for their own self-interest; and, that Congress will force collective bargaining, but will not force settlements.

B. Pitfalls of compulsory arbitration

We have seen conclusively that there is no such thing as one-shot temporary compulsory arbitration. Its effect is not only sweeping but lasting, and the record shows the railroad industry keeps coming back for more.

Before closing, I would like to list for the record some of the more obvious pitfalls of compulsory arbitration.

1. Rather than promote collective bargaining, compulsory arbitration destroys the climate or atmosphere conducive to meaningful negotiations. Indeed, just the consideration of compulsory arbitration by Congress precludes collective bargaining. It is used as an excuse not to bargain.

2. Compulsory arbitration—bad in itself—can be used or misused to mistreat, harass, and bait employees, and force them out of the industry; all under the guise that the compulsory ruling permits such inhuman and inhumane activities.

3. A "little bit" of compulsory arbitration breeds more. It also does nothing to solve the problem that first set it off. The fireman dispute is an example. After 4 years, the issue is as alive and the dispute as bitter as it was before the temporary settlement was forced by law.

4. In the long-range effect, compulsory arbitration in one industry is easily transferred or widened to include other industries, which are given an "emergency" tag by the public press. Notably, newspaper publishers think compulsory arbitration should prevent strikes in their industry, but Congress has yet to agree.

5. A series of "one-shot" compulsory arbitration resolutions would soon end with final and binding arbitration as part of the labor laws. As in countries that have such laws now, we find workers striking against government, not industry. We do not want our Nation's workers to be placed in the category of criminals if they defend their jobs.

6. Lastly, compulsory arbitration in any industry will eventually cause nationalization of that industry. I cannot believe that the Congress would force a segment of workers to labor at a forced wage scale, under forced working conditions and then let the industry profit and operate as a free enterprise.

While I believe in the right to strike and it should be preserved, if that is to be denied however, as we did in 1963, we have asked Congress to take a hands-off attitude in the manning dispute and serve as a watchdog over the negotiations we hoped would be forthcoming. As you know that did not happen, but I would recommend the same general idea here today.

When a labor relations issue gets to Congress, the role of Congress is circumscribed to forcing a settlement. Although third-party recommendations are employed, it boils down to Congress setting up a compulsory arbitration board, and then putting the force of law behind the board's decisions. That is compulsory arbitration, pure and simple.

Instead of forcing a settlement, why not force collective bargaining? That may sound strange, but I seriously propose that Congress create, by force, an atmosphere for collective bargaining and mediation.