would be, I estimated in a statement on the floor of the Senate that it

would be from \$12 to \$15 billion.

In January of this year the after-the-fact funding bill came in. The supplemental request was \$12.9 billion, raising the total of the new obligational authority for fiscal year 1967 to \$72.8 billion. The defense expenditures estimate for fiscal year 1967 was raised to \$67.9 billion, about \$9.6 billion over the original budget estimate. Once again, therefore, the funding of the war on a piecemeal basis threw the original budget, and, therefore, overall economic planning, en-

tirely out of kilter.

I don't have any particular connections with the business world, but I did learn from them, after the fact, something about how much it meant to them to have some guidance and some information upon which they could base their production planning and adjustment in supplies. These things can't be done accurately. There is a slippage there that is inevitable. There are changes in circumstances and facts, but I think we owe it to the legislative branch of the Government and to the economy as a whole to do the very best we can. I am sure that you gentlemen agree.

Congress has the primary responsibility under the Constitution for the appropriation of funds. In doing this we are entitled to all of the facts and the very best financial estimates that can be made by those in the executive branch of the Government, who are closest to the problem. Otherwise, we are not able to fulfill our obligations, and it seems to me that the way this matter was handled in calendar year 1965 and calendar year 1966 forced the legislative branch of Govern-

ment to what was, in effect, a neglect of duty.

In addition, as I have said, I think that the business, financial, and labor segments of our economy are entitled to know, as far as security permits, the "facts of life" with reference to our fiscal affairs so that they may better plan for their own future and thus keep our

economy strong.

These were the basic principles of government which were my motivation in insisting on realistic figures during these 2 years. Another basic fact is that, because of the lack of information, and being "in the dark," so to speak, as to even the approximate cost of the war, the Congress passed defense appropriations bills during these 2 years in amounts which fell far short of the actual costs. As a result, the entire national budget was understated, thus making it more probable that other appropriations for new or expanded programs would be approved during the rush at the end of the session. That is a major fact of life. Despite the exclusive congressional responsibility as to appropriation bills, we did not have the facts before us; even those handling the defense bills didn't have the real facts that would afford sufficient guidance.

As the Secretary of Defense has stated, the basic approach in preparing the fiscal year 1968 defense budget was changed, and I commend this very highly. It theoretically funds the war in Southeast Asia for the entire year but at the levels of troop deployments and military operations which had been approved and authorized at the time the budget was put together and finalized. This is in happy contrast to the year before when the budget was based on the assumption that the war was going to be over by June 30, 1967. That was a laudable change. I quote now from the Secretary of Defense who said

this year: