they are in this "revolutionary development cadre program"-still

with very modest success only.

It it your thought from your experience in this area, and you have long experience in this area, that ultimately there is going to have to be a shift in emphasis, an escalation of the manpower in the pacification program? Is this your view, if we are going to succeed on the nonmilitary side of the war, so that the military side of the war will have been worthwhile?

Senator Stennis. Well, in the first place, I wholly agree with you that this whole thing could be lost if we win, so to speak, militarily, and then just pull out of there and leave. In 3 to 6 months, I think, they would be cut to pieces again. So I think we are going to have to stay, not for desire of territory or anything but for protection to

them.

No. 2, about the pacification program, that certainly is a problem, and it has got to be welded together in some manner. I don't know just how much a westerner can teach an Asiatic in an Asiatic country about self-government, or how fast this can be done. They have their ideas about those things and we have ours. I am beginning to feel like there is a missed connection there in some way.

Representative Rumsfeld. It certainly looks like it from the situa-

tion thus far.

Senator Stennis. Yes. Perhaps the military uniform is not the way to do it. We have got to use it now under the circumstances. But I envision there that we will have to stay, and evolve an altogether different plan from what we are using now. That is the way I see it. You have been over there, I believe, and had a special look at this thing. I would be glad for you to comment for my edification.

Representative Rumsfeld. The conclusion I think you are reaching

and I am reaching is that regardless of when the Department of Defense may assume or speculate that the war might be over, that from that date on, even if the formal military part ended today, we would still have, if we weren't to lose what has been gained, a requirement for a substantial commitment, if we were to move through this socalled pacification program. This is your conclusion.

Senator Stennis. You are absolutely right, I think, and we ought to always make clear though that we are doing and are continuing to do that for their protection, and not for conquest, not for territory,

and not for any gain. I am sure you agree with that.

Representative Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. My time is up. I certainly

thank you for taking your time today.
Senator Stennis. I thank you very much. Chairman Proxmire. Congressman Brock?

Representative Brock. Senator, I have been very grateful for your testimony this morning. It has opened a lot of doors.

Senator Stennis. Thank you, Congressman.

Representative Brock. I will try not to take too much of your time. Senator Stennis. That is all right. I am glad to see you again.

Representative Brock. I have been fascinated in skimming through and just picking up the figures from your statement. I would like to recap them and see if we can come to some conclusion.

In 1966 the military requested \$7.9 billion more than the Secretary of Defense submitted to Congress. His original figure was \$48.5 bil-