

unfunded Vietnam expenditures. I did that in keeping with my concept of my duties as a constitutional officer, I was acting chairman of this subcommittee, and we were at war. I know it and also knew there wasn't any money in the bill for the war at the escalated scale. It was going to be financed under the transfer authority.

While Secretary McNamara did not see fit to do this, in August 1965, he did submit a request for an add-on of \$1.7 billion to the fiscal year 1966 request. While this was approved, it was still far from being adequate. I pointed out in presenting the appropriation bill to the Senate on August 24, 1965, that the amount provided definitely would not finance the war during the then current fiscal year.

At about that time, that is, in August 1965, I publicly estimated that in January 1966, we would be faced with a supplementary defense appropriation request of from \$12 to \$14 billion. That was purely an estimate, but I thought my colleagues in the Congress and the public as well were entitled to my best judgment.

The supplementary defense appropriation request for fiscal year 1966 presented to us in January 1966, was for \$12.7 billion. It was, of course, approved. Thus, the basic defense budget of \$48.5 billion which the Congress considered in the spring and summer of 1965 ballooned to \$63.3 billion in early 1966—including about \$900 million to fund the pay raise—because of the tremendous increase in military operations and costs. Even with the supplemental, the amounts provided the Army were not entirely adequate. By May of 1966 the Army had estimated an additional requirement of over \$900 million to carry on its operations for fiscal year 1966. As a result of all of this, the overall fiscal and economic planning for fiscal year 1966, including estimates of the size of the deficit, was thrown completely out of balance.

In fairness it should be pointed out clearly that the large buildup of military operations during calendar year 1965 necessarily threw the original estimates out of balance to a considerable degree. The point which I made while handling the fiscal year 1966 defense appropriation bill was that there was no effort whatsoever to give the Congress a realistic or practical estimate of the additional funds which would be required to finance the war. The \$1.7 billion finally requested in August 1965 was obviously entirely insufficient and was known to be at the time.

The same cycle evidenced itself for fiscal year 1967. The basic military budget presented was about \$59.9 billion in new obligation authority—some \$3.5 billion less than the total for fiscal year 1966, despite the fact that our military operations had escalated and it was entirely clear that the cost of the war had gone up very substantially. It was also \$12.9 billion less than the services had requested. It was again clear that this was entirely inadequate. Fiscal planning at that time, as the Secretary of Defense frankly stated, was based on the arbitrary assumption that the war would end by July 1, 1967. This proved to be unrealistic.

The tragedy here was that we were required to legislate and appropriate in this vacuum of facts. Even if the facts couldn't be told to the public, I think it was a downgrading of the legislative branch of the Government to keep us in the dark in that manner.

Although repeated questioning in executive session failed to bring from Defense officials even a ball park estimate of the rate of spending for the war or what the fiscal year 1967 supplemental request