NAB 9-4326 TRW Inc Redondo Beach Calif 161,891 NAB 9-4605 Dow Chemical Co Midland Mich 161,000 NAB 9-4494 Atlantic Research Alexandria Va 160,600 NAB 9-6207 Systems Engr Ft Lauderdale Fla 160,000 NAB 9-3632 Marshall Labs Torrance Calif 158,698 NAB 9-4014 Melpar Inc Falls Church Va 155,000 NAB 9-5092 Systems Engr Ft Lauderdale fl.a 154,593 NAB 9-5269 Honeywell Inc. Minneapolis Minn 153,500 NAB 9-3528 Bell Aerospace Corp Buffalo NY 152,982 NAB 9-1189 Garrett Corp Los Angeles Calif 151,786 NAB 9-3564 Electro Optical Pasadena Calif 150,761 PAGENO="1392" 1388 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 4kcn ro~n p~ AS Q1 DECJSSNOSt 31. 19b~ Location Negotiated Contract Number Contractor Contract A~p9~ NAS 9-4771 General Electric Philadelphia Pa 149,900 HAS 9-5123 Dudley Observatory Albany NY 148,900 NAS 9-3685 General Electric Philadelphia Pa 148,244 NAS 9-5765 LTV Aerospace Corp Dallas Tex 148,067 NAN 9-6158 AVCO Corp Tulsa Okla 146,772 HAS 9-4297 Sperry Rand Corp Phoenix Ariz 144,720 NAS 9-4618 International Bus Mach Bethesda Md 144,622 NAS 9-4614 Spacelabs Inc Van Huys Calif l44,4~6 HAS 9-3411 TRW Inc Redondo Beach Calif 143,473 NAS 9-1512 TRW Inc Inglewood Calif 143,266 NAS 9~2998 Westinghouse Electric Pittsburgh Pa 141,834 NAS 9-5168 TRW Inc Redondo Beach Calif 138,500 NAS 9-3063 Industrial Optics Corp Bloomfield NJ 136,950 NAS 9-4313 American Bosch Arma Philadelphia Pa 136,100 HAS 9-171 Honeywell Inc Minneapolis Minn 135,564 NAS 9-4953 Redcor Corp Canoga Park Calif 135,000 NAS 9-3873 LTV Aerospace Corp Dallas Texas 134,486 NAS 9-4072 Sperry Rand Corp Houston Tex 133,300 NAS 9-4640 TRW Inc Redondo Beach Calif 133,020 HAS 9-1004 T1tW Inc Inglewood Calif 130,477 NAS 9-4145 Service Bureau Corp Houston Vexas 128,000 NAS 9-4521 Irving Air Chute Co Glendale Calif 127,820 HAS 9-5114 Lockheed Aircraft Corp Palo Alto Calif 126,000 HAS 9-3650 Westinghouse Electric Baltimore Md 125,700 HAS 9-253 Federal Mogul Los Alainitow Calif 125,209 HAS 9-6616 Heat Technology Labs Huntsville Ala 124,900 HAS 9-4329 AVCO Corp Wilmington Mass 123,498 HAS 9-804 International Tel & Tel Ft Wayne Ind 118,993 HAS 9-2619 Texas Center for Research Austin Tex 116,371 HAS 9-3355 Perkin Elmer Corp Norwalk Conn 113,873 HAS 9-4189 Southern Research Inst Birmingham Ala 113,610 HAS 9-3565 Melpar Inc Falls Church Va 113,411 HAS 9-4962 Barnes Engr Co Stamford Conn 113,106 HAS 9-1671 Ling Temco Vought Dallas Tex 112,949 HAS 9-724 Ling Temco Vought Dallas Tex 112,357 HAS 9-4548 Hughes Aircraft Culver City Calif 110,924 HAS 9-4261 Gulton Industries Albuquerque NM 110,624 HAS 9-5568 AVCO Corp Wilmington Mass 108,177 PAGENO="1393" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1389 Contract Number Contractor NAS 9-5207 AVCO Corp NAB 9-1608 Philco Corp NAB 9-3554 Arthur D Little NAS 9-5)46 Electro Magn Meas NAS 9-4355 Aerojet General HAS 9-3408 Brown Engr Co Inc NAB 9-4835 Applied Dynamics NAB 9-5081 Lockheed Aircraft Corp NAB 9-6288 Boeing Co NAB 9-4916 AVCO Corp NAB 9-6065 Sperry Rand Corp NAB 9-4204 Arthur D Little NAS 9-6636 Westinghouse Electric NAB 9-6649 Spacelabs Inc NAB 9-5267 AVCO Corp NAB 9-4468 Motorola Inc NAB 9-5293 TRW Inc NAB 9-3161 Martin Marietta NAB 9-538 Lockheed Aircraft Corp NAB 9-3022 TRW Inc NAB 9-6105 Atlantic Research NAB 9-4522 John B Pierce NAB 9-4119 General Electric NAB 9-5321 Hughes Aircraft NAB 9-6178 Astrodata Inc NAB 9-6333 Texas Instruments NAB 9-5330 Bell Aerospace Co NAB 9-95177 Southwest Factories NAB 9-3898 Perkin Elmer Corp NAB 9-6591 Sooex Inc NAB 9-4874 AVCO Corp NAS 9-2787 Electro Optical NAB 9-4845 AVCO Corp NAB 9-4759 lIT Research Inst NAB 9-3547 Northrop Corp NAB 9-4634 Bendix Corp NAB 9-6485 General Dynamics Negotiated Contract Amount 105,283 101,197 100,960 100,900 100,448 100,186 99,955 99,925 99,500 99,000 98,627 98,626 98,500 98,000 98,000 97,450 97,000 96,677 95,800 95,570 95,295 95,000 94,850 94,671 94,500 93,602 92,392 90,369 90,000 89,850 88,789 88,078 86,000 85,934 85,451 85,368 85,332 ACTIVE MSC R&D CONTRACTS - 350.000 & OVER AS OF DECSMBER 31. 1966 Location Qi~ Wilmington Mass Newport Beach Calif Cambridge Mass Farmingdale N! Downey Calif Huntsville Ala Ann Arbor Mich Burbank Calif Seattle Wash Wilmington Mass St Paul Minn Cambridge Mass Baltimore Md Van Nuys Calif Wilmington Mass Scottsdale Ariz Redondo Beach Calif Baltimore Md Sunnyvale Calif Redondo Beach Calif Alexandria Va New Haven Conn Philadelphia Pa Los Angeles Calif Anaheim Calif Dallas Tex Buffalo NY Albuquerque NH Norwalk Conn Philadelphia Pa Wilmington Mass Pasadena Calif Tulsa Okla Chioago Ill Newbury Park Oonn Davenport Iowa Houston Tex 76-265 0 - 67 - pt. 2 - 88 PAGENO="1394" 1390 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION ACTIVE MSC R&D CONTRACTS - 150.000 & OVER AS OP DEC~4BER 31. 1966 Location Negotiated Contract Number Contract r Contract Amount NAS 9-5315 Melpar Inc Falls Church Va 84,289 NAS 9-4387 North American Aviation Downey Calif 84,234 NAS 9-5430 Aerotherm Corp Palo Alto Calif 83,900 NAS 9-5331 Beckman Instrument Fullerton Calif 83,860 NAS 9-6420 Hughes Aircraft Culver City Calif 82,000 HAS 9-4539 Northrop Corp Hawthorne Calif 82,000 NAS 9-5820 Ardel Corp Glendale Calif 81,727 NAS 9-2896 Systron Dormer Concord Calif 80,938 HAS 9-3407 General Dynamics Ft Worth Tex 80,493 HAS 9-5637 Dudley Observatory Albany NY 80,000 HAS 9-4637 Electro Mech Research Sarasota Fla 80,000 HAS 9-5589 Geophysics Corp Bedford Mass 79,132 HAS 9-4607 Philco Corp Willow Grove Pa 78,500 NAS 9-4948 General Dynamics San Diego Calif 77,312 NAB 9-6584 Environmental Research Randallstown Md 77,033 HAS 9-1301 General Electric Philadelphia Pa 76,775 HAS 9-2005 Computer Products Houston Tex 76,724 HAS 9-4240 Geonautics Inc Washington DC 76,360 HAS 9-5073 TRW Inc Redondo Beach Calif 76,181 HAS 9-6543 Ampex Corp Redwood City Calif 75,989 HAS 9-3734 Bendix Corp Ann Arbor Mich 75,320 HAS 9-6093 Northrop Corp Hawthorne Calif 75,000 HAS 9-5742 Chrysler Corp Huntsville Ala 74,900 HAS 9-1186 David Clark Co Worcester Mass 73,280 HAS 9-2947 3 A Maurer Inc Long Island NY 73,000 HAS 9-1670 Ling Temoo Vought Dallas Tex 72,520 HAS 9-5366 Motorola Inc Scottsdale Ariz 72,000 HAS 9-5711 Ling Temco Vought Dallas Vex 71,900 HAS 9-3678 Farrand Optical Co New York NY 71,300 HAS 9-5558 Rodana Research Bethesda Md 70,000 HAS 9-6720 Atlantic Research Alexandria Va 69,600 HAS 9-4266 Hughes Aircraft Culver City Calif 69,073 HAS 9-5032 Garrett Corp Los Angeles Calif 69,000 HAS 9-4282 Thermo Electron Waltham Mass 68,950 HAS 9-4911 Ling Temco Vought Dallas Vex 67,310 HASr-l20 Franklin Instit Philadelphia Pa 67,000 PAGENO="1395" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1391 ACTIVE NBC R&D CONTRACTS ~5O 000 & OVER AS OF DECRWBER 31. 1966 Location Negotiated Contract Niraber Contractor ç~~act Amount NAS 9-4174 Motorola Inc Scottsdale Ariz 65,804 NAS 9-6348 Vacudyne Corp Chicago Ill 65,300 NAS 9-1808 General Electric West Lynn Mass 64,995 NAS 9-4327 Space Craft Inc Huntsville Ala 60,722 NAB 9-5432 United Aircraft East Hartford Conn 60,553 HAS 9-5113 TRW Inc Redondo Beach Calif 59,558 HAS 9-4315 Goodyear Aerospace Akron Ohio 59,310 NAS 9-4516 Genera]. Electric Philadelphia Pa 59,000 NASw-416 Ling Temco Vought Dallas Tex 57,560 NAS 9-5880 Kaman Aircraft Corp Austin Tex 57,500 NAS 9-4430 Lab for Electronics Boston Mass 56,996 NAB 9-6489 Diffraction Ltd Inc Bedford Mass 56,395 HAS 9-6376 Vidar Corp Mountain View Calif 55,726 NAB 9 5567 TRW Inc Red ndo Beach Calif 55 147 NAS 9-2801 General Electric Valley Forge Pa 54,256 HAS 9 5232 General Dynamics San Diego Calif 54 079 NAS 9-2648 Arde Portland Inc Paramus NJ 53,462 HAS 9-6409 Electro Optical Syst Pasadena Calif 52,700 HAS 9-5374 TRW Inc Redondo Beach Calif 51,700 HAS 9 4347 I titut f Re r h Houston Tex 51 662 HAS 9-5648 American Electronic Labs Lansdale Pa 51,300 HAS 9-5%O McDonnell Co St Louis Mo 50,000 HAS 9 5959 Grumman Aircraft Engr Corp Bethpag NY 50 000 HAS 9-5958 Douglas Aircraft Huntington Beach Calif 50,000 HAS 9-5860 Fifth Dimension Inc Princeton NJ 50,000 PAGENO="1396" 1392 1968 NASA AIJTHORIZATION II. FISCAL G. List of construction contracts with estimated completion date and total costs. PAGENO="1397" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1393 1450 CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS F! 1962 _______ Descr~pt4or~ Location Contractor __________ __________ Nine (9) new NASA No. 1 Space- North American buildings and mod- craft Facility Aviation S&I iuications to Division existing facili- ties Environmental Houston, Texas Testing Labora- tory Buildings 1,2,3, Houston, Texas 4,7,8,10,12,13, 15,16,17,19,20, 22, 23, and 26; site development and utility in- stallation; design and engineering services NSC CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS F! 1963 NDPR Or Contract ~ Number DescrIption Location _________ __________ __________ R&D T-95500 Propulsion system White Sands Test development Facility, Las Facility Cruces, New Mexico CofF T-955O2 Facilities for White Sands Teat test of lunar Facility, Las excursion Cruces, New module Mexico Two By-Pass Sys- White Sends Test tems and One Facility, Las Steam Module Cruces, New Mexico Two Isolation White Sands Test Devices Facility, Las Cruces, New Mexico CofF T-20004 Flight accel- Houston, Texas eration facility CofF T-200l2 Buildings 24 & 25, Houston, Texas site development and utilities CofF T-200l4 Integrated mis- Houston, Texas sion control center NDPR Or Contract ~P2IB Number R&D HAS 7-90 CofF T-20000 CofF T-2000l Corps of Engineers Corps of Engineers Anticipated Completion Total Cost~! Date $10,517,679 Apr., 1967 30,955,120 Feb., 1966 Claims pending. 