

law. The transcript of the House Hearings in June 1966 suggests that the members of the House Armed Services Committee are not terribly interested in studying the cost and feasibility of meeting our military manpower requirements on a voluntary basis. The arguments against an all-volunteer force can be put in capsule form as follows:

1. It would be too costly.
2. It could not achieve the *requisite flexibility* in force strengths to insure the defense of the nation and to meet our international obligations.
3. It would have possibly undesirable social consequences such as a military class or an all-Negro army.

4. It is inconsistent with the American heritage of a citizen militia. The reader could undoubtedly supply other arguments against the adoption of a voluntary manpower procurement system. The last two criticisms listed above can, I believe, be more forcefully refuted by others—Congressman Thomas Curtiss and Professor Milton Friedman for example. I shall briefly examine the flexibility issue in Part VI below. In this section attention is directed to the cost of an all-volunteer force.

Under any procurement system, the demand for new recruits A_t is determined by the losses during the year L_t and planned changes in force strengths ($F_t - F_{t-1}$). If peacetime force strength objectives are stabilized, $F_t - F_{t-1}$ will be equal to zero. Hence demand A_t will depend only on losses L_t which, in turn, are determined by personnel turnover and the size of the active duty force. The losses due to personnel turnover can be estimated from a retention profile describing the proportion of men remaining in service N years after initial entry. The retention profile for a mixed force of conscripts and volunteers (33 per cent of whom were reluctant volunteers) was estimated from the experience of the late 1950's and is shown in the first two columns of Table 5. A perusal of Table 5 reveals that voluntary separations upon completion of the first term of three to four years account for the largest part of personnel turnover. Over the period FY 1957-64, the average first term reenlistment rate of voluntary enlistments was 25.6 per cent, while that of draftees was only 7.7 per cent. The retention profile of the mixed force implies an annual turnover rate of 18.9 per cent for enlisted men; this turnover rate climbs as the fraction of two-year draftees increases.

If all initial accessions were true volunteers, the Armed Services would enjoy a substantially lower turnover rate. The first term reenlistment rate of Negroes is around 49 per cent as compared to a Regular Army reenlistment rate of only 22 per cent. The reason for this large difference is apparent. Negroes do not suffer from pay discrimination in the Armed Services. In the civilian economy, they earn substantially less than their white counterparts because of job and pay discrimination by civilian employers. Military service is a far more attractive alternative to the Negro who can meet the mental qualification standards. They are more likely to volunteer, and once in service, far more likely to reenlist. If all initial inputs were true volunteers (as indeed most Negro volunteers presently are), we could expect a similar climb in reenlistment rates especially if recruits do not suffer from the wage exploitation that they now do. I estimate that the first term reenlistment rate in an all-volunteer force would be 36.6 per cent as compared to an average of only 25.6 per cent in the preceding eight years. Hence, the retention profile of enlisted men should shift toward greater retention as indicated by the last two columns of Table 5. From the estimated retention profile applicable to a voluntary force, I estimated the required accessions for alternative force strengths. The required accessions for a mixed force were taken from the Marshall Commission report, p. 14.

Required accession to enlisted ranks in voluntary and mixed forces

Active duty force strength	Enlisted strength	Voluntary force	Mixed force ¹
2,500,000	2,175,000	314	452
2,650,000	2,310,000	334	500
3,000,000	2,658,000	384	609
3,300,000	2,937,000	426	732
3,500,000	3,115,000	452	812

¹ Figures for the 2,500,000, 3,000,000, and 3,500,000 strengths were taken from the Marshall Commission report, p. 14. The estimates for the strengths of 2,650,000 and 3,300,000 were interpolated.