

security demands not only the transportation of finished defense products but also the movement of the many raw materials and supplies essential to the continued operation of plants engaged in the production of vital arms and equipment. Many of these materials are in no way identifiable as defense items nor does it appear remotely practicable to separate, for special transport, such part of these supplies as will insure the uninterrupted manufacture of the items on which our national security is dependent.

"The situation is totally dissimilar from that which permits arrangements with striking longshoremen to load defense cargo for direct transportation to the point of use.

"In our complex economy, the interdependency of one supplier on another is such that it is impossible to predict in advance where and how a rail strike will interfere with needed defense production. All that we can predict is that a rail strike would cause critical and irremediable shortages for essential defense production and that to identify and provide special treatment for the myriad of raw materials and supplies necessary to avoid such shortages would be a hopeless task.

"As I have already indicated, most of our suppliers have a mixture of defense and commercial business. If a rail strike cuts off the flow into their plants of those materials and components which are necessary for commercial production, these suppliers would find it economically infeasible to continue production essential to defense.

"We could not reasonably expect a steel plant to continue to operate on only that small part of its output destined for defense needs. We could not realistically expect a firm making parts for both military and civilian vehicles to produce only those parts destined for defense needs.

"Moreover, if the unions were to agree to move all materials and supplies into any plant engaged even in a limited way in defense work, commercial competitors of such a firm could suffer a permanent loss of market position as their customers turn to those plants still operating as a result of their defense activity.

"Enormous problems would be inherent in establishing a system of administration to identify and to separate from the nonessential all material and products necessary in any manner to uninterrupted defense production.

"Who can determine how much of what trainful of coal is needed by an industrial plant to operate its production line for military but not for commercial civilian needs?

"Even if all fuel supplies were to be moved to all plants, what happens to a trainful of bauxite for aluminum production, or iron ore, or unrefined copper, or the hundreds of other raw materials necessary to the production of processed materials used for all kinds of defense and commercial production?

"What do we do about the many manufactured materials which are not clearly identifiable as defense-related, but which are nonetheless necessary for defense production; in other words, items common to both defense and commercial production?

"Any attempt to solve this problem of identification would require the establishment of a large administrative organization—with no reasonable assurance that it would be successful in its task.