30,385,609 Mar., 1964 Claims pending Anticipated Completion ___________ Date Nov., 1964 Claims pending. June, 1967 150,849 May, 1966 468,000 Feb., 1967 Contractor Total Cost~ Corps of Engineers $ 8,459,000 Corps of Engineers 13,792,260 CofF NAS9-5lO8 CofF NAS9-5lO7 Thiokol Chemical Corporation Thiokol Chemical Corporation Corps of Engineers Corps of Engineers Corps of Engineers 9,545,526 $ 7,323,545 11,689,470 Feb., 1966 Claim pending. Dec., 1963 Claims pending. Nov., 1964 Claims pending. 5On contract January 1, 1967 PAGENO="1398" 1394 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MSC CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS FT 1964 ND!'R Or Anticipated Contract Completion ~ Number Description Location Contractor Total Cost* Date CofF T-22247 Mission Simulation Houston, Texas Corps of Engineers ~ 1,662,500 Feb., 1965 and Training Facility CofF T-2225O Center Support Houston, Texas Corps of Engineers 3,596,260 $ept., 1966 Facility CofF T-22252 Project Engi- Houston, Texas Corps of Engineers : 2,313,67Os**Apr., 1966 neering Facility CbfF~ T-2225l Launch Environ- Houston, Texas Corps of Engineers 6,769,851 Feb., 1966 ment and Antenna Claims Test Facility pending CofF T-22248 Spacecraft Con- Houston, Texas Corps of Engineers 1,910,150 June, 1965 trol Technology Laboratory ColT T-34913 Atmospheric Re- Houston, Texas Corps of Engineers 1,872,000 Nov., 1966 entry Materials Claims & Structures pending ColT T-22254 Ultra High Vacuum Houston, Texas Corps of Engineers 892,000 Apr., 1966 Space Chamber Claims pending. *On contract January 1, 1967 **See Fl 1965 for additional funding MSC CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS F! 1965 NDPR Or Anticipated Contract Completion ~pp~ Number Description Location Contractor Total Cost* Date ColT T-349O6 Central Heating & Houston, Texas Corps of Engineers ~ 1,224,900 May, 1966 Cooling Plant and Warehouse E~ten- sion CofF T-349O7 Electronic Systems Houston Texas Corps of Engineers 1 899 600 Oct , 1966 Compatibility Facility ColT T-349O8 Project Engineer- Houston, Texas Corps of Engineers l,3l2,186**Apr., 1966 ing Facility ColT T-349lO Lunar Mission and Houston, Texas Corps of Engineers 1,641,100 March, 1966 Space Exploration Claims Facility pending. ColT T-349l7 Technical Services Houston, Texas Corps of Engineers 2,114,000 March, 1967 Facility CofF T-349]4 Crew Systems Houston, Texas Corps of Engineers 1,581,000 Apr~.,l966 Facility ColT T-47l92 Cafeteria Houston, Texas Corps of Engineers 746,100 Jan., 1967 R&D NAS9-35O2 Modifications to Downey, Calif. North American 753,511 Acquisition Facilities Aviation Contract *On contract January 1, 1967 **See F! 1964 for additional funding PAGENO="1399" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1395 MSC CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS FT 1965 (Cont'd) NDPR Or Anticipated Contract Coaplation ~ Number Description Location Contractor Total Cost* Date R&D T-34919 Revisions to Cham- Houston, Texas Corps of Engineers ~ 44,980 Aug., 1965 ber UBIt Circuitry R&D T-95528 Addition to Were- White Sands Test Corps of Engineers 143,000 Oct., 1965 house No. 1 Facility R&D T-95530 Construction White Sands Test Corps of Engineers 41,800 Oct., 1965 Support Ware- Facility house R&D T-9553l Re~ir of Frozen White Sands Test Corps of Engineers 220,000 Aug., 1965 Controls and Facility Booster Pump R&D T-95532 Service Module White Sands Test Corps of Engineers 45,000 Sept., 1965 Clean Room Facility R&D T-95533 GSA Vehicle Main- White Sands Test Corps of Engineers 82,848 Oct., 1966 tenance Facility Facility R&D T-95534 Additional White Sands Test Corps of Engineers 73,535 Aug., 1966 Cryogenics Facility Storage R&D T-95535 Lumber Storage White Sands Test Corps of Engineers 11,617 Aug., 1966 Shed Facility R&D T-95536 Addition to Bldg. White Sands Test Corps of Engineers ~ 11,910 Aug., 1966 114 Facility CofF NAS9-4848 Atmospheric Re- Houston, Texas AVCO Corp. 738,363 March, 1967 entry ARC Heater NSC CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS NDPR Or Fl 1966 ~nticipated Contract Completion ~ Number Description Location Contractor Total Cost ~ Date CofF T-53283 Mission Support Houston, Texas Corps of Engineers $ 599,200 Dec., 1966 Warehouse AD NAS9-5D71 Emergency Thiel Houston, Texas Cross Construction 100,969 Feb., 1967 Oil, Bldg. 262 Conipany Heating System AD NAS9-4l39 Service Contrac- Houston, Texas Cross Construction 8,467 Oct., 1965 tor' s Complex Company AD NAS9-5D69 Maintenance Shop, Houston, Texas Snowcon, Inc. 191,097 Dec., 1965 Equipment Facility, Work Control Cen- ter, Material Storage GofF NAS9-5969 Install parti- Houston, Texas Virginia Metal 52,324 Aug., 1966 tions in Bldg. 45 Products Division AD NAS9-5969 Install parti- Houston, Texas Virginia Metal 25,834 Feb., 1967 tions in Bldgs. Products Division 2&4 CofF NAS9-5924 Modifications to Houston, Texas Cross Construction 404,254 Feb., 1967 Environmental Company Testing Lab *Dn contract January 1, 1967 PAGENO="1400" 1396 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MSC CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS FY 1966 (Cont'd) NDPR Or Contract ~ Number Description _______ CofF NAS9-6095 Closed Loop Cooling System, Bldg. 32 CofF NAS9-6382 Modifications to Bldg. 32 - Helium Refrigeration R&D NAS9-6382 Test Support Ve- hicle Acces: mod- ifications to Water Impact Test Facil- ity AO NAS9-6382 Sanitary Sewer, Houston, Texas Avenue B A0 NAS9-6367 Modifications to Houston, Texas 2nd Floor, Bldg. 8 R&D NAS9-6367 Modifications to Houston, Texas 1st Floor for Photo Grammetric Lab CofF NAS9-6356 Install 50 ton crane, Bldg. 32 R&D NAS9-5876 Install founda- tion for testing machine, Bldg. 16A and Thermochemical equi~nent storage facility CofF NAS9-5875 Construct housing for Space Vehicle Motion Simulator ColT NAS9-57l0 Modifications to Environmental Testing Lab R&D T-95549 Warning System and Automatic Controls R&D T-349l8 Additional utilities for Chamber `tB't R&D T-34920 Tank Farm for Houston, Texas Spacecraft Fluids R&D NAS9-6244 Modifications to 3rd Floor, Bldg. 36 Artticipatec Completion Contractor Total Cost5 Date Evans Construction ~ 121,730 Oct., 1966 Company Snowcon, Inc. ,/T.A. Kilgore & Co. Snowcon, Inc./T.A. Kilgore & Co. Location Houston, Texas Houston, Texas Houston, Texas Houston, Texas Houston, Texas 19,719 74,328 22, 350 73,410 49,123 16,048 69,700 89,272 2,300,564 19,837 19,702 97,250 Oct., 1966 Feb., 1967 Feb., 1967 Dec., 1966 Jan., 1967 Jan., 1967 Oct., 1966 Mar., 1967 Jan., 1967 Aug., 1967 Aug., 1965 Jan., 1966 Snowcon, Inc., T.A. Kilgore & Co. Evans Construction Company Evans Construction Company Evans Construction Company Cross Construction ~ Company Stone Construction Company Cry-c Vac, Inc. Corps of Engineers Corps of Engineers Corps of Engineers Houston, Texas Houston, Texas White Sands Test Facility Houston, Texas Houston, Texas Evans Construction Company 133,964 Feb., 1967 *On contract January 1, 1967 PAGENO="1401" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MSC CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS F! 1966 (Cont'd) 1397 NDPR Or Contract ~pp~ Number Description Location ~&D NAS9-.6356 Install LN Burst Houston, Texas Disc; air ~ock; stairway enclosure, and LOX trailer pad ~&D NAS9-6355 Modifications to Houston, Texas Thermochemical area and out- side Bottle Storage, Bldg. 36 Graphics Service Houston, Texas addition; central gas cylinder; and Contractor Shop/Warehouse G&N Checkout Lab Houston, Texas and Instrument Construction Shop, Bldg. l6A Addition to Health Houston, Texas Physics Lab; ~2 Facility, Bldg. 7; Microminiature Lab, Bldg. 15; and mockup facility, Bldg. 5. Modifications to Houston, Texas computer area, Bldg. 440 Fabrication of Houston, Texas 50 ton bridge crane Modifications to Houston, Texas provide elec- trical power and air con- ditioning to Bldg. 30 & 48 Stone Construction 38,215 Dec., 1966 Company Evans Construction 212,593 Feb., 1967 Company Contractor Evans Construction Company Anticipated Completion Total Costs Date ~ 220,029 Feb., 1967 AdO NAS9-6355 Stone