

they say they don't have any particular plans to put into effect if there should be negotiations, but when the Ackley committee reports, it will recommend what we should do.

At that point we will have this information. Now we don't have it. It seemed to us that without waiting for the Ackley committee, that it would be possible for them to arrange almost overnight certain proposals that might be sensible for us to prepare to put into effect if we should get a cease-fire.

Mr. WEIDENBAUM. I must say, one, I am concerned about the lack of public availability of any contingency planning.

Secondly, I personally fail to see the reason for the tremendous amount of delay. As you know, I was the first executive secretary of the Ackley committee, the President's Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament, and of course I am aware of the difficulties involved in getting agreement among a wide variety of Federal agencies. But given the six points in the Presidential Economic Report on Post-Vietnam Planning, where the President very clearly, to my pleasant surprise outlines the six key kinds of actions which can be taken to offset the deflationary impact of peace in Vietnam, I think that the implementation of those six points is something that could be done quite quickly.

In my formal paper I presented the key alternative ways of achieving each of those six points, and it strikes me essentially that these are not problems that require a great deal of background research. Certainly, the tremendous amount of work that has been done on the economic impact of disarmament, the 1963, 1964—

Chairman PROXMIRE. The Arms Control Agency testified on that, Mr. Alexander, who is head of that particular part of it. He was before us yesterday.

Mr. WEIDENBAUM. Good, because I think the agency has contributed a great deal to our knowledge of the economic impacts of defense cut-backs, and we can draw on that material already, without awaiting the tedious review of policy details.

In my formal paper I have a table on page 67 where I array what I think are the major alternative specific kinds of actions that the administration can consider in each of the President's six categories.

I just do not understand why this is a matter for 6 months or more of study, because the key aspect of a post-Vietnam adjustment program is the timely, quick, prompt, implementation of actions.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Two of the points that he recommends might take some time and effort. He suggests, No. 4, to determine priorities for the longer range expansion of programs to meet the needs of the American people, both for new and existing programs.

Now conceivably that would take some consultation, not only with the Budget Bureau, but some of the other people who are involved to find out what their priorities were, and what would be feasible to put into effect promptly, and so forth.

Then the other one is to study and evaluate the future direction of Federal financial support to our States and local governments. This is something that might require some consultation with Governors and with other people around the country, as well as the resolution of the problem involved putting the Heller-Peckman proposal into effect, for instance.