

in the event that interruptions to civil rail service are impending or should occur as the result of unresolved differences between railroad management and railroad labor."

It should be fully understood that the Air Force must be assured of timely and positive operation of this weapon system under all circumstances other than those attributable to acts of God.

In the event that your organization might wish further information with respect to our Minuteman missile program, we would be happy to arrange such a presentation at the appropriate time.

Your response to the above proposal is requested so that the Air Force may proceed in its assessment of the feasibility of utilizing the Nation's railroads as an integral part of a weapon system.

That was Colonel Hedlund's letter. Mr. Loomis replied on November 4, 1959, confirming the assurance requested, on behalf of the board of directors of the AAR, for the member railroads of the AAR, which represents 95 percent of railroad mileage.

I replied on November 10, 1959, after obtaining the unanimous approval of all members of the RLEA, confirming the assurance on our part. I pointed out also in my letter to Colonel Hedlund that:

Mr. Loomis had stated on behalf of railroad managements that if the assurances you sought from railway labor were given, the managements would not, in the event of a strike, use service to the Government as a means of impairing the effectiveness of a strike; that if missile train operations and other services in connection therewith were required, employees who would normally perform such services would be used under joint management-union arrangements and the services thus made available to the Government would not be utilized by management in efforts to handle other traffic.

Mr. Chairman, I ask your consent that the text of this exchange of correspondence be printed in full in your hearing record at the close of my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be done.
(See pp. 231-233.)

Mr. LEIGHTY. Now, to keep moving 150 missile trains daily during a strike is by no means a minor operation. The missile trains, running 24 hours a day at an average 40 miles an hour, would accumulate 144,000 train-miles a day. Total freight train-miles of all class I railroads in the year 1965 averaged 1,145,000 a day.

The proposed missile train operation would require most of the basic underpinnings of railroad service—for example, signals, control towers, dispatching, communications, inspection and emergency repair of ways and structures, servicing of locomotives and cars, and inspection and emergency repair of locomotives and cars.

This was the undertaking that railway labor and railway management gave to the Pentagon as to the proposed missile trains in event of a strike. There were at that time no protests or claims of "It can't be done."

I might add one word about the missile train project: If I recall the newspaper accounts correctly, the Pentagon later shifted its interest to Polaris submarines rather than missile trains as mobile launching platforms for long-distance missiles. However, that does not lessen the significance of our 1959 agreement.

I would like to recall an old saying: If you wish peace, prepare for war. The analogy in this present dispute might be phrased: If you wish a settlement, prepare for a strike. I subscribe fully to what Mr.