Construction 57,741 Dec., 1966 Company Stone Construction 195,874 Feb., 1967 Company CofF NAS9-6355 R&D NAS9-6336 CofF NAS9-613l ColT NAS9-60l2 R&D NAS9-6000 Chambers & McGregor $ 59,571 Aug., 1966 Crane Hoist 74,863 Jan., 1967 Chambers & McGregor 170,003 Feb., 1967 50n contract January 1, 1967 PAGENO="1402" 1398 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MSC CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS BY 1967 NDPR Or Anticipated Contract Completion ~ Number P~scrip~4q~ Location Contractor Total Cost * Date Cof~ NAS9-6689 Modifications to Houston, Texas Stone Construction $ 13,860 Jan., 1967 Equipment Room, Company Bldg. 45 R&D NAS9-66l8 Modifications to Houston, Texas Evans Construction 32,200 Dec., 1966 computer area, Company Bldg. 12 CofF NAS9-6594 Modifications to Houston, Texas Evans Construction 216,100 March, 1967 Emergency Repres- Company surizátion Sys- tem, Bldg. 32 R&D NAS9-6527 Lunar Landing Houston, Texas B. J. Larvin, 88,948 Dec., 1966 Training Ve- General Contractor hide Opera- tions & Mainte- nance Facility CofF NAS9-6500 Phase II Con- Houston, Texas Warrior/NAIXIN/ 2,000,000 July, 1967 struction of NAT Lunar Receiving Laboratory CofF NAS9-645l Phase I Construc- Houston, Texas Warrior Construc- 1,692,855 March, 1967 tion of Lunar tion Company Receiving Labora- tory R&D 1-95557 Chemistry Labora- White Sands Test Corps of Engineers ~ 68,700 May, 1967 tory modifications Facility to Bldg. 200 R&D T-95570 Access Fence White Sands Test U. S. Department 19,875 Apr., 1967 Facility of Interior *Dn contract January 1, 1967 PAGENO="1403" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1399 III PROCUREMENT FOR RESEARCH AND DEVEE~OPMENT A. Number B. Number C. Number of. Procurement Plans Submitted to Center Director Submitted to NASA Headquarters of Procurement Plans not Inciwled in A and. B above PAGENO="1404" 1400 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MSC PROCUREMENT PLAN POLICY This Section sets forth the policy and level of approving authority for procurement plans at MSC. The number of procurement plans prepared at this Center during Fiscal Years 1965, 1966, and 1967 to date (December 31, 1966) are set forth in the appropriate category. All procurement plans whic have been submitted to NASA Headquarters have been further identified as to `title of procurement" and "estimated value." If the contract is expected to be less than $1,000,000, the procurement plan does not require ap- proval by the Center Director but is approved by the MSC Procurement Officer after coordination wi the Procurement Policy and Review Section and the cognizant Program Office or Assistant Directorat If the contract is expected to be more than $1,000,000 but less than $5,000,000, the procurement plan must be approved by the Center Director after coordination with the Procurement Policy and Review Section, the cognizant Program Office or Assistant Directorate, and the MSC Procurement Officer. The plan may then be forwarded to Headquarters if factors indicate such action desirable for example, when technical responsibility remains in Headquarters. In all instances where the contract is expected to exceed $5,000,000, the procurement plan is forwarded to NASA Headquartera for review and approval. If the contract is for services, a procurement plan is prepared if the estimated cost is $100,000 or more or if the duration of the contract with the options is six months or more. Such plans are approved by the Director if the estimated cost is less than $1,000,000 or if the duration of the contract with the options is less than a year. Beyond these limits the plans are approved by NASA Headquarters. PROCUREMENT PLANS FY65 Fy66 F'Y67toDate Number of procurement plans prepared by MSC i~8 l7I~ 48 Number of procurement plans submitted to Center Director for approval 23 29 6 Number of procurement plans submitted to NASA Headquarters 12 11 Number of procurement plans submitted to the Procurement Officer, MSC, for approval 111 ~8 PAGENO="1405" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1401 IV. CONTRACTS, A. Number of Competitive participants in each Research & Development negotiated Contract PAGENO="1406" 1402 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MSC NEGOTIATE]) COMPETITIVE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CONTRACTS CALENDAR YEAR 1966 Total Firms Number of Competiti Contract Number Descriotion Solici~p4 Particinants NAS 9-5266 Design and Integration Study of 30 16 a Photovoltaic Power System NAS 9-5391 Hall Effect System 41 8 NAS 9-5425 Time and Frequency Reference System 48 3 NAS 9-5430 Testing and Evaluation of Thermal 39 6 Protection System NAS 9-5451 Apollo Experiments Pallet Phase I- 43 9 Program Definition NAB 9-5491 The Evaluation and Design of Cryogenic 12 6 Pressure Vessels NAB 9-5499 Orbital Position Indicator 26 3 NAS 9-5567 Accelerator Modification Equipment 20 2 NAB 9-5568 Multiple Frame Electronic Camera 50 3 NAB 9-5580 Static Inverter 100 13 NAB 9-5581 Study Static Inverter 100 13 NAS 9-5592 Thin Film Capacitor Study 29 8 NAB 9-5642 Tape Recorder - Reproducer 10 3 NAB 9-5648 Broad Band Amplifiers 17 2 NAB 9-5682 Comparator 10 3 NAB 9 5692 Video Switching Matrix 15 3 NAB 9-5699 Ultrasonic Cleaning Equipment 14 3 NAB 9-5723 Analog Computer 11 5 NAB 9-5727 X-Y Plotter 17 2 NAB 9-5742 Development of Data Analyzer 83 7 NAB 9-5781 Ablator Material 20 4 NAB 9-5809 Induction Heated Silicon Epitaxial 15 3 Growth System NAB 9-5820 Performance of Tests to Determine 10 4 the Effects of Space Environment and Reentry Conditions on Parachute Materials NAB 9-5825 Double-Chamber Diffusion Furnace 18 4 NAB 9-5829 Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments 36 9 Package Development Program NAB 9-5831 Torque Measuring System 13 1 NAB 9-5842 Investigation of Low-Temperature 49 20 Creep in Titanium Alloys NAB 9-5846 Signal Conditioning Checkout System 66 1 NAB 9-5854 Fabrication Process for Nominally 30 4 Spherical Beads NAB 9-5860 Microminiature Low Level Multicoder 10 10 NAB 9-5868 Versatile Stereoscope with Accessories 12 1 NAS 9-5872 Gloves for use in io6 TORE Vacuum 24 10 PAGENO="1407" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1403 MSC NEGOTIATED COMPETITIVE RESEARCH PRO DEVELOPMENT CONTRACTS CALENDAR YEAR 1966 Total Firms Number of Competitive ntract Number Description Solicited Participants NAN 9-5887 Digital TV Encoder/Decoder 35 2 NAN 9-5888 Lunar Environment Simulator System 21 11 NAS 9-5910 LM Crew Station Condola 25 8 NAS 9-5919 Laboratory Furniture and Equ.i~ment 10 6 NAN 9-5955 Time Delay Correlators 39 1 NAS 9-5976 Meteoroid Detector Analyzer 28 11 NAN 9-5981 LM Film GraphIcs 32 9 NAN 9-5983 Optical Measuring Device 3 3 NAN 9-5995 Analog Computer 13 6 NAN 9-5997 Data Logging System 110 6C NAN 9-6046 Timing Subsystem 12 7 NAN 9-6064 Star Simulators and Beam Combination 33 16 Unit NAN 9-6077 Digital Tape Transport 10 5 NAN 9-6080 Flat Face Probes 9 6 NAN 9-6081 Airborne Digital Voltohmmeter 7 3 NAN 9-6090 Video Distribution and Test Bay 9 6 NAN 9-6092 Contract for Phase C, Program 43 7 Definition of the Apollo Lunar Surface Drill Program NAS 9-6093 Contract for Phase C, Program 43 7 Definition of the Apollo Lunar Surface Drill Program NAN 9-6105 Liquid Propellant Tests in a 38 12 Vacuum Chamber NAN 9-6106 Pressure Transducers 12 6 NAN 9-6114 Universal Signal Conditioning Modules 45 10 NAN 9-6126 Tape Recorder 10 4 NAN 9-6136 Data Read-out System 10 5 NAN 9-6151 Logic Expansion Units 8 5 NAS 9-6160 Optical Scanner 55 27 NAN 9-6169 Miorophotometers 12 8 NAN 9-6173 Implementation and Operation of 46 16 Apollo Process Control Unit NAN 9-6174 Analog Tape Recorder 10 5 NAN 9-6178 Digital High-speed Statistical 24 11 Calculation Unit NAN 9-6193 Irradiation of Thermal Control 26 10 Coating Materials NAN 9-6195 Diode Development of a Gallium 17 6 Arsenide Laser NAN 9-6207 Digital Data Acquisition System 30 15 PAGENO="1408" 1404 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MSC NEGOTIATED COMPETITIVE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CON~ CALENDAR TEAR 1966 Total Firms Number of Competitii Contract Number Descriotion Solicited Particioants NAS 9-6220 Airborne Time Code Generators 11 8 NAS 9-6287 Design and Development of 66 29 Radiation Survey Meters and Design and Fabrication of Personal Radiation Dosimeters NAS 9-6288 Charring Ablation Material Study 43 13 MAO 9-6294 Strip Chart Recorders 16 10 NAS 9-6305 Calculation of Electrical Charge 45 22 on Apollo CSM in Lunar Environment NAS 9-6324 Study of Biaxial Stress Corrosion 19 2 NAS 9-6333 Infrared Imaging System and 2 2 Display System NAS 9-6334 Dividing Head 3 3 NAS 9-6348 Hyperbaric Chamber 25 10 MAO 9-6352 Video Patching and Distribution 10 6 NAS 9-6376 Multiplex System 11 4 NAS 9-6409 Pressure Switches 60 29 NAS 9-6420 Laser Communication