house and you know and I know that the courts decided the case and we are still in court over it.

The crew consist dispute gives a real example of what happens to collective bargaining under compulsory arbitration and what can happen again if Congress intervenes, because you fear there might be an emergency.

I don't think that Congress understood the last portion of that when they passed the law in 1963. That national crisis was not caused by the unions promulgating their rules. The national crisis was caused by the railroads promulgating their rules and trying to take working conditions away from men that they had had for 30 and 40 years.

As a good example of it, one of the rules was that they would have the sole right to establish where the terminals would be. People had built their homes, helped build the communities, were uprooted overnight and out in the cornfields, or somewhere else.

By doing that, they served notice that at a certain time they would put their rules into effect and it wasn't going to be caused by anything that the unions did; it was something that management was doing.

It can also show you what the railroads are up to. Under Public Law 88–108, Congress intended the parties to continue negotiations. Everybody understood that. I will say this: that Mr. Wolfe testified to that, the chief negotiator for the carriers. Secretary of Labor Wirtz clearly understood the intent of that law.

I refer you to quotes from the record as shown in my prepared statement on pages 4 through 7. But what actually happened during the 2-year period under the law when we tried to negotiate?

I encouraged our representatives to seek out their management and try for a fair and reasonable settlement. Some few of them were able to do so. Ninety-three neutrals were appointed by the Mediation Board during the 2-year period of the law to serve on special boards. Their decision in almost every case rubberstamped the company's proposal.

In January 1965 I took a personal hand in the dispute. I contacted top management officers in the East and told them we could negotiate an agreement. We sat down and wrote an agreement on January 29, 1965. This agreement settled the crew controversy in the East, including such railroads as the New York Central and the Pennsylvania. Others later joined, including the B. & O., until the total had reached 32 railroads. This settlement was for a 5-year period, with changes thereafter to be under the Railway Labor Act.

I next wrote the railroad presidents of the West and Southwest, giving them a copy of the eastern agreement and asking for a similar meeting. I was hopeful we had found the solution to the crew consist problem. Replies told me otherwise. They all referred me to their personnel department or said that the National Labor Conference would handle it. Some of those who had settled reopened the dispute.

I would like to tell you what happened there. In the East I met with Mr. Saunders, president of the Pennsylvania. I met with Mr. Perlman, or his representative, of the New York Central. I met with the late Bill White, president of the Erie & Lackawanna.

They told me that they understood what Public Law 88–108 intended to be and they were willing to sit down and work out an agreement. We worked out this agreement in less than 3 hours. We signed