Collective bargaining is the only way to satisfactorily dispose of any issue in controversy. Through that process each party to the agreement has some responsibility in implementing the mutual product.

Before I leave the subject of the court opinion, I want to comment on the newspaper coverage of the case. The Washington Post and one of the wire services reported the case as being a new threat to railroad labor peace and even raised strike possibilities.

Now I know this is standard new coverage procedure, but I protest that it inflames the present situation unfairly. We are not about to set up picket lines. We are trying our best to get Mr. Wolfe away from Congress and to the bargaining table, if such is possible.

Therefore, I want you to know that I am disturbed that news accounts of the recent court ruling would have a poor effect on your deliberations. I hope such is not the case.

V. CONCLUSIONS

A. Compulsory arbitration is never really "one-shot" or temporary

After having to live with compulsory arbitration for 3 years—and it seems more like 30 years—I feel I am entitled to say, respectfully, that I told you so.

In 1963, the Commerce committees of both the Senate and House were considering the administration's proposal for one-shot, temporary compulsory arbitration. I testified before both committees and I want to repeat here a very brief statement I made at that time. This was my statement:

> I suspect that those who support this resolution know that it provides for compulsory arbitration, but they believe it to be just a little bit of compulsory arbitration. But even a little bit will be the hole in the dike. Introduction of compulsory arbitration, so history shows, portends the end of that kind of collective bargaining which government, industry and labor ought to promote—that kind of bargaining which has become associated with and a part of our system of free enterprise.
>
> It marks the beginning of a process wherein one or both parties shuns responsibility and passes the buck to the arbitration tribunal to indicate the terms of the contract. That process, in my opinion, will be pursued in future contract negotiations, if the resolution passes, and Congress again will be confronted with identical problems.

The resolution passed in 1963. In the short span of 4 years, two more critical transportation labor disputes have been brought before Congress, including the present one. It bears out what I said, and what many Members of Congress said would happen.

I am not going to belabor this point, because I know the Congress is fully aware of the pitfalls of becoming a stop along the way in labor relations struggles. Also, it is clear that the railroad industry—which has been here twice in 4 years—is boldly using Congress as a weapon to throttle railroad employees.

Without fear of contradiction, I can say that railroad management will be back before you four, five, six, even 10 times, with labor relations problems until it achieves its professed goal—final and binding arbitration in the Railway Labor Act.

The industry should be told now—in 1967—that Congress will not be part of railroad management's no-bargaining process; that Congress will deal harshly with those who try to use the legislative force