System 35 10 MAO 9-6464 Mars Excursion Module Development 60 18 MAO 9-6468 Testing Machine 19 10 MAO 9-6470 Development and Fabrication 24 10 Storage System MAO 9-6481 Determination of Heat Flow 18 6 From the Body NAS 9-6489 Optic Collimator 16 6 NAS 9-6494 The Effects of Lunar Gravity 24 5 Simulation for Metabolic Rates MAO 9-6506 Vibration Isolation System 20 10 MAO 9-6543 Laboratory Apollo Data Storage 42 7 Equipment Instrumentation Recorder! Reproducer NAS 9-6557 Slow Scan Test and Sync Generator 28 15 MAO 9-6587 Phase 0 Apollo Lunar Surface Drill 43 6 MAO 9-6591 Microminiature Telemetry 9 5 Modulation System MAO 9-6615 Modulation Transfer Function 9 4 Analyzer NAS 9-6616 Develop Instrumented Models for use in 44 18 Qualification of Apollo Thermal Protection System MAO 9-6636 Design, Development and Fabrication 58 17 of Microcircuits in Conjunction with Apollo Personal Communications System MAO 9-6642 Automatic Tape Search and Time 20 10 Display System PAGENO="1409" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1405 OMPETITIVE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CONTRACTS CALENDAR YEAR 1966 Total Firms Number of Competitive ~ract Number Descriotion Solicited Particicants NAS 9-6709 Instrumentation Recorder 28 11 NAS 9-6720 Therodyneinic Properties of 23 4 Aerozine 50 NAS 9-95140 Recorder/Reproducer 36 9 NAS 9-95144 Radio Transceivers 71 35 NAS 9-95177 Helium Semitrailers 55 37 NAS 9-95197 Microanalyzer 71 30 TOTAL NuMBER CONTRACTS - 98 76-265 0 - 67 - pt. 2 - 89 PAGENO="1410" 1406 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION IV. CONTRACTS B. Fixed-price contracts converted to CPIF C. Contracts scheduled to be converted to CPIF D. Contracts to a review board to determine final fee MSC CONTRACT DATA The following contractual information is furnished for calendar year 1966. B. MSC had no fixed-price contracts converted to CPIF. The following information is provided as to CPFF contracts converted to incentive type. 1. On January 26, 1966, Contract NAS 9-150 with North American Aviation, Inc., Space and Information Systems Division, was converted from CPFF to CPIF, with target cost of $629.5 million and a fee range of $27.29 to *85.735 million. 2. Contract NAB 9-996 with International Business Machines, Inc., for the design develop- ment implementation, maintenance and operations of the Real Time Computer Complex was converted from CPFF to CPIF on August 5, 1966. The estimated contract cost at conversion was $130,753,098 with an incentive fee range of negative $1,630,000 to positive $9,950,000, and a fixed fee of $1,380,958. 3. The conversion from CPFF to CPIF of Contract NAS 9-1100 for the Lunar Module with Gruannan Aircraft Engineering Corporation was approved by NASA Headquarters February 11, 1966. The total estimated cost, exclusive of fee of the contract, is $1,290,000,000 with a fee range of $57,580,000 to $154,050,000. 4. Contract NAS 9-2011 with the Houston Fire and Safety Equipment Company for fire protec- tion of MSC was converted July 1, 1966, from CPFF to CPAF. The estimated contract cost at the time of conversion was $651,947, with a fee range of zero dollars to $45,600. 5. On July 1, 1966, Contract NAB 9-2915 with Lockheed Aircraft Corporation for engineering design and drafting services was converted from CPFF to CRAP. The estimated contract cost is $1,717,575 with a fee range of $2,011 to $123,358. 6. Contract NAB 9-3535 with United Aircraft Division of United Aircraft Corporation for the developnent of Apollo prototype spacesuits and portable life support system was approved for conversion from CPFF to CPIF by NASA Headquarters on May 4, 1966. The tote], estimated cost is $24,300,000, with a fee range from $729,000 to $3,645,000. 7. On July 1, 1966, Contract NAB 9-5026 with Taft Broadcasting Company for closed circuit TV maintenance, operation, and engineering services was converted from CPFF to~'CPAF. The total contract cost is $367,357, with a fee range of zero dollars to $16,000. MSC CONTRACT DATA C. The following contract is scheduled to be converted to CPIF. On September 15, 1966, NASA Headquarters approved the prenegotiation incentive position of Contract NAB 9-1261 with Philco-Ford Corporation, Western Developaent Laboratories Division. This is an effort to continue this contract under incentive arrangement. D. No contracts were subjected to a review board to determine final contract fee after completion. PAGENO="1411" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1407 IV CONTRACTS E. Organization identification of Contract Approval Authority (organization level and type of authority) MSC CONTRACT APPROVAL AUTHORITT The following sets forth the Center and NASA policy for authority to approve contracts re- flecting the type of authority available at each organization level. All contracts in excess of $2,500,000 and specialty contracts such as certain categories of utility services; all contracts for personal services; management consultants; advance pay- ments leases of real property where the annual rental exceeds $25 000 architect engineering contracts vben the total dollar value is $250,000 or the work to be performed under a cost- plus-fixed-fee or fixed-price contract includes preparation of designs, plans,, drawings, and specifications (Title I Services) and the fee, inclusive Of the architect-engineer's costs, to be paid to the architect engineer for the performance of such services exceeds 61 of the estimated cost of the related construction project, exclusive of the amount of such fee; and facility contracts `where the total cost of facilities will exceed $250,000 or which involve real property regardless of amount, are subject. to approval by NASA Headquarters. Authority for issuance of contracts under $2,500,000 subject to the above exceptions which require NASA Headquarters approval resides in the Center Director, who in turn delegates the authority to the Center Procurement Officer. Contract modifications which, of themselves, commit the Government to expenditures within the monetary limits cited above are, for approval purposes, treated as contracts. IV. CONTRACTS F. Contracts Renegotiated G. Percentage of Contracts to Small Business F. There were no contracts renegotiated by MSC. C. The following two statements are based on fiscal year, not calendar year, computations: (1) Forty-six percent of the total number of MSC contracts awarded in FY 66 was let to small business. PAGENO="1412" 1408 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION V. FACILITIES A. Furnish information to show the status of projects; whether in planning, design or construction for Fiscal Years 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968 and future years when incrementally funded. Provide fiscal data to include unobligated balances as of January 1, 1967. (An unobligated balance exists for this purpose when available funds are not obligated to a contract or work order to another Government agency.) PAGENO="1413" 1968 NASA AUTHOTUZATION 1409 STATSS OF FACILITY PROJECTS MANNEN SPACECRAFT CENTER, HOUSTON, TEXAS . FT Program Prolect Approired Plan Unobligated Balance Jan,. 1. 19.67 201 Environmental Testing Laboratory 1962 $37,954,400 $ 672,376 Construction 99% complete. Claims pen- ding. 203 MSC Facilities 1962 $34,167,000 0 Construction completed. Claim pen- ding. 203 MSC Facilities 1963 7,403,380 12,428 Construction completed. Claims pen- ding. 205 Flight Acceleration Facility 1963 11,245,100 ~ 94,6ed ~ Construction completed. Claims pen- ding. 7207 Mission Control Center 1963 21,678,676 0 Construction completed. Claims pen- ding. 7207 Additions to the Mission Control Center 1964 8,409,000 14,815 Completed. 7212 Mission Simulation and Training Facility 1964 2,069,000 56,500. Construction completed. 7213 Spacecraft Control Technology Laboratory 1964 5,557,800 452,941 Construction completed. Equipment Pro- curement 95% complete. 7214 Atmospheric Re-entry Materials and 1964 $ 2,695,000 Structures Evaluation Facility $ 63,137 Construction 85% complete. 7215 Center Support Facilities . 1964 3,821,000 . ~ 225,000 Construction 99% complete. Equipment Procurement 94% complete. 7216 Launch Environment and Antenna Test 1964 7,514,400 1,168 Construction completed. Claims pen- ding. 7218 Project Engineering Facility 1964& 4,525,000 1965 805,790 Construction 99% complete. 7220 Ultra-High Vacuum Space Chamber Facility 1964 1,728,600 39,308 Construction 90% complete. Claims pen- ding. 7222 Lunar Mission and Space Facility 1965 2,554,000 35,770 Construction 98% complete. Claims pen- ding. 7223 Electronic Systems Compatibility Facility 1965 3,435,000 252~087 Construction completed. 7224 Modification to Environmental Test 1965 6,043,000 Laboratory 3,873,964 Construction 48% complete. 7226 Technical Services Facility 1965 2,330,400 216,400 Construction 90% complete. 