

Now, I do appreciate the assurances that you are giving us again that you are firm and you have indicated in your statement that you are firm on your estimates for 1968. You do not think that they are going to increase very much. I want to ask you if you still feel that way in view of the statistics disclosed in the Economic Indicators, which are as follows: In February of 1966 the Department of Defense military \$4.2 billion; March, \$5.2 billion, that was last year.

Now, this year they have accelerated from \$4.2 billion in February to \$5.5 billion this year and in March to \$6.6 billion this year. This is between a 25- and 30-percent increase.

Now, perhaps this is just about what you would expect, but I want to make sure it is, and I want to know if the April expenditures are running at about the same level because, if there is anything at all in the picture which would cause you to modify or caution us on the possibility of an increase—a very well informed Senator said this yesterday, that he had good information that some 100,000 additional troops may go to Vietnam, and we do not want anything that is classified, of course, in this room, but we do want to have the best estimates you can possibly give us, because we do have a responsibility for advising the Congress on economic policy, and we cannot do it unless we get your information as firm as possible.

Mr. ANTHONY. Let me first go back to the early part of your comment and then discuss our current situation as I see it.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Right.

Mr. ANTHONY. I think Secretary McNamara made great efforts to explain to the Congress, beginning when he presented the budget in January or February 1966, the assumption on which it was based—the fact that should the situation change, then additional requirements would have to be submitted. Indeed, the statement he made several times—I think Senator Symington heard him make it—was something like “I don’t know whether this budget is too high or too low, but I know it is not exactly right.” He was trying to express at that time the uncertainties that existed.

Chairman PROXMIRE. When did he say he did not know it was too high or too low, roughly?

Mr. ANTHONY. Did he not say that before your committee some time either in January or February, Senator Symington?

Chairman PROXMIRE. He said he thought it was too low——

Mr. ANTHONY. Yes, quite possibly.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Too high, rather.

Mr. ANTHONY. Certainly. It could have been too high. By hindsight we are now looking at a situation in which the conflict did, in fact, continue. This is 13 or 14 months after we were talking. It was conceivable that the conflict would have ceased.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Well, even if the conflict ceased May 1, even if it ceases before the June 30 deadline, you still have a terrific underestimate. It is almost a joke that you missed by 100 percent, and this is not a department that has not been meticulous about its estimates and about its figures. You have a fine and hard-earned reputation for it. That is the thing that is very, very hard for me to understand—how a department headed by Secretary McNamara, who is so very careful to do his best to get information as precise as possible, missed by such