

Chairman PROXMIRE. You are not giving the Vietnam personnel. You are giving the overall military.

Mr. ANTHONY. Which is a better way of measuring the budgetary impact, you see; it is better to look at the full picture. The difference between 734,000 and 811,000 is a measure of the increase expected in 1968.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Let me ask you, out of the sum of this—and I am not asking you to disclose anything—but supposing 50,000 of these additional men were in Vietnam. What effect would that have on the budget?

Mr. ANTHONY. I do not want to comment, I think, on any possible specific plans for Vietnam.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I am not asking that. I am asking you to tell me what effect it has if instead of having an additional man in the armed services here in this country he is in Vietnam. Does it make a substantial difference or not?

Mr. ANTHONY. Yes, it makes a difference. The cost of a man is between double and triple if he is in Vietnam rather than in this country.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Then on that basis, can you tell us how much your estimate would be changed if (a) there were 50,000 more troops in Vietnam and (b) there were 100,000 more troops, not asking you to disclose what the plans are and obviously you should not and you will not.

Mr. ANTHONY. I could not.

I cannot make an estimate on just that one factor. I would be glad to supply something for the record.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Do you want to supply it for the record?

Mr. ANTHONY. Yes.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Good, I would appreciate that. You cannot tell us or give us a general idea whether this is \$1 billion, \$2 billion, or \$3 billion, something of that kind, or whether it is much less than that.

Mr. ANTHONY. I would rather do a little calculating on that if I may, Mr. Chairman.

(The material referred to was subsequently submitted and follows:)

In fiscal year 1967 the incremental cost of Southeast Asia operations was about \$20 billion, and the average number of personnel deployed in that year was about 400,000. A division of one of the numbers into the other gives a quotient of \$50,000. The multiplication of \$50,000 by 50,000 gives \$2.5 billion, and by 100,000 gives \$5 billion. However, these results are not satisfactory estimates of the cost of any specific deployment plan. In order to make such an estimate, one must know a great deal about the specific proposal—the mix of troops, aircraft, and ships, and the planned activity levels.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Last Friday, two distinguished economists discussed the Vietnam impact here in Washington at a meeting at the Shoreham Hotel. Professor Smithies, whom you know, said that our strategy in Vietnam is not the same as it was during World War II and the Korean conflict. At the same meeting Professor Musgrave said the Defense Department should not announce planned defense expenditures for national security reasons.