7227 Crew Systems Facility 1965 1,626,000 0 Construction complete. Claims pen- ding. PAGENO="1414" 1410 * R&D Appropriation 1968. NASA AUTHORIZATION STATUS OF FACILIfT PROJECTS Unobligated F! Program Balance ______ Approved Plan Jan. 1. 1967 ~ 1965 $ 787,500 $ 25,823 Constructio 99% complet 1965 1,450,000 225,100 Constructjo completed. Claims pen- ding. Equip ment Procure ment 85% complete. 1966 800,000 200,800 Construction completed. 1966 3,380,000 551,540 Construction 85% complete 1967 1,000,000 1,000,00 Under design 1967 8,100,000 4,011,234 Construction 50% complete 1967 1,100,000 Under design 1967 2,600,000 Planning 1968 525,000 Planning 1968 1,900,000 Planning Unobligated Balance ______ _______ ______ Jan. 1. 1967 1963 $ 8,809,000* $ 0 Completed. Claims pen- ding. 1964 ]4,430,000 1,150 Construction. Claims pen- ding 0 Construction. Project 7228 Cafeteria 7230 Central Heating and Cooling Plant and Warehouse Addition 7215 Center Support Facilities 7224 Modifications to Environmental Testing Laboratory 7215 Center Support Facilities 7235 Lunar Sample Receiving Laboratory 7242 Flight (b~ew Training Facility 7245 Engineering Building 7215 Center Support Facilities 7224 Modifications to Environmental Testing Laboratory Project 9121 Apollo Propulsion Systems Development Facility (WSTF) 9137 Lunar Iladule Test Facility (wsTF) 3581 Apollo Spacecraft Facilities (Downey) 1,100,000 2,600,000 525,000 1,900,000 STATUS OF FACILITY PROJECTS EARNED SPACECRAFT CENTER - VARIOUS LOCATIONS F! Program ______ A~~roved Plan __________ 1963 9,289,000* PAGENO="1415" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1411 V. FACILITIES B. Furnish a listing of Cost-Plus-Pixed-Fee and Cost-Plus-Award-Fee Contracts entered into for facility management, services and construction. Provide ii~fonnation as to the purpose of each. PAGENO="1416" 1412 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION CPFF CONTRACT FOR FACILITIES EFFORT Chambers and McGregor, Inc. P. 0. Box 74 Houston, Texas Cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to install additional air conditioning controls and air handling units, and modifications to accommodate new Real Time Computer Complex equipment in Building 30. Contract No. NAS9-6000 Total Estimated cost: $246,766 CPFF CONTRACT FOR FACILITIES EFFORT Chambers and McGregor, Inc. and C Equipment Sales Company P. 0. Box 74 Houston, Texas Cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to provide electrical cable and wiring installation in Building 440, move computer equipment from Building 420, and inatall this equipment in Building 440. Contract No. NAS9-6l31 Total Estimated Cost: $59,571 OPFF CONTRACT FOR FACILITIES EFFORT CryoVac, Inc. 930 Kinnear Road Columbus, Ohio Cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for modification to the cryogenic and vacuum systems in the Space Environmental Simulation Laboratory, Building 32. Contract No. NAS9-571O Total Estimated Cost: $21,191 PAGENO="1417" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1413 çPFF CONTRACT FOR FACILITIES EFFORT Thiokol Chemical Corporation Reaction Motors Division Denville, New Jersey Cost.-plus-fixed-fee contract for the design, fabrication, installation, and testing of two emergency isolation devices for the LM Test Facility at WSTF. Contract No. NAS9-5l07 Total Estimated Cost: $468,000 CPAF CONTRACT FOR FACILITIES EFFORT Warrior Construction, Inc., Natkin and Company, Inc *, and National Electric Corporation (A joint venture) P. 0. Box 127 Houston, Texas 77001 Cost-plus-award--fee contract to provide all labor, services, material and equipment, except GFE, necessary to complete construc- tion of the Lunar Receiving Laboratory, and to install, checkout, and perform acceptance test on all equipment and systems in the facility. Contract No. NAS9-6500 Total Estimated Cost: $4,802,000 PAGENO="1418" 1414 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION V. FACILITIES C. An estimate of future construction fund requirements for facility together with a genera]. description of probable work. Future Construction Fund Requirements for Projects Included in F! 1968 Program 1. Modifications to Environmental Testing Laboratory - due to the complex and sophisticated nature of this facility, $1 to $2 million will be required on a yearly basis to retain present capabilities and incorporate technological advances. 2. Center Support Facilities - It is anticipated that additional funds will be required for utilities and center development to support any future construction programs. PAGENO="1419" SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX STATEMENT BY DR GEORGE E MUELLER ASSOCIATE ADMINISPRA TOR FOR MANNED SPACE FLIGHT NASA SUBMITTED IN EXECU TIVE SESSION APRIL 24 1967, ON APOLLO AND APOLLO APPLICA TIONS R & D BUDGET ADJUSTMENTS FOR APPOLLO AS-204 ACCIDENT The purpose of this statement is to pi ovide data requested by the Subcommit tee on Manned Space Flight during the April 24, 1967, authorization hearing (executive session). Specifically, the request was to update, in consideration of the Apollo AS-204 accident, the schedule and funding data submitted to the committee in support of the fiscal year 1968 NASA manned space flight budget request. In the hearing before the Subcommittee on NASA Oversight on May 10, 1967, Mr. Webb and Dr. Seamans discussed `the effect of the AS-204 accident on sched- ules and cost During this hearing I discussed in detail the specific actions to be taken in relation to each of the Apollo 204 Board recommendations addi tional actions to be taken that are not related to the Board's recommendations but that are appropriate in terms of the first manned flight of a Block II space craft and the planned steps leading to the first manned Apollo flight. To highlight the impact of `the Apollo 264 accident: 1. It has reduced but not eliminated the probability of a manned lunar land- ing attempt in this `decade. 2 It has reduced our overall manned flight program flexibility at an increase in runout costs of over $400 million 3 It has delayed the earliest target foi majoi Apollo applications program nussions 4 It has necessitated ieadjustment of fiscal yeai 1967 and fiscal year 1968 cost estimates which we are determined to absorb Within the current budget I equest Above all the accident has had an impact on the NASA organization and the industrial teams it directs We are certain we can make the changes and run the tests and accomplish the missions we have planned since 1961 We are cei tam we can find effective means of adjusting workloads within the framework of `the total job to be done, to reflect the `capacity of each element in the organiza- tion to aCcomplish its task. `The `attached encloSures discuss the schedule and cost adjustments for the Apollo and Apollo Applications programs ~POLLO PROGRAM SCHEDULE The Apollo Flight program utilizes the all up concept which I have discussed bei~ore this committee in the past This concept means that complete launch vehicles and spacecraft are used as early in the flight program as possible This provides an early readiness of the system and enables us to capitalize on success Another advantage of this concept is that a single vehicle is capable of performing more than one mission type This concept has become increasingly 1415 PAGENO="1420" 1416 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION important since the accident because it allows the flight program to maintain flexibility in manning the uprated Saturn I and Saturn V and in the transfer of testing between the two series. In addition, this concept allows rapid response to flight failures and to changes in the expected availability of the' flight hard- ware. The preplanned mission types have remained fixed, but the assignment of particular pieces of hardware to missions has been changed following the accident. The basic flight program remains the same as before and the flight missions are adjusted only in the point of transfer to the Saturn V series of launch ve- hicles. This transfer now will occur after the Command-Service `Module opera- tions phase using the Saturn V. The mission types and launch schedules appear on figures 1 and 2. The first manned flight is scheduled to take place in the first quarter of 1968. This means that there has been approximately a year's delay in the schedule of the first manned Apollo flight. The first rendezvous and docking mission with a com- plete Lunar Module and Command-Service Module will `be delayed about 9 months. The first complete manned space vehicle with lunar configured hard- ware will also be delayed about 9 months. These delays have reduced the flex- ibility in achieving the Apollo goal-that of landing men on the moon and re- turning them safely to the earth before 1970-but it still remains within reach. It has been the plan for some time to perform unmanned missions this year using the first two Saturn V launch vehicles and an uprated Saturn I. In addi- tion to flight testing the launch vehicles, these flights can evaluate the per- formance of the spacecraft heat shield at lunar return reentry velocities and other subsystems of the spacecraft in orbital flight. It is also planned to use these vehicles to begin testing the changes in procedures and hardware that are a result of the accident investigation. The next uprated Saturn I launch will be a Lunar Module development flight. This launch is scheduled for the second half of calendar year 1967, which is a delay from previous schedules. The cause of this delay is not the result of the accident, but rather the result of the problems associated with moving the first Lunar Module article through manufacturing and checkout. Further, we have found it desirable to change the uprated Saturn I launch vehicle for this mis- sion from SA-206 to SA-204. The basis for this decision was: 1. The SA-204 launch vehicle suffered no damage as a result of the 204 accident. 2. The SA-204 is a more highly instrumented launch vehicle than SA-206. Its utilization at this time will enhance the confidence in launch vehicle reliabil- ity for later manned flights. 3. The use of SA-204 avoids the necessity for refurbishment of the launch vehicle after a period of extended storage. The first Saturn V launch in the Apollo program is the Apollo/Saturn V AS- 501. The purpose of this mission is the development of the Saturn V launch vehicle, evaluation of the performance of the spacecraft heat shield at lunar return velocities, `and verification of other spacecraft subsystems in flight. This mission is now scheduled for the third quarter of calendar year 1967. This is a delay of several months from what we had planned previously. The cause of this delay is the review of the AS-501 Block I spacecraft (CSM 017) with respect to those things learned as a result of the AS-204 accident. The third launch will be the second unmanned Apollo/Saturn V, AS-502, scheduled late this year. This will be a repeat of the AS-501 mission and will complete the launch vehicle qualification. We are also considering the modifica- tion of the CSM 020 Block I spacecraft assigned to this mission to include a test of the new unified hatch. As mentioned earlier, the first manned Apollo flight is scheduled for early calendar year 1968. This flight will use an uprated Saturn I and a Block II spacecratt to check out the command-service module and the crew in space flight. This spacecraft will be modified to incroporate all changes that have been defined as a result of our work following the AS-204 accident. In summary then, the plan for the immediate future is an unmanned lunar module flight with an uprated Saturn I; two unmanned launches' of the Saturn PAGENO="1421" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1417 with the modified Block I command-service module; and the first manned ppollo flight, using the Block II spacecraft and an uprated Saturn I. The nominal program calls for the next phase to develop the more complex perations in space, including rendezvous, which will be required for the lunar nission. When this phase is completed, we plan to demonstrate the maturity f the overall system for accomplishment of the lunar landing by performing simulation of the lunar mission in earth orbit. The command-service module lunar module operations may be flown on SA-206/207 and subsequent uprated Saturn I vehicles or on SA-503 and sub- sequent vehicles. Mission objectives for this flight are: 1. Verify lunar module/crew performance in earth orbital environment. 2. Verify spacecraft/crew operation in earth orbit. 3. Demonstrate mission support facilities performance during an earth orbital mission. The Lunar Mission Simulation which will be conducted on the Saturn V launch vehicle will have these objectives: 1. Demonstrate launch vehicle capability for inserting a manned, fully loaded Apollo spacecraft on an ellipse, employing a nearly full duration S-IVB burn, including S-IVB restart in orbit. 2. Demostrate capability of the Apollo spacecraft/crew/ground support facili- ties to perform the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous mission operations by simulations. 3. Demonstrate crew/spacecraft performance in simulated lunar mission. After completion of the Lunar Mission Simulation the next series of flights will have the objective to: 1. Demonstrate the capability to perform manned lunar landing and return. 2. Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling. Because we are now close to the initial Saturn V flights and our known major problems are solved, we feel we can compress the interval between the early and later launches. This has allowed us to arrive at the revised program that has just been discussed. APOLLO BACKUP MI5SIONS Several of the launch vehicles can be used for backup missions. SA-206 and SA-207 can be used as backup for the Lunar Module Development or the Com- mand-Service Module operations missions, respectively. There are preplanned alternate missions that accomplish the development of Command-Service Module Lunar Module operations using the uprated Saturn I in place of the Saturn V launch vehicle if we encounter difficulties in the Saturn V development. All uprated Saturn I vehicles are configured to allow these preplanned missions to be flown., We plan to transfer development of manned spacecraft operations to the Saturn V series as soon as that vehicle is flight proven, at which time the remaining uprated Saturn I vehicles will be available for the Apollo Applications program. However, we are prepared with boilerplate spacecraft in the event that Saturn V development problems are encountered; we can devote missions en- tirely to launch vehicle objectives. All Saturn V vehicles, with the exception of the first three, are configured to be capable of performing the required missions for Command-Service Module Lunar Module operations for simulating the lunar mission in earth orbit (Lunar Mission Simulation) and for performing lunar missions. This planning will con- tinue to allow- program flexibility to minimize the impact of possible future contingencies. BUDGET SITUATION. The program planning I have described has flexibility; however, it depends upon full support of the fiscal year 1968 budget request. As a matter of policy, NASA will not request a supplemental appropriation in fiscal year 1968; the impact of the accident will be contained within the total budget plan as presently before the Congress. I would like now to discuss our plans in this regard. First, the immediate problem posed is how can be absorb the added costs in fiscal year 1967 and fiscal year 1968 and still maintain a balanced program. The PAGENO="1422" 1418 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION budget charts used before the committee during the fiscal year 1968 authorizath hearings have been marked up to show the changes. Our review of the Apol budget for the 2 years indicated the following increases over the combined fisc year 1967 operating plan and fiscal year 1968 request: 1 The required materials changes and flammability testing for the new spac craft configuration are estimated at $5 million 2 The design and incorporation of equipment changes `md modifications in th Block II spacecraft are estimated at $40 million. 3. The development of new spacesuits is estimated at $8 million. 4. The rescheduling of spacecraft deliveries, both Command-Service Modul and Lunar Module, is estimated at $17 million. 5. The modifications to the launch facilities are estimated at $5 million. In total, then, about $75 million of additional costs through fiscal year 196 have been identified to date. Offsetting reductions of $25 million in fund require ments, stemming from the lower than planned level of mission operations, hay been established, of which $15 million relates to less launch preparation and $1 million for fewer recovery operations. The remaining $50 million of additional costs will have to be offset by carefu management of existing contracts.. The contracts provide strong incentives for maximum contractor effort to achieve the best in meeting performance, cost, am time requirements. Additionally, through the control of obligations in the larg Saturn V contracts, we anticipate making up a large part of the $50 million deficit. I wish to stress again that these are estimates at this time and are sub- ject to revision as the individual contractual actions are taken. In the longer term, the runout eosts of Apollo are estimated to increase by $410 million from our previous estimates, largely as a factor of extending the basic Saturn V launch schedule into fiscal year 1971. The net effect of these changed requirements on the fiscal year 1968 budget re- quest are shown on the following charts. Apollo assignments Primary Backup 204 Lunar Module development None 205 Command-Service Module operations None. 206/207 and subs Command-Service Module - Lunar Lunar Module development, Com- Module operations. mand-Service Module operations. 501 L/V and S/C development None. 502 L/V and S/C development None. 503 Command-Service Module - Lunar L/V and SIC development. Module operations. 504 . Lunar mission simulation.... Command-Service Module .Lunar Module operations 505 and subs Lunar mission capability Lunar mi~ion simulation FIGURE 1 Summary of adjustments to schedule through SA-21P2 and SA-516 Launches Fiscal year i967 Fiscal year 1968 Fiscal year 1969 Fiscal year 1970 Fiscal year 1971 Previous schedule: SaturnlB SaturnV Revised schedule: Saturn lB SaturnV 4 i 2 4 4 3 i ~ ~ ~ 6 1 FIGURE 2 PAGENO="1423" MANNED SPACE FLIGHT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT APOLLO FY 1968 BUDGET ESTIMATE (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) FY 1966 FY 1961 1,261.3 $-h25O.3~ FY 1968~ 1,095.3 $ 1,~13t.3 $ 1,233.8 SATURN I 214.8 1,134.9 236.6 1,131.6 -1-~1~35~& 156.2 1 062.5 1,1O8.5~ DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT 133.2 164.3 49.8 221~ -t~r~-- TOTAL $2,941.0 $2,916.2 $2,606.5 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1419 NASA MANNED SPACE FLIGHT FY 1968 BUDGET ESTIMATE (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) _________________________ FY 1966 FY 1961 FY 1968 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT $3,199.5 $3024.0 $3,069.2 APOLLO 2,941.0 2916.2 2,606.5 APOLLO APPLICATIONS 51.2 80.0 454.1 ADVANCED MISSIONS 10.0 6.2 8.0 GEMINI 191.3 21.6 -O~ CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES . 11.5 43.8 21.9 ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS 296.9 315.4 323.5 TOTAL $3513.9 $3,383.2 $3,420.6 CHANGE FIGURE 3 NASA HQ MP67-5440 1-15-67 FIGURE 4 NASA HQ MP67-5441 1-15-67 PAGENO="1424" 1420 FY 1966 FY 1961 FY 1968 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES LUNAR MODULE 612~8 362.6 5654 560.4 472.5 524.0 -4940- 195.1 -3-1-&1- GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION 137.2 16.6 55.4 INTEGRATION, RELIABILITY AND CHECKOUT 32.3 30.0 23.2 SPACECRAFT SUPPORT 88.9 116.8 110.8 91.6 -9&?6-- TOTAL $1,233.8 $-1~~a- $ NASA HQ MP67-5438 1-15-67 FIGURE 5 MANNED SPACE FLIGHT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT UPRATED SATURN I FY 1968 BUQGET ESTIMATES (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) I FY 1966 FY 1967 FY 1968 1st STAGE (5-IB) 51.6 43.1 30.5 2nd STAGE (S-IVB) 64.0 56.9 37.1 INSTRUMENT UNIT 47.7 40.6 22.6 GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT H-i ENGINES 26.6 10.1 11.5 8.1 6.5 5.2 NI CHANGE ~ J-2 ENGINES 13.5 6.1 .9 VEHICLE SUPPORT 61.3 69.7 53.4 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MANNED SPACE FLIGHT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT APOLLO SPACECRAFT FY 1968 BUDGET ESTIMATE MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) TOTAL $ 274.8 $ 236.6 $156.2 NASA HQ MP67-5437 -15-67 FIGURE 6 PAGENO="1425" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MANNED SPACE FLIGHT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SATURN V FY 1968 BUDGET ESTIMATE (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) 1421 FY 1966 FY 1967 1st STAGE IS-IC) 2nd STAGE LS-IIJ 3rd STAGE (S-I YB) INSTRUMENT UNIT GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT F-i ENGINES J-2 ENGINES VEHICLE SUPPORT 191.9 256.2 162.0 678 107.6 66.2 67.2 216.0 184.9 244.6 24O.~ 154.0 72.9 60.9 92.3 83.5 238.5 FY 1968 -162.2 - 174.1 1*8 15.1 lilt TOTAL $1,134.9 i~I31.6 $ 1,135G~ 1~O62.-5 $4-1G&5 NASA HQ MP67-5436 1- 15-67 FIGURE 7 MANNED SPACE FLIGHT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ENGINE DEVELOPMENT & MISSION SUPPORT FY 1968 BUDGET ESTIMATES (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) FY 1966 FY 1961 FY 1968 ENGiNE DEVELOPMENT $133.2 $ 49.8 $ 24.5 MISSION SUPPORT $164.3 2319 $-2439-- 268.0 $-2fl1.f~ 1899 216.0 OPERATIONS 112.9 406.3- ~-22970- SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 20.0 20.0 20.0 SUPPORTING DEVELOPMENT 31.4 21.0 32.0 NASA HQ MP67-5439 1-15-67 FIGURE 8 PAGENO="1426" 1422 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION APOLLO APPLICATIONS PROGRAM First, I believe it is wise to reaffirm one of the important Apollo Applicatlo program elements-the continued availability of the Saturn launch vehicles f space activities beyond the initial production in support of the Apollo mainli activity. The fiscal year 1968 Apollo Applications program plan calls for continu tion of both the Saturn V and the uprated Saturn at an average launch rate four per year. There are no reasons at this time to change this plan; the ra of delivery is scaled to the most economical level we have identified, and termin tion of either or both production capabilities would leave this Nation without major spacebooster at a time when the rest of the technologically powerful cou tries of the world are showing evidence of increasing their strength in this fiel Second, I believe that the fundamental concept of the Apollo Application pr gram-to capitalize upon a developed capability rather than start a whole ne developmental effort for an incremental Improvement in performance, is soun Through the Apollo Appliciations program we will identify the goals and rewar that the space environment can offer-at what cost and for what returns. The impact of the Apollo 204 accident on the orbital workshop and the Apoll solar telescope experiments leads to a slightly different organization of progra elements than that projected at the time of the fiscal year 1968 budget. One result of the accident has been the decision to include in Apollo eart orbital flights only those experiments relating directly to the eventual luna mission. This leaves a number of scientific and technological experiments whic have been approved and are under development without a spacecraft assignment Another result has been the need to reconsider the use of the Apollo prim spacecraft contractor for experiment integration and spacecraft modiflcatio required by the individual Apollo Applications program missions; in order t avoid diversions from 1~he mainline task, the spacecraft contractor will concen- trate on the task of providing reliable standard 1unar~configured spacecraft. A third result has been the requirement to retain, for possible mainline Apollo alternate or backup flights, the uprated Saturn I launch vehicles that, under earlier plans, might have become excess to mainline needs at an earlier date, thereby permitting their allocation to the Apollo Applications program. It is presently planned to select an entirely separate industrial organization to support the Apollo Applications program effort. This new industry team com- petitively selected, would be responsible for the integration of Apollo Applica- tions program experiments with the standard Apollo spacecraft, including the necessary engineering, design, development, and test effort for Apollo Applica- tions program required modifications. The mission planning for the Apollo Applications program Is basically sound and does not change under the circumstances of the 204 accident. The basic concept of orbital storage and reuse of manned space systems remains at the heart of the earth orbit program, continuing scientific and applications missions with the development of long-duration (up to 1 year) mission capability. For lunar operations, the plan is to increase stay time on the lunar surface through the landing of unmanned supply and shelter systems. The investigation of the utility of manned systems in synchronous orbit is still attractive, especially for astronomical and meterological observations. Detailed mission planning for early Apollo Applications program missions must be based on certain assumptions. I wish to make these assumptions very clear so that the relationship of the Apollo Applications program to the mainline Apollo is not ambiguous. In 1968 and 1969 the Source of flight hardware for Apollo Applications pro- gram is the Apollo program; flight availability of systems funded under the Apollo Applications program does not begin until 1969 for the uprated Saturn I and 1970 for the spacecraft and Saturn V. Depending upon the progress of Apollo, some flight hardware may become available to the Apollo Applications program effort under differing circumstances. For example, early Apollo success in moving from the uprated Saturn I to the Saturn V would release uprated Saturn I vehicles for Apollo Applications program missions in 1968 and 1969. At the same time, a lower rate of Apollo utilization of spacecraft after completion of the command-service module/lunar module opera;tions phase could release standard lunar mission spacecraft for alternate missions in earth orbit. It is not possible to predict with accuracy today which of the many program alterna- tives is the most likely, but it is clear that appropriate Apollo Applications program payloads should continue to be developed to take advantage of either the success expected in Apollo or the difficulties that may be encountered. PAGENO="1427" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION 1423 `In the event that spacecraft availability alone becomes a pacing item for the Apollo Applications program because of Apollo priorities, `it is possible to reuse previous flown spacecraft. Studies have been completed on the feasibility of this approach and appear encouraging. It is planned to turn over one or two of the first Apollo `earth orbital Command Modules to the Apollo Applications program organization for experimental refurbishing, after they have completed their assigned missions. Phis work could be undertaken by the Apollo Applica- tions program industrial team charged with experiment integration; it' is not now planned to add such a task to the workload of the basic spacecraft produc- tion organization. Refurbished spacecraft, then, could be available in 1969 to ~upport Apollo Applications program flights without interference and in parallel with Apollo missions. The following specific tasks will be implemented and/or furnished by the spacecraft modification contractor: 1. Furnish the required engineering, development, and test effort to produce a final detailed hardware design for the Command-Service Module modification-S. 2. Fabricate, assemble, test, and install the modifications in the Command- Service Modules (new or refurbished) in kit form or by other appropriate methods. 3. Perform the necessary engineering analysis to determine the extent of renovation necessary to accomplish the refurbishment of previous flown com- mand modules and refurbish two previous flown Apollo Command Modules. 4. Perform tests to assure that the refurbished and modified command module and the modified service module are fully integrated, operational and ready for assembly into a flight article. The revised mission plan includes a new single launch, uprated Saturn I manned mission in the last half of calendar year 1968. Assuming that the Apollo program is successful In transferring its flight activity to the Saturn V vehicle in mid-1968, then a single launch mission employing an uprated Saturn I vehicle and a Block II Command-Service Module identified as AAP-IA could be avail- able for flight in the fall of 1968. This mission would have the primary objective of conducting science and technology experiments which have been removed from the Apollo program. As I have stated, current plans for Apollo earth orbital missions call for concentra- tion solely on qualification of Apollo-Saturn space vehicle systems and flight operations to provide the earliest possible availability of the lunar mission con- figuration. As many as possible of the experiments already under development for flight in Apollo would be integrated with the AAP-IA Command and Service Module at the Kennedy Space Center. The mission would be of a nominal 14-day dura- tion at an altitude of approximately 125 nautical milesand an orbital inclination of between 28'/2° and 500, as may be required by the experiments. Included in the experiments for AAP-IA would be the earth orbital test of the lunar mapping and survey system, which can form the basic experiment carrier for integrating other experiments. In this way, it appears possible to minimize the work required on the Command and Service Module after it is delivered to Kennedy Space Center in the standard Block II lunar configuration. The Workshop mission, utilizing two uprated Saturn I launches, would be the second mission in the revised Apollo Applications program plan and would `be flown approximately 6 months later than provided for in the current plan. Current assessments of the launch dates for the Orbital Workshop 28-day mission and the Apollo Telescope Mount 56-day mission indicate approximately 6 months delay from the previously planned 1968 launch dates for those missions. The earliest possible availability of Apollo Command and Service Modules for use on these two Apollo Applications program missions now appears to support an early 1969 launch of the Orbital Workshop and a mid-1969 launch of the Apollo Telescope Mount. There will be a mission flown between the Workshop and Apollo Telescope Mount mission which would be a single uprated Saturn I launch of a refuthished command module to be used for resupply and reuse of the Workshop. Following the Apollo Telescope Mount mission, a second refur- bished command module would be launched to resupply and further extend use of the Workshop-Apollo Telescope Mount cluster. Earth orbit missions in 1970 and 1971 would be essentially unchanged from the previously approved plan with Apollo Applications experiments being major payloads to be carried and utilized in conjunction with the Workshop. Alternate plans provide for launch of a second Workshop and Apollo Telescope Mount in 1970. PAGENO="1428" 1424 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION In the case of Saturn V, missions previously designated as alternate. Apollo- Apollo Applications program missions would revert to basic Apollo lunar landing missions. Under the new plan, we would carry out in early 1970 on a later vehicle the same lunar orbit mission previously planned for late 1969. The synchronous orbit Workshop mission and the dual Saturn V extended lunar exploration mission would remain on the same schedule as in the previously approved plan. After careful review of the alternatives available for rescheduling Apollo launches to meet the planned mission objectives, we have planned Apollo Appli- cations schedules for delivery and launch of the uprated Saturn V vehicles, the command and service modules, and the 1u~ar modulesi. The schedules reflect the capabilities of the stage and spacecraft contractors and the launch schedules will establish and maintain the momentum required to achieve both the Apollo objective of a manned lunar landing in this decade and the Apollo Applications program objectives of increasingly long duration flights in earth orbit; significant science and applications experiments; and extensions of our Apollo lunar explora- tion beginning in the early 1970's. FISCAL YEAR 1968 BUDGET-APoLLO APPLICATIONS The Apollo Applications budget plan for fiscal year 1968 (fig. 1) has also been reviewed in the light of schedule and program changes. The major in- crease results from the plan to refurbish and reuse command modules previously flown on Apollo missions and to procure and modify additional service mod- ules to mate with the refurbished command modules. This effort is expected to cost over $55 million to initiate in fiscal year 1968. A corresponding decrease, however, will be applied to the funds earlier planned for follow-on spacecraft procurement, mission-peculiar modification, and experiments. The command and service module procurement budget will decrease $18 mil- lion. There will be an estimated decrease of $33 millIon for spacecraft modifi- cations and about $4 million for experiments. These decreases result from the rescheduling of experiments between Apollo and Apollo Applications as discussed earlier. The net effect of these changed requirements on the fiscal year 1968 budget request are shown on the following charts. MANNED SPACE FLIGHT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT APOLLO APPLICATIONS FY 1968 BUDGET ESTIMATES [MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) FY66 FY61 FY68 SPACE VEHICLES EXPERIMENTS . MISSION SUPPORT $ 8.5 40.3 2.4 $ 38.6 35.6 5.8 267.7 $-263f 136.7 44O~7- 50.3 TOTAL $ 51~2 $ 80.0 $ 454.7 NASA HQ MPR67-5725 2-2-67 FIGURE 1 PAGENO="1429" 1968 NASA AUTHORIZATION MANNED SPACE FLIGHT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT APOLLO APPLICATIONS FY 1968 BUDGET ESTIMATES MILLIONS OF DOLLARS 1425 FY66 FY61 FY68 SPACE VEHICLES CSM PROCUREMENT $8.5 -0- -0- $263.1~~ -4!~~ UPRATED SATURN I PROCUREMENT 1.0 24.0 SATURN V PROCUREMENT -0- -0- 45.6 iias * SPACECRAFT MODIFICATION 7.5 14.6 -94~3- LAUNCH VEHICLE MODIFICATION -0- -0- 5.0 NASA HQ MP67-57~ -15-67 FIGURE 2 MANNED SPACE FLIGHT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT APOLLO APPLICATIONS FY 1968 BUDGET ESTIMATES MILLIONS OF DOLLARS I FY68 FY66- L FY61 1*7 EXPERIMENTS $40.3 $35.6 DEFINITION 34.4 12.0 33.7 * DEVELOPMENT , 5.9 23.6 103.0 4O'~+ ~SSION SUPP0R]~ 1?± ~L PAYLOAD INTEGRATION .1 4.4 40.0 OPERATIONS 2.3 1.4 10.3 FIGURE 3 NASA HQ MP67-5708 1-15-67 0 PAGENO